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:  ■'  '    -:V,  RfBBH 


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V  * 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


HISTORY  OF 

MODERN   PHILOSOPHY 

From  Nicolas  of  Cusa  to  the  Present  Time 


BY 

EICHAED   FALCKENBERG 

Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Erlangen 


THIRD   AMERICAN  FROM  THE  SECOND    HERMAN   EDITION 


TRANSLATED   WITH   THE   AUTHOR'S   SANCTION  BY 

A.   C.   ARMSTRONG,   Jr. 

Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Wesleyan  University 


NEW  YORK 
HENRY   HOLT    AND  COMPANY 

1897 


Copyright,  1893 

BY 

HENRY  HOLT  &  CCX 


TRANSLATOR'S    PREFACE. 


The  aim  of  this  translation  is  the  same  as  that  of  the 
original  work.  Each  is  the  outcome  of  experience  in  uni- 
versity instruction  in  philosophy,  and  is  intended  to  furnish 
a  manual  which  shall  be  at  once  scientific  and  popular,  one 
to  stand  midway  between  the  exhaustive  expositions  of  the 
larger  histories  and  the  meager  sketches  of  the  compen- 
diums.  A  pupil  of  Kuno  Fischer,  Fortlage,  J.  E.  Erdmann, 
Lotze,  and  Eucken  among  others,  Professor  Falckenberg 
began  his  career  as  Docent  in  the  university  of  Jena.  In  the 
year  following  the  first  edition  of  this  work  he  became  Ex- 
traordinarius in  the  same  university,  and  in  1888  Ordinarius 
at  Erlangen,  choosing  the  latter  call  in  preference  to  an 
invitation  to  Dorpat  as  successor  to  Teichmüller.  The 
chair  at  Erlangen  he  still  holds.  His  work  as  teacher  and 
author  has  been  chiefly  in  the  history  of  modern  philosophy. 
Besides  the  present  work  and  numerous  minor  articles,  he 
has  published  the  following:  Ucbcr  den  intelligiblen  Char- 
akter, zur  Kritik  der  Kantischen  Freiheitslehre,  1879;  Grund- 
züge der  Philosophie  des  Nicolaus  Cusanus,  1880-81;  and 
lieber  die  gegenwärtige  Lage  der  deutschen  Philosophie,  1 890 
(inaugural  address  at  Erlangen),  Since  1884-5  Professor 
Falckenberg  has  also  been  an  editor  of  the  Zeitschrift  für 
Philosopläe  und  philosophische  Kritik,  until  1888  in  association 
with  Krohn,  and  after  the  hitter's  death,  alone.  At  present 
he  has  in  hand  a  treatise  on  Lotze  for  a  German  series  analo- 
gous to  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics,  which  is  to  be 
issued  under  his  direction.  Professor  Falckenberg's  general 
philosophical  position  may  be  described  as  that  of  moderate 
idealism.  His  historical  method  is  strictly  objective,  the  aim 
being  a  free  reproduction  of  the  systems  discussed,  as  far  as 
possible  in  their  original  terminology  and  historical  connec- 
tion, and  without  the  intrusion  of  personal  criticism. 

The  translation  has  been  made  from  the  second  German 

12        99 


iv  TRANSLATOR'S   PRE  FACE. 

edition  (1892),  with  still  later  additions  and  corrections  com- 
municated by  the  author  in  manuscript.  The  translator  has 
followed  the  original  faithfully  but  not  slavishly.  lie  has 
not  felt  free  to  modify  Professor  Falckenberg's  expositions, 
even  in  the  rare  cases  where  his  own  opinions  would  have 
led  him  to  dissent,  but  minor  changes  have  been  made  wher- 
ever needed  to  fit  the  book  for  the  use  of  English-speaking 
students.  Thus  a  few  alterations  have  been  made  in  dates 
and  titles,  chiefly  under  the  English  systems  and  from  the 
latest  authorities  ;  and  a  few  notes  added  in  elucidation  of 
portions  of  the  text.  Thus  again  the  balance  of  the  bibli- 
ography has  been  somewhat  changed,  including  transfers 
from  text  to  notes  and  vice  versa  and  a  few  omissions,  be- 
sides  the  introduction  of  a  number  of  titles  from  our  Eng- 
lish philosophical  literature  chosen  on  the  plan  referred  to 
in  the  preface  to  the  first  German  edition.  The  glossary  of 
terms  foreign  to  the  German  reader  has  been  replaced  by  a 
revision  and  expansion  of  the  index,  with  the  analyses  of  the 
glossary  as  a  basis.  Wherever  possible,  and  this  has  been 
true  in  all  important  cases,  the  changes  have  been  indicated 
by  the  usual  signs. 

The  translator  has  further  rewritten  Chapter  XV.,  Section 
3,  on  recent  British  and  American  Philosophy.  In  this  so 
much  of  the  author's  (historical)  standpoint  and  treatment 
as  proved  compatible  with  the  aim  of  a  manual  in  English 
has  been  retained,  but  the  section  as  a  whole  has  been  re- 
arranged and  much  enlarged. 

The  labor  of  translation  has  been  lightened  by  the  exam- 
ple of  previous  writers,  especially  of  the  translators  of  the 
standard  treatises  of  Ueberweg  and  Erdmann.  The  thanks 
of  the  translator  are  also  due  to  several  friends  who  have 
kindly  aided  him  by  advice  or  assistance  :  in  particular  to 
his  friend  and  former  pupil,  Mr.  C.  M.  Child,  M.S.,  who  par- 
ticipated in  the  preparation  of  a  portion  of  the  translation  ; 
and  above  all  to  Professor  Falckenberg  himself,  who,  by  his 
willing  sanction  of  the  work  and  his  co-operation  throughout 
its  progress,  has  given  a  striking  example  of  scholarly 
courtesy. 

A.  C.  A.,  Jr. 

Wesleyan   University,  June,   1893. 


PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   GERMAN 
EDITION. 


SINCE  the  appearance  of  Eduard  Zeller's  Grundriss  der 
Geschichte  der  griechischen  Philosophie  (1883  ;  3d  ed.  1889) 
the  need  has  become  even  more  apparent  than  before  for 
a  presentation  of  the  history  of  modern  philosophy  which 
should  be  correspondingly  compact  and  correspondingly 
available  for  purposes  of  instruction.  It  would  have  been 
an  ambitious  undertaking  to  attempt  to  supply  a  counter- 
part to  the  compendium  of  this  honored  scholar,  with  its 
clear  and  simple  summation  of  the  results  of  his  much 
admired  five  volumes  on  Greek  philosophy;  and  it  has  been 
only  in  regard  to  practical  utility  and  careful  consideration 
of  the  needs  of  students — concerning  which  we  have  en- 
joyed opportunity  for  gaining  accurate  information  in  the 
review  exercises  regularly  held  in  this  university — that  we 
have  ventured  to  hope  that  we  might  not  fall  too  far 
short  of  his  example. 

The  predominantly  practical  aim  of  this  History — it  is 
intended  to  serve  as  an  aid  in  introductory  work,  in  re- 
viewing, and  as  a  substitute  for  dictations  in  academical 
lectures,  as  well  as  to  be  a  guide  for  the  wider  circle  of 
cultivated  readers — has  enjoined  self-restraint  in  the  de- 
velopment of  personal  views  and  the  limitation  of  critical 
reflections  in  favor  of  objective  presentation.  It  is  only 
now  and  then  that  critical  hints  have  been  given.  In  the 
discussion  of  phenomena  of  minor  importance  it  has  been 
impossible  to  avoid  the  oratio  obliqna  of  exposition  ;  but, 
wherever  practicable,  we  have  let  the  philosophers  them- 
selves develop  their  doctrines  and  reasons,  not  so  much  by 


vi  TO    THE    FIRST   GERMAN  EDITION. 

literal  quotations  from  their  works,  as    by   free,  condensed 

reproductions  oi  their  leading  ideas.  If  the  principiant 
view  of  the  forces  which  control  the  history  of  philosophy, 
and  oi  the  progress  of  modern  philosophy,  expressed  in  the 
Introduction  and  in  the  Retrospect  at  the  end  of  the  book, 
have  not  been  everywhere  verified  in  detail  from  the  his- 
torical facts,  this  is  due  in  part  to  the  limits,  in  part  to  the 
pedagogical  aim,  of  the  work.  Thus,  in  particular,  more 
has  for  pedagogical  reasons  been  devoted  to  the 
"  psychological  "  explanation  of  systems,  as  being  more 
popular,  than  in  our  opinion  its  intrinsic  importance  would 
entitle  it  to  demand.  To  satisfy  every  one  in  the  choice 
of  subjects  and  in  the  extent  of  the  discussion  is  im- 
possible; but  our  hope  is  that  those  who  would  have  pre- 
ferred a  guide  of  this  sort  to  be  entirely  different  will  not 
prove  too  numerous.  In  the  classification  of  movements 
and  schools,  and  in  the  arrangement  of  the  contents  of  the 
various  systems,  it  has  not  been  our  aim  to  deviate  at  all 
hazards  from  previous  accounts  ;  and  as  little  to  leave  un- 
utilized the  benefits  accruing  to  later  comers  from  the  dis- 
tinguished achievements  of  earlier  workers  in  the  field.  In 
particular  we  acknowledge  with  gratitude  the  assistance 
derived  from  the  renewed  study  of  the  works  on  the  sub- 
ject by  Kuno  Fischer,  J.  E.  Erdmann,  Zeller,  Windelband, 
Ueberweg-Heinze,  Harms,  Lange,  Vorländer,  and  Pünjer. 

The  motive  which  induced  us  to  take  up  the  present  work 
was  the  perception  that  there  was  lacking  a  text-book  in  the 
history  of  modern  philosophy,  which,  more  comprehensive, 
thorough,  and  precise  than  the  sketches  of  Schwegler  and 
his  successors,  should  stand  between  the  fine  but  detailed 
exposition  of  Windelband,  and  the  substantial  but — because 
of  the  division  of  the  text  into  paragraphs  and  notes  and 
the  interpolation  of  pages  of  bibliographical  references — 
rather  dry  outline  of  Ueberweg.  While  the  former  refrains 
from  all  references  to  the  literature  of  the  subject  and  the 
latter  includes  far  too  many,  at  least  for  purposes  of  instruc- 
tion, and  J.  B.  Meyer's  Leitfaden  (1882)  is  in  general  confined 
to  biographical  and  bibliographical  notices  ;  we  have  men- 
tioned, in  the  text  or  the  notes  and  with  the  greatest  possi- 


PREFACE    TO    THE    FIRST   GERMAN  EDITION.  vn 

ble  regard  for  the  progress  of  the  exposition,  both  the  chief 
works  of  the  philosophers  themselves  and  some  of  the 
treatises  concerning  them.  The  principles  which  have 
guided  us  in  these  selections — to  include  only  the  more 
valuable  works  and  those  best  adapted  for  students'  read- 
ing, and  further  to  refer  as  far  as  possible  to  the  most 
recent  works — will  hardly  be  in  danger  of  criticism.  But 
we  shall  not  dispute  the  probability  that  many  a  book 
worthy  of  mention  may  have  been  overlooked. 

The  explanation  of  a  number  of  philosophical  terms, 
which  has  been  added  as  an  appendix  at  the  suggestion  of 
the  publishers,  deals  almost  entirely  with  foreign  expressions 
and  gives  the  preference  to  the  designations  of  fundamental 
movements.  It  is  arranged,  as  far  as  possible,  so  that  it 
may  be  used  as  a  subject-index. 

Jena,  December  23,  iSSj. 


PREFACE   TO   THE  SECOND   GERMAN 
EDITION. 


The  majority  of  the  alterations  and  additions  in  this 
new  edition  are  in  the  first  chapter  and  the  last  two ;  no  de- 
parture from  the  general  character  of  the  exposition  has 
seemed  to  me  necessary.  I  desire  to  return  my  sincere 
thanks  for  the  suggestions  which  have  come  to  me  alike 
from  public  critiques  and  private  communications.  In  some 
cases  contradictory  requests  have  conflicted — thus,  on  the 
one  hand,  I  have  been  urged  to  expand,  on  the  other,  to  cut 
down  the  sections  on  German  idealism,  especially  those  on 
Hegel — and  here  I  confess  my  inability  to  meet  both  de- 
mands. Among  the  reviews,  that  by  B.  Erdmann  in  the 
first  volume  of  the  Archiv  für  Geschichte  der  Philosophie, 
and,  among  the  suggestions  made  by  letter,  those  of  H. 
Heussler,  have  been  of  especial  value.  Since  others  com- 
monly see  defects  more  clearly  than  one's  self,  it  will  be  very 
welcome  if  I  can  have  my  desire  continually  to  make  this 
History  more  useful  supported  by  farther  suggestions  from 
the  circle  of  its  readers.  In  case  it  continues  to  enjoy  the 
favor  of  teachers  and  students,  these  will  receive  conscien- 
tious consideration. 

For  the  sake  of  those  who  may  complain  of  too  much 
matter,  I  may  remark  that  the  difficulty  can  easily  be 
avoided  by  passing  over  Chapters  I.,  V.  (§§  1-3),  VI.,  VIII., 
XII.,  XV.,  and  XVI. 

Professor  A.  C.  Armstrong,  Jr.,  is  preparing  an  English 
translation.  My  earnest  thanks  arc  due  to  Mr.  Karl  Nie- 
mann of  Charlottenburg  for  his  kind  participation  in  the  labor 
of  proof-reading.  R.  F. 

Erlangen,  June  11,  1892. 

ix 


\ 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

Introduction i 

CHAPTER   I. 

The  Period  of  Transition:  from   Nicolas  of  Cusa 
to  Descartes 18 

I.  Nicolas  of  Cusa    .........     19 

The  Revival  of  Ancient  Philosophy  and  the  Opposition 

to  it 26 

The  Italian  Philosophy  of  Nature       .         .         .         .         -33 

4.  Philosophy  of  the  State  and  of  Law 39 

5.  Skepticism  in  France  ........     48 

6.  German  Mysticism        .         .         .         .         .         .         .  51 

7.  The  Foundation  of  Modern  Physics   .         .         .         .         -56 

8.  Philosophy  in  England  to  the  Middle  of  the  Seventeenth 
Century  .........     63 

(a)   Bacon's  Predecessors  ......     63 

(ß)  Bacon 64 

(c)  Hobbes .         .         .71 

(d)  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury  .         .         .         .         -79 

9.  Preliminary  Survey      ........     80 


PART   I. 
jfrom  Bescartes  to  ftant. 

CHAPTER    II. 


Descartes  . 

1.  The  Principles 

2.  Nature 

3.  Man 


86 

88 
97 


XII 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    III. 

The  Devei  <  »pment  and  Transformation  of  Carte- 
sianism  in  the  netherlands  and  in 
France  

i.  ( )ccasionalism  :  Geulincx     ..... 

2.  Spiimza         ........ 

Substance,  Attributes,  and  Modes 

(b)  Anthropology;  Cognition  and  the  Passions 

(c)  Practical  Philosophy 

3.  Pascal,  Malebranche,  Bayle  .... 


108 

108 
116 
123 

'3i 

136 

143 


CHAPTER    IV. 


Locke 


(a)  Theory  of  Knowledge 

(b)  Practical  Philosophy   . 


153 

1 55 

176 


CHAPTER   V. 
English  Philosophy  in  the  Eighteenth  Century.  181  N 

1.  Natural  Philosophy  and  Psychology    .         .         .         .         .181 

2.  Deism .         .184 

3.  Moral  Philosophy  ........   195 

4.  Theory  of  Knowledge  .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .214 

(a)  Berkeley .214 

(b)  Hume  ..........  220 

(c)  The  Scottish  School 236 


\ 


CHAPTER    VI. 
The  French  '  Illumination 

1.  The  Entrance  of  English  Doctrines     . 

2.  Theoretical  and  Practical  Sensationalism 

3.  Skepticism  and  Materialism 

4.  Rousseau's  Conflict  with  the  Illumination 


.  241 

•  243 

•  245 

•  251 
.  260 


CHAPTER    VII. 
Leibnitz 266 

I.  Metaphysics:  the  Monads,  Representation,  the  Pre-estab- 
lished Harmony;  the  Laws  of  Thought  and  of  the 
World     . 269 


CONTENTS.  xiii 

PAGE 

2.  The  Organic  World      ........  280 

3.  Man  :  Cognition  and  Volition      ......  282 

4.  Theology  and  Theodicy       .......  287 

CHAPTER    VIII. 
The  German  Illumination 293 

1.  The  Contemporaries  of  Leibnitz  .....  293 

2.  Christian  Wolff    .........  296 

3.  The  Illumination  as  Scientific  and  as  Popular  Philosophy  301 

4.  The  Faith  Philosophy 30 


PART   II. 


jfcom  Ikant  to  tbc  present  ZHme* 


CHAPTER    IX. 
Kant 315 

1.  Theory  of  Knowledge  .         .         .         .         .         .         .341 

(a)  The  Pure  Intuitions  (Transcendental  yEsthetic)         .  341 

(b)  The  Concepts  and    Principles  of  the   Pure   Under- 
standing (Transcendental  Analytic)        ....  354 

{c)  The    Reason's    Ideas  of   the    Unconditioned    (Tran- 
scendental Dialectic)       .         .         .         .         .         .         .371 

2.  Theory  of  Ethics  ........  383 

3.  Theory  of  the  Beautiful  and  of  Ends  in  Nature  .         .         .  400 

(a)  /Esthetic  Judgment     .         .         .         .         .         .         .401 

(b)  Teleological  Judgment         ......  409 

4.  From  Kant  to  Fichte  .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .414 


CHAPTER    X. 


Fichte 


The  Science  of  Knowledge  . 

(a)  The  Problem 

(b)  The  Three  Principles. 

(c)  The  Theoretical  Ego  . 

(d)  The  Practical  Ego 
The  Science  of  Ethics  and  of  Right 


419 

424 
424 
429 
432 
434 
436 


CONTENTS. 


3.   Fichte's    Second    Period:    his    View  of    History  and    his 

Theoi  v  of  Religion         .......  439 


CHAPTER    XI. 


ELLING 


• 445 

\a.  Philosophy  of  Nature         .......  448 

\b.   Transcendental  Philosophy        ......  454 

2.     System  of  Identity     ........  456 

3<7.  Doctrine  of  Freedom  .......  461 

2,0.    Philosophy  of  Mythology  and  Revelation  .  .  .  465 


CHAPTER    XII. 
Schellinc'.s  Co-workers    . 


468 

1.  The  Philosophers  of  Nature         ......  468 

2.  The  Philosophers  of  Identity  (F.  Krause)  ....  470 

3.  The    Philosophers   of    Religion    (Baader    and    Schleier- 


macher) 


CHAPTER    XIII. 


Hegel 


1.  Hegel's  View  of  the  World  and  his  Method 

2.  The  System  ..... 

(a)  Logic    ...... 

(J?)  The  Philosophy  of  Nature  . 

(c)  The  Doctrine  of  Subjective  Spirit 

(d)  The  Doctrine  of  Objective  Spirit 

(e)  Absolute  Spirit     .... 


472 


487 

489 
494 
495 
496 

497 
498 
501 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

The  Opposition  to  Constructive  Idealism  :  Fries, 

Herbart,  Schopenhauer 505 

1.  The  Psychologists :  Fries  and  Beneke         ....  506 

2.  Realism:  Herbart         ........  516 

3.  Pessimism:  Schopenhauer  .......   537 


CHAPTER    XV. 
Philosophy  out  of  Germany 

1.  Italy      .         .         .         . 

2.  France  ...... 


.548 

•  548 

•  552 


CONTENTS.  xv 

PAGE 

3.  Great  Britain  and  America  .......  563 

4.  Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark,  and  Holland    ....  583 

CHAPTER    XVI. 
German  Philosophy  since  the  Death  of  Hegel     .  587 

1.  From  the  Division  of  the  Hegelian  School   to  the   Ma- 

terialistic Controversy    .......  588 

2.  New  Systems:  Trendelenburg,  Fechner,  Lotze,  and  Hart- 

mann      ..........   599 

3.  From    the    Revival    of   the    Kantian     Philosophy    to    the 

Present  Time  .         .  .         .         .         .         .  614 

(a)  Neo-Kantianism.    Positivism,    and     Kindred     Phe- 
nomena ..........  614 

(b)  Idealistic  Reaction  against  the  Scientific  Spirit  .         .  622 

(c)  The  Special  Philosophical  Sciences     ....  625 

4.  Retrospect    ..........  629 

Index   ...........       .635 


INTRODUCTION. 


In  no  other  department  is  a  thorough  knowledge  of  his- 
tory so  important  as  in  philosophy.  Like  historical  science 
in  general,  philosophy  is,  on  the  one  hand,  in  touch  with 
exact  inquiry,  while,  on  the  other,  it  has  a  certain  relation- 
ship with  art.  With  the  former  it  has  in  common  its  method- 
ical procedure  and  its  cognitive  aim  ;  with  the  latter,  its 
intuitive  character  and  the  endeavor  to  compass  the  whole 
of  reality  with  a  glance.  Metaphysical  principles  are  less 
easily  verified  from  experience  than  physical  hypotheses, 
but  also  less  easily  refuted.  Systems  of  philosophy,  there- 
fore, are  not  so  dependent  on  our  progressive  knowledge  of 
facts  as  the  theories  of  natural  science,  and  change  less 
quickly ;  notwithstanding  their  mutual  conflicts,  and  in  spite 
of  the  talk  about  discarded  standpoints,  they  possess  in  a 
measure  the  permanence  of  classical  works  of  art,  they  retain 
for  all  time  a  certain  relative  validity.  The  thought  of 
Plato,  of  Aristotle,  and  of  the  heroes  of  modern  philosophy 
is  ever  proving  anew  its  fructifying  power.  Nowhere  do 
we  find  such  instructive  errors  as  in  the  sphere  of  philoso- 
phy ;  nowhere  is  the  new  so  essentially  a  completion  and 
development  of  the  old,  even  though  it  deem  itself  the 
whole  and  assume  a  hostile  attitude  toward  its  predecessors  ; 
nowhere  is  the  inquiry  so  much  more  important  than  the 
final  result  ;  nowhere  the  categories  "  true  and  false  "  so 
inadequate.  The  spirit  of  the  time  and  the  spirit  of  the 
people,  the  individuality  of  the  thinker,  disposition,  will, 
fancy — all  these  exert  a  far  stronger  influence  on  the  devel- 
opment of  philosophy,  both  by  way  of  promotion  and  by 
way  of  hindrance,  than  in  any  other  department  of  thought. 
If  a  system  gives  classical  expression  to  the  thought  of  an 
epoch,  a  nation,  or  a  great  personality;  if  it  seeks  to  attack 
the  world-riddle  from  a   new  direction,  or  brings  us  nearer 


INTRODUCTION. 

its  solution  by  important  original  conceptions,  by  a  subtler 
or  a  simpler  comprehension  of  the  problem,  by  a  wider  out- 
look or  a  deeper  insight ;  it  has  accomplished  more  than 
it  could  have  done  by  bringing  forward  a  number  of  in- 
disputably correct  principles.  The  variations  in  philosophy, 
which,  on  the  assumption  of  the  unity  of  truth,  are  a  rock 
of  offense  to  many  minds,  may  be  explained,  on  the  one 
hand,  by  the  combination  of  complex  variety  and  limitation 
in  the  motives  which  govern  philosophical  thought, — for  it 
is  the  whole  man  that  philosophizes,  not  his  understanding 
merely, — and,  on  the  other,  by  the  inexhaustible  extent  of 
the  field  of  philosophy.  Back  of  the  logical  labor  of  proof 
and  inference  stand,  as  inciting,  guiding,  and  hindering 
agents,  psychical  and  historical  forces,  which  are  themselves 
in  large  measure  alogical,  though  stronger  than  all  logic  ; 
while  just  before  stretches  away  the  immeasurable  domain 
of  reality,  at  once  inviting  and  resisting  conquest.  The 
grave  contradictions,  so  numerous  in  both  the  subjective 
and  the  objective  fields,  make  unanimity  impossible  con- 
cerning ultimate  problems  ;  in  fact,  they  render  it  difficult 
for  the  individual  thinker  to  combine  his  convictions  into 
a  self-consistent  system.  Each  philosopher  sees  limited 
sections  of  the  world  only,  and  these  through  his  own  eyes ; 
every  system  is  one-sided.  Yet  it  is  this  multiplicity  and 
variety  of  systems  alone  which  makes  the  aim  of  philosophy 
practicable  as  it  endeavors  to  give  a  complete  picture  of 
the  soul  and  of  the  universe.  The  history  of  philosophy 
is  the  philosophy  of  humanity,  that  great  individual,  which, 
with  more  extended  vision  than  the  instruments  through 
which  it  works,  is  able  to  entertain  opposing  princi- 
ples, and  which,  reconciling  old  contradictions  as  it  dis- 
covers new  ones,  approaches  by  a  necessary  and  certain 
growth  the  knowledge  of  the  one  all-embracing  truth, 
which  is  rich  and  varied  beyond  our  conception.  In  order 
to  energetic  labor  in  the  further  progress  of  philosophy,  it 
is  necessary  to  imagine  that  the  goddess  of  truth  is  about 
to  lift  the  veil  which  has  for  centuries  concealed  her.  The 
historian  of  philosophy,  on  the  contrary,  looks  on  each  new 
system  as  a  stone,  which,  when  shaped  and  fitted  into 
its  place,  will  help  to  raise  higher  the  pyramid  of  knowledge. 


IN  TROD  UC  TION.  3 

Hegel's  doctrine  of  the  necessity  and  motive  force  of  con- 
tradictories, of  the  relative  justification  of  standpoints,  and 
the  systematic  development  of  speculation,  has  great  and 
permanent  value  as  a  general  point  of  view.  It  needs  only 
to  be  guarded  from  narrow  scholastic  application  to  become 
a  safe  canon  for  the  historical  treatment  of  philosophy. 

In  speaking  above  of  the  worth  of  the  philosophical  doc- 
trines of  the  past  as  defying  time,  and  as  comparable  to  the 
standard  character  of  finished  works  of  art,  the  special  ref- 
erence was  to  those  elements  in  speculation  which  proceed 
less  from  abstract  thinking  than  from  the  fancy,  the  heart, 
and  the  character  of  the  individual,  and  even  more  directly 
from  the  disposition  of  the  people  ;  and  which  to  a  certain 
degree  may  be  divorced  from  logical  reasoning  and  the 
scientific  treatment  of  particular  questions.  These  may  be 
summed  up  under  the  phrase,  views  of  the  world.  The 
necessity  for  constant  reconsideration  of  them  is  from 
this  standpoint  at  once  evident.  The  Greek  view  of  the 
world  is  as  classic  as  the  plastic  art  of  Phidias  and  the  epic 
of  Homer;  the  Christian,  as  eternally  valid  as  the  architec- 
ture of  the  Middle  Ages  ;  the  modern,  as  irrefutable  as 
Goethe's  poetry  and  the  music  of  Beethoven.  The  views  of 
the  world  which  proceed  from  the  spirits  of  different  ages,  as 
products  of  the  general  development  of  culture,  are  not  so 
much  thoughts  as  rhythms  in  thinking,  not  theories  but 
modes  of  intuition  saturated  with  feelings  of  worth.  We 
may  dispute  about  them,  it  is  true;  we  may  argue  against 
them  or  in  their  defense  ;  but  they  can  neither  be  established 
nor  overthrown  by  cogent  proofs.  It  is  not  only  optimism 
and  pessimism,  determinism  and  indeterminism,  that  have 
their  ultimate  roots  in  the  affective  side  of  our  nature,  hut 
pantheism  and  individualism,  also  idealism  and  materialism, 
even  rationalism  and  sensationalism.  Even  though  they 
operate  with. the  instruments  of  thought,  they  remain  in  the 
last  analysis  matters  of  faith,  of  feeling,  and  of  resolution. 
The  aesthetic  view  of  the  world  held  by  the  Greeks,  the 
transcendental-religious  view  of  Christianity,  the  intellectual 
view  of  Leibnitz  and  Hegel,  the  panthelistic  views  of  Fichte 
and  Schopenhauer  are  vital  forces,  not  doctrines,  postulates, 
not  results  of  thought.      One  view  of  the  world  is  forced  to 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

yield  its  pre-eminence  to  another,  which  it  has  itself  helped 
to  produce  by  its  own  one-sidedness ;  only  to  reconquer  its 
opponent  later,  when  it  has  learned  from  her,  when  it  has 
been  purified,  corrected,  and  deepened  by  the  struggle. 
But  the  elder  contestant  is  no  more  confuted  by  the  younger 
than  the  drama  of  Sophocles  by  the  drama  of  Shakspere, 
than  youth  by  age  or  spring  by  autumn. 

If  it  is  thus  indubitable  that  the  views  of  the  world  held  in 
earlier  times  deserve  to  live  on  in  the  memory  of  man,  and  to 
live  as  something  better  than  mere  reminders  of  the  past — 
the  history  of  philosophy  is  not  a  cabinet  of  antiquities,  but 
a  museum  of  typical  products  of  the  mind — the  value  and 
interest  of  the  historical  study  of  the  past  in  relation  to  the 
exact  scientific  side  of  philosophical  inquiry  is  not  less  evi- 
dent. In  every  science  it  is  useful  to  trace  the  origin  and 
growth  of  problems  and  theories,  and  doubly  so  in  philoso- 
phy. With  her  it  is  by  no  means  the  universal  rule  that 
progress  shows  itself  by  the  result ;  the  statement  of  the  ques- 
tion is  often  more  important  than  the  answer.  The  prob- 
lem is  more  sharply  defined  in  a  given  direction  ;  or  it  be- 
comes more  comprehensive,  is  analyzed  and  refined  ;  or  if 
now  it  threatens  to  break  up  into  subtle  details,  some  genius 
appears  to  simplify  it  and  force  our  thoughts  back  to  the 
fundamental  question.  This  advance  in  problems,  which 
happily  is  everywhere  manifested  by  unmistakable  signs,  is, 
in  the  case  of  many  of  the  questions  which  irresistibly  force 
themselves  upon  the  human  heart,  the  only  certain  gain  from 
centuries  of  endeavor.  The  labor  here  is  of  more  value 
than  the  result. 

In  treating  the  history  of  philosophy,  two  extremes  must 
be  avoided,  lawless  individualism  and  abstract  logical 
formalism.  The  history  of  philosophy  is  neither  a  dis- 
connected succession  of  arbitrary  individual  opinions  and 
clever  guesses,  nor  a  mechanically  developed  series  of 
typical  standpoints  and  problems,  which  imply  one  another 
in  just  the  form  and  order  historically  assumed.  The 
former  supposition  does  violence  to  the  regularity  of  philo- 
sophical development,  the  latter  to  its  vitality.  In  the  one 
case,  the  connection  is  conceived  too  loosely,  in  the  other, 
too    rigidly    and    simply.       One    view    underestimates    the 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

power  of  the  logical  Idea,  the  other  overestimates  it.     It  is 
not  easy  to  support   the   principle    that    chance   rules   the 
destiny  of  philosophy,  but  it  is  more  difficult  to  avoid  the 
opposite  conviction  of  the  one-sidedness  of  formalistic  con- 
struction, and  to  define  the  nature  and  limits  of  philosophical 
necessity.     The  development  of  philosophy  is,  perhaps,  one 
chief  aim   of   the  world-process,  but  it  is  certainly  not  the 
only  one  ;  it  is  a  part  of  the  universal  aim,  and  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  instruments  of  its  realization   do  not  work 
exclusively  in  its  behalf,  that  their  activity  brings  about  re- 
sults which  seem  unessential  for  philosophical  ends   or  ob- 
stacles in  their  way.     Philosophical  ideas  do  not  think  them- 
selves, but  are  thought  by  living  spirits,  which   are  some- 
thing other  and  better  than   mere   thought   machines — by 
spirits  who  live  these  thoughts,  who    fill    them  with    per- 
sonal   warmth    and    passionately  defend   them.      There   is 
often  reason,  no  doubt,  for  the  complaint  that  the  person- 
ality which  has  undertaken  to  develop  some  great  idea  is 
inadequate  to  the  task,  that  it  carries  its  subjective  defects 
into  the  matter  in  hand,  that  it  does  too  much  or  too  little, 
or  the  right  thing  in  the  wrong  way,  so  that  the   spirit   of 
philosophy  seems  to  have  erred  in  the  choice  and  the  prepara- 
tion of  its  instrument.     But  the  reverse  side  of  the  picture 
must  also  be  taken  into  account.     The    thinking  spirit   is 
more  limited,  it  is  true,  than  were  desirable  for  the  perfect 
execution  of  a  definite  logical  task;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  is  far  too  rich  as  well.     A  soulless  play  of  concepts  would 
certainly  not  help  the  cause,  and  there  is  no  disadvantage 
in  the  failure   of   the  history  of  philosophy  to  proceed  so 
directly  and  so  scholastically,  as,  for  instance,  in  the  system 
of  Hegel.     A  graded  series  of  interconnected  general  forces 
mediate  between  the  logical  Idea  and  the  individual  thinker 
— the  spirit  of  the  people,  of  the  age,  of  the  thinker's  voca- 
tion, of    his   time  of  life,  which  are   felt   by  the   individual 
as  part   of  himself  and  whose    impulses   he   unconsciously 
obeys.       In   this  way  the   modifying,   furthering,  hindering 
correlation  of  higher  and  lower,  of  the  ruler  with  his  com- 
mands and  the  servant  with  his  more  or  less  willing  obedi- 
ence, is  twice  repeated,  the  situation  being  complicated  fur- 
ther by  the  fact  that  the  subject  affected  by  these  historical 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

forces  himself  helps  to  make  history.  The  most  important 
factor  in  philosophical  progress  is,  of  course,  the  state  of 
inquiry  at  the  time,  the  achievements  of  the  thinkers  of  the 
immediately  preceding  age  ;  and  in  this  relation  of  a  phil- 
osopher to  his  predecessors,  again,  a  distinction  must  be 
made  between  a  logical  and  a  psychological  element.  The 
successor  often  commences  his  support,  his  development, 
or  his  refutation  at  a  point  quite  unwelcome  to  the  con- 
structive historian.  At  all  events,  if  we  may  judge  from  the 
experience  of  the  past,  too  much  caution  cannot  be  exer- 
cised in  setting  up  formal  laws  for  the  development  of 
thought.  According  to  the  law  of  contradiction  and  recon- 
ciliation, a  Schopenhauer  must  have  followed  directly  after 
Leibnitz,  to  oppose  his  pessimistic  ethelism  to  the  optimistic 
intellectualism  of  the  latter  ;  when,  in  turn,  a  Schleiermacher, 
to  give  an  harmonic  resolution  of  the  antithesis  into  a 
concrete  doctrine  of  feeling,  would  have  made  a  fine  third. 
But  it  turned  out  otherwise,  and  we  must  be  content. 

The  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  history  of  philosophy 
in  general,  given  at  the  start,  is  the  more  true  of  the  history 
of  modern  philosophy,  since  the  movement  introduced  by 
the  latter  still  goes  on  unfinished.  We  are  still  at  work 
on  the  problems  which  were  brought  forward  by  Descartes, 
Locke,  and  Leibnitz,  and  which  Kant  gathered  up  into  the 
critical  or  transcendental  question.  The  present  continues 
to  be  governed  by  the  ideal  of  culture  which  Bacon  pro- 
posed and  Fichte  exalted  to  a  higher  level ;  we  all  live 
under  the  unweakened  spell  of  that  view  of  the  world  which 
was  developed  in  hostile  opposition  to  Scholasticism,  and 
through  the  enduring  influence  of  those  mighty  geographical 
and  scientific  discoveries  and  religious  reforms  which 
marked  the  entrance  of  the  modern  period.  It  is  true, 
indeed,  that  the  transition  brought  about  by  Kant's  noetical 
and  ethical  revolution  was  of  great  significance, — more  sig- 
nificant even  than  the  Socratic  period,  with  which  we  are 
fond  of  comparing  it  ;  much  that  was  new  was  woven  on, 
much  of  the  old,  weakened,  broken,  destroyed.  And  yet, 
if  we  take  into  account  the  historical  after-influence  of 
Cartesianism,  we  shall  find  that  the  thread  was  only  knotted 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

and  twisted  by  Kantianism,  not  cut  through.  The  con- 
tinued power  of  the  pre-Kantian  modes  of  thought  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  Spinoza  has  been  revived  in 
Fichte  and  Schelling,  Leibnitz  in  Herbart  and  Hegel,  the 
sensationalism  of  the  French  Illuminati  in  Feuerbach  ;  and 
that  even  materialism,  which  had  been  struck  down  by  the 
criticism  of  the  reason  (one  would  have  thought  forever),  has 
again  raised  its  head.  Even  that  most  narrow  tendency  of 
the  early  philosophy  of  the  modern  period,  the  apotheosis 
of  cognition  is, — in  spite  of  the  moralistic  counter-movement 
of  Kant  and  Fichte, — the  controlling  motive  in  the  last  of 
the  great  idealistic  systems,  while  it  also  continues  to  exer- 
cise a  marvelously  powerful  influence  on  the  convictions  of 
our  Hegel-weary  age,  alike  within  the  sphere  of  philosophy 
and  (still  more)  without  it.  In  view  of  the  intimate  relations 
between  contemporary  inquiry  and  the  progress  of  thought 
since  the  beginning  of  the  modern  period,  acquaintance 
with  the  latter,  which  it  is  the  aim  of  this  History  to  facili- 
tate, becomes  a  pressing  duty.  To  study  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy since  Descartes  is  to  study  the  pre-conditions  of 
contemporary  philosophy. 

We  begin  with  an  outline  sketch  of  the  general  charac- 
teristics of  modern  philosophy.  These  may  be  most  con- 
veniently described  by  comparing  them  with  the  characteris- 
tics of  ancient  and  of  mediaeval  philosophy.  The  character 
of  ancient  philosophy  or  Greek  philosophy, — for  they  are 
practically  the  same, — is  predominantly  aesthetic.  The 
Greek  holds  beauty  and  truth  closely  akin  and  inseparable  ; 
"  cosmos  "  is  his  common  expression  for  the  world  and  for 
ornament.  The  universe  is  for  him  a  harmony,  an  organ- 
ism, a  work  of  art,  before  which  he  stands  in  admiration 
and  reverential  awe.  In  quiet  contemplation,  as  with  the 
eye  of  a  connoisseur,  he  looks  upon  the  world  or  the  indi- 
vidual object  as  a  well-ordered  whole,  more  disposed  to  en- 
joy the  congruity  of  its  parts  than  to  study  out  its  ulti- 
mate elements.  He  prefers  contemplation  to  analysis,  his 
thought  is  plastic,  not  anatomical.  He  finds  the  nature 
of  the  object  in  its  form  ;  and  ends  give  him  the  key  to 
the  comprehension  of  events.  Discovering  human  elements 
everywhere,  he  is  always  ready  with  judgments  of  worth — 


S  RODUCTION. 

the  stars  move  in  circles  because  circular  motion  is  the 
most  perfect  :  the  right  is  better  than  left,  upper  finer  than 
lower,  that  which  precedes  more  beautiful  than  that  which 
follows.  Thinkers  in  whom  this  aesthetic  reverence  is  weaker 
than  the  analytic  impulse — especially  Democritus — seem 
half  modern  rather  than  Greek.  By  the  side  of  the  Greek 
philosophy,  in  its  sacred  festal  garb,  stands  the  modern  in 
secular  workday  dress,  in  the  laborer's  blouse,  with  the 
merciless  chisel  of  analysis  in  its  hand.  This  does  not  seek 
beaut}',  but  only  the  naked  truth,  no  matter  what  it  be.  It 
holds  it  impossible  to  satisfy  at  once  the  understanding  and 
taste  ;  nay,  nakedness,  ugliness,  and  offensiveness  seem  to 
it  to  testify  for,  rather  than  against,  the  genuineness  of 
truth.  In  its  anxiety  not  to  read  human  elements  into 
nature,  it  goes  so  far  as  completely  to  read  spirit  out  of 
nature.  The  world  is  not  a  living  whole,  but  a  machine; 
not  a  work  of  art  which  is  to  be  viewed  in  its  totality  and 
enjoyed  with  reverence,  but  a  clock-movement  to  be  taken 
apart  in  order  to  be  understood.  Nowhere  are  there  ends  in 
the  world,  but  everywhere  mechanical  causes.  The  charac- 
ter of  modern  thought  would  appear  to  a  Greek  returned 
to  earth  very  sober,  unsplendid,  undevout,  and  intrusive. 
And,  in  fact,  modern  philosophy  has  a  considerable  amount 
of  prose  about  it,  is  not  easily  impressed,  accepts  no  limit- 
ations from  feeling,  and  holds  nothing  too  sacred  to  be  at- 
tacked with  the  weapon  of  analytic  thought.  And  yet  it  corn- 
bin  es  penetration  with  intrusiveness;  acuteness,  coolness,  and 
logical  courage  with  its  soberness.  Never  before  has  the  de- 
mand for  unprejudiced  thought  and  certain  knowledge  been 
made  with  equal  earnestness.  This  interest  in  knowledge  for 
its  own  sake  developed  so  suddenly  and  with  such  strength 
that,  in  presumptuous  gladness,  men  believed  that  no  pre- 
vious age  had  rightly  understood  what  truth  and  love  for 
truth  are.  The  natural  consequence  was  a  general  overesti- 
mation  of  cognition  at  the  expense  of  all  other  mental  activi- 
ties. Even  among  the  Greek  thinkers,  thought  was  held  by 
the  majority  to  be  the  noblest  and  most  divine  function. 
But  their  intellectualism  was  checked  by  the  aesthetic  and 
eudaemonistic  element,  and  preserved  from  the  one-sidedness 
which  it  manifests  in  the  modern  period,  because  of  the  lack 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

of  an  effective  counterpoise.  However  eloquently  Bacon 
commends  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  conquest 
of  nature,  he  still  understands  inquiry  for  inquiry's  sake,  and 
honors  it  as  supreme  ;  even  the  ethelistic  philosophers, 
Fichte  and  Schopenhauer,  pay  their  tribute  to  the  prejudice 
in  favor  of  intellectualism.  The  fact  that  the  modern 
period  can  show  no  one  philosophic  writer  of  the  literary 
rank  of  Plato,  even  though  it  includes  such  masters  of 
style  as  Fichte,  Schelling,  Schopenhauer,  and  Lotze,  not  to 
speak  of  lesser  names,  is  an  external  proof  of  how  noticeably 
the  aesthetic  impulse  has  given  way  to  one  purely  intel- 
lectual. 

When  we  turn  to  the  character  of  mediaeval  thinking,  we 
find,  instead  of  the  aesthetic  views  of  antiquity  and  the 
purely  scientific  tendency  of  the  modern  era,  a  distinctively 
religious  spirit.  Faith  prescribes  the  objects  and  the  lim- 
itations of  knowledge  ;  everything  is  referred  to  the  here- 
after, thought  becomes  prayer.  Men  speculate  concern- 
ing the  attributes  of  God,  on  the  number  and  rank  of 
the  angels,  on  the  immortality  of  man — all  purely  tran- 
scendental subjects.  Side  by  side  with  these,  it  is  true, 
the  world  receives  loving  attention,  but  always  as  the  lower 
story  merely,*  above  which,  with  its  own  laws,  rises  the 
true  fatherland,  the  kingdom  of  grace.  The  most  subtle 
acuteness  is  employed  in  the  service  of  dogma,  with  the 
task  of  fathoming  the  how  and  why  of  things  whose  ex- 
istence is  certified  elsewhere.  The  result  is  a  formalism  in 
thought  side  by  side  with  profound  and  fervent  mysticism. 
Doubt  and  trust  are  strangely  intermingled,  and  a  feeling 
of  expectation  stirs  all  hearts.  On  the  one  side  stands 
sinful,  erring  man,  who,  try  as  hard  as  he  may,  only  half 
unravels  the  mysteries  of  revealed  truth  ;  on  the  other,  the 
God  of  grace,  who,  after  our  death,  will  reveal  himself  to  us 
as  clearly  as  Adam  knew  him  before  the  fall.  God  alone, 
however,  can  comprehend  himself — for  the  finite  spirit, 
even  truth  unveiled  is  mystery,  and  ecstasy,  unresisting 
devotion  to  the  incomprehensible,  the  culmination  of  knowl- 

*  On  the  separation  and  union  of  the  three  worlds,  natura,  gratia,  gloria,  in 
Thomas  Aquinas,  cf.  Rudolph  Eucken,  Die  Philosophie  des  Thomas  von  Aquino 
und  die  Kultur  der  Neuzeit,  Halle.  1886. 


io  INTRODUCTION. 

edge.  In  mediaeval  philosophy  the  subject  looks  longingly 
upward  to  the  infinite  object  of  his  thought,  expecting 
that  the  latter  will  bend  down  toward  him  or  lift  him 
upward  toward  itself ;  in  Greek  philosophy  the  spirit 
confronts  its  object,  the  world,  on  a  footing  of  equality; 
in  modern  philosophy  the  speculative  subject  feels  him- 
self higher  than  the  object,  superior  to  nature.  In  the 
conception  of  the  Middle  Ages,  truth  and  mystery  are 
identical;  to  antiquity  they  appear  reconcilable;  modern 
thought  holds  them  as  mutually  exclusively  as  light  and 
darkness.  The  unknown  is  the  enemy  of  knowledge, 
which  must  be  chased  out  of  its  last  hiding-place.  It  is, 
therefore,  easy  to  understand  that  the  modern  period 
stands  in  far  sharper  antithesis  to  the  mediaeval  era  than 
to  the  ancient,  for  the  latter  has  furnished  it  many  princi- 
ples which  can  be  used  as  weapons  against  the  former. 
Grandparents  and  grandchildren  make  good  friends. 

When  a  new  movement  is  in  preparation,  but  there  is  a 
lack  of  creative  force  to  give  it  form,  a  period  of  tumultu- 
ous disaffection  with  existing  principles  ensues.  What  is 
wanted  is  not  clearly  perceived,  but  there  is  a  lively  sense  of 
that  which  is  not  wanted.  Dissatisfaction  prepares  a  place 
for  that  which  is  to  come  by  undermining  the  existent 
and  making  it  ripe  for  its  fall.  The  old,  the  outgrown,  the 
doctrine  which  had  become  inadequate,  was  in  this  case 
Scholasticism  ;  modern  philosophy  shows  throughout — and 
most  clearly  at  the  start — an  anti-Scholastic  character.  If 
up  to  this  time  Church  dogma  had  ruled  unchallenged  in 
spiritual  affairs,  and  the  Aristotelian  philosophy  in  things 
temporal,  war  is  now  declared  against  authority  of  every 
sort  and  freedom  of  thought  is  inscribed  on  the  banner.* 
"  Modern  philosophy  is  Protestantism  in  the  sphere  of  the 
thinking  spirit  "  (Erdmann).  Not  that  which  has  been  con- 
sidered   true    for  centuries,   not  that   which  another  says, 

*  The  doctrine  of  twofold  truth,  under  whose  protecting  cloak  the  new  liberal 
movements  had  hitherto  taken  refuge,  was  now  disdainfully  repudiated.  Cf. 
Freudenthal,  Zur  Beurtheilung  der  Scholastik,  in  vol.  iii.  of  the  Archiv  für 
Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  1890.  Also,  H.  Reuter,  Geschichte  der  religiösen 
Aufklärung  im  Mittelalter.  1 875-77;  and  Dilthey,  Einleitung  in  die  Geistes- 
wissenschaften, 1883. 


INTRODUCTION.  « 

though  he  be  Aristotle  or  Thomas  Aquinas,  not  that  which 
flatters  the  desires  of  the  heart,  is  true,  but  that  only 
which  is  demonstrated  to  my  own  understanding  with  con- 
vincing force.  Philosophy  is  no  longer  willing  to  be  the 
handmaid  of  theology,  but  must  set  up  a  house  of  her 
own.  The  watchword  now  becomes  freedom  and  in- 
dependent thought,  deliverance  from  every  form  of  con- 
straint, alike  from  the  bondage  of  ecclesiastical  decrees  and 
the  inner  servitude  of  prejudice  and  cherished  inclinations. 
But  the  adoption  of  a  purpose  leads  to  the  consideration 
of  the  means  for  attaining  it.  Thus  the  thirst  for  knowl- 
edge raises  questions  concerning  the  method,  the  instru- 
ments, and  the  limits  of  knowledge  ;  the  interest  in  noetics 
and  methodology  vigorously  develops,  remains  a  constant 
factor  in  modern  inquiry,  and  culminates  in  Kant,  not 
again  to  die  away. 

This  negative  aspect  of  modern  tendencies  needs,  however, 
a  positive  supplement.  The  mediaeval  mode  of  thought  is 
discarded  and  the  new  one  is  not  yet  found.  What  can 
more  fittingly  furnish  a  support,  a  preliminary  substitute, 
than  antiquity?  Thus  philosophy,  also,  joins  in  that  great 
stream  of  culture,  the  Renaissance  and  humanism,  which, 
starting  from  Italy,  poured  forth  over  the  whole  civilized 
world.  Plato  and  Neoplatonism,  Epicurus  and  the  Stoa 
are  opposed  to  Scholasticism,  the  real  Aristotle  to  the 
transformed  Aristotle  of  the  Church  and  the  distorted 
Aristotle  of  the  schools.  Back  to  the  sources,  is  the  cry. 
With  the  revival  of  the  ancient  languages  and  ancient 
books,  the  spirit  of  antiquity  is  also  revived.  The  dust  of 
the  schools  and  the  tyranny  of  the  Church  are  thrown  off, 
and  the  classical  ideal  of  a  free  and  noble  humanity  gains  en- 
thusiastic adherents.  The  man  is  not  to  be  forgotten  in 
the  Christian,  nor  art  and  science,  the  rights  and  the  riches  of 
individuality  in  the  interest  of  piety;  work  for  the  future 
must  not  blind  us  to  the  demands  of  the  present  nor  lead  us 
toneglect  thecomprehensive  cultivation  of  the  natural  capac- 
ities of  the  spirit.  The  world  and  man  are  no  longer  viewed 
through  Christian  eyes,  the  one  as  a  realm  of  darkness  and 
the  other  as  a  vessel  of  weakness  and  wrath,  but  nature 
and    life    gleam    before     the     new    generation     in    joyous, 


ra  INTRODUCTION, 

hopeful  light.     Humanism  and  optimism  have  always  been 

allied. 

This  change  in  the  spirit  of  thought  is  accompanied  by 
a  corresponding  change  in  the  object  of  thought  :  theol- 
ogy  must  yield  its  supremacy  to  the  knowledge  of  nature. 
Weary  of  Christological  and  soteriological  questions,  weary 
of  disputes  concerning  the  angels,  the  thinking  spirit  longs 
to  make  himself  at  home  in  the  world  it  has  learned  to  love, 
demands  real  knowledge, — knowledge  which  is  of  practical 
utility,— and  no  longer  seeks  God  outside  the  world,  but  in 
it  and  above  it.  Nature  becomes  the  home,  the  body  of 
God.  Transcendence  gives  place  to  immanence,  not  only 
in  theology,  but  elsewhere.  Modern  philosophy  is  natural- 
istic in  spirit,  not  only  because  it  takes  nature  for  its 
favorite  object,  but  also  because  it  carries  into  other  branches 
of  knowledge  the  mathematical  method  so  successful  in 
natural  science,  because  it  considers  everything  stib  ratione 
natura  and  insists  on  the  "  natural  "  explanation  of  all 
phenomena,  even  those  of  ethics  and  politics. 

In  a  word,  the  tendency  of  modern  philosophy  is  anti- 
Scholastic,  humanistic,  and  naturalistic.  This  summary 
must  suffice  for  preliminary  orientation,  while  the  detailed 
division,  particularization,  modification,  and  limitation  of 
these  general  points  must  be  left  for  later  treatment. 

Two  further  facts,  however,  may  receive  preliminary 
notice.  The  indifference  and  hostility  to  the  Church  which 
have  been  cited  among  the  prominent  characteristics  of 
modern  philosophy,  do  not  necessarily  mean  enmity 
to  the  Christian  religion,  much  less  to  religion  in  gen- 
eral. In  part,  it  is  merely  a  change  in  the  object  of  religious 
feeling,  which  blazes  up  especially  strong  and  enthusiastic 
in  the  philosophy  of  the  sixteenth  century,  as  it  transfers 
its  worship  from  a  transcendent  deity  to  a  universe  indued 
with  a  soul  ;  in  part,  the  opposition  is  directed  against 
the  mediaeval,  ecclesiastical  form  of  Christianity,  with  its 
monastic  abandonment  of  the  world.  It  was  often  noth- 
ing but  a  very  deep  and  strong  religious  feeling  that  led 
thinkers  into  the  conflict  with  the  hierarchy.  Since  the  ele- 
ments of  permanent  worth  in  the  tendencies,  doctrines,  and 
institutions  of  the  Middle  Ages  are  thus  culled  out  from  that 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

which  is  corrupt  and  effete,  and  preserved  by  incorporation 
into  the  new  view  of  the  world  and  the  new  science,  and  as 
fruitful  elements  from  antiquity  enter  with  them,  the  prog- 
ress of  philosophy  shows  a  continuous  enrichment  in  its 
ideas,  intuitions,  and  spirit.  The  old  is  not  simply  dis- 
carded and  destroyed,  but  purified,  transformed,  and  assimi- 
lated. The  same  fact  forces  itself  into  notice  if  we  consider 
the  relations  of  nationality  and  philosophy  in  the  three 
great  eras.  The  Greek  philosophy  was  entirely  national 
in  its  origin  and  its  public,  it  was  rooted  in  the  character  of 
the  people  and  addressed  itself  to  fellow-countrymen  ;  not 
until  toward  its  decline,  and  not  until  influenced  by  Chris- 
tianity, were  its  cosmopolitan  inclinations  aroused.  The 
Middle  Ages  were  indifferent  to  national  distinctions,  as  to 
everything  earthly,  and  naught  was  of  value  in  comparison 
with  man's  transcendent  destiny.  Mediaeval  philosophy  is 
in  its  aims  un-national,  cosmopolitan,  catholic  ;  it  uses  the 
Latin  of  the  schools,  it  seeks  adherents  in  every  land,  it  finds 
everywhere  productive  spirits  whose  labors  in  its  service 
remain  unaffected  by  their  national  peculiarities.  The 
modern  period  returns  to  the  nationalism  of  antiquity,  but 
does  not  relinquish  the  advantage  gained  by  the  extension 
of  mediaeval  thought  to  the  whole  civilized  world.  The 
roots  of  modern  philosophy  are  sunk  deep  in  the  fruit- 
ful soil  of  nationality,  while  the  top  of  the  tree  spreads 
itself  far  beyond  national  limitations.  It  is  national  and 
cosmopolitan  together;  it  is  international  as  the  common 
property  of  the  various  peoples,  which  exchange  their 
philosophical  gifts  through  an  active  commerce  of  ideas. 
Latin  is  often  retained  for  use  abroad,  as  the  universal  lan- 
guage of  savants,  but  many  a  work  is  first  published  in  the 
mother-tongue — and  thought  in  it.  Thus  it  becomes 
possible  for  the  ideas  of  the  wise  to  gain  an  entrance  into 
the  consciousness  of  the  people,  from  whose  spirit  they 
have  really  sprung,  and  to  become  a  power  beyond  the 
circle  of  the  learned  public.  Philosophy  as  illumination,  as 
a  factor  in  general  culture,  is  an  exclusively  modern  phe- 
nomenon. In  this  speculative  intercourse  of  nations,  how- 
ever, the  French,  the  English,  and  the  Germans  are  most 
involved,  both  as  producers  and  consumers.     France  gives 


i4  INTRODUCTION. 

the  initiative  (in  Descartes),  then  England  assumes  the 
leadership  (in  Locke),  with  Leibnitz  and  Kant  the  hegem- 
ony passes  over  to  Germany.  Besides  these  powers,  Italy 
takes  an  eager  part  in  the  production  of  philosophical  ideas 
in  the  period  of  ferment  before  Descartes.  Each  of  these 
nations  contributes  elements  to  the  total  result  which  it 
alone  is  in  a  position  to  furnish,  and  each  is  rewarded  by 
gifts  in  return  which  it  would  be  incapable  of  producing 
out  of  its  own  store.  This  international  exchange  of  ideas, 
in  which  each  gives  and  each  receives,  and  the  fact  that  the 
chief  modern  thinkers,  especially  in  the  earlier  half  of  the 
era,  prior  to  Kant,  are  in  great  part  not  philosophers  by  pro- 
fession but  soldiers,  statesmen,  physicians,  as  well  as  natural 
scientists,  historians,  and  priests,  give  modern  philosophy  an 
unprofessional,  worldly  appearance,  in  striking  contrast 
to  the  clerical  character  of  mediaeval,  and  the  prophetic 
character  of  ancient  thinking. 

Germany,  England,  and  France  claim  the  honor  of  having 
produced  the  first  modern  philosopher,  presenting  Nicolas 
of  Cusa,  Bacon  of  Verulam,  and  Rene  Descartes  as  their 
candidates,  while  Hobbes,  Bruno,  and  Montaigne  have 
received  only  scattered  votes.  The  claim  of  England  is  the 
weakest  of  all,  for,  without  intending  to  diminish  Bacon's  im« 
portance,  it  may  be  said  that  the  programme  which  he 
develops — and  in  essence  his  philosophy  is  nothing  more — 
was,  in  its  leading  principles,  not  first  announced  by  him, 
and  not  carried  out  with  sufficient  consistency.  The  dispute 
between  the  two  remaining  contestants  may  be  easily  and 
equitably  settled  by  making  the  simple  distinction  be- 
tween forerunner  and  beginner,  between  path-breaker 
and  founder.  The  entrance  of  a  new  historical  era  is  not 
accompanied  by  an  audible  click,  like  the  beginning  of  a  new 
piece  on  a  music-box,  but  is  gradually  effected.  A  consid- 
erable period  may  intervene  between  the  point  when  the 
new  movement  flashes  up,  not  understood  and  half  uncon- 
scious of  itself,  and  the  time  when  it  appears  on  the  stage 
in  full  strength  and  maturity,  recognizing  itself  as  new  and 
so  acknowledged  by  others:  the  period  of  ferment  between 
the  Middle  Ages  and  modern  times  lasted  almost  two  cen- 
turies.    It   is   in   the  end  little    more   than    logomachy   to 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

discuss  whether  this  time  of  anticipation  and  desire,  of 
endeavor  and  partial  success,  in  which  the  new  struggles 
with  the  old  without  conquering  it,  and  the  opposite  tend- 
encies in  the  conflicting  views  of  the  world  interplay  in  a 
way  at  once  obscure  and  wayward,  is  to  be  classed  as  the  epi- 
logue of  the  old  era  or  the  prologue  of  the  new.  The 
simple  solution  to  take  it  as  a  transition  period,  no  longer 
mediaeval  but  not  yet  modern,  has  met  with  fairly  general 
acceptance.  Nicolas  of  Cusa  (1401-64)  was  the  first  to 
announce  fundamental  principles  of  modern  philosophy — he 
is  the  leader  in  this  intermediate  preparatory  period.  Des- 
cartes (1 596-1650)  brought  forward  the  first  system — he  is 
the  father  of  modern  philosophy. 

A  brief  survey  of  the  literature  may  be  added  in  conclu- 
sion : 

Heinrich  Ritter's  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophie  (vols,  ix.-xii.  of 
his  Geschichte  der  Philosophie),  1850-53,  to  Wolff  and  Rousseau,  has  been 
superseded  by  more  recent  works.  J.  E.  Erdmann's  able  Versuch  einer 
wissenschaftlichen  Darstellung  der  neueren  Philosophie  (6  vols.,  1834- 
53)  gives  in  appendices  literal  excerpts  from  non-German  writers ;  the  same 
author's  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  (2  vols.,  1869;  3d 
ed.,  1878)  contains  at  the  end  the  first  exposition  of  German  Philosophy 
since  the  Death  of  Hegel  [English  translation  in  3  vols.,  edited  by  W. 
S.  Hough,  1890. — Tr.].  Ueberweg's  Grundriss  (7th  ed.  by  M.  Heinze, 
1888)  is  indispensable  for  reference  on  account  of  the  completeness 
of  its  bibliographical  notes,  which,  however,  are  confusing  to  the 
beginner  [English  translation  by  G.  S.  Morris,  with  additions  by  the 
translator,  Noah  Porter,  and  Vincenzo  Botta,  New  York,  1872-74. — Tr.]. 
The  most  detailed  and  brilliant  exposition  has  been  given  by  Kuno 
Fischer  (1854  seq.;  3d  ed.,  1878  seq.;  the  same  author's  Baco  raid  seine 
Nachfolger,  2d  ed.,  1875, — English  translation,  1857,  by  Oxenford, — sup- 
plements the  first  two  volumes  of  the  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophie), 
This  work,  which  is  important  also  as  a  literary  achievement,  is  better 
fitted  than  any  other  to  make  the  reader  at  home  in  the  ideal  world  of  the 
great  philosophers,  which  it  reconstructs  from  its  central  point,  and  to 
prepare  him  for  the  study  (which,  of  course,  even  the  best  exposition 
cannot  replace)  of  the  works  of  the  thinkers  themselves.  Its  excessive 
simplification  of  problems  is  not  of  great  moment  in  the  first  introduc- 
tion to  a  system  [English  translation  of  vol.  iii.  book  2  (ist  ed.),  A 
Commentary  on  Kant's  Critick  of  the  Pure  Reason,  by  J.  P.  Mahaffy, 
London,  1866;  vol.  i.  part  1  and  part  2,  book  1,  Descartes  and  his 
School,  by  J.  P.  Gordy,  New  York,  1887;  of  vol.  v.  chaps,  i.-v.,  A 
Critique  of  Kant,  by  VV.  S.  Hough,  London,  1888.— Tr.].  Wilhelm 
Windelband   {Geschichte    der  neueren   Philosophie,  2  vols.,   1878   and 


i6  INTRODUCTION. 

iSSo.  to  Hegel  and  Herbart  inclusive)  accentuates  the  connection  of 
philosophy  with  general  culture  and  the  particular  sciences,  and  empha- 
sizes philosophical  method.  This  work  is  pleasant  reading,  yet,  in  the 
interest  of  clearness,  we  could  wish  that  the  author  had  given  more  of 
;ive  information  concerning  the  content  of  the  doctrines  treated, 
instead  of  merely  advancing  reflections  on  them.  A  projected  third  volume 
is  to  trace  the  development  of  philosophy  down  to  the  present  time. 
Windelband's  compendium,  Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  1890-91,  is  dis- 
tinguished from  other  expositions  by  the  fact  that,  for  the  most  part,  it 
confines  itself  to  a  history  of  problems.  Baumann's  Geschichte  der  Phil- 
osophie, 1890,  aims  to  give  a  detailed  account  of  those  thinkers  only  who 
have  advanced  views  individual  either  in  their  content  or  in  their  proof. 
Eduard  Zeller  has  given  his  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Philosophie  seit 
Leibniz  (1873  ;  2d  ed.,  1875)  the  benefit  of  the  same  thorough  and  com- 
prehensive knowledge  and  mature  judgment  which  have  made  his  Phil- 
osophie der  Griechen  a  classic.  [Bowen  's  Modem  Philosophy,  New  York, 
1857  (6th  ed.,  1 89 1 ) ;  Royce's  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  1892.— Tr.] 

Eugen  Dühring's  hypercritical  Kritische  Geschichte  der  Philosophie 
(1869;  3d  ed.,  1878)  can  hardly  be  recommended  to  students.  Lewes 
(German  translation,  1876)  assumes  a  positivistic  standpoint  ;  Thilo 
(1874),  a  position  exclusively  Herbartian  ;  A.  Stoeckl  (3d  ed.,  1889)  writes 
from  the  standpoint  of  confessional  Catholicism  ;  Vincenz  Knauer  (2d 
ed.,  1882)  is  a  Guntherian.  With  the  philosophico-historical  work  of 
Chr.  W.  Sigwart  (1854),  and  one  of  the  same  date  by  Oischinger,  we  are 
not  intimately  acquainted. 

Expositions  of  philosophy  since  Kant  have  been  given  by  the  Hegelian, 
C.  L.  Michelet  (a  larger  one  in  2  vols.,  1837-38,  and  a  smaller  one,  1843)  ; 
by  Chalybaeus  (1837  ;  5th  ed.,  i860,  formerly  very  popular  and  worthy  of 
it,  English,  1854);  by  Fr.  K.  Biedermann  (1842-43);  by  Carl  Fortlage 
(1852,  Kantio-Fichtean  standpoint);  and  by  Friedrich  Harms  (1876). 
The  last  of  these  writers  unfortunately  did  not  succeed  in  giving  a  suf- 
ficiently clear  and  precise,  not  to  say  tasteful,  form  to  the  valuable  ideas 
and  original  conceptions  in  which  his  work  is  rich.  The  very  popular 
exposition  by  an  anonymous  author  of  Hegelian  tendencies,  Deutschlands 
Denker  seit  Kant  (Dessau,  1851),  hardly  deserves  mention. 

Further,  we  may  mention  some  of  the  works  which  treat  the  historical 
development  of  particular  subjects  :  On  the  history  of  the  philosophy  of 
religion,  the  first  volume  of  Otto  Pfleiderer's  Religionsphilosophie  auf 
geschichtlicher  Grundlage  (2d  ed.,  1883  ;— English  translation  by 
Alexander  Stewart  and  Allan  Menzies,  1886-88.— Tr.),  and  the  very 
trustworthy  exposition  by  Bernhard  Piinjer  (2  vols.,  1880,  1883  ;  English 
translation  by  W.  Hastie,  vol.  i.,  1887. — Tr.).  On  the  history  oipractical 
philosophy,  besides  the  first  volume  of  I.  H.  Fichte's  Ethik  (1850),  Franz 
Vorländer's  Geschichte  der  philosophischen  Moral,  Rechts-  und  Staats- 
lehre der  Engländer  und  Franzosen  (1855)  '<  Fr.  J°dl,  Geschichte  der 
Ethik  in  der  neueren  Philosophie  (2  vols.,  1882,  1889),  and  Bluntschli, 
Geschichte  der  neueren  Staatswissenschaft  (3d  ed.,  1881);  [Sidgwicks 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

Outlines  of  the  History  of  Ethics,  3d  ed.,  1892,  and  Martineau's 
Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  3d  ed.,  1891.— Tr.].  On  the  history  of  the 
philosophy  of  history;  Rocholl,  Die  Philosophic  do-  Geschichte,  1878; 
Richard  Fester,  Rousseau  und  die  deutsche  Geschichtsphilosophie,  1890 
[Flint,  The  Philosophy  of  History  in  Europe,  vol.  i.,  1874,  complete  in 
3  vols.,  1893  seq.].  On  the  history  of  (esthetics,  R.  Zimmermann, 
1858;  H.  Lotze,  1868;  Max  Schasler,  1871  ;  Ed.  von  Hartmann  (since 
Kant),  1886  ;  Heinrich  von  Stein,  Hie  Entstehung  der  neueren  .Esthetik 
(1886)  ;  [Bosanquet,  A  History  of  Aesthetic,  1892. — TR.j.  Further,  Fr. 
Alb.  Lange,  Geschichte  des  Materialismus'),  1866;  4th  ed.,  1882;  [English 
translation  by  E.  C.  Thomas,  3  vols.,  1878-81. — Tr.];  Jul.  Baumann, 
Die  Lehren  von  Raum,  Zeit  und  Mathematik  in  der  neueren  Philosophie, 
1868-69;  Edm.  König,  Die  Ent\oickelutig  des  Causalproblems  von 
Cartcsius  bis  Kant,  1888,^*//  Kant,  1890;  Kurd  Lasswitz,  Geschichte 
der  Atomistik  vom  Mittelalter  bis  Neiuton,  2  vols.,  1890;  Ed.  Grimm, 
Zur  Geschichte  des  Erkennt  nissproblons,  von  Bacon  zu  Hu  ine,  1890. 
The  following  works  are  to  be  recommended  on  the  period  of  transition  : 
Moritz  Carriere,  Die  philosophische  Weltanschauung  der  Reforma- 
tionsseil, 1847  ;  2d  ed.,  1887  ;  and  Jacob  Burckhardt,  Kultur  der  Renais- 
sance in  I /alien,  4th  ed.,  1886.  Reference  may  also  be  made  to  A. 
Trendelenburg,  Historische  Beiträge  zur  Philosophie,  3  vols.,  1846-67  ; 
Rudolph  Eucken,  Geschichte  und  Kritik  der  Grundbegriffe  der  Gegen- 
wart, 1878;  [English  translation  by  M.  Stuart  Phelps,  1880.— Tr.]  ;  the 
same,  Geschichte  der  philosophischen  Terminologie,  1879;  the  same, 
Beiträge  zur  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophie,  1886  (including  a 
valuable  paper  on  parties  and  party  names  in  philosophy);  the  same,  Die 
Lcbensatischauungcn  der  grossen  Denker,  1890;  Ludwig  Noack,  Philos- 
oph iegeschichtliches  Lexicon,  1879;  Ed.  Zeller,  Vortrage  und  Abhand- 
lungen, three  series,  1865-84;  Chr.  von  Sigwart,  Kleine  Schriften,  2 
vols.,  1881  ;  2d  ed.,  1889.  R.  Seydel's  Religion  und  Philosophie,  1887, 
contains  papers  on  Luther,  Schleiermacher,  Schelling,  Weisse,  Fechner, 
Lotze,  Hartmann,  Darwinism,  etc.,  which  are  well  worth  reading. 

Among  the  smaller  compendsSchwegler's  (1848  ;  recent  editions  revised 
and  supplemented  by  R.  Koeberj  remains  still  the  least  bad  [English 
translations  by  Seelye  and  Smith,  revised  edition  with  additions,  New 
York,  1880;  and  J.  H.  Stirling,  with  annotations,  7th  ed.,  1879. — Tk-J- 
The  meager  sketches  by  Deter,  Koeber,  Kirchner,  Kuhn.  Rabus,  Vogel, 
and  others  are  useful  for  review  at  least.  Fritz  Schultze's  Stammbaum 
der  Philosophie,  1890,  gives  skillfully  constructed  tabular  outlines,  but, 
unfortunately,  in  a  badly  chosen  form. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    PERIOD    OF    TRANSITION:    FROM    NICOLAS 
OF    CUSA    TO    DESCARTES. 

The  essays  at  philosophy  which  made  their  appearance 
between  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century  and  the  middle 
of  the  seventeenth,  exhibit  mediaeval  and  modern  charac- 
teristics in  such  remarkable  intermixture  that  they  can  be 
assigned  exclusively  to  neither  of  these  two  periods.  There 
are  eager  longings,  lofty  demands,  magnificent  plans,  and 
promising  outlooks  in  abundance,  but  a  lack  of  power  to 
endure,  a  lack  of  calmness  and  maturity;  while  the  shackles 
against  which  the  leading  minds  revolt  still  bind  too 
firmly  both  the  leaders  and  those  to  whom  they  speak. 
Only  here  and  there  are  the  fetters  loosened  and  thrown  off ; 
if  the  hands  are  successfully  freed,  the  clanking  chains  still 
hamper  the  feet.  It  is  a  time  just  suited  for  original  think- 
ers, a  remarkable  number  of  whom  in  fact  make  their 
appearance,  side  by  side  or  in  close  succession.  Further, 
however  little  these  are  able  to  satisfy  the  demand  for  per- 
manent results,  they  ever  arouse  our  interest  anew  by  the 
boldness  and  depth  of  their  brilliant  ideas,  which  alternate 
with  quaint  fancies  or  are  pervaded  by  them  ;  by  the  youth- 
ful courage  with  which  they  attacked  great  questions ; 
and  not  least  by  the  hard  fate  which  rewarded  their  efforts 
with  misinterpretation,  persecution,  and  death  at  the  stake. 
We  must  quickly  pass  over  the  broad  threshold  between 
modern  philosophy  and  Scholastic  philosophy,  which 
is  bounded  by  the  year  1450,  in  which  Nicolas  of  Cusa 
wrote  his  chief  work,  the  Idiota,  and  .1644,  when  Descartes 
began  the  new  era  with  his  Principia  Philosophic? ;  and 
can  touch,  in  passing,  only  the  most  important  factors.  We 
shall  begin  our  account  of  this  transition  period  with  Nicolas, 
and  end  it  with  the  Englishmen,  Bacon,  Hobbes,  and  Lord 
Herbert  of  Cherbury.     Between  these  we  shall  arrange  the 

18 


NICOLAS  OF  CUSA.  *9 

various  figures  of  the  Philosophical  Renaissance  (in  the  broad 
sense)  in  six  groups  :  the  Restorers  of  the  Ancient  Systems 
and  their  Opponents  ;  the  Italian  Philosophers  of  Nature  ; 
the  Political  and  Legal  Philosophers ;  the  Skeptics  ;  the 
Mystics ;  the  Founders  of  the  Exact  Investigation  of 
Nature.  In  Italy  the  new  spiritual  birth  shows  an  aesthetic, 
scientific,  and  humanistic  tendency;  1n  Germany  it  is  pre- 
eminently religious  emancipation — in  the  Reformation. 

I.  Nicolas   of  Cusa. 

Nicolas*  was  born  in  1401,  at  Cues  (Cusa)  on  the 
Moselle  near  Treves.  He  early  ran  away  from  his  stern 
father,  a  boatman  and  vine-dresser  named  Chrypps  (or 
Krebs),  and  was  brought  up  by  the  Brothers  of  the 
Common  Life  at  Deventer.  In  Padua  he  studied  law, 
mathematics,  and  philosophy,  but  the  loss  of  his  first  case 
at  Mayence  so  disgusted  him  with  his  profession  that  he 
turned  to  theology,  and  became  a  distinguished  preacher. 
He  took  part  in  the  Council  of  Basle,  was  sent  by  Pope 
Eugen  IV.  as  an  ambassador  to  Constantinople  and  to  the 
Reichstag  at  Frankfort ;  was  made  Cardinal  in  1448,  and 
Bishop  of  Brixen  in  1450.  His  feudal  lord,  the  Count  of 
Tyrol,  Archduke  Sigismund,  refused  him  recognition  on  ac- 
count of  certain  quarrels  in  which  they  had  become  engaged, 
and  for  a  time  held  him  prisoner.  Previous  to  this  he  had 
undertaken  journeys  to  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  on 
missionary  business.  During  a  second  sojourn  in  Italy 
death  overtook  him,  in  the  year  1464,  at  Todi  in  Umbria. 
The  first  volume  of  the  Paris  edition  of  his  collected  works 
(15 14)  contains  the  most  important  of  his  philosophical 
writings;  the  second,  among  others,  mathematical  essays 
and  ten  books  of  selections  from  his  sermons;  the  third,  the 

*  R.  Zimmermann,  Nikolaus  Cusanus  als  Vorläufe)-  Leibnizens,m  vol.  viii. 
of  the  Sitzungsberichte  der  philosophisch-historischen  Klasse  der  Akademie  der 
Wissenschaften,  Vienna,  1852,  p.  306  seq.  R.  Falckenberg,  Grundzüge  der  Phil- 
osophie des  Nikolaus  Cusanus  mit  besonderer  Berücksichtigung  der  lehre  vom 
Erkennen,  Breslau,  1880.  R.  Kucken,  Beiträge  zur  Geschichte  der  neueren 
Philosophie,  Heidelberg,  1886,  p.  6  seq.  ;  Joh  Uebinger,  Die  Gotteslehre  des 
Nikolaus  Cusanus,  Münster,  1888.  Scharpff,  Des  Nikolaus  von  Cusa 
wichtigste  Schriften  in  deutscher  Uebersetzung,  Freiburg  i.  Br.,  1862. 


20  THE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

extended  work,  De  Concordantia  Catholiea,  which  lie  had 
completed  .it  Basle.  In  [440 (having  already  written  on  the 
Reform  oi  the  Calendar)  he  began  his  imposing  series  of 
philosophical  writings  with  the  De Docta  Ignorantiat  to  which 
the  De  Conjecturis  was  added  in  the  following  year.  These 
were  succeeded  by  smaller  treatises  entitled  De  Qucerendo 
Deum,  De  Dato  Patris  Luminum,  De  Filiatione  Dei,  De  Genesis 
and  a  defense  of  the  Dc  Docta  Ignorant ia.  His  most  im- 
portant work  is  the  third  of  the  four  dialogues  of  the  Idiota 
{"  On  the  Mind"),  1450.  He  clothes  in  continually  changing 
forms  the  one  supreme  truth  on  which  all  depends,  and 
which  cannot  be  expressed  in  intelligible  language  but 
only  comprehended  by  living  intuition.  In  many  different 
ways  he  endeavors  to  lead  the  reader  on  to  a  vision  of  the 
inexpressible,  or  to  draw  him  up  to  it,  and  to  develop 
fruitfully  the  principle  of  the  coincidence  of  opposites,  which 
had  dawned  upon  him  on  his  return  journey  from  Constan- 
tinople (De  Visione  Dei,  Dialogus  de  Passest,  De  Beryllo,  De 
Ludo  Globi,  De  Venatione  Sapient 'ice,  De  Apice  Theories,  Com- 
pendium). Sometimes  he  uses  dialectical  reasoning  ;  some- 
times he  soars  in  mystical  exaltation  ;  sometimes  he  writes 
with  a  simplicity  level  to  the  common  mind,  and  in  con- 
nection with  that  which  lies  at  hand  ;  sometimes,  with  the 
most  comprehensive  brevity.  Besides  these  his  philoso- 
phico-religious  works  are  of  great  value,  De  Paec  Fidci,  De 
Cribratione  Alchorani.  Liberal  Catholics  reverence  him 
as  one  of  the  .deepest  thinkers  of  the  Church;  but  the 
fame  of  Giordano  Bruno,  a  more  brilliant  but  much  less 
original  figure,  has  hitherto  stood  in  the  way  of  the 
general  recognition  of  his  great  importance  for  modern 
philosophy. 

Human  knowledge  and  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world  are 
the  two  poles  of  the  Cusan's  system.  He  distinguishes  four 
stages  of  knowledge.  Lowest  of  all  stands  sense  (together 
with  imagination),  which  yields  only  confused  images;  next 
above,  the  understanding  {ratio),  whose  functions  comprise 
analysis,  the  positing  of  time  and  space,  numerical  opera- 
tions, and  denomination,  and  which  keeps  the  opposites 
distinct  under  the  law  of  contradiction  ;  third,  the  specu- 
lative  reason   {intcllectus),  which   finds  the  opposites  rec- 


NICOLAS  OF  CUSA.  21 

oncilable  ;  and  highest  of  all  the  mystical,  supra-rational 
intuition  (visio  sine  comprehensione,  intuitio,  unio,  filiatio), 
for  which  the  opposites  coincide  in  the  infinite  unity.  The 
intuitive  culmination  of  knowledge,  in  which  the  soul  is 
united  with  God, — since  here  even  the  antithesis  of  subject 
and  object  disappears, — is  but  seldom  attained  ;  and  it  is 
difficult  to  keep  out  the  disturbing  symbols  and  images  of 
sense,  which  mingle  themselves  in  the  intuition.  But  it  is 
just  this  insight  into  the  incomprehensibility  of  the  infinite 
which  gives  us  a  true  knowledge  of  God;  this  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  "  learned  ignorance,"  the  docta  ignorantia.  The 
distinctions  between  these  several  stages  of  cognition  are 
not,  however,  to  be  understood  in  any  rigid  sense,  for  each 
higher  function  comprehends  the  lower,  and  is  active 
therein.  The  understanding  can  discriminate  only  when  it 
is  furnished  by  sensation  with  images  of  that  which  is  to  be 
discriminated,  the  reason  can  combine  only  when  the  under- 
standing has  supplied  the  results  of  analysis  as  material 
for  combination  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  under- 
standing which  is  present  in  sense  as  consciousness, 
and  the  reason  whose  unity  guides  the  understanding  in  its 
work  of  separation.  Thus  the  several  modes  of  cognition 
do  not  stand  for  independent  fundamental  faculties,  but  for 
connected  modifications  of  one  fundamental  power  which 
work  together  and  mutually  imply  one  another.  The  posi- 
tion that  an  intellectual  function  of  attention  and  discrimi- 
nation is  active  in  sensuous  perception,  is  a  view  entirely 
foreign  to  mediaeval  modes  of  thought  ;  for  the  Scholastics 
were  accustomed  to  make  sharp  divisions  between  the  cog- 
nitive faculties,  on  the  principle  that  particulars  are  felt 
through  sense  and  universals  thought  through  the  under- 
standing. The  idea  on  which  Nicolas  bases  his  argument  for 
immortality  has  also  an  entirely  modern  sound  :  viz.,  that 
space  and  time  are  products  of  the  understanding,  and, 
therefore,  can  have  no  power  over  the  spirit  which  pro- 
duces them  ;  for  the  author  is  higher  and  mightier  than 
the  product. 

The  confession  that  all  our  knowledge  is  conjecture  does 
not  simply  mean  that  absolute  and  exact  truth  remains  con- 
cealed from  us;  but  is  intended  at   the   same   time  to  en- 


THE   P KR lOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

courage  us  to  draw  as  near  as  possible  to  the  eternal  verity 
by  ever  truer  conjectures.  There  are  degrees  of  truth,  and 
our  surmises  arc  neither  absolutely  true  nor  entirely  false. 
Conjecture  becomes  error  only  when,  forgetting  the  inad- 
equacy of  human  knowledge,  we  rest  content  with  it  as  a 
final  solution  ;  the  Socratic  maxim,  "  I  know  that  I  am  ig- 
norant," should  not  lead  to  despairing  resignation  but  to 
courageous  further  inquiry.  The  duty  of  speculation  is  to 
penetrate  deeper  and  deeper  into  the  secrets  of  the  divine, 
even  though  the  ultimate  revelation  will  not  be  given  us 
until  the  hereafter.  The  fittest  instrument  of  speculation 
is  furnished  by  mathematics,  in  its  conception  of  the 
infinite  and  the  wonders  of  numerical  relations  :  as  on  the 
infinite  sphere  center  and  circumference  coincide,  so  God's 
essence  is  exalted  above  all  opposites  ;  and  as  the  other 
numbers  are  unfolded  from  the  unit,  so  the  finite  proceeds 
by  explication  from  the  infinite.  A  controlling  significance 
in  the  serial  construction  of  the  world  is  ascribed  to  the 
ten,  as  the  sum  of  the  first  four  numbers — as  reason,  under- 
standing, imagination,  and  sensibility  are  related  in  human 
cognition,  so  God,  spirit,  soul,  and  body,  or  infinity, 
thought,  life,  and  being  are  related  in  the  objective  sphere  ; 
so,  further,  the  absolute  necessity  of  God,  the  concrete 
necessity  of  the  universe,  the  actuality  of  individuals,  and  the 
possibility  of  matter.  Beside  the  quaternary  the  tern  also 
exercises  its  power — the  world  divides  into  the  stages  of 
eternity,  imperishability,  and  the  temporal  world  of  sense, 
or  truth,  probability,  and  confusion.  The  divine  trinity  is 
reflected  everywhere :  in  the  world  as  creator,  created, 
and  love  ;  in  the  mind  as  creative  force,  concept,  and  will. 
The  triunity  of  God  is  very  variously  explained — as  the 
subject,  object,  and  act  of  cognition  ;  as  creative  spirit, 
wisdom,  and  goodness  ;  as  being,  power,  and  deed  ;  and, 
preferably,  as  unity,  equality,  and  the  combination  of 
the  two. 

God  is  related  to  the  world  as  unity,  identity,  complicatioy 
to  otherness,  diversity,  explicatio,  as  necessity  to  contin- 
gency, as  completed  actuality  to  mere  possibility;  yet,  in 
such  a  way  that  the  otherness  participates  in  the  unity,  and 
receives  its  reality  from  this,  and  the  unity  does  not  have 


NICOLAS   OF   CUSA.  23 

the  otherness  confronting  it,  outside  it.  God  is  triune  only 
as  the  Creator  of  the  world,  and  in  relation  to  it ;  in  him- 
self he  is  absolute  unity  and  infinity,  to  which  nothing  dis- 
parate stands  opposed,  which  is  just  as  much  all  things  as 
not  all  things,  and  which,  as  the  Areopagite  had  taught  of 
old,  is  better  comprehended  by  negations  than  by  affirma- 
tions. To  deny  that  he  is  light,  truth,  spirit,  is  more  true 
than  to  affirm  it,  for  he  is  infinitely  greater  than  anything 
which  can  be  expressed  in  words  ;  he  is  the  Unutterable, 
the  Unknowable,  the  supremely  one  and  the  supremely  abso- 
lute. In  the  world,  each  thing  has  things  greater  and 
smaller  by  its  side,  but  God  is  the  absolutely  greatest  and 
smallest ;  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  the  coinci- 
dentia  oppositoriun,  the  absolute  maximum  and  the  absolute 
minimum  coincide.  That  which  in  the  world  exists  as  con- 
cretely determinate  and  particular,  is  in  God  in  a  simple 
and  universal  way  ;  and  that  which  here  is  present  as  incom- 
pleted striving,  and  as  possibility  realizing  itself  by  gradual 
development,  is  in  God  completed  activity.  He  is  the 
realization  of  all  possibility,  the  Can-be  or  Can-is  (possest) ; 
and  since  this  absolute  actuality  is  the  presupposition  and 
cause  of  all  finite  ability  and  action,  it  may  be  uncondition- 
ally designated  ability  {posse  ipsum),  in  antithesis  to  all  de- 
terminate manifestations  of  force  ;  namely,  to  all  ability  to 
be,  live,  feel,  think,  and  will. 

However  much  these  definitions,  conceived  in  harmony 
with  the  dualistic  view  of  Christianity,  accentuate  the  anti- 
thesis between  God  and  the  world,  this  is  elsewhere  much 
softened,  nay  directly  denied,  in  favor  of  a  pantheistic 
view  which  points  forward  to  the  modern  period.  Side  by 
side  with  the  assertion  that  there  is  no  proportion  whatever 
between  the  infinite  and  the  finite,  the  following  naively 
presents  itself,  in  open  contradiction  to  the  former:  God 
excels  the  reason  just  as  much  as  the  latter  is  superior  to 
the  understanding,  and  the  understanding  to  sensibility,  or 
he  is  related  to  thought  as  thought  to  life,  and  life  to  being. 
Nay,  Nicolas  makes  even  bolder  statements  than  these, 
when  he  calls  the  universe  a  sensuous  and  mutable  God, 
man  a  human  God  or  a  humanly  contracted  infinity,  the 
creation  a  created  God  or  a  limited   infinity;  thus  hinting 


I  t  TUE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

tli.it  God  and  the  world  arc  at  bottom  essentially  alike, 
differing  only  in  the  form  of  their  existence,  that  it  is  one 
and  the  same  being  and  action  which  manifests  itself  abso- 
lutely in  God,  relatively  and  in  a  limited  way  in  the  system 
of  creation.  It  was  chiefly  three  modern  ideas  which  led 
the  Cusan  on  from  dualism  to  pantheism — the  boundless- 
ness of  the  universe,  the  connection  of  all  being,  and  the 
all-comprehensive  richness  of  individuality.  Endlessness 
belongs  to  the  universe  as  well  as  to  God,  only  its  endlessness 
is  not  an  absolute  one,  beyond  space  and  time,  but  weak- 
ened and  concrete,  namely  unlimited  extension  in  space 
and  unending  duration  in  time.  Similarly,  the  universe  is 
unity,  yet  not  a  unity  absolutely  above  multiplicity  and 
diversity,  but  one  which  is  divided  into  many  members  and 
obscured  thereby.  Even  the  individual  is  infinite  in  a  cer- 
tain sense  ;  for,  in  its  own  way,  it  bears  in  itself  all  that  is, 
it  mirrors  the  whole  world  from  its  limited  point  of  view,  is 
an  abridged,  compressed  representation  of  the  universe. 
As  the  members  of  the  body,  the  eye,  the  arm,  the  foot,  in- 
teract in  the  closest  possible  way,  and  no  one  of  them  can 
dispense  with  the  rest,  so  each  thing  is  connected  with  each, 
different  from  it  and  yet  in  harmony  with  it,  so  each  con- 
tains all  the  others  and  is  contained  by  them.  All  is  in  all, 
for  all  is  in  the  universe  and  in  God,  as  the  universe  and 
God  in  all.  In  a  still  higher  degree  man  is  a  microcosm 
{parvus  miindus),  a  mirror  of  the  All,  since  he  not  merely, 
like  other  beings,  actually  has  in  himself  all  that  exists,  but 
also  has  a  knowledge  of  this  richness,  is  capable  of  develop- 
ing it  into  conscious  images  of  things.  And  it  is  just  this 
which  constitutes  the  perfection  of  the  whole  and  of  the 
parts,  that  the  higher  is  in  the  lower,  the  cause  in  the  effect, 
the  genus  in  the  individual,  the  soul  in  the  body,  reason  in 
the  senses,  and  conversely.  To  perfect,  is  simply  to  make 
active  a  potential  possession,  to  unfold  capacities  and 
to  elevate  the  unconscious  into  consciousness.  Here 
we  have  the  germ  of  the  philosophy  of  Bruno  and  of 
Leibnitz. 

As  we  have  noticed  a  struggle  between  two  opposite 
tendencies,  one  dualistic  and  Christian,  one  pantheistic  and 
modern,  in  the  theology  of  Nicolas,  so  at  many  other  points 


A' I  COLAS   OF   CUSA.  25 

a  conflict  between  the  mediaeval  and  the  modern  view  of 
the  world,  of  which  our  philosopher  is  himself  unconscious, 
becomes  evident  to  the  student.  It  is  impossible  to  follow 
out  the  details  of  this  interesting  opposition,  so  we  shall  only 
attempt  to  distinguish  in  a  rough  way  the  beginnings  of  the 
new  from  the  remnants  of  the  old.  Modern  is  his  interest 
in  the  ancient  philosophers,  of  whom  Pythagoras,  Plato,  and 
the  Neoplatonists  especially  attract  him  ;  modern,  again, 
his  interest  in  natural  science*  (he  teaches  not  only  the 
boundlessness  of  the  world,  but  also  the  motion  of  the  earth) ; 
his  high  estimation  of  mathematics,  although  he  often 
utilizes  this  merely  in  a  fanciful  symbolism  of  numbers; 
his  optimism  (the  world  an  image  of  the  divine,  everything 
perfect  of  its  kind,  the  bad  simply  a  halt  on  the  way  to  the 
good);  his  intellectualism  (knowing  the  primal  function  and 
chief  mission  of  the  spirit ;  faith  an  undeveloped  knowledge; 
volition  and  emotion,  as  is  self-evident,  incidental  results 
of  thought ;  knowledge  a  leading  back  of  the  creature  to 
God  as  its  source,  hence  the  counterpart  of  creation)  ; 
modern,  finally,  the  form  and  application  given  to  the 
Stoic-Neoplatonic  concept  of  individuality,  and  the  ideal- 
istic view  which  resolves  the  objects  of  thought  into  prod- 
ucts thereof. f  This  last  position,  indeed,  is  limited  by 
the  lingering  influence  of  nominalism,  which  holds  the  con- 
cepts of  the  mind  to  be  merely  abstract  copies,  and  not 
archetypes  of  things.  Moreover,  explicatio,  evolutio,  un- 
folding, as  yet  does  not  always  have  the  meaning  of  develop- 
ment to-day,  of  progressive  advance.  It  denotes,  quite 
neutrally,  the  production  of  a  multiplicity  from  a  unity,  in 
which  the  former  has  lain  confined,  no  matter  whether  this 
multiplicity  and  its  procession  signify  enhancement  or 
attenuation.  For  the  most  part,  in  fact,  involution,  com- 
plicatio  (which,  moreover,  always  means  merely  a  primal, 
germinal  condition,  never,  as  in  Leibnitz,  the  return  thereto) 

*  The  attention  of  our  philosopher  was  called  to  the  natural  sciences,  and  thus 
also  to  geography,  which  at  this  time  was  springing  into  new  life,  by  his  friend 
Paul  Toscanelli,  the  Florentine.  Nicolas  was  the  first  to  have  the  map  of  Ger- 
many engraved  (cf.  S.  Ruge  in  Globus,  vol.  Ix.,  No.  1,  1891),  which,  however,  was 
not  completed  until  long  after  his  death,  and  issued  in  141)1. 

f  On  the  modern  elements  in  his  theory  of  the  state  and  of  right,  cf.  Gierke, 
Das  deutsche  Genossenschaftsrecht,  vol.  iii.  ^  1 1,   1881. 


20  THE   PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

represents  the  more  perfect  condition.  The  chief  examples 
of  the  relation  of  involution  and  evolution  are  the  prin- 
ciples in  which  science  is  involved  and  out  of  which  it  is 
unfolded  ;  the  unit,  which  is  related  to  numbers  in  a  similar 
way  ;  the  spirit  and  the  cognitive  operations  ;  God  and  his 
creatures.  However  obscure  and  unskillful  this  application 
of  the  idea  of  development  may  appear,  yet  it  is  indisputa- 
ble that  a  discovery  of  great  promise  has  been  made,  ac- 
companied by  a  joyful  consciousness  of  its  fruitfulness.  Of 
the  numberless  features  which  point  backward  to  the  Middle 
Ages,  only  one  need  be  mentioned,  the  large  space  taken 
up  by  speculations  concerning  the  God-man  (the  whole 
third  book  of  the  De  Docta  Ignorant  id),  and  by  those  con- 
cerning the  angels.  Yet  even  here  a  change  is  noticeable, 
for  the  earthly  and  the  divine  are  brought  into  most  inti- 
mate relation,  while  in  Thomas  Aquinas,  for  instance,  they 
form  twro  entirely  separate  worlds.  In  short,  the  new  view 
of  the  world  appears  in  Nicolas  still  bound  on  every  hand 
by  mediaeval  conceptions.  A  century  and  a  half  passed  be- 
fore the  fetters,  grown  rusty  in  the  meanwhile,  broke  under 
the  bolder  touch  of  Giordano  Bruno. 

2.  The  Revival  of  Ancient  Philosophy  and  the  Oppo- 
sition to  it. 

Italy  is  the  home  of  the  Renaissance  and  the  birthplace 
of  important  new  ideas  which  give  the  intellectual  life  of 
the  sixteenth  century  its  character  of  brave  endeavor 
after  high  and  distant  ends.  The  enthusiasm  for  ancient 
literature  already  aroused  by  the  native  poets,  Dante  (1300), 
Petrarch  (1341),  and  Boccaccio  (1350),  was  nourished  by  the 
influx  of  Greek  scholars,  part  of  whom  came  in  pur- 
suance of  an  invitation  to  the  Council  of  Ferrara  and 
Florence  (1438)  called  in  behalf  of  the  union  of  the 
Churches  (among  these  were  Pletho  and  his  pupil  Bessarion  ; 
Nicolas  Cusanus  was  one  of  the  legates  invited),  while  part 
were  fugitives  from  Constantinople  after  its  capture  by  the 
Turks  in  1453.  The  Platonic  Academy,  whose  most  cele- 
brated member,  Marsilius  Ficinus,  translated  Plato  and  the 
Neoplatonists  into  Latin,  was  founded  in  1440  on  the  sug- 


REVIVAL    OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY.  27 

gestion  of  Georgius  Gemistus  Pletho*  under  the  patronage 
of  Cosimo  dei  Medici.  The  writings  of  Pletho  ("  On  the 
Distinction  between  Plato  and  Aristotle"),  of  Bessarion 
{Adversus  Calumniatorem  Platonis,  1469,  in  answer  to  the 
Comparatio  Aristotelis  et  Platonis,  1464,  an  attack  by  the 
Aristotelian,  George  of  Trebizond,  on  Pletho's  work),  and 
of  Ficinus  {Theologia  Platonica,  1482),  show  that  the  Platon- 
ism  which  they  favored  was  colored  by  religious,  mystical, 
and  Neoplatonic  elements.  If  for  Bessarion  and  Ficinus, 
just  as  for  the  Eclectics  of  the  later  Academy,  there  was 
scarcely  any  essential  distinction  between  the  teachings  of 
Plato,  of  Aristotle,  and  of  Christianity  ;  this  confusion  of 
heterogeneous  elements  was  soon  carried  much  farther,  when 
the  two  Picos  (John  Pico  of  Mirandola,  died  1494,  and  his 
nephew  Francis,  died  1533)  and  Johann  Reuchlin  {De  Verbo 
Mirifico,  1494;  De  Arte  Cabbalistica,  15 17),  who  had  been  in- 
fluenced by  the  former,  introduced  the  secret  doctrines  of 
the  Jewish  Cabala  into  the  Platonic  philosophy,  and  Cor- 
nelius Agrippa  von  Nettesheim  of  Cologne  {De  Occulta  Philo- 
sophia,  1 5 10;  cf.  Sigwart,  Kleine  Schriften,  vol.  i.  p.  1  scq.) 
made  the  mixture  still  worse  by  the  addition  of  the  magic 
art.  The  impulse  of  the  modern  spirit  to  subdue  nature  is 
here  already  apparent,  only  that  it  shows  inexperience  in  the 
selection  of  its  instruments  ;  before  long,  however,  nature 
will  willingly  unveil  to  observation  and  calm  reflection 
the  secrets  which  she  does  not  yield  to  the  compulsion  of 
magic. 

A  similar  romantic  figure  was  Phillipus  Aureolus  Theo- 
phrastus  Bombast  Paracelsusfvon  Hohenheim  (1493-1541), 
a  traveled  Swiss,  who  endeavored  to  reform  medicine  from 
the  standpoint  of  chemistry.  Philosophy  for  Paracelsus  is 
knowledge  of  nature,  in  which  observation  and  thought  must 
co-operate;  speculation  apart  from  experience  and  worship 

*  Pletho  died  at  an  advanced  age  in  1450.  His  chief  work,  the  Nofjot,  was  given 
to  the  flames  by  his  Aristotelian  opponent,  Georgius  Scholarius,  surnamed  Gen- 
nadius,  Patriarch  of  Constantinople.  Portions  of  it  only,  which  had  previously 
become  known,  have  been  preserved.  On  Pletho's  life  and  teachings,  cf.  Fritz 
Schultze,  G.  G.  Plethon,  Jena,  1874. 

f  On  Paracelsus  cf.  Sigwart,  Kleine  Schriften,  vol.  i.  p.  25  seq.j  Eucken, 
Beiträge  zur  Gesehichteder  neueren  Philosophie,  p.  32  seq.;  Lasswitz,  Geschichte 
der  Atomistik,  vol.  i.  p.  294  seq. 


TUE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION, 

of  the  paper-wisdom  of  the  ancients  lead  to  no  result. 
The  world  is  a  living  whole,  which,  like  man,  the 
microcosm,  in  whom  the  whole  content  of  the  macro- 
cosm is  concentrated  as  in  an  extract,  runs  its  life  course. 
Originally  all  things  were  promiscuously  intermingled 
in  a  unity,  the  God-created  prima  materia,  as  though  in- 
closed in  a  germ,  whence  the  manifold,  with  its  various 
forms  and  colors,  proceeded  by  separation.  The  de- 
velopment then  proceeds  in  such  a  way  that  in  each  genus 
that  is  perfected  which  is  posited  therein,  and  does  not  cease 
until,  at  the  last  day,  all  that  is  possible  in  nature  and  his- 
tory shall  have  fulfilled  itself.  But  the  one  indwelling  life 
of  nature  lives  in  all  the  manifold  forms  ;  the  same  laws 
rule  in  the  human  body  as  in  the  universe;  that  which 
works  secretly  in  the  former  lies  open  to  the  view  in  the 
latter,  and  the  world  gives  the  clew  to  the  knowledge  of 
man.  Natural  becoming  is  brought  about  by  the  chemical 
separation  and  coming  together  of  substances  :  the  ulti- 
mate constituents  revealed  by  analysis  are  the  three 
fundamental  substances  or  primitive  essences,  quicksilver, 
sulphur,  and  salt,  by  which,  however,  something  more  prin- 
cipiant  is  understood  than  the  empirical  substances  bearing 
these  names  :  mercurius  means  that  which  makes  bodies 
liquid, sulfur,  that  which  makes  them  combustible,^^/,  that 
which  makes  them  fixed  and  rigid.  From  these  are  com- 
pounded the  four  elements,  each  of  which  is  ruled  by 
elemental  spirits — earth  by  gnomes  or  pygmies,  water  by 
undines  or  nymphs,  air  by  sylphs,  fire  by  salamanders  (cf.  with 
this,  and  with  Paracelsus's  theory  of  the  world  as  a  whole, 
Faust's  two  monologues  in  Goethe's  drama)  ;  which  are  to 
be  understood  as  forces  or  sublimated  substances,  not  as 
personal,  demoniacal  beings.  To  each  individual  being  there 
is  ascribed  a  vital  principle,  the  Archeus,  an  individualiza- 
tion of  the  general  force  of  nature,  Vulcanus ;  so  also  to 
men.  Disease  is  a  checking  of  this  vital  principle  by  con- 
trary powers,  which  are  partly  of  a  terrestrial  and  partly  of 
a  sidereal  nature  ;  and  the  choice  of  medicines  is  to  be  de- 
termined by  their  ability  to  support  the  Archeus  against 
its  enemies.  Man  is,  however,  superiorto  nature — he  is  not 
merely  the  universal  animal,  inasmuch  as  he  is  completely 


REVIVAL    OF  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY.  29 

that  which  other  beings  are  only  in  a  fragmentary  way  ; 
but,  as  the  image  of  God,  he  has  also  an  eternal  element  in 
him,  and  is  capable  of  attaining  perfection  through  the  ex- 
ercise of  his  rational  judgment.  Paracelsus  distinguishes 
three  worlds:  the  elemental  or  terrestrial,  the  astral  or  ce- 
lestial, and  the  spiritual  or  divine.  To  the  three  worlds, 
which  stand  in  relations  of  sympathetic  interaction,  there 
correspond  in  man  the  body,  which  nourishes  itself  on  the 
elements,  the  spirit,  whose  imagination  receives  its  food, 
sense  and  thoughts,  from  the  spirits  of  the  stars,  and,  finally, 
the  immortal  soul,  which  finds  its  nourishment  in  faith  in 
Christ.  Hence  natural  philosophy,  astronomy,  and  the- 
ology are  the  pillars  of  anthropology,  and  ultimately  of 
medicine.  This  fantastic  physic  of  Paracelsus  found  many 
adherents  both  in  theory  and  in  practice.*  Among  those 
who  accepted  and  developed  it  may  be  named  R.  Fludd 
(died  1637),  and  the  two  Van  Helmonts,  father  and  son 
(died  1644  and  1699). 

Beside  the  Platonic  philosophy,  others  of  the  ancient 
systems  were  also  revived.  Stoicism  was  commended  by 
Justus  Lipsius  (died  1606)  and  Caspar  Schoppe  (Scioppius, 
born  1562);  Epicureanism  was  revived  by  Gassendi 
(1647),  and  rhetorizing  logicians  went  back  to  Cicero  and 
Quintilian.  Among  the  latter  were  Laurentius  Valla  (died 
1457)  J  R-  Agricola  (died  1485)  ;  the  Spaniard,  Ludovicus 
Vives  (1531),  who  referred  inquiry  from  the  authority  of 
Aristotle  to  the  methodical  utilization  of  experience ;  and 
Marius  Nizolius  (1553),  whose  Antibarbarus  was  reissued  by 
Leibnitz  in  1670. 

The  adherents  of  Aristotle  were  divided  into  two  parties, 
one  of  which  relied  on  the  naturalistic  interpretation  of  the 
Greek  exegete,  Alexander  of  Aphrodisias  (about  200  A.  D.), 
the  other  on  the  pantheistic  interpretation  of  the  Arabian 
commentator,  Averroes  (died  1198).  The  conflict  over 
the  question  of  immortality,  carried  on  especially  in 
Padua,  was  the  culmination  of   the  battle.     The    Alexan- 

*  The  influence  of  Paracelsus,  as  of  Vives  and  Campanella.  is  evident  in  the 
great  educator,  Amos  Comenius  (Komensky,  1592-1670),  whose  pansophical 
treatises  appeared  in  1637-68.  On  Comenius  cf.  Pappenhcim,  Berlin,  1871  ; 
Kvacsala,  Doctor's  Dissertation,  Leipsic,  1886  ;  Walter  Mueller,  Dresden,  1887. 


3o  THE   PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

drists  asserted  that,  recording  to  Aristotle,  the  soul  was 
mortal,  the  Averroists,  that  the  rational  part  which  is 
common  to  all  men  was  immortal  ;  while  to  this  were 
added  the  further  questions,  if  and  how  the  Aristotelian 
view  could  be  reconciled  with  the  Church  doctrine,  which 
demanded  a  continued  personal  existence.  The  most 
eminent  Aristotelian  of  the  Renaissance,  Petrus  Pompona- 
tius  {De Immortalite  Animce,  1516;  De  Fato,  Libero  Arbitrio, 
Providentia  et  Prcedestinatione),  was  on  the  side  of  the  Alex- 
andrists.  Achillini  and  Niphus  fought  on  the  other  side. 
Caesalpin  (died  1603),  Zabarella,  and  Cremonini  assumed  an 
intermediate,  or,  at  least,  a  less  decided  position.  Still 
others,  as  Faber  Stapulensis  in  Paris  (1500),  and  Deside- 
rius  Erasmus  (1520),  were  more  interested  in  securing  a  cor- 
rect text  of  Aristotle's  works  than  in  his  philosophical 
principles. 

Among  the  Anti-Aristotelians  only  two  famous  names 
need  be  mentioned,  that  of  the  influential  Frenchman, 
Petrus  Ramus,  and  the  German,  Taurellus.  Pierre  de  la 
Ramee  (assassinated  in  the  massacre  of  St.  Bartholomew, 
1572),  attacked  the  (unnatural  and  useless)  Aristotelian 
logic  in  his  Aristotelicce  Animadversiones,  1543,  objecting, 
with  the  Ciceronians  mentioned  above,  to  the  separation 
of  logic  and  rhetoric  ;  and  attempted  a  new  logic  of  his 
own,  in  his  lnstitntiones  Dialectics,  which,  in  spite  of  its 
formalism,  gained  acceptance,  especially  in  Germany.* 
Nicolaus  Oechslein,  Latinized  Taurellus  (born  in  1547  at 
Mömpelgard  ;  at  his  death,  in  1606,  professor  of  medicine  in 
the  University  of  Altdorf),  stood  quite  alone  because  of  his 
independent  position  in  reference  to  all  philosophical  and 
religious  parties.  His  most  important  works  were  his  Philo- 
sophic Triumpkus,  1573;  Synopsis  Aristotelis  Metaphysicce, 
1596;  Alpes  Cczsce  (against  Caesalpin,  and  the  title  pun- 
ning on  his  name),  1597;  and  De  Rernm  Eternit  ate,  i6o4.f 
The  thought  of  Taurellus  inclines  toward  the  ideal  of  a 
Christian  philosophy  ;  which,  however,  Scholasticism,  in  his 

*  On  Ramus  cf.  Waddington's  treatises,  one  in  Latin,  Paris,  1849,  the  other  in 
French.  Paris,  1855. 

t  SchmidSchwarzenburg  has  written  on  Taurellus,  i860,  2d  ed.,  1864. 


OPPOSITIOX    TO  ANCIENT  PHILOSOPHY.  31 

view,  did  not  attain,  inasmuch  as  its  thought  was  heathen 
in  its  blind  reverence  for  Aristotle,  even  though  its  faith 
was  Christian.  In  order  to  heal  this  breach  between  the 
head  and  the  heart,  it  is  necessary  in  religion  to  return 
from  confessional  distinctions  to  Christianity  itself,  and 
in  philosophy,  to  abandon  authority  for  the  reason.  We 
should  not  seek  to  be  Lutherans  or  Calvinists,  but  simply 
Christians,  and  we  should  judge  on  rational  grounds,  in- 
stead of  following  Aristotle,  Averroes,  or  Thomas  Aquinas. 
Anyone  who  does  not  aim  at  the  harmony  of  theology  and 
philosophy,  is  neither  a  Christian  nor  a  philosopher.  One 
and  the  same  God  is  the  primal  source  of  both  rational  and 
revealed  truth.  Philosophy  is  the  basis  of  theology,  the- 
ology the  criterion  and  complement  of  philosophy.  The 
one  starts  with  effects  evident  to  the  senses  and  leads  to 
the  suprasensible,  to  the  First  Cause ;  the  other  follows 
the  reverse  course.  To  philosophy  belongs  all  that  Adam 
knew  or  could  know  before  the  fall  ;  had  there  been  no  sin, 
there  would  have  been  no  other  than  philosophical  knowl- 
edge. But  after  the  fall,  the  reason,  which  informs  us,  it  is 
true,  of  the  moral  law,  but  not  of  the  divine  purpose  of 
salvation,  would  have  led  us  to  despair,  since  neither  pun- 
ishment nor  virtue  could  justify  us,  if  revelation  did  not 
teach  us  the  wonders  of  grace  and  redemption.  Although 
Taurellus  thus  softens  the  opposition  between  theology 
and  philosophy,  which  had  been  most  sharply  expressed  in 
the  doctrine  of  "  twofold  truth  "  (that  which  is  true  in 
philosophy  may  be  false  in  theology,  and  conversely),  and 
endeavors  to  bring  the  two  into  harmony,  the  antithesis 
between  God  and  the  world  still  remains  for  him  im- 
movably fixed.  God  is  not  things,  though  he  is  all.  He  is 
pure  affirmation  ;  all  without  him  is  composed,  as  it  were, 
of  being  and  nothing,  and  can  neither  be  nor  be  known 
independently:  negatio  nori  nihil  est,  alias  nee  esset  nee  in- 
telligeretur,  sed  limitatio  est  affirmationis.  Simple  being  or 
simple  affirmation  is  equivalent  to  infinity,  eternity,  unity, 
uniqueness, — properties  which  do  not  belong  to  the  world. 
He  who  posits  things  as  eternal,  sublates  God.  God  and 
the  world  are  opposed  to  each  other  as  infinite  cause  and 
finite  effect.     Moreover,  as  it  is  our  spirit  which    philoso- 


THE  PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

phizes  and  not  God's  spirit  in  us,  so  the  faith  through 
which  man  appropriates  Christ's  merit  is  a  free  action  of 
the  human  spirit,  the  capacity  for  which  is  inborn,  not  in- 
fused from  above;  in  it,  God  acts  merely  as  an  auxiliary  or 
remote  cause,  by  removing  the  obstacles  which  hinder  the 
operation  of  the  power  of  faith.  With  this  anti-pantheistic 
tendency  he  combines  an  anti-intellectualistic  one — being 
and  production  precedes  and  stands  higher  than  contempla- 
tion ;  God's  activity  does  not  consist  in  thought  but  in  pro- 
duction, and  human  blessedness,  not  in  the  knowledge  but 
the  love  of  God,  even  though  the  latter  presupposes  the 
former.  While  man,  as  an  end  in  himself,  is  immortal — 
and  the  whole  man,  not  his  soul  merely — the  world  of  sense, 
which  has  been  created  only  for  the  conservation  of  man 
(his  procreation  and  probation),  must  disappear  ;  above  this 
world,  however,  a  higher  rears  its  walls  to  subserve  man's 
eternal    happiness. 

The  high  regard  which  Leibnitz  expressed  for  Taurellus 
may  be  in  part  explained  by  the  many  anticipations 
of  his  own  thoughts  to  be  found  in  the  earlier  writer. 
The  intimate  relation  into  which  sensibility  and  under» 
standing  are  brought  is  an  instance  of  this  from  the 
theory  of  knowledge.  Receptivity  is  not  passivity,  but 
activity  arrested  (through  the  body).  All  knowledge  is 
inborn;  all  men  are  potential  philosophers  (and,  so  far  as 
they  are  loyal  to  conscience,  Christians)  ;  the  spirit  is  a 
thinking  and  a  thinkable  universe.  Taurellus's  philosophy 
of  nature,  recognizing  the  relative  truth  of  atomism,  makes 
the  world  consist  of  manifold  simple  substances  com- 
bined into  formal  unity  :  he  calls  it  a  well  constructed 
system  of  wholes.  A  discussion  of  the  origin  of  evil  is  also 
given,  with  a  solution  based  on  the  existence  and  misuse  of 
freedom.  Finally,  it  is  to  be  mentioned  to  the  great  credit 
of  Taurellus,  that,  like  his  younger  contemporaries,  Galileo 
and  Kepler,  he  vigorously  opposed  the  Aristotelian  and 
Scholastic  animation  of  the  material  world  and  the  anthro- 
pomorphic conception  of  its  forces,  thus  preparing  the 
way  for  the  modern  view  of  nature  to  be  perfected  by 
Newton. 


ITALIAN  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE.  33 

3.  The  Italian  Philosophy  of  Nature. 

We  turn  now  from  the  restorers  of  ancient  doctrines  and 
their  opponents  to  the  men  who,  continuing  the  opposition 
to  the  authority  of  Aristotle,  point  out  new  paths  for  the 
study  of  nature.  The  physician,  Hieronymus  Cardanus  of 
Milan  (1501-76),  whose  inclinations  toward  the  fanciful 
were  restrained,  though  not  suppressed,  by  his  mathemat- 
ical training,  may  be  considered  the  forerunner  of  the 
school.  While  the  people  should  accept  the  dogmas  of 
the  Church  with  submissive  faith,  the  thinker  may  and 
should  subordinate  all  things  to  the  truth.  The  wise  man 
belongs  to  that  rare  class  who  neither  deceive  nor  are  de- 
ceived ;  others  are  either  deceivers  or  deceived,  or  both. 
In  his  theory  of  nature,  Cardanus  advances  two  prin- 
ciples: one  passive,  matter  (the  three  cold  and  moist 
elements),  and  an  active,  formative  one,  the  world-soul, 
which,  pervading  the  All  and  bringing  it  into  unity,  ap- 
pears as  warmth  and  light.  The  causes  of  motion  are 
attraction  and  repulsion,  which  in  higher  beings  become 
love  and  hate.  Even  superhuman  spirits,  the  demons,  are 
subject  to  the  mechanical  laws  of  nature. 

The  standard  bearer  of  the  Italian  philosophy  of  nature 
was  Bernardinus  Telesius"*  of  Cosenza  (1508-88;  De  Rerum 
Natura  juxta  Propria  Principia,  1565,  enlarged  1586), 
the  founder  of  a  scientific  society  in  Naples  called  the  Tele- 
sian,  or  after  the  name  of  his  birthplace,  the  Cosentian 
Academy.  Telesius  maintained  that  the  Aristotelian  doc- 
trine must  be  replaced  by  an  unprejudiced  empiricism  ;  that 
nature  must  be  explained  from  itself,  and  by  as  few  princi- 
ples as  possible.  Beside  inert  matter,  this  requires  only 
two  active  forces,  on  whose  interaction  all  becoming  and 
all  life  depend.  These  are  warmth,  which  expands,  and 
cold,  which  contracts  ;  the  former   resides  in  the  sun  and 

*Cf.  on  Telesius,  Fiorentino,  2  vols.,  Naples,  1872-74  ;  K.  Heiland,  Er- 
kenntnisslehre und  Ethik  des  Telesius,  Doctor's  Dissertation  at  Leipsic,  1891. 
Further,  Kixner  and  Siber,  Leben  und  Lehrmeinungen  berühmter  Physiker  am 
Ende  des  XVI.  und  am  Anfang  des  XVII.  Jahrhunderts,  Sulzbach  (1 819-26), 
7  Hefte,  2d  ed.,  1829.  Hefte  2-6  discuss  Cardanus,  Telesius,  Patritius,  Bruno, 
and  Campanella  ;  the  first  is  devoted  to  Paracelsus,  and  the  seventh  to  the 
older  Van  Helmont  (Joh.  Bapt.). 


34  THE  PER  ion   OF   TRANSITION. 

t hence  proceeds,  the  hitter  is  situated  in  the  earth.  Al- 
though Telesius  acknowledges  an  immaterial,  immortal 
soul,  he  puts  the  emphasis  on  sensuous  experience,  without 
which  the  understanding  is  incapable  of  attaining  certain 
knowledge.  lie  is  a  sensationalist  both  in  the  theory  of 
knowledge  and  in  ethics,  holding  the  functions  of  judgment 
and  thought  deducible  from  the  fundamental  power  of  per- 
ception, and  considering  the  virtues  different  manifesta- 
tions of  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  (which  he  ascribes 
to  matter  as  well). 

With  the  name  of  Telesius  we  usually  associate  that  of 
Franciscus  Patritius  (1529-97),  professor  of  the  Platonic 
philosophy  in  Ferrara  and  Rome  {Discussioncs  Peripateticce, 
1 581;  Nova  de  Univcrsis  Philosophia,  1591),  who,  com- 
bining Neoplatonic  and  Telesian  principles,  holds  that  the 
incorporeal  or  spiritual  light  emanates  from  the  divine 
original  light,  in  which  all  reality  is  seminally  contained  ; 
the  heavenly  or  ethereal  light  from  the  incorporeal ;  and  the 
earthly  or  corporeal,  from  the  heavenly — while  the  original 
light  divides  into  three  persons,  the  One  and  All  (Unomnid), 
unity  or  life,  and  spirit. 

The  Italian  philosophy  of  nature  culminates  in  Bruno 
and  Campanella,  of  whom  the  former,  although  he  is  the 
earlier,  appears  the  more  advanced  because  of  his  freer 
attitude  toward  the  Church.  Giordano  Bruno  was  born  in 
1548  at  Nola,  and  educated  at  Naples;  abandoning  his 
membership  in  the  Dominican  Order,  he  lived,  with  various 
changes  of  residence,  in  France,  England,  and  Germany. 
Returning  to  his  native  land,  he  was  arrested  in  Venice  and 
imprisoned  for  seven  years  at  Rome,  where,  on  February 
17,  1600,  he  suffered  death  at  the  stake,  refusing  to  re- 
cant. (The  same  fate  overtook  his  fellow-countryman, 
Vanini,  in  1619,  at  Toulouse.)  Besides  three  didactic  poems 
in  Latin  (Frankfort,  1 591),  the  Italian  dialogues,  Delia 
Causa.  Principio  ed  Uno,  Venice,  1584  (German  translation 
by  Lasson,  1872),  are  of  chief  importance.  The  Italian 
treatises  have  been  edited  by  Wagner,  Leipsic,  1829,  and 
by  De  Lagarde,  2  vols.,  Göttingen,  1888;  the  Latin  ap- 
peared at  Naples,  in  3  vols.,  1880,  1886,  and  1 891.  Of  a 
passionate  and  imaginative  nature,  Bruno  was  not  an  essen- 


4  ** 

# 

ITALIAN  PHILOSOPHY  OF.  NATURE.  35 

tially  creative  thinker,  but  borrowed  the  ideas  which  he  pro- 
claimed with  burning  enthusiasm  and  lofty  eloquence,  and 
through  which  he  has  exercised  great  influence  on  later 
philosophy,  from  Telesius  and  Nicolas,  complaining  the 
while  that  the  priestly  garb  of  the  latter  sometimes  hin- 
dered the  free  movement  of  his  thought.  Beside  these 
thinkers  he  has  a  high  regard  for  Pythagoras,  Plato,  Lucre- 
tius, Raymundus  Lullus,  and  Copernicus  (died  1543).*  He. 
forms  the  transition  link  between  Nicolas  of  Cusa  and 
Leibnitz,  as  also  the  link  between  Cardanus  and  Spinoza. 
"To  Spinoza  Bruno  offered  the  naturalistic  conception  of 
God  (God  is  the  "first  cause"  immanent  in  the  universe, 
to  which  self-manifestation  or  self-revelation  is  essential ; 
He  is  natura  naturalis,  the  numberless  worlds  are  natura 
naturata);  Leibnitz  he  anticipated  by  his  doctrine  of  the 
"monads,"  the  individual,  imperishable  elements  of  the 
existent,  in  which  matter  and  form,  incorrectly  divorced  by 
Aristotle  as  though  two  antithetical  principles,  constitute 
one  unity.  The  characteristic  traits  of  the  philosophy  of 
Bruno  are  the  lack  of  differentiation  between  pantheistic 
and  individualistic  elements,  the  mediaeval  animation  and 
endlessness  of  the  world,  and,  finally,  the  religious  relation 
to  the  universe  or  the  extravagant  deification  of  nature 
(nature  and  the  world  are  entirely  synonymous,  the  All, 
the  world-soul,  and  God  nearly  so,  while  even  matter  is 
called  a  divine  being). f 

Bruno  completes  the  Copernican  picture  of  the  world  by 
doing  away  with  the  motionless  circle  of  fixed  stars  with  which 
Copernicus,  and  even  Kepler,  had  thought  our  solar  system 

*  Nicolaus  Copernicus  (Koppernik  ;  1473-1543)  was  born  at  Thorn  ;  studied 
astronomy,  law,  and  medicine  at  Cracow,  Bologna,  and  I'adua  ;  and  died  a  Canon 
of  Frauenberg.  His  treatise,  De  Revolutionibus  Orbium  Calestium,  which 
was  dedicated  to  Pope  Paul  III.,  appeared  at  Nuremberg  in  1543,  with  a  preface 
added  to  it  by  the  preacher,  Andreas  Osiander,  which  calls  the  heliocentric 
system  merely  an  hypothesis  advanced  as  a  basis  for  astronomical  calculations. 
Copernicus  reached  his  theory  rather  by  speculation  than  by  observation  ;  its 
first  suggestion  came  from  the  Pythagorean  doctrine  of  the  motion  of  the  earth. 
On  Copernicus  cf.  I.eop.  Prowe,  vol.  i.  Copernicus'  Leben),  vol.  ii.  {Urkunden), 
Berlin,  1883-84  ;  and  K.  Lohmeyer  in  Sybel's  Historische  Zeitschrift,  vol.  lvii.„ 
1887. 

f  Cf.  on  Bruno,  II.  Brunnhofer  (somewhat  too  enthusiastic),  Leipsic,  1882; 
also  Sigwart,  Kleine  Schriften,  vol.  i.  p.  49  seq. 


^r77H*/P$R/on   OF    TRANSITION. 

surrounded,  and  by  opening  up  the  view  into  the  immeasur- 
ability of  the  world.  With  this  the  Aristotelian  antithesis 
of  the  terrestrial  and  the  celestial  is  destroyed.  The  in- 
finite space  (filled  with  the  jet  her)  is  traversed  by  number-  1 
less  bodies,  no  one  of  which  constitutes  the  center  of  the 
world.  The  fixed  stars  are  suns,  and,  like  our  own,  sur-  | 
rounded  by  planets.  The  stars  are  formed  of  the  same 
materials  as  the  earth,  and  are  moved  by  their  own  souls  j 
or  forms,  each  a  living  being,  each  also  the  residence  of  4 
infinitely  numerous  living  beings  of  various  degrees  of  per- 
fection, in  whose  ranks  man  by  no  means  takes  the  first 
place.  All  organisms  are  composed  of  minute  elements,  t 
called  minima  or  monads  :  each  monad  is  a  mirror  of  the 
^l":~eacti"at  once  corporeal  and  soul-like,  matter  and  form, 
each  eternal  ;  their  combinations  alone  being  in  constant 
change.  The  universe  is  boundless  in  time,  as  in  space  ; 
development  never  ceases,  for  the  fullness  of  forms  which 
slumber  in  the  womb  of  matter  is  inexhaustible.  The 
Absolute  is  the  primal  unity,  exalted  above  all  antitheses, 
from  which  all  created  being  is  unfolded  and  in  which  it  re- 
mains included.  All  isone,  all  is  out  of  God  and  in  God.  In 
the  living  unity  of  the  universe,  also,  the  two  sides,  the  spirit- 
ual (world-soul),  and  the  corporeal  (universal  matter),  are 
distinguishable,  but  not  separate.  The  world-reason  per- 
vades in  its  omnipresence  the  greatest  and  the  smallest, 
but  in  varying  degrees.  It  weaves  all  into  one  great  system, 
so  that  if  we  consider  the  whole,  the  conflicts  and  contra- 
dictions which  rule  in  particulars  disappear,  resolved  into 
the  most  perfect  harmony.  Whoever  thus  regards  the 
world,  becomes  filled  with  reverence  for  the  Infinite  and 
bends  his  will  to  the  divine  law — from  true  science  proceed 
true  religion  and  true  morality,  those  of  the  spiritual  hero, 
of  the  heroic  sage. 

Thomas  Campanella*  (1 568-1639)  was  no  less  dependent 
on  Nicolas  and  Telesius  than  Bruno.  A  Calabrian  by  birth 
like  Telesius,  whose  writings  filled  him  with  aversion  to 
Aristotle,  a  Dominican  like  Bruno,  he  was  deprived  of  his 
freedom  on  an  unfounded  suspicion  of  conspiracy  against 

*  Campanella's  works  have  been  edited  by  AI.  d'Ancona,  Turin,  1854.  Cf. 
Sigwart,  Kleine  Schriften,  vol.  i.  p.  125  seq. 


ITALIAN  PHILOSOPHY   OF  NATURE.  37 

the  Spanish  rule,  spent  twenty-seven  years  in  prison,  and 
died  in  Paris  after  a  short  period  of  quiet.  Renewing 
an  old  idea,  Campanella  directed  attention  from  the  written 
volume  of  Scripture  to  the  living  book  of  nature  as  being 
also  a  divine  revelation.  Theology  rests  on  faith  (in  the- 
ology, Campanella,  in  accordance  with  the  traditions  of  his 
order,  follows  Thomas  Aquinas);  philosophy  is  based  on  per- 
ception, which  in  its  instrumental  part  comprises  mathe- 
matics and  logic,  and  in  its  real  part,  the  doctrine  of  nature 
and  of  morals,  while  metaphysics  treats  of  the  highest  presup- 
positions and  the  ultimate  grounds, — the  "  pro-principles." 
Campanella  starts,  as  Augustine  before  him  and  Descartes 
in  later  times,  from  the  indisputable  certitude  of  the  spirit's 
own  existence,  from  which  he  rises  to  the  certitude  of 
God's  existence.  On  this  first  certain  truth  of  my  own  ex- 
istence there  follow  three  others  :  my  nature  consists  in 
the  three  functions  of  power,  knowledge,  and  volition  ;  I 
am  finite  and  limited,  might,  wisdom,  and  love  are  in  man 
constantly  intermingled  with  their  opposites,  weakness, 
foolishness,  and  hate  ;  my  power,  knowledge,  and  volition 
do  not  extend  beyond  the  present.  The  being  of  God  fol- 
lows from  the  idea  of  God  in  us,  which  can  have  been  de- 
rived from  no  other  than  an  infinite  source.  It  would  be 
impossible  for  so  small  a  part  of  the  universe  as  man  to 
produce  from  himself  the  idea  of  a  being  incomparably 
greater  than  the  whole  universe.  I  attain  a  knowledge  of 
God's  nature  from  my  own  by  thinking  away  from  the  lat- 
ter, in  which,  as  in  everything  finite,  being  and  non-being 
are  intermingled,  every  limitation  and  negation,  by  raising 
to  infinity  my  positive  fundamental  powers, posse,  cognosccre, 
and  velle,  or  potcntia,  sapicntia,  and  amor,  and  by  transfer- 
ring them  to  him,  who  is  pure  affirmation,  ens  entirely  with- 
out non-ens.  Thus  I  reach  as  the  three  pro-principles  or 
primalities  of  the  existent  or  the  Godhead,  omnipotence, 
omniscience,  and  infinite  love.  But  the  infrahuman  world 
may  also  be  judged  after  the  analogy  of  our  fundamental 
faculties.  The  universe  and  all  its  parts  possess  souls ; 
there  is  naught  without  sensation  ;  consciousness,  it  is 
true,  is  lacking  in  the  lower  creatures,  but  they  do  not 
lack  life,  feeling,  and  desire,  for  it  is  impossible  for  the  ani- 


38  TUE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

mate  to  come  from  the  inanimate.  Everything  loves  and 
hates,  desires  and  avoids.  Plants  are  motionless  animals, 
and  their  roots,  mouths.  Corporeal  motion  springs  from  an 
obscure,  unconscious  impulse  of  self-preservation  ;  the  heav- 
enly bodies  circle  about  the  sun  as  the  center  of  sympathy  ; 
space  itself  seeks  a  content  {horror  vaciti). 

The  more  imperfect  a  thing  is,  the  more  weakened  is  the 
divine  being  in  it  by  non-being  and  contingency.  The 
entrance  of  the  naught  into  the  divine  reality  takes  place 
by  degrees.  First  God  projects  from  himself  the  ideal  or 
archetypal  world  {mundus  archctypus),  i.  c,  the  totality  of 
the  possible.  From  this  ideal  world  proceeds  the  meta- 
physical world  of  eternal  intelligences  (mundus  mentalis), 
including  the  angels,  the  world-soul,  and  human  spirits. 
The  third  product  is  the  mathematical  world  of  space 
(mundus  sempiternus),  the  object  of  geometry  ;  the  fourth, 
the  temporal  or  corporeal  world  ;  the  fifth,  and  last,  the  em- 
pirical world  (mundus  situalis),  in  which  everything  appears 
at  a  definite  point  in  space  and  time.  All  things  not  only 
love  themselves  and  seek  the  conservation  of  their  own 
being,  but  strive  back  toward  the  original  source  of  their 
being,  to  God  ;  i.  c,  they  possess  religion.  In  man,  natural 
and  animal  religion  are  completed  by  rational  religion,  the 
limitations  of  which  render  a  revelation  necessary.  A  re- 
ligion can  be  considered  divine  only  when  it  is  adapted  to  all, 
when  it  gains  acceptance  through  miracles  and  virtue,  and 
when  it  contradicts  neither  natural  ethics  nor  the  reason. 
Religion  is  union  with  God  through  knowledge,  purity  of 
will,  and  love.  It  is  inborn,  a  law  of  nature,  not,  as  Machia- 
velli  teaches,  a  political  invention.  Campanella  desired  to 
see  the  unity  in  the  divine  government  of  the  world  em- 
bodied in  a  pyramid  of  states  with  the  papacy  at  the  apex: 
above  the  individual  states  was  to  come  the  province,  then 
the  kingdom,  the  empire,  the  (Spanish)  world-monarchy,  and, 
finally,  the  universal  dominion  of  the  Pope.  The  Church 
should  be  superior  to  the  State,  the  vicegerent  of  God  to 
temporal  rulers  and  to  councils. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF    THE   STATE  AND  OF  LA  IV.  39 

4.  Philosophy  of  the  State  and  of  Law. 

The  originality  of  the  modern  doctrines  of  natural  law 
was  formerly  overestimated,  as  it  was  not  known  to  how 
considerable  an  extent  the  way  had  been  prepared  for  them 
by  the  mediaeval  philosophy  of  the  state  and  of  law.  It 
is  evident  from  the  equally  rich  and  careful  investigations 
of  Otto  Gierke*  that  in  the  political  and  legal  theories  of 
a  Bodin,  a  Qrotius,  a  Hobbes,  a  Rousseau,  we  have  system- 
atic developments  of  principles  long  extant,  rather  than 
new  principles  produced  with  entire  spontaneity.  Their 
merit  consists  in  the  principiant  expression  and  accentu- 
ation and  the  systematic  development  of  ideas  which  the 
Middle  Ages  had  produced,  and  which  in  part  belong  to 
the  common  stock  of  Scholastic  science,  in  part  constitute 
the  weapons  of  attack  for  bold  innovators.  Marsilius  of 
Padua  {Defensor  Pads,  1325),  Occam  (died  1347),  Gerson 
(about  1400),  and  the  Cusanf  (Concordantia  Catholica,  1433) 
especially,  are  now  seen  in  a  different  light.  "  Under  the 
husk  of  the  mediaeval  system  there  is  revealed  a  continu- 
ously growing  antique-modern  kernel,  which  draws  all  the 
living  constituents  out  of  the  husk,  and  finally  bursts  it  " 
(Gierke,  Deutsches  Genossenschaftsrecht,  vol.  iii.  p.  312). 
Without  going  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  theocratico- 
organic  view  of  the  state  prevalent  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
most  of  the  conceptions  whose  full  development  was 
accomplished  by  the  natural  law  of  modern  times  were 
already  employed  in  the  Scholastic  period.  Here  we 
already  find  the  idea  of  a  transition  on  the  part  of  man 
from  a  prc-political  natural  state  of  freedom  and  equality 
into  the  state  of  citizenship  ;  the  idea  of  the  origin  of  the 
state  by  a  contract  (social  and  of  submission)  ;  of  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  ruler  {rex  major  popitlo  ;  plenitudo  potestatis), 
and     of     popular    sovereignty  :J:  {populus    major  principe): 

*GierUe,Jo//iin>ns  Althusius  und  die  Entvrickelung  der  naturrechtlichen  Staats- 
theorien,  Breslau,  1880;  the  same, Deutsches  Genossenschaftsrecht,  vol.  iii.  §  II, 
Berlin, 1881.  Cf.  further,  Sigm,  Riezler,  Die  literarischen  Widersacher  der  Päpste, 
J.eipsic,  1874;  A.  Franck,  Peformateurs et  Publicistes  de  V Europe,  Paris,  1864. 

f  Nicolas'  political  ideas  arc-  discussed  by  T.  Stumpf,  Cologne,  1865. 

%  Cf.  F.  von  Bezold,  Die  Lehre  run  Jer  Volkssouveränität  im  Mittelalter, 
(Sybel's  Historische  Zeitschrift,  vol.  xxxvi.,  1876). 


40  THE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

of  the  original  and  inalienable  prerogatives  of  the  general- 
it)',  and  the  innate  and  indestructible  right  of  the  individual 
to  freedom  ;  the  thought  that  the  sovereign  power  is  sup- 
erior to  positive  law  {princeps  legibus  solutus),  but  subordinate 
to  natural  law  ;  even  tendencies  toward  the  division  of 
powers  (legislative  and  executive),  and  the  representative 
system.  These  are  germs  which,  at  the  fall  of  Scholast- 
icism and  the  ecclesiastical  reformation,  gain  light  and  air 
for  free  development. 

The  modern  theory  of  natural  law,  of  which  Grotius  was 
the  most  influential  representative,  began  with  Bodin  and 
Althusius.  The  former  conceives  the  contract  by  which 
the  state  is  founded  as  an  act  of  unconditional  submission 
on  the  part  of  the  community  to  the  ruler,  the  latter  con- 
ceives it  merely  as  the  issue  of  a  (revocable)  commission  ;  in 
the  view  of  the  one,  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  is  entirely 
alienated,  "  transferred,"  in  that  of  the  other,  administra- 
tive authority  alone  is  granted,  "  conceded,"  while  the  sover- 
eign prerogatives  remain  with  the  people.  Bodin  is  the 
founder  of  the  theory  of  absolutism,  to  which  Grotius  and 
the  school  of  Pufendorf  adhere,  though  in  a  more  moderate 
form,  and  which  Hobbes  develops  to  the  last  extreme. 
Althusius,  on  the  other  hand,  by  his  systematic  development 
of  the  doctrine  of  social  contract  and  the  inalienable  sover- 
eignty of  the  people,  became  the  forerunner  of  Locke*  and 
Rousseau. 

The  first  independent  political  philosopher  of  the  mod- 
ern period  was  Nicolo  Machiavelli  of  Florence  (1469- 
1527).  Patriotism  was  the  soul  of  his  thinking,  questions 
of  practical  politics  its  subject,  and  historical  fact  its 
basis. f  He  is  entirely  unscholastic  and  unecclesiastical. 
The  power  and  independence  of  the  nation  are  for 
him  of  supreme  importance,  and   the  greatness  and  unity 

*  Ulrich  Huber  (1674)  may  be  called  the  first  representative  of  constitution- 
alism, and  so  the  intermediate  link  between  Althusius  and  Locke.  Cf.  Gierke, 
Althusius,  p.  290. 

f  In  his  Essays  on  the  First  Decade  of  Livy  (Discorsi),  Machiavelli  investigates 
the  conditions  and  the  laws  of  the  maintenance  of  states  ;  while  in  The  Prince 
(II  Principe,  1515),  he  gives  the  principles  for  the  restoration  of  a  ruined  state. 
Besides  these  he  wrote  a  history  of  Florence,  and  a  work  on  the  art  of  war,  in 
which  he  recommended  the  establishment  of  national  armies. 


PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE   STATE   AND    OF  LAW.  41 

of  Italy,  the  goal  of  his  political  system.  He  opposes 
the  Church,  the  ecclesiastical  state,  and  the  papacy  as 
the  chief  hindrances  to  the  attainment  of  these  ends, 
and  considers  the  means  by  which  help  may  be  given  to 
the  Fatherland.  In  normal  circumstances  a  republican 
constitution,  under  which  Sparta,  Rome,  and  Venice  have 
achieved  greatness,  would  be  the  best.  But  amid  the 
corruption  of  the  times,  the  only  hope  of  deliverance  is 
from  the  absolute  rule  of  a  strong  prince,  one  not  to  be 
frightened  back  from  severity  and  force.  Should  the  ruler 
endeavor  to  keep  within  the  bounds  of  morality,  he  would 
inevitably  be  ruined  amid  the  general  wickedness.  Let  him 
make  himself  liked,  especially  make  himself  feared,  by  the 
people  ;  let  him  be  fox  and  lion  together  ;  let  him  take  care, 
when  he  must  have  recourse  to  bad  means  for  the  sake  of 
the  Fatherland,  that  they  are  justified  by  the  result,  and 
still  to  preserve  the  appearance  of  loyalty  and  honor  when 
he  is  forced  to  act  in  their  despite — for  the  populace  always 
judges  by  appearance  and  by  results.  The  worst  thing  of 
all  is  half-way  measures,  courses  intermediate  between  good 
and  evil  and  vacillating  between  reason  and  force.  Even 
Moses  had  to  kill  the  envious  refractories,  while  Savonarola, 
the  unarmed  prophet,  was  destroyed.  God  is  the  friend  of 
the  strong,  energy  the  chief  virtue  ;  and  it  is  well  when,  as 
was  the  case  with  the  ancient  Romans,  religion  is  associ- 
ated with  it  without  paralyzing  it.  The  current  view  of 
Christianity  as  a  religion  of  humility  and  sloth,  which 
preaches  only  the  courage  of  endurance  and  makes  its  fol- 
lowers indifferent  to  worldly  honor,  is  unfavorable  to  the 
development  of  political  vigor.  The  Italians  have  been 
made  irreligious  by  the  Church  and  the  priesthood  ;  the 
nearer  Rome,  the  less  pious  the  people.  When  Machiavelli, 
in  his  proposals  looking  toward  Lorenzo  (II.)  dei  Medici  (died 
1 5 19),  approves  any  means  for  restoring  order,  it  must  be 
remembered  that  he  has  an  exceptional  case  in  mind,  that 
he  does  not  consider  deceit  and  severity  just,  but  only  un- 
avoidable amid  the  anarchy  and  corruption  of  the  time. 
But  neither  the  loftiness  of  the  end  by  which  he  is  inspired, 
nor  the  low  condition  of  moral  views  in  his  time,  justifies  his 
treatment  of  the  laws  as  mere  means  to  political  ends,  and 


4-  THE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

his  unscrupulous  subordination  of  morality  to  calculating 
prudence.  Machiavelli's  general  view  of  the  world  and  of 
life   is   by  no   means  a  comforting  one.     Men   are  simple, 

verned  by  their  passions  and  by  insatiable  desires,  dis- 
satisfied  with  what  they  have,  and  inclined  to  evil.  They  do 
good  only  of  necessity  ;  it  is  hunger  which  makes  them 
industrious  and  laws  that  render  them  good.  Everything 
rapidly  degenerates:  power  produces  quiet,  quiet,  idleness, 
then  disorder, and, finally, ruin,  until  men  learn  by  misfortune, 
and  so  order  and  power  again  arise.  History  is  a  continual 
rising  and  falling,  a  circle  of  order  and  disorder.  Govern- 
mental forms,  even,  enjoy  no  stability  ;  monarch)',  when  it 
has  run  out  into  tyranny,  is  followed  by  aristocracy,  which 
gradually  passes  over  into  oligarchy  ;  this  in  turn  is  replaced 
by  democracy,  until,  finally,  anarchy  becomes  unendurable, 
and  a  prince  again  attains  power.  No  state,  however,  is  so 
powerful  as  to  escape  succumbing  to  a  rival  before  it  com- 
pletes the  circuit.  Protection  against  the  corruption  of  the 
state  is  possible  only  through  the  maintenance  of  its  princi- 
ples, and  its  restoration  only  by  a  return  to  the  healthy 
source  whence  it  originated.  This  is  secured  either  by 
some  external  peril  compelling  to  reflection,  or  internally, 
by  wise  thought,  by  good  laws  (framed  in  accordance  with 
the  general  welfare,  and  not  according  to  the  ambition  of  a 
minority),  and  by  the  example  of  good  men. 

In  the  interval  between  Machiavelli  and  the  system  of  nat- 
ural law  of  Grotius,  the  Netherlander  (1625  :  De  Jure  Belli 
et  Pacis),  belong  the  socialistic  ideal  state  of  the  English- 
man, Thomas  More  {De  Optimo  Rcipublicce  Statu  deque  Nova 
Insula  Utopia,  15 16),  the  political  theory  of  the  Frenchman, 
Jean  Bod  in  {Six  Livres  de  la  Re'publique,  1577,  Latin  1584  ; 
also  a  philosophico-historical  treatise,  Methodus  ad  Facilcm 
Historiarum  Cognitionen,  and  the  Colloquium  Heptaplomeres, 
edited  by  Noack,  1857),  and  the  law  of  war  of  the  Italian, 
Albericus  Gentilis,  at  his  death  professor  in  Oxford  {De 
Jure  Belli,  1588).  Common  to  these  three  was  the  advocacy 
of  religious  tolerance,  from  which  atheists  alone  were  to  be 
excepted  ;  common,  also,  their  ethical  standpoint  in  opposi- 
tion to  Machiavelli,  while  they  are  at  one  with  him  in  regard 
to  the  liberation  of  political  and  legal  science  from  theology 


PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE    STATE   AND    OF  LAW.  43 

and  the  Church.  With  Gentilis  (1551-1611)  this  separa- 
tion assigns  the  first  five  commandments  to  divine,  and  the 
remainder  to  human  law,  the  latter  being  based  on  the 
laws  of  human  nature  (especially  the  social  impulse). 
In  place  of  this  derivation  of  law  and  the  state  from  the 
nature  of  man,  Jean  Bodin  (1530-96)  insists  on  an  histori- 
cal interpretation  ;  endeavors,  though  not  always  with  suc- 
cess, to  give  sharp  definitions  of  political  concepts  ;*  rejects 
composite  state  forms,  and  among  the  three  pure  forms, 
monarchy,  aristocracy,  and  democracy,  rates  (hereditär)) 
monarchy  the  highest,  in  which  the  subjects  obey  the  laws 
of  the  monarch,  and  the  latter  the  laws  of  God  or  of  nature 
by  respecting  the  freedom  and  the  property  of  the  citizens. 
So  far,  no  one  has  correctly  distinguished  between  forms 
of  the  state  and  modes  of  administration.  Even  a  demo- 
cratic state  may  be  governed  in  a  monarchical  or  aristo- 
cratic way.  So  far,  also,  there  has  been  a  failure  to  take 
into  account  national  peculiarities  and  differences  of  situa- 
tion, conditions  to  which  legislation  must  be  adjusted.  The 
people  of  the  temperate  zone  are  inferior  to  those  of  the 
North  in  physical  power  and  inferior  to  those  of  the  South 
in  speculative  ability,  but  superior  to  both  in  political 
gifts  and  in  the  sense  of  justice.  The  nations  of  the  North 
are  guided  by  force,  those  of  the  South  by  religion,  those 
between  the  two  by  reason.  Mountaineers  love  freedom. 
A  fruitful  soil  enervates  men,  when  less  fertile,  it  renders 
them  temperate  and  industrious. 

Attention  has  only  recently  been  called  (by  Ü.  Gierke,  in 
the  work  already  mentioned,  Heft  vii.  of  his  Untersuchun- 
gen zur  deutschen  Staats-  und  Rcchtsgeschtchtc,  Bveslau,  1880) 
to  the  Westphalian,  Johannes  Althusius  (Althuscn  or 
Althaus)  as  a  legal  philosopher  worthy  of  notice.  He  was 
born,  1557,  in  the  Grafschaft  Witgenstein  ;  was  a  teacher  of 
law  in  Ilerborn  and  Siegen  from  1586,  and  Syndic  in  Emden 
from  1604  to  his  death  in    1638.      His  chief  legal  work  was 

*  What  is  the  state?  What  is  sovereignty?  The  former  is  defined  as  t he 
rational  and  supremely  empowered  control  over  a  number  of  families  and  "I 
whatever  is  common  to  them  ;  the  latter  is  absolute  and  continuous  authority 
over  the  state,  with  the  right  of  imposing  laws  without  being  bound  by  them. 
The  prince,  to  whom  the  sovereignty  has  been  unconditionally  relinquished  by 
the  people  in  the  contract  of  submission,  is  accountable  to  God  alone. 


44  THE  PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

the  Dicaologica,  1617  (a  recasting  of  a  treatise  on  Roman 
law  which  appeared  in  1586),  and  his  chief  political  work 
the  Politiea,  1603  (altered  and  enlarged  1610,  and  reprinted, 
in  addition,  three  times  before  his  death  and  thrice  subse- 
quently). Down  to  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century  he  was  esteemed  or  opposed  as  chief  among  the 
Monarchomachi,  so  called  by  the  Scotchman,  Barclay  {De 
Regno  et  Regali  Pot  est  ate,  1600) ;  since  that  time  he  has 
fallen  into  undeserved  oblivion.  The  sovereign  power 
(majestas)  of  the  people  is  untransferable  and  indivisible, 
the  authority  vested  in  the  chosen  wielder  of  the  adminis- 
trative power  is  revocable,  and  the  king  is  merely  the 
chief  functionary  ;  individuals  are  subjects,  it  is  true,  but 
the  community  retains  its  sovereignty  and  has  its  rights 
represented  over  against  the  chief  magistrate  by  a  college 
of  ephors.  If  the  prince  violates  the  compact,  the  ephors 
are  authorized  and  bound  to  depose  the  tyrant,  and  to 
banish  or  execute  him.  There  is  but  one  normal  state- 
form;  monarchy  and  polyarchy  are  mere  differences  in 
administrative  forms.  Mention  should  finally  be  made  of 
his  valuation  of  the  social  groups  which  mediate  between 
the  individual  and  the  state  :  the  body  politic  is  based  on 
the  narrower  associations  of  the  family,  the  corporation, 
the  commune,  and  the  province. 

While  with  Bodin  the  historical,  and  with  Gentilis  the 
a  priori  method  of  treatment  predominates,  HugoGrotius* 
combines  both  standpoints.  He  bases  his  system  on  the 
traditional  distinction  of  two  kinds  of  law.  The  origin  of 
positive  law  is  historical,  by  voluntary  enactment ;  natural 
law  is  rooted  in  the  nature  of  man,  is  eternal,  unchange- 
able, and  everywhere  the  same.     He  begins  by  distinguish- 

*Hugo  de  Groot  lived  1583-1645.  He  was  born  in  Delft,  became  Fiscal  of 
Holland  in  1607,  and  Syndic  of  Rotterdam  and  member  of  the  States  General 
in  1 613.  A  leader  of  the  aristocratic  party  with  Oldenbarneveld,  he  adhered 
to  the  Arminians  or  Remonstrants,  was  thrown  into  prison,  freed  in  1621 
through  the  address  of  his  wife,  and  fled  to  Paris,  where  he  lived  till  163 1  as  a 
private  scholar,  and,  from  1635,  as  Swedish  ambassador.  Here  he  composed 
his  epoch-making  work.  De  Jure  Belli  et  Pacts,  1625.  Previous  to  this  had 
appeared  his  treatise,  De  Veritate  Religionis  Christiana,  1619,  and  the  Mare 
Liberum,  1609,  the  latter  a  chapter  from  his  maiden  work,  De  Jure  Prceda, 
which  was  not  printed  until  1868. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF    THE    STATE   AND   OF  LAW.  45 

ing  with  Gentilis  the  jus  humanuni  from  the  jus  divinum 
given  in  the  Scriptures.  The  former  determines,  on  the  one 
hand,  the  legal  relations  of  individuals,  and,  on  the  other, 
those  of  whole  nations;  it  is  jus  personale  and  jus  gentium* 
The  distinction  between  natural  and  conventional  law  which 
has  been  already  mentioned,  finds  place  within  both:  the 
positive  law  of  persons  is  called  jus  civile,  and  the  positive 
law  of  nations,  jusgentium  voluntarium.  Positive  law  has 
its  origin  in  regard  for  utility,  while  unwritten  law  finds  its 
source  neither  in  this  nor  (directly)  in  the  will  of  God,f  but 
in  the  rational  nature  of  man.  Man  is  by  nature  social, 
and,  as  a  rational  being,  possesses  the  impulse  toward 
ordered  association.  Unlawful  means  whatever  renders 
such  association  of  rational  beings  impossible,  as  the  viola- 
tion of  promises  or  the  taking  away  and  retention  of  the 
property  of  others.  In  the  (pre-social)  state  of  nature,  all 
belonged  to  all,  but  through  the  act  of  taking  possession 
{occupatio)  property  arises  (sea  and  air  are  excluded  from 
appropriation).  In  the  state  of  nature  everyone  has  the 
right  to  defend  himself  against  attack  and  to  revenge  him- 
self on  the  evil-doer ;  but  in  the  political  community, 
founded  by  contract,  personal  revenge  is  replaced  by  punish- 
ment decreed  by  the  civil  power.  The  aim  of  punishment 
is  not  retribution,  but  reformation  and  deterrence.  It 
belongs  to  God  alone  to  punish  because  of  sin  committed, 
the  state  can  punish  only  to  prevent  it.  (The  antithesis 
quia  peccatum  est — ne peccetur  comes  from  Seneca.) 

This  energetic  revival  of  the  distinction  already  com- 
mon in  the  Middle  Ages  between  "  positive  and  natural," 
which  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury  brought  forward  at  the 
same  period  (1624)  in  the  philosophy  of  religion,  gave  the 

*  The  meaning  which  Grotius  here  gives  to  jus  gentium  (international  law), 
departs  from  the  customary  usage  of  the  Scholastics,  with  whom  it  denotes  the 
law  uniformly  acknowledged  among  all  nations.  Thomas  Aquinas  understands 
by  it,  in  distinction  to  jus  naturale  pi  per,  the  sum  of  the  conclusions  deduced 
from  this  as  a  result  of  the  development  of  human  culture  and  its  departure 
from  primitive  purity.  Cf.  Gierke,  Althusius,  p.  273  ;  Deutsches  Genossen- 
schaftsrecht, vol.  iii.  p.  612.  On  the  meaning  of  natural  law  cf.  Gierke's 
Inaugural  Address  as  Rector  at  Breslau,  Naturrecht  und  Deutsches  A'echt, 
Frankfort  on-the-Main,  1883. 

f  Natural  law  would  be  valid  even  if  there  were  no  God.  With  these  words 
the  alliance  between  the  modern  and  the  mediaeval  philosophy  of  law  is  severed. 


40  THE    PERIOD    OF    TRANSITION: 

catchword  for  a  moveirent  in  practical  philosophy  whose  de- 
velopments extend  into  the  nineteenth  century.  Not  only 
the  illumination  period,  but  all  modern  philosophy  down  to 
Kant  and  Fichte, is  under  the  ban  of  the  antithesis,  natural 
and  artificial.  In  all  fields,  in  ethics  as  well  as  in  noetics, 
men  return  to  the  primitive  or  storm  back  to  it, in  the  hope  of 
finding  there  the  source  of  all  truth  and  the  cure  for  all  evils. 
Sometimes  it  is  called  nature,  sometimes  reason  (natural 
law  and  rational  law  are  synonymous,  as  also  natural 
religion  and  the  religion  of  the  reason),  by  which  is  under- 
stood that  which  is  permanent  and  everywhere  the  same  in 
contrast  to  the  temporary  and  the  changeable,  that  which 
is  innate  in  contrast  to  that  which  has  been  developed,  in 
contrast,  further,  to  that  which  has  been  revealed.  What- 
ever passes  as  law  in  all  places  and  at  all  times  is  natural 
law,  says  Grotius;  that  which  all  men  believe  forms  the 
content  of  natural  religion,  says  Lord  Herbert.  Before 
long  it  comes  to  be  said  :  that  alone  is  genuine,  true, 
healthy,  and  valuable  which  has  eternal  and  universal 
validity  ;  all  else  is  not  only  superfluous  and  valueless  but 
of  evil,  for  it  must  be  unnatural  and  corrupt.  This  step 
is  taken  by  Deism,  with  the  principle  that  whatever  is  not 
natural  or  rational  in  the  sense  indicated  is  unnatural  and 
irrational.  Parallel  phenomena  are  not  wanting,  further, 
in  the  philosophy  of  law  (Gierke,  Altkusius,  p.  303,  note 
99).  But  these  errors  must  not  be  too  harshly  judged. 
The  confidence  with  which  they  were  made  sprang  from 
the  real  and  the  historical  force  of  their  underlying  idea. 

As  already  stated,  the  "  natural  "  forms  the  antithesis  to 
the  supernatural,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  historical,  on 
the  other.  This  combination  of  the  revealed  and  the  his- 
torical will  not  appear  strange,  if  we  remember  that  the 
mediaeval  view  of  the  world  under  criticism  was,  as  Chris- 
tian, historico-religious,  and,  moreover,  that  for  the  phil- 
osophy of  religion  the  two  in  fact  coincide,  inasmuch  as 
revelation  is  conceived  as  an  historical  event,  and  the  his- 
torical religions  assume  the  character  of  revealed.  The 
term  arbitrary,  applied  to  both  in  common,  was  question- 
able, however:  as  revelation  is  a  divine  decree,  so  his- 
torical institutions  are  the  products  of  human  enactment, 


PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE    STATE   AND    OE  LAW.  47 

the  state,  the  result  of  a  contract,  dogmas,  inventions  of 
the  priesthood,  the  results  of  development ,  artificial  con- 
structions!  It  took  long  ages  for  man  to  free  himself  from 
the  idea  of  the  artificial  and  conventional  in  his  view  of 
history.  Hegel  was  the  first  to  gather  the  fruit  whose 
seeds  had  been  sown  by  Leibnitz,  Lessing,  Herder,  and  the 
historical  school  of  law.  As  often,  however,  as  an  attempt 
was  made  from  this  standpoint  of  origins  to  show  laws  in 
the  course  of  history,  only  one  could  be  reached,  a  law  of 
necessary  degeneration,  interrupted  at  times  by  sudden 
restorations — thus  the  Deists,  thus  Machiavelli  and  Rous- 
seau. Everything  degenerates,  science  itself  only  con- 
tributes to  the  fall — therefore,  back  to  the  happy  begin- 
nings of  things ! 

If,  finally,  we  inquire  into  the  position  of  the  Church  in 
regard  to  the  questions  of  legal  philosophy,  we  may  say 
that,  among  the  Protestants,  Luther,  appealing  to  the  Scrip- 
ture text,  declares  rulers  ordained  by  God  and  sacred, 
though  at  the  same  time  he  considers  law  and  politics  but 
remotely  related  to  the  inner  man  ;  that  Melancthon,  in  his 
Elements  of  Ethics  (1538),  as  in  all  his  philosophical  text- 
books,* went  back  to  Aristotle,  but  found  the  source  of 
natural  law  in  the  Decalogue,  being  followed  in  this  by 
Oldendorp  (1539),  Hemming  (1562),  and  B.  Winkler  (161 5). f 

On  the  Catholic  side,  the  Jesuits  (the  Order  was  founded 
in  1534,  and  confirmed  in  1540),  on  the  one  hand,  revived 
the  Pelagian  theory  of  freedom  in  opposition  to  the 
Luthero-Augustinian  doctrine  of  the  servitude  of  the  will, 
and,  on  the  other,  defended  the  natural  origin  of  the  state 
in  a  (revocable)  contract  in  opposition  to  its  divine  origin 
asserted  by  the  Reformers,  and  the  sovereignty  of  the 
people  even  to  the  sanctioning  of  tyrannicide.  Bellarmin 
(1 542-1621)  taught  that  the  prince  derives  his  authority 
from  the  people,  and  as  the  latter  have  given  him  power, 
so  they  retain  the  natural  right  to  take  it  back  and  bestow  it 
elsewhere.     The  view  of  Juan  Mariana  (1 537-1624  ;  De  Rege% 

*  The  edition  of  Melancthon's  works  by  Bretschneider  and  Bindseil  gives  the 
ethical  treatises  in  vol.  xvi.  and  the  other  philosophical  treatises  in  vol.  xiii. 
(in  part  also  in  vols.  xi.  and  xx.). 

f  Cf.  C.v.  Kaltenborn,  Die  Vorläufer  des  Hugo  Grotius,  Lcipsic,  1848. 


48  THE   PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

1599)  is  that,  as  the  people  in  transferring  rights  to  the 
prince  retain  still  greater  power  themselves,  they  are  entitled 
in  given  cases  to  call  the  king  to  account.  If  he  corrupts  the* 
state  by  evil  manners,  and,  degenerating  into  the  tyrant, 
despises  religion  and  the  laws,  he  may,  as  a  public  enemy, 
be  deprived  by  anyone  of  his  authority  and  his  life.  It  is 
lawful  to  arrest  tyranny  in  any  way,  and  those  have  always 
been  highly  esteemed  who,  from  devotion  to  the  public 
welfare,  have  sought  to  kill  the  tyrant. 

5.  Skepticism  in  France. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  in  the  very 
country  which  was  to  become  the  cradle  of  modern  phi- 
losophy, there  appeared,  as  a  forerunner  of  the  new  think- 
ing, a  skepticism  in  which  that  was  taken  for  complete  and 
ultimate  truth  which  with  Descartes  constitutes  merely  a 
moment  or  transition  point  in  the  inquiry.  The  earliest 
and  the  most  ingenious  among  the  representatives  of  this 
philosophy  of  doubt  was  Michel  de  Montaigne  (1533-92), 
who  in  his  Essays — which  were  the  first  of  their  kind  and 
soon  found  an  imitator  in  Bacon  ;  they  appeared  in  1580  in 
two  volumes,  with  an  additional  volume  in  1588 — combined 
delicate  observation  and  keen  thinking,  boldness  and  pru- 
dence, elegance  and  solidity.  The  French  honor  him  as 
one  of  their  foremost  writers.  The  most  important  among 
these  treatises  or  essays  is  considered  to  be  the  "Apology 
for  Raymond  of  Sabunde  "  (ii.  12)  with  valuable  excursuses 
on  faith  and  knowledge.  Montaigne  bases  his  doubt  on  the 
diversity  of  individual  views,  each  man's  opinion  differing 
from  his  fellow's,  while  truth  must  be  one.  There  exists  no 
certain,  no  universally  admitted  knowledge.  The  human 
reason  is  feeble  and  blind  in  all  things,  knowledge  is  decep- 
tive, especially  the  philosophy  of  the  day,  which  clings  to 
tradition,  which  fills  the  memory  with  learned  note-stuff, 
but  leaves  the  understanding  void  and,  instead  of  things, 
interprets  interpretations  only.  Both  sensuous  and  rational 
knowledge  are  untrustworthy  :  the  former,  because  it  can- 
not be  ascertained  whether  its  deliverances  conform  to 
reality,  and  the  latter,  because  its  premises,  in  order  to  be 


SKEPTICISM  IN  FRANCE.  49 

valid,  need  others  in  turn  for  their  own  establishment,  etc., 
ad  infinitum.  Every  advance  in  inquiry  makes  our  ignor- 
ance the  more  evident ;  the  doubter  alone  is  free.  But 
though  certainty  is  denied  us  in  regard  to  truth,  it  is 
not  withheld  in  regard  to  duty.  In  fact,  a  twofold  rule  of 
practical  life  is  set  up  for  us  :  nature,  or  life  in  accordance 
with  nature  and  founded  on  self-knowledge,  and  superna- 
tural revelation,  the  Gospel  (to  be  understood  only  by  the 
aid  of  divine  grace).  Submission  to  the  divine  ruler  and 
benefactor  is  the  first  duty  of  the  rational  soul.  From 
obedience  proceeds  every  virtue,  from  over-subtlety  and 
conceit,  which  is  the  product  of  fancied  knowledge,  comes 
every  sin.  Montaigne,  like  all  who  know  men,  has  a  sharp 
eye  for  human  frailty.  He  depicts  the  universal  weakness 
of  human  nature  and  the  corruption  of  his  time  with  great 
vivacity  and  not  without  a  certain  pleasure  in  the  obscene  ; 
and  besides  folly  and  passion,  complains  above  all  of  the 
fact  that  so  few  understand  the  art  of  enjoyment,  of  which 
he,  a  true  man  of  the  world,  was  master. 

The  skeptico-practical  standpoint  of  Montaigne  was  de- 
veloped into  a  system  by  the  Paris  preacher,  Pierre  Charron 
(1 541-1603),  in  his  three  books  On  Wisdom  (1601).  Doubt 
has  a  double  object :  to  keep  alive  the  spirit  of  inquiry  and 
to  lead  us  on  to  faith.  From  the  fact  that  reason  and  ex- 
perience are  liable  to  deception  and  that  the  mind  has  at 
its  disposal  no  means  of  distinguishing  truth  from  false- 
hood, it  follows  that  we  are  born  not  to  possess  truth  but 
to  seek  it.  Truth  dwells  alone  in  the  bosom  of  God  ;  for 
us  doubt  and  investigation  are  the  only  good  amid  all  the 
error  and  tribulation  which  surround  us.  Life  is  all 
misery.  Man  is  capable  of  mediocrity  alone  ;  he  can  neither 
be  entirely  good  nor  entirely  evil  ;  he  is  weak  in  virtue, 
weak  in  vice,  and  the  best  degenerates  in  his  hands.  Even 
religion  suffers  from  the  universal  imperfection.  It  is 
dependent  on  nationality  and  country,  and  each  religion  is 
based  on  its  predecessor;  the  supernatural  origin  of  which 
all  religions  boast  belongs  in  fact  to  Christianity  alone, 
which  is  to  be  accepted  with  humility  and  with  submission 
of  the  reason.  Charron  lays  chief  emphasis,  however,  on 
the  practical  side  of  Christianity,  the  fulfillment  of  duty  ; 


So  THE  PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

and  the  "  wisdom  "  which  forms  the  subject  of  his  book 
is  synonymous  with  uprightness  (probitt-),  the  way  to  which 
is  opened  up  by  self-knowledge  and  whose  reward  is  repose 
of  spirit.  And  yet  we  are  not  to  practice  it  for  the  sake  of 
the  reward,  but  because  nature  and  reason,  i.  c,  God,  abso- 
lutely (entirely  apart  from  the  pleasurable  results  of  virtue) 
require  us  to  be  good.  True  uprightness  is  more  than  mere 
legality,  for  even  when  outward  action  is  blameless,  the 
motives  may  be  mixed.  "  I  desire  men  to  be  upright  without 
paradise  and  hell."  Religion  seeks  to  crown  morality,  not 
to  generate  it ;  virtue  is  earlier  and  more  natural  than  piety. 
In  his  definition  of  the  relation  between  religion  and 
ethics,  his  delimitation  of  morality  from  legality,  and  his 
insistence  on  the  purity  of  motives  (do  right,  because  the 
inner  rational  law  commands  it),  an  anticipation  of  Kantian 
principles  may  be  recognized. 

Under  Francis  Sanchez  (died  1632  ;  his  chief  work  is 
entitled  Quod  Nihil  Scitur),a.  Portuguese  by  birth,  and  pro- 
fessor of  medicine  in  Montpellier  and  Toulouse,  skepticism 
was  transformed  from  melancholy  contemplation  into  a 
fresh,  vigorous  search  after  new  problems.  In  the  place 
of  book-learning,  which  disgusts  him  by  its  smell  of  the 
closet,  its  continued  prating  of  Aristotle,  and  its  self-exhaus- 
tion in  useless  verbalism,  Sanchez  desires  to  substitute  a 
knowledge  of  things.  Perfect  knowledge,  it  is  true,  can  be 
hoped  for  only  when  subject  and  object  correspond  to  each 
other.  But  how  is  finite  man  to  grasp  the  infinite  universe? 
Experience,  the  basis  of  all  knowledge,  gropes  about  the 
outer  surface  of  things  and  illumines  particulars  only,  with- 
out the  ability  either  to  penetrate  to  their  inner  nature 
or  to  comprehend  the  whole.  We  know  only  what  we 
produce.  Thus  God  knows  the  world  which  he  has  made, 
but  to  us  is  vouchsafed  merely  an  insight  into  mediate  or 
second  causes,  causes  secundcz.  Here,  however,  a  rich  field 
still  lies  open  before  philosophy — only  let  her  attack  her 
problem  with  observation  and  experiment  rather  than  with 
words. 

The  French  nation,  predisposed  to  skepticism  by  its  pre- 
vailing acuteness,  has  never  lacked  representatives  of  skep- 
tical  philosophy.      The   transition    from    the    philosophers 


GERMAN  MYSTICISM.  51 

of  doubt  whom  we  have  described  to  the  great  Bayle  was 
formed  by  La  Mothe  le  Vayer  (died  1672;  Five  Dialogues, 
1671),  the  tutor  of  Louis  XIV.,  and  P.  D.  Huet(ius), 
Bishop  of  Avranches  (died  172 1),  who  agreed  in  holding 
that  a  recognition  of  the  weakness  of  the  reason  is  the  best 
preparation  for  faith. 

6.     German   Mysticism. 

In  a  period  which  has  given  birth  to  a  skeptical  phi- 
losophy, one  never  looks  in  vain  for  the  complementary 
phenomenon  of  mysticism.  The  stone  offered  by  doubt  in 
place  of  bread  is  incapable  of  satisfying  the  impulse  after 
knowledge,  and  when  the  intellect  grows  weary  and  despair- 
ing, the  heart  starts  out  in  the  quest  after  truth.  Then  its 
path  leads  inward,  the  mind  turns  in  upon  itself,  seeks  to 
learn  the  truth  by  inner  experience  and  life,  by  inward  feel- 
ing and  possession,  and  waits  in  quietude  for  divine  illumi- 
nation. The  German  mysticism  of  Eckhart  *  (about  1300), 
which  had  been  continued  in  Suso  and  Tauler  and  had 
received  a  practical  direction  in  the  Netherlands, — Ruys- 
broek  (about  1350)  to  Thomas  ä  Kempis  (about  1450), — 
now  puts  forth  new  branches  and  blossoms  at  the  turning 
point  of  the  centuries. 

Luther  himself  was  originally  a  mystic,  with  a  high 
appreciation  of  Tauler  and  Thomas  ä  Kempis,  and  pub- 
lished in  15  18  that  attractive  little  book  by  an  anonymous 
Frankfort  author,  the  German  Theology.  When,  later,  he 
fell  into  literalism,  it  was  the  mysticism  of  German  Protes- 
tantism which,  in  opposition  to  the  new  orthodoxy,  held 
fast  to  the  original  principle  of  the  Reformation,  i.e.,  to  the 
principle  that  faith  is  not  assent  to  historical  facts,  not  the 
acceptance  of  dogmas,  but  an  inner  experience,  a  renewal 
of  the  whole   man.      Religion    and    theology  must  not  be 

*  Master  Eckhart's  Works  have  been  edited  by  F.  Pfeiffer,  Leipsic,  1857. 
The  following  have  written  on  him  :  Jos.  Bach,  Vienna,  1864  ;  Ad.  I.asson, 
Berlin,  1808  ;  the  same,  in  the  second  part  of  Ueberweg's  Grundriss,  last  section  ; 
Denifle,  in  the  Archiv  für  Litteralur  und  Kulturgeschichte  des  Mittelalters,  ii. 
417  seq.;  H.  Siebeck,  Der  Begiiff  des  Gemüts  in  der  deutschen  Mystik  (Beiträge 
zur  Entstehungsgeschichte  der  neueren  Psychologie,  i),  Giessen  Programme, 
1801. 


5-  THE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

confounded.  Religion  is  not  doctrine,  but  a  new  birth. 
With  Schwenckfeld,  and  also  with  Franck,  mysticism  is 
still  essentially  pietism  ;  with  Weigel,  and  by  the  addition 
of  ideas  from  Paracelsus,  it  is  transformed  into  theosophy, 
and  as  such  reaches  its  culmination  in  Böhme. 

Caspar  Schwenckfeld  sought  to  spiritualize  the  Lutheran 
movement  and  protested  against  its  being  made  into  a 
pastors'  religion.  Though  he  had  been  aroused  by  Luth- 
er's pioneer  feat,  he  soon  saw  that  the  latter  had  not  gone 
far  enough;  and  in  his  Letter  on  the  Eucharist,  1527,  he 
defined  the  points  of  difference  between  Luther's  view  of 
the  Sacrament  and  his  own.  Luther,  he  maintained,  had 
fallen  back  to  an  historical  view  of  faith,  whereas  the  faith 
which  saves  can  never  consist  in  the  outward  acceptance 
of  an  historical  fact.  He  who  makes  salvation  dependent 
on  preaching  and  the  Sacrament,  confuses  the  invisible 
and  the  visible  Church,  Ecclesia  interna  and  externa.  The 
layman  is  his  own  priest. 

According  to  Sebastian  Franck  (1500-45),  there  are  in 
man,  as  in  everything  else,  two  principles,  one  divine  and 
one  selfish,  Christ  and  Adam,  an  inner  and  an  outer  man; 
if  he  submits  himself  to  the  former  (by  a  timeless  choice),  he 
is  spiritual,  if  to  the  latter,  carnal.  God  is  not  the  cause 
of  sin,  but  man,  who  turns  the  divine  power  to  good  or 
evil.  He  who  denies  himself  to  live  God  is  a  Christian, 
whether  he  knows  and  confesses  the  Gospel  or  not.  Faith 
does  not  consist  in  assent,  but  in  inner  transformation. 
The  historical  element  in  Christianity  and  its  ceremo- 
nial observances  are  only  the  external  form  and  garb  (its 
"figure"),  have  merely  a  symbolic  significance  as  media  of 
communication,  as  forms  of  revelation  for  the  eternal  truth, 
proclaimed  but  not  founded  by  Christ ;  the  Bible  is  merely 
the  shadow  of  the  living  Word  of  God. 

Valentin  Weigel  (born  in  1533,  pastor  in  Zschopau  from 
1567),  whose  works  were  not  printed  until  after  his  death, 
combines  his  predecessors'  doctrine  of  inner  and  eter- 
nal Christianity  with  the  microcosmos-idea  of  Paracelsus. 
God,  who  lacks  nothing,  has  not  created  the  world  in  order 
to  gain,  but  in  order  to  give.  Man  not  only  bears  the  earthly 
world  in  his  body,  and  the  heavenly  world  of  the  angels  in 


GERMAN  MYSTICISM.  53 

his  reason  (his  spirit),  but  by  virtue  of  his  intellect  (his  im- 
mortal soul)  participates  in  the  divine  world  also.  As  he 
is  thus  a  microcosm  and,  moreover,  an  image  of  God,  all 
his  knowledge  becomes  self-knowledge,  both  sensuous  per- 
ception (which  is  not  caused  by  the  object,  but  only  occa- 
sioned by  it),  and  the  knowledge  of  God.  The  literalist 
knows  not  God,  but  he  alone  who  bears  God  in  himself. 
Man  is  favored  above  other  beings  with  the  freedom  to 
dwell  in  himself  or  in  God.  When  man  came  out  from  God, 
he  was  his  own  tempter  and  made  himself  proud  and  selfish. 
Thus  evil,  which  had  before  remained  hidden,  was  revealed, 
and  became  sin.  As  the  separation  from  God  is  an  eternal 
act,  so  also  redemption  and  resurrection  form  an  inner  event. 
Christ  is  born  in  everyone  who  gives  up  the  I-ness  (JcJi heit)  ; 
each  regenerate  man  is  a  son  of  God.  But  no  vicarious 
suffering  can  save  him  who  does  not  put  off  the  old  Adam, 
no  matter  how  much  an  atheology  sunk  in  literalism  may 
comfort  itself  with  the  hope  that  man  can  "  drink  at  an- 
other's cost"  (that  the  merit  of  another  is  imputed  to  him).* 
German  mysticism  reaches  its  culmination  in  the  Görlitz 
cobbler,  Jacob  Böhme  (i 575-1624;  Aurora,  or  the  Rising 
Daw)i  ;  Mysterium  Magnum,  or  on  the  First  Book  of  Moses, 
etc.  The  works  of  Böhme,  collected  by  his  apostle,  Gichtel, 
appeared  in  1682  in  ten  volumes,  and  in  1730  in  six  volumes  ; 
a  new  edition  was  prepared  by  Schiebler  in  1831-47,  with 
a  second  edition  in  1861  seq.).  Böhme's  doctrine  f  centers 
about  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  evil.  He  transfers  this 
to  God  himself  and  joins  therewith  the  leading  thought  of 
Eckhart,that  God  goes  through  a  process,  that  he  proceeds 
from  an  unrevealed  to  a  revealed  condition.  At  the  sight 
of  a  tin  vessel  glistening  in  the  sun,  he  conceived,  as  by 
inspiration,  the  idea  that  as  the  sunlight  reveals  itself  on 
the  dark  vessel  so  all  light  needs  darkness  and  all  good 
evil  in  order  to  appear  and  to  become  knowable.  Every- 
thing becomes  perceptible  through  its  opposite  alone : 
gentleness  through  sternness,  love  through  anger,  affirma- 

*  Weigel  is  discussed  by  J.  O.  Opel,  Leipsic,  1864. 

\  Cf.  Windelband's  fine  exposition,  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophie,  vol.  i. 
£  19.  The  following  have  written  on  Böhme  :  Fr.  Baader  (in  vols.  iii.  and  xiii. 
of  his  Werke);  Hamberger,  Munich,  1844;  IF.  A.  Fechner,  Görlitz,  1857; 
A.  v.  Harless,  Berlin,  1870,  new  edition,  I.eipsic,  1882. 


54  THE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

tion  through  negation.  Without  evil  there  would  be  no 
life,  no  movement,  no  distinctions,  no  revelation  ;  all  would 
be  unqualified,  uniform  nothingness.  And  as  in  nature 
nothing  exists  in  which  good  and  evil  do  not  reside,  so  in 
God,  besides  power  or  the  good,  a  contrary  exists,  without 
which  he  would  remain  unknown  to  himself.  The  theo- 
gonic  process  is  twofold  :  self-knowledge  on  the  part  of  God, 
and  his  revelation  outward,  as  eternal  nature,  in  seven 
moments. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  first  development  God  is  will  with- 
out object,  eternal  quietude  and  rest,  unqualified  ground- 
lessness without  determinate  volition.  But  in  this  divine 
nothingness  there  soon  awakes  the  hunger  after  the  aught 
(somewhat,  existence),  the  impulse  to  apprehend  and  mani- 
fest self,  and  as  God  looks  into  and  forms  an  image  of  him- 
self, he  divides  into  Father  and  Son.  The  Son  is  the  eye 
with  which  the  Father  intuits  himself,  and  the  proces- 
sion of  this  vision  from  the  groundless  is  the  Holy  Ghost. 
Thus  far  God,  who  is  one  in  three,  is  only  understanding 
or  wisdom,  wherein  the  images  of  all  the  possible  are  con- 
tained ;  to  the  intuition  of  self  must  be  added  divisibility  ;  it 
is  only  through  the  antithesis  of  the  revealed  God  and  the 
unrevealed  groundless  that  the  former  becomes  an  actual 
trinity  (in  which  the  persons  stand  related  as  essence,  power, 
and  activity),  and  the  latter  becomes  desire  or  nature  in 
God. 

At  the  creation  of  the  world  seven  equally  eternal  qual- 
ities, source-spirits  or  nature-forms,  are  distinguished  in  the 
divine  nature.  First  comes  desire  as  the  contractile,  tart 
quality  or  pain,  from  which  proceed  hardness  and  heat;  next 
comes  mobility  as  the  expansive,  sweet  quality,  as  this  shows 
itself  in  water.  As  the  nature  of  the  first  was  to  bind  and 
the  second  was  fluid,  so  they  both  are  combined  in  the  bitter 
quality  or  the  pain  of  anxiety,  the  principle  of  sensibility. 
(Contraction  and  expansion  are  the  conditions  of  percepti- 
bility.) From  these  three  forms  fright  or  lightning  sud- 
denly springs  forth.  This  fourth  quality  is  the  turning- 
point  at  which  light  flames  up  from  darkness  and  the  love 
of  God  breaks  forth  from  out  his  anger ;  as  the  first  three,  or 
four,  forms  constitute  the  kingdom  of  wrath,  so  the  latter 


GERMAN  MYSTICISM.  55 

three  constitute  the  kingdom  of  joy.  The  fifth  quality  is 
called  light  or  the  warm  fire  of  love,  and  has  for  its  func- 
tions external  animation  and  communication  ;  the  sixth, 
report  and  sound,  is  the  principle  of  inner  animation  and 
intelligence  ;  the  seventh,  the  formative  quality,  corpo- 
reality, comprehends  all  the  preceding  in  itself  as  their 
dwelling. 

The  dark  fire  of  anger  (the  hard,  sweet,  and  bitter 
qualities)  and  the  light  fire  of  love  (light,  report,  and  cor- 
poreality), separated  by  the  lightning-fire,  in  which  God's 
wrath  is  transformed  into  mercy,  stand  related  as  evil  and 
good.  The  evil  in  God  is  not  sin,  but  simply  the  inciting 
sting,  the  principle  of  movement  ;  which,  moreover,  is 
restrained,  overcome,  transfigured  by  gentleness.  Sin  arises 
only  when  the  creature  refuses  to  take  part  in  the  advance 
from  darkness  to  light,  and  obstinately  remains  in  the  fire  of 
anger  instead  of  forcing  his  way  through  to  the  fire  of  love. 
Thus  that  which  was  one  in  God  is  divided.  Lucifer  be- 
comes enamored  of  the  tart  quality  (the  centrum  naturace 
or  the  matrix)  and  will  not  grow  into  the  heart  of  God  ;  and 
it  is  only  after  such  lingering  behind  that  the  kingdom  of 
wrath  become  a  real  hell.  Heaven  and  hell  are  not  future 
conditions,  but  are  experienced  here  on  earth  ;  he  who 
instead  of  subduing  animality  becomes  enamored  of  it, 
stands  under  the  wrath  of  God  ;  whereas  he  who  abjures 
self  dwells  in  the  joyous  kingdom  of  mercy.  He  alone 
truly  believes  who  himself  becomes  Christ,  who  repeats  in 
himself  what  Christ  suffered  and  attained. 

The  creation  of  the  material  world  is  a  result  of  Lucifer's 
fall.  Böhme's  description  of  it,  based  on  the  Mosaic  account 
of  creation,  may  be  passed  without  notice  ;  similarly  his 
view  of  cognition,  familiar  from  the  earlier  mystics,  that  all 
knowledge  is  derived  from  self-knowledge,  that  our  destina- 
tion is  to  comprehend  God  from  ourselves,  and  the  world 
from  God.  Man,  whose  body,  spirit,  and  soul  hold  in  them 
the  earthly,  the  sidereal,  and  the  heavenly,  is  at  once  a 
microcosm  and  a  "  little  God." 

Under  the  intractable  form  of  Böhme's  speculations  and 
amid  their  riotous  fancy,  no  one  will  fail  to  recognize  their 
true-hearted  sensibility  and  an   unusual  depth  and  vigor  of 


50  THE   PERIOD    OF    TRANSITION. 

thought.  They  found  acceptance  in  England  and  France, 
and  have  been  revived  in  later  times  in  the  systems  of 
Baader  and  Schefline. 


7.  The  Foundation  of  Modern  Physics. 

In  no  field  has  the  modern  period  so  completely  broken 
with  tradition  as  in  physics.  The  correctness  of  the  Co- 
pernican  theory  is  proved  by  Kepler's  laws  of  planetary 
movement,  and  Galileo's  telescopical  observations;  the 
scientific  theory  of  motion  is  created  by  Galileo's  laws  of 
projectiles,  falling  bodies,  and  the  pendulum  ;  astronomy 
and  mechanics  form  the  entrance  to  exact  physics — Des- 
cartes ventures  an  attempt  at  a  comprehensive  mechanical 
explanation  of  nature.  And  thus  an  entirely  new  move- 
ment is  at  hand.  Forerunners,  it  is  true,  had  not  been  lack- 
ing. Roger  Bacon  (1214-94)  had  already  sought  to  obtain 
an  empirical  knowledge  of  nature  based  upon  mathematics; 
and  the  great  painter  Leonardo  da  Vinci  (1452-1519)  had 
discovered  the  principles  of  mechanics,  though  without  gain- 
ing much  influence  over  the  work  of  his  contemporaries.  It 
was  reserved  for  the  triple  star  which  has  been  mentioned 
to  overthrow  Scholasticism.  The  conceptions  with  which 
the  Scholastic-Aristotelian  philosophy  of  nature  sought  to 
get  at  phenomena — substantial  forms,  properties,  qualitative 
change — are  thrown  aside  ;  their  place  is  taken  by  matter, 
forces  working  under  law,  rearrangement  of  parts.  The  in- 
quiry into  final  causes  is  rejected  as  an  anthropomorphosis 
of  natural  events,  and  deduction  from  efficient  causes  is 
alone  accepted  as  scientific  explanation.  Size,  shape,  num- 
ber, motion,  and  law  are  the  only  and  the  sufficient  princi- 
ples of  explanation.  For  magnitudes  alone  are  knowable  ; 
wherever  it  is  impossible  to  measure  and  count,  to  deter- 
mine force  mathematically,  there  rigorous,  exact  science 
ceases.  Nature  a  system  of  regularly  moved  particles  of 
mass  ;  all  that  takes  place  mechanical  movement,  viz.,  the 
combination,  separation,  dislocation,  oscillation  of  bodies 
and  corpuscles  ;  mathematics  the  organon  of  natural  sci- 
ence !  Into  this  circle  of  modern  scientific  catagories  are 
articulated,  further,  Galileo's  new  conception  of  motion  and 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  MODERN  PHYSICS.  57 

the  conception  of  atoms,  which,  previously  employed  by 
physicists,  as  Daniel  Sennert  (1619)  and  others,  is  now 
brought  into  general  acceptance  by  Gassendi,  while  the 
four  elements  are  definitively  discarded  (Lasswitz,  Ge- 
schichte der  Atomistik,  1890).  Still  another  doctrine  of 
Democritus  is  now  revived  ;  an  evident  symptom  of  the 
quantification  and  mechanical  interpretation  of  natural  phe- 
nomena being  furnished  by  the  doctrine  of  the  subjectivity 
of  sense  qualities,  in  which,  although  on  varying  grounds, 
Kepler,  Galileo,  Descartes,  Gassendi,  and  Hobbes  agree.* 
Descartes  and  Hobbes  will  be  discussed  later.  Here  we 
may  give  a  few  notes  on  their  fellow  laborers  in  the  ser- 
vice of  the  mechanical  science  of  nature. 

We  begin  with  John  Kepler f  (1 571-1630;  chief  work, 
The  New  Astronomy  or  Celestial  Physics,  in  Commentaries 
on  the  Motions  of  Mars,  1609).  Kepler's  merit  as  an 
astronomer  has  long  obscured  his  philosophical  importance, 
although  his  discovery  of  the  laws  of  planetary  motion  was 
the  outcome  of  endeavors  to  secure  an  exact  founda- 
tion for  his  theory  of  the  world.  The  latter  is  aesthetic 
in  character,  centers  about  the  idea  of  a  universal  world- 
harmony,  and  employs  mathematics  as  an  instrument  of 
confirmation.  For  the  fact  that  this  theory  satisfies  the 
mind,  and,  on  the  whole,  corresponds  to  our  empirical  im- 
pression of  the  order  of  nature,  is  not  enough  in  Kepler's 
view  to  guarantee  its  truth  ;  by  exact  methods,  by  means 
of  induction  and  experiment,  a  detailed  proof  from 
empirical  facts  must  be  found  for  the  existence  not  only 
of  a  general  harmony,  but  of  definitely  fixed  proportions. 
Herewith  the  philosophical  application  of  mathematics 
loses  that  obscure  mystical  character  which  had  clung  to 
it  since  the  time  of  Pythagoras,  and  had  strongly  mani- 
fested itself  as  late  as  in  Nicolas  of  Cusa.  Mathematical 
relations  constitute  the  deepest  essence  of  the  real  and  the 
object  of  science.  Where  matter  is,  there  is  geometry  ; 
the  latter   is  older  than   the   world   and   as  eternal  as  the 

*Cf.  chapter  vi.  in  Natorp's  work  on  Descartes'  Erkenntnisstheorie,  Marburg, 
1882,  and  the  same  author's  Analekten  zur  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  in  the 
Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vol.  xviii.  1882,  p.  572  se</. 

fSee  Sigwart,  Kleine  Schriften,  vol.  i.  p,  182  seq.;  K.  Kucken,  Beiträge 
zw  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophie,  p.  54  seq. 


58  THE   PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

divine  Spirit  ;  magnitudes  are  the  source  of  things.  True 
knowledge  exists  only  where  quanta  are  known  ;  the  pre- 
supposition of  the  capacity  for  knowledge  is  the  capacity 
to  count  ;  the  spirit  cognizes  sensuous  relations  by  means  of 
the  pure,  archetypal,  intellectual  relations  born  in  it,  which, 
before  the  advent  of  sense-impressions,  have  lain  concealed 
behind  the  veil  of  possibility ;  inclination  and  aversion 
between  men,  their  delight  in  beauty,  the  pleasant  im- 
pression of  a  view,  depend  upon  an  unconscious  and  instinc- 
tive perception  of  proportions.  This  quantitative  view  of 
the  world,  which,  with  a  consciousness  of  its  novelty  as 
well  as  of  its  scope,  is  opposed  to  the  qualitative  view  of 
Aristotle  ;*  the  opinion  that  the  essence  of  the  human 
spirit,  as.well  as  of  the  divine,  nay,  the  essence  of  all  things, 
consists  in  activity  ;  that,  consequently,  the  soul  is  always 
active,  being  conscious  of  its  own  harmony  at  least  in  a 
confused  way,  even  when  not  conscious  of  external  propor- 
tions ;  further,  the  doctrine  that  nature  loves  simplicity, 
avoids  the  superfluous,  and  is  accustomed  to  accomplish 
large  results  with  a  few  principles — these  remind  one  of 
Leibnitz.  At  the  same  time,  the  law  of  parsimony  and  the 
methodological  conclusions  concerning  true  hypotheses  and 
real  causes  (an  hypothesis  must  not  be  an  artificially  con- 
structed set  of  fictions,  forcibly  adjusted  to  reality,  but 
is  to  trace  back  phenomena  to  their  real  grounds),  obedi- 
ence to  which  enabled  him  to  deduce  a  priori  from  causes 
the  conclusions  which  Copernicus  by  fortunate  conjecture 
had  gathered  inductively  from  effects — these  made  our 
thinker  a  forerunner  of  Newton.  The  physical  method  of 
explanation  must  not  be  corrupted  either  by  theological 
conceptions  (comets  are  entirely  natural  phenomena!) 
or  by  anthropomorphic  views,  which  endow  nature  with 
spiritual   powers. 

Intermediate  between  Bacon  and  Descartes,  both  in  the 
order  of  time  and  in  the  order  of  fact,  and  a  co-founder  of 

*  Aristotle  erred  when  he  considered  qualitative  distinctions  (idem  and  aliud) 
ultimate.  These  are  to  be  traced  back  to  quantitative  differences,  and  the  aliud 
or  diversum  is  to  be  replaced  by  plus  et  minus.  There  is  nothing  absolutely 
light,  but  only  relatively.  Since  all  things  are  distinguished  only  by  "  more  or 
less,"  the  possibility  of  mediating  members  or  proportions  between  them  is 
given. 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  MODERN  PHYSICS.  59 

modern  philosophy,  stands  Galileo  Galilei  (i 564-1641).* 
Galileo  exhibits  all  the  traits  characteristic  of  modern 
thinking  :  the  reference  from  words  to  things,  from  memory 
to  perception  and  thought,  from  authority  to  self-ascer- 
tained principles,  from  chance  opinion,  arbitrary  opinion, 
and  the  traditional  doctrines  of  the  schools,  to  "  knowl- 
edge," that  is,  to  one's  own,  well  grounded,  indisputable  in- 
sight, from  the  study  of  human  affairs  to  the  study  of 
nature.  Study  Aristotle,  but  do  not  become  his  slave  ;  in- 
stead of  yielding  yourselves  captive  to  his  views,  use  your 
own  eyes  ;  do  not  believe  that  the  mind  remains  unproduc- 
tive unless  it  allies  itself  with  the  understanding  of  another  ; 
copy  nature,  not  copies  merely  !  He  equals  Bacon  in  his 
high  estimation  of  sensuous  experience  in  contrast  to  the 
often  illusory  conclusions  of  the  reason,  and  of  the  value 
of  induction  ;  but  he  does  not  conceal  from  himself  the  fact 
that  observation  is  merely  the  first  step  in  the  process  of 
cognition,  leaving  the  chief  role  for  the  understanding. 
This,  supplementing  the  defect  of  experience — the  im- 
possibility of  observing  all  cases — by  its  a  priori  concept 
of  law  and  with  its  inferences  overstepping  the  bounds 
of  experience,  first  makes  induction  possible,  brings  the 
facts  established  into  connection  (their  combination 
under  laws  is  thought,  not  experience),  reduces  them  to 
their  primary,  simple,  unchangeable,  and  necessary  causes 
by  abstraction  from  contingent  circumstances,  regulates 
perception,  corrects  sense-illusions,  i.  e.,  the  false  judg- 
ments originating  in  experience,  and  decides  concerning 
the  reality  or  fallaciousness  of  phenomena.  Demonstration 
based  on  experience,  a  close  union  of  observation  and 
thought,  of  fact  and  Idea  (law) — these  are  the  require- 
ments made  by  Galileo  and  brilliantly  fulfilled  in  his  dis- 
coveries;  this,  the  "inductive  speculation,"  as  Diihring 
terms  it,  which  derives  laws  of  far-reaching  importance 
from  inconspicuous  facts;  this,  as  Galileo  himself  recog- 
nizes, the  distinctive  gift  of  the  investigator.  Galileo  antici- 
pates Descartes  in  regard  to  the  subjective  character  of  sense 

*  Cf.  Natorp's  essay  on  Galileo,  in  vol.  xviii.  of  the  Philosophische  Monats- 
hefte, 1882. 


Co  THE   PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

qualities  and  their  reduction  to  quantitative  distinctions,* 
while  he  shares  with  him  the  belief  in  the  typical  character 
of  mathematics  and  the  mechanical  theory  of  the  world. 
The  truth  of  geometrical  propositions  and  demonstrations 
is  as  unconditionally  certain  for  man  as  for  God,  only  that 
man  learns  them  by  a  discursive  process,  whereas  God's  in- 
tuitive understanding  comprehends  them  with  a  glance 
and  knows  more  of  them  than  man.  The  book  of  the  uni- 
verse is  written  in  mathematical  characters  ;  motion  is  the 
fundamental  phenomenon  in  the  world  of  matter ;  our 
knowledge  reaches  as  far  as  phenomena  are  measurable  ; 
the  qualitative  nature  of  force,  back  of  its  quantitative  de- 
terminations, remains  unknown  to  us.  When  Galileo  main- 
tains that  the  Copernican  theory  is  philosophically  true 
and  not  merely  astronomically  useful,  thus  interpreting  it 
as  more  than  a  hypothesis,  he  is  guided  by  the  conviction 
that  the  simplest  explanation  is  the  most  probable  one, 
that  truth  and  beauty  are  one,  as  in  general  he  concedes  a 
guiding  though  not  a  controlling  influence  in  scientific 
work  to  the  aesthetic  demand  of  the  mind  for  order,  har- 
mony, and  unity  in  nature,  to  correspond  to  the  wisdom 
of  the  Creator. 

One  of  the  most  noted  and  influential  among  the  con- 
temporaries, countrymen,  and  opponents  of  Descartes,  was 
the  priest  and  natural  scientist,  Petrus  Gassendi,f  from  1633 
Provost  of  Digne,  later  for  a  short  period  professor  of  mathe- 
matics at  Paris.  His  renewal  of  Epicureanism,  to  which  he 
was  impelled  by  temperament,  by  his  reverence  for  Lucretius, 
and  by  the  anti-Aristotelian  tendency  of  his  thinking,  was  of 
far  more  importance  for  modern  thought  than  the  attempts 

*  This  doctrine  is  developed  by  Galileo  in  the  controversial  treatise  against 
Padre  Grassi,  The  Scales  (//  Snggiatore,  1623,  in  the  Florence  edition  of  his 
collected  works,  1842  seq. ,  vol.  iv.  pp.  149-369;  cf.  Natorp,  Descartes'  Erkennt- 
nisstheorie, 1882,  chap.  vi).  In  substance,  moreover,  this  doctrine  is  found,  as 
Heussler  remarks,  Baco,  p.  94,  in  Bacon  himself,  in  Valerius  Terminus  (  Works, 
Spedding,  vol.  iii.  pp.  217-252. 

f  Pierre  Gassend,  1592-1655  :  On  the  Life  and  Character  of  Epicurus,  1647  ; 
Notes  on  the  Tenth  Book  of  Diogenes  Laertius,  with  a  Survey  of  the  Doctrine  of 
Epicurus,  1649.  Works,  Lyons,  1658,  Florence,  1727.  Cf.  Lange,  History  of 
Materialism,  book  i.  §  3,  chap.  1  ;  Natorp,  Analekten,  Philosophische  Mon- 
atshefte, vol.  xviii.  1882,  p.  572  seq. 


THE  FOUNDATION  OF  MODERN  PHYSICS.  61 

to  revive  the  ancient  systems  which  have  been  mentioned 
above  (p.  29).  Its  superior  influence  depends  on  the  fact  that, 
in  the  conception  of  atoms,  it  offered  exact  inquiry  a  most 
useful  point  of  attachment.  The  conflict  between  the 
Gassendists  and  the  Cartesians,  which  at  first  was  a  bitter 
one,  centered,  as  far  as  physics  was  concerned,  around  the 
value  of  the  atomic  hypothesis  as  contrasted  with  the 
corpuscular  and  vortex  theory  which  Descartes  had  opposed 
to  it.  It  soon  became  apparent,  however,  that  these  two 
thinkers  followed  along  essentially  the  same  lines  in  the 
philosophy  of  nature,  sharply  as  they  were  opposed  in  their 
noetical  principles.  Descartes'  doctrine  of  body  is  conceived 
from  an  entirely  materialistic  standpoint,  his  anthropology, 
indeed,  going  further  than  the  principles  of  his  system 
would  allow.  Gassendi,  on  the  other  hand,  recognizes  an 
immaterial,  immortal  reason,  traces  the  origin  of  the  world, 
its  marvelous  arrangement,  and  the  beginning  of  motion 
back  to  God,  and,  since  the  Bible  so  teaches,  believes  the 
earth  to  be  at  rest, — holding  that,  for  this  reason,  the  deci- 
sion must  be  given  in  favor  of  Tycho  Brahe  and  against 
Copernicus,  although  the  hypothesis  of  the  latter  affords 
the  simpler  and,  scientifically,  the  more  probable  explanation. 
Both  thinkers  rejoice  in  their  agreement  with  the  dogmas 
of  the  Church,  only  that  with  Descartes  it  came  unsought 
in  the  natural  progress  of  his  thought,  while  Gassendi  held 
to  it  in  contradiction  to  his  system.  It  is  the  more  surprising 
that  Gassendi's  works  escaped  being  put  upon  the  Index,  a 
fate  which  overtook  those  of  Descartes  in  1663. 

As  modern  thought  derives  its  mechanical  temper  equally 
from  both  these  sources,  and  the  natural  science  of  the  day 
has  appropriated  the  corpuscles  of  Descartes  under  the 
name  of  molecules,  as  well  as  the  atoms  of  Gassendi,  though 
not  without  considerable  modification  in  both  conceptions 
(Lange,  vol.  i.  p.  269),  so  we  find  attempts  at  mediation  at 
an  early  period.  While  Pere  Mersenne  (1 588-1648),  who 
was  well  versed  in  physics,  sought  an  indecisive  middle 
course  between  these  two  philosophers,  the  English 
chemist,  Robert  Boyle,  effected  a  successful  synthesis  of 
both.  The  son  of  Richard  Boyle,  Earl  of  Cork,  he  was 
born    at   Lismore  in    1626,  lived  in   literary  retirement    at 


6a  THE   PERIOD    OF    TRANSITION. 

Oxford  from  1654,  an  J  later  in  Cambridge,  and  died,  1692, 
in  London,  president  of  the  Royal  Society.  His  principal 
work,  The  Sceptical  Chemist  {Works,  vol.  i.  p.  2Qp  seq.),  ap- 
peared in  i66i,the  tract,  De  Ipsa  Natura,  in  1682.*  By  his 
introduction  of  the  atomic  conception  he  founded  an  epoch 
in  chemistry,  which,  now  for  the  first,  was  freed  from  bond- 
age to  the  ideas  of  Aristotle  and  the  alchemists.  Atom- 
ism, however,  was  for  Boyle  merely  an  instrument  of 
method  and  not  a  philosophical  theory  of  the  world.  A 
sincerely  religious  man,f  he  regards  with  disfavor  both 
the  atheism  of  Epicurus  and  his  complete  rejection  of 
teleology — the  world-machine  points  to  an  intelligent  Crea- 
tor and  a  purpose  in  creation  ;  motion,  to  a  divine  impulse. 
He  defends,  on  the  other  hand,  the  right  of  free  inquiry 
against  the  priesthood  and  the  pedantry  of  the  schools, 
holding  that  the  supernatural  must  be  sharply  distin- 
guished from  the  natural,  and  mere  conjectures  concerning 
insoluble  problems  from  positions  susceptible  of  experi- 
mental proof ;  while,  in  opposition  to  submission  to  author- 
ity, he  remarks  that  the  current  coin  of  opinion  must  be 
estimated,  not  by  the  date  when  and  the  person  by  whom 
it  was  minted  but  by  the  value  of  the  metal  alone.  Carte- 
sian elements  in  Boyle  are  the  start  from  doubt,  the  deri- 
vation of  all  motion  from  pressure  and  impact,  and  the  ex- 
tension of  the  mechanical  explanation  to  the  organic  world. 
His  inquiries  relate  exclusively  to  the  world  of  matter  so 
far  as  it  was  "  completed  on  the  last  day  but  one  of  crea- 
tion." He  defends  empty  space  against  Descartes  and 
Hobbes.  He  is  the  first  to  apply  the  mediaeval  terms, 
primary  and  secondary  qualities,  to  the  antithesis  between 

*  Boyle's  Works  were  published  in  Latin  at  Geneva,  in  1660.  in  six  volumes, 
and  in  1714  m  five;  an  edition  by  Birch  appeared  at  London,  1744,  in  five  volumes, 
second  edition,  1772,  in  six.  Cf.  Buckle,  History  of  Civilization  in 
England,  vol.  i.  chap.  vii.  pp.  265-268  ;  Lange,  History  of  Materialism,  vol.  i. 
pp.  293-306  ;  vol.  ii.  p.  351  seq.;  Georg  Baku.  Der  Streit  über  den  Naturbe- 
griff, Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vol.   xcviii.,  1891,  p.  162  jvy. 

f  The  foundation  named  after  him  had  for  its  object  to  promote  by  means 
of  lectures  the  investigation  of  nature  on  the  basis  of  atomism,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  free  it  from  the  reproach  of  leading  to  atheism  and  to  show  its 
harmony  with  natural  religion.  Samuel  Clarke's  work  onThe  Being  and  Attri- 
butes of  God,  1705,  originated  in  lectures  delivered  on  this  foundation. 


BACON'S  PREDECESSORS.  63 

objective  properties  which  really  belong  to  things,  and 
sensuous  or  subjective  qualities  present  only  in  the  feeling 
subject.* 

8.  Philosophy  in  England  to  the  Middle  of  the 
Seventeenth  Century. 

(a)  Bacon's  Predecessors. — The  darkness  which  lay  over 
the  beginnings  of  modern  English  philosophy  has  been  but 
incompletely  dispelled  by  the  meritorious  work  of  Ch.  de 
Remusat  {Histoire  de  la  Philosophie  en  Anglet erre  depuis 
Bacon  jusqiia  Locke,  2  vols.,  1878).  The  most  recent  in- 
vestigations of  J.  Freudenthal  {Beiträge  zur  Geschichte  der 
Englischen  Philosophie,  in  the  Archiv  für  Geschichte  der 
Philosophie,  vols.  iv.  and  v.,  1 891 )  have  brought  assistance 
in  a  way  deserving  of  thanks,  since  they  lift  at  important 
points  the  veil  which  concealed  Bacon's  relations  to  his 
predecessors  and  contemporaries,  by  describing  the  scien- 
tific tendencies  and  achievements  of  Digby  and  Temple. 
The  following  may  be  taken  from  his  results. 

Everard  Digby  (died  1592  ;  chief  work,  Theoria  Analytica, 
1579),  instructor  in  logic  in  Cambridge  from  1573,  who 
was  strongly  influenced  by  Reuchlin  and  who  favored  an 
Aristotelian-Alexandrian-Cabalistic  eclecticism,  was  the 
first  to  disseminate  Neoplatonic  ideas  in  England  ;  and,  in 
spite  of  the  lack  of  originality  in  his  systematic  presenta- 
tion of  theoretical  philosophy,  aroused  the  study  of  this 
branch  in  England  into  new  life.  His  opponent,  Sir 
William  Temple  \  (r  553—1626),  by  his  defense  and  exposi- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  Ramus  (introduced  into  Great  Britain 
by  George  Buchanan  and  his  pupil,  Andrew  Melville),  made 
Cambridge  the  chief  center  of  Ramism.  He  was  the  first 
who  openly  opposed  Aristotle. 

Bacon  was  undoubtedly  acquainted  with  both  these 
writers  and  took  ideas  from  both.  Digby  represented  the 
scholastic  tendency,  which  Bacon  vehemently  opposed,  yet 

*  Eucken,  Geschichte   der  philosophise hen  \  Terminologie,  pp.  94,  196. 

f  Temple  was  secretary  to  Philip  Sir'nev,  William  Davison,  and  the  Earl 
of  Essex,  and,  from  16)9.  Provost  of  Trinity  College,  Dublin.  His  maiden 
work,  De  Unica  P.  Rami  Methodo,  which  he  published  under  the  pseudonym, 
MildapettU«,  1580,  was  aimed  at  Digby'g  De  Duplici  Methodo.  His  chief  work, 
P.  Rami  Dialectics  Libri  Duo  Scholiis  Illustrati,  appeared  in  1584. 


<>4  THE  PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

without  being  able  completely  to  break  away  from  it. 
Temple  was  one  of  those  who  supplied  him  with  weapons 
for  this  conflict.  Finally,  it  must  be  mentioned  that  many 
of  the  English  scientists  of  the  time,  especially  William 
Gilbert  (1 540-1603  ;  De  Magnete,  1600),  physician  to  Queen 
Elizabeth,  used  induction  in  their  work  before  Bacon  ad- 
vanced his  theory  of  method. 

(b)  Bacon. — The  founder  of  the  empirical  philosophy  of 
modern  times  was  Francis  Bacon  (1 561-1626),  a  contempo- 
rary of  Shakspere.  Bacon  began  his  political  career  by  sit- 
ting in  Parliament  for  many  years  under  Queen  Elizabeth,  as 
whose  counsel  he  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  engaging  in 
the  prosecution  of  his  patron,  the  Earl  of  Essex,  and  at 
whose  command  he  prepared  a  justification  of  the  process. 
Under  James  I.  he  attained  the  highest  offices  and  honors, 
being  made  Keeper  of  the  Great  Seal  in  1617,  Lord  Chan- 
cellor and  Baron  Verulam  in  1618,  and  Viscount  St.  Albans 
in  162 1.  In  this  last  year  came  his  fall.  He  was  charged 
with  bribery,  and  condemned  ;  the  king  remitted  the  im- 
prisonment and  fine,  and  for  the  remainder  of  his  life  Bacon 
devoted  himself  to  science,  rejecting  every  suggestion  toward 
a  renewal  of  his  political  activity.  The  moral  laxity  of  the 
times  throws  a  mitigating  light  over  his  fault  ;  but  he 
cannot  be  aquitted  of  self-seeking,  love  of  money  and  of 
display,  and  excessive  ambition.  As  Macaulay  says  in  his 
famous  essay,  he  was  neither  malignant  nor  tyrannical, 
but  he  lacked  warmth  of  affection  and  elevation  of  senti- 
ment ;  there  were  many  things  which  he  loved  more  than 
virtue,  and  many  which  he  feared  more  than  guilt.  He 
first  gained  renown  as  an  author  by  his  ethical,  economic, 
and  political  Essays,  after  the  manner  of  Montaigne  ;  of  these 
the  first  ten  appeared  in  1597,  in  the  third  edition  (1625)  in- 
creased to  fifty-eight  ;  the  Latin  translation  bears  the  title 
Sermones  Fideles.  His  great  plan  for  a  "  restoration  of  the 
sciences"  was  intended  to  be  carried  out  in  four,  or  rather, 
in  six  parts.  But  only  the  first  two  parts  of  the  Instauratio 
Magna  were  developed:  the  encyclop&dia,  or  division  of  all 
sciences,*  a  chart  of  the  globus  intellectualis,  on  which  was 

*  According  to  the  faculties  of  the  soul,  memory,  imagination,  and  understand- 
ing, three  principal  sciences  are  distinguished  :    history,  poesy,  and  philosophy. 


BACON.  65 

depicted  what  each  science  had  accomplished  and  what  still 
remained  for  each  to  do  ;  and  the  development  of  the  new 
method.  Bacon  published  his  survey  of  the  circle  of  the 
sciences  in  the  English  work,  the  Advancement  of  Learn- 
ing, 1605,  a  much  enlarged  revision  of  which,  De  Dignitate 
et  Augment  is  Scientiarum,  appeared  in  Latin  in  1623.  In 
1612  he  printed  as  a  contribution  to  methodology  the 
draft,  Cogitata  et  Visa  (written  1607),  later  recast  into  the 
[first  book  of  the]  Novum  Organum,  1620.  This  title, 
Novum  Organum,  of  itself  indicates  opposition  to  Aris- 
totle, whose  logical  treatises  had  for  ages  been  collected 
under  the  title  Organon.  If  in  this  work  Bacon  had  given 
no  connected  exposition  of  his  reforming  principles,  but 
merely  a  series  of  aphorisms,  and  this  an  incomplete  one, 
the  remaining  parts  are  still  more  fragmentary,  only 
prefaces  and  scattered  contributions  having  been  reduced 
to  writing.  The  third  part  was  to  have  been  formed 
by  a  description  of  the  world  or  natural  history,  Historia 
Naturalis,  and  the  last, — introduced  by  a  Scala  Intel- 
lectus  (ladder  of  knowledge,  illustrations  of  the  method 
by  examples),  and  by  Prodromi  (preliminary  results  of  his 
own  inquiries), — by  natural  science,  Philosophia  Secunda. 
The  best  edition  of  Bacon's  works  is  the  London  one  of 
Spedding,  Ellis  &  Heath,  1857  seq.,  7  vols.,  2d  ed.,  1870; 
with  7  volumes  additional  of  The  Letters  and  Life  of 
Francis  Bacon,  including  His  Occasional  Works,  and  a 
Commentary,  by  J.  Spedding,  1862-74.  Spedding  fol- 
lowed this  further  with  a  briefer  Account  of  the  Life  and 
Times  of  Francis  Bacon,  2  vols.,  1878.* 

Of  the  three  objects  of  the  latter,  "  nature  strikes  the  mind  with  a  direct  ray,  God 
with  a  refracted  ray,  and  man  himself  with  a  reflected  ray."  Theology  is  natural 
or  revealed.  Speculative  (theoretical)  natural  philosophy  divides  into  physics, 
concerned  with  material  and  efficient  causes,  and  metaphysics,  whose  mission,  ac- 
cording to  the  traditional  view,  is  to  inquire  into  final  causes,  hut  in  Bacon's  own 
opinion,  into  formal  causes  ;  operative  (technical)  natural  philosophy  is  mechanics 
and  natural  magic.  The  doctrine  concerning  man  comprises  anthropology  (in- 
cluding logic  and  ethics)  and  politics.  This  division  of  Bacon  was  still  retained 
by  D'Alcmbert  in  his  preliminary  discourse  to  the  Encyclopedic. 

*  Cf .  on  Bacon,  K.  Fischer,  2d  ed.,  1875  ;  Chr.  Sigwart,  in  the  Preussische 
Jahrbücher,  1863  and  1864,  and  in  vol.  ii.  of  his  Logik  ;  II.  Ilcussler,  Baco 
und  seine  geschichtliche  Stellung.  Breslau,  1889.  [Adamson,  Encyclcpadia 
Britannica,  9th.  ed.,  vol.  iii.  pp.  200-222  ;  Fowler,  English  Philosophers  Series, 
1881;   Nichol,  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics,  2  vols.,  1888-89. — Tk.| 


66 


THE   PERIOD   OE    TRA XS/TIOAr. 


Bacon's  merit  was  threefold  :  he  felt  more  forcibly  and 
more  clearly  than  previous  thinkers  the  need  of  a  reform  in 
science  ;  he  set  up  a  new  and  grand  ideal — unbiased  and 
methodical  investigation  of  nature  in  order  to  mastery  over 
nature  ;  and  he  gave  information  and  directions  as  to  the 
way  in  which  this  goal  was  to  be  attained,  which,  in  spite 
of  their  incompleteness  in  detail,  went  deep  into  the  heart 
of  the  subject  and  laid  the  foundation  for  the  work  of 
centuries.*  His  faith  in  the  omnipotence  of  the  new 
method  was  so  strong,  that  he  thought  that  science  for  the 
future  could  almost  dispense  with  talent.  He  compares 
his  method  to  a  compass  or  a  ruler,  with  which  the  unprac- 
tised man  is  able  to  draw  circles  and  straight  lines  better 
than  an  expert  without  these  instruments. 

All  science  hitherto,  Bacon  declares,  has  been  uncertain 
and  unfruitful,  and  does  not  advance  a  step,  while  the  me- 
chanic arts  grow  daily  more  perfect  ;  without  a  firm  basis, 
garrulous,  contentious,  and  lacking  in  content,  it  is  of  no 
practical  value.  The  seeker  after  certain  knowledge  must 
abandon  words  for  things,  and  learn  the  art  of  forcing 
nature  to  answer  his  questions.  The  seeker  after  fruitful 
knowledge  must  increase  the  number  of  discoveries,  and 
transform  them  from  matters  of  chance  into  matters  of  de- 
sign. For  discovery  conditions  the  power,  greatness,  and 
progress  of  mankind.  Man's  power  is  measured  by  his 
knowledge,  knowledge  is  power,  and  nature  is  conquered  by 
^obedience — scientia  est  potentia  ;  natura  parendo  vincitur. 

Bacon  declares  three  things  indispensable  for  the  attain- 
ment of  this  power-giving  knowledge:  the  mind  must 
understand  the  instruments  of  knowledge  ;  it  must  turn 
to^experience.  deriving  the  materials  of  knowledge  from 
perception  ;  and  it  must  not  risefrom  particular  principles 
to  the  higheraxioms  to*o  rapidlyTbut  steadily  and  gradually 
through  mid3Te~1Tx7oms: — iHTe~nTTn7T~c1in-_accomplish  noth- 
ing when  left  to  itself;  but  undirected  experience  alone  is 
also  insufficient  (experimentation  without  a  plan  is  groping 
in  the  dark),  and  the  senses,  moreover,  are  dece-  tive  and 
not  acute  enough  for  the  subtlety  of  nature — therefore,  me. 

*  His  detractors  are  unjust  when  they  apply  the  criterion  of  the  present 
method  of  investigation  and  find  only  imperfection  in  an  imperfect  beginning. 


BACON. 


67 


thodical  experimentation  alone,  not  chance  observation,  is 
worthy  of  confidence.  Instead  of  the  customary  divorce  of 
experience  and  understanding,  a  firm  alliance,  a  "  lawful 
marriage,"  must  be  effected  between  them.  The  empiricists 
merely  collect,  like  the  ants;  the  dogmatic  metaphysicians 
spin  the  web  of  their  ideas  out  of  themselves,  like  the 
spiders  ;  but  the  true  philosopher  must  be  like  the  bee, 
which  by  its  own  power  transforms  and  digests  the  gathered 
material. 

As  the  mind,  like  a  dull  and  uneven  mirror,  by  its  own 
nature  distorts  the  rays  of  objects,  it  must  first  of  all  be 
cleaned  and  polished,  that  is,  it  must  be  freed  from  all  prej- 
udices and  false  notions,  which,  deep-rooted  by  habit, 
prevent  the  formation"  of  a  true  picture  of  the  world.  It 
must  root  out  its  prejudices,  or,  where  this  is  impossible, 
at  least  understand  them.  Doubt  is  the  first  step  on  t^e 
way  to  truth.  Of  these  Phantoms  or  Idols  to  be  discarded, 
Bacon"  distinguishes  four  classes  :  Idols  of  the  Theater,  of 
the  Market  Place,  of  the  Den,  and  of  the  Tribe.  The  most 
dangerous  are  the  idolatjieatri,  which  consist  in  the  ten- 
denjcy  to  put  more  trust  in  authority  and  trädTticrnTthan  in  * 
independent  reflection,  to  adopt  current  ideas  "simply  be- 
cause they  find  generaf  acceptance.  Bacon's  injunction 
concerning  these  is  not  to  be  deceived  by  stage-plays  (i.  <?., 
by  the  teachings  of  earlier  thinkers  which  represent  things 
other  than  they  are)  ;  instead  of  helievinp-  nt^ei^  observe 
iäi  ÜajtfaJtf !  The  idola  fori,  which  arise  from  the  use  of 
language  in  public  intercourse,  depend  upon  the  confusion 
of  words,  which  are  mere  symbols  with  a  conventional  value 
and  which  are  based  on  the  carelessly  constructed  concepts 
of  the  vulgar,  with  things  themselves.  Here  Bacon  warns 
us  to  keep  close  to  things.  The  idola  specus  are  individual 
prepossessions  which  interfere  with  the  apprehension  of 
the  true  state  of  affairs,  such  as  the  excessive  tendency  of 
thought  toward  the  resemblances  or  the  differences  of 
things,  or  the  investigator's  habit  of  transferring  ideas  cur- 
rent in  his  own  department  to  subjects  of  a  different  kind. 
Such  individual  weaknesses  are  numberless,  yet  they  may 
in  part  be  corrected  by  comparison  with  the  perceptions 
of  others.     The   idola  tribus,  finally,  are  grounded   in  the 


68  THE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

nature  of  the  human  species.  To  this  class  belong,  among 
Others,  illusions  of  the  senses,  which  may  in  part  be  cor- 
rected by  the  use  of  instruments,  with  which  we  arm  our 
organs ;  further,  the  tendency  to  hold  fast  to  opinioi^ 
acceptable  to  us  in  spite  of  contrary  instances  ;  similarly, 
the  tendency  to  anthropomorphic  views,  including,  as  its 
most  important  special  instance,  the  mistake  of  thinking 
that  we  perceive  purposive  relations  everywhere  and  the 
working  of  final  causes,  after  the  analogy  of  human  action, 
when  in  reality  efficient  causes  alone  are  concerned.  Here 
Bacon's  injunction  runs,  not  to  interpret  natural  phenomena 
teleologically,  but  to  explain  them  from  mechanical  causes; 
not  to  narrow  the  world  down  to  the  limits  of  the  mind,  but 
to  extend  the  mind  to  the  boundaries  of  the  world,  so  that 
it  shall  understand  it  as  it  really  is. 

To  these  warnings  there  are  added  positive  rules.  When 
the  investigator,  after  the  removal  of  prejudices  and 
habitual  modes  of  thought,  approaches  experience  with 
his  senses  unperverted  and  a  purified  mind,  he  is  to  ad- 
vance from  the  phenomena  given  to  their  conditions.  First 
of  all,  the  facts  must  be  established  by  observation  and 
experiment,  and  systematically  arranged,*  then  let  him 
go  on  to  causes  and  laws.f     The  true   or  scientific  induc- 

*  Bacon  illustrates  the  method  by  the  explanation  of  heat.  The  results  of 
experimental  observation  are  to  be  arranged  in  three  tables.  The  table  of  pres- 
ence contains  many  different  cases  in  which  heat  occurs  ;  the  table  of  absence, 
those  in  which,  under  circumstances  otherwise  the  same,  it  is  wanting  ;  the  table 
of  degrees  or  comparison  enumerates  phenomena  whose  increase  and  decrease 
accompany  similar  variations  in  the  degree  of  heat.  That  which  remains  after 
the  exclusion  now  to  be  undertaken  (of  that  which  cannot  be  the  nature  or 
cause  of  heat),  yields  as  a  preliminary  result  or  commencement  of  interpreta- 
tion (as  a  "first  vintage"),  the  definition  of  heat:  "a  motion,  expansive,  re- 
strained, and  acting  in  its  strife  upon  the  smaller  particles  of  bodies." 

f  This  goal  of  Baconian  inquiry  is  by  no  means  coincident  with  that  of  exact 
natural  science.  Law  does  not  mean  to  him,  as  to  the  physical  scientist  of  to- 
day, a  mathematically  formulated  statement  of  the  course  of  events,  but  the 
nature  of  the  phenomenon,  to  be  expressed  in  a  definition  (E.  König,  Entwicke- 
lung des  Causalproblems  bis  Kant,  l883,  pp.  154-156).  Bacon  combines  in  a 
peculiar  manner  ancient  and  modern,  Platonic  and  corpuscular  fundamental  ideas. 
Rejecting  final  causes  with  the  atomists,  yet  handing  over  material  and  efficient 
causes  (the  latter  of  which  sink  with  him  to  the  level  of  mere  changing  occa- 
sional causes)  to  empirical  physics,  he  assigns  to  metaphysics,  as  the  true  science 
of  nature,  the  search  for  the  "  forms  "  and  properties  of  things.     In  this  he  is 


bacon;  69 

tion  *  thus  inculcated  is  quite  different  from  the  credu- 
lous induction  of  common  life  or  the  unmethodical 
induction  of  Aristotle.  Bacon  emphasizes  the  fact  that 
hitherto  the  importance  of  negative  instances,  which 
are  to  be  employed  as  a  kind  of  counter-proof,  has 
been  completely  overlooked,  and  that  a  substitute  for 
complete  induction,  which  is  never  attainable,  may  be 
found,  on  the  one  hand,  in  the  collection  of  as  many  cases 
as  possible,  and,  on  the  other,  by  considering  the  more 
important  or  decisive  cases,  the  "  prerogative  instances." 
Then  the  inductive  ascent  from  experiment  to  axiom  is  to 
be-  followed  by  a  deductive  descent  from  axioms  to  new 
experiments  and  discoveries.  Bacon  rejects  the  syllogism 
on  the  ground  that  it  fits  one  to  overcome  his  opponent 
in  disputation,  but  not  to  gain  an  active  conquest  over 
nature.  In  his  own  application  of  these  principles  of  method, 
his  procedure  was  that  of  a  dilettante  ;  the  patient,  assid- 
uous labor  demanded  for  the  successful  promotion  of  the 
mission  of  natural  investigation  was  not  his  forte.  His 
strength  lay  in  the  postulation  of  problems,  the  stimulation 
and  direction  of  inquiry,  the  discovery  of  lacunae  and  the 
throwing  out  of  suggestions;  and  many  ideas  incident- 
ally thrown  off  by  him  surprise  us  by  their  ingenious  antici- 

guided  by  the  following  metaphysical  presupposition  :  Phenomena,  however 
manifold  they  may  be,  are  at  bottom  composed  of  a  few  elements,  namely,  per- 
manent properties,  the  so-called  "  simple  naturess,"  which  form,  as  it  were,  the 
alphabet  of  nature  or  the  colors  on  her  palette,  by  the  combination  of  which 
she  produces  her  varied  pictures;  e.g.,  the  nature  of  heat  and  cold,  of  a  red 
color,  of  gravity,  and  also  of  age,  of  death.  Now  the  question  to  be  investigated 
becomes,  What,  then,  is  heat,  redness,  etc.?  The  ground  essence  and  law  of  the 
natures  consist  in  certain  forms,  which  Bacon  conceives  in  a  Platonic  way  as  con- 
cepts and  substances,  but  phenomenal  ones,  and,  at  the  same  time,  with  Democ- 
ritus,  as  the  grouping  or  motion  of  minute  material  particles.  Thus  the  form 
of  heat  is  a  particular  kind  of  motion,  the  form  of  whiteness  a  determinate  ar- 
rangement of  material  particles.  Cf.  Natge,  Ueber  F.  Bacons  Forvienlchre, 
Leipsic,  1891,  in  which  Heussler's  view  is  developed  in  more  detail.  [Cf.  further, 
Fowler's  Bacon,  English  Philosophers  Series,  1881,  chap.  iv. — Tk.] 

*  The  Baconian  method  is  to  be  called  induction,  it  is  true,  only  in  the 
broad  sense.  Even  before  Sigwart,  Apelt,  Theorie  der  Induction,  1854,  pp.  151, 
153,  declared  that  the  question  it  discussed  was  essentially  a  method  of  ab- 
straction. This,  however,  does  not  detract  from  the  fame  of  Bacon  as  the  founder 
of  the  theory  of  inductive  investigation  (in  later  times  carefully  elaborated  by 
Mill). 


;o  THE   PERIOD   OF    TRANSITION. 

pations  of  later  discoveries.  The  greatest  defect  in  his 
theory  was  his  complete  failure  to  recognize  the  services 
promised  by  mathematics  to  natural  science.  The  charge 
of  utilitarianism,  which  has  been  so  broadly  made,  is,  on 
the  contrary,  unjust.  For  no  matter  how  strongly  he  em- 
phasizes the  practical  value  of  knowledge,  he  is  still  in 
agreement  with  those  who  esteem  the  godlike  condition  of 
calm  and  cheerful  acquaintance  with  truth  more  highly 
than  the  advantages  to  be  expected  from  it ;  he  desires 
science  to  be  used,  not  as  "a  courtezan  for  pleasure,"  but 
"  as  a  spouse  for  generation,  fruit  and  comfort,"  and — leaving 
entirely  out  of  view  his  isolated  acknowledgments  of  the 
inherent  value  of  knowledge — he  conceives  its  utility  wholly 
in  the  comprehensive  and  noble  sense  that  the  pursuit  of 
science,  from  which  as  such  all  narrow-minded  regard  for 
direct  practical  application  must  keep  aloof,  is  the  most 
important  lever  for  the  advancement  of  human  culture. 

Bacon  intended  that  his  reforming  principles  should 
accrue  to  the  benefit  of  practical  philosophy  also,  but 
gave  only  aphoristic  hints  to  this  end.  Everything  is 
impelled  by  two  appetites,  of  which  the  one  aims  at  indi- 
vidual welfare,  the  other  at  the  welfare  of  the  whole  of 
which  the  thing  is  a  part  (bonum  suitatis — bonam  commn- 
nionis).  The  second  is  not  only  the  nobler  but  also  the 
stronger  ;  this  holds  of  the  lower  creatures  as  well  as  of 
man,  who,  when  not  degenerate,  prefers  the  general  welfare 
to  his  individual  interests.  Love  is  the  highest  of  the 
virtues,  and  is  never,  as  other  human  endowments,  exposed 
to  the  danger  of  excess  ;  therefore  the  life  of  action  is 
of  more  worth  than  the  life  of  contemplation.  By  this 
principle  of  morals  Bacon  marked  out  the  way  for  the  Eng- 
lish ethics  of  later  times.*  He  notes  the  lack  of  a  science 
of  character,  for  which  more  material  is  given  in  ordinary 
discourse,  in  the  poets  and  the  historians,  than  in  the  works 
of  the  philosophers  ;  he  explains  the  power  of  the  affections 
over  the  reason  by  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  present  good 
fills  the  imagination  more  forcibly  than  the  idea  of  good  to 
come,  and  summons  persuasion,  habit,  and  morals  to  the  aid 
of  the  latter.     We  must  endeavor  so  to  govern  the  passions 

*  Cf.  Vorlaender,  p.  267  seq. 


HOB  BES.  7 1 

(each  of  which  combines  in  itself  a  masculine  impetuosity 
with  a  feminine  weakness)  that  they  shall  take  the  part 
of  the  reason  instead  of  attacking  it.  Elsewhere  Bacon 
gives  (not  entirely  unquestionable)  directions  concerning 
the  art  of  making  one's  way.  Acute  observations  and  in- 
genious remarks  everywhere  abound.  In  order  to  inform 
one's  self  of  a  man's  intentions  and  ends,  it  is  necessary 
to  "keep  a  good  mediocrity  in  liberty  of  speech,  which 
invites  a  similar  liberty,  and  in  secrecy,  which  induces  trust." 
"  In  order  to  get  on  one  must  have  a  little  of  the  fool  and 
not  too  much  of  the  honest."  "  As  the  baggage  is  to  an 
army,  so  is  riches  to  virtue.  It  cannot  be  spared  nor  left 
behind,  but  it  hindereth  the  march  ;  yea,  and  the  care  of  it 
sometimes  loseth  or  disturbeth  the  victory  "(impedimenta  = 
baggage  and  hindrance).  On  envy  and  malevolence  he 
says  :  "  For  men's  minds  will  either  feed  upon  their  own 
good  or  upon  others'  evil  ;  .  .  .  and  whoso  is  out  of  hope 
to  attain  another's  virtue  will  seek  to  come  at  even  hand 
by  depressing  another's  fortune." 

In  ethics,  as  in  theoretical  philosophy,  Bacon  demands  the 
completion  of  natural  knowledge  by  revelation.  The  light 
of  nature  (the  reason  and  the  conscience)  is  able  only  to 
convince  us  of  sin  and  not  to  give  us  complete  information 
concerning  our  duty, — e.  g.,  the  lofty  moral  principle,  Love 
your  enemies.  Similarly,  natural  theology  is  quite  suf- 
ficient to  place  the  existence  of  God  beyond  doubt,  by 
reasoning  from  the  order  in  nature  ("  slight  tastes  of  phi- 
losophy may  perchance  move  one  to  atheism  but  fuller 
draughts  lead  back  to  religion  ") ;  but  the  doctrines  of 
Christianity  are  matters  of  faith.  Religion  and  science  are 
separate  fields,  any  confusion  of  which  involves  the  danger 
of  an  heretical  religion  or  a  fabulous  philosophy.  The 
more  a  principle  of  faith  contradicts  the  reason,  the  greater 
the  obedience  and  the  honor  to  God  in  accepting  it. 

(c)  Hobbes. —  Hobbes  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  Bacon 
both  in  disposition  and  in  doctrine.  Bacon  was  a  man 
of  a  wide  outlook,  a  rich,  stimulating,  impulsive  nature, 
filled  with  great  plans,  but  too  mobile  and  desultory  to  al- 
low them  to  ripen  to  perfection  ;  Hobbes  is  slow,  tenacious, 
persistent,  unyielding,  his  thought  strenuous   and    narrow. 


7-'  THE  PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

To  this  corresponds  a  profound  difference  in  their  systems, 
which  is  by  no  means  adequately  characterized  by  saying 
that  Hobbes  brings  into  the  foreground  the  mathematical 
element  neglected  by  his  predecessor,  and  turns  his  atten- 
tion chiefly  to  politics.  The  dependence  of  Hobbes  on 
Bacon  is,  in  spite  of  their  personal  acquaintance,  not  so 
great  as  formerly  was  universally  assumed.  His  guiding 
stars  are  rather  the  great  mathematicians  of  the  Continent, 
Kepler  and  Galileo,  while  Cartesian  influences  also  are  not 
to  be  denied.      He  finds  his  mission  in  the  construction  of  a 


srrirHy  rnerhanical  view  ot  the  world.  Mechanism  applied 
to  the  world  gives  materialism ;  applied  to  knowledge, 
sensationalism  of  a  mathematical  type  ;  applied  to  the  will, 
determinism  ;  to  morality  and  the  state,  ethical  and  polit- 
ical naturalism.  Nevertheless,  the  empirical  tendency  of  his 
nation  has  a  certain  power  over  him  ;  he  holds  fast  to  the 
position  that  all  ideas  ultimately  spring  from  experience. 
With  his  energetic  but  short-breathed  thinking,  he  did  not 
succeed  in  fusing  the  rationalistic  elements  received  from 
foreign  sources  with  these  native  tendencies,  so  as  to 
produce  a  unified  system.  As  Grimm  has  correctly  shown 
{Zur  Geschichte  des  Erkenntnissproblcms  \,  there  is  an 
unreconciled  contradiction  between  the  dependence  of 
thought  on  experience,  which  he  does  not  give  up,  and 
the  universal  validity  of  the  truths  derived  from  pure 
reason,  which  he  asserts  on  the  basis  of  the  mathematico- 
philosophical  doctrines  of  the  Continent.  A  similar  un- 
mediated  dualism  will  meet  us  in  Locke  also. 

Thomas  Hobbes  (i 588-1679)  was  repelled  while  a  student 
at  Oxford  by  Scholastic  methods  in  thought,  with  which 
he  agreed  only  in  their  nominalistic  results  (there  are 
no  universals  except  names).  During  repeated  sojourns  in 
Paris,  where  he  made  the  acquaintance  of  Gassendi, 
Mersenne,  and  Descartes,  he  devoted  himself  to  the 
study  of  mathematics,  and  was  greatly  influenced  by 
the  doctrines  of  Galileo  ;  while  the  disorders  of  the  En- 
glish revolution  led  him  to  embrace  an  aj^sxilutj^t^theory 
of  the  state.  His  chief  works  were  his  politics,  under 
the  title  Leviathan,  165 1,  and  his  Elementa  Philosophic, 
in    three    parts    {De    Corpore,    De    Homine,    De    Cive),    of 


HOB  BES.  73 

which  the  third,  De  Cive,  appeared  first  (in  Latin  ;  in 
briefer  form  and  anonymously,  "1642,  enlarged  1647),  the 
first,  De  Corpore,  in  1655,  and  the  second,  De Homine,  in  1658. 
These  had  been  preceded  by  two  books*  written,  like  the  two 
last  parts  of  the  Elements,  in  English  :  On  Human  Nature 
and  De  Corpore  Politico,  composed  1640,  printed  without 
the  author's  consent  in  1650.  Besides  these  he  wrote  two 
treatises  Of  Liberty  and  Necessity,  1646  and  1654,  and  pre- 
pared, 1668,  a  collected  edition  of  his  works  (in  Latin).  In 
Molesworth's  edition,  1839-45,  the  Latin  works  occupy  five 
volumes  and  the  English  eleven. f 

Philosophy  is  formally  defined  by  Hobbes  as  knowledge 
of  effects  from  causes  and  causes  from  effects  by  means 
of  legitimate  rational  inference.  This  implies  the  equal 
validity  of  the  deductive  and  inductive  methods, — while 
Bacon  had  proclaimed  the  latter  the  most  important  instru- 
ment of  knowledge, — as  well  as  the  exclusion  of  theology 
based  on  revelation  from  the  domain  of  science.  Philos- 
ophy is  objectively  defined  as  the  theory  of  body  and 
motion  :  all  that  exists  is  body;  all  that  occurs,  motion. 
Everything  real  is  corporeal ;  this  holds  of  points,  lines,  and 
surfaces,  which  as  the  limits  of  body  cannot  be  incorporeal, 
as  well  as  of  the  mind  and  of  God.  The  mind  is  merely 
a  (for  the  senses  too)  refined  body,  or,  as  it  is  stated  in 
another  place,  a  movement  in  certain  parts  of  the  organic 
body.  AJj  events,  even  mternal  events,  the_J&ejjjigs_and 
passions,  are  movements  of  material  parts.  "  Endeavor 
is^a- clTminutive  motion,  as  the  atom  "Ts"_tTTe  smallest  of 
bodies;  sensation  and  representation  are  changes  in  the 
perceiving  body.  Space  is  the  idea  of  an  existing  thing  as 
such,  i.  e.,  merely  as  existing  outside  the  perceiving  sub- 
ject ;  time,  tin-  idea  <>f  motion.  All  phenomena  arc  cor- 
poreal  motions,  which  take  place  with  mechanical  necessity. 
Neither  formal  nor  final  causes  exist,  but  only  efficient 
causes.     All  that   happens  takes  its  origin  in  the  activity 

*  Or  rather  one  ;  Up'  treatise  On  Human  Mature  consists  of  the  lirst  thirteen 
chapters  of  the  work,  Elements  of  Law,  Natural  and  Politic,  and  tin'  De 
Corpora  Politico  <>f  1  lie  remainder. 

\  Cf.    "ii  Hobbes,  G.   C,    Robertson   (Blackwood's    Philosophical   Classics, 

vol.  x.),  rHSO  ;  I  umiies  in  the  I'irrtrtj.tlu  ^thrift  für  wissttUi  haftlicht  Philoso- 
phie, Jahrg.  3-5,  1879-81. 


74  THE   PERIOD    OF    TRANSITION. 

of  an  external  cause,  and  not  in  itself ;  a  body  at  rest  (or 
in  motion)  remains  at  rest  (or  in  motion)  forever,  unless 
affected  by  another  in  a  contrary  sense.  And  as  bodies 
and  their  changes  constitute  the  only  objects  of  philosophy, 
so  the  mathematical  method  is  the  only  correct  method. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  bodies  :  natural  bodies,  which  man 
finds  in  nature,  and  artificial  bodies,  which  he  himself  pro- 
duces. By  the  latter  Hobbes  refers  especially  to  the  state 
as  a  human  artefact.  Man  stands  between  the  two  as  the 
most  perfect  natural  body  and  an  element  in  the  political 
body.  Philosophy,  therefore,  besides  the  introductory 
pliilosophia prima,  which  discusses  the  underlying  concepts, 
consists  of  three  parts:  physics,  anthropology,  and  politics. 
Even  the  theory  of  the  state  is  capable  of  demonstrative 
treatment ;  moral  phenomena  are  as  subject  to  the  law  of 
mechanical  causation  as  physical  phenomena. 

The  first  factor  in  the  cognitive  process  is  an  impression 
on  a  sense-organ,  which,  occasioned  by  external  motion, 
continues  onward  to  the  heart  and  from  this  center  gives 
rise  to  a  reaction.  The  perception  or  sensation  which 
thus  arises  is  entirely  subjective,  a  function  of  the  knower 
merely,  and  in  no  way  a  copy  of  the  external  movement. 
The  properties  light,  color,  and  sound,  which  we  believe 
to  be  without  us,  are  merely  internal  phenomena  dependent 
on  outer  and  inner  motions,  but  with  no  resemblance  to 
them.  Memory  consists  in  the  lingering  effects  or  residuary 
traces  of  perception  ;  it  is  a  sense  or  consciousness  of  hav- 
ing felt  before  {sentire  se  sensisse  meminisse  est),  and  ideas 
are  distinguished  from  sensations  as  the  perfect  from  the 
present  tense.  Experience  is  the  totality  of  perceptions 
retained  in  memory,  together  with  a  certain  foresight  of  the 
future  after  the  analogy  of  the  past.  These  stages  of  cog- 
nition, which  can  yield  prudence  but  not  necessary  and 
universal  knowledge,  are  present  in  animals  as  well  as  men. 
The  human  capacity  for  science  is  dependent  on  the  faculty 
of  speech  ;  words  are  conventional  signs  to  facilitate  the 
retention  and  communication  of  ideas.  As  the  memory- 
images  denoted  by  words  are  weaker,  fainter,  and  less 
clearly  discriminated  than  the  original  sensations,  it  comes 
to  pass  that  a  number  of  similar  ideas  of  memory  receive  a 


/ 


-C?6tr    «tiA^Uf  MOB B ES.  75 

common  name.  Thus  abstract  general  ideas  and  generic 
concepts  arise,  to  which  nothing  real  corresponds,  for  in 
reality  particulars  alone  exist.  The  universal  is  a  human 
artefact.  The  combination  of  words  into  propositions, 
being  an  addition  or  subtraction  of  arbitrary  symbols  or 
marks,  is  called  judgment ;  the  combination  of  propositions 
into  syllogisms,  inference  ;  the  united  body  of  true  or 
demonstrated  principles^  science — hence  mathematics  is  the 
type  of  all  knowledge.  In  short,  thought  is  nothing  but 
calculation  and  the  words  with  which  we  operate  are  mere 
counters  ;  he  who  takes  counters  for  coin  is  a  fool.  Ani- 
mals lack  reason,  i.  e.,  this  power  of  combining  artificial 
symbols. 

Hobbes's  theory  of  the  will  is  characterized  by  the  same 
sensationalism  and  mechanism  as  his  theory  of  knowledge. 
All  spiritual  events  originate  in  impressions  of  sense  Man 
responds  to  the  action  of  objects  by  a  double  reaction, 
adding  to  the  theoretical  reaction  of  sensation  a  practical 
one  in  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  (according  as  the 
impression  furthers  or  hinders  the  vital  function),  whence 
desire  and  aversion  follow  in  respect  to  future  experience. 
Further  developments  from  the  feelings  experienced  at  the 
signs  of  honor  (the  acknowledgment  of  superior  power)  and 
the  contrary,  are  the  affections  of  pride,  courage,  anger,  of 
shame  and  repentance,  of  hope  and  love,  of  pity,  etc.  De- 
liberation is  the  alternation  of  different  appetites;  the  final, 
victorious  one  which  immediately  precedes  action  is  called 
will.  Freedom  cannot  be  predicated  of  the  will,  but  only 
of  the  action,  and  even  in  this  case  it  means  simply  the 
absence  of  external  restraints,  the  procedure  of  the  action 
from  the  will  of  the  agent;  while  the  action  is  necessary 
nevertheless.  Every  motion  is  the  inevitable  result  of  the 
sum  of  the  preceding  (including  cerebral)  motions. 

Things  which  we  desire  are  termed  good,  and  those  which 
we  shun,  evil.  Nothing  is  good  />cr  sc  or  absolutely,  but  only 
relatively,  for  a  given  person,  place,  time,  or  set  of  circum- 
stances. Different  things  are  good  to  different  nun,  and 
there  is  no  objective,  universal  rule  of  good  and  evil,  so 
long  as  men  are  considered  as  individuals,  apart  from 
society.      A  definite  criterion  of  the  good  is  first  reached  ill 


76 


THE  PERIOD   OE    TRANSITION. 


the  state:  that  is  right  which  the  law  permits,  that  wrong 
which  it  forbids;  good  means  that  which  is  conducive  to 
the  general  welfare.  In  the  state  of  nature  nothing  is  for- 
bidden ;  nature  gives  every  man  a  right  to  everything,  and 
right  is  coextensive  with  might.  What,  then,  induces 
man  to  abandon  the  state  of  nature  and  enter  the  state  of 
citizenship  ?  Xhe  opinion  of  Aristotle  and  Grotius  that 
-thejstate  origipa^g  «*"  Mie,  gfyial  jmpnlgp  i<*  fal^e ;  fr.r  m^P  ;c. 
essentiall)'  not  social,  but  selfish,  and  nothing  but  regard  for 
fils  own  interests  hids  him  seek  the  protection  oi  tlie  state: 
thr_  civil  fiommn"""aRlth  ic  c,n  a^+ifl^i'ai  product  of  fear 
and  prudence.  The  highest  good  is"selt-preservation  ;  all 
other  goods,  as  friendship,  riches,  wisdom,  knowledge,  and, 
above  all,  power,  are  valuable  only  as  instruments  of  the 
former.  The  precondition  of  well-being,  for  which  each 
man  strives  by  nature,  is  security  for  life  and  health.  This 
is  wanting  in  the  state  of  nature,  in  which  the  passions 
govern  ;  for  the  state  of  nature  is  a  state  of  war  of  everyone 
against  everyone  {bellum  omnium  contra  omnes).  Each  man 
strives  for  success  and  power,  and,  since  he  cannot  trust  his 
fellow,  seeks  to  subdue,  nay,  to  kill  him  ;  each  looks  upon 
his  fellow  as  a  wolf  which  he  prefers  to  devour  rather  than 
submit  himself  to  the  like  operation.  Now,  as  no  one  is  so 
weak  as  to  be  incapable  of  inflicting  on  his  fellows  that 
worst  of  evils,  death,  and  thus  the  strongest  is  unsafe, 
reason,  in  the  interest  of  everyone,  enjoins  a  search  after 
peace  and  the  establishment  of  an  ordered  community. 
The  conditions  of  peace  are  the  "  lawj^gX  nature»"  which 
relate  both  to  politicsTänd  ro  morals  butwhich  do  not  attain' 
their  full  hjpHT^authuiiTv--tuiiilj:hev  become  positive  Taws, 
injunctions  of  the  sovereign  power.  Peace  is  attainable 
only  when  each  man,  in  return  for  the  protection  vouchsafed 
to  him,  gives  up  his  natural  right  to  all.  The  compact  by 
which  each  renounces  his  natural  liberty  to  do  what  he 
pleases,  provided  all  others  are  ready  for  the  same  renuncia- 
tion,— to  which  are  added,  further,  the  laws  of  justice  (sanc- 
tity of  covenants),  equity,  gratitude,  modesty,  sociability, 
mercifulness,  etc.,  whose  opposites  would  bring  back  the 
state  of  nature, — this  compact  is  secured  against  violation 
by  the  transfer  of  the  general  power  and  freedom  to  a  single 


HOBBES. 


77 


will  (the  will  of  an  assembly  or  of  an  individual  person), 
which  then  represents  the  general  will.  The  civil  contract 
includes,  then,  two  moments:  first,  renunciation ;  second, 
irrevocable  transference  and  (absolute)  submission.  The 
second  unites  the  multitude  into  a  civil  personality,  the 
most  perfect  unity  being  vouchsafed  by  absolute  monarchy. 
The  sovereign  is  the  soul  of  the  political  body  ;  the  offi- 
cials, its  limbs;  reward  and  punishment,  its  nerves;  law 
and  equity,  its  reason. 

The  social  contract  theory  has  often  experienced  demo- 
cratic interpretation  and  application,  both  before  and  since 
Hobbes's  time;  and,  in  fact,  it  does  not  include  per  se  the 
irrevocability  of  the  transfer,  the  absoluteness  of  the  sov- 
ereign power,  and  the  monarchical  head,  which  Hobbes  con- 
sidered indispensable  in  order  to  guard  against  the  danger 
of  anarchy.  In  every  abridgment  of  the ^upreme  power, 
whether  by  division  or  limitation,  he  sees  a  step  towaTd 
the  renewafof  the  state  of  nature;  and  he  defends~~wiTh 
iron  rigor"  the  omnipotence  of  the  state  and  tfte  completejack 
oT  legal  status  OH  the  part  öTäTTIndividuals  in  contrast  with 
it!  The  düzen"**nr  not  to  obey  his  own  conscience,  which 
h~as  simply  the  value  of  a  private  opinion,  but  the  laws,  as 
the  public  conscience ;  while  the  supreme  ruler,  on  the 
contrary,  is  superior  to  the  civil  laws,  for  it  is  he  that 
decrees,  interprets,  alters,  and  abrogates  them.  He  is  lord 
ov"eTTn~e  property,  the  life,  and  the  death  of  the  citizens,  and 
can  do  no  one  wrong.  For  he  alone  has  retained  his  original 
natural  right  to  all,  which  the  rest  have  entirely  and  for- 
ever renounced.  He  must  have  regard,  indeed,  to  the  wel- 
fare of  the  people,  but  he  is  accountable  to  God  alone. 
The  obligation  of  the  subject  to  obey  is  extinguished  in 
one  case  only, — when  the  civil  power  is  incapable  of  provid- 
ing him  further  with  external  and  internal  protection. 
Vox  the  rest,  Hobbes  declaresthe  existing  public  order  the 
lawful  one,  the  evils  of  arbitrary  rule  much  more  tolerable,. 
1  hostility  of  the  state  of  nature,  and  aver- 
diseasc  inherited    f mm  the  republicans  of 


lan  the  univer 
sion  to  tyrant  s 
antiquity. 

"~  The   sovereign,   by  the    laws  and   by    instruction,  deter- 
mines what   is  good   and  evil  ;   he   determines  also  what    is 


/S  THE   PERIOD    OE    TRANSITION. 

to  be  believed.  Religion  unsanctioned  by  the  state  is  su- 
perstition. The  temporal  ruler  is  also  the  spiritual  ruler, 
the  king,  the  chief  pastor,  and  the  clergy  his  servants.  One 
and  the  same  community  is  termed  state  in  so  far  as  it  con- 
sists of  men,  and  church  in  so  far  as  it  consists  of  Christian 
men  (the  ecclesiastical  commonwealth).  The  dogmas  which 
the  law  prescribes  are  to  be  received  without  investigation, 
to  be  swallowed  like  pills,  without  mastication. 

The  principle  that  every  passion  and  every  action  is  in 
its  nature  indifferent,  that  right  and  wrong  exist  only  in  the 
state,  that  the  will  of  a  despot  is  to  determine  what  is 
moral  and  what  immoral,  has  given  just  offense.  Moreover, 
this  was  not,  in  fact,  Hobbes's  deepest  conviction.  Even 
without  ascribing  great  importance  to  isolated  statements,* 
it  must  be  admitted  that  his  doctrine  was  interpreted  more 
narrowly  than  it  was  intended.  He  does  not  say  that  no 
moral  distinctions  whatever  exist  before  the  foundation  of 
the  state,  but  only  that  the  state  first  supplies  a  fixed 
criterion  of  the  good.  Moral  ideas  have  a  certain  cur- 
rency before  this,  but  they  lack  power  to  enforce  them- 
selves. Eurther.  wheiuhe^asxribes  the  origin  of  the  state 
to  self-interest,  this  does  not  mean  that  reason,  conscience, 
generosity,  and  love  for  our  fellows  are  entirely  wanting^  in— 
the  state  of  nature,  but  only  that  they  are  not  general  enough, 
and,  as  against  the  passions,  not  strongxnough  to  furnish  a 
foundation  for  the  edifice  of  the  state.  Not  only  exaggera- 
tion in  statement  but  also  uncouthness  of  thought  may  be 
forgiven  the  representative  of  a  movement  which  is  at  once 
new  and  strengthened  by  the  consciousness  of  agreement 
with  a  naturalistic  theory  of  knowledge  and  physics ;  and 
the  vigor  of  execution  compels  admiration,  even  though 
many  obscurities  remain  to  be  deplored  (c.  g.,  the  relation 
of  the  two  moral  standards,  the  standard  of  the  reason  or 
natural  law  and  the  standard  of  positive  law).     And  recog- 

*  God  inscribed  the  divine  or  natural  law  (Do  not  that  to  another,  etc.) 
on  the  heart  of  man,  when  he  gave  him  the  reason  to  rule  his  actions.  The 
laws  of  nature  are,  it  is  true,  not  always  legally  binding  {in  foro  externa),  but 
always  and  everywhere  binding  on  the  conscience  {in  foro  inferno).  Justice  is  the 
virtue  which  we  can  measure  by  civil  laws  ;  love,  that  which  we  measure  hy  the 
law  of  nature  merely.  The  ruler  ought  to  govern  in  accordance  with  the  law  of 
nature. 


LORD  HERBERT  OF  CHERBURY.  79 

nition  must  be  accorded  to  the  significant  kernel  of  doc- 
trine formed,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  endeavor  to  separate 
ethics  from  theology,  and  on  the  other,  by  the  thoughts — 
which,  it  is  true,  were  not  perfectly  brought  out — that  the 
moral  is  not  founded  on  a  natural  social  impulse,  but  on 
a  law  of  the  reason,  and  first  gains  a  definite  criterion  in 
society,  and  that  the  interests  of  the  individual  are  insepar- 
ably connected  with  those  of  the  community.  In  any  case, 
the  attempt  to  form  a  naturalistic  theory  of  the  state  would 
be  an  undertaking  deserving  of  thanks,  even  if  the  promul- 
gation of  this  theory  had  done  no  further  service  than  to 
challenge  refutation. 

(d)  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury.— Between  Bacon  (1605, 
1620)  and  Hobbes  (1642,  165 1)  stands  Lord  Herbert  of 
Cherbury  (1 581-1648),  who,  by  his  work  De  Veritate{\62^)* 
became  the  founder  of  deism,  that  theory  of  "  natural  re- 
ligion," which,  in  opposition  to  the  historical  dogmatic  faith 
of  the  Church  theology,  takes  the  reason,  which  is  the 
same  in  all  men,  as  its  basis  and  morality  for  its  content. 
Lord  Herbert  introduces  his  philosophy  of  religion  by  a 
theory  of  knowledge  which  makes  universal  consent  the 
highest  criterion  of  truth  {summa  veritatis  norma  consensus 
universalis),  and  bases  knowledge  on  certain  self-evident 
principles  {principia),  common  to  ail  men  in  virtue  of  a 
natural  instinct,  which  gives  safe  guidance.  These  com- 
mon notions  {notitice  communes)  precede  all  reflective  inquiry, 
as  well  as  all  observation  and  experience,  which  would  be 
impossible  without  them.  The  most  important  among 
them  are  the  religious  and  ethical  maxims  of  conscience. 

This  natural  instinct  is  both  an  impulse  toward  truth 
and  a  capacity  for  good  or  impulse  to  self-preservation. 
The  latter  extends  not  only  to  the  individual  but  to  all 
things  with  which  the  individual  is  connected,  to  the  species, 
nay,  to  all  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  its  final  goal  is  eternal 
happiness  :  all  natural  capacities  are  directed  toward  the 
highest  good  or  toward  God.  The  sense  for  the  divine 
may  indeed  be  lulled  to  sleep  or  led  astray  by  our  free  will, 
but  not  eradicated.     To  be  rational  and  to  be  religious  are 

*  7'ractntus  t/e  Vert  täte  firout  disHttgllitur  "  Revehitione,  11  I'erisimili,  a  Pvssi- 
bile,  eta  Falso.     Also,  De  Religione  Gentilium,  1645,  complete  1663. 


So  THE  PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

inseparable;  it  is  religion  that  distinguishes  man  from  the 
brute,  and  no  people  can  be  found  in  which  it  is  lacking. 
If  atheists  really  exist,  they  are  to  be  classed  with  the 
irrational  and  the  insane. 

The  content  of  natural  religion  may  be  summed  up  in  the 
following  five  articles,  which  all  nations  confess:  I.  That 
there  is  a  Supreme  Being  {jiumen  supremitm).  2.  That  he 
ought  to  be  worshiped.  3.  That  virtue  and  piety  are  the 
chief  elements  of  worship.  4.  That  man  ought  to  repent 
of  his  sins.  5.  That  there  are  rewards  and  punishments  in 
a  future  life.  Besides  these  general  principles,  on  the  dis- 
covery of  which  Lord  Herbert  greatly  prides  himself,  the 
positive  religions  contain  arbitrary  additions,  which  distin- 
guish them  from  one  another  and  which  owe  their  origin, 
for  the  most  part,  to  priestly  deception,  although  the 
rhapsodies  of  the  poets  and  the  inventions  of  the  philoso- 
phers have  contributed  their  share.  The  essential  principles 
of  natural  religion  (God,  virtue,  faith,  hope,  love,  and  repent- 
ance) come  more  clearly  to  light  in  Christianity  than  in  the 
religions  of  heathendom,  where  they  are  overgrown  with 
myths  and  ceremonies. 

The  Religio  Medici  (1642)  of  Sir  Thomas  Browne  shows 
similar  tendencies. 

9.  Preliminary   Survey. 

In  the  line  of  development  from  the  speculations  of 
Nicolas  of  Cusa  to  the  establishment  of  the  English  phi- 
losophy of  nature,  of  religion,  and  of  the  state  by  Bacon, 
Herbert,  and  Hobbes,  and  to  the  physics  of  Galileo,  modern 
ideas  have  manifested  themselves  with  increasing  clearness 
and  freedom.  Hobbes  himself  shows  thus  early  the  influ- 
ence of  Descartes's  decisive  step,  with  which  the  twilight  gives 
place  to  the  brightness  of  the  morning.  In  Descartes  the 
empiricism  and  sensationalism  of  the  English  is  confronted 
by  rationalism,  to  which  the  great  thinkers  of  the  Continent 
continue  loyal.  In  Britain,  experience,  on  the  Continent 
the  reason  is  declared  to  be  the  source  of  cognition  ;  in  the 
former,  the  point  of  departure  is  found  in  particular  im- 
pressions of  sense,  on  the  latter,  in  general  concepts  and 
principles  of    the     understanding;     there    the    method    of 


PRELIMINARY  SURVEY.  81 

observation  is  inculcated  and  followed,  here,  the  method 
of  deduction.  This  antithesis  remained  decisive  in  the 
development  of  philosophy  down  to  Kant,  so  that  it  has 
long  been  customary  to  distinguish  two  lines  or  schools, 
the  Empirical  and  the  Rationalistic,  whose  parallelism  may 
be  exhibited  in  the  following  table  (when  only  one  date  is 
given  it  indicates  the  appearance  of  the  philosopher's  chief 
work) : 

Empiricism.  Rationalism. 

Bacon,  1620.  (Nicolas,  1450  ;  Bruno,  1584). 

Hobbes,  165 1.  Descartes,  died  1650. 

Locke,  1690  (1632-1704).         Spinoza,  (1632-)  1677. 

Berkeley,  17 10.  Leibnitz,  17 10. 

Hume,  1748.  Wolff,  died  1754. 

We  must  not  forget,  indeed,  the  lively  interchange  of 
ideas  between  the  schools  (especially  the  influence  of 
Descartes  on  Hobbes,  and  of  the  latter  on  Spinoza  ;  further, 
of  Descartes  on  Locke,  and  of  the  latter  on  Leibnitz)  which 
led  to  reciprocal  approximation  and  enrichment.  Berkeley 
and  Leibnitz,  from  opposite  presuppositions,  arrive  at  the 
same  idealistic  conclusion — there  is  no  real  world  of  matter, 
but  only  spirits  and  ideas  exist.  Hume  and  Wolff  conclude 
the  two  lines  of  development :  under  the  former,  empiricism 
disintegrates  into  skepticism  ;  under  the  latter,  rationalism 
stiffens  into  a  scholastic  dogmatism,  soon  to  run  out  into  a 
popular  eclecticism  of  common  sense. 

If  we  compare  the  mental  characteristics  of  the  three 
great  nations  which,  in  the  period  between  Descartes  and 
Kant,  participated  most  productively  in  the  work  of  phi- 
losophy,— the  Italians,  with  their  receptive  temperament 
and  so  active  in  many  fields,  exerted  a  decisive  influence  on 
its  development  and  progress  in  the  transition  period 
alone, — it  will  be  seen  that  the  Frenchman  tends  chiefly  to 
acuteness,  the  Englishman  to  clearness  and  simplicity,  the 
German  to  profundity  of  thought.  France  is  the  land  of 
m  ithematical,  England  of  practical,  Germany  of  speculative 
thinkers  ;  the  first  is  the  home  of  the  skeptics,  though  of 
the  enthusiasts  as  well ;  the  second,  of  the  realists  ;  the  third, 
of  the  idealists. 

The   English  philosopher   resembles  a    geographer  who, 


S2  THE  PERIOD   OE   TRANSITION. 

with  conscientious  care,  outlines  a  map  of  the  region  through 
which  he  journeys;  the  Frenchman,  an  anatomist  who/ 
with  steady  stroke,  lays  bare  the  nerves  and  muscles  of  the 
organism  ;  the  German,  a  mountaineer  who  loses  in  clear 
vision  of  particular  objects  as  much  as  he  gains  in  loftiness 
of  position  and  extent  of  view.  The  Englishman  describes 
the  given  reality,  the  Frenchman  analyses  it,  the  German 
transfigures  it. 

The  English  thinker  keeps  as  close  as  possible  to  phe- 
nomena, and  the  principles  which  he  uses  in  the  explanation 
of  phenomena  themselves  lie  in  the  realm  of  concrete 
experience.  He  explains  one  phenomenon  by  another  ;  he 
classifies  and  arranges  the  given  material  without  analyzing 
it;  he  keeps  constantly  in  touch  with  the  popular  con- 
sciousness. His  reverence  for  reality,  as  this  presents 
itself  to  him,  and  his  distrust  of  far-reaching  abstraction, 
are  so  strong  that  it  is  enough  for  him  to  take  his  bearings 
from  the  real,  and  to  give  a  true  reproduction  of  it,  while  he 
willingly  renounces  the  ambition  to  form  it  anew  in  concepts. 
With  this  respect  for  concrete  reality  he  combines  a  similar 
reverence  for  ethical  postulates.  When  the  development 
of  a  given  line  of  thought  threatens  to  bring  him  into  con- 
flict with  practical  life,  he  is  honest  enough  to  draw  the 
conclusions  which  follow  from  his  premises  and  to  give  them 
expression,  but  he  avoids  the  collision  by  a  simple  com- 
promise, shutting  up  the  refinements  of  philosophy  in  the 
study  and  yielding  in  practice  to  the  guidance  of  natural 
instinct  and  conscience.  His  support,  therefore,  of  theories 
which  contradict  current  views  in  morals  is  free  from 
the  levity  in  which  the  Frenchman  indulges.  Life  and 
thought  are  separate  fields,  contradictions  between  them 
are  borne  in  patience,  and  if  science  draws  its  material  from 
life  it  shows  itself  grateful  for  the  favor  by  giving  life  the 
benefit  of  the  useful  outcome  of  its  labors,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  shielding  it  from  the  revolutionary  or  disinte- 
grating effect  of  its  doubtful  paradoxes. 

While  the  deliberate  craft  of  English  philosophy  does 
not  willingly  lose  sight  of  the  shores  of  the  concrete  world, 
French  thought  sails  boldly  and  confidently  out  into  the 
open  sea  of  abstraction.       It  is  not  strange  that    it   finds 


PRELIMINARY  SURVEY.  83 

the  way  to  the  principles  more  rapidly  than  the  way 
back  to  phenomena.  A  free  road,  a  fresh  start,  a  straight 
course — such  is  the  motto  of  French  thinking.  Whatever 
is  inconsistent  with  rectilinearity  is  ignored,  or  opposed  as 
unfitting.  The  line  drawn  by  Descartes  through  the  world 
between  matter  and  spirit,  and  that  by  Rousseau  between 
nature  and  culture,  are  distinctive  of  the  philosophical 
character  of  their  countrymen.  Dualism  is  to  them  en- 
tirely congenial  ;  it  satisfies  their  need  for  clearness,  and 
with  this  they  are  content.  Antithesis  is  in  the  French- 
man's blood  ;  he  thinks  in  it  and  speaks  in  it,  in  the  salon 
or  on  the  platform,  in  witty  jest  or  in  scientific  earnestness 
of  thought.  Either  A  or  not-A,  and  there  is  no  middle 
ground.  This  habit  of  precision  and  sharp  analysis  facili- 
tates the  formation  of  closed  parties,  whereas  each  individ- 
ual German,  in  philosophy  as  in  politics,  forms  a  party  of 
his  own.  The  demand  for  the  removal  of  the  rubbish  of 
existing  systems  and  the  sanguine  return  to  the  sources,  give 
French  philosophy  an  unhistorical,  radical,  and  revolution- 
ary character.  Minds  of  the  second  order,  who  are  incapable 
of  taking  by  themselves  the  step  from  that  which  is  given 
to  the  sources,  prove  their  radicalism  by  following  down 
to  the  roots  that  which  others  have  begun  (so  Condillac 
and  the  sensationalism  of  Locke).  Moreover,  philosoph- 
ical principles  are  to  be  translated  into  action  ;  the  thinker 
has  shown  himself  the  doctrinaire  in  his  destructive 
analysis  of  that  which  is  given,  so,  also,  he  hopes  to  play 
the  dictator  by  overturning  existing  institutions  and  es- 
tablishing a  new  order  of  things, — only  his  courageous 
endeavor  flags  as  soon  in  the  region  of  practice  as  in  that 
of  theory. 

The  German  lacks  the  happy  faculty,  which  distinguishes 
the  two  nations  just  discussed,  of  isolating  a  problem  near 
at  hand,  and  he  is  accustomed  to  begin  his  system  with 
Leda's  egg  ;  but,  by  way  of  compensation,  he  combines  the 
lofty  flight  of  the  French  with  the  phlegmatic  endurance  of 
the  English,  i,  c,  he  seeks  his  principles  far  above  experi- 
ence, but,  instead  of  stopping  with  the  establishment  of 
points  of  view  or  when  In-  has  set  the  note,  he  carries 
his  principles  through   in   detail  with   loving  industry  and 


$4  THE  PERIOD   OF   TRANSITION. 

comprehensive  architectonic  skill.  While  common  sense 
turns  the  scale  with  the  English  and  analytical  thought 
with  the  French,  the  German  allows  the  fancy  and  the  heart 
to  take  an  important  part  in  the  discussion,  though  in  such 
a  way  that  the  several  faculties  work  together  and  in  har- 
mony. While  in  France  rationalism,  mysticism,  and  the 
philosophy  of  the  heart  were  divided  among  different 
thinkers  (Descartes,  Malebranche  and  Pascal,  Rousseau), 
there  is  in  every  German  philosopher  something  of  all 
three.  The  skeptical  Kant  provides  a  refuge  for  the  postu- 
lates of  thought  in  the  sanctuary  of  faith  ;  the  earnest,  ener- 
getic Fichte,  toward  the  end  of  his  life,  takes  his  place 
among  the  mystics  ;  Schelling  thinks  with  the  fancy  and 
dreams  with  the  understanding  ;  and  under  the  broad  cloak 
of  the  Hegelian  dialectic  method,  beside  the  reflection  of 
the  Critique  of  Reason  and  of  the  Science  of  Knowledge, 
the  fancies  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,  the  deep  inwardness 
of  Böhme,  even  the  whole  wealth  of  empirical  fact,  found  a 
place.  As  synthesis  is  predominant  in  his  view  of  things, 
so  a  harmonizing,  conciliatory  tendency  asserts  itself  in  his 
relations  to  his  predecessors  :  the  results  of  previous  philoso- 
phers are  neither  discarded  out  of  hand  nor  accepted  in 
the  mass,  but  all  that  appears  in  any  way  useful  or  akin  to 
the  new  system  is  wrought  in  at  its  proper  place,  though 
often  with  considerable  transformation.  In  this  work  of 
mediation  there  is  considerable  loss  in  definiteness,  the 
just  and  comprehensive  consideration  of  the  most  diverse 
interests  not  always  making  good  the  loss.  And  since  such 
a  philosophy,  as  we  have  already  shown,  engages  the  whole 
man,  its  disciple  has  neither  impulse  nor  strength  left  for 
reforming  labors;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  he  perceives  no 
external  call  to  undertake  them,  since  he  views  the  world 
through  the  glasses  of  his  system.  Thus  philosophy  in 
Germany,  pursued  chiefly  by  specialists,  remains  a  profes- 
sional affair,  and  has  not  exercised  a  direct  transforming 
influence  on  life  (for  Fichte,  who  helped  to  philosophize 
the  French  out  of  Germany,  was  an  exception) ;  but  its 
influence  has  been  the  greater  in  the  special  sciences, 
which  in  Germany  more  than  any  other  land  are  handled 
in  a  philosophic  spirit. 


PRELIMINARY  SURVEY.  85 

The  mental  characteristics  of  these  nations  are  reflected 
also  in  their  methods  of  presentation.  The  style  of  the 
English  philosopher  is  sober,  comprehensible,  diffuse,  and 
slightly  wearisome.  The  French  use  a  fluent,  elegant, 
lucid  style  which  entertains  and  dazzles  by  its  epigram- 
matic phrases,  in  which  not  infrequently  the  epigram  rules 
the  thought.  The  German  expresses  his  solid,  thoughtful 
positions  in  a  form  which  is  at  once  ponderous  and  not 
easily  understood  ;  each  writer  constructs  his  own  termin- 
ology, with  a  liberal  admixture  of  foreign  expressions, 
and  the  length  of  his  paragraphs  is  exceeded  only  by  the 
thickness  of  his  books.  These  national  distinctions  may 
be  traced  even  in  externals.  The  Englishman  makes  his 
divisions  as  they  present  themselves  at  first  thought,  and 
rather  from  a  practical  than  from  a  logical  point  of  view. 
The  analytic  Frenchman  prefers  dichotomy,  while  trich- 
otomy corresponds  to  the  synthetic,  systematic  character 
of  German  thinking;  and  Kant's  naive  delight,  because  in 
each  class  the  third  category  unites  its  two  predecessors, 
has  been  often  experienced  by  many  of  his  countrymen  at 
the  sight  of  their  own  trichotomies. 

The  division  of  labor  in  the  pre-Kantian  philosophy 
among  these  three  nationalities  entirely  agrees  with  the 
account  given  of  the  peculiarities  of  their  philosophical 
endowment.  The  beginning  falls  to  the  share  of  France  ; 
Locke  receives  that  tangled  skein,  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge, from  the  hand  of  Descartes,  and  passes  it  on  to 
Leibnitz;  and  while  the  Illumination  in  all  three  countries 
is  converting  the  gold  inherited  from  Locke  and  Leibnitz 
into  small  coin,  the  solution  of  the  riddle  rings  out  from 
Königsberg. 


PART     I. 
FROM  DESCARTES  TO  KANT. 


CHAPTER  II. 

DESCARTES. 

The  long  conflict  with  Scholasticism,  which  had  been 
carried  on  with  ever  increasing  energy  and  ever  sharper 
weapons,  was  brought  by  Descartes  to  a  victorious  close. 
The  new  movement,  long  desired,  long  sought,  and  prepared 
for  from  many  directions,  at  length  appears,  ready  and  well- 
established.  Descartes  accomplishes  everything  needful 
with  the  sure  simplicity  of  genius.  He  furnishes  philosophy 
with  a  settled  point  of  departure  in  self-consciousness, 
offers  her  a  method  sure  to  succeed  in  deduction  from  clear 
and  distinct  conceptions,  and  assigns  her  the  mechanical 
explanation  of  nature  as  her  most  imperative  and  fruitful 
mission. 

Ren6  Descartes  was  born  at  La  Haye  in  Touraine,  in 
1596,  and  died  at  Stockholm  in  1650.  Of  the  studies 
taught  in  the  Jesuit  school  at  La  Fleche,  mathematics 
alone  was  able  to  satisfy  his  craving  for  clear  and  certain 
knowledge.  The  years  1613-17  he  spent  in  Paris;  then 
he  enlisted  in  the  military  service  of  the  Netherlands,  and, 
in  1619,  in  that  of  Bavaria.  While  in  winter  quarters  at 
Neuburg,  he  vowed  a  pilgrimage  to  Loretto  if  the  Virgin 
would  show  him  a  way  of  escape  from  his  tormenting 
doubts ;  and  made  the  saving  discovery  of  the  "  foundations 
of  a  wonderful  science."  At  the  end  of  four  years  this  vow 
was  fulfilled.  On  his  return  to  Paris  (1625),  he  was  besought 
by  his  learned  friends  to  give  to  the  world  his  epoch-mak- 
ing ideas.  Though,  to  escape  the  distractions  of  society,  he 
kept  his  residence  secret,  as  he  had  done  during  his  first  stay 

86 


DESCARTES.  87 

in  Paris,  and  frequently  changed  it,  he  was  still  unable  to 
secure  the  complete  privacy  and  leisure  for  scientific  work 
which  he  desired.  Therefore  he  went  to  Holland  in  1629, 
and  spent  twenty  years  of  quiet  productivity  in  Amsterdam, 
Franecker,  Utrecht,  Leeuwarden,  Egmond,  Harderwijk, 
Leyden,  the  palace  of  Endegeest,  and  five  other  places. 
His  work  here  was  interrupted  only  by  a  few  journeys,  but 
much  disturbed  in  its  later  years  by  annoying  controversies 
with  the  theologian  Gisbert  Voetius  of  Utrecht,  with  Regius, 
a  pupil  who  had  deserted  him,  and  with  professors  from 
Leyden.  His  correspondence  with  his  French  friends  was 
conducted  through  Pere  Mersenne.  In  1649  he  yielded  to 
pressing  invitations  from  Queen  Christina  of  Sweden  and 
removed  to  Stockholm.  There  his  weak  constitution  was 
not  adequate  to  the  severity  of  the  climate,  and  death 
overtook  him  within  a  few  months. 

The  two  decades  of  retirement  in  the  Netherlands  were 
Descartes's  productive  period.  His  motive  in  developing 
and  writing  out  his  thoughts  was,  essentially,  the  desire  not  to 
disappoint  the  widely  spread  belief  that  he  was  in  possession 
of  a  philosophy  more  certain  than  the  common  one.  The 
work  entitled  Le  Monde,  begun  in  1630  and  almost  com- 
pleted, remained  unprinted,  as  the  condemnation  of  Galileo 
(1632)  frightened  our  philosopher  from  publication  ;  frag- 
ments of  it  only,  and  a  brief  summary,  appeared  after  the 
author's  death.  The  chief  works,  the  Discourse  on  Method, 
the  Meditations  on  the  First  Philosophy,  and  the  Principles  of 
Philosophy,  appeared  between  1637  and  1644, — the  Discours 
de  la  Methode  in  1637,  together  with  three  dissertations  (the 
"Dioptrics,"  the  "  Meteors,"  and  the  "  Geometry  "),  under 
the  common  title,  Essais  Philosoph iques.  To  the  (six)  Medi- 
tationes  de  Prima  Pliilosophia,  published  in  1641,  and  dedi- 
cated to  the  Paris  Sorbonne,  are  appended  the  objections 
of  various  savants  to  whom  the  work  had  been  communi- 
cated in  manuscript,  together  with  Descartes's  rejoinders. 
He  himself  considered  the  criticisms  of  Arnauld,  printed 
fourth  in  order,  as  the  most  important.  The  Third  Objec- 
tions are  from  Hobbes,  the  Fifth  from  Gassendi,  the  First, 
which  were  also  the  first  received,  from  the  theologian 
Caterus  of  Antwerp,  while  the  Second  and  Sixth,  collected 


SS  DESCARTES. 

by  Mersenne,  are  from  various  theologians  and  mathema- 
ticians. In  the  second  edition  there  were  added,  further,  the 
Seventh  Objections,  by  the  Jesuit  Bourdin,  and  the  Replies 
of  the  author  thereto.  The  four  books  of  the  Principia 
Philosophies,  published  in  1644  and  dedicated  to  Elizabeth, 
Countess  Palatine,  give  a  systematic  presentation  of  the 
new  philosophy.  The  Discourse  on  Method  appeared,  1644; 
in  a  Latin  translation,  the  Meditations  and  the  Principles 
in  French,  in  1647.  The  Treatise  on  the  Passions  was  pub- 
lished in  1650;  the  Letters,  1657-67,  in  French,  1668,  in 
Latin.  The  Opera  Postuma,  1701,  beside  the  Compendium 
of  Music  (written  in  161 8)  and  other  portions  of  his  post- 
humous writings,  contain  the  "  Rules  for  the  Direction  of 
the  Mind,"  supposed  to  have  been  written  in  1629,  and  the 
"  Search  for  Truth  by  the  Light  of  Nature."  The  complete 
works  have  been  often  published,  both  in  Latin  and  in 
French.  The  eleven  volume  edition  of  Cousin  appeared  in 
1824-26.* 

We  begin  our  discussion  with  Descartes's  noetical  and 
metaphysical  principles,  and  then  take  up  in  order  his 
doctrine  of  nature  and  of  man. 

1.  The  Principles. 

That  which  passes  nowadays  for  science,  and  is  taught  as 
such  in  the  schools,  is  nothing  but  a  mass  of  disconnected, 
uncertain,  and  often  contradictory  opinions.  A  principle 
of  unity  and  certainty  is  entirely  lacking.  If  anything 
permanent  and  irrefutable  is  to  be  accomplished  in  science, 
everything  hitherto  considered  true  must  be  thoroughly 
demolished  and  built  up  anew.  For  we  come  into  the 
world  as  children  and  we  form  judgments  of  things,  or  re- 

*  Of  the  many  treatises  on  the  philosophy  of  Descartes  those  of  C.  Shaar- 
«-hrnidt  {D  escartes  und  Spinoza,  i850)andj.  H.  Löwe,  1855,  may  be  mentioned. 
Further,  M.  Heinze  has  discussed  Die  Sittenlehre  des  Descartes,  1872  ;  Ed. 
Grimm,  Descartes'  Lehre  von  den  angeborenen  Ideen,  1873  ;  G.  Glogau,  Dar- 
legung und  Kritik  des  Grundgedankens  der  Cartesianisch.  Metaphysik  {Zeit- 
schrift für  Philosophie,  vol.  lxxiii.  p.  209  seq.),  1878  ;  Paul  Natorp,  Descartes' 
Erkenntnisstheorie,  1882  ;  and  Kas.  Twardowski,  Idee  und  Perception  in  Des- 
cartes. 1892.  In  French,  Francisque  Bouillier  (Histoire  de  la  Philosophie 
Cart/sienne,  1854)  and  E.  Saisset  (Pr/curseurs  el  Disciples  de  Descartes,  1&62) 


PRINCIPLES  OF    THE   SYSTEM.  89 

peat  them  after  others,  before  we  have  come  into  the  full 
possession  of  our  intellectual  powers  ;  so  that  it  is  no 
wonder  that  we  are  filled  with  a  multitude  of  prejudices, 
from  which  we  can  thoroughly  escape  only  by  considering 
everything  doubtful  which  shows  the  least  sign  of  uncer- 
tainty.. Let  us  renounce,  therefore,  all  our  old  views,  in  order 
later  to  accept  better  ones  in  their  stead  ;  or,  perchance,  to 
take  the  former  up  again  after  they  shall  have  stood  the  test 
of  rational  criticism.  The  recognized  precaution,  never  to 
put  complete  confidence  in  that  which  has  once  deceived 
us,  holds  of  our  relation  to  the  senses  as  elsewhere.  It  is 
certain  that  they  sometimes  deceive  us — perhaps  they  do 
so  always.  Again,  we  dream  every  day  of  things  which 
nowhere  exist,  and  there  is  no  certain  criterion  by  which 
to  distinguish  our  dreams  from  our  waking  moments, — what 
guarantee  have  we, then,  that  we  are  not  always  dreaming? 
Therefore,  our  doubt  must  first  of  all  be  directed  to  the  ex- 
istence of  sense-objects.  Nay,  even  mathematics  must  be 
suspected  in  spite  of  the  apparent  certainty  of  its  axioms 
and  demonstrations,  since  controversy  and  error  are  found 
in  it  also. 

I  doubt  or  deny,  then,  that  the  world  is  what  it  appears 
to  be,  that  there  is  a  God,  that  external  objects  exist,  that 
I  have  a  body,  that  twice  two  are  four.  One  thing,  how- 
ever, it  is  impossible  for  me  to  bring  into  question,  namely, 
that  I  myself,  who  exercise  this  doubting  function,  exist. 
There  is  one  single  point  at  which  doubt  is  forced  to  halt 
— at  the  doubter,  at  the  self-existence  of  the  thinker.  I 
can  doubt  everything  except  that  I  doubt,  and  that,  in 
doubting,  I  am.  Even  if  a  superior  being  sought  to  de- 
ceive me  in  all  my  thinking,  he  could  not  succeed  unless  I 
existed,  he  could  not  cause  me  not  to  exist  so  long  as  I 
thought.     To  be  deceived  means  to  think  falsely  ;  but   that 

have  written  on  Cartesianism.  [The  Method,  Meditations,  and  Selections  from 
the  Principles  have  heen  translated  into  English  by  John  Veitch,  5th  ed.,  1879, 
and  others  since;  and  II.  A.  P.  Torrey  has  published  The  Philosophy  of 
Descartes  in  Extracts  from  his  Writings,  1892  (Sneath's  Modem  Philosophers; 
The  English  reader  may  be  referred,  also,  to  Mahaffy's  Descartes,  [880,  in  I'.lack- 
wood's  Philosophical  Classics;  to  the  article  "  Cartesianism,"  Encyclopedia 
Britannica,  9th  ed.,  vol.  v.,  by  Edward  Catrd  ;  and,  for  .1  complete  discussion, 
to  the  English  translation  of  Fischer's  Descartes  and  his  School  by  J.  P.  '.iordy, 
1887.— Tr.] 


9°  DESCAXTES. 

something  is  thought,  no  matter  what  it  be,  is  no  de- 
ception. It  might  be  true,  indeed,  that  nothing  at  all  ex- 
isted ;  but  then  there  would  be  no  one  to  conceive  this 
non-existence.  Granted  that  everything  may  be  a  mistake; 
yet  the  being  mistaken,  the  thinking  is  not  a  mistake. 
Everything  is  denied,  but  the  denier  remains.  The  whole 
content  of  consciousness  is  destroyed  ;  consciousness  itself, 
the  doubting  activity,  the  being  of  the  thinker,  is  inde- 
structible. Cogitatio  sola  a  me  divelli  nequit.  Thus  the 
settled  point  of  departure  required  for  knowledge  is  found 
in  the  self-certitude  of  the  thinking  ego.  From  the  fact 
that  I  doubt,  i.  e.,  think,  it  follows  that  I,  the  doubter,  the 
thinker,  am.  Cogito,  ergo  sum  is  the  first  and  most  certain 
of  all  truths. 

The  principle,  "  I  think,  therefore  I  am,"  is  not  to  be 
considered  a  deduction  from  the  major  premise,  "Whatever 
thinks  exists."  It  is  rather  true  that  this  general  proposi- 
tion is  derived  from  the  particular  and  earlier  one.  I  must 
first  realize  in  my  own  experience  that,  as  thinking,  I  exist, 
before  I  can  reach  the  general  conclusion  that  thought  and 
existence  are  inseparable.  This  fundamental  truth  is  thus 
not  a  syllogism,  but  a  not  further  deducible,  self-evident, 
immediate  cognition,  a  pure  intuition — sum  cogitans.  Now, 
if  my  existence  is  revealed  by  my  activity  of  thought,  if  my 
thought  is  my  being,  and  the  converse,  if  in  me  thought  and 
existence  are  identical,  then  I  am  a  being  whose  essence 
consists  in  thinking.  I  am  a  spirit,  an  ego,  a  rational  soul. 
My  existence  follows  only  from  my  thinking,  not  from  any 
chance  action.  Ambulo  ergo  sum  would  not  be  valid,  but 
mihi  videor  or  puto  me  ambulare,  ergo  sum.  If  I  believe  I 
am  walking,  I  may  undoubtedly  be  deceived  concerning  the 
outward  action  (as,  for  instance,  in  dreams),  but  never  con- 
cerning my  inward  belief.  Cogitatio  includes  all  the  conscious 
activities  of  the  mind,  volition,  emotion,  and  sensation,  as 
well  as  representation  and  cognition  ;  they  are  all  modi 
cogitandi.  The  existence  of  the  mind  is  therefore  the 
most  certain  of  all  things.  We  know  the  soul  better  than 
the  body.  It  is  for  the  present  the  only  certainty,  and 
every  other  is  dependent  on  this,  the  highest  of  all. 

What,  then,  is  the  peculiarity  of  this   first  and  most  cer- 


PRINCIPLES  OF    THE   SYSTEM.  91 

tain  knowledge  which  renders  it  self-evident  and  independ- 
ent of  all  proof,  which  makes  us  absolutely  unable  to  doubt 
it?  Its  entire  clearness  and  distinctness.  Accordingly,  I  may- 
conclude  that  everything  which  I  perceive  as  clearly  and 
distinctly  as  the  cogito  ergo  sum  is  also  true,  and  I  reach 
this  general  rule,  omne  est  verum,  quod  clare  et  distincte  per- 
cipio.  So  far,  then,  we  have  gained  three  things  :  a  challenge 
to  be  inscribed  over  the  portals  of  certified  knowledge,  de 
omnibus  dubitandum ;  a  basal  truth,  sum  cogitans ;  a  cri- 
terion of  truth,  clara  et  distincta  perceptio. 

The  doubt  of  Descartes  is  not  the  expression  of  a  resigned 
spirit  which  renounces  the  unattainable  ;  it  is  precept,  not 
doctrine,  the  starting  point  of  philosophy,  not  its  conclusion, 
a  methodological  instrument  in  the  hand  of  a  strong  and 
confident  longing  for  truth,  which  makes  use  of  doubt  to  find 
the  indubitable.  It  is  not  aimed  at  the  possibility  of  attain- 
ing knowledge,  but  at  the  opinion  that  it  has  already  been 
attained,  at  the  credulity  of  the  age,  at  its  excessive  ten- 
dency toward  historical  and  poly-historical  study,  which 
confuses  the  acquisition  and  handing  down  of  information 
with  knowledge  of  the  truth.  That  knowledge  alone  is 
certain  which  is  self-attained  and  self-tested — and  this 
cannot  be  learned  or  handed  down  ;  it  can  only  be  redis- 
covered through  examination  and  experience.  Instead  of 
taking  one's  own  unsupported  conjectures  or  the  opinions 
of  others  as  a  guide,  the  secret  of  the  search  for  truth  is  to 
become  independent  and  of  age,  to  think  for  one's  self ; 
and  the  only  remedy  against  the  dangers  of  self-deception  and 
the  ease  of  repetition  is  to  be  found  in  doubting  everything 
hitherto  considered  true.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the 
Cartesian  doubt,  which  is  more  comprehensive  and  more 
thorough  than  the  Baconian.  Descartes  disputed  only  the 
certitude  of  the  knowledge  previously  attained,  not  the 
possibility  of  knowledge — for  of  the  latter  no  man  is  more 
firmly  convinced  than  he.  He  is  a  rationalist,  not  a  skeptic. 
The  intellect  is  assured  against  error  just  as  soon  as,  freed 
from  hindrances,  it  remains  true  to  itself,  as  it  puts  forth 
all  its  powers  and  lets  nothing  pass  for  truth  which  is  not 
clearly  and  distinctly  known.  Descartes  demands  the  same 
thing  for  the  human  understanding  as  Rousseau  at  a  later 


92  DESCARTES. 

period  for  the  heart  :  a  return  to  uncorrupted  nature.  This 
faith  in  the  unartificial,  the  original,  the  natural,  this  radical 
and  naturalistic  tendency  is  characteristically  French.  The 
purification  of  the  mind,  its  deliverance  from  the  rubbish 
of  scholastic  learning,  from  the  pressure  of  authority,  and 
from  inert  acceptance  of  the  thinking  of  others — this  is 
all.  Descartes  finds  the  clearest  proof  of  the  mind's  ca- 
pacity for  truth  in  mathematics,  whose  trustworthiness  he 
never  seriously  questioned,  but  only  hypothetically,  in  order 
to  exhibit  the  still  higher  certainty  of  the  "  I  think,  there- 
fore I  am."  He  wants  to  give  philosophy  the  stable  char- 
acter which  had  so  impressed  him  in  mathematics  when  he 
was  a  boy,  and  recommends  her,  therefore,  not  merely  the 
evidence  of  mathematics  as  a  general  example,  but  the 
mathematical  method  for  definite  imitation.  Metaphysics, 
like  mathematics,  must  derive  its  conclusions  by  deduction 
from  self-evident  principles.  Thus  the  geometrical  method 
begins  its  rule  in  philosophy,  a  rule  not  always  attended 
with  beneficial  results. 

With  this  criterion  of  truth  Descartes  advances  to  the 
consideration  of  ideas.  He  distinguishes  volition  and  judg- 
ment from  ideas  in  the  narrow  sense  {imagines),  and  divides 
the  latter,  according  to  their  origin,  into  three  classes: 
idea  innatce,  adventiticz,  a  vie  ipso  factce,  considering  the 
second  class,  the  "adventitious"  ideas,  the  most  numerous, 
but  the  first,  the  "  innate  "  ideas,  the  most  important.  No 
idea  is  higher  or  clearer  than  the  idea  of  God  or  the 
most  perfect  being.  Whence  comes  this  idea?  That  every 
idea  must  have  a  cause,  follows  from  the  "  clear  and  dis- 
tinct"  principle  that  nothing  produces  nothing.  It  follows 
from  this  same  principle,  ex  niJiilo  nihil  fit,  however,  that 
the  cause  must  contain  as  much  reality  or  perfection — 
realitas  and  perfectio  are  synonymous — as  the  effect,  for 
otherwise  the  overplus  would  have  come  from  nothing.  So 
much  ("objective,"  representative)  reality  contained  in  an 
idea,  so  much  or  more  ("  formal,"  actual)  reality  must  be 
contained  in  its  cause.  The  idea  of  God  as  infinite,  inde- 
pendent, omnipotent,  omniscient,  and  creative  substance, 
has  not  come  to  me  through  the  senses,  nor  have  I  formed 
it  myself.     The  power  to  conceive  a  being  more  perfect 


PRINCIPLES   OF    THE    SYSTEM.  93 

than  myself,  can  have  only  come  from  someone  who  is  more 
perfect  in  reality  than  I.  Since  I  know  that  the  infinite  con- 
tains more  reality  than  the  finite,  I  may  conclude  that  the 
idea  of  the  infinite  has  not  been  derived  from  the  idea  of 
the  finite  by  abstraction  and  negation  ;  it  precedes  the 
latter,  and  I  become  conscious  of  my  defects  and  my  fini- 
tude  only  by  comparison  with  the  absolute  perfection  of 
God.  This  idea,  then,  must  have  been  implanted  in  me 
by  God  himself.  The  idea  of  God  is  an  original  endow- 
ment ;  it  is  as  innate  as  the  idea  of  myself.  However 
incomplete  it  may  be,  it  is  still  sufficient  to  give  a  knowl- 
edge of  God's  existence,  although  not  a  perfect  compre- 
hension of  his  being,  just  as  a  man  may  skirt  a  mountain 
without  encircling  it. 

Descartes  brings  in  the  idea  of  God  in  order  to  escape 
solipsism.  So  long  as  the  self-consciousness  of  the  ego  re- 
mained the  only  certainty,  there  was  no  conclusive  basis 
for  the  assumption  that  anything  exists  beyond  self, 
that  the  ideas  which  apparently  come  from  without  are 
really  occasioned  by  external  things  and  do  not  spring  from 
the  mind  itself.  For  our  natural  instinct  to  refer  them  to 
objects  without  us  might  well  be  deceptive.  It  is  only 
through  the  idea  of  God,  and  by  help  of  the  principle 
that  the  cause  must  contain  at  least  as  much  reality  as  the 
effect,  that  I  am  taken  beyond  myself  and  assured  that  I 
am  not  the  only  thing  in  the  world.  For  as  this  idea  con- 
tains more  of  representative,  than  I  of  actual  reality,  I 
cannot  have  been  its  cause. 

To  this  empirical  argument,  which  derives  God's  exist- 
ence from  our  idea  of  God  (from  the  fact  that  we  have  an 
idea  of  him),  Descartes  joins  the  (modified)  ontological  ar- 
gument of  Anselm,  which  deduces  the  existence  of  God 
from  the  concept  of  God.  While  the  ideas  of  all  other 
things  include  only  the  possibility  of  existence,  necessary 
existence  is  inseparable  from  the  concept  of  themost  perfect 
being.  God  cannot  be  thought  apart  from  existence  ;  he 
has  the  ground  of  his  existence  in  himself;  he  is  a  sc  or 
causa  sui.  Finally,  Descartes  adds  a  third  argument.  The 
idea  of  perfections  which  I  do  not  possess  can  oidy  have 
been  imparted  to  me  by  a  more  perfect  being  than  I,  which 


94  DESCARTES. 

has  bestowed  on  me  all  that  I  am  and  all  that  I  am  capa- 
ble of  becoming.  If  I  had  created  myself,  I  would  have 
bestowed  upon  myself  these  absent  perfections  also. 
And  the  existence  of  a  plurality  of  causes  is  negatived  by 
the  supreme  perfection  which  I  conceive  in  the  idea  of 
God,  the  indivisible  unity  of  his  attributes.  Among  the 
attributes  of  God  his  veracity  is  of  special  importance.  It  is 
impossible  that  he  should  will  to  deceive  us  ;  that  he  should 
be  the  cause  of  our  errors.  God  would  be  a  deceiver,  if  he 
had  endowed  us  with  a  reason  to  which  error  should  appear 
true,  even  when  it  uses  all  its  foresight  in  avoiding  it  and 
assents  only  to  that  which  it  clearly  and  distinctly  per- 
ceives. Error  is  man's  own  fault  ;  he  falls  into  it  only  when 
he  misuses  the  divine  gift  of  knowledge,  which  includes  its 
own  standard.  Thus  Descartes  finds  new  confirmation  for 
his  test  of  truth  in  the  veracitas  dei.  Erdmann  has  given  a 
better  defense  of  Descartes  than  the  philosopher  himself 
against  the  charge  that  this  is  arguing  in  a  circle,  inasmuch  as 
the  existence  of  God  is  proved  by  the  criterion  of  truth,  and 
then  the  latter  by  the  former:  The  criterion  of  certitude  is 
the  ratio  cognoscendi  of  God's  existence  ;  God  is  the  ratio 
essendi  of  the  criterion  of  certitude.  In  the  order  of  exist- 
ence God  is  first,  he  creates  the  reason  together  with  its 
criterion;  in  the  order  of  knowledge  the  criterion  precedes, 
and  God's  existence  follows  from  it.  Descartes  himself 
endeavors  to  avoid  the  circle  by  making  intuitive  knowl- 
edge self-evident,  and  by  not  bringing  in  the  appeal  to 
God's  veracity  in  demonstrative  knowledge  until,  in  reflect- 
ive thought,  we  no  longer  have  each  separate  link  in  the 
chain  of  proof  present  to  our  minds  with  full  intuitive  cer- 
tainty, but  only  remember  that  we  have  previously  under- 
stood the  matter  with  clearness  and  distinctness. 

Our  ideas  represent  in  part  things,  in  part  qualities. 
Substance  is  defined  by  the  concept  of  independence  as  res 
quce  ita  existit,  ut  nulla  alia  re  indigeat  ad  exist endum ;  a 
pregnant  definition  with  which  the  concept  of  substance 
gains  the  leadership  in  metaphysics,  which  it  held  till  the 
time  of  Hume  and  Kant,  sharing  it  then  with  the  conception 
of  cause  or,  rather,  relinquishing  it  to  the  latter.  The  Spi- 
nozistic  conclusion  that,  according  to  the  strict  meaning  of 


PRINCIPLES  OF    THE    SYSTEM.  95 

this  definition,  there  is  but  one  substance,  God,  who,  as 
causa  sui,  has  absolutely  no  need  of  any  other  thing  in  order 
to  his  existence,  was  announced  by  Descartes  himself.  If 
created  substances  are  under  discussion,  the  term  does  not 
apply  to  them  in  the  same  sense  (not  univoce)  as  when  we 
speak  of  the  infinite  substance  ;  created  beings  require  a 
different  explanation,  they  are  things  which  need  for 
their  existence  only  the  co-operation  of  God,  and  have  no 
need  of  one  another.  Substance  is  cognized  through  its 
qualities,  among  which  one  is  pre-eminent  from  the  fact  that 
it  expresses  the  essence  or  nature  of  the  thing,  and  that  it 
is  conceived  through  itself,  without  the  aid  of  the  others, 
while  they  presuppose  it  and  cannot  be  thought  without  it. 
The  former  fundamental  properties  are  termed  attributes, 
and  these  secondary  ones,  modes  or  accidents.  Position, 
figure,  motion,  are  contingent  properties  of  body  ;  they  pre- 
suppose that  it  is  extended  or  spatial  ;  they  are  modi  exten- 
sions, as  feeling,  volition,  desire,  representation,  and  judg- 
ment are  possible  only  in  a  conscious  being,  and  hence  are 
merely  modifications  of  thought.  Extension  is  the  essen- 
tial or  constitutive  attribute  of  body,  and  thought  of  mind. 
Body  is  never  without  extension,  and  mind  never  without 
thought — mens  semper  cogitat.  Guided  by  the  self-evident 
principle  that  the  non-existent  has  no  properties,  we  argue 
from  a  perceived  quality  to  a  substance  as  its  possessor  or 
support.  Substances  are  distinct  from  one  another  when 
we  can  clearly  and  distinctly  cognize  one  without  the  other. 
Now,  we  can  adequately  conceive  mind  without  a  corporeal 
attribute  and  body  without  a  spiritual  one;  the  former  has 
nothing  of  extension  in  it,  the  latter  nothing  of  thought: 
hence  thinking  substance  and  extended  substance  are 
entirely  distinct  and  have  nothing  in  common.  Matter  and 
mind  are  distinct  realiter,  matter  and  extension  idealiter 
merely.  Thus  we  attain  three  clear  and  distinct  ideas,  three 
eternal  verities  :  substantia  infinita  sive  dens,  substantia  finita 
cogitans  sive  mens,  substantia  exteusa  sive  corpus. 

By  this  abrupt  contraposition  of  body  and  mind  as  re- 
ciprocally independent  substances,  Descartes  founded  that 
dualism,  as  whose  typical  representative  he  is  still  honored 
or  opposed.    This  dualism  between  the  material  and  spiritual 


96  DESCARTES. 

worlds  belongs  to  those  standpoints  which  are  valid  with- 
out being  ultimate  truth  ;  on  the  pyramid  of  metaphysical 
knowledge  it  takes  a  high,  but  not  the  highest,  place.  We 
may  not  rest  in  it,  yet  it  retains  a  permanent  value  in  op- 
position to  subordinate  theories.  It  is  in  the  right  against 
a  materialism  which  still  lacks  insight  into  the  essen- 
tial distinction  between  mind  and  matter,  thought  and  ex- 
tension, consciousness  and  motion ;  it  loses  its  validity 
when,  with  a  full  consideration  and  conservation  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  these  two  spheres,  we  succeed  in  bridging 
over  the  gulf  between  them,  whether  this  is  accomplished 
through  a  philosophy  of  identity,  like  that  of  Spinoza  and 
Schelling,  or  by  an  idealism,  like  that  of  Leibnitz  or  Fichte. 
In  any  case  philosophy  retains  as  an  inalienable  possession 
the  negative  conclusion,  that,  in  view  of  the  heterogeneity  of 
consciousness  and  motion,  the  inner  life  is  not  reducible  to 
material  phenomena.  This  clear  and  simple  distinction, 
which  sets  bounds  to  every  confusion  of  spiritual  and  ma- 
terial existence,  was  an  act  of  emancipation  ;  it  worked  on 
the  sultry  intellectual  atmosphere  of  the  time  with  the  puri- 
fying and  illuminating  power  of  a  lightning  flash.  We  shall 
find  the  later  development  of  philosophy  starting  from  the 
Cartesian  dualism. 

Descartes  himself  looked  upon  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples which  have  now  been  discussed  as  merely  the  founda- 
tion for  his  life  work,  as  the  entrance  portal  to  his  cosmol- 
ogy. Posterity  has  judged  otherwise  ;  it  finds  his  chief 
work  in  that  which  he  considered  a  mere  preparation  for 
it.  The  start  from  doubt,  the  self-certitude  of  the  thinking 
ego,  the  rational  criterion  of  certitude,  the  question  of  the 
origin  of  ideas,  the  concept  of  substance,  the  essential  dis- 
tinction between  conscious  activity  and  corporeal  being, 
and,  also,  the  principle  of  thoroughgoing  mechanism  in 
the  material  world  (from  his  philosophy  of  nature) — these 
are  the  thoughts  which  assure  his  immortality.  The  vesti- 
bule has  brought  the  builder  more  fame,  and  has  proved 
more  enduring,  than  the  temple  :  of  the  latter  only  the 
ruins  remain  ;  the  former  has  remained  undestroyed  through 
the  centuries. 


NA  TÜRE.  97 


2.  Nature. 


/ 


What  guarantee  have  we  for  the  existence  of  material 
objects  affecting  our  senses  ?  That  the  ideas  of  sense  do  not 
come  from  ourselves,  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  it  is  not  in 
our  power  to  determine  the  objects  which  we  perceive,  or 
the  character  of  our  perception  of  them.  The  supposition 
that  God  has  caused  our  perceptions  directly,  or  by  means 
of  something  which  has  no  resemblance  whatever  to  an  ex- 
ternal object  extended  in  three  dimensions  and  movable,  is 
excluded  by  the  fact  that  God  is  not  a  deceiver.  In  reliance 
on  God's  veracity  we  may  accept  as  true  whatever  the 
reason  declares  concerning  body,  though  not  all  the  reports 
of  the  senses,  which  so  often  deceive  us.  At  the  instance  of 
the  senses  we  clearly  and  distinctly  perceive  matter  distinct 
from  our  mind  and  from  God,  extended  in  three  dimensions, 
length,  breadth,  and  depth,  with  variously  formed  and  vari- 
ously moving  parts,  which  occasion  in  us  sensations  of 
many  kinds.  The  belief  that  perception  makes  known 
things  as  they  really  are  is  a  prejudice  of  sense  to  be  dis- 
carded ;  on  the  contrary,  it  merely  informs  us  concerning 
the  utility  or  harmfulness  of  objects,  concerning  their  rela- 
tion to  man  as  a  being  composed  of  soul  and  body.  (The 
body  is  that  material  thing  which  is  very  intimately  joined 
with  the  mind,  and  occasions  in  the  latter  certain  feelings, 
e.g.,  pain,  which  as  merely  cogitative  it  would  not  have.) 
Sense  qualities,  as  color,  sound,  odor,  cannot  constitute  the 
essence  of  matter,  fortheir  variation  or  loss  changes  nothing 
in  it  ;  I  can  abstract  from  them  without  the  material  thing 
disappearing.*  There  is  one  property,  however,  extensive 
magnitude  {quantitas),  whose  removal  would  imply  the  de- 
struction of  matter  itself.  Thus  I  perceive  by  pure  thought 
that  the  essence  of  matter  consists  in  extension,  in  that 
which  constitutes  the  object  of  geometry,  in  that  magnitude 
which  is  divisible,  figurable,  and  movable.  This  thesis 
{corpus  =  extensiosive  spatiuvi)  is  next  defended  by  Descartes 
against  several  objections.      In  reply  to  the  objection  drawn 

*  They  are  merely  subjective  states  in  the  perceiver,  and  entirely  unlike  the 
motions  which  jjive  rise  to  them,  although  there  is  a  certain  agreement,  as  the 
differences  and  variations  in  sensation  are  paralleled  by  those  in  the  object. 


9S  DESCARTES. 

from  the  condensation  and  rarefaction  of  bodies,  he  urges 
that  the  apparent  increase  or  decrease  in  extension  is,  in 
fact,  a  mere  change  of  figure ;  that  the  rarefaction  of  a  body 
depends  on  the  increase  in  size  of  the  intervals  between  its 
parts,  and  the  entrance  into  them  of  foreign  bodies,  just  as 
a  sponge  swells  up  when  its  pores  become  filled  with  water 
and,  therefore,  enlarged.  The  demand  that  the  pores,  and 
the  bodies  which  force  their  way  into  them,  should  always 
be  perceptible  to  the  senses,  is  groundless.  He  meets  the 
second  point,  that  we  call  extension  by  itself  space,  and  not 
body,  by  maintaining  that  the  distinction  between  exten- 
sion and  corporeal  substance  is  a  distinction  in  thought,  and 
not  in  reality;  that  attribute  and  substance,  mathematical 
and  physical  bodies,  are  not  distinct  in  fact  but  only  in  our 
thought  of  them.  We  apply  the  term  space  to  extension 
in  general,  as  an  abstraction,  and  body  to  a  given  individual, 
determinate,  limited  extension.  In  reality,  wherever  ex- 
tension is,  there  substance  is  also, — the  non-existent  has  no 
extension, — and  wherever  space  is,  there  matter  is  also. 
Empty  space  does  not  exist.  When  we  say  a  vessel  is 
empty,  we  mean  that  the  bodies  which  fill  it  are  impercep- 
tible ;  if  it  were  absolutely  empty  its  sides  would  touch. 
Descartes  argues  against  the  atomic  theory  and  against  the 
finitude  of  the  world,  as  he  argues  against  empty  space  : 
matter,  as  well  as  space,  has  no  smallest,  indivisible  parts, 
and  the  extension  of  the  world  has  no  end.  In  the  identi- 
fication of  space  and  matter  the  former  receives  fullness 
from  the  latter,  and  the  latter  unlimitedness  from  the 
former,  both  internal  unlimitedness  (endless  divisibility) 
and  external  (boundlessness).  Hence  there  are  not  several 
matters  but  only  one  (homogeneous)  matter,  and  only  one 
(illimitable)  world. 

Matter  is  divisible,  figurable,  movable  quantity.  Natu- 
ral science  needs  no  other  principles  than  these  indisputably 
true  conceptions,  by  which  all  natural  phenomena  mav  he 
explained,  and  must  employ  no  others.  Themost  important 
is  motion,  op  which  all  the  diversity  of  forms  depends.  •  Cor- 
poreal being  has  been  shown  to  be  extension  ;  corporeal 
becoming  is  motion.  Motion  is  defined  as  "  the  transport- 
ing of  one  part  of  matter,  or  of  one  body,  from  the  vicinity 


NA  TÜRE.  99 

of  those  bodies  that  are  in  immediate  contact  with  it,  or 
which  we  regard  as  at  rest,  to  the  vicinity  of  other  bodies." 
This  separation  of  bodies  is  reciprocal,  hence  it  is  a  matter 
of  choice  which  shall  be  considered  at  rest.  Besides  its 
own  proper  motion  in  reference  to  the  bodies  in  its  imme- 
diate vicinity,  a  body  can  participate  in  very  many  other 
motions:  the  traveler  walking  back  and  forth  on  the  deck 
of  a  ship,  for  instance,  in  the  motion  of  the  vessel,  of  the 
waves,  and  of  the  earth.  The  common  view  of  motion  as 
an  activity  is  erroneous;  since  it  requires  force  not  only  to 
set  in  motion  bodies  which  are  at  rest,  but  also  to  stop 
those  which  are  in  motion,  it  is  clear  that  motion  implies 
no  more  activity  than  rest.  Both  are  simply  different 
states  of  matter.  Since  there  is  no  empty  space,  each  mo- 
tion spreads  to  a  whole  circle  of  bodies  :  A  forces  B  out  of 
its  place,  B  drives  out  C,  and  so  on,  until  Z  takes  up  the 
position  which  A  has  left. 

The  ultimate  cause  of  motion  is  God.  He  has  created 
bodies  with  an  original  measure  of  motion  and  rest,  and, 
in  accordance  with  his  immutable  character,  he  preserves 
this  quantity  of  motion  unchanged  :  it  remains  constant  in 
the  world  as  a  whole,  though  it  varies  in  individual  bodies. 
For  with  the  power  to  create  or  destroy  motion  bodies 
lack,  further,  the  power  to  alter  their  quantity  of  motion. 
By  the  side  of  God,  the  primary  cause  of  motion,  the  laws 
of  motion  appear  as  secondary  causes.  The  first  of  these 
is  the  one  become  familiar  under  the  name,  law  of  inertia: 
Everything  continues  of  itself  in  the  state  (of  motion  or 
rest)  in  which  it  is,  and  changes  its  state  only  as  a  result  of 
some  extraneous  cause.  The  second  of  these  laws,  which 
are  so  valuable  in  mechanics,  runs  :  Every  portion  of  matter 
tends  to  continue  a  motion  which  has  been  begun  in  the 
same  direction,  hence  in  a  straight  line,  and  changes  its 
direction  only  under  the  influence  of  another  body,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  circle  above  described.  Descartes  ba^es 
these  laws  on  the  unchangeableness  of  God  and  the  sim- 
plicity of  his  world-conserving  (7.  e.,  constantly  creative) 
activity.  The  third  law  relates  to  the  communication  of 
motion  ;  but  Descartes  does  not  recognize  the  equality  of 
action  and  reaction  as  universally  as  the  fact  demands.     If  a 


/ 


IOO  DESCAKTES. 

body  in  motion  meets  another  body,  and  its  power  (to  con- 
tinue its  motion  in  a  straight  line)  is  less  than  the  resistance 
of  the  other  on  which  it  has  impinged,  it  retains  its  motion, 
but  in  a  different  direction  :  it  rebounds  in  the  opposite 
direction.  If,  on  the  contrary,  its  force  is  greater,  it  carries 
the  other  body  along  with  it,  and  loses  so  much  of  its  own 
motion  as  it  imparts  to  the  latter.  The  seven  further 
rules  added  to  these  contain  much  that  is  erroneous.  As 
actio  in  distans  is  rejected,  all  the  phenomena  of  motion 
are  traced  back  to  pressure  and  impulse.  The  distinction 
between  fluid  and  solid  bodies  is  based  on  the  greater  or 
less  mobility  of  their  parts. 

The  leading  principle  in  the  special  part  of  the  Cartesian 
physics, — we  can  only  briefly  sketch  it,— which  embraces, 
first,  celestial,  and,  then,  terrestial  phenomena,  is  the  axiom 
that  we  cannot  estimate  God's  power  and  goodness  too 
highly,  nor  ourselves  too  meanly.  It  is  presumptuous  to  seek 
to  comprehend  the  purposes  of  God  in  creation,  to  consider 
ourselves  participants  in  his  plans,  to  imagine  that  things 
exist  simply  for  our  sake — there  are  many  things  which  no 
man  sees  and  which  are  of  advantage  to  none.  Nothing  is 
to  be  interpreted  teleologically,  but  all  must  be  interpreted 
from  clearly  known  attributes,  hence  purely  mechanically. 
After  treating  of  the  distances  of  the  various  heavenly 
bodies,  of  the  independent  light  of  the  sun  and  the  fixed  stars 
and  the  reflected  light  of  the  planets,  among  which  the  earth 
belongs,  Descartes  discusses  the  motion  of  the  heavenly 
bodies.  In  reference  to  the  motion  of  the  earth  he  seeks 
a  middle  course  between  the  theories  of  Copernicus  and 
Tycho  Brahe\  He  agrees  with  Copernicus  in  the  main 
point,  but,  in  reliance  on  his  definition  of  motion,  maintains 
that  the  earth  is  at  rest,  viz.,  in  respect  to  its  immediate 
surroundings.  It  is  clear  that  the  harmony  of  his  views 
with  those  of  the  Church  (though  it  was  only  a  verbal  agree- 
ment) was  not  unwelcome  to  him.  According  to  his  hypoth- 
esis,— as  he  suggests,  perhaps  an  erroneous  hypothesis, — 
the  fluid  matter  which  fills  the  heavenly  spaces,  and  which 
may  be  compared  to  a  vortex  or  whirlpool,  circles  about  the 
sun  and  carries  the  planets  along  with  it.  Thus  the  planets 
move  in  relation  to  the  sun,  but  are  at  rest  in  relation  to 


MAN.  lor 

the  adjacent  portions  of  the  matter  of  the  heavens.  In 
view  of  the  biblical  doctrine,  according  to  which  the  world 
and  all  that  therein  is  was  created  at  a  stroke,  he  apolo- 
getically describes  his  attempt  to  explain  the  origin  of  the 
world  from  chaos  under  the  laws  of  motion  as  a  scientific 
fiction,  intended  merely  to  make  the  process  more  compre- 
hensible. It  is  more  easily  conceivable,  if  we  think  of 
the  things  in  the  world  as  though  they  had  been  gradually 
formed  from  elements,  as  the  plant  develops  from  the  seed. 
We  now  pass  to  the  Cartesian  anthropology,  with  its 
three  chief  objects:  the  body,  the  soul,  and  the  union  of 
the  two. 

3.  Man. 

The  human  body,  like  all  organic  bodies,  is  a  machine. 
Artificial  automata  and  natural  bodies  are  distinguished 
only  in  degree.  Machines  fashioned  by  the  hand  of  man 
perform  their  functions  by  means  of  visible  and  tangible 
instruments,  while  natural  bodies  employ  organs  which,  for 
the  most  part,  are  too  minute  to  be  perceived.  As  the  clock- 
maker  constructs  a  clock  from  wheels  and  weights  so  that 
it  is  able  to  go  of  itself,  so  God  has  made  man's  body  out  of 
dust,  only,  being  a  far  superior  artist,  he  produces  a  work 
of  art  which  is  better  constructed  and  capable  of  far  more 
wonderful  movements.  The  cause  of  death  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  some  important  part  of  the  machine,  which  prevents 
it  from  running  longer  ;  a  corpse  is  a  broken  clock,  and  the 
departure  of  the  soul  comes  only  as  a  result  of  death.  The 
common  opinion  that  the  soul  generates  life  in  the  body  is 
erroneous.  It  is  rather  true  that  life  must  be  present  before 
the  soul  enters  into  union  with  the  body,  as  it  is  also  true 
that  life  must  have  ended  before  it  dissolves  the  bond. 

The  sole  principles  of  physiology  are  motion  and  heat. 
The  heat  (vital  warmth,  a  fire  without  light),  which  God  has 
put  in  the  heart  as  the  central  organ  of  life,  has  for  its 
function  the  promotion  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood,  in 
the  description  of  which  Descartes  mentions  with  praise  the 
discoveries  of  Harvey  {De  Motu  Cordis  et  Sanguinis  in  Ani- 
malibus,  1628).  From  the  blood  are  separated  its  finest,  most 
fiery,  and  most   mobile  parts,  called  by  Descartes  "  animal 


I02  DESCARTES. 

spirits  "  {Spiritus  animates  sire  corporalcs),  and  described  as  a 
"  very  subtle  wind  "  or  "  pure  and  vivid  flame,"  which  ascend 
into  the  cavities  of  the  brain,  reach  the  pineal  gland  sus- 
pended in  its  center  {conarion,  glans pinealis, g/audu /a),  pass 
into  the  nerves,  and,  by  their  action  on  the  muscles  connected 
with  the  nerves,  effect  the  motions  of  the  limbs.  These  views 
refer  to  the  body  alone,  and  so  are  as  true  of  animals  as  of 
men.  If  automata  existed  similar  to  animals  in  all  respects, 
both  external  and  internal,  it  would  be  absolutely  impossi- 
ble to  distinguish  them  from  real  animals.  If,  however, 
they  were  made  to  resemble  human  bodies,  two  signs  would 
indicate  their  unreality — we  would  find  no  communication 
of  ideas  by  means  of  language,  and  also  an  absence  of  those 
bodily  movements  which  take  their  origin  in  the  reason 
(and  not  merely  in  the  constitution  of  the  body).  The 
only  thing  which  raises  man  above  the  brute  is  his  rational 
soul,  which  we  are  on  no  account  to  consider  a  product  of 
matter,  but  which  is  an  express  creation  of  God,  superadded. 
The  union  of  the  soul  or  the  mind  {anima  sive  mens)  with 
the  body  is,  it  is  true,  not  so  loose  that  the  mind  merely  dwells 
in  the  body,  like  a  pilot  in  a  ship,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
view  of  the  essential  contrariety  of  the  two  substances,  is  it 
so  intimate  as  to  be  more  than  a  nnio  compositionis.  Although 
the  soul  is  united  to  the  whole  body,  an  especially  active 
intercourse  between  them  is  developed  at  a  single  point,, 
the  pineal  gland,  which  is  distinguished  by  its  central,  pro- 
tected position,  above  all,  by  the  fact  that  it  is  the  only 
cerebral  organ  that  is  not  double.  This  gland,  together 
with  the  animal  spirits  passing  to  and  from  it,  mediates 
between  mind  and  body  ;  and  as  the  point  of  union  for  the 
twofold  impressions  from  the  (right  and  left)  eyes  and  ears, 
without  which  objects  would  be  perceived  double  instead  of 
single,  is  the  seat  of  the  soul.  Here  the  soul  exercises  a 
direct  influence  on  the  body  and  is  directly  affected  by  it  ; 
here  it  dwells,  and  at  will  produces  a  slight,  peculiar  move- 
ment of  the  gland,  through  this  a  change  in  the  course  of 
the  animal  spirits  (for  it  is  not  capable  of  generating  motion, 
but  only  of  changing  its  direction),  and,  finally,  movements  of 
the  members;  just  as,  on  the  other  hand,  it  remarks  the 
slightest  change  in  the  course  of  the  spiritus  through  a  cor- 


MAN.  103 

responding  movement  of  the  gland,  whose  motions  vary  ac- 
cording to  the  sensuous  properties  of  the  object  to  be  per- 
ceived, and  responds  by  sensations.  Although  Descartes 
thus  limits  the  direct  interaction  of  soul  and  body  to  a 
small  part  of  the  organism,  he  makes  an  exception  in  the 
case  of  memoria,  which  appears  to  him  to  be  more  of  a 
physical  than  a  psychical  function,  and  which  he  conjec- 
tures to  be  diffused  through  the  whole  brain. 

In  spite  of  the  comprehensive  meaning  which  Descartes 
gives  to  the  notion  cogitatio,  it  is  yet  too  narrow  to  leave 
room  for  an  anima  vegetativa  and  an  anima  scnsitiva. 
Whoever  makes  mind  and  soul  equivalent,  holds  that  their 
essence  consists  in  conscious  activity  alone,  and  interprets 
sensation  as  a  mode  of  thought,  cannot  escape  the  paradox 
of  denying  to  animals  the  possession  of  a  soul.  Descartes 
does  not  shrink  from  such  a  conclusion.  Animals  are  mere 
machines  ;  they  are  bodies  animated,  but  soulless  ;  they  lack 
conscious  perception  and  appetition,  though  not  the  ap- 
pearance of  them.  When  a  clock  strikes  seven  it  knows 
nothing  of  the  fact  ;  it  does  not  regret  that  it  is  so  late  nor 
long  soon  to  be  able  to  strike  eight  ;  it  wills  nothing,  feels 
nothing,  perceives  nothing.  The  lot  of  the  brute  is  the 
same.  It  sees  and  hears  nothing,  it  does  not  hunger  or 
thirst,  it  does  not  rejoice  or  fear,  if  by  these  anything  more 
than  mere  corporeal  phenomena  is  to  be  meant  ;  of  all 
these  it  possesses  merely  the  unconscious  material  basis;  it 
moves  and  motion  goes  on  in  it — that  is  all. 

The  psychology  of  Descartes,  which  has  had  important 
results,*  divides  cogitationes  into  two  classes  :  actiones  and 
passiones.  Action  denotes  everything  which  takes  its  ori- 
gin in,  and  is  in  the  power  of,  the  soul  ;  passion,  everything 
which  the  soul  receives  from  without,  in  which  it  can  make 
no  change,  which  is  impressed  upon  it.  The  further  de- 
velopment of  this  distinction  is  marred  by  the  crossing  of 
the  most  diverse  lines  of  thought,  resulting  in  obscurities  and 
contradictions.  Descartes's  simple, naive  habits  of  thought 
and  speech,  which  were  those  of  a  man  of  the  world  rather 
than  of  a  scholar,  were  quite  incompatible  with  the  adop- 
tion and  consistent  use  of  a  finely  discriminated  tcrmi- 
*For  details  cf.  the  able  monograph  of  Dr.  Anton  Koch,  1881. 


104 


DESCARTES. 


nology  ;  he  is  very  free  with  sive,  and  not  very  careful  with 
the  expressions  actio,passio,perctptio,  affcctio,  volitio.      First 
lie  equates  activity  and  willing,  for  the  will  springs  exclu- 
sively from  the  soul — it  is  only  in  willing  that  the  latter  is 
entirely  independent;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  passivity  is 
made  equivalent  to  representation  and  cognition,  for  the  soul 
does   not    create    its    ideas,   but   receives    them, — sensuous 
impressions  coming  to  her  quite  evidently  from  the  body. 
These  equations,  "  actio  =  the  practical,  passio  =  the  theo- 
retical  function,"  are  soon  limited  and  modified,  however. 
The  natural  appetites  and  affections  are  forms  of  volition, 
it  is  true,  but   not   free  products  of  the  mind,  for  they  take 
their  origin   in  its    connection    with    the    body.      Further, 
not  all  perceptions  have  a  sensuous  origin  ;  when   the  soul 
makes  free  use  of  its  ideas  in  imagination,  especially  when  in 
pure  thought  it  dwells  on  itself,  when   without  the  inter- 
ference of  the  imagination  it  gazes  on  its  rational  nature, 
it  is  by  no  means  passive  merely.     Every  act  of  the  will, 
again,  is  accompanied  by  the  consciousness  of  volition.    The 
volitio  is  an  activity,  the  cogitatio  volitionis  a  passivity  ;  the 
soul    affects    itself,  is    passively   affected   through   its    own 
activity,  is  at  the  same  instant  both  active    and    passive. 
Thus   not    every  volition,   e.  g.,   sensuous  desire,  is  action 
nor    all  perception,   e.  g.,   that  of  the   pure    intellect,  pas- 
sion.    Finally,  certain  psychical  phenomena  fall  indifferently 
under  the  head  of  perception  or  of  volition,  e.  g.,  pain,  which 
is  both  an   indistinct  idea  of  something  and  an  impulse  to 
shun  it.     In  accordance  with  these  emendations,  and  omit- 
ting certain  disturbing  points  of  secondary  importance,  the 
matter  may  be  thus  represented  : 

COGITATIO. 


ACTIO. 

PASSIO. 

(Mens  sola  ;  clarae  et  distinct»  ides.) 

(Mens  unita  cum  corpore  ;  confusae  idea.) 

Volitio  :    6.  Voluntas.      3*.  Commotiones 
intellectuals. 

Judicium. 

3«.  Affectus.          2.  Appetitus  naturales. 

Sensus  interni. 

Perceptio  : 

5.  Intellectus. 


4.  Imaginatio 
i,b.  Phantasia. 


4a.  Memoria.        1.  Sensus  externi. 


MAN.  105 

Accordingly  six  grades  of  mental  function  are  to  be 
distinguished  :  (  I  The  external  senses.  (2)  The  natural 
appetites.  (3)  The  passions  (which,  together  with  the 
natural  appetites,  constitute  the  internal  senses,  and  from 
which  the  mental  emotions  produced  by  the  intellect  are 
quite  distinct).  (4)  The  imagination  with  its  two  divisions, 
passive  memory  and  active  phantasy.  (5)  The  intellect 
or  reason.  (6)  The  will.  These  various  stages  or  facul- 
ties are,  however,  not  distinct  parts  of  the  soul,  as  in  the 
old  psychology,  in  opposition  to  which  Descartes  em- 
phatically defends  the  unity  of  the  soul.  It  is  one  and 
the  same  psychical  power  that  exercises  the  higher  and 
the  lower,  the  rational  and  the  sensuous,  the  practical  and 
the  theoretical  activities. 

Of  the  mental  functions,  whether  representative  images, 
perceptions,  or  volitions,  a  part  are  referred  to  body  (to 
parts  of  our  own  body,  often  also  to  external  objects), 
and  produced  by  the  body  (by  the  animal  spirits  and,  gener- 
ally, by  the  nerves  as  well),  while  the  rest  find  both  object 
and  cause  in  the  soul.  Intermediate  between  the  two  classes 
stand  those  acts  of  the  will  which  are  caused  by  the  soul, 
but  which  relate  to  the  body,  e.  g.,  when  I  resolve  to  walk 
or  leap;  and,  what  is  more  important,  the  passions,  which 
relate  to  the  soul  itself,  but  which  are  called  forth,  sus- 
tained, and  intensified  by  certain  motions  of  the  animal 
spirits.  Since  only  those  beings  which  consist  of  a  body  as 
well  as  a  soul  are  capable  of  the  passions,  these  are  specifi- 
cally human  phenomena.  These  affections,  though  very 
numerous,  may  be  reduced  to  a  few  simple  or  primary  ones, 
of  which  the  rest  are  mere  specializations  or  combinations. 
Descartes  enumerates  six  primitive  passions  (which  num- 
ber Spinoza  afterward  reduced  one-half) — admiratio,  amor 
et  odium,  cupiditas  (di'sir),  gaud i  um  et  trist  it  ia.  The  first 
and  the  fourth  have  no  opposites,  the  former  being  neither 
positive  nor  negative,  and  the  latter  both  at  once.  Wonder, 
which  includes  under  it  esteem  and  contempt,  signifies  in- 
terest in  an  object  which  neither  attracts  us  by  its  utility 
nor  repels  us  by  its  hurtfulncss,  and  yet  does  not  leave  us 
indifferent.  It  is  aroused  by  the  powerful  or  surprising 
impression  made  by  the  extraordinary,  the  rare,  the  unex- 


io6  DESCARl'ES. 

pec  ted.  Love  seeks  to  appropriate  that  which  is  profitable  ; 
hate,  to  ward  off  that  which  is  harmful,  to  destroy  that 
which  is  hostile.  Desire  or  longing  looks  with  hope  or  fear 
to  the  future.  When  that  which  is  feared  or  hoped  for  has 
come  to  pass,  joy  and  grief  come  in,  which  relate  to  exist- 
ing good  and  evil,  as  desire  relates  to  those  to  come. 

The  Cartesian  theory  of  the  passions  forms  the  bridge  over 
which  its  author  passes  from  psychology  to  ethics.  No  soul 
is  so  weak  as  to  be  incapable  of  completely  mastering  its 
passions,  and  of  so  directing  them  that  from  them  all  there 
will  result  that  joyous  temper  advantageous  to  the  reason. 
The  freedom  of  the  will  is  unlimited.  Although  a  direct 
influence  on  the  passions  is  denied  it, — it  can  neither  annul 
them  merely  at  its  bidding,  nor  at  once  reduce  them  to  si- 
lence, at  least,  not  the  more  violent  ones, — it  still  has  an  indi- 
rect power  over  them  in  two  ways.  During  the  continuance 
of  the  affection  (e.  g.,  fear)  it  is  able  to  arrest  the  bodily 
movements  to  which  the  affection  tends  (flight),  though 
not  the  emotion  itself,  and,  in  the  intervals  of  quiet,  it  can 
take  measures  to  render  a  new  attack  of  the  passion  less 
dangerous.  Instead  of  enlisting  one  passion  against  an- 
other, a  plan  which  would  mean  only  an  appearance  of  free- 
dom, but  in  fact  a  continuance  in  bondage,  the  soul  should 
fight  with  its  own  weapons,  with  fixed  maxims  {jadicid)y 
based  on  certain  knowledge  of  good  and  evil.  The  will 
conquers  the  emotions  by  means  of  principles,  by  clear  and 
distinct  knowledge,  which  sees  through  and  corrects  the 
false  values  ascribed  to  things  by  the  excitement  of  the 
passions.  Besides  this  negative  requirement,  "  subjec- 
tion of  the  passions,"  Descartes'  contributions  to  ethics — 
in  the  letters  to  Princess  Elizabeth  on  human  happiness, 
and  to  Queen  Christina  on  love  and  the  highest  good — 
were  inconsiderable.  Wisdom  is  the  carrying  out  of  that 
which  has  been  seen  to  be  best,  virtue  is  steadfastness,  sin 
inconstancy  therein.  The  goal  of  human  endeavor  is 
peace  of  conscience,  which  is  attained  only  through  the 
determination  to  be  virtuous,  i.  e.,  to  live  in  harmony  with 
self. 

Besides  its  ethical  mission,  the  will  has  allotted  to  it 
the  theoretical  function  of  affirmation  and  negation,  i.  e.,  of 


MAN.  107 

judgment.  If  God  in  his  veracity  and  goodness  has  be- 
stowed on  man  the  power  to  know  truth,  how  is  misuse  of 
this  power,  how  is  error  possible  ?  Single  sensations  and 
ideas  cannot  be  false,  but  only  judgments — the  reference  of 
ideas  to  objects.  Judgment  or  assent  is  a  matter  of  the 
will ;  so  that  when  it  makes  erroneous  affirmations  or  nega- 
tions, when  it  prefers  the  false  judgment  to  the  true,  it 
alone  is  guilty.  Our  understanding  is  limited,  our  will 
unlimited  ;  the  latter  reaches  further  than  the  former,  and 
can  assent  to  a  judgment  even  before  its  constituent  parts 
have  attained  the  requisite  degree  of  clearness.  False 
judgment  is  prejudgment,  for  which  we  can  hold  neither 
God  nor  our  own  nature  responsible.  The  possibility  of 
error,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  avoiding  error,  resides 
in  the  will.  This  has  the  power  to  postpone  its  assent  or 
dissent,  to  hold  back  its  decision  until  the  ideas  have  be- 
come entirely  clear  and  distinct.  The  supreme  perfection 
is  the  libertas  non  errandi.  Thus  knowledge  itself  be- 
comes a  moral  function ;  the  true  and  the  good  are  in 
the  last  analysis  identical.  The  contradiction  with  which 
Descartes  has  been  charged,  that  he  makes  volition  and 
cognition  reciprocally  determinative,  that  he  bases  moral 
goodness  on  the  clearness  of  ideas  and  vice  versa,  does  not 
exist.  We  must  distinguish  between  a  theoretical  and  a 
practical  stadium  in  the  will  ;  it  is  true  of  the  latter  that  it 
depends  on  knowledge  of  the  right,  of  the  former  that  the 
knowledge  of  the  right  is  dependent  on  it.  In  order  to  the 
possibility  of  moral  action  the  will  must  conform  to  clear 
judgment;  in  order  to  the  production  of  the  latter  the 
will  must  be  moral.  It  is  the  unit-soul,  which  first,  by 
freely  avoiding  overhasty  judgment,  cognizes  the  truth, 
to  exemplify  it  later  in  moral  conduct. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  DEVELOPMENT  AND  TRANSFORMATION  OF 
CARTESIANISM  IN  THE  NETHERLANDS  AND 
IN    FRANCE.* 

I.  Occasionalism :    Geulincx. 

THE  propagation  and  defense  of  a  system  of  thought 
soon  give  occasion  to  its  adherents  to  purify,  complete, 
and  transform  it.  Obscurities  and  contradictions  are  dis- 
covered, which  the  master  has  overlooked  or  allowed  to 
remain,  and  the  disciple  exerts  himself  to  remove  them, 
while  retaining  the  fundamental  doctrines.  In  the  system 
of  Descartes  there  were  two  closely  connected  points  which 
demanded  clarification  and  correction,  viz.,  his  double  dual- 
ism (i)  between  extended  substance  and  thinking  substance, 
(2)  between  created  substance  and  the  divine  substance. 
In  contrast  with  each  other  matter  and  mind  are  sub- 
stances or  independent  beings,  for  the  clear  conception 
of  body  contains  naught  of  consciousness,  thought,  repres- 
entation, and  that  of  mind  nothing  of  extension,  matter, 
motion.  In  comparison  with  God  they  are  not  so  ;  apart 
from  the  creator  they  can  neither  exist  nor  be  conceived. 
In  every  case  where  the  attempt  is  made  to  distinguish 
between  intrinsic  and  general  (as  here,  between  substance 
in  the  stricter  and  wider  senses),  an  indecision  betrays 
itself  which  is  not  permanently  endured. 

The  substantiality  of  the  material  and  spiritual  worlds 
maintained  by  Descartes  finds  an  excellent  counterpart  in 
his  (entirely  modern)  tendency  to  push  the  conciirsus  dei 
as  far  as  possible  into  the  background,  to  limit  it  to  the  pro- 
duction of  the  original  condition  of  things,  to  give  over  mo- 
tion, once  created,  to  its  own  laws,  and  ideas  implanted 
in  the  mind  to  its  own  independent  activity  ;   but  it  is  hard 

*Cf.  G.  Monchamp,  Histoire  du  Carthianisme  en  Belgique,  Brussels,  1886. 

log 


OCCASIONALISM :  GEULINCX.  109 

to  reconcile  with  it  the  view,  popular  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
that  the  preservation  of  the  world  is  a  perpetual  crea- 
tion. In  the  former  case  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world 
is  made  an  external  relation  ;  in  the  latter,  an  internal  one. 
In  the  one  the  world  is  thought  of  as  a  clock,  which  once 
wound  up  runs  on  mechanically,  in  the  second  it  is  likened 
to  apiece  of  music  which  the  composer  himself  recites.  If 
God  preserves  created  things  by  continually  recreating  them 
they  are  not  substances  at  all ;  if  they  are  substances,  preser- 
vation becomes  an  empty  word,  which  we  repeat  after  the 
theologians  without  giving  it  any  real  meaning. 

Matter  and  spirit  stand  related  in  our  thought  only  by 
way  of  exclusion  ;  is  the  same  true  of  them  in  reality  ? 
They  can  be  conceived  and  can  exist  without  each  other; 
can  they,  further,  without  each  other  effect  all  that  we  per- 
ceive them  to  accomplish  ?  There  are  some  motions  in  the 
material  world  which  we  refer  to  a  voluntary  decision  of 
the  soul,  and  some  among  our  ideas  (e.  g.,  perceptions  of 
the  senses)  which  we  refer  to  corporeal  phenomena  as  their 
causes.  If  body  and  soul  are  substances,  how  can  they  be 
dependent  on  each  other  in  certain  of  their  activities,  if 
they  are  of  opposite  natures,  how  can  they  affect  each  other  ? 
How  can  the  incorporeal,  unmoved  spirit  move  the  animal 
spirits  and  receive  impulses  from  them  ?  The  substantial- 
ity (reciprocal  independence)  of  body  and  mind,  and  their 
interaction  (partial  reciprocal  dependence),  are  incompatible, 
one  or  the  other  is  illusory  and  must  be  abandoned.  The 
materialists  (Hobbes)  sacrifice  the  independence  of  mind, 
the  idealists  (Berkeley,  Leibnitz),  the  independence  of  mat- 
ter, the  occasionalists,  the  interaction  of  the  two.  This 
forms  the  advance  of  the  last  beyond  Descartes,  who  either 
naively  maintains  that,  in  spite  of  the  contrariety  of  material 
and  mental  substances,  an  exchange  of  effects  takes  place  be- 
tween them  as  an  empirical  fact,  or,  when  he  realizes  the 
difficulty  of  the  anthropological  problem, — how  is  the  union 
of  the  two  substances  in  man  possible, — ascribes  the  inter- 
action of  body  and  mind,  together  with  the  union  of  the 
two,  to  the  power  of  God,  and  by  this  abandonment  of  the 
attempt  at  a  natural  explanation,  opens  up  the  occasionalistic 
way  of  escape.     Further,  in  his  more  detailed  description  of 


no  DEl'ELOP.h'EXT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

the  intercourse  between  body  and  mind  Descartes  had  been 
guilt)'  of  direct  violations  of  his  laws  of  natural  philosophy. 
If  the  quantity  of  motion  is  declared  to  be  invariable  and 
a  change  in  its  direction  is  attributed  to  mechanical  causes 
alone,  we  must  not  ascribe  to  the  soul  the  power  to  move 
the  pineal  gland,  even  in  the  gentlest  way,  nor  to  control 
the  direction  of  the  animal  spirits.  These  inconsistencies 
also  are  removed  by  the  occasionalistic  thesis. 

The  question  concerning  the  substantiality  of  mind  and 
matter  in  relation  to  God,  is  involved  from  the  very  begin- 
ning in  this  latter  problem,  "  How  is  the  appearance  of  inter- 
action between  the  two  to  be  explained  without  detriment 
to  their  substantiality  in  relation  to  each  other?"  The 
denial  of  the  reciprocal  dependence  of  matter  and  spirit 
leads  to  sharper  accentuation  of  their  common  dependence 
upon  God.  Thus  occasionalism  forms  the  transition  to  the 
pantheism  of  Spinoza,  Geulincx  emphasizing  the  non-sub- 
stantiality of  spirits,  and  Malebranche  the  non-substan- 
tiality of  bodies,  while  Spinoza  combines  and  intensifies 
both.  And  yet  history  was  not  obliging  enough  to  carry 
out  this  convenient  and  agreeable  scheme  of  development 
with  chronological  accuracy,  for  she  had  Spinoza  complete 
his  pantheism  before  Malebranche  had  prepared  the  way. 
The  relation  which  was  noted  in  the  case  of  Bruno  and 
Campanella  is  here  repeated  :  the  earlier  thinker  assumes 
the  more  advanced  position,  while  the  later  one  seems 
backward  in  comparison  ;  and  that  which,  viewed  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  question  itself,  may  be  considered  a 
transition  link,  is  historically  to  be  taken  as  a  reaction 
against  the  excessive  prosecution  of  a  line  of  thought 
which,  up  to  a  certain  point,  had  been  followed  by  the  one 
who  now  shrinks  back  from  its  extreme  consequences.  The 
course  of  philosophy  takes  first  a  theological  direction  in 
the  earlier  occasionalists,  then  a  metaphysical  (naturalistic) 
trend  in  Spinoza,  to  renew  finally,  in  Malebranche,  the  first 
of  these  movements  in  opposition  to  the  second.  The 
Cartesian  school,  as  a  whole,  however,  exhibits  a  tendency 
toward  mysticism,  which  was  concealed  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  by  the  rationalistic  need  for  clear  concepts,  but 
never  entirely  suppressed. 


OCCASIONALISM :  GEULINCX.  HI 

Although  the  real  interaction  of  body  and  mind  be  denied, 
some  explanation  must,  at  least,  be  given  for  the  appear- 
ance of  interaction,  i.  e.,  for  the  actual  correspondence  of 
bodily  and  mental  phenomena.  Occasionalism  denotes  the 
theory  of  occasional  causes.  It  is  not  the  body  that 
gives  rise  to  perception,  nor  the  mind  that  causes  the 
motion  of  the  limbs  which  it  has  determined  upon — neither 
the  one  nor  the  other  can  receive  influence  from  its  fellow 
or  exercise  influence  upon  it ;  but  it  is  God  who,  "  on  the 
occasion  "  of  the  physical  motion  (of  the  air  and  nerves) 
produces  the  sensation  (of  sound),  and,  "at  the  instance" 
of  the  determination  of  the  will,  produces  the  movement  of 
the  arms.  The  systematic  development  and  marked  in- 
fluence of  this  theory,  which  had  already  been  more  or  less 
clearly  announced  by  the  Cartesians  Cordemoy  and  De  la 
Forge,*  was  due  to  the  talented  Arnold  Geulincx  (1624- 
69),  who  was  born  at  Antwerp,  taught  in  Lyons  (1646-58) 
and  Leyden,  and  became  a  convert  to  Calvinism.  It 
ultimately  gained  over  the  majority  of  the  numerous 
adherents  of  the  Cartesian  philosophy  in  the  Dutch  univer- 
sities,— Renery  (died  1639)  and  Regius  (van  Roy;  Funda- 
menta  Physical,  164.6;  Philosopliia  Naturalis,  1661)  in 
Utrecht;  further,  Balthasar  Bekker  (1634-98;  The  World 
Beivitched,  1690),  the  brave  opponent  of  the  belief  in 
angels  and  devils,  of  magic,  and  of  prosecution  for 
witchcraft, — in  the  clerical  orders  in  France  and,  finally,  in 
Germany. 

*  Gerauld  de  Cordemoy,  a  Parisian  advocate  (died  1684,  Dissertations  Philoso- 
phiques,  1666),  communicated  his  occasionalistic  views  orally  to  his  friends  as 
early  as  1658  (cf.  L.  Stein  in  the  Archiv  für  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  vol.  i., 
1888.  p.  56).  Louis  de  la  Forge,  a  physician  of  Saumur,  Tractatus  de  Meute 
Humana,  1666,  previously  published  in  French;  cf.  Seyfarth,  Gotha,  1887.  But 
the  logician.  Johann  Clauberg,  professor  in  Duisburg  (1622-65  ;  Opera,  edited  by 
Schalbruch,  1691),  is,  according  to  the  investigations  of  Herrn.  Müller  (J.  Clau~ 
brrg  und  seine  Stellung  im  Cartesianismus,  Jena,  1891),  to  be  stricken  from  the 
list  of  thinkers  who  prepared  the  way  for  occasionalism,  since  in  his  discus- 
sion of  the  anthropological  problem  (corporis  el  aninnr  conjunctio)  he  merely 
develops  the  Cartesian  position,  and  does  not  go  beyond  it.  He  employs  the 
expression  occasio,  it  is  true,  but  not  in  the  sense  of  the  occasionalists.  Accord- 
ing to  Clauberg  the  bodily  phenomenon  becomes  the  stimulus  or  "  occasion  " 
(not  for  God,  but)  for  the  soul  to  produce  from  itself  the  corresponding  mental 
phenomenon. 


112  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

Geulincx  himself,  besides  two  inaugural  addresses  at  Ley- 
den  (as  Lector  in  1662,  Professor  Extraordinary  in  1665), 
published  the  following  treatises  :  Qucestiones  Quodlibeticat 
(in  the  second  edition,  1665, entitled  Saturnalia)  with  an  im- 
portant introductory  discourse  ;  Logica  Fundamentis  Suis  Res- 
titute, 1662  ;  Met 'Junius  Invenicndi  Argumenta  (new  edition  by 
Bontekoe,  1675) ;  and  the  first  part  of  his  Ethics — De  Virtute 
et  Primis  ejus  Proprietatibus,  qua;  vulgo  Virtutes  Cardinales 
Vocantur,  Tractatus  EtJiicus  Primus,  1665.  This  chief  work 
was  issued  complete  in  all  six  parts  with  the  title,  Tvco^i 
Gsavrov sive  EtJiica,  1675,  by  Bontekoe,  under  the  pseudonym 
Philaretus.  The  Physics,  1688,  the  MetafiJiysics,  1691,  and 
the  Annotata  Major  a  in  Cartesii  Principia  PJiilosopJtice,  1691, 
were  also  posthumous  publications,  from  the  notes  of  his 
pupils.  In  view  of  the  rarity  of  these  volumes,  and  the 
importance  of  the  philosopher,  it  is  welcome  news  that 
J.  P.  N.  Land  has  undertaken  an  edition  of  the  collected 
works,  in  three  volumes,  of  which  the  first  two  have  already 
appeared.*     The  Hague,  1891-92^ 

Geulincx  bases  the  occasionalistic  position  on  the  prin- 
ciple, quod  nescis,  quomodo  fiat,  id  non  facis.  Unless  I 
know  how  an  event  happens,  I  am  not  its  cause.  Since  I 
have  no  consciousness  how  my  decision  to  speak  or  to  walk 
is  followed  by  the  movement  of  my  tongue  or  limbs,  I  am 
not  the  one  who  effects  these.  Since  I  am  just  as  ignorant 
how  the  sensation  in  my  mind  comes  to  pass  as  a  sequel  to 
the  motion  in  the  sense-organ  ;  since,  further,  the  body  as  an 
unconscious  and  non-rational  being  can  effect  nothing,  it  is 
neither  I  nor  the  body  that  causes  the  sensation.  Both  the 
bodily  movement  and  the  sense-impression  are,  rather,  the 
effects  of  a  higher  power,  of  the  infinite  spirit.  The  act  of 
my  will  and  the  sense-stimulus  are  only  causa?  occasionales 
for  the  divine  will,  in  an  incomprehensible  way,  to  effect,  in 
the  one  case,  the  execution  of  the  movement  of  the  limbs 
resolved  upon,  and,  in  the  other,  the  origin  of  the   percep- 

*  On  vol.  i.  cf.  Eucken,  Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vol.  xxviii.,  1892,  p. 
200  seq. 

f  On  Geulincx  see  V.  van  der  Haeghen,  Geulincx,  Etude  stir  so.  Vie,  sa  Philoso- 
phie, et  ses  Ouvrages,  Ghent,  1886,  including  a  complete  bibliography  ;  and 
Land  in  vol.  iv.  of  the  Archiv  für  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  1890.  [English 
translation,  Mind,  vol.  xvi.  p.  223  seqJ\ 


OCCASIONALISM :    GEULINCX.  113 

tion  ;  they  are  (unsuitable)  instruments,  effective  only  in  the 
hand  of  God  ;  he  brings  it  to  pass  that  my  will  goes  out 
beyond  my  soul,  and  that  corporeal  motion  has  results 
in  it.  The  meaning  of  this  doctrine  is  misapprehended 
when  it  is  assumed, — an  assumption  to  which  the  Leib- 
nitzian  account  of  occasionalism  may  mislead  one, — that  in 
it  the  continuity  of  events,  alike  in  the  material  and  the 
psychical  world,  is  interrupted  by  frequent  scattered  interfer- 
ences from  without,  and  all  becoming  transformed  into  a 
series  of  disconnected  miracles.  An  order  of  nature  such  as 
would  be  destroyed  by  God's  action  does  not  exist  ;  God 
brings  everything  to  pass  ;  even  the  passage  of  motion  from 
one  body  to  another  is  his  work.  Further,  Geulincx  expressly 
says  that  God  has  imposed  such  laivs  on  motion  that  it 
harmonizes  with  the  soul's  free  volition,  of  which,  how- 
ever, it  is  entirely  independent  (similar  statements  occur 
also  in  De  la  Forge).  And  with  this  our  thinker  appears — 
as  Pfleiderer*  emphasizes — closely  to  approach  the  pre- 
established  harmony  of  Leibnitz.  The  occasionalistic 
theory  certainly  constitutes  the  preliminary  step  to  the 
Leibnitzian  ;  but  an  essential  difference  separates  the  two. 
The  advance  does  not  consist  in  the  substitution  by  Leib- 
nitz of  one  single  miracle  at  creation  for  a  number  of 
isolated  and  continually  recurring  ones,  but  (as  Leibnitz 
himself  remarks,  in  reply  to  the  objection  expressed  by 
Father  Lami,  that  a  perpetual  miracle  is  no  miracle)  in  the 
exchange  of  the  immediate  causality  of  God  for  natural 
causation.  With  Geulincx  mind  and  body  act  on  each 
other,  but  not  by  their  own  power ;  with  Leibnitz  the 
monads  do  not  act  on  one  another,  but  they  act  by  their 
own  power.f — When  Geulincx  in  the  same  connection  ad- 
vances to  the  statements  that,  in  view  of  the  limitcdness 
and  passivity  of  finite  things,  God  is  the  only  truly  active, 
because  the  only  independent,  being  in  the  world,  that  all 

*  Kdm.  Pfleiderer,  Geulincx,  als  Hauptvertreter  der  occasionalistischen  Meta- 
physik und  Ethik,  Tübingen,  1882  ;  the  same,  Leibniz  und  Geulincx  mit  beson- 
derer Beziehung  auf  ihr  Uhrengleichnis,  Tübingen,  1884. 

■f  See  Ed.  Zeller,  Sitzungsberichte  der  Berliner  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften, 
1884,  p.  673  seq.;  Eucken,  Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vol.  xix.,  1893,  p.  525 
teq.s  vol.  xxiii.,  1887,  p.  587  seq. 


ii-4  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

activity  is  his  activity,  that  the  human  (finite)  spirit  is  re- 
lated to  the  divine  (infinite)  spirit  as  the  individual  body 
to  space  in  general,  viz.,  as  a  section  of  it,  so  that,  by  think- 
ing away  all  limitations  from  our  mind,  we  find  God  in  us 
and  ourselves  in  him,  it  shows  how  nearly  he  verges  on 
pantheism. 

Geulincx's  services  to  noetics  have  been  duly  recognized 
by  Ed.  Grimm  (Jena,  1875),  although  with  an  excessive 
approximation  to  Kant.  In  this  field  he  advances  many 
acute  and  suggestive  thoughts,  as  the  deduction  which 
reappears  in  Lotze,  that  the  actually  existent  world  of 
figure  and  motion  cognized  by  thought,  though  the  real 
world,  is  poorer  than  the  wonderful  world  of  motley  sen- 
suous appearance  conjured  forth  in  our  minds  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  former,  that  the  latter  is  the  more  beautiful  and 
more  worthy  of  a  divine  author.  Further,  the  conviction, 
also  held  by  Lotze,  that  the  fundamental  activities  of  the 
mind  cannot  be  defined,  but  only  known  through  inner  ex- 
perience or  immediate  consciousness  (he  who  loves,  knows 
what  love  is ;  it  is  a  per  conscientiam  et  intimam  experien- 
tiam  notissima  res);  the  praiseworthy  attempt  to  give  a 
systematic  arrangement,  according  to  their  derivation  from 
one  another,  to  the  innate  mathematical  concepts,  which 
Descartes  had  simply  co-ordinated  (the  concept  of  surface  is 
gained  from  the  concept  of  body  by  abstracting  from  the 
third  dimension,  thickness — the  act  of  thus  abstracting 
from  certain  parts  of  the  content  of  thought,  Geulincx 
terms  consideratio  in  contrast  to  cogitatio,  which  includes 
the  whole  content);  and,  finally,  the  still  more  important 
inquiry,  whether  it  is  possible  for  us  to  reach  a  knowledge 
of  things  independently  of  the  forms  of  the  understanding, 
as  in  pure  thought  we  strip  off  the  fetters  of  sense.  The 
possibility  of  this  is  denied;  there  is  no  higher  faculty  of 
knowledge  to  act  as  judge  over  the  understanding,  as  the 
latter  over  the  sensibility,  and  even  the  wisest  man  cannot 
free  himself  from  the  forms  of  thought  (categories,  modi 
cogitandi).  And  yet  the  discussion  of  the  question  is  not 
useless:  the  reason  should  examine  into  the  unknowable  as 
well  as  the  knowable;  it  is  only  in  this  way  that  we  learn 
that  it  is  unknowable.     As  the  highest  forms  of  thought 


OCCASIONALISM :   GEULINCX.  115 

Geulincx  names  subject  (the  empty  concept  of  an  existent, 
ens  or  quod  est)  and  predicate  {modus  entis),  and  derives 
them  from  two  fundamental  activities  of  the  mind,  a  com- 
bining function  {simulsumtio,  totatio)  and  an  abstracting 
function  (one  which  removes  the  nota  subjecti).  Sub- 
stance and  accident,  substantive  and  adjective,  are  expres- 
sions for  subjective  processes  of  thought  and  hence  do  not 
hold  of  things  in  themselves.  With  reference  to  the  impor- 
tance, nay,  to  the  indispensability,  of  linguistic  signs  in  the 
use  of  the  understanding,  the  science  of  the  forms  of 
thought  is  briefly  termed  grammar. 

The  principle  ubi  nihil  vales,  ibi  nihil  veils,  forms  the  con- 
nection between  the  occasionalistic  metaphysics  and  ethics, 
the  latter  deducing  the  practical  consequences  of  the  for- 
mer. Where  thou  canst  do  nothing,  there  will  nothing. 
Since  we  can  effect  nothing  in  the  material  world,  to  which 
we  are  related  merely  as  spectators,  we  ought  also  not  to 
seek  in  it  the  motives  and  objects  of  our  actions.  God, 
does  not  require  works,  but  dispositions  only,  for  the  result  of 
our  volition  is  beyond  our  power.  Our  moral  vocation,  then, 
consists  in  renunciation  ot  the  world  and  retirement  into  our- 
selves, and  in  patient  faithfulness  at  the  post  assigned  to 
us.  Virtue  is  amor  dei  ac  rationis,  self-renouncing,  active, 
obedient  love  to  God  and  to  the  reason  as  the  image  and 
law  of  God  in  us.  The  cardinal  virtues  are  diligentia,  sedu- 
lous listening  for  the  commands  of  the  reason  ;  obcdientia, 
the  execution  of  these  ;justitia,  the  conforming  of  the  whole 
life  to  what  is  perceived  to  be  right  ;  finally,  humilitas,  the 
recognition  of  our  impotency  and  self-renunciation  [inspectio 
and  despectio,  or  derelictio,  neglect  us,  contempt  us,  incuria  s/n). 
The  highest  of  these  is  humility,  pious  submission  to  the 
divine  order  of  things;  its  condition,  the  self-knowledge 
commended  in  the  title  of  the  Ethics;  the  primal  evil,  self- 
love  (Pliilantia — ipsissimum peccatum).  Man  is  unhappy  be- 
cause he  seeks  happiness.  Happiness  is  like  our  shadows; 
it  shuns  us  when  we  pursue  it,  it  follows  us  when  we  flee  from 
it.  The  joys  which  spring  from  virtue  are  an  adornment  of 
it,  not  an  enticement  to  it  ;  they  are  its  result,  not  its  aim. 
The  ethics  of  Geulincx,  which  we  cannot  further  trace  out 
here,  surprises   one   by  its  approximation    to   the  views  of 


no  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

Spinoza  and  of  Kant.  With  the  former  it  has  in  common 
the  principle  of  love  toward  God,  as  well  as  numerous  de- 
tails ;  with  the  latter,  the  absoluteness  of  the  moral  law  (in 
rebus  moralibus  absolute priccipit  ratio  ant  vetat,  nulla  intcr- 
posita  conditione)\  with  both  the  depreciation  of  sympathy, 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  concealed  egoistic  motive. 

The  denial  of  substantiality  to  individual  things,  brought 
in  by  the  occasionalists,  is  completed  by  Spinoza,  who 
boldly  and  logically  proclaims  pantheism  on  the  basis  of 
Cartesianism  and  gives  to  the  divine  All-one  a  naturalistic 
instead  of  a  theological  character. 

2.  Spinoza. 

Benedictus  (originally  Baruch)  de  Spinoza  sprang  from 
a  Jewish  family  of  Portugal  or  Spain,  which  had  fled  to 
Holland  to  escape  persecution  at  home.  He  was  born  in 
Amsterdam  in  1632  ;  taught  by  the  Rabbin  Morteira,  and, 
in  Latin,  by  Van  den  Ende,  a  free-thinking  physician  who 
had  enjoyed  a  philological  training ;  and  expelled  by 
anathema  from  the  Jewish  communion,  1656,  on  account 
of  heretical  views.  During  the  next  four  years  he  found 
refuge  at  a  friend's  house  in  the  country  near  Amsterdam, 
after  which  he  lived  in  Rhynsburg,  and  from  1664  in  Voor- 
burg,  moving  thence,  in  1669,  to  The  Hague,  where  he 
died  in  1677.  Spinoza  lived  in  retirement  and  had  few 
wants;  he  supported  himself  by  grinding  optical  glasses ; 
and,  in  1673,  declined  the  professorship  at  Heidelberg 
offered  him  by  Karl  Ludwig,  the  Elector  Palatine,  because 
of  his  love  of  quiet,  and  on  account  of  the  uncertainty  of 
the  freedom  of  thought  which  the  Elector  had  assured  him. 
Spinoza  himself  made  but  two  treatises  public  :  his  dicta- 
tions on  the  first  and  second  parts  of  Descartes's  Principia 
Philosophice,  which  had  been  composed  for  a  private  pupil, 
with  an  appendix,  Cogitala  Metaphysica,  1663,  and  the 
Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus,  published  anonymously  in 
1670,  in  defense  of  liberty  of  thought  and  the  right  to  un- 
prejudiced criticism  of  the  biblical  writings.  The  prin- 
ciples expressed  in  the  latter  work  were  condemned  by  all 
parties  as  sacrilegious  and  atheistic,  and  awakened  concern 
even  in  the  minds  of  his  friends.     When,  in  1675,  Spinoza 


SPINOZA.  117 

journeyed  to  Amsterdam  with  the  intention  of  giving  his 
chief  work,  the  Ethics,  to  the  press,  the  clergy  and  the 
followers  of  Descartes  applied  to  the  government  to  forbid 
its  issue.  Soon  after  Spinoza's  death  it  was  published  in 
the  Opera  PostJiuma,  1677,  which  were  issued  under  the 
care  of  Hermann  Schuller,*  with  a  preface  by  Spinoza's 
friend,  the  physician  Ludwig  Meyer,  and  which  contained, 
besides  the  chief  work,  three  incomplete  treatises  (Tractatus 
Politicus,  Tractatus  dc  Intellectus  Enicndatione,  Compendiiuti 
Grammaticcs  Linntce  Hebrcece\  and  a  collection  of  Letters 
by  and  to  Spinoza.  The  Etkica  Ordine  Geomctrico  Demon- 
strata,  in  five  parts,  treats  (1)  of  God,  (2)  of  the  nature  and 
origin  of  the  mind,  (3)  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  the 
emotions,  (4)  of  human  bondage  or  the  strength  of  the 
passions,  (5)  of  the  power  of  the  reason  or  human  freedom. 
It  has  become  known  within  recent  times  that  Spinoza  made 
a  very  early  sketch  of  the  system  developed  in  the  Ethics, 
the  Tractatus  Brcvis  de  Deo  ct  Nomine  cjusquc  Felicitate^ 
of  which  a  Dutch  translation  in  two  copies  was  discovered, 
though  not  the  original  Latin  text.  This  treatise  was 
published  by  Böhmer,  1852,  in  excerpts,  and  complete  by 
Van  Vloten,  1862,  and  by  Schaarschmidt,  1869.  It  was 
not  until  our  own  century,  and  after  Jacobi's  Weder  die 
Lehre  des  Spinoza  in  Briefen  an  Moses  Mendelssohn  (1785) 
had  aroused  the  long  slumbering  interest  in  this  much  mis- 
understood philosopher,  who  has  been  oftener  despised  than 
studied,  that  complete  editions  of  his  works  were  prepared, 
by  Paulus  1802-03  ;  Gfrörer,  1830;  Bruder,  1843-46;  Gins- 
berg (in  Kirchmann's  Philosophische  Bibliothek,  4  vols.), 
1875-82  ;   and   Van    Vloten    and    Land.f   2   vols.,    1882-83. 

*  See  L.  Stein  in  the  Archiv  für  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  vol.  i.(  1888, 
p.  554  seq. 

\  For  the  literature  on  Spinoza  the  reader  is  referred  to  Ueberweg  and  to  Van 
der  I  .hide's  H.  Spinoza,  Bibliografie,  187 1  ;  while  among  recent  works  we 
shall  mention  only  Camerer's  Die  /.ehre  Spinozas,  Stuttgart,  1877.  [An 
English  translation  of  The  ('/net  Work*  "/  Spino  a  has  been  given  by  Elwes, 
1883-84  ;  a  translation  of  the  Ethics  by  White,  1883  ;  and  one  of  selections  from 
the  /■'.lliies,  with  notes,  by  Fullerton  in  Sneath's  Modern  Philosophers,  1892. 
Among  the  various  works  on  Spinoza,  the  reader  may  !><•  referred  i"  Pollock's 
Spm,'  -/,  His  Life  mni  /'mies,  1880  (with  bibliograph)  to  same  year);  Mar- 
tineau's  Study  0/  Spinoza,  1883  ;  and  J.  Caird's  Spinoza,  Blackwood's  Philo- 
sophical Classics,  1888. — Tk.| 


i'S  DE VEL OPMEN  T  OF  CAR TESIAN1SM. 

B.  Auerbach  has  worked  Spinoza's  life  into  a  romantic 
novel,  Spinoza,  ein  Denkerleben,  1837;  2d  ed.,  1855  [English 
translation  by  C.  T.  Brooks,  1882.] 

We  shall  consider  Spinoza's  system  as  a  completed  whole 
as  it  is  given  in  the  Ethics;  for  although  it  is  interesting 
for  the  investigator  to  trace  out  the  development  of  his 
thinking  by  comparing  this  chief  work  with  its  forerunner 
(that  Tractatus  Brcvis  "  concerning  God,  man,  and  the  hap- 
piness of  the  latter,"  whose  dialogistical  portions  we  may 
surmise  to  have  been  the  earliest  sketch  of  the  Spinozistic 
position,  and  which  was  followed  by  the  Tractatus  de  Intel- 
lectus  Emendatione)  such  a  procedure  is  not  equally  valuable 
for  the  student.  In  regard  to  Spinoza's  relations  to  other 
thinkers  it  cannot  be  doubted,  since  Freudenthal's  * 
proof,  that  he  was  dependent  to  a  large  degree  on  the 
predominant  philosophy  of  the  schools,  i.  e.  on  the  later 
Scholasticism  (Suarez  f),  especially  on  its  Protestant  side 
(Jacob  Martini,  Combachius,  Scheibler,  Burgersdijck,  Heere- 
boord);  Descartes,  it  is  true,  felt  the  same  influence. 
Joel,:}:  Schaarschmidt,  Sig\vart,§  R.  Avenarius,*[  and  Böh- 
mer ||  have  advanced  the  view  that  the  sources  of  Spi- 
noza's philosophy  are  not  to  be  sought  exclusively  in  Carte- 
sianism,  but  rather  that  essential  elements  were  taken  from 
the  Cabala,  from  the  Jewish  Scholasticism  (Maimonides, 
1190;  Gersonides,  died  1344;  Chasdai  Crescas,  1410),  and 
from  Giordano  Bruno.    In  opposition  to  this  Kuno  Fischer 

*  J.  Freudenthal,  Spinoza  und  die  Scholastik  in  the  Philosophische  Aufsätze, 
Zeller  zum  ^O-Jährigen  Doktorjubiläum  gewidmet,  Leipsic,  1887,  p.  85  seq. 
Freudenthal's  proof  covers  the  Cogitata  Metaphysica  and  many  of  the  principal 
propositions  of  the  Ethics. 

f  The  Spanish  Jesuit,  Francis  Suarez,  lived  1548-1617.  Works,  Venice, 
1714  Cf.  Karl  Werner,  Suarez  und  die  Scholastik  der  letzten  Jahrhunderte, 
Regensburg,  1861. 

%  M.  Joel,  Don  Chasdai  Crescas'  religions-philosophische  Lehren  in  ihrem 
geschichtlichen  Einjluss,  1866  ;  Spinozas  Theo. -pol.  Traktat  auf  seine  Quellen 
geprüft,  1870;  Zur  Genesis  der  Lehre  Spinozas  mit  besonderer  Berücksichtigung 
des  kurzen  Traktats,  1871. 

§  Spinozas  neu  entdeckter  Traktat  eläutert  u.  s.  70.,  1866;  Spinozas  kur- 
zer Traktat  übersetzt  mit  Einleitungen  und  Erläuterungen,  1S70. 

•  tTeber  die  beiden  ersten  Phasendes  Spinozistischen  Pantheismus  und  das 
Verhältniss  der  ziueiten  zur  dritten  Phase,  1868. 

||  Sfiinozana  in  Fichte's  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vols,  xxxvi.,  xlii.,  lvii., 
1860-70. 


SPINOZA.  119 

has  defended,  and  in  the  main  successfully,  the  proposition 
that  Spinoza  reached,  and  must  have  reached,  his  funda- 
mental pantheism  by  his  own  reflection  as  a  development  of 
Descartes's  principles.  The  traces  of  his  early  Talmudic 
education,  which  have  been  noticed  in  Spinoza's  works, 
prove  no  dependence  of  his  leading  ideas  on  Jewish  the- 
ology. His  pantheism  is  distinguished  from  that  of  the 
Cabalists  by  its  rejection  of  the  doctrine  of  emanation,  and 
from  Bruno's,  which  nevertheless  may  have  influenced  him, 
by  its  anti-teleological  character.  When  with  Greek 
philosophers,  Jewish  theologians,  and  the  Apostle  Paul 
he  teaches  the  immanence  of  God  (Epist.  21),  when  with 
Maimonides  and  Crescas  he  teaches  love  to  God  as  the 
principal  of  morality,  and  with  the  latter  of  these,  determin- 
ism also,  it  is  not  a  necessary  consequence  that  he  derived 
these  theories  from  them.  That  which  most  of  all  sepa- 
rates him  from  the  mediaeval  scholastics  of  his  own  peo- 
ple, is  his  rationalistic  conviction  that  God  can  be  known. 
His  agreement  with  them  comes  out  most  clearly  in  the 
Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus.  But  even  here  it  holds  only 
in  regard  to  undertaking  a  general  criticism  of  the  Scriptures 
and  to  their  figurative  interpretation,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  demand  for  a  special  historical  criticism,  and  the 
object  which  with  Spinoza  was  the  basis  of  the  investiga- 
tion as  a  whole,  were  foreign  to  mediaeval  Judaism — in 
fact,  entirely  modern  and  original.  This  object  was  to 
make  science  independent  of  religion,  whose  records  and 
doctrines  are  to  edify  the  mind  and  to  improve  the  charac- 
ter, not  to  instruct  the  understanding.  "Spinoza  could 
not  have  learned  the  complete  separation  of  religion  and 
science  from  Jewish  literature;  this  was  a  tendency  which 
sprang  from  the  spirit  of  his  own  time  "  (Windelband, 
Geschichte  der   neueren  Philosophie,  vol.  i.  p.  194V 

The  logical  presuppositions  of  Spinoza's  philosophy  lie 
in  the  fundamental  ideas  of  Descartes,  which  Spinoza 
accentuates,  transforms,  and  adopts.  Three  pairs  of 
thoughts  captivate  him  and  incite  him  to  think  them 
through:  first,  the  rationalistic  belief  in  the  power  of  the 
human  spirit  to  possess  itself  of  the  truth  by  pure  thought, 
together  with  confidence  in  the  omnipotence  of  the  mathe- 


WO  VELOPMENT  OF  C.lA'TJ-:s/.is\/SM 

matical  method  ;  second,  the  concept  of  substance,  together 
with  the  dualism  ol  extension  and  thought ;  finally,  the  fun- 
damental mechanical  position,  together  with  the  impossi- 
bility of  interaction  between  matter  and  spirit,  held  in 
common  with  the  occasionalists,  but  reached  independently 
of  them.  Whatever  new  elements  are  added  (e.  g.,  the 
transformation  of  the  Deity  from  a  mere  aid  to  knowledge 
into  its  most  important,  nay,  its  only  object ;  as,  also,  the 
enthusiastic,  directly  mystical  devotion  to  the  all-embracing 
world-ground)  are  of  an  essentially  emotional  nature,  and 
to  be  referred  less  to  historical  influences  than  to  the  indi- 
viduality of  the  thinker.  The  divergences  from  his  pre- 
decessors, however,  especially  the  extension  of  mechanism 
to  mental  phenomena  and  the  denial  of  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  inseparable  from  this,  result  simply  from  the  more  con- 
sistent application  of  Cartesian  principles.  Spinoza  is  not 
an  inventive,  impulsive  spirit,  like  Descartes  and  Leibnitz, 
but  a  systematic  one;  his  strength  does  not  lie  in  brilliant 
inspirations,  but  in  the  power  of  resolutely  thinking  a  thing 
through;  not  in  flashes  of  thought,  but  in  strictly  closed 
circles  of  thought.  He  develops,  but  with  genius,  and  to  the 
end.  Nevertheless  this  consecutiveness  of  Spinoza,  the 
praises  of  which  have  been  unceasingly  sung  by  genera- 
tions since  his  day,  has  its  limits.  It  holds  for  the  un- 
wavering development  of  certain  principles  derived  from 
Descartes,  but  not  with  equal  strictness  for  the  inter- 
connection of  the  several  lines  of  thought  followed  out 
separately.  His  very  custom  of  developing  a  principle 
straight  on  to  its  ultimate  consequences,  without  regard 
to  the  needs  of  the  heart  or  to  logical  demands  from 
other  directions,  make  it  impossible  for  the  results  of  the 
various  lines  of  thought  to  be  themselves  in  harmony  ;  his 
vertical  consistency  prevents  horizontal  consistency.  If  the 
original  tendencies  come  into  conflict  (the  consciously  held 
theoretical  principles  into  conflict  with  one  another,  or 
with  hidden  aesthetic  or  moral  principles),  either  one  gains 
the  victory  over  the  other  or  both  insist  on  their  claims  ; 
thus  we  have  inconsistencies  in  the  one  case,  and  contra- 
dictions in  the  other  (examples  of  which  have  been  shown 
by  Volkelt  in  his  maiden  \\oxV,PantJicisnms  and  Individual- 


SPINOZA.  I2i 

Ismus  im  Systeme  Spinozas,  1872).  Science  demands  unified 
comprehension  of  the  given,  and  seeks  the  smallest  number 
of  principles  possible  ;  but  her  concepts  prove  too  narrow 
vessels  for  the  rich  plenitude  of  reality.  He  who  asks 
from  philosophy  more  than  mere  special  inquiries  finds 
himself  confronted  by  two  possibilities:  first,  starting  from 
one  standpoint,  or  a  few  such,  he  may  follow  a  direct  course 
without  looking  to  right  or  left,  at  the  risk  that  in  his 
thought-calculus  great  spheres  of  life  will  be  wholly  left 
out  of  view,  or,  at  least,  will  not  receive  due  consideration  ; 
or,  second,  beginning  from  many  points  of  departure  and  as- 
cending along  converging  lines,  he  may  seek  a  unifying  con- 
clusion. In  Spinoza  we  possess  the  most  brilliant  example 
of  the  former  one-sided,  logically  consecutive  power  of 
(also,  no  doubt,  violence  in)  thought,  while  Leibnitz  fur- 
nishes the  type  of  the  many-sided,  harmonistic  thinking. 
The  fact  that  even  the  rigorous  Spinoza  is  not  infrequently 
forced  out  of  the  strict  line  of  consistency,  proves  that  the 
man  was  more  many-sided  than  the  thinker  would  have 
allowed  himself  to  be. 

To  begin  with  the  formal  side  of  Spinozism  :  the  rational- 
ism of  Descartes  is  heightened  by  Spinoza  into  the  impos- 
ing confidence  that  absolutely  everything  is  cognizable  by 
the  reason,  that  the  intellect  is  able  by  its  pure  concepts 
and  intuitions  entirely  to  exhaust  the  multiform  world  of 
reality,  to  follow  it  with  its  light  into  its  last  refuge.* 
Spinoza  is  just  as  much  in  earnest  in  regard  to  the  typical 
character  of  mathematics.  Descartes  (with  the  exception 
of  an  example  asked  for  in  the  second  of  the  Objections, 
and  given  as  an  appendix  to  the  Meditations,  in  which  he 
endeavors  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  God  and  the  dis- 
tinction of  body  and  spirit  on  the  synthetic  Euclidean 
method),  had  availed  himself  of  the  analytic  form  of  presen- 
tation, on  the  ground  that,  though  less  cogent,  it  is  more 

*  Heussler's  objections  {Der  Rationalismus  des  17  Jahrhunderts,  1885,  pp. 
82-85)  to  this  characterization  of  Kuno  Fischer's  are  not  convincing.  The 
question  is  not  so  much  about  a  principle  demonstrable  by  definite  citations  as 
about  an  unconscious  motive  in  Spinoza's  thinking,  Fischer's  views  OH  this 
point  seem  to  us  correct.  Spinoza's  mode  of  thinking  is,  in  fact,  saturated 
with  this  strong  confidence  in  the  omnipotence  of  the  reason  and  the  rational 
constitution  of  true  reality. 


'-'-  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

suited  for  instruction  since  it  shows  the  way  by  which  the 
matter  has  been  discovered.  Spinoza,  on  the  other  hand, 
rigorously  carried  out  the  geometrical  method,  even  in 
externals.  He  begins  with  definitions,  adds  to  these  axi- 
oms (or  postulates),  follows  with  propositions  or  the- 
orems as  the  chief  thing,  finally  with  demonstrations  or 
proofs,  which  derive  the  later  propositions  from  the  earlier, 
and  these  in  turn  from  the  self-evident  axioms.  To  these 
four  principal  parts  are  further  added  as  less  essential, 
deductions  or  corollaries  immediately  resulting  from  the 
theorems,  and  the  more  detailed  expositions  of  »ihe 
demonstrations  or  scholia.  Besides  these,  some  longer 
discussions  are  given  in  the  form  of  remarks,  introductions, 
and  appendices. 

If  everything  is  to  be  cognizable  through  mathematics, 
then  everything  must  take  place  necessarily  ;  even  the 
thoughts,  resolutions,  and  actions  of  man  cannot  be  free  in 
the  sense  that  they  might  have  happened  otherwise.  Thus 
there  is  an  evident  methodological  motive  at  work  for  the 
extension  of  mechanism  to  all  becoming,  even  spiritual  be- 
coming. But  there  are  metaphysical  reasons  also.  Des- 
cartes had  naively  solved  the  anthropological  problem  by  the 
answer  that  the  interaction  of  mind  and  body  is  incompre- 
hensible but  actual.  The  occasionalists  had  hesitatingly» 
questioned  these  conclusions  a  little,  the  incomprehen- 
sibility as  well  as  the  actuality,  only  at  last  to  leave  them 
intact.  For  the  explanation  that  therej^a  real  influence 
of  body  on  mind  and  vice  versa,  though  not  an  immediate 
but  an  occasional  one,  one  mediated  by  the  divine  will,  is 
scarcely  more  than  a  confession  that  the  matter  is  inexpli- 
cable. Spinoza,  who  admits  neither  the  incognizability  of 
anything  real,  nor  any  supernatural  interferences,  roundly 
denies  both.  There  is  no  intercourse  between  body  and 
soul  ;  yet  that  which  is  erroneously  considered  such  is  both 
actually  present  and  explicable.  The  assumed  interaction 
is  as  unnecessary  as  it  is  impossible.  Body  and  soul  do  not 
need  to  act  on  one  another,  because  they  are  not  two  in 
kind  at  all,  but  constitute  one  being  which  may  be  looked 
at  from  two  different  sides.  This  is  called  body  when  con- 
sidered  under   its  attribute   of   extension,  and   spirit  when 


SPINOZA:  SUBSTANCE,  ATTRIBUTES,  MODES.         123 

cons/Hered  under  its  attribute  of  thought.  It  is  quite  im- 
possible for  two  substances  to  affect  each  other,  because  by 
their  reciprocal  influence,  nay,  by  their  very  duality,  they 
would  lose  their  independence,  and,  with  this,  their  sub- 
stantiality. There  is  no  plurality  of  substances,  but  only 
one,  the  infinite,  the  divine  substance.  Here  we  reach  the 
center  of  the  system.  There  is  but  one  becoming  and 
but  one  independent,  substantial  being.  Material  and 
spiritual  becoming  form  merely  the  two  sides  of  one 
and  the  same  necessary  world-process  ;  particular  extended 
beings  and  particular  thinking  beings  are  nothing  but  the 
changeable  and  transitory  states  {modi)  of  the  enduring, 
eternal,  unified  world-ground.  "  Necessity  in  becoming  and 
unity  of  being,"  mechanism  and  pantheism — these  are  the 
controllingconceptions  in  Spinoza's  doctrine.  Multiplicity, 
the  self-dependence  of  particular  things,  free  choice,  ends, 
development,  all  this  is  illusion  and  error. 

(a)  Substance,  Attributes,  and  Modes. — There  is  but  one 
substance,  and  this  is  infinite  (I.  prop.  10,  scJwl. ;  prop.  14, 
cor.  1).  Why,  then,  only  one  and  why  infinite?  With 
Spinoza  as  with  Descartes  independence  is  the  essence  of 
substantiality.  This  is  expressed  in  the  third  definition  : 
"  By  substance  I  understand  that  which  is  in  itself  and  is 
conceived  by  means  of  itself,  i.  e.,  that  the  conception  of 
which  can  be  formed  without  the  aid  of  the  conception  of 
any  other  thing."  Per  substantiam  intelligo  id,  quod  in  se 
est  et  per  se  concipittir  ;  hoc  est  id,  cujus  concept  us  non  indiget 
conceptu  alterius  rei,  a  quo  for  mar  i  debeat.  An  absolutely 
self-dependent  being  can  neither  be  limited  (since,  in 
respect  to  its  limits,  it  would  be  dependent  on  the  limit- 
ing being),  nor  occur  more  than  once  in  the  world.  Infinity 
follows  from  its  self-dependence,  and  its  uniqueness  from 
its  infinity. 

Substance  is  the  being  which  is  dependent  on  nothing 
and  on  which  everything  depends ;  which,  itself  uncaused, 
effects  all  else;  which  presupposes  nothing,  but  itself  con- 
stitutes the  presupposition  of  all  that  is:  it  is  pure  being, 
primal  being,  the  cause  of  itself  and  of  all.  Thus  in  Spinoza 
the  being  which  is  without  presuppositions  is  broughl  into 
the  most   intimate  relation  with  the   fullness  of  multiform 


i-4  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

existence,  not  coldly  and  abstractly  exalted  above  it,  as  by 
the  ancient  Eleatics.  Substance  is  the  being  in  (not  above) 
things,  that  in  them  which  constitutes  their  reality,  which 
supports  and  produces  them.  As  the  cause  of  all  things 
Spinoza  calls  it  God,  although  he  is  conscious  that  he 
understands  by  the  term  something  quite  different  from 
the  Christians.  God  does  not  mean  for  him  a  transcendent, 
personal  spirit,  but  only  the  ens  absolute  infinitum  {def.  sexto), 
the  essential  heart  of  things  :  Deus  sive  substantia. 

How  do  things  proceed  from  God  ?  Neither  by  creation 
nor  by  emanation.  He  does  not  put  them  forth  from  him- 
self, they  do  not  tear  themselves  free  from  him,  but  they 
follow  out  of  the  necessary  nature  of  God,  as  it  follows 
from  the  nature  of  the  triangle  that  the  sum  of  its  angles  is 
equal  to  two  right  angles  (I.  prop.  17,  schol.).  They  do 
not  come  out  from  him,  but  remain  in  him  ;  just  this  fact 
that  they  are  in  another,  in  God,  constitutes  their  lack  of 
self-dependence  (I.  prop.  18,  dem.:  nulla  res,  qua?  extra 
Dcum  in  se  sit).  God  is  their  inner,  indwelling  cause 
{causa  immanens,  non  vero  transiens. — I.  prop.  18),  is  not  a 
transcendent  creator,  but  natura  naturalis,  over  against  the 
sum  of  finite  beings,  natura  naturata  (I.  prop.  29,  schol.)-. 
Dens  sive  natura. 

Since  nothing  exists  out  of  God,  his  actions  do  not  follow 
from  external  necessity,  are  not  constrained,  but  he  is  free 
cause,  free  in  the  sense  that  he  does  nothing  except  that 
toward  which  his  own  nature  impels  him,  that  he  acts  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  his  being  (def.  septima :  ea  res 
libera  dicitur,  qua?  ex  sola  sua?  natura?  necessitate  existit  et  a 
se  sola  ad  agendum  determinatur ;  Epist.  26).  This  inner 
necessitation  is  so  little  a  defect  that  its  direct  opposite, 
undetermined  choice  and  inconstancy,  must  rather  be  ex- 
cluded from  God  as  an  imperfection.  Freedom  and  (inner) 
necessity  are  identical;  and  antithetical,  on  the  one  side,  to 
undetermined  choice  and,  on  the  other,  to  (external)  com- 
pulsion. Action  in  view  of  ends  must  also  be  denied  of  the 
infinite ;  to  think  of  God  as  acting  in  order  to  the  good  is  to 
make  him  dependent  on  something  external  to  him  (an 
aim)  and  lacking  in  that  which  is  to  be  attained  by  the 
action.     With  God  the  ground  of  his  action  is  the  same  as 


$ 


SPINOZA:  SUBSTANCE,  ATTRIBUTES,  MODES.         125 

the  ground  of  his  existence  ;  God's  power  and  his  essence 
coincide  {I.  prop.  34:  Dei  potentia  est  ipsa  ipsius  essentia). 
He  is  the  cause  of  himself  {clef,  prima:  per  causam  sui 
intelligo  id,  cujus  essentia  involvit  cxistentiam,  sive  id,  cujus 
natura  non  potest  concipi  nisi  existcns) ;  it  would  be  a  con- 
tradiction to  hold  that  being  was  not,  that  God,  or  sub- 
stance, did  not  exist ;  he  cannot  be  thought  otherwise  than 
as  existing;  his  concept  includes  his  existence.  To  be 
self-caused  means  to  exist  necessarily  (I.  prop.  7).  The 
same  thing  is  denoted  by  the  predicate  eternal,  which, 
according  to  the  eighth  definition,  denotes  "  existence 
itself,  in  so  far  as  it  is  conceived  to  follow  necessarily  from 
the  mere  definition  of  the  eternal  thing." 
J  'The  infinite  substance  stands  related  to  finite,  individual 
thjuigs,  not  only  as  the  independent  to  the  dependent,  as 
the  cause  to  the  caused,  as  the  one  to  the  many,  and  the 
whole  to  the  parts,  but  also  as  the  universal  to  the  particular, 
the  indeterminate  to  the  determinate.  From  infinite  being 
as  pure  affirmation  (I.  prop.  8,  schol.  1  :  absoluta  affirmatid) 
everything  which  contains  a  limitation  or  negation,  and  this 
includes  every  particular  determination,  must  be  kept  at  a 
distance  :  deterviinatio  negatio  est  {Epist.  50  and  41  :  a  deter- 
mination denotes  nothing  positive,  but  a  deprivation,  a  lack 
of  existence  ;  relates  not  to  the  being  but  to  the  non-being 
of  the  thing).  A  determination  states  that  which  dis- 
tinguishes one  thing  from  another,  hence  what  it  is  not, 
expresses  a  limitation  of  it.  Consequently  God,  who  is 
free  from  every  negation  and  limitation,  is  to  be  conceived 
as  the  absolutely  indeterminate.  The  results  thus  far 
reached  run  :  Substantia  una  infinit  a — Dens  sive  natura — 
causa  sui  (ceterna)  et  rerum  (immancus) — libera  necessitas — 
non  determinata.  Or  more  briefly  :  Substance  =  God  =-= 
nature.  The  equation  of  God  and  substance  had  been 
announced  by  Descartes,  but  not  adhered  to,  while  Bruno 
had  approached  the  equation  of  God  and  nature — Spinoza 
decisively  completes  both  and  combines  them. 

A  further  remark  may  be  added  concerning  the  relation 
of  God  and  the  world.  In  calling  the  infinite  at  once  the 
permanent  essence  of  things  and  their  producing  cause, 
Spinoza    raises   a  demand   which    it   is   not  easy  to  fulfill, 


\ 


I«6  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIAX1 'SM. 

the  demand  to  think  the  existence  of  things  in  substance  as 
a  following  from  substance,  and  their  procession  from  God 
as  a  remaining  in  him.  He  refers  us  to  mathematics  :  the 
things  which  make  up  the  world  are  related  to  God  as  the 
properties  of  a  geometrical  figure  to  its  concepts,  as  theo- 
rems to  the  axiom,  as  the  deduction  to  the  principle,  which 
from  eternity  contains  all  that  follows  from  it  and  retains 
this  even  while  putting  it  forth.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that 
such  a  view  of  causality  contains  error, — it  has  been  char- 
acterized as  a  confusion  of  ratio  and  causa,  of  logical  ground 
and  real  cause, — but  it  is  just  as  certain  that  Spinoza  com- 
mitted it.  He  not  only  compares  the  dependence  of  the 
effect  on  its  cause  to  the  dependence  of  a  derivative  prin- 
ciple on  that  from  which  it  is  derived,  but  fully  equates 
the  two;  he  thinks  that  in  logico-mathematical  "  con- 
sequences "  he  has  grasped  the  essence  of  real  "  effects  "  : 
for  him  the  type  of  all  legality,  as  also  of  real  becoming, 
was  the  necessity  which  governs  the  sequence  of  mathe- 
matical truths,  and  which,  on  the  one  hand,  is  even  and 
still,  needing  no  special  exertion  of  volitional  energy,  while, 
on  the  other,  it  is  rigid  and  unyielding,  exalted  above  all 
choice.  Philosophy  had  sought  the  assistance  of  mathe- 
matics because  of  the  clearness  and  certainty  which  dis- 
tinguish the  conclusions  of  the  latter,  and  which  she  wished 
to  obtain  for  her  own.  In  excess  of  zeal  she  was  not 
content  with  striving  after  this  ideal  of  indefectible  certi- 
tude, but,  forgetting  the  diversity  of  the  two  fields,  strove 
to  imitate  other  qualities  which  are  not  transferable ; 
instead  of  learning  from  mathematics  she  became  sub- 
servient to  it. 

Substance  does  not  affect  us  by  its  mere  existence,  but 
through  an  Attribute.  By  attribute  is  meant,  accoiding  to 
the  fourth  definition,  "  that  which  the  understanding  per- 
ceives of  substance  as  constituting  the  essence  of  it  "  {quod 
intellectus  de  substantia  percipit,  tanquam  ejusdem  esscntiam 
constituent).  The  more  reality  a  substance  contains,  the 
more  attributes  it  has;  consequently  infinite  substance 
possesses  an  infinite  number,  each  of  which  gives  expres- 
sion to  its  essence,  but  of  which  two  only  fall  within  our 
knowledge.     Among  the  innumerable  divine  attributes  the 


Y 


SPINOZA:  SUBSTANCE,  ATTRIBUTES,  MODES.         127 

human  mind  knows  those  only  which  it  finds  in  itself,  thought 
and  extension.  Although  man  beholds  God  only  as 
thinking  and  extended  substance,  he  yet  has  a  clear  and 
complete — an  adequate — idea  of  God.  Since  each  of  the 
two  attributes  is  conceived  without  the  other,  hence  in 
itself  {perse),  they  are  distinct  from  each  other  realiter,  and 
independent.  God  is  absolutely  infinite,  the  attributes 
only  in  their  kind  {in  suo  genere). 

How  can  the  indeterminate  possess  properties  ?  Are  the 
attributes  merely  ascribed  to  substance  by  the  understand- 
ing, or  do  they  possess  reality  apart  from  the  knowing 
subject  ?  This  question  has  given  rise  to  much  debate. 
According  to  Hegel  and  Ed.  Erdmann  the  attributes  are 
something  external  to  substance,  something  brought  into  it 
by  the  understanding,  forms  of  knowledge  present  in  the 
beholder  alone ;  substance  itself  is  neither  extended  nor 
cogitative,  but  merely  appears  to  the  understanding  under 
these  determinations,  without  which  the  latter  would  be 
unable  to  cognize  it.  This  "  formalistic "  interpretation, 
which,  relying  on  a  passage  in  a  letter  to  De  Vries  {Epist. 
27),  explains  the  attributes  as  mere  modes  of  intellectual  ap- 
prehension, numbers  Kuno  Fischer  among  its  opponents. 
As  the  one  party  holds  to  the  first  half  of  the  definition, 
the  other  places  the  emphasis  on  the  second  half  ("  that 
which  the  understanding  perceives — as  constituting  the 
essence  of  substance").  The  attributes  are  more  than  mere 
modes  of  representation — they  are  real  properties,  which 
substance  possesses  even  apart  from  an  observer,  nay,  in 
which  it  consists ;  in  Spinoza,  moreover,  "  must  be  con- 
ceived "  is  the  equivalent  of  "  to  be."  Although  this  latter 
"realistic"  party  undoubtedly  has  the  advantage  over  the 
former,  which  reads  into  Spinoza  a  subjectivism  foreign  to 
his  system,  they  ought  not  to  forget  that  the  difference  in 
interpretation  has  for  its  basis  a  conflict  among  the  motives 
'which  control  Spinoza's  thinking.  The  reference  of  the 
attributes  to  the  understanding,  given  in  the  definition,  is 
not  without  significance.  It  sprang  from  the  wish  not  to 
mar  the  indeterminateness  of  the  absolute  by  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  attributes,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  an  equally 
pressing   need   for   the  conservation  of  the   immanence  of 


I«8  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

substance  forbade  a  bold  transfer  of  the  attributes  to  the 
observer.  The  real  opinion  of  Spinoza  is  neither  so  clear 
and  tree  from  contradictions,  nor  so  one-sided,  as  that  which 
his  interpreters  ascribe  to  him.  Fischer's  further  interpre- 
tation of  the  attributes  of  God  as  his  "  powers"  is  tenable, 
so  long  as  by  causa  and  potent ia  we  understand  nothing 
more  than  the  irresistible,  but  non-kinetic,  force  with  which 
an  original  truth  establishes  or  effects  those  which  follow 
from  it. 

As  the  dualism  of  extension  and  thought  is  reduced 
from  a  substantial  to  an  attributive  distinction,  so  individ- 
ual bodies  and  minds,  motions  and  thoughts,  are  degraded 
a  stage  further.  Individual  things  lack  independence  of 
every  sort.  The  individual  is,  as  a  determinate  finite  thing, 
burdened  with  negation  and  limitation,  for  every  determi- 
nation includes  a  negation  ;  that  which  is  truly  real  in  the 
individual  is  God.  Finite  things  are  modi  of  the  infinite 
substance,  mere  states,  variable  states,  of  God.  By  them- 
selves they  are  nothing,  since  out  of  God  nothing  exists. 
They  possess  existence  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  con- 
ceived in  their  connection  with  the  infinite,  that  is,  as  transi- 
tory forms  of  the  unchangeable  substance.  They  are  not 
in  themselves,  but  in  another,  in  God,  and  are  conceived 
only  in  God.  They  are  mere  affections  of  the  divine  attri- 
butes, and  must  be  considered  as  such. 

To  the  two  attributes  correspond  two  classes  of  modes. 
The  most  important  modifications  of  extension  are  rest 
and  motion.  Among  the  modes  of  thought  are  under- 
standing and  will.  These  belong  in  the  sphere  of  determi- 
nate and  transitory  being  and  do  not  hold  of  the  natura 
naturans  :  God  is  exalted  above  all  modality,  above  will  and 
understanding,  as  above  motion  and  rest.  We  must  not  assert 
of  the  natura  naturata  (the  world  as  the  sum  of  all  modes), 
as  of  the  natura  naturans,  that  its  essence  involves  exist- 
ence (I.  prop.  24):  we  can  conceive  finite  things  as  non- 
existent, as  well  as  existent  {Epist.  29).  This  constitutes 
their  "  contingency,"  which  must  by  no  means  be  inter- 
preted as  lawlessness.  On  the  contrary,  all  that  takes  place 
in  the  world  is  most  rigorously  determined  ;  every  individ- 
ual, finite,  determinate  thing  and  event  is  determined  to  its 


SPINOZA:   SUBSTANCE,    ATTRIBUTES,    MODES.  129 

existence  and  action  by  another  similarly  finite  and  deter- 
minate thing  or  event,  and  this  cause  is,  in  turn,  determined 
in  its  existence  and  action  by  a  further  finite  mode,  and  so 
on  to  infinity  (I.  prop.  28).  Because  of  this  endlessness  in 
the  series  there  is  no  first  or  ultimate  cause  in  the  phenom- 
enal world  ;  all  finite  causes  are  second  causes  ;  the  primary 
cause  lies  within  the  sphere  of  the  infinite  and  is  God  him- 
self. The  modes  are  all  subject  to  the  constraint  of  an 
unbroken  and  endless  nexus  of  efficient  causes,  which 
leaves  room  neither  for  chance,  nor  choice,  nor  ends. 
Nothing  can  be  or  happen  otherwise  than  as  it  is  and  hap- 
pens {I.  prop.  29,  33). 

The  causal  chain  appears  in  two  forms :  a  mode  of  ex- 
tension has  its  producing  ground  in  a  second  mode  of 
extension ;  a  mode  of  thought  can  be  caused  only  by 
another  mode  of  thought — each  individual  thing  is  de- 
termined by  one  of  its  own  kind.  The  two  series  proceed 
side  by  side,  without  a  member  of  either  ever  being  able  to 
interfere  in  the  other  or  to  effect  anything  in  it — a  motion 
can  never  produce  anything  but  other  motions,  an  idea  can 
result  only  in  other  ideas  ;  the  body  can  never  determine 
the  mind  to  an  idea,  nor  the  soul  the  body  to  a  movement. 
Since,  however,  extension  and  thought  are  not  two  sub- 
stances, but  attributes  of  one  substance,  this  apparently 
double  causal  nexus  of  two  series  proceeding  in  exact  cor- 
respondence is,  in  reality,  but  a  single  one  (III.  prop.  2, 
scholl)  viewed  from  different  sides.  That  which  represents 
a  chain  of  motions  when  seen  from  the  side  of  exten- 
sion, bears  the  aspect  of  a  series  of  ideas  from  the  side 
of  thought.  Modus  cxtcnsionis  et  idea  illius  modi  una 
cadcmquc  est  res,  scd  duobus  modis  cxpressa  (II.  prop.  J, 
schol.;  cf.  III.  prop.  2,  sehol.).  The  soul  is  nothing  but  the 
idea  of  an  actual  body,  body  or  motion  nothing  but  the 
object  or  event  in  the  sphere  of  extended  actuality  cor- 
responding to  an  idea.  No  idea  exists  without  something 
corporeal  corresponding  to  it,  no  body,  without  at  the  same 
time  existing  as  idea,  or  being  conceived  ;  in  other  words, 
everything  is  both  body  and  spirit,  all  things  are  animated 
(II.  prop.  13,  schol.).  Thus  the  famous  proposition  results  ; 
Ordo  et  eonncxio  idcarum  idem  est  ac  ordo  et  eonnexio  rerum 


'3°  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIAX1  SM. 

(sivt  corporum ;  II.  prop.  7),  and  in  application  to  man, 
"  the  order  of  the  actions  and  passions  of  our  body  is 
simultaneous  in  nature  with  the  order  of  the  actions  and 
passions  of  the  mind  "  {111. prop.  2,  schol.). 

The  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  relation  between 
the  material  and  the  mental  worlds  by  asserting  their 
thoroughgoing  correspondence  and  substantial  identity, 
was  philosophically  justifiable  and  important,  though  many 
evident  objections  obtrude  themselves  upon  us.  The 
required  assumption,  that  there  is  a  mental  event  corre- 
sponding to  every  bodily  one,  and  vice  versa,  meets  with  invol- 
untary and  easily  supported  opposition,  which  Spinoza  did 
nothing  to  remove.  Similarly  he  omitted  to  explain  how 
body  is  related  to  motion,  mind  to  ideas,  and  both  to  actual- 
ity. The  ascription  of  a  materialistic  tendency  to  Spinoza  is 
not  without  foundation.  Corporeality  and  reality  appear 
well-nigh  identical  for  him, — the  expressions  corpora  and  res 
are  used  synonymously, — so  that  there  remains  for  minds 
and  ideas  only  an  existence  as  reflections  of  the  real  in  the 
sphere  of  [an]  ideality  (whose  degree  of  actuality  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  determine).  Moreover,  individualistic  impulses  have 
been  pointed  out,  which,  in  part,  conflict  with  the  monism 
which  he  consciously  follows,  and,  in  part,  subserve  its 
interests.  An  example  of  this  is  given  in  the  relation  of 
mind  and  idea:  Spinoza  treats  the  soul  as  a  sum  of  ideas, 
as  consisting  in  them.  An  (at  least  apparently  substan- 
tial) bond  among  ideas,  an  ego,  which  possesses  them,  does 
not  exist  for  him  :  the  Cartesian  cogito  has  become  an  im- 
personal cogitatnr  or  a  Dens  cogitat.  In  order  to  the  unique 
substantiality  of  the  infinite,  the  substantiality  of  individual 
spirits  must  disappear.  That  which  argues  for  the  latter  is 
their  I-ness  (Ichlieit),  the  unity  of  self-consciousness  ;  it  is 
destroyed,  if  the  mind  is  a  congeries  of  ideas,  a  composite  of 
them.  Thus  in  order  to  relieve  itself  from  the  self-depend- 
ence of  the  individual  mind,  monism  allies  itself  with  a 
spiritual  atomism,  the  most  extreme  which  can  be  conceived. 
The  mind  is  resolved  into  a  mass  of  individual  ideas. 

Mention  may  be  made  in  passing,  also,  of  a  strange  con- 

.  ception,  which  is  somewhat  out  of  harmony  with  the  rest 

of  the  system,  and  of  which,  moreover,  little  use  is   made. 


SPINOZA:   SUBSTANCE,    ATTRIBUTES,   MODES.  131 

This  is  the  conception  of  infinite  modes.  As  such  are  cited, 
facics  totins  mundi,  mot  as  et  quies,  intellectus  absolute  infin- 
itus.  Kuno  Fischer's  interpretation  of  this  difficult  con- 
ception may  be  accepted.  It  denotes,  according  to  him,  the 
connected  sum  of  the  modes,  the  itself  non-finite  sum  total 
of  the  finite — the  universe  meaning  the  totality  of  individ- 
ual things  in  general  (without  reference  to  their  nature  as 
extended  or  cogitative);  rest  and  motion,  the  totality  of 
material  being;  the  absolutely  infinite  understanding,  the 
totality  of  spiritual  being  or  the  ideas.  Individual  spirits 
together  constitute,  as  it  were,  the  infinite  intellect ;  our 
mind  is  a  part  of  the  divine  understanding,  yet  not  in  such 
a  sense  that  the  whole  consists  of  the  parts,  but  that  the 
part  exists  only  through  the  whole.  When  we  say,  the 
human  mind  perceives  this  or  that,  it  is  equivalent  to  say- 
ing that  God — not  in  so  far  as  he  is  infinite,  but  as  he  ex- 
presses himself  in  this  human  mind  and  constitutes  its 
essence — has  this  or  that  idea  (II. prop.  II,  coro//.). 

The  discussion  of  these  three  fundamental  concepts  ex. 
hausts  all  the  chief  points  in  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  God. 
Passing  over  his  doctrine  of  body  (II.  between  prop.  13  and 
prop.  14)  we  turn  at  once  to  his  discussion  of  mind  and  man. 

(b)  Anthropology:  Cognition  and  the  Passions. —  Each 
thing  is  at  once  (cf.  p.  129)  mind  and  body,  representation 
and  that  which  is  represented,  idea  and  ideate  (object). 
Body  and  soul  are  the  same  being,  only  considered  under  dif- 
erent  attributes.  The  human  mind  is  the  idea  of  the  human 
body;  it  cognizes  itself  in  perceiving  the  affections  of  its 
body  ;  it  represents  all  that  takes  place  in  the  body,  though 
not  all  adequately.  As  man's  body  is  composed  of  very  many 
bodies,  so  his  soul  is  composed  of  very  many  ideas.  To  judge 
of  the  relation  of  the  human  mind  to  the  mind  of  lower 
beings,  we  must  consider  the  superiority  of  man's  body  to 
other  bodies  ;  the  more  complex  a  body  is,  and  the  greater 
the  variety  of  the  affections  of  which  it  is  capable,  the  better 
and  more  adapted  for  adequate  cognition,  the  accompanying 
mind. — A  result  of  the  identity  of  soul  and  body  is  that  the 
acts  of  our  will  are  not  (ree(E/>ist.62):  they  are,  in  fact,  deter- 
minations of  our  body,  only  considered  under  the  attribute 
of  thought,  and  no  more  free  than  this  from  the  constraint 


ij-  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIAN  I  SM. 

of  the  causal  law  (III.  prop.  2,  scholl). — Since  the  mind 
does  nothing  without  at  the  same  time  knowing  that  it 
does  it — since,  in  other  words,  its  activity  is  a  conscious  ac- 
tivity, it  is  not  merely  idea  corporis  humani,  but  also  idea 
idea  corporis  or  idea  mentis. 

All  adherents  of  the  Eleatic  separation  of  the  one  pure 
being  from  the  manifold  and  changing  world  of  appearance 
are  compelled  to  make  a  like  distinction  between  two  kinds 
and  two  organs  of  knowledge.  The  representation  of  the 
empirical  manifold  of  separately  existing  individual  things, 
together  with  the  organ  thereof,  Spinoza  terms  imaginatio ; 
the  faculty  of  cognizing  the  true  reality,  the  one,  all-embracing 
substance,  he  calls  intellectus.  Imaginatio  (imagination,  sen- 
suous representation)  is  the  faculty  of  inadequate,  confused 
ideas,  among  which  are  included  abstract  conceptions,  as 
well  as  sensations  and  memory-images.  The  objects  of  per- 
ception are  the  affections  of  our  body;  and  our  perceptions, 
therefore,  are  not  clear  and  distinct,  because  we  are  not  com- 
pletely acquainted  with  their  causes.  In  the  merely  per- 
ceptual stage,  the  mind  gains  only  a  confused  and  muti- 
lated idea  of  external  objects,  of  the  body,  and  of  itself ; 
it  is  unable  to  separate  that  in  the  perception  (e.  g.f 
heat)  which  is  due  to  the  external  body  from  that  which  is 
due  to  its  own  body.  An  inadequate  idea,  however,  is  not 
in  itself  an  error;  it  becomes  such  only  when,  unconscious 
of  its  defectiveness,  we  take  it  for  complete  and  true. 
Prominent  examples  of  erroneous  ideas  are  furnished  by 
general  concepts,  by  the  idea  of  ends,  and  the  idea  of  the 
freedom  of  the  will.  The  more  general  and  abstract  an  idea, 
the  more  inadequate  and  indistinct  it  becomes ;  and  this 
shows  the  lack  of  value  in  generic  concepts,  which  are  formed 
by  the  omission  of  differences.  All  cognition  which  is  carried 
on  by  universals  and  their  symbols,  words,  yields  opinion 
and  imagination  merely  instead  of  truth.  Quite  as  value- 
less and  harmful  is  the  idea  of  ends,  with  its  accompani- 
ments. We  think  that  nature  has  typical  forms  hovering 
before  it,  which  it  is  seeking  to  actualize  in  things  ;  when 
this  intention  is  apparently  fulfilled  we  speak  of  things  as 
perfect  and  beautiful ;  when  it  fails,  of  imperfect  and  ugly 
things.     Such  concepts  of  value  belong  in  the  sphere  of  fie- 


SPINOZA  :   ANTHROPOLOGY.  133 

tions.  The  same  is  true  of  the  idea  of  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
which  depends  on  our  ignorance  of  that  which  constrains 
us.  Apart  from  the  consideration  that  "  the  will,"  the 
general  conception  of  which  comes  under  the  rubric  of  un- 
real abstractions,  is  in  fact  merely  the  sum  of  the  particular 
volitions,  the  illusion  of  freedom,  e.g.,  that  we  will  and  act 
without  a  cause,  arises  from  the  fact  that  we  are  conscious 
of  our  action  (and  also  of  its  proximate  motives),  but  not 
of  its  (remoter)  determining  causes.  Thus  the  thirsty  child 
believes  it  desires  its  milk  of  its  own  free  will,  and  the  timid 
one,  that  it  freely  chooses  to  run  away  {Ethica,  III.  prop.  2, 
schol.;  I.  app.).  If  the  falling  stone  were  conscious,  it 
would,  likewise,  consider  itself  free,  and  its  fall  the  result 
of  an  undetermined  decision. 

Two  degrees  are  to  be  distinguished  in  the  true  or 
adequate  knowledge  of  the  intellect :  rational  knowledge 
attained  through  inference,  and  intuitive,  self-evident  knowl- 
edge ;  the  latter  has  principles  for  its  object,  the  former 
that  which  follows  from  them.  Instead  of  operating  with 
abstract  concepts  the  reason  uses  common  notions,  notiones 
communes.  Genera  do  not  exist,  but,  no  doubt,  some- 
thing common  to  all  things.  All  bodies  agree  in  being 
extended  ;  all  minds  and  ideas  in  being  modes  of  thought ; 
all  beings  whatever  in  the  fact  that  they  are  modes  of  the 
divine  substance  and  its  attributes  ;  "  that  which  is  common 
to  all  things,  and  which  is  equally  in  the  part  and  in  the 
whole,  cannot  but  be  adequately  conceived."  The  ideas  of 
extension,  of  thought,  and  of  the  eternal  and  infinite  essence 
of  God  are  adequate  ideas.  The  adequate  idea  of  each 
individual  actual  object  involves  the  idea  of  God,  since  it 
can  neither  exist  nor  be  conceived  apart  from  God,  and  "all 
ideas,  in  so  far  as  they  are  referred  to  God,  are  true."  The 
ideas  of  substance  and  of  the  attributes  are  conceived 
through  themselves,  or  immediately  (intuitively)  cognized  ; 
they  are  underivative,  original,  self-evident  ideas. 

There  are  thus  three  kinds,  degrees,  or  faculties  of  cogni- 
tion— sensuous  or  imaginative  representation,  reason,  and 
immediate  intuition.  Knowledge  of  the  second  and  third 
degrees  is  necessarily  true,  and  our  only  means  of  distin- 
guishing the  true  from  the  false.     As    light    reveals   itself 


< 


134  DEVELOPMENT  OP  CARTESIANJSM. 

and  darkness,  so  the  truth  is  the  criterion  of  itself  and  of 
error.  Every  truth  is  accompanied  by  certainty,  and  is  its 
own  witness  (II.  prop.  43,  schoL). — Adequate  knowledge 
does  not  consider  things  as  individuals,  but  in  their  neces- 
sary connection  and  as  eternal  sequences  from  the  world- 
ground.  The  reason  perceives  things  under  the  form  of 
eternity:  sub  specie  cstemitatis  (II.  prop.  44,  cor.  2). 

In  his  theory  of  the  emotions,  Spinoza  is  more  dependent 
on  Descartes  than  anywhere  else;  but  even  here  he  is  guided 
by  a  successful  endeavor  after  greater  rigor  and  simplicity. 
He  holds  his  'predecessor's  false  concept  of  freedom  respon- 
sible for  the  failure  of  his  very  acute  inquiry.  All  previous 
writers  on  the  passions  have  either  derided,  or  bewailed,  or 
condemned  them,  instead  of  investigating  their  nature. 
Spinoza  will  neither  denounce  nor  ridicule  human  actions 
and  appetites,  but  endeavor  to  comprehend  them  on  the 
basis  of  natural  laws,  and  to  consider  them  as  though  the 
question  concerned  lines,  surfaces,  and  bodies.  He  aims 
not  to  look  on  hate,  anger,  and  the  rest  as  flaws,  but  as 
necessary,  though  troublesome,  properties  of  human  nature, 
for  which,  as  really  as  for  heat  and  cold,  thunder  and  light- 
ning, a  causal  explanation  is  requisite. — As  a  determinate, 
finite  being  the  mind  is  dependent  in  its  existence  and  its 
activity  on  other  finite  things,  and  is  incomprehensible 
without  them  ;  from  its  involution  in  the  general  course  of 
nature  the  inadequate  ideas  inevitably  follow,  and  from  these 
the  passive  states  or  emotions  ;  the  passions  thus  belong 
to  human  nature,  as  one  subject  to  limitation  and  nega- 
tion.— The  destruction  of  contingent  and  perishable  things 
is  effected  by  external  causes;  no  one  is  destroyed  by 
itself;  so  far  as  in  it  lies  everything  strives  to  persist  in  its 
being  (III.  prop.  4  and  6).  The  fundamental  endeavor  after 
self-preservation  constitutes  the  essence  of  each  thing  (III. 
prop.  7).  This  endeavor  (co?iatus)  is  termed  will  {voluntas)  or 
desire  (cupiditas)  when  it  is  referred  to  the  mind  alone,  and 
appetite  (appetitus)  when  referred  to  the  mind  and  body 
together;  desire  or  volition  is  conscious  appetite (II I. prop.q, 
schol.).  We  call  a  thing  good  because  we  desire  it,  not 
desire  a  thing  because  we  hold  it  good  (cf.  Hobbes,  p.  75). 
To  desire  two  further  fundamental  forms  of  the  emotions 


SPINOZA  :   ANTHROPOLOGY.  135 

are  added,  pleasure  and  pain.  If  a  thing  increases  the 
power  of  our  body  to  act,  the  idea  of  it  increases  the  power 
of  our  soul  to  think,  and  is  gladly  imagined  by  it.  Pleasure 
(Icetitia)  is  the  transition  of  a  man  to  a  greater,  and  pain 
{tristitid)  his  transition  to  a  lesser  perfection. 

All  other  emotions  are  modifications  or  combinations  of 
the  three  original  ones,  to  which  Spinoza  reduces  the  six  of 
Descartes  (cf.  p.  105).  In  the  deduction  and  description  of 
them  his  procedure  is  sometimes  aridly  systematic,  some- 
times even  forced  and  artificial,  but  for  the  most  part 
ingenious,  appropriate,  and  psychologically,  acute.  What- 
ever gives  us  pleasure  augments  our  being,  and  whatever 
pains  us  diminishes  it ;  hence  we  seek  to  preserve  the  causes 
of  pleasurable  emotions,  and  love  them,  to  do  away  with 
the  causes  of  painful  ones,  and  hate  them.  "  Love  is 
pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an  external  cause; 
hate  is  pain  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an  external 
cause."  Since  all  that  furthers  or  diminishes  the  being 
of  (the  cause  of  our  pleasure)  the  object  of  our  love, 
exercises  at  the  same  time  a  like  influence  on  us,  we  love 
that  which  rejoices  the  object  of  our  love  and  hate  that 
which  disturbs  it ;  its  happiness  and  suffering  become  ours 
also.  The  converse  is  true  of  the  object  of  our  hate  :  its 
good  fortune  provokes  us  and  its  ill  fortune  pleases  us.  If 
we  are  filled  with  no  emotion  toward  things  like  ourselves, 
we  sympathize  in  their  sad  or  joyous  feelings  by  involuntary 
imitation.  Pity,  from  which  we  strive  to  free  ourselves  as 
from  every  painful  affection,  inclines  us  to  benevolence  or 
to  assistance  in  the  removal  of  the  cause  of  the  misery 
of  others.  Envy  of  those  who  are  fortunate,  and  com- 
miseration of  those  who  are  in  trouble,  are  alike  rooted 
in  emulation.  Man  is  by  nature  inclined  to  envy  and 
malevolence.  Hate  easily  leads  to  underestimation,  love  to 
overestimation,  of  the  object,  and  self-love  to  pride  or  self- 
satisfaction,  which  are  much  more  frequently  met  with  than 
unfeigned  humility.  Immoderate  desire  for  honor  is  termed 
ambition  ;  if  the  desire  to  please  others  is  kept  within  due 
bounds  it  is  praised  as  unprctentiousness,  courtesy,  mod- 
esty {modest id).  Ambition,  luxury,  drunkenness,  avarice, 
and  lust  have   no  contraries,  for  temperance,  sobriety,  and 


136  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

chastity  are  not  emotions  (passive  states),  but  denote  the 
power  of  the  soul  by  which  the  former  are  moderated,  and 
which  is  discussed  later  under  the  name  fortitudo.  Self- 
abasement  or  humility  is  a  feeling  of  pain  arising  from 
the  consideration  of  our  weakness  and  impotency ;  its 
opposite  is  self-complacency.  Either  of  these  may  be 
accompanied  by  the  (erroneous)  belief  that  we  have  done  the 
saddening  or  gladdening  act  of  our  own  free  will  ;  in  this 
case  the  former  affection  is  termed  repentance.  Hope  and 
fear  are  inconstant  pleasure  and  pain,  arising  from  the  idea 
of  something  past  or  to  come,  concerning  whose  coming 
and  whose  issue  we  are  still  in  doubt.  There  is  no  hope 
unmingled  with  fear,  and  no  fear  without  hope;  for  he  who 
still  doubts  imagines  something  which  excludes  the  exist- 
ence of  that  which  is  expected.  If  the  cause  of  doubt  is 
removed,  hope  is  transformed  into  a  feeling  of  confidence 
and  fear  into  despair.  There  are  as  many  kinds  of  emotions 
as  there  are  classes  among  their  objects  or  causes. 

Besides  the  emotions  to  be  termed  "  passions  "  in  the 
strict  sense,  states  of  passivity,  Spinoza  recognizes  others 
which  relate  to  us  as  active.  Only  those  which  are  of  the 
nature  of  pleasure  or  desire  belong  to  this  class  of  active 
emotions  ;  the  painful  affections  are  entirely  excluded,  since 
without  exception  they  diminish  or  arrest  the  mind's  power 
to  think.  The  totality  of  these  nobler  impulses  is  called 
fortitudo  (fortitude),  and  a  distinction  is  made  among  them 
between  animositas  (vigor  of  soul)  and  gencrositas  (mag- 
nanimity, noble-mindedness),  according  as  rational  desire  is 
directed  to  the  preservation  of  our  own  being  or  to  aiding 
our  fellow-men.  Presence  of  mind  and  temperance  are 
examples  of  the  former,  modesty  and  clemency  of  the 
latter.  By  this  bridge,  the  idea  of  the  active  emotions,  we 
may  follow  Spinoza  into  the  field  of  ethics. 

(c)  Practical  Philosophy. — Spinoza's  theory  of  ethics  is 
based  on  the  equation  of  the  three  concepts,  perfection, 
reality,  activity  (V.  prop.  40,  don.).  The  more  active  a 
thing  is,  the  more  perfect  it  is  and  the  more  reality  it 
possesses.  It  is  active,  however,  when  it  is  the  complete 
or  adequate  cause  of  that  which  takes  place  within  it  or 
without  it  ;  passive  when  it  is  not  at  all  the  cause  of  this,  or 


SPINOZA  :   PRA  C  PICA  L   PHIL  O  SOPH  Y.  137 

the  cause  only  in  part.  A  cause  is  termed  adequate,  when 
its  effect  can  be  clearly  and  distinctly  perceived  from 
it  alone.  The  human  mind,  as  a  modus  of  thought,  is 
active  when  it  has  adequate  ideas  ;  all  its  passion  consists 
in  confused  ideas,  among  which  belong  the  affections  pro- 
duced by  external  objects.  The  essence  of  the  mind  is 
thought  ;  volition  is  not  only  dependent  on  cognition,  but 
at  bottom  identical  with  it. 

Descartes  had  already  made  the  will  the  power  of 
affirmation  and  negation.  Spinoza  advances  a  step  further: 
the  affirmation  cannot  be  separated  from  the  idea  affirmed, 
it  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  truth  without  in  the  same  act 
affirming  it,  the  idea  involves  its  own  affirmation.  "  Will 
and  understanding  are  one  and  the  same  (II.  prop.  49,  cor.). 
For  Spinoza  moral  activity  is  entirely  resolved  into  cogni- 
tive activity.  To  the  two  stages  of  knowing,  imaginatio  and 
intellectus,  correspond  two  stages  of  willing — desire,  which 
is  ruled  by  imagination,  and  volition,  which  is  guided 
by  reason.  The  passive  emotions  of  sensuous  desire  are 
directed  to  perishable  objects,  the  active,  which  spring 
from  reason,  have  an  eternal  object — the  knowledge  of  the 
truth,  the  intuition  of  God.  For  reason  there  are  no 
distinctions  of  persons, — she  brings  men  into  concord  and 
gives  them  a  common  end  (IV.  prop.  35-37,40), — and  no 
distinctions  of  time  (IV.  prop.  62,  66),  and  in  the  active 
emotions,  which  are  always  good,  no  excess  (IV.  prop.  61). 
The  passive  emotions  arise  from  confused  ideas.  They 
cease  to  be  passions,  when  the  confused  ideas  of  the  modi- 
fications of  the  body  are  transformed  into  clear  ones  ;  as 
soon  as  we  have  clear  ideas,  we  become  active  and  cease  to 
be  slaves  of  desire.  We  master  the  emotions  by  gaining  a 
clear  knowledge  of  them.  Now,  an  idea  is  clear  when  we 
cognize  its  object  not  as  an  individual  thing,  but  in  its 
connection,  as  a  link  in  the  causal  chain,  as  necessary,  and 
as  a  mode  of  God.  The  more  the  mind  conceives  things  in 
their  necessity,  and  the  emotions  in  their  reference  to  God, 
the  less  it  is  passively  subject  to  the  emotions,  the  more 
power  it  attains  over  them  :  "  Virtue  is  power  "  (IV.  def.  8  ; 
prop.  20,  dem.).  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  one  emotion  can  be 
conquered  only  by  another  stronger  one,  a  passive  emotion 


138  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIAN] SM . 

only  by  an  active  one.  The  active  emotion  by  which 
knowledge  gains  this  victory  over  the  passions  is  the  joyous 
consciousness  of  our  power  (III.  prop.  58,  59).  Adequate 
ideas  conceive  their  objects  in  union  with  God  ;  thus  the 
pleasure  which  proceeds  from  knowledge  of,  and  victory 
over,  the  passions  is  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  God,  and, 
consequently  (according  to  the  definition  of  love),  by  love 
toward  God (V.  prop.  15,  32).  The  knowledge  and  love  of 
God,  together,  "  intellectual  love  toward  God,"  *  is  the 
highest  good  and  the  highest  virtue  (IV .prop.  28).  Blessed- 
ness is  not  the  reward  of  virtue,  but  virtue  itself.  The 
intellectual  love  of  man  toward  God,  in  which  the  high- 
est peace  of  the  soul,  blessedness,  and  freedom  consist,  and 
in  virtue  of  which  (since  it,  like  its  object  and  cause,  true 
knowledge,  is  eternal),  the  soul  is  not  included  in  the  de- 
struction of  the  body  (V ' .prop.  23,  33),  is  a  part  of  the  infinite 
love  with  which  God  loves  himself,  and  is  one  and  the  same 
with  the  love  of  God  to  man.  The  eternal  part  of  the  soul 
is  reason,  through  which  it  is  active  ;  the  perishable  part 
is  imagination  or  sensuous  representation,  through  which  it 
is  passively  affected.  We  are  immortal  only  in  adequate 
cognition  and  in  love  to  God  ;  more  of  the  wise  man's  soul 
is  immortal  than  of  the  fool's. 

Spinoza's  ethics  is  intellectualistic — virtue  is  based  on 
knowledge. f  It  is,  moreover,  naturalistic — morality  is  a 
necessary  sequence  from  human  nature ;  it  is  a  physical 
product,  not  a  product  of  freedom  ;  for  the  acts  of  the  will 
are  determined  by  ideas,  which  in  their  turn  are  the  effects 
of  earlier  causes.  The  foundation  of  virtue  is  the  effort 
after  self-preservation :  How  can  a  man  desire  to  act 
rightly  unless  he   desires  to  be  (IV.  prop.  21,  22)?     Since 

*  The  conception  amor  Dei  intellectualis  in  Spinoza  is  discussed  in  a  disser- 
tation by  C.  Lülmann,  Jena,  1884. 

f  That  virtue  which  springs  from  knowledge  is  alone  genuine.  The  pain- 
ful, hence  unactive,  emotions  of  pity  and  repentance  may  impel  to  actions  whose 
accomplishment  is  better  than  their  omission.  Emotion  caused  by  sym- 
pathy for  others  and  contrition  for  one's  own  guilt,  both  of  which  increase 
present  evil  by  new  ones,  have  only  the  value  of  evils  of  a  lesser  kind.  They  are 
salutary  for  the  irrational  man,  in  so  far  as  the  one  spurs  him  on  to  acts  of  as- 
sistance and  the  other  diminishes  his  pride.  They  are  harmful  to  the  wise  man, 
or,  at  least,  useless;  he  is  in  no  need  of  irrational  motives  to  rational  action. 
Action  from  insight  is  alone  true  morality. 


SPINOZA  :   PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY.  139 

reason  never  enjoins  that  which  is  contrary  to  nature,  it  of 
necessity  requires  every  man  to  love  himself,  to  seek  that 
which  is  truly  useful  to  him,  and  to  desire  all  that  makes 
him  more  perfect.  According  to  the  law  of  nature  all  that 
is  useful  is  allowable.  The  useful  is  that  which  increases 
our  power,  activity,  or  perfection,  or  that  which  furthers 
knowledge,  for  the  life  of  the  soul  consists  in  thought  (IV. 
prop. 26;  app.  cap.  5).  That  alone  is  an  evil  which  restrains 
man  from  perfecting  the  reason  and  leading  a  rational  life. 
Virtuous  action  is  equivalent  to  following  the  guidance  of 
the  reason  in  self-preservation  (IV.  prop.  24). — Nowhere 
in  Spinoza  are  fallacies  more  frequent  than  in  his  moral 
philosophy  ;  nowhere  is  there  a  clearer  revelation  of  the 
insufficiency  of  his  artificially  constructed  concepts,  which, 
in  their  undeviating  abstractness,  are  at  no  point  congruent 
with  reality.  He  is  as  little  true  to  his  purpose  to  exclude 
the  imperative  element,  and  to  confine  himself  entirely  to 
the  explanation  of  human  actions  considered  as  facts,  as 
any  philosopher  who  has  adopted  a  similar  aim.  He 
relieves  the  inconsistency  by  clothing  his  injunctions  under 
the  ancient  ideal  of  the  free  wise  man.  This,  in  fact,  is 
not  the  only  thing  in  Spinoza  which  reminds  one  of  the 
customs  of  the  Greek  moralists.  He  renews  the  Platonic 
idea  of  a  philosophical  virtue,  and  the  opinion  of  Socrates, 
that  right  action  will  result  of  itself  from  true  insight. 
Arguing  from  himself,  from  his  own  pure  and  strong  desire 
for  knowledge,  to  mankind  in  general,  he  makes  reason  the 
essence  of  the  soul,  thought  the  essence  of  reason,  and 
holds  the  direction  of  the  impulse  of  self-preservation  to 
the  perfection  of  knowledge,  which  is  "  the  better  part  of 
us,"  to  be  the  natural  one. 

All  men  endeavor  after  continuance  of  existence  (III. 
prop.  6)  ;  why  not  all  after  virtue  ?  If  all  endeavor  after  it, 
why  do  so  few  reach  the  goal?  Whence  the  sadly  large  \ 
number  of  the  irrational,  the  selfish,  the  vicious?  Whence 
the  evil  in  the  world  ?  Vice  is  as  truly  an  outcome  of 
"nature  "as  virtue.  Virtue  is  power,  vice  is  weakness; 
the  former  is  knowledge,  the  latter  ignorance.  Whence 
the  powerless  natures?  Whence  defective  knowledge? 
Whence   imperfection   in   general  ? 


M°  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

The  concept  of  imperfection  expresses  nothing  positive, 
nothing  actual,  but  merely  a  defect,  an  absence  of  reality.  It 
is  nothing  but  an  idea  in  us,  a  fiction  which  arises  through 
the  comparison  of  one  thing  with  another  possessing 
greater  reality,  or  with  an  abstract  generic  concept,  a 
pattern,  which  it  seems  unable  to  attain.  That  concepts  of 
value  are  not  properties  of  things  themselves,  but  denote 
only  their  pleasurable  or  painful  effects  on  us,  is  evident  from 
the  fact  that  one  and  the  same  thing  may  be  at  the  same 
time  good,  bad,  and  indifferent  :  the  music  which  is  good  for 
the  melancholy  man  may  be  bad  for  the  mourner,  and  neither 
good  nor  bad  for  the  deaf.  Knowledge  of  the  bad  is  an 
abstract,  inadequate  idea  ;  in  God  there  is  no  idea  of  evil. 
If  imperfection  and  error  were  something  real,  it  would 
have  to  be  conceded  that  God  is  the  author  of  evil  and  sin. 
In  reality  everything  is  that  which  it  can  be,  hence  without 
defect  :  everything  actual  is,  in  itself  considered,  perfect. 
Even  the  fool  and  the  sinner  cannot  be  otherwise  than  he 
is  :  he  appears  imperfect  only  when  placed  beside  the  wise 
and  the  virtuous.  Sin  is  thus  only  a  lesser  reality  than 
virtue,  evil  a  lesser  good  ;  good  and  bad,  activity  and  pas- 
sivity, power  and  weakness  are  merely  distinctions  in  de- 
gree. But  why  is  not  everything  absolutely  perfect  ?  Why 
are  there  lesser  degrees  of  reality?  Two  answers  are  given. 
The  first  is  found  only  between  the  lines:  the  imperfections 
in  the  being  and  action  of  individual  things  are  grounded 
in  their  finitude,  particularly  in  their  involution  in  the  chain 
of  causality,  in  virtue  of  which  they  are  acted  on  from 
without,  and  are  determined  in  their  action  not  by  their 
own  nature  only,  but  also  by  external  causes.  Man  sins 
because  he  is  open  to  impressions  from  external  things, 
and  only  superior  natures  are  strong  enough  to  preserve 
their  rational  self-determination  in  spite  of  this.  The  other 
answer  is  expressly  given  at  the  end  of  the  first  part  (with 
an  appeal  to  the  sixteenth  proposition,  that  everything 
which  the  divine  understanding  conceives  as  creatable  has 
actually  come  into  existence).  "  To  those  who  ask  why 
God  did  not  so  create  all  men  that  they  should  be  governed 
only  by  reason,  I  reply  only:  because  matter  was  not  lack- 
ing to  him  for  the  creation  of  every  degree  of  perfection 


SPPYOZA  :   PR  A  C  TIC  A  L   PHILOSOPH  V.  1 4 1 

from  highest  to  lowest  ;  or,  more  strictly,  because  the  laws 
of  his  nature  were  so  ample  as  so  suffice  for  the  production 
of  everything  conceivable  by  an  infinite  intellect."  All 
possible  degrees  of  perfection  have  come  into  being,  includ- 
ing sin  and  error,  which  represent  the  lowest  grade.  The 
universe  forms  a  chain  of  degrees  of  perfection,  of  which 
none  must  be  wanting  :  particular  cases  of  defect  are  justi- 
fied by  the  perfection  of  the  whole,  which  would  be  incom- 
plete without  the  lowest  degree  of  perfection,  vice  and 
wickedness.  Here  we  see  Spinoza  following  a  path  which 
Leibnitz  was  to  broaden  out  into  a  highway  in  his  Theodicy. 
Both  favor  the  quantitative  view  of  the  world,  which 
softens  the  antitheses,  and  reduces  distinctions  of  kind  to 
distinctions  of  degree.  Not  till  Kant  was  the  qualitative 
view  of  the  world,  which  had  been  first  brought  into  ethics 
by  Christianity,  restored  to  its  rights.  An  ethics  which 
denies  freedom  and  evil  is  nothing  but  a  physics  of  morals. 
In  his  theory  of  the  state  Spinoza  follows  Hobbes  pretty 
closely,  but  rejects  absolutism,  and  declares  democracy,  in 
which  each  is  obedient  to  self-imposed  law,  to  be  the  form 
of  government  most  in  accordance  with  reason.  (So  in  the 
Tractatus  Theologico- Politicus,  while  in  the  later  Tractatus 
Politicus  he  gives  the  preference  to  aristocracy.)  In  accord- 
ance with  the  supreme  right  of  nature  each  man  deems 
good,  and  seeks  to  gain,  that  which  seems  to  him  useful ; 
all  things  belong  to  all,  each  may  destroy  the  objects  of  his 
hate.  Conflict  and  insecurity  prevail  in  the  state  of  nature 
as  a  result  of  the  sensuous  desires  and  emotions  {homines 
ex  natura  hostes) ;  and  they  can  be  done  away  with  only 
through  the  establishment  of  a  society,  which  by  punitive 
laws  compels  everyone  to  do,  and  leave  undone,  that  which 
the  general  welfare  demands.  Strife  and  breach  of  faith 
become  sin  only  in  the  state  ;  before  its  formation  that  alone 
was  wrong  which  no  one  had  the  desire  and  power  to  do. 
Besides  this  mission,  however,  of  protecting  selfish  interests 
by  the  prevention  of  aggression,  the  civil  community  has  a 
higher  one,  to  subserve  the  development  of  reason  ;  it  is 
only  in  the  state  that  true  morality  and  true  freedom  are 
possible,  and  the  wise  man  will  prefer  to  live  in  the  state, 
because  he  finds  more  freedom  there  than  in  isolation.    Thus 


M-  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANJSM. 

the  dislocation  of  concepts,  which  is  perceptible  in  Spinoza's 
ethics,  repeats  itself  in  his  politics.  First,  virtue  is  based 
on  the  impulse  of  self-preservation  and  the  good  is  equated 
with  that  which  is  useful  to  the  individual ;  then,  with  a 
transformation  of  mere  utility  into  "true"  utility,  the 
rational  moment  is  brought  in  (first  as  practical  pru- 
dence, next  as  the  impulse  after  knowledge,  and  then, 
with  a  gradual  change  of  meaning,  as  moral  wisdom),  until, 
finally,  in  strange  contrast  to  the  naturalistic  beginning, 
the  Christian  idea  of  virtue  as  purity,  self-denial,  love  to 
our  neighbors  and  love  to  God,  is  reached.  In  a  similar 
way  "Spinoza  conceives  the  starting  point  of  the  state 
naturalistically,  its  culmination   idealistically."  * 

The  fundamental  ideas  of  the  Spinozistic  system,  and 
those  which  render  it  important,  are  rationalism,  pantheism, 
the  essential  identity  of  the  material  and  spiritual  worlds,  and 
the  uninterrupted  mechanism  of  becoming.  Besides  the 
twisting  of  ethical  concepts  just  mentioned,  we  may  briefly 
note  the  most  striking  of  the  other  difficulties  and  contra- 
dictions which  Spinoza  left  unexplained.  There  is  a  break 
between  his  endeavor  to  exalt  the  absolute  high  above  the 
phenomenal  world  of  individual  existence,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  bring  the  former  into  the  closest  possible  conjunc- 
tion with  the  latter,  to  make  it  dwell  therein — a  break 
between  the  transcendent  and  immanent  conceptions  of 
the  idea  of  God.  No  light  is  vouchsafed  on  the  relation 
between  primary  and  secondary  causes,  between  the  imme- 
diate divine  causality  and  the  divine  causality  mediated 
through  finite  causes.  The  infinity  of  God  is  in  conflict 
with  his  complete  cognizability  on  the  part  of  man  ;  for 
how  is  a  finite,  transitory  spirit  able  to  conceive  the  Infinite 
and  Eternal  ?  How  does  the  human  intellect  rise  above 
modal  limitations  to  become  capable  and  worthy  of  the 
mystical  union  with  God?  Reference  has  been  already 
made  to  the  twofold  nature  of  the  attributes  (as  forms  of 
intellectual  apprehension  and  as  real  properties  of  sub- 
stance) which  invites  contradictory  interpretations. 

*  C.  Schindler  in  his  dissertation  Ueber  den  Begriff  des  Guten  und  Nützlichen 
bei  Spinoza,  Jena,  1885,  p.  42,  a  work,  however,  which  does  not  penetrate  to 
the  full  depth  of  the  matter.      Cf.  Eucken,  Lebensanschauungen,  p.  406. 


PASCAL.  »43 

3.  Pascal,  Malebranche,  Bayle. 

Returning  from  Holland  to  France,  we  find  a  combina- 
tion of  Cartesianism  and  mysticism  similar  to  that  which 
we  have  noticed  in  the  former  country.  Under  Geulincx 
these  two  forces  had  lived  peacefully  together;  in  Spinoza 
they  had  entered  into  the  closest  alliance;  with  Blaise 
Pascal  (1623-62),  the  first  to  adopt  a  religious  tendency, 
they  came  into  a  certain  antithesis.  Spinoza  had  taught : 
through  the  knowledge  of  God  to  the  love  of  God;  in 
Pascal  the  watchword  becomes,  God  is  not  conceived 
through  the  reason,  but  felt  with  the  heart.  After  attack- 
ing the  Jesuits  in  his  Provincial  Letters,  and  unveiling  the 
worthlessness  of  their  casuistical  morality,  Pascal,  con- 
strained by  a  genuine  piety,  undertook  to  construct  a 
philosophy  of  Christianity;  but  the  attempt  was  ended 
by  the  early  death  of  the  author,  who  had  always  suf- 
fered under  a  weak  constitution.  Fragments  of  this  work 
were  published  by  his  friends,  the  Jansenists,  under 
the  title,  Thoughts  on  Religion,  1669,  though  not  without 
mediating  alterations.  The  Port-Royal  Logic  (The  Art  of 
Thinking,  1662),  edited  by  Arnauld  and  Nicole,  was  based 
on  a  treatise  of  Pascal.  His  thought,  which  was  not  dis- 
tinguished by  clearness,  but  by  depth  and  movement, 
and  which,  after  the  French  fashion,  delighted  in  antitheses, 
was  influenced  by  Descartes,  Montaigne,  and  Epictetus. 
He,  too,  finds  in  mathematics  the  example  for  all  science, 
and  holds  that  whatever  transcends  mathematics  transcends 
the  reason.  By  the  application  of  mathematics  to  the 
study  of  nature  we  attain  a  mundane  science,  which  is  cer- 
tain, no  doubt,  and  which  makes  constant  progress,*  but 
which  does  not  satisfy,  since  it  reveals  nothing  of  the 
infinite,  of  the  whole,  without  which  the  parts  remain  unin- 
telligible. Hence  all  natural  philosophy  together  is  not 
worth  an  hour's  toil.  Pascal  consoles  himself  for  our  igno- 
rance concerning  external  things  by  the  stability  of  ethics. 

The  leading  principles  of  his  ethics  are  as  follows:   In  sin 

*  It  is  this  uninterrupted  progress  which  raises  the  reason  above  the  opera- 
tions of  nature  and  the  instincts  of  animals.  While  the  bees  build  their  cells 
to-day  just  as  they  did  a  thousand  years  ago,  science  is  continually  developing. 
This  guarantees  to  us  our  immortal  destiny. 


144  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

the  love  to  God  created  in  us  has  left  us  and  self-love  has 
transgressed  its  limits  ;  pride  has  delivered  us  over  to  selfish- 
ness and  misery.  Our  nature  is  corrupted,  but  not  beyond 
redemption.  In  his  actions  worthless  and  depraved,  man  is 
seen  to  be  exalted  and  incomprehensible  in  his  ends  ;  in 
reality  he  is  worthy  of  abhorrence,  but  great  in  his  desti- 
nation. No  philosophy  or  religion  has  so  taught  us  at  once 
to  know  the  greatness  and  the  misery  of  man  as  Christianity : 
this  bids  him  recognize  his  low  condition,  but  at  the  same 
time  to  endeavor  to  become  like  God.  We  must  humbly 
despise  the  world  and  renounce  ourselves  ;  in  order  to  love 
God,  we  must  hate  ourselves.  Moral  reformation  is  an  act 
of  divine  grace,  and  the  merit  of  human  volition  con- 
sists only  in  not  resisting  this.  God  transforms  the  heart 
by  a  heavenly  sweetness,  grants  it  to  know  that  spiritual 
pleasure  is  greater  than  bodily  pleasure,  and  infuses  into 
it  a  disgust  at  the  allurements  of  sin.  Virtue  is  find- 
ing one's  greatest  happiness  in  God  or  in  the  eternal 
good.  As  morality  is  a  matter  of  feeling,  not  of 
thought,  so  God,  so  even  the  first  principles  on  which 
the  certitude  of  demonstration  depends,  are  the  object, 
not  of  reason,  but  of  the  heart.  That  which  certifies 
to  the  highest  indemonstrable  principles  is  a  feeling,  a 
belief,  an  instinct  of  nature:  les  principes  se  sentcnt.  Asa 
defender  of  the  needs  and  rights  of  the  heart,  Pascal  is  a 
forerunner  of  the  great  Rousseau.  His  depreciation  of  the 
reason  to  exalt  faith  establishes  a  certain  relationship  with 
the  skeptics  of  his  native  land,  among  whom  Cousin  has 
unjustly  classed  him  {Etudes  sur  Pascal,  5th  ed.,  1857).* 

Nicolas  Malebranche  (1638-1715),  a  member  of  the  Ora- 
tory of  Jesus,  in  Paris,  which  was  opposed  by  the  Jesuits, 
completed  the  development  of  Cartesianism  in  the  religious 
direction  adopted  by  Pascal.  His  thought  is  controlled  by 
the  endeavor  to  combine  Cartesian  metaphysics  and  Au- 
gustinian  Christianity,  those  two  great  forces  which  consti- 
tuted the  double  citadel  of  his  order.  His  collected  works 
appeared  three  years  before   his  death  ;   and    a  new    edi- 

*  Of  the  works  on  Pascal  we  may  mention  that  of  H.  Reuchlin,  1840; 
Havet's  edition  of  the  Pens/es,  with  notes,  Paris,  1866  ;  and  the  Etude  by 
Ed.   Droz,   Paris,   1886. 


MALE  BRA  NCHE.  1 4  5 

tion  in  four  volumes,  prepared  by  J.  Simon,  in  1871.  His 
chief  work,  On  the  Search  for  Truth  (new  edition  by  F. 
BouiHier,  1880),  appeared  in  1675,  and  was  followed  by  the 
Treatise  on  Ethics  (new  edition  by  H.  Joly,  1882)  and  the 
Christian  and  Metaphysical  Meditations  in  1684,  the  Dis- 
cussions on  Metaphysics  and  on  Religion  in  1688,  and  various 
polemic  treatises.  The  best  known  among  the  doctrines  of 
Malebranche  is  the  principle  that  zve  see  all  things  in  God 
{que  nous  voyons  toutes  choses  en  Dieu. — Recherche,  iii.  2,  6). 
What  does  this  mean,  and  how  is  it  established  ?  It  is  in- 
tended as  an  answer  to  the  question,  How  is  it  possible  for 
the  mind  to  cognize  the  body  if,  as  Descartes  has  shown, 
mind  and  body  are  two  fundamentally  distinct  and  recipro- 
cally independent  substances  ? 

The  seeker  after  truth  must  first  understand  the  sources 
of  error.  Of  these  there  are  two,  or,  more  exactly,  five — as 
many  as  there  are  faculties  of  the  soul.  Error  may  spring 
from  either  the  cognitive  or  the  appetitive  faculty  ;  in  the 
first  case,  either  from  sense-perception,  the  imagination,  or 
the  pure  understanding,  and,  in  the  latter,  from  the  in- 
clinations or  the  passions.  The  inclinations  and  the  pas- 
sions do  not  reveal  the  nature  of  things,  but  only  express 
how  they  affect  us,  of  what  value  they  are  to  us.  Further 
still,  the  senses  and  the  imagination  only  reproduce  the 
impressions  which  things  make  on  us  as  feeling  subjects, 
express  only  what  they  are  for  us,  not  what  they  are  in 
themselves.  The  senses  have  been  given  us  simply  for  the 
preservation  of  our  body,  and  so  long  as  we  expect  nothing 
further  from  them  than  practical  information  concerning 
the  (useful  or  hurtful)  relation  of  things  to  our  body,  there 
is  no  reason  for  mistrusting  them, — here  we  are  not  deceived 
by  sensation,  but  at  most  by  the  overhasty  judgment 
of  the  will.  "  Consider  the  senses  as  false  witnesses  in 
regard  to  the  truth,  but  as  trustworthy  counselors  in  relation 
to  the  interests  of  life  !  " — Sensation  and  imagination  belong 
to  the  soul  in  virtue  of  its  union  with  the  body  ;  apart  from 
this  it  is  pure  spirit.  The  essence  of  the  soul  is  thought, 
for  this  function  is  the  only  one  which  cannot  be  ab- 
stracted from  it  without  destroying  it.  Hence  there  can 
be  no  moment  in   the  life   of  the  soul  when    it   ceases   to 


146  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

think;  it  thinks  always  \l\itnc pense  toujour  s),  only  it  does 
not  always  remember  the  fact. 

The  kinds  of  knowledge  differ  with  the  classes  of  things 
cognized.  God  is  known  immediately  and  intuitively. 
He  is  necessary  and  unlimited  being,  the  universal,  infinite 
being,  being  absolutely;  he  only  is  known  through  himself. 
The  concept  of  the  infinite  is  the  presupposition  of  the  con- 
cept of  the  finite,  and  the  former  is  earlier  in  us;  we  gain  the 
conception  of  a  particular  thing  only  when  we  omit  some- 
thing from  the  idea  of  "  being  in  general,"  or  limit  it.  God 
is  cogitative,  like  spirits,  and  extended,  like  bodies,  but  in 
an  entirely  different  manner  from  created  things.  We 
know  our  own  soul  through  consciousness  or  inner  per- 
ception. We  know  its  existence  more  certainly  than  that 
of  bodies,  but  understand  its  nature  less  perfectly  than 
theirs.  To  know  that  it  is  capable  of  sensations  of  pain, 
of  heat,  of  light,  we  must  have  experienced  them.  For 
knowledge  of  the  minds  of  others  we  are  dependent  upon 
conjecture,  on  analogical  inferences  from  ourselves. 

But  how  is  the  unextended  soul  capable  of  cognizing 
extended  body?  Only  through  the  medium  of  ideas. 
The  ideas  occupy  an  intermediate  position  between  objects, 
whose  archetypes  they  are,  and  representations  in  the 
soul,  whose  causes  they  are.  The  ideas,  after  the  pattern 
of  which  God  has  created  things,  and  the  relations  among 
them  (necessary  truths),  are  eternal,  hence  uncaused  ;  they 
constitute  the  wisdom  of  God  and  are  not  dependent  on 
his  will.  Things  are  in  God  in  archetypal  form,  and  are 
cognized  through  these  their  archetypes  in  God.  Ideas 
are  not  produced  by  bodies,  by  the  emission  of  sensuous 
images,*  nor  are  they  originated  by  the  soul,  or  possessed 
by  it  as   an   innate   possession.     But  God  is  the  cause  of 

*  Malebranche's  refutation  of  the  emanation  hypothesis  of  the  Peripatetics 
is  acute  and  still  worthy  of  attention.  If  bodies  transmitted  to  the  sense-organs 
forms  like  themselves,  these  copies,  which  would  evidently  be  corporeal,  must, 
by  their  departure,  diminish  the  mass  of  the  body  from  which  they  came  away, 
and  also,  because  of  their  impenetrability,  obstruct  and  interfere  with  one 
another,  thus  destroying  the  possibility  of  clear  impressions.  A  further  point 
against  the  image  theory  is  furnished  by  the  increase  in  the  size  of  an  object, 
when  approached.  And,  above  all,  it  can  never  be  made  conceivable  how 
motion  can  be  transformed  into  sensations  or  ideas. 


MA  LEB  RA  NC  HE.  1 4  7 

knowledge,  although  he  neither  imparts  ideas  to  the  soul 
in  creation  nor  produces  them  in  it  on  every  separate 
occasion.  The  ideas  or  perfections  of  things  are  in  God 
and  are  beheld  by  spirits,  who  likewise  dwell  in  God 
as  the  universal  reason.  As  space  is  the  place  of  bodies, 
so  God  is  the  place  of  spirits.  As  bodies  are  modes  of 
extension,  so  their  ideas  are  modifications  of  the  idea  of 
extension  or  of  "  intelligible  extension."  The  principle 
stated  at  the  beginning,  that  things  are  perceived  in  God, 
is,  therefore,  supported  in  the  following  way :  we  perceive 
bodies  (through  ideas,  which  ideas,  and  we  ourselves,  are) 
in  God. 

As  the  knowledge  of  truth  has  been  found  to  consist  in 
seeing  things  as  God  sees  them,  so  morality  consists  in 
man's  loving  things  as  God  loves  them,  or,  what  amounts 
to  the  same  thing,  in  loving  them  to  that  degree  which  is 
their  due  in  view  of  their  greater  or  less  perfection.  If,  in 
the  last  analysis,  all  cognition  is  knowledge  of  God,  so 
all  volition  is  loving  God  ;  there  is  implanted  in  every 
creature  a  direction  toward  the  Creator.  God  is  not  only  the 
primordial,  unlimited  being,  he  is  also  the  highest  good,  the 
final  end  of  all  striving.  As  the  ideas  of  things  are  imperfect 
participations  in,  or  determinations  of  universal  being, 
the  absolute  perfection  of  God,  so  the  particular  desires, 
directed  toward  individual  objects,  are  limitations  of  the 
universal  will  toward  the  good.  How  does  it  happen  that 
the  human  will,  so  variously  mistaking  its  fundamental 
direction  toward  God,  attaches  itself  to  perishable  goods, 
and  prefers  worthless  objects  to  those  which  have  value, 
and  earthly  to  heavenly  pleasure?  The  soul  is,  on  the  one 
hand,  united  to  God,  on  the  other,  united  to  the  body. 
The  possibility  of  error  and  sin  rests  on  its  union  with  the 
body,  since  with  the  ideas  (as  representations  of  the  pure 
understanding)  are  associated  sensuous  images,  which 
mingle  with  and  becloud  them,  and  passions  with  the  incli- 
nations (or  the  will  of  the  soul,  in  so  far  as  it  is  pure  spirit). 
This  gives,  however,  merely  the  possibility  of  the  immoral, 
sensuous,  G  >d-estranged  disposition,  which  becomes 
actual  only  through  man's  free  act,  when  he  fails  to 
stand  the  test.     For  sin  does  not  consist  in  having  passions, 


148  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

but  in  consenting  to  them.  The  passion  is  not  caused 
by  the  corporeal  movement  of  which  it  is  the  sequel, 
but  only  occasioned  by  it  ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the 
movement  of  the  limbs  and  the  decision  of  the  will.  The 
one  true  cause  of  all  that  happens  is  God.  It  is  he  who 
produces  affections  in  the  soul,  and  motion  in  the  material 
world.  For  the  body  possesses  only  the  capacity  of  being 
moved  ;  and  the  soul  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  movement, 
since  it  would  then  have  to  know  how  it  produces  the  latter. 
In  fact  those  who  lack  a  medical  training  have  no  idea  of 
the  muscular  and  nervous  processes  involved.  Without 
God  we  cannot  even  move  the  tongue.  It  is  he  who  raises 
our  arm,  even  when  we  use  it  contrary  to  his  law. 

Anxious  to  guard  his  pantheism  from  being  identified 
with  that  of  Spinoza,  Malebranche  points  out  that,  ac- 
cording to  his  views,  the  universe  is  in  God,  not,  as  with 
Spinoza,  that  God  is  in  the  universe;  that  he  teaches  crea- 
tion, which  Spinoza  denies;  that  he  distinguishes,  which 
Spinoza  had  not  done,  between  the  world  in  God  (the  ideas 
of  things)  and  the  world  of  created  things,  and  between 
intelligible  and  corporeal  extension.  It  may  be  added  that 
he  maintains  the  freedom  of  God  and  of  man,  which  Spinoza 
rejects,  and  that  he  conceives  God,  who  brings  everything 
to  pass,  not  as  nature,  but  as  omnipotent  will.  Nevertheless, 
as  Kuno  Fischer  has  shown,  he  approaches  the  naturalism 
of  Spinoza  more  nearly  than  he  is  himself  conscious, 
when  he  explains  finite  things  as  limitations  (hence  as 
modes)  of  the  divine  existence,  posits  the  will  of  God  in 
dependence  on  his  wisdom  (the  uncreated  world  of  ideas), 
thus  limiting  it  in  its  omnipotence,  and,  which  is  deci- 
sive, makes  God  the  sole  author  of  motion,  i,  e.,  a  natural 
cause.  His  attempt  at  a  Christian  pantheism  was  conse- 
quently unsuccessful.  But  its  failure  has  not  shattered  the 
well-grounded  fame  of  its  thoughtful  author  as  the  second 
greatest  metaphysician  of  France. 

Pierre  Poiret  *  (1646-1719;  for  some  years  a  preacher  in 

*  Poiret  :  Cogitationes  Rationales  de  Deo,  Anima,  et  Malo,  1677,  the  later 
editions  including  a  vehement  attack  on  the  atheism  of  Spinoza  ;  L ' CEconomie 
Divine,  1682  ;  De  Eruditione  Solida,  Superficiaria,  et  Falsa,  1692  ;  Fides  et 
Ratio  Collate?,  against  Locke,  1707. 


POIRE T,   BAYLE.  M9 

Hamburg;  lived  later  in  Rhynsburg  near  Leyden)  was 
rendered  hostile  to  Cartesianism  through  the  influence  of 
mystical  writings  (among  others  those  of  Antoinette  Bour- 
ignon,  which  he  published),  and  through  the  perception  of 
the  results  to  which  it  had  led  in  Spinoza.  All  cognition 
is  taking  up  the  form  of  the  object.  The  perfection  of 
man  is  based  more  on  his  passive  capacities  than  on  his  ac- 
tive reason,  which  is  concerned  with  mere  ideas,  unreal 
shadows  ;  the  mathematical  spirit  leads  to  fatalism,  to  the 
denial  of  freedom.  The  passive  faculties,  on  the  contrary, 
are  in  direct  intercourse  with  reality,  the  senses  with 
external  material  objects,  and  the  arcanum  of  the  mind,  the 
basis  of  the  soul,  the  intellect,  with  spiritual  truths  and 
with  God,  whose  existence  is  more  certain  than  our  own. 
Man  is  not  unconcerned  in  the  development  of  the  highest 
power  of  the  mind,  he  must  offer  himself  to  God  in  sincere 
humility.  In  subordination  to  the  passive  intellect,  the 
external  faculty,  the  active  reason,  is  also  to  be  culti- 
vated ;  it  deserves  care,  like  the  skin.  Evil  consists  in  the 
absurdity  that  the  creature,  who  apart  from  God  is  noth- 
ing, ascribes  to  himself  an  independent  existence. 

Le  Vayer  and  Huet,  who  have  been  already  mentioned 
(pp.  50-51),  mediate  between  the  founders  of  skepticism 
and  Bayle,  its  most  gifted  representative.  The  latter  of 
these  two  wrote  a  Criticism  of  the  Cartesian  Philosophy, 
1689,  besides  a  Treatise  on  the  Impotence  of  the  Human 
Mind,  which  did  not  appear  until  after  his  death.  He 
opposes,  among  other  things,  the  criterion  of  truth  based 
on  evidence,  since  there  is  an  evidence  of  the  false  not  to  be 
distinguished  from  that  of  the  true,  as  well  as  the  position 
that  God  becomes  a  deceiver  in  the  bestowal  of  a  weak 
and  blind  reason — for  he  gives  us,  at  the  same  time,  the 
power  to  know  its  deceptive  character. 

As  the  last  among  those  influenced  by  Descartes  but 
who  advanced  beyond  him,  may  be  mentioned  the  acute 
Pierre  Bayle  (1 647-1 706  ;  professor  in  Sedan  and  Rotterdam  ; 
Works,  1725-31*),  who  greatly  excited  the  world  of  letters 
by  his   occasional  and  polemic  treatises,  and  still  more   by 

*Cf.  on  Bayle,  L.  Feuerbach.  1838,  2d  ed.,  1844  ;  Kucken  in  the  Allgemeine 
Zeitung,  supplement  to  Nos.  251,  252,  October  27,   28,  1891. 


15°  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

the  journal,  Nouvelles de  la  Re" publique  des  Lettres  from  1684, 
and  his  Historical  and  Critical  Dictionary,  in  two  volumes, 
1695  and  1697.  Nowhere  do  the  most  opposite  antitheses 
dwell  in  such  close  proximity  as  in  the  mind  of  Bayle. 
Along  with  an  ever  watchful  doubt  he  harbors  a  most 
active  zeal  for  knowledge,  with  a  sincere  spirit  of  belief 
(which  has  been  wrongly  disputed  by  Lange,  Zeller,  and 
Pünjer)  a  demoniacal  pleasure  in  bringing  to  light  absurdi- 
ties in  the  doctrines  of  faith,  with  absolute  confidence  in 
the  infallibility  of  conscience  an  entirely  pessimistic  view  of 
human  morality.  His  strength  lies  in  criticism  and  polem- 
ics, his  work  in  the  latter  (aside  from  his  hostility  to 
fanaticism  and  the  persecution  of  those  differing  in  faith) 
being  directed  chiefly  against  optimism  and  the  deistic 
religion  of  reason,  which  holds  the  Christian  dogmas  capable 
of  proof,  or,  at  least,  faith  and  knowledge  capable  of  recon- 
ciliation. The  doctrines  of  faith  are  not  only  above  reason, 
incomprehensible,  but  contrary  to  reason  ;  and  it  is  just 
on  this  that  our  merit  in  accepting  them  depends.  The 
mysteries  of  the  Gospel  do  not  seek  success  before  the 
judgment  seat  of  thought,  they  demand  the  blind  sub- 
mission of  the  reason  ;  nay,  if  they  were  objects  of  knowl- 
edge they  would  cease  to  be  mysteries.  Thus  we  must 
choose  between  religion  and  philosophy,  for  they  cannot 
be  combined.  For  one  who  is  convinced  of  the  untrust- 
worthiness  of  the  reason  and  her  lack  of  competence  in 
things  supernatural,  it  is  in  no  wise  contradictory  or  impos- 
sible to  receive  as  true  things  which  she  declares  to  be 
false;  he  will  thank  God  for  the  gift  of  a  faith  which  is 
entirely  independent  of  the  clearness  of  its  objects  and  of 
its  agreement  with  the  axioms  of  philosophy.  Even,  when 
in  purely  scientific  questions  he  calls  attention  to  difficul- 
ties and  shows  contradictions  on  every  hand,  Bayle  by 
no  means  intends  to  hold  up  principles  with  contradictory 
implications  as  false,  but  only  as  uncertain.*     The  reason, 

*  Thus,  in  regard  to  the  problem  of  freedom,  he  finds  it  hard  to  comprehend 
how  the  creatures,  who  are  not  the  authors  of  their  own  existence,  can  be  the 
authors  of  their  own  actions,  but.  at  the  same  time,  inadmissible  to  think  of 
God  as  the  cause  of  evil.  He  seeks  only  to  show  the  indemonstrability  and 
incomprehensibility  of  freedom,  not  to  reject  it.  For  he  sees  in  it  the  condition 
of  morality,  and  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  difficulties  in  which  those  who 


BAYLE.  15 l 

he  says,  generalizing  from  his  own  case,  is  capable  only  of 
destruction,  not  of  construction  ;  of  discovering  error,  not  of 
finding  truth  ;  of  finding  reasons  and  counter-reasons,  of 
exciting  doubt  and  controversy,  not  of  vouchsafing  certitude. 
So  long  as  it  contents  itself  with  controverting  that  which 
is  false,  it  is  potent  and  salutary  ;  but  when,  despising 
divine  assistance,  it  advances  beyond  this,  it  becomes 
dangerous,  like  a  caustic  drug  which  attacks  the  healthy 
flesh  after  it  has  consumed  that  which  was  diseased. 

He  who  seeks  to  refute  skepticism  must  produce  a  cri- 
terion of  truth.  If  such  exists,  it  is  certainly  that  advanced 
by  Descartes,  the  evidence,  the  evident  clearness  of  a  princi- 
ple. Well,  then,  the  following  principles  pass  for  evident  : 
That  one,  who  does  not  exist,  can  have  no  responsibility  for 
an  evil  action  ;  that  two  things,  which  are  identical  with  the 
same  thing,  are  identical  with  each  other;  that  I  am  the 
same  man  to-day  that  I  was  yesterday.  Now,  the  revealed 
doctrines  of  original  sin  and  of  the  Trinity  show  that  the 
first  and  second  of  these  axioms  are  false,  and  the  Church 
doctrine  of  the  preservation  of  the  world  as  a  continuous 
creation,  that  the  last  principle  is  uncertain.  Thus  if  not 
even  self-evidence  furnishes  us  a  criterion  of  truth,  we  must 
conclude  that  none  whatever  exists.  Further,  in  regard  to 
the  origin  of  the  world  from  a  single  principle,  its  creation 
by  God,  we  find  this  supported,  no  doubt,  both  by  the  con- 
clusions of  the  pure  reason  and  by  the  consideration  of 
nature,  but  controvened  by  the  fact  of  evil,  by  the  misery 
and  wickedness  of  man.  Is  it  conceivable  that  a  holy  and 
benevolent  God  has  created  so  unhappy  and  wicked  a 
being? 

Riyle's  motives  in  defending  faith  against  reason  were, 
on  the  one  hand,  his  personal  piety,  on  the  other,  his  con- 
viction of  the  unassailable  purity  of  Christian  ethics.  All 
the  sects  agree  in  regard  to  moral  principles,  and  it  is  this 
which  assures  us  of  the  divinity  of  the  Christian  revelation. 
Nevertheless,  he  does  not  conceal  from  himself  the  fact  that 
possession  of  the  theoretical  side    of    religion   is   far   from 

deny  freedom  involve  themselves  are  far  greater  than  those  of  their  opponents, 
lie  shows  himse'f  entirely  averse  to  the  determinism  and  pantheism  of 
Spinoza. 


15-  DEVELOPMENT  OF  CARTESIANISM. 

being  a  guarantee  of  practice  in  conformity  with  her  pre- 
cepts. It  is  neither  true  that  faith  alone  leads  to  morality 
nor  that  unbelief  is  the  cause  of  immorality.  A  state 
composed  of  atheists  would  be  not  at  all  impossible,  if 
only  strict  punishments  and  strict  notions  of  honor  were 
insisted  upon. 

The  judgments  of  the  natural  reason  in  moral  questions 
are  as  certain  and  free  from  error  as  its  capacity  is  shown  to 
be  weak  and  limited  in  theoretical  science.  The  idea  of 
morality  never  deceives  anyone  ;  the  moral  law  is  innate 
in  every  man.  Although  Christianity  has  given  the  best 
development  of  our  duties,  yet  the  moral  law  can  be  under- 
stood and  followed  by  all  men,  even  by  heathen  and  athe- 
ists. We  do  not  need  to  be  Christians  in  order  to  act 
virtuously;  the  knowledge  given  by  conscience  is  not 
dependent  upon  revelation.  From  the  knowledge  of  the 
good  to  the  practice  of  it  is,  it  is  true,  a  long  step  ;  we 
may  be  convinced  of  moral  truth  without  loving  it,  and 
God's  grace  alone  is  able  to  strengthen  us  against  the 
power  of  the  passions,  by  adding  to  the  illumination  of 
the  mind  an  inclination  of  the  heart  toward  the  good. 
Temperament,  custom,  self-love  move  the  soul  more 
strongly  than  general  truths.  As  in  life  pleasure  is  far 
outbalanced  by  pain  and  vexation,  so  far  more  evil  acts 
are  done  than  good  ones :  history  is  a  collection  of 
misdeeds,  with  scarcely  one  virtuous  act  for  a  thousand 
crimes.  It  is  not  the  external  action  that  constitutes 
the  ethical  character  of  a  deed,  but  the  motive  or  dis- 
position ;  almsgiving  from  motives  of  pride  is  a  vice,  and 
only  when  practiced  out  of  love  to  one's  neighbors,  a 
virtue.  God  looks  only  at  the  act  of  the  will  ;  our  highest 
duty,  and  one  which  admits  of  no  exceptions,  is  never  to 
act  contrary  to  conscience. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

LOCKE. 

AFTER  the  Cartesian  philosophy  had  given  decisive  expres- 
sion to  the  tendencies  of  modern  thought,  and  had  been 
developed  through  occasionalism  to  its  completion  in  the 
system  of  Spinoza,  the  line  of  further  progress  consisted  in 
two  factors  :  Descartes's  principles — one-sidedly  rationalistic 
and  abstractly  scientific,  as  they  were — were,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  be  supplemented  by  the  addition  of  the  empirical 
element  which  Descartes  had  neglected,  and,  on  the  other, 
to  be  made  available  for  general  culture  by  approximation 
to  the  interests  of  practical  life.  England,  with  its  freer 
and  happier  political  conditions,  was  the  best  place  for  the 
accomplishment  of  both  ends,  and  Locke,  a  typically 
healthy  and  sober  English  thinker,  with  a  distaste  for 
extreme  views,  the  best  adapted  mind.  Descartes,  the 
rationalist,  had  despised  experience,  and  Bacon,  the  empir- 
icist, had  despised  mathematics  ;  but  Locke  aims  to  show 
that  while  the  reason  is  the  instrument  of  science,  demon- 
stration its  form,  and  the  realm  of  knowledge  wider  than 
experience, yet  this  instrument  and  this  form  are  dependent 
for  their  content  on  a  supply  of  material  from  the  senses. 
The  emphasis,  it  is  true,  falls  chiefly  on  the  latter  half 
of  this  programme,  and  posterity,  especially,  has  almost 
exclusively  attended  to  the  empirical  side  of  Locke's 
theory  of  knowledge  in  giving  judgment  concerning  it. 

John  Locke  was  born  at  Wrington,  not  far  from  Bristol, 
in  1632.  At  Oxford  he  busied  himself  with  philosophy, 
natural  science,  and  medicine,  being  repelled  by  the  Scho- 
lastic thinkers,  but  strongly  attracted  by  the  writings  of 
Descartes.  In  1665  he  became  secretary  to  the  English 
ambassador  to  the  Court  of  Brandenburg.  Returning 
thence  to  Oxford  he  made  the  acquaintance  of  Lord 
Anthony  Ashley  (from  1672  Earl  of  Shaftesbury ;  died  in 
Holland  1683),  who  received  him  into  his  own  household  as 

«53 


'54  LOCKE. 

a  friend,  physician,  and  tutor  to  his  son  (the  father  of 
Shaftesbury,  the  moral  philosopher),  and  with  whose  vary- 
ing fortunes  Locke's  own  were  henceforth  to  be  intimately 
connected.  Twice  he  became  secretary  to  his  patron  (once 
in  1667 — with  an  official  secretaryship  in  1672,  when  Shaftes- 
bury became  Lord  Chancellor — and  again  in  1679,  when  he 
became  President  of  the  Council),  but  both  times  he  lost 
his  post  on  his  friend's  fall.  The  years  1675-79  were  spent 
in  Montpellier  and  Paris.  In  1683  he  went  into  voluntary 
exile  in  Holland  (where  Shaftesbury  had  died  in  January 
of  the  same  year),  and  remained  there  until  1689,  when 
the  ascension  of  the  throne  by  William  of  Orange  made 
it  possible  for  him  to  return  to  England.  Here  he  was 
made  Commissioner  of  Appeals,  and,  subsequently,  one  of 
the  Commissioners  of  Trade  and  Plantations  (till  1700). 
He  died  in  1704  at  Oates,  in  Essex,  at  the  house  of  Sir 
Francis  Masham,  whose  wife  was  the  daughter  of  Cud- 
worth,  the  philosopher. 

Locke's  chief  work,  An  Essay  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing, which  had  been  planned  as  early  as  1670,  was 
published  in  1689-90,  a  short  abstract  of  it  having  previously 
appeared  in  French  in  Le  Clerc's  Bibliothcque  Universelle, 
1688.  His  theoretical  works  include,  further,  the  two 
posthumous  treatises,  On  the  Conduct  of  the  Understanding 
(originally  intended  for  incorporation  in  the  fourth  edition 
of  the  Essay,  which,  however,  appeared  in  1700  without 
this  chapter,  which  probably  had  proved  too  extended) 
and  the  Elements  of  Natural  Philosophy.  To  political  and 
politico-economic  questions  Locke  contributed  the  two 
Treatises  on  Government,  1690,  and  three  essays  on  money 
and  the  coinage.  In  the  year  1689  appeared  the  first 
of  three  Letters  on  Tolerance,  followed,  in  1693,  by  Some 
Thoughts  on  Education,  and,  in  1695,  by  The  Reasonableness 
of  Christianity  as  delivered  in  the  Scriptures.  The  collected 
works  appeared  for  the  first  time  in  1714,  and  in  nine 
volumes  in  1853;  the  philosophical  works  (edited  by  St. 
John)  are  given  in  Bonn's  Standard  Library  (1867-68).* 

*  Lord  King- and  Fox  Bourne  have  written  on  Locke's  life,  1829  and  1876. 
A  comparison  of  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge  with  Leibnitz's  critique  was  pub- 
lished by  Hartenstein  in  1865,  and  one  by  Von  Benoit  (prize  dissertation)  in 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  155 

(a)  Theory  of  Knowledge. — Locke's  theory  of  knowledge 
is  controlled  by  two  tendencies,  one  native,  furnished  by 
the  Baconian  empiricism,  and  the  other  Continental,  sup- 
plied by  the  Cartesian  question  concerning  the  origin  of 
ideas.  Bacon  had  demanded  the  closest  connection  with 
experience  as  the  condition  of  fruitful  inquiry.  Locke 
supports  this  commendation  of  experience  by  a  detailed 
description  of  the  services  which  it  renders  to  cognition, 
namely,  by  showing  that,  in  simple  ideas,  perception  supplies 
the  material  for  complex  ideas,  and  for  all  the  cognitive 
work  of  the  understanding.  Descartes  had  divided  ideas, 
according  to  their  origin,  into  three  classes:  those  which 
are  self-formed,  those  which  come  from  without,  and  those 
which  are  innate  (p.  92),  and  had  called  this  third  class  the 
most  valuable.  Locke  disputes  the  existence  of  ideas  in 
the  understanding  from  birth,  and  makes  it  receive  the 
elements  of  knowledge  from  the  senses,  that  is,  from  with- 
out. He  is  a  representative  of  sensationalism, — not  in  the 
stricter  sense,  first  put  into  the  term  by  those  who  subse- 
quently continued  his  endeavors,  that  thought  arises  from 
perception,  that  it  is  transformed  sensation — but  in  the 
wider  sense,  that  thought  is  (free)  operation  with  ideas, 
which  are  neither  created  by  it  nor  present  in  it  from  the 
first,  but  given  to  it  by  perception,  that,  consequently,  the 
cognitive  process  begins  with  sensation  and  so  its  first 
attitude  is  a  passive  one.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
Cartesian  problem,  which  he  solves  in  a  sense  opposite  to 
Descartes,  Locke  supplements  the  empiricism  of  Bacon  by 
basing  it  on  a  psychologically  developed  theory  of  knowl- 
edge. That  in  the  course  of  the  inquiry  he  introduces  a 
new  principle,  which  causes  him  to  diverge  from  the  true 
empirical  path,  will  appear  in  the  sequel. 

The  question  "  How  our  ideas  come  into  the  mind  "  re- 
ceives a  negative  answer  (in  the  first  book  of  the  Essay)'. 

i860,,  and  an  exposition  of  his  th<-ory  of  substance  by  De  Fries  in  1879.  Victor 
Cousin's  Philosophie  de  Locke  lias  passed  through  six  editions.  [Among  more 
recent  English  discussions  reference  may  be  made  to  Green's  Introduction  to 
Hume's  Treatise  on  I[<t»i<in  Nature,  1874  (new  ed.  1890),  which  is  a  valuable 
critique  of  the  line  of  development,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume;  Fowler's  Locke, 
in  the  English  Men  of  Letters,  1880;  and  Eraser's  Locke,  in  Blackwood's 
Philosophical  Classics,  1890. — Tr.] 


156  LOCKE. 

"  There  are  no  innate  principles  in  the  mind  "*  The  doc- 
trine of  the  innate  character  of  certain  principles  is  based 
on  their  universal  acceptance.  The  asserted  agreement  of 
mankind  in  regard  to  the  laws  of  thought,  the  principles 
of  morality,  the  existence  of  God,  etc.,  is  neither  cogent  as 
an  argument  nor  correct  in  fact.  In  the  first  place,  even  if 
there  were  any  principles  which  everyone  assented  to,  this 
would  not  prove  that  they  had  been  created  in  the  soul ; 
the  fact  of  general  consent  would  admit  of  a  different  expla- 
nation. Granted  that  no  atheists  existed,  yet  it  would  not 
necessarily  follow  that  the  universal  conviction  of  the  exist- 
ence of  God  is  innate,  for  it  might  have  been  gradually 
reached  in  each  case  through  the  use  of  the  reason — 
might  have  been  inferred,  for  instance,  from  the  percep- 
tion of  the  purposive  character  of  the  world.  Second,  the 
fact  to  which  this  theory  of  innate  ideas  appeals  is  not 
true.  No  moral  rule  can  be  cited  which  is  respected  by 
all  nations.  The  idea  of  identity  is  entirely  unknown  to 
idiots  and  to  children.  If  the  laws  of  identity  and  con- 
tradiction were  innate  they  must  appear  in  consciousness 
prior  to  all  other  truths;  but  long  before  a  child  is  con- 
scious of  the  proposition  "  It  is  impossible  for  the  same 
thing  to  be  and  not  to  be,"  it  knows  that  sweet  is  not 
bitter,  and  that  black  is  not  white.  The  ideas  first  known 
are  not  general  axioms  and  abstract  concepts,  but  particular 
impressions  of  the  senses.  Would  nature  write  so  illegible 
a  hand  that  the  mind  must  wait  a  long  time  before  becom- 
ing able  to  read  what  had  been  inscribed  upon  it?  It  is 
often  said,  however,  that  innate  ideas  and  principles  may 
be  obscured  and,  finally,  completely  extinguished  by  habit, 
education,  and  other  extrinsic  circumstances.     Then,  if  they 

*  According  to  Fox  Bourne  this  first  book  was  written  after  the  others. 
Gail  (C/eber  die  Abhängigkeit  Lockes  von  Descartes,  Strassburg,  1887,  chap, 
iii.)  has  endeavored  to  prove  that,  since  the  arguments  controverted  are  want- 
ing in  Descartes,  the  attack  was  not  aimed  at  Descartes  and  his  school,  but  at 
native  defenders  of  innate  ideas,  as  Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury  and  the  English 
Platonists  (Cudworth,  More,  Parker,  Gale).  That  along  with  these  the  Carte- 
sian doctrine  was  a  second  and  chief  object  of  attack  is  shown  by  Benno  Erd- 
mann in  his  discussion  of  the  treatises  by  G.  Geil  and  R.  Sommer  {Lockes  Ver- 
hältnis zu  Descartes,  Berlin,  1887)  in  the  Archiv  fur  Geschichte  der  Philosophie, 
ii.  pp.  99-121. 


THEORY  OF  KXOW LEDGE.  157 

gradually  become  corrupted  and  disappear,  they  must  at 
least  be  discoverable  in  full  purity  where  these  disturbing 
influences  have  not  yet  acted  ;  but  it  is  especially  vain  to 
look  for  them  in  children  and  the  ignorant.  Perhaps,  how- 
ever, these  possess  such  principles  unconsciously  ;  perhaps 
they  are  imprinted  on  the  understanding,  without  being 
attended  to?  This  would  be  a  contradiction  in  terms.  To 
be  in  the  mind  or  the  understanding  simply  means  "  to  be 
understood  "  or  to  be  known  ;  no  one  can  have  an  idea 
without  being  conscious  of  it.  Finally,  if  the  attempt  be 
made  to  explain  "  originally  in  the  mind  "  in  so  wide  a  sense 
that  it  would  include  all  truths  which  man  can  ever  attain 
or  is  capable  of  discovering  by  the  right  use  of  reason,  this 
would  make  not  only  all  mathematical  principles,  but  all 
knowledge  in  general,  all  sciences,  and  all  arts  innate  ; 
there  would  be  no  ground  even  for  the  exclusion  of  wisdom 
and  virtue.  Therefore,  either  all  ideas  are  innate  or  none 
are.  This  is  an  important  alternative.  While  Locke  de- 
cides for  the  second  half  of  the  proposition,  Leibnitz  de- 
fends the  first  by  a  delicate  application  of  the  concept  of 
unconscious  representation  and  of  implicit  knowledge, 
which  his  predecessor  rejects  out  of  hand.  - 

Locke's  positive  answer  to  the  question  concerning  the 
origin  of  ideas  is  given  in  his  second  book.  Ideas  are  not 
present  in  the  understanding  from  the  beginning,  nor  are 
they  originated  by  the  understanding,  but  received  through 
sensation.  The  understanding  is  like  a  piece  of  white 
paper  on  which  perception  inscribes  its  characters.  All 
knowledge  arises  in  experience.  This  is  of  two  kinds, 
derived  either  from  the  external  senses  or  the  internal 
sense.  The  perception  of  external  objects  is  termed 
Sensation,  that  of  internal  phenomena  (of  the  states  of 
the  mind  itself)  Reflection.  External  and  internal  per- 
ception are  the  only  windows  through  which  the  light 
of  ideas  penetrates  into  the  dark  chamber  of  the  under* 
standing.  The  two  are  not  opened  simultaneously,  how- 
ever, but  one  after  the  other;  since  the  perceptions  of 
the  sensible  qualities  of  bodies,  unlike  that  of  the  oper- 
ations of  the  mind  itself,  do  not  require  an  effort  of  atten- 
tion, they  are  the  earlier.     The  child  receives  ideas  of  sen- 


15s  LOCKE. 

sation  before  those  of  reflection  ;  internal  perception  pre- 
supposes external  perception. 

In  this  distinction  between  sensation  and  reflection,  we 
may  recognize  an  after-effect  of  the  Cartesian  dualism 
between  matter  and  spirit.  The  antithesis  of  substances 
has  become  a  duality  in  the  faculties  of  perception.  But 
while  Descartes  had  so  far  forth  ascribed  precedence  to  the' 
mind,  in  that  he  held  the  self-certitude  of  the  ego  to  be 
the  highest  and  clearest  of  all  truths  and  the  soul  to  be 
better  known  than  the  body,  in  Locke  the  relation  of  the 
two  was  reversed,  since  he  made  the  perception  of  self 
dependent  on  the  precedent  perception  of  external  objects. 
This  antithesis  was  made  still  sharper  in  later  thinking, 
when  Condillac  made  full  use  of  the  priority  of  sensation, 
which  in  Locke  had  remained  without  much  effect  ;  while 
Berkeley,  on  the  other  hand,  reduced  external  perception 
to  internal  perception. 

All  original  ideas  are  representations  either  of  the  exter- 
nal senses  or  of  the  internal  sense,  or  of  both.  And  since, 
in  the  case  of  ideas  of  sensation,  there  is  a  distinction  be- 
tween those  which  are  perceived  by  a  single  one  of  the 
external  senses  and  those  which  come  from  more  than  one, 
four  classes  of  simple  ideas  result:  (i)  Those  which  come 
from  one  external  sense,  as  colors,  sounds,  tastes,  odors, 
heat,  solidity,  and  the  like.  (2)  Those  which  come  from 
more  than  one  external  sense  (sight  and  touch),  as  exten- 
sion, figure,  and  motion.  (3)  Reflection  on  the  operations 
of  our  minds  yields  ideas  of  perception  or  thinking  (with 
its  various  modes,  remembrance,  judging,  knowledge,  faith, 
etc.),  and  of  volition  or  willing.  (4)  From  both  external 
and  internal  perception  there  come  into  the  mind  the  ideas 
of  pleasure  and  pain,  existence,  power,  unity,  and  succes- 
sion. These  are  approximately  our  original  ideas,  which 
are  related  to  knowledge  as  the  letters  to  written  discourse; 
as  all  Homer  is  composed  out  of  only  twenty-four  letters, 
so  these  few  simple  ideas  constitute  all  the  material  of 
knowledge.  The  mind  can  neither  have  more  nor  other 
simple  ideas  than  those  which  are  furnished  to  it  by  these 
two  sources  of  experience. 

Locke   differs   from   Descartes  again  in  regard  to  exten- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  159 

sion  and  thought.  Extension  does  not  constitute  the 
essence  of  matter,  nor  thought  the  essence  of  mind.  Exten- 
sion and  body  are  not  the  same  ;  the  former  is  presupposed 
by  the  latter  as  its  necessary  condition,  but  it  is  the  former 
alone  which  yields  mathematical  matter.  The  essence  of 
physical  matter  consists  rather  in  solidity:  where  impene- 
trability is  found  there  is  body,  and  the  converse  ;  the  two 
are  absolutely  inseparable.  With  space  the  case  is  different. 
I  cannot  conceive  unextended  matter,  indeed,  but  I  can 
easily  conceive  immaterial  extension,  an  unfilled  space 
Further,  if  the  essence  of  the  soul  consisted  in  thought,  it 
must  be  always  thinking.  As  the  Cartesians  maintained,  it 
must  have  ideas  as  soon  as  it  begins  to  be,  which  is  man- 
ifestly contrary  to  experience.  Thinking  is  merely  an  ac- 
tivity of  the  mind,  as  motion  is  an  activity  of  the  body,  and 
not  its  essential  characteristic.  The  mind  does  not  receive 
ideas  until  external  objects  occasion  perception  in  it  through 
impressions,  which  it  is  not  able  to  avert.  The  understand- 
ing may  be  compared  to  a  mirror,  which,  without  inde- 
pendent activity  and  without  being  consulted,  takes  up  the 
images  of  things.  Some  of  the  simple  ideas  which  have 
been  mentioned  above  represent  the  properties  of  things 
as  they  really  are,  others  not.  The  former  class  includes 
all  ideas  of  reflection  (for  we  are  ourselves  the  immediate 
object  of  the  inner  sense) ;  but  among  the  ideas  of  sensa- 
tion those  only  which  come  from  different  senses,  hence 
extension,  motion  and  rest,  number,  figure,  and,  further, 
solidity,  are  to  be  accounted  primary  qualities,  i.  e.,  such  as 
are  actual  copies  of  the  properties  of  bodies.  All  other 
ideas,  on  the  contrary,  have  no  resemblance  to  properties 
of  bodies;  they  represent  merely  the  ways  in  which  things 
act,  and  are  not  copies  of  things.  The  ideas  of  secoiidary 
or  derivative  qualities  (hard  and  soft,  warm  and  cold,  colors 
and  sounds,  tastes  and  odors)  are  in  the  last  analysis  caused 
— as  are  the  primary — by  motion,  but  not  perceived  as  such. 
Yellow  and  warm  are  merely  sensations  in  us,  which  we  erro- 
neously ascribe  to  objects  ;  with  equal  right  we  might  ascribe 
to  fire,  as  qualities  inherent  in  it,  the  changes  in  form  and 
color  which  it  produces  in  wax  and  the  pain  which  it  causes 
in  the  finger  brought  into  proximity  with  it.     The  warmth 


i6o  LOCKE. 

and  the  brightness  of  the  blaze,  the  redness,  the  pleasant 
taste,  and  the  aromatic  odor  of  the  strawberry,  exist  in  these 
bodies  merely  as  the  power  to  produce  such  sensations  in  us 
by  stimulation  of  the  skin,  the  eye,  the  palate,  and  the  nose. 
If  we  remove  the  perceptions  of  them,  they  disappear  as 
such,  and  their  causes  alone  remain — the  bulk,  figure,  num- 
ber, texture,  and  motion  of  the  insensible  particles.  The 
ground  of  the  illusion  lies  in  the  fact  that  such  qualities  as 
color,  etc.,  bear  no  resemblance  to  their  causes,  in  no  wise 
point  to  these,  and  in  themselves  contain  naught  of  bulk, 
density,  figure,  and  motion,  and  that  our  senses  are  too 
weak  to  discover  the  material  particles  and  their  primary 
qualities. — The  distinction  between  qualities  of  the  first 
and  second  order — first  advanced  by  the  ancient  atomists, 
revived  by  Galileo  and  Descartes  on  the  threshold  of  the 
modern  period,  retained  by  Locke,  and  still  customary 
in  the  natural  science  of  the  day — forms  an  important 
link  in  the  transition  from  the  popular  view  of  all  sense- 
qualities  as  properties  of  things  in  themselves  to  Kant's 
position,  that  spatial  and  temporal  qualities  also  belong  to 
phenomena  alone,  and  are  based  merely  on  man's  subjective 
mode  of  apprehension,  while  the  real  properties  of  things 
in  themselves  are  unknowable. 

Thus  far  the  procedure  of  the  understanding  has  been 
purely  passive.  But  besides  the  capacity  for  passively 
receiving  simple  ideas,  it  possesses  the  further  power  of  vari- 
ously combining  and  extending  these  original  ideas  which 
have  come  into  it  from  without,  of  working  over  the  material 
given  in  sensation  by  the  combination,  relation,  and  separa- 
tion of  its  various  elements.  In  this  it  is  active,  but  not  crea- 
tive. It  is  not  able  to  form  new  simple  ideas  (and  just  as 
little  to  destroy  such  as  already  exist),  but  only  freely  to 
combine  the  elements  furnished  without  its  assistance 
by  perception  (or,  following  the  figure  mentioned  above, 
to  combine  into  syllables  and  words  the  separate  letters  of 
sensation).  Complex  ideas  arise  from  simple  ideas  through 
voluntary  combination  of  the  latter. 

Perception  is  the  first  step  toward  knowledge.  After 
perception  the  most  indispensable  faculty  is  retention,  the 
prolonged  consciousness  of  present  ideas  and  the  revival  of 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  161 

those  which  have  disappeared,  or,  as  it  were,  have  been  put 
aside.  For  an  idea  to  be  "in  the  memory"  means  that  the 
mind  has  the  capacity  to  reproduce  it  at  will,  whereupon 
it  recognizes  it  as  previously  experienced.  If  our  ideas  are 
not  freshened  up  from  time  to  time  by  new  impressions  of 
the  same  sort  they  gradually  fade  out,  until  finally  (as  the 
idea  of  color  in  one  become  blind  in  early  life)  they  com- 
pletely disappear.  Ideas  impressed  upon  the  mind  by 
frequent  repetition  are  rarely  entirely  lost.  Memory  is  the 
basis  for  the  intellectual  functions  of  discernment  and  com- 
parison, of  composition,  abstraction,  and_  naming.  Since, 
amid  the  innumerable  multitude  of  ideas,  it  is  not  possible 
to  assign  to  each  one  a  definite  sign,  the  indispensable  con- 
dition of  language  is  found  in  the  power  of  abstraction,  that 
is,  in  the  power  of  generalizing  ideas,  of  compounding  many 
ideas  into  one,  and  of  indicating  by  the  names  of  the  gen- 
eral ideas,  or  of  the  classes  and  species,  the  particular  ideas 
also  which  are  contained  under  these.  Here  is  the  great 
distinction  between  man  and  the  brute.  The  brute  lacks 
language  because  he  lacks  (not  all  understanding  whatever, 
e.g.,  not  a  capacity,  though  an  imperfect  one,  of  compari- 
son and  composition,  but)  the  faculty  of  abstraction  and  of 
forming  general  ideas.  The  object  of  language  is  simply 
the  quick  and  easy  communication  of  our  thoughts  to 
others,  not  to  give  expression  to  the  real  essence  of  objects. 
Words  are  not  names  for  particular  things,  but  signs  of 
general  ideas  ;  and  abstracto,  nothing  more  than  an  artifice 
for  facilitating  intellectual  intercourse.  This  abbreviation, 
which  aids  in  the  exchange  of  ideas,  involves  the  danger  that 
the  creations  of  the  mind  denoted  by  words  will  be  taken 
for  images  of  real  general  essences,  of  which,  in  fact,  there 
are  none  in  existence,  but  only  particular  things.  In  order 
to  prevent  anyone  to  whom  I  am  speaking  from  understand- 
ing my  words  in  a  different  sense  from  the  one  intended,  it 
is  necessary  for  me  to  define  the  complex  ideas  by  analyzing 
them  into  their  elements,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  give 
examples  in  experience  of  the  simple  ideas,  which  do  not 
admit  of  definition,  or  to  explain  them  by  synonyms. 
Thus  much  from  Locke's  philosophy  of  language,  to  which 
he  devotes  the  third  book  of  the  Essay. 


1Ö2  LOCKE. 

Complex  ideas,  which  are  very  numerous,  may  be 
divided  into  three  classes  :  Modes,  Substances,  and  Rela- 
tions. 

Modes  (states,  conditions)  are  such  combinations  of  simple 
ideas  which  do  not  "  contain  in  them  the  supposition  of 
subsisting  by  themselves,  but  are  considered  as  depend- 
encies on,  or  affections  of  substances."  They  fall  into  two 
classes  according  as  they  are  composed  of  the  same  simple 
ideas,  or  simple  ideas  of  various  kinds  ;  the  former  are  called 
simple,  the  latter  mixed,  modes.  Under  the  former  class 
belong,  for  example,  a  dozen  or  a  score,  the  idea  of  which 
is  composed  of  simple  units;  under  the  latter,  running, 
fighting,  obstinacy,  printing,  theft,  parricide.  The  forma- 
tion of  mixed  modes  is  greatly  influenced  by  national  cus- 
toms. Very  complicated  transactions  (sacrilege,  triumph, 
ostracism),  if  often  considered  and  discussed,  receive  for 
the  sake  of  brevity  comprehensive  names,  which  cannot  be 
rendered  by  a  single  expression  in  the  language  of  other 
nations  among  whom  the  custom  in  question  is  not  found. 
The  elements  most  frequently  employed  in  the  formation 
of  mixed  modes  are  ideas  of  the  two  fundamental  activi- 
ties, thinking  and  motion,  together  with  power,  which  is 
their  source.  Locke  discusses  simple  modes  in  more  detail, 
especially  those  derived  from  the  ideas  of  space,  time, 
unity,  and  power.  Modifications  of  space  are  distance, 
figure,  place,  length  ;  since  any  length  or  measure  of  space 
can  be  repeated  to  infinity,  we  reach  the  idea  of  immensity. 
As  modes  of  time  are  enumerated  succession  (which  we  per- 
ceive and  measure  only  by  the  flow  of  our  ideas),  duration, 
and  lengths  or  measures  of  duration,  the  endless  repetition 
of  which  yields  the  idea  of  eternity.  From  unity  are  devel- 
oped the  modes  of  numbers,  and  from  the  unlimitedness  of 
these  the  idea  of  infinity.  No  idea,  however,  is  richer  in 
modes  than  the  idea  of  power.  A  distinction  must  be  made 
between  active  power  and  passive  power,  or  mere  recep- 
tivity. While  bodies  are  not  capable  of  originating  motion, 
but  only  of  communicating  motion  received,  we  notice  in 
ourselves,  as  spiritual  beings,  the  capacity  of  originating 
actions  and  motions.  The  body  possesses  only  the  passive 
power  of  being  moved,  the  mind  the  active  power  of  pro- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  163 

ducing  motion.  This  latter  is  termed  "  will."  Here  Locke 
discusses  at  length  the  freedom  of  the  will,  but  not  with 
entire  clearness  and  freedom  from  contradictions  (cf. 
below,  p.  177). 

Modes  are  conditions  which  do  not  subsist  of  themselves, 
but  have  need  of  a  basis  or  support ;  they  are  not  conceiv- 
able apart  from  a  thing  whose  properties  or  states  they  are. 
We  notice  that  certain  qualities  always  appear  together, 
and  habitually  refer  them  to  a  substratum  as  the  ground  of 
their  unity,  in  which  they  subsist  or  from  which  they  pro- 
ceed. Substance  denotes  this  self-existent  "we  know  not 
what,"  which  has  or  bears  the  attributes  in  itself,  and  which 
arouses  the  ideas  of  them  in  us.  It  is  the  combination  of 
a  number  of  simple  ideas  which  are  presumed  to  belong  to 
one  thing.  From  the  ideas  of  sensation  the  understanding 
composes  the  idea  of  body,  and  from  the  ideas  of  reflection 
that  of  mind.  Each  of  these  is  just  as  clear  and  just  as 
obscure  as  the  other;  of  each  we  know  only  its  effects 
and  its  sensuous  properties  ;  its  essence  is  for  us  entirely 
unknowable.  Instead  of  the  customary  names,  material 
and  immaterial  substances,  Locke  recommends  cogitative 
and  incogitative  substances,  since  it  is  not  inconceivable 
that  the  Creator  may  have  endowed  some  material  beings 
with  the  capacity  of  thought.  God, — the  idea  of  whom  is 
attained  by  uniting  the  ideas  of  existence,  power,  might, 
knowledge,  and  happiness  with  that  of  infinity, — is  abso- 
lutely immaterial,  because  not  passive,  while  finite  spirits 
(which  are  both  active  and  passive)  are  perhaps  only  bodies 
which  possess  the  power  of  thinking. 

While  the  ideas  of  substances  are  referred  to  a  reality 
without  the  mind  as  their  archetype,  to  which  they  are  to 
conform  and  which  they  should  image  and  represent,  Rela- 
tions  (V.  g.,  husband,  greater)  are  free  and  immanent  prod- 
ucts of  the  understanding.  They  are  not  copies  of  real 
things,  but  represent  themselves  alone,  are  their  own  arche- 
types. We  do  not  ask  whether  they  agree  with  things,  but, 
conversely,  whether  things  agree  with  them  (Book  iv.  4.  5). 
The  mind  reaches  an  idea  of  relation  by  placing  two  things 
side  by  side  and  comparing  them.  If  it  perceives  that  a 
thing,  or  a  quality,  or  an  idea   begins  to  exist  through  the 


1 04  LOCA'E. 

operation  of  some  other  thing,  it  derives  from  this  the  idea 
of  the  causal  relation,  which  is  the  most  comprehensive  of 
all  relations,  since  all  that  is  actual  or  possible  can  be 
brought  under  it.  Cause  is  that  which  makes  another 
thing  to  begin  to  be;  effect,  that  which  had  its  beginning 
from  some  other  thing.  The  production  of  a  new  quality 
is  termed  alteration  ;  of  artificial  things,  making  ;  of  a  liv- 
ing being,  generation  ;  of  a  new  particle  of  matter,  creation. 
Next  in  importance  is  the  relation  of  identity  and  diversity. 
Since  it  is  impossible  for  a  thing  to  be  in  two  different 
places  at  the  same  time  and  for  two  things  to  be  at  the 
same  time  in  the  same  place,  everything  that  at  a  given 
instant  is  in  a  given  place  is  identical  with  itself,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  distinct  from  everything  else  (no  matter 
how  great  the  resemblance  between  them)  that  at  the  same 
moment  exists  in  another  place.  Space  and  time  therefore 
form  the  principiitm  individuations.  By  what  marks,  how- 
ever, may  we  recognize  the  identity  of  an  individual  at 
different  times  and  in  different  places?  The  identity  of 
inorganic  matter  depends  on  the  continuity  of  the  mass  of 
atoms  which  compose  it  ;  that  of  living  beings  upon  the 
permanent  organization  of  their  parts  (different  bodies  are 
united  into  one  animal  by  a  common  life)  ;  personal  iden- 
tity consists  in  the  unity  of  self-consciousness,  not  in  the 
continuity  of  bodily  existence  (which  is  at  once  excluded 
by  the  change  of  matter).  The  identity  of  the  person  or 
the  ego  must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  that  of 
substance  and  of  man.  It  would  not  be  impossible  for 
the  person  to  remain  the  same  in  a  change  of  substances, 
in  so  far  as  the  different  beings  (for  instance,  the  souls 
of  Epicurus  and  Gassendi)  participated  in  the  same  self- 
consciousness ;  and,  conversely,  for  a  spirit  to  appear  in 
two  persons  by  losing  the  consciousness  of  its  previous 
existence.  Consciousness  is  the  sole  condition  of  the  self, 
or  personal  identity. — The  determinations  of  space  and 
time  are  for  the  most  part  relations.  Our  answers  to  the 
questions  "  When  ?""  How  long?"  "  How  large?  "  denote 
the  distance  of  one  point  of  time  from  another  (e.  g.,  the 
birth  of  Christ),  the  relation  of  one  duration  to  another  (of 
a  revolution  of  the   sun),  the  relation  of  one  extension  to 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  165 

another  well-known  one  taken  as  a  standard.  Many  appar- 
ently positive  ideas  and  words,  as  young  and  old,  large  and 
small,  weak  and  strong,  are  in  fact  relative.  They  imply 
merely  the  relation  of  a  given  duration  of  life,  of  a  given  size 
and  strength,  to  that  which  has  been  adopted  as  a  standard 
for  the  class  of  things  in  question.  A  man  of  twenty  is 
called  young,  but  a  horse  of  like  age,  old;  and  neither  of 
these  measures  of  time  applies  to  stars  or  diamonds.  Moral 
relations,  which  are  based  on  a  comparison  of  man's  volun- 
tary actions  with  one  of  the  three  moral  laws,  will  be  dis- 
cussed below. 

The  inquiry  now  turns  from  the  origin  of  ideas  to  their 
cognitive  value  or  their  validity,  beginning  (in  the  conclud- 
ing chapters  of  the  second  book)  with  the  accuracy  of 
single  ideas,  and  advancing  (in  Book  iv.,  which  is  the  most 
important  in  the  whole  work)  to  the  truth  of  judgments. 
An  idea  is  real  when  it  conforms  to  its  archetype,  whether 
this  is  a  thing,  real  orpossible,  or  an  idea  of  some  other  thing  ; 
it  is  adequate  when  the  conformity  is  complete.  The  idea 
of  a  four-sided  triangle  or  of  brave  cowardice  is  unreal  or 
fantastical,  since  it  is  composed  of  incompatible  elements, 
and  the  idea  of  a  centaur,  since  it  unites  simple  ideas  in  a 
way  in  which  they  do  not  occur  in  nature.  The  layman's 
ideas  of  law  or  of  chemical  substances  are  real,  but  inade- 
quate, since  they  have  a  general  resemblance  to  those  of 
experts,  and  a  basis  in  reality,  but  yet  only  imperfectly 
represent  their  archetypes.  Nay,  further,  our  ideas  of 
substances  are  all  inadequate,  not  only  when  they  are  taken 
for  representations  of  the  inner  essences  of  things  (since  we 
do  not  know  these  essences),  but  also  when  they  are  con- 
sidered merely  as  collections  of  qualities.  The  copy  never 
includes  all  the  qualities  of  the  thing,  the  less  so  since  the 
majority  of  these  are  powers,  i.  e.,  consist  in  relations  to 
other  objects,  and  since  it  is  impossible,  even  in  the  case  <>f 
a  single  body,  to  discover  all  the  changes  which  it  is  fitted 
to  impart  to,  or  to  receive  from,  other  substances.  Ideas  of 
modes  and  relations  arc  all  adequate,  for  they  are  their  own 
archetypes,  are  not  intended  to  represent  anything  other 
than  themselves,  arc  images  without  originals.  An  idea  <>f 
this  kind,  however,  though   perfect  when  originally  formed, 


*66  LOCKE. 

may  become  imperfect  through  the  use  of  language,  when  it 
is  unsuccessfully  intended  to  agree  with  the  idea  of  some 
other  person  and  denominated  by  a  current  term.  In  the 
case  of  mixed  modes  and  their  names,  therefore,  the  com- 
patibility of  their  elements  and  the  possible  existence  of 
their  objects  are  not  enough  to  secure  their  reality  and  their 
complete  adequacy;  in  order  to  be  adequate  they  must, 
further,  exactly  conform  to  the  meaning  connected  with 
their  names  by  their  author,  or  in  common  use.  Simple 
ideas  are  best  off,  according  to  Locke,  in  regard  both  to 
reality  and  to  adequacy.  For  the  most  part,  it  is  true,  they 
are  not  accurate  copies  of  the  real  qualities,  of  things,  but 
only  the  regular  effects  of  the  powers  of  things.  But 
although  real  qualities  are  thus  only  the  causes  and  not 
the  patterns  of  sensations,  still  simple  ideas,  by  their  con- 
stant correspondence  with  real  qualities,  sufficiently  fulfill 
their  divinely  ordained  end,  to  serve  us  as  instruments  of 
knowledge,  i.e.,  in  the  discrimination  of  things. — An  unreal 
and  inadequate  idea  becomes  false  only  when  it  is  referred 
to  an  object,  whether  this  be  the  existence  of  a  thing,  or  its 
true  essence,  or  an  idea  of  other  things.  Truth  and  error 
belong  always  to  affirmations  or  negations,  that  is,  to  (it 
may  be,  tacit)  propositions.  Ideas  uncombined,  unrelated, 
apart  from  judgments,  ideas,  that  is,  as  mere  phenomena 
in  the  mind,  are  neither  true  nor  false. 

Knowledge  is  defined  as  the  "perception  of  the  con- 
nexion and  agreement,  or  disagreement  and  repugnancy  " 
of  two  ideas  ;  truth,  as  "  the  right  joining  or  separating  of 
signs,  i.  e.,  ideas  or  words."  The  object  of  knowledge  is 
neither  single  ideas  nor  the  relations  of  ideas  to  things,  but 
the  relations  of  ideas  among  themselves.  This  view  was  at 
once  paradoxical  and  pregnant.  If  all  cognition,  as  Locke 
suggests  in  objection  to  his  own  theory,  consists  in  perceiv- 
ing the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  our  ideas,  are  not  the 
visions  of  the  enthusiast  and  the  reasonings  of  sober  thinkers 
alike  certain  ?  are  not  the  propositions,  A  fairy  is  not  a 
centaur,  and  a  centaur  is  a  living  being,  just  as  true  as  that  a 
circle  is  not  a  triangle,  and  that  the  sum  of  the  angles  of 
a  triangle  is  equal  to  two  right  angles?  The  mind  directly 
perceives  nothing  but  its  own  ideas,  but  it  seeks  a  knowl- 


THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  167 

edge  of  things  !  If  this  is  possible  it  can  only  be  indirect 
knowledge — the  mind  knows  things  through  its  ideas,  and 
possesses  criteria  which  show  that  its  ideas  agree  with 
things.  I 

Two  cases  must  be  clearly  distinguished,  for  a  consider-'—  V/ 
able  number  of  our  ideas,  viz.,  all  complex  ideas  except 
those  of  substances,  make  no  claim  to  represent  things,  and 
consequently  cannot  represent  them  falsely.  For  mathe- 
matical and  moral  ideas  and  principles,  and  the  truth 
thereof,  it  is  entirely  immaterial  whether  things  and  condi- 
tions correspondent  to  them  exist  in  nature  or  not.  They 
are  valid,  even  if  nowhere  actualized  ;  they  are  "  eternal 
truths,"  not  in  the  sense  that  they  are  known  from  child- 
hood, but  in  the  sense  that,  as  soon  as  known,  they  are 
immediately  assented  to.*  The  case  is  different,  however,»  ■» 
with  simple  ideas  and  the  ideas  of  substances,  which  have 
their  originals  without  the  mind  and  which  are  to  corre- 
spond with  these.  In  regard  to  the  former  we  may  always  be 
certain  that  they  agree  with  real  things,  for  since  the  mind 
can  neither  voluntarily  originate  them  (e.  g.,  cannot  pro- 
duce sensations  of  color  in  the  dark)  nor  avoid  having  them 
at  will,  but  only  receive  them  from  without,  they  are  not 
creatures  of  the  fancy,  but  the  natural  and  regular  produc- 
tions of  external  things  affecting  us.  In  regard  to  the 
latter,  the  ideas  of  substances,  we  may  be  certain  at  least 
when  the  simple  ideas  which  compose  them  have  been 
found  so  connected  in  experience.  Perception  has  an 
external  cause,  whose  influence  the  mind  is  not  able  to 
withstand.  The  mutual  corroboration  furnished  by  the 
reports  of  the  different  senses,  the  painfulness  of  certain 
sensations,  the  clear  distinction  between   ideas  from  actual 

*  Thus  it  results  that  knowledge,  although  dependent  on  experience  for  all 
its  materials,  extends  beyond  experience.  The  understanding  is  completely 
bound  in  the  reception  of  simple  ideas  ;  less  so  in  the  combination  "I  these  into 
complex  ideas  ;  absolutely  free  in  the  act  of  comparison,  which  it  can  omil  at 
will  ;  finally,  again,  completely  bound  in  its  recognition  of  the  relation  in  which 
the  ideas  it  has  chosen  to  compare  stand  to  one  another,  There  is  room  for 
choice  only  in  the  intermediate  stage  of  the  cognitive  process  ;  at  the  beginning 
(in  the  reception  of  the  simple  ideas  of  perception,  a,  b,  c,  d),  and  al  the  end 
(in  judging  how  the  concepts  a  b  c  and  a  b  d  stand  related  to  each  other),  the 
understanding  is  completely  determined. 


1 68  LOCKE. 

perception  and  those  from  memory,  the  possibility  of  pro- 
ducing and  predicting  new  sensations  of  an  entirely  definite 
nature  in  ourselves  and  in  others,  by  means  of  changes 
which  we  effect  in  the  external  world  (e.  g.,  by  writing 
down  a  word) — these  give  further  justification  for  the  trust 
which  we  put  in  the  senses.  No  one  will  be  so  skeptical 
as  to  doubt  in  earnest  the  existence  of  the  things  which  he 
sees  and  touches,  and  to  declare  his  whole  life  to  be  a 
deceptive  dream.  The  certitude  which  perception  affords 
concerning  the  existence  of  external  objects  is  indeed  not 
an  absolute  one,  but  it  is  sufficient  for  the  needs  of  life  and 
the  government  of  our  actions  ;  it  is  "  as  certain  as  our 
happiness  or  misery,  beyond  which  we  have  no  concernment, 
either  of  knowing  or  being."  In  regard  to  the  past  the 
testimony  of  the  senses  is  supplemented  by  memory,  in 
which  certainty  [in  regard  to  the  continued  existence  of 
things  previously  perceived]  is  transformed  into  high  prob- 
ability ;  while  in  regard  to  the  existence  of  other  finite 
spirits,  numberless  kinds  of  which  may  be  conjectured  to 
exist,  though  their  existence  is  quite  beyond  our  powers 
of  perception,  certitude  sinks  into  mere  (though  well- 
grounded)  faith. 

More  certain  than  our  sensitive  knowledge  of  the  exist- 
ence of  external  objects,  are  our  immediate  or  intuitive 
knowledge  of  our  own  existence  and  our  mediate  or  demon- 
strative knowledge  of  the  existence  of  God.  Every  idea 
that  we  have,  every  pain,  every  thought  assures  us  of  our 
own  existence.  The  existence  of  God,  however,  as  the 
infinite  cause  of  all  reality,  endowed  with  intelligence,  will, 
and  supreme  power,  is  inferred  from  the  existence  and  con- 
stitution of  the  world  and  of  ourselves.  Reality  exists  ;  the 
real  world  is  composed  of  matter  in  motion  and  thinking 
beings,  and  is  harmoniously  ordered.  Since  it  is  impossible 
for  any  real  being  to  be  produced  by  nothing,  and  since  we 
obtain  no  satisfactory  answer  to  the  question  of  origin 
until  we  rise  to  something  existent  from  all  eternity,  we 
must  assume  as  the  cause  of  that  which  exists  an  Eternal 
Being,  which  possesses  in  a  higher  degree  all  the  perfec- 
tions which  it  has  bestowed  upon  the  creatures.  As  tht 
cause  of  matter  and  motion,  and  as  the  source  of  all  power, 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  169 

this  Being  must  be  omnipotent  ;  as  the  cause  of  beauty 
and  order  in  the  world,  and,  above  all,  as  the  creator  of 
thinking  beings,  it  must  be  omniscient.  But  these  per- 
fections are  those  which  we  combine  in  the  idea  of  God. 

Intuitive  knowledge  is  the  highest  of  the  three  degrees 
of  knowledge.  It  is  gained  when  the  mind  perceives  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  two  ideas  at  first  sight,  with- 
out hesitation,  and  without  the  intervention  of  any  third 
idea.  This  immediate  knowledge  is  self-evident,  irresistible, 
and  exposed  to  no  doubt.  Knowledge  is  demonstrative 
when  the  mind  perceives  the  agreement  (or  disagreement) 
of  two  ideas,  not  by  placing  them  side  by  side  and  com- 
paring them,  but  through  the  aid  of  other  ideas.  The 
intermediate  links  are  called  proofs;  their  discovery  is  the 
work  of  the  reason,  and  quickness  in  finding  them  out  is 
termed  sagacity.  The  greater  the  number  of  the  interme- 
diate steps,  the  more  the  clearness  and  distinctness  of  the 
knowledge  decreases,  and  the  more  the  possibility  of  error 
increases.  In  order  for  an  argument  {e.  g.,  that  a  =  d)  to  be 
conclusive,  every  particular  step  in  it  (a  =  b,  b  =  c,  c  =  d) 
must  possess  intuitive  certainty.  Mathematics  is  not  the 
only  example  of  demonstrative  knowledge,  but  the  most 
perfect  one,  since  in  mathematics,  by  the  aid  of  visible 
symbols,  the  full  equality  and  the  least  differences  among 
ideas  may  be  exactly  measured  and  sharply  determined. 

Besides  real  existence  Locke,  unsystematically  enough, 
enumerates  three  other  sorts  of  agreement  between  ideas, — 
in  the  perception  of  which  he  makes  knowledge  consist, — 
viz.,  identity  or  diversity  (blue  is  not  yellow),  relation  (when 
equals  are  added  to  equals  the  results  are  equal),  and  co- 
existence or  necessary  connexion  (gold  is  fixed).  We  are 
best  off  in  regard  to  the  knowledge  of  the  first  of  these, 
"  identity  or  diversity,"  for  here  our  intuition  extends 
as  far  as  our  ideas,  since  we  recognize  every  idea,  as  soon  as 
it  arises,  as  identical  with  itself  and  different  from  others. 
We  are  worst  off  in  regard  to  "  necessary  connexion."  We 
know  something,  indeed,  concerning  the  incompatibility  or 
coexistence  of  certain  properties  (<?.  g.,  that  the  same  ob- 
ject cannot  have  two  different  sizes  or  colors  at  the  same 
time;  that  figure  cannot  exist  apart  from  extension):  but  it 


17°  LOCKE. 

is  only  in  regard  to  a  few  qualities  and  powers  of  bodies 
that  we  are  able  to  discover  dependence  and  necessary- 
connexion  by  intuitive  or  demonstrative  thought,  while  in 
most  cases  we  are  dependent  on  experience,  which  gives  us 
information  concerning  particular  cases  only,  and  affords 
no  guarantee  that  things  are  the  same  beyond  the  sphere  of 
our  observation  and  experiment.  Since  empirical  inquiry 
furnishes  no  certain  and  universal  knowledge,  and  since  the 
assumption  that  like  bodies  will  in  the  same  circumstances 
have  like  effects  is  only  a  conjecture  from  analogy,  natural 
science  in  the  strict  sense  does  not  exist.  Both  mathe- 
matics and  ethics,  however,  belong  in  the  sphere  of  the 
demonstrative  knowledge  of  relations.  The  principles  of 
ethics  are  as  capable  of  exact  demonstration  as  those  of 
arithmetic  and  geometry,  although  their  underlying  ideas 
are  more  complex,  more  involved,  hence  more  exposed  to 
misunderstanding,  and  lacking  in  visible  symbols  ;  though 
these  defects  can,  and  should,  in  part  be  made  good  by 
careful  and  strictly  consistent  definitions.  Such  moral 
principles  as  "  where  there  is  no  property  there  is  no  injus- 
tice," or  "  no  government  allows  absolute  liberty,"  are  as 
certain  as  any  proposition  in  Euclid. 

The  advantage  of  the  mathematical  and  moral  sciences 
over  the  physical  sciences  consists  in  the  fact  that,  in  the 
former,  the  real  and  nominal  essences  of  their  objects  coin- 
cide, while  in  the  latter  they  do  not ;  and,  further,  that  the 
real  essences  of  substances  are  beyond  our  knowledge.  The 
true  inner  constitution  of  bodies,  the  root  whence  all  their 
qualities,  and  the  coexistence  of  these,  necessarily  proceed, 
is  completely  unknown  to  us;  so  that  we  are  unable  to 
deduce  them  from  it.  Mathematical  and  moral  ideas,  on 
the  other  hand,  and  their  relations,  are  entirely  accessible, 
for  they  are  the  products  of  our  own  voluntary  operations. 
They  are  not  copied  from  things,  but  are  archetypal  for 
reality  and  need  no  confirmation  from  experience.  The 
connexion  constituted  by  our  understanding  between  the 
ideas  crime  and  punishment  (e.  g.,  the  proposition:  crime 
deserves  punishment)  is  valid,  even  though  no  crime  had 
ever  been  committed,  and  none  ever  punished.  Exist- 
ence is  not  at  all  involved  in  universal  propositions  ;  "  gen- 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  171 

eral  knowledge  lies  only  in  our  own  thoughts,  and  consists 
barely  in  the  contemplation  of  our  own  abstract  ideas  " 
and  their  relations.  The  truths  of  mathematics  and  ethics 
are  both  universal  and  certain,  while  in  natural  science 
single  observations  and  experiments  are  certain,  but 
not  general,  and  general  propositions  are  only  more  or 
less  probable.  Both  the  particular  experiments  and  the 
general  conclusions  are  of  great  value  under  certain  circum- 
stances, but  they  do  not  meet  the  requirements  of  compre- 
hensive and  certain  knowledge. 

The  extent  of  our  knowledge  is  very  limited — much  less, 
in  fact,  than  that  of  our  ignorance.  For  our  knowledge 
reaches  no  further  than  our  ideas,  and  the  possibility  of 
perceiving  their  agreements.  Many  things  exist  of  which 
we  have  no  ideas — chiefly  because  of  the  fewness  of  our 
senses  and  their  lack  of  acuteness — and  just  as  many  of 
which  our  ideas  are  only  imperfect.  Moreover,  we  are  often 
able  neither  to  command  the  ideas  which  we  really  possess, 
or  at  least  might  attain,  nor  to  perceive  their  connexions. 
The  ideas  which  are  lacking,  those  which  are  undiscover- 
able,  those  which  are  not  combined,  are  the  causes  of  the 
narrow  limits  of  human  knowledge. 

There  are  two  ways  by  which  knowledge  may  be  ex- 
tended :  by  experience,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other, 
by  the  elevation  of  our  ideas  to  a  state  of  clearness  and 
distinctness,  together  with  the  discovery  and  systematic 
arrangement  of  those  intermediate  ideas  which  exhibit  the 
relation  of  other  ideas,  in  themselves  not  immediately  com- 
parable. The  syllogism,  as  an  artificial  form,  is  of  little 
value  in  the  perception  of  the  agreements  between  these 
intermediate  and  final  terms,  and  of  none  whatever  in  the 
discovery  of  the  former.  Analytical  and  identical  proposi- 
tions which  merely  explicate  the  conception  of  the  subject, 
but  express  nothing  not  already  known,  arc,  in  spite  of 
their  indefeasible  certitude,  valueless  for  the  extension  of 
knowledge,  and  when  taken  for  more  than  verbal  expla- 
nations, mere  absurdities.  Even  those  most  general  prop- 
ositions, those  "principles"  which  are  so  much  talked  of 
in  the  schools,  lack  the  utility  which  is  so  commonly 
ascribed   to  them.      Maxims  arc,  it    is  true,  fit   instruments 


172  LOCKE. 

for  the  communication  of  knowledge  already  acquired, 
and  in  learned  disputations  may  perform  indispensable 
service  in  silencing  opponents,  or  in  bringing  the  dispute 
to  a  conclusion  ;  but  they  are  of  little  or  no  use  in  the 
discovery  of  new  truth.  It  is  a  mistake  to  believe  that 
special  cases  (as  5  =  2  +  3,  or  5  =  1+4)  are  dependent 
on  the  truth  of  the  abstract  rule  (the  whole  is  equal  to  the 
sum  of  its  parts),  that  they  are  confirmed  by  it  and  must  be 
derived  from  it.  The  particular  and  concrete  is  not  only 
as  clear  and  certain  as  the  general  maxim,  but  better 
known  than  this,  as  well  as  earlier  and  more  easily  per- 
ceived. Nay,  further,-  in  cases  where  ideas  are  confused 
and  the  meanings  of  words  doubtful,  the  use  of  axioms  is 
dangerous,  since  they  may  easily  lend  the  appearance  of 
proved  truth  to  assertions  which  are  really  contradictory. 

Between  the  clear  daylight  of  certain  knowledge  and  the 
dark  night  of  absolute  ignorance  comes  the  twilight  of 
probability.  We  find  ourselves  dependent  on  opinion  and 
presumption,  or  judgment  based  upon  probability,  when 
experience  and  demonstration  leave  us  in  the  lurch  and  we 
are,  nevertheless,  challenged  to  a  decision  by  vital  needs 
which  brook  no  delay.  The  judge  and  the  historian  must 
convince  themselves  from  the  reports  of  witnesses  concern- 
ing events  which  they  have  not  themselves  observed  ;  and 
everyone  is  compelled  by  the  interests  of  life,  of  duty,  and 
of  eternal  salvation  to  form  conclusions  concerning  things 
which  lie  beyond  the  limits  of  his  own  perception  and  reflect- 
ive thought,  nay,  which  transcend  all  human  experience 
and  rigorous  demonstration  whatever.  To  delay  decision 
and  action  until  absolute  certainty  had  been  attained,  would 
scarcely  allow  us  to  lift  a  single  finger.  In  cases  concerning 
events  in  the  past,  the  future,  or  at  a  distance,  we  rely  on 
the  testimony  of  others  (testing  their  reports  by  considering 
their  credibility  as  witnesses  and  the  conformity  of  the  evi- 
dence to  general  experience  in  like  cases)  ;  in  regard  to 
questions  concerning  that  which  is  absolutely  beyond  ex- 
perience, e.g.,  higher  orders  of  spirits,  or  the  ultimate  causes 
of  natural  phenomena,  analogy  is  the  only  help  we  have. 
If  the  witnesses  conflict  among  themselves,  or  with  the 
usual  course  of  nature,  the  grounds  pro  and  con  must   be 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  173 

carefully  balanced  ;  frequently,  however,  the  degree  of  prob- 
ability attained  is  so  great  that  our  assent  is  almost  equiva- 
lent to  complete  certainty.  No  one  doubts, — although  it 
is  impossible  for  him  to  "know," — that  Caesar  conquered 
Pompey,  that  gold  is  ductile  in  Australia  as  elsewhere,  that 
iron  will  sink  to-morrow  as  well  as  to-day.  Thus  opinion 
supplements  the  lack  of  certain  knowledge,  and  serves  as  a 
guide  for  belief  and  action,  wherever  the  general  lot  of  man- 
kind or  individual  circumstances  prevent  absolute  certitude. 

Although  in  this  twilight  region  of  opinion  demonstra- 
tive proofs  are  replaced  merely  by  an  "  occasion  "  for  "  tak- 
ing "  a  given  fact  or  idea  "as  true  rather  than  false,"  yet 
assent  is  by  no  means  an  act  of  choice,  as  the  Cartesians 
had  erroneously  maintained,  for  in  knowledge  it  is  deter- 
mined by  clearly  discerned  reasons,  and  in  the  sphere  of 
opinion,  by  the  balance  of  probability.  The  understanding 
is  free  only  in  combining  ideas,  not  in  its  judgment  con- 
cerning the  agreement  or  the  repugnancy  of  the  ideas  com- 
pared ;  it  lies  within  its  own  power  to  decide  whether  it 
will  judge  at  all,  and  what  ideas  it  will  compare,  but  it  has 
no  control  over  the  result  of  the  comparison  ;  it  is  impossible 
for  it  to  refuse  its  assent  to  a  demonstrated  truth  or  a  pre- 
ponderant probability. 

In  this  recognition  of  objective  and  universally  valid 
relations  existing  among  ideas,  which  the  thinking  subject, 
through  comparisons  voluntarily  instituted,  discovers  valid 
or  finds  given,  but  which  it  can  neither  alter  nor  demur  to, 
Locke  abandons  empirical  ground  (cf.  p.  155)  and  approaches 
the  idealists  of  the  Platonizing  type.  His  inquiry  divides 
into  two  very  dissimilar  parts  (a  psychological  descrip- 
tion of  the  origin  of  ideas  and  a  logical  determination  of 
the  possibility  and  the  extent  of  knowledge),  the  latter 
of  which  is,  in  Locke's  opinion,  compatible  with  the 
former,  but  which  could  never  have  been  developed  from 
it.  The  rationalistic  edifice  contradicts  the  sensationalistic 
foundation.  Locke  had  hoped  to  show  the  value  and  the 
limits  of  knowledge  by  an  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  ideas, 
but  his  estimate  of  this  value  and  these  limits  cannot  be 
proved  from  the  a  posteriori  origin  of  ideas — it  can  only  be 
maintained  in  despite  of  this,  and  stands  in    need  of  sup- 


174  LOCKT. 

port  from  some  (rationalistic)  principle  elsewhere  obtained. 
Thinkers  who  trace  back  all  simple  ideas  to  outer  and 
inner  perception  we  expect  to  reject  every  attempt  to 
extend  knowledge  beyond  the  sphere  of  experience,  to 
declare  the  combinations  of  ideas  which  have  their  origin 
in  sensation  trustworthy,  and  those  which  are  formed  with- 
out regard  to  perception,  illusory  ;  or  else,  with  Protagoras, 
to  limit  knowledge  to  the  individual  perceiving  subject, 
with  a  consequent  complete  denial  of  its  general  validity. 
But  exactly  the  opposite  of  all  these  is  found  in  Locke.  The 
remarkable  spectacle  is  presented  of  a  philosopher  who 
admits  no  other  sources  of  ideas  than  perception  and  the  vol- 
untary combination  of  perceptions,  transcending  the  limits 
of  experience  with  proofs  of  the  divine  existence,  viewing 
with  suspicion  the  ideas  of  substance  formed  at  the  instance 
of  experience,  and  reducing  natural  science  to  the  sphere 
of  mere  opinion  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  he  ascribes  real- 
ity and  eternal  validity  to  the  combinations  of  ideas  formed 
independently  of  perception,  which  are  employed  by  math- 
ematics and  ethics,  and  completely  abandons  the  individu- 
alistic position  in  his  naive  faith  in  the  impregnable 
validity  of  the  relations  of  ideas,  which  is  evident  to  all 
who  turn  their  attention  to  them.  The  ground  for  the 
universal  validity  of  the  relations  among  ideas  as  well  as  of 
our  knowledge  of  them,  naturally  lies  not  in  their  empir- 
ical origin  (for  my  experience  gives  information  to  me  alone, 
and  that  only  concerning  the  particular  case  in  question), 
but  in  the  uniformity  of  man's  rational  constitution.  If 
two  men  really  have  the  same  ideas — not  merely  think 
they  have  because  they  use  similar  language — it  is  impossi- 
ble, according  to  Locke,  that  they  should  hold  different 
opinions  concerning  the  relation  of  their  ideas.  With  this 
conviction,  that  the  universal  validity  of  knowledge  is 
rooted  in  the  uniformity  of  man's  rational  constitution,  and 
the  further  one,  that  we  attain  certain  knowledge  only 
when  things  conform  to  our  ideas,  Locke  closely  approaches 
Kant  ;  while  his  assumption  of  a  fixed  order  of  relations 
among  ideas,  which  the  individual  understanding  can- 
not refuse  to  recognize,  and  the  typical  character  assigned 
to     mathematics,    associate    him    with     Malebranche    and 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  175 

Spinoza.  In  view  of  these  points  of  contact  with  the 
rationalistic  school  and  his  manifold  dependence  on  its 
founder,  we  may  venture  the  paradox,  that  Locke  may  not 
only  be  termed  a  Baconian  with  Cartesian  leanings,  but 
(almost)  a  Cartesian  influenced  by  Bacon.  The  possibility 
must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  rationalistic  sugges- 
tions came  to  him  also  from  Galileo,  Hobbes,  and  Newton.* 
Intermediate  between  knowledge  and  opinion  stands 
faith  as  a  form  of  assent  which  is  based  on  testimony  rather 
than  on  deductions  of  the  reason,  but  whose  certitude  is 
not  inferior  to  that  of  knowledge,  since *t  is  a  communica- 
tion from  God,  who  can  neither  deceive  nor  be  deceived. 
Faith  and  the  certainty  thereof  depend  on  reason,  in  so  far 
as  reason  alone  can  determine  whether  a  divine  revelation 
has  really  been  made  and  the  meaning  of  the  words  in 
which  the  revelation  has  come  down  to  us.  In  determin- 
ing the  boundaries  of  faith  and  reason  Locke  makes  use  of 
the  distinction — which  has  become  famous — between  things 
above  reason,  according  to  reason,  and  contrary  to  reason. 
Our  conviction  that  God  exists  is  according  to  reason  ; 
the  belief  that  there  are  more  gods  than  one,  or  that  a 
body  can  be  in  two  different  places  at  the  same  time,  con- 
trary to  reason  ;  the  former  is  a  truth  which  can  be  dem- 
onstrated on  rational  grounds,  the  latter  an  assumption 
incompatible  with  our  clear  and  distinct  ideas.  In  the  one 
case  revelation  confirms  a  proposition  of  which  we  were 
already  certain  ;  in  the  other  an  alleged  revelation  is  in- 
capable of  depriving  our  certain  knowledge  of  its  force. 
Above  reason  are  those  principles  whose  probability  and 
truth  cannot  be  shown  by  the  natural  use  of  our  faculties, 
as  that  the  dead  shall  rise  again  and  the  account  of  the  fall 
of  part  of  the  angels.  Among  the  things  which  are  not 
contrary  to  reason  belong  miracles,  for  they  contradict 
opinion  based  on  the  usual  course  of  nature,  it  is  true,  hut 
not  our  certain  knowledge;  in  spite  of  their  supernatural 
character  they  deserve  willing  acceptance,  and  receive  it, 
when  they  are  well  attested,  whereas  principles  contrary  to 
reason  must  be  unconditionally  rejected  as  a  revelation 
from  God.     Locke's  demand   for  the  subjection  of  faith  to 

*  Cf.  the  article  by  Henno  Erdmann  cited  p.  156,  note. 


176  LOCKE. 

rational  criticism  assures  him  an  honorable  place  in  the 
history  of  English  deism.  He  enriched  the  philosophy  of 
religion  by  two  treatises  of  his  own  :  The  Reasonableness  of 
Christianity,  1695,  and  three  Letters  on  Tolerance,  1689-1692. 
The  former  transfers  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  Chris- 
tian religion  from  history  to  the  doctrine  of  redemption  ; 
the  Letters  demand  religious  freedom,  mutual  tolerance 
among  the  different  sects,  and  the  separation  of  Church  and 
State.  Those  sects  aloite  are  to  receive  no  tolerance  which 
themselves  exercise  none,  and  which  endanger  the  well- 
.  being  of, society  ;j&gether  withAth«ists,  wh*o  are  incapable 
of  taking  oaths.  In  other  respects  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
»         state  to  protect  wall  confessions  and  to  favor  none. 

(b)  Practical  Philosophy. — Locke  contributed  to  practical 
philosophy  important  suggestions  concerning  freedom, 
morality^p^tttics,  and  education.  Freedom  is  the  "power 
to  begin  or  forbear,  continue  or  put  an  end  to "  actions 
•  ^  <fr!fc>ug his  andjmaÜÄis).  ^Jt  is  not  destroyed  by  the  fact 
that  the  will  is  always  moved  by  desire,  more  exactly,  by 
y.  ^  ^  uneasiness  i|*^def  prWent  ciscumjjt^nces,  and  that  the  deci- 
sion is  determined  by  the  judgment  of  the  understanding. 
Although  the  result  of  examination  is  itself  dependent  on 
the  unaltera%le*reiMK>ns*£>f  idea%7  ft  is  still  in  our  power  to 
decide  whether  we  wnl  consider  at  all,  and  what  ideas  we 
will  take  into  consideration.  Not  the  thought,  not  the  deter- 
mination of  the  will,  is  free,  but  the  person,  the  mind;  this 
has  the  power  to  suspend  the  prosecution  of  desire,  and  by 
its  judgment  to  determine  the  will,  even  in  opposition  to 
inclination.  Four  stages  must,  consequently,  be  distin- 
guished in  the  volitional  process:  desire  or  uneasiness; 
the  deliberative  combination  of  ideas;  the  judgment  of  the 
understanding;  determination.  Freedom  has  its  place  at 
the  beginning  of  the  second  stage :  it  is  open  to  me  to 
decide  whether  to  proceed  at  all  to  consideration  and  final 
judgment  concerning  a  proposed  action  ;  thus  to  prevent 
desire  from  directly  issuing  in  movements;  and,  according 
to  the  result  of  my  examination,  perhaps,  to  substitute 
for  the  act  originally  desired  an  opposite  one.  Without 
freedom,  moral  judgment  and  responsibility  would  be  im- 
possible.   The  above  appears  to  us  to  represent  the  essence 


PRACTICAL   PHILOSOPHY.  177 

of  Locke's  often  vacillating  discussion  of  freedom  (II.  21). 
Desire  is  directed  to  pleasure;  the  will  obeys  the  under- 
standing, which  is  exalted  above  motives  of  pleasure 
and  the  passions.  Everything  is  physically  good  which 
occasions  and  increases  pleasure  in  us,  which  removes  or 
diminishes  pain,  or  contributes  to  the  attainment  of  some 
other  good  and  the  avoidance  of  some  other  evil.  Actions, 
on  the  contrary,  are  morally  good  when  they  conform  to  a 
rule  by  which  they  are  judged.  Whoever  earnestly  medi- 
tates on  his  welfare  will  prefer  moral  or  rational  good  to 
sensuous  good,  since  the  former  alone  vouchsafes  true 
happiness.  God  has  most  intimately  united  virtue  and 
general  happiness,  since  he  has  made  the  preservation  of 
human  society  dependent  on  the  exercise  of  virtue. 

The  mark  of  a  law  for  free  beings  is  the  fact  that  it  appor- 
tions reward  for  obedience  and  punishment  for  disobedience. 
The  laws  to  which  an  action  must  conform  in  order  to 
deserve  the  predicate  "good"  are  three  in  number  (II. 
28) :  by  the  divine  law  "  men  judge  whether  their  actions 
are  sins  or  duties";  by  the  civil  law,  "whether  they  be 
criminal  or  innocent  "  (deserving  of  punishment  or  not) ;  by 
the  law  of  opinion  or  reputation,  "  whether  they  be  virtues 
or  vices."  The  first  of  these  laws  threatens  immorality  with 
future  misery;  the  second,  with  legal  punishments;  the 
third,  with  the  disapproval  of  our  fellow-men. 

The  third  law,  the  law  of  opinion  or  reputation,  called 
also  philosophical,  coincides  on  the  whole,  though  not 
throughout,  with  the  first,  the  divine  law  of  nature,  which 
is  best  expressed  in  Christianity,  and  which  is  the  true 
touchstone  of  the  moral  character  of  actions.  While  Locke, 
in  his  polemic  against  innate  ideas,  had  emphasized  the  diver- 
sity of  moral  judgments  among  individuals  and  nations  (as 
a  result  of  which  an  action  is  condemned  in  one  place  and 
praised  as  virtuous  in  another),  he  here  gives  prominence  to 
the  fact  of  general  agreement  in  essentials,  since  it  is  only 
natural  that  each  should  encourage  by  praise  and  esteem 
that  which  is  to  his  advantage,  while  virtue  evidently  con- 
duces to  the  good  of  all  who  come  into  contact  with  the 
virtuous.  Amid  the  greatest  diversity  of  moral  judg- 
ments   virtue    and    praise,    vice    and    blame,    go    together, 


178  LOCKE. 

while  in  general  that  is  praised  which  is  really  praise- 
worthy— even  the  vicious  man  approves  the  right  and  con- 
demns that  which  is  faulty,  at  least  in  others.  Locke  was 
the  first  to  call  attention  to  general  approval  as  an  external 
mark  of  moral  action,  a  hint  which  the  Scottish  moralists 
subsequently  exploited.  The  objection  that  he  reduced 
.  morality  to  the  level  of  the  conventional  is  unjust,  for  the  law 
of  opinion  and  reputation  did  not  mean  for  him  the  true 
principle  of  morality,  but  only  that  which  controls  the 
majority  of  mankind. — If  anyone  is  inclined  to  doubt  that 
commendation  and  disgrace  are  sufficient  motives  to  action, 
he  does  not  understand  mankind  ;  there  is  hardly  one  in 
ten  thousand  insensible  enough  to  endure  in  quiet  the  con- 
stant disapproval  of  society.  Even  if  the  lawbreaker  hopes 
to  escape  punishment  at  the  hands  of  the  state,  and  puts 
out  of  mind  the  thought  of  future  retribution,  he  can  never 
escape  the  disapproval  of  his  misdeeds  on  the  part  of  his 
fellows.  In  entire  harmony  with  these  views  is  Locke's 
advice  to  educators,  that  they  should  early  cultivate  the 
love  of  esteem  in  their  pupils. 

Of  the  four  principles  of  morals  which  Locke  employs 
side  by  side,  and  in  alternation,  without  determining  their 
exact  relations — the  reason,  the  will  of  God,  the  general  good 
(and,  deduced  from  this,  the  approval  of  our  fellow-men), 
self-love — the  latter  two  possess  only  an  accessory  signifi- 
cance, while  the  former  two  co-operate  in  such  a  way  that 
the  one  determines  the  content  of  the  good  and  the  other 
confirms  it  and  gives  it  binding  authority.  The  Christian 
religion  does  the  reason  a  threefold  service — it  gives  her 
information  concerning  our  duty,  which  she  could  have 
reached  herself,  indeed,  without  the  help  of  revelation,  but 
not  with  the  same  certitude  and  rapidity;  it  invests  the 
good  with  the  majesty  of  absolute  obligation  by  proclaim- 
ing it  as  the  command  of  God  ;  it  increases  the  motives  to 
morality  by  its  doctrines  of  immortality  and  future  retribu- 
tion. Although  Locke  thus  intimately  joins  virtue  with 
earthly  joy  and  eternal  happiness,  and  although  he  finds 
in  the  expectation  of  heaven  or  hell  a  welcome  support 
for  the  will  in  its  conflict  with  the  passions,  we  must 
remember  that  he  values  this   regard    for  the   results  and 


PRACTICAL  PHILOSOPHY.  179 

rewards  of  virtue  only  as  a  subsidiary  motive,  and  does  not 
esteem  it  as  in  itself  ethical :  eternal  happiness  forms,  as  it 
were,  the  "  dowry"  of  virtue,  which  adds  to  its  true  value 
in  the  eyes  of  fools  and  the  weak,  though  it  constitutes 
neither  its  essence  nor  its  basis.  Virtue  seems  to  the  wise 
man  beautiful  and  valuable  enough  even  without  this,  and 
yet  the  commendations  of  philosophers  gain  for  her  but 
few  wooers.  The  crowd  is  attracted  to  her  only  when  it  is 
made  clear  to  it  that  virtue  is  the  "best  policy." 

In  politics  Locke  is  an  opponent  of  both  forms  of  abso- 
lutism, the  despotic  absolutism  of  Hobbes  and  the  patri- 
archal absolutism  of  Filmer  (died  1647 ;  his  PatriarcJia 
declared  hereditary  monarchy  a  divine  institution),  and  a 
moderate  exponent  of  the  liberal  tendencies  of  Milton 
{1608-74)  and  Algernon  Sidney  (died  1683 ;  Discourses 
concerning  Government).  The  two  Treatises  on  Civil  Govern- 
ment, 1690,  develop,  the  first  negatively,  the  second  posi- 
tively, the  constitutional  theory  with  direct  reference  to 
the  political  condition  of  England  at  the  time.  All  men  are 
born  free  and  with  like  capacities  and  rights.  Each  is  to 
preserve  his  own  interests,  without  injuring  those  of  others. 
The  right  to  be  treated  by  every  man  as  a  rational  being 
holds  even  prior  to  the  founding  of  the  state  ;  but  then 
there  is  no  authoritative  power  to  decide  conflicts.  The 
state  of  nature  is  not  in  itself  a  state  of  war,  but  it  would 
lead  to  this,  if  each  man  should  himself  attempt  to  exercise 
the  right  of  self-protection  against  injury.  In  order  to  pre- 
vent acts  of  violence  there  is  needed  a  civil  community, 
based  on  a  free  contract,  to  which  each  individual  mem- 
ber shall  transfer  his  freedom  and  power.  Submission  to  the 
authority  of  the  state  is  a  free  act,  and,  by  the  contract 
made,  natural  rights  are  guarded,  not  destroyed;  political 
freedom  is  obedience  to  self-imposed  law,  subordination  to 
the  common  will  expressing  itself  in  the  majority.  The 
political  power  is  neither  tyrannical,  for  arbitrary  rule  is  no 
better  than  the  state  of  nature,  nor  paternal,  for  rulers  and 
subjects  arc  on  an  equality  in  the  use  of  the  reason,  which 
is  not  the  case  with  parents  and  children.  The  supreme 
power  is  the  legislative,  intrusted  by  the  community  to  its 
chosen  representatives — the  laws  should  aim  at  the  general 


i  So  LOCKE. 

good.  Subordinate  to  the  legislative  power,  and  to  be 
kept  separate  from  it,  come  the  two  executing  powers,  which 
are  best  united  in  a  single  hand  (the  king),  viz.,  the  exec- 
utive power  (administrative  and  judicial),  which  carries  the 
laws  into  effect,  and  the  federative  power,  which  defends 
the  community  against  external  foes.  The  ruler  is  subject 
to  the  law.  If  the  government,  through  violation  of  the 
law,  has  become  unworthy  of  the  power  intrusted  to  it,  and 
has  forfeited  it,  sovereign  authority  reverts  to  the  source 
whence  it  was  derived,  that  is,  to  the  people.  The  people 
decides  whether  its  representatives  and  the  monarch  have 
deserved  the  confidence  placed  in  them,  and  has  the  right  to 
depose  them,  if  they  exceed  their  authority.  As  the  sworn 
obedience  (of  the  subjects)  is  to  the  law  alone,  the  ruler 
who  acts  contrary  to  law  has  lost  the  right  to  govern,  has  put 
himself  in  a  state  of  hostility  to  the  people,  and  revolution 
becomes  merely  necessary  defense  against  aggression. 

Montesquieu  made  these  political  ideas  of  Locke  the 
common  property  of  Europe.*  Rousseau  did  a  like  serv- 
ice for  Locke's  pedagogical  views,  given  in  the  modest 
but  important  Thoughts  concerning  Education,  1693.  The 
aim  of  education  should  not  be  to  instill  anything  into  the 
pupil,  but  to  develop  everything  from  him ;  it  should 
guide  and  not  master  him,  should  develop  his  capacities  in 
a  natural  way,  should  rouse  him  to  independence,  not 
drill  him  into  a  scholar.  In  order  to  these  ends  thorough 
and  affectionate  consideration  of  his  individuality  is  requi- 
site, and  private  instruction  is,  therefore,  to  be  preferred  to 
public  instruction.  Since  it  is  the  business  of  education  to 
make  men  useful  members  of  society,  it  must  not  neglect 
their  physical  development.  Learning  through  play  and 
object  teaching  make  the  child's  task  a  delight;  modern 
languages  are  to  be  learned  more  by  practice  than  by  sys- 
tematic study.  The  chief  difference  between  Locke  and 
Rousseau  is  that  the  former  sets  great  value  on  arousing 
the  sense  of  esteem,  while  the  latter  entirely  rejects  this  as 
an  educational  instrument. 

*  Cf.  Theod.  Pietsch,  Ueber  das  Verhältniss  der  politischen  Theorien  Loches 
zu  Montesquieus  Lehre  von  der  Teilung  der  Gewalten,  Berlin  dissertation, 
Breslau,  1887. 


CHAPTER  V. 

ENGLISH    PHILOSOPHY    IN    THE    EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY. 

BESIDES  the  theory  of  knowledge,  which  forms  the  cen- 
tral doctrine  in  his  system,  Locke  had  discussed  the  remain- 
ing branches  of  philosophy,  though  in  less  detail,  and,  by 
his  many-sided  stimulation,  had  posited  problems  for  the 
Illumination  movement  in  England  and  in  France.  Now 
the  several  disciplines  take  different  courses,  but  the  after- 
influence  of  his  powerful  mind  is  felt  on  every  hand.  The 
development  of  deism  from  Toland  on  is  under  the  direct 
influence  of  his  "rational  Christianity";  the  ethics  of 
Shaftesbury  stands  in  polemic  relation  to  his  denial  of 
everything  innate ;  and  while  Berkeley  and  Hume  are 
deducing  the  consequences  of  his  theory  of  knowledge, 
Hartley  derives  the  impulse  to  a  new  form  of  psychology 
from  his  chapter  on  the  association  of  ideas. 

i.  Natural  Philosophy  and  Psychology. 

In  Locke's  famous  countryman,  Isaac  Newton  (1642- 
1727),*  the  modern  investigation  of  nature  attains  the  level 
toward  which  it  had  striven,  at  first  by  wishes  and  demands, 
gradually,  also,  in  knowledge  and  achievement,  since  the 
end  of  the  mediaeval  period.  Mankind  was  not  able  to  dis- 
card at  a  stroke  its  accustomed  Aristotelian  view  of  nature, 
which  animated  things  with  inner,  spirit-like  forces.  A  full 
century  intervened  between  Telesius  and  Newton,  the 
concept  of  natural  law  requiring  so  long  a  time  to  break 
out  of  its  shell.  A  tremendous  revolution  in  opinion  had 
to  be  effected  before  Newton  could  calmly  promulgate  his 

*  1669-95  professor  of  mathematics  in  Cambridge,  later  resident  in  London  ; 
1672,  member,  and,  1703,  president  of  the  Royal  Society-  Chief  work.  Philo- 
sophic Naturalis  Principia  Mathematica,  1687.  Works,  1779  seq.  On  Newton 
cf.  K.  Snell,  1843  ;  Durdik,  Leibniz  und  Newton,  1869;  Lange,  History  of 
Materialism,  vol.  i.  p.  306  scq. 

181 


i>s-  ENGLISH  PHILOSOPHY. 

great  principle,  "Abandon  substantial  forms  and  occult 
qualities  and  reduce  natural  phenomena  to  mathematical 
laws,"  before  he  could  crown  the  discoveries  of  Galileo  and 
Kepler  with  his  own.  For  this  successful  union  of  Bacon's 
experimental  induction  with  the  mathematical  deduction 
of  Descartes,  this  combination  of  the  analytic  and  the  syn- 
thetic methods,  which  was  shown  in  the  demand  for,  and  the 
establishment  of,  mathematically  formulated  natural  laws, 
presupposes  that  nature  is  deprived  of  all  inner  life  *  and  all 
qualitative  distinctions,  that  all  that  exists  is  compounded 
of  uniformly  acting  parts,  and  that  all  that  takes  place  is 
conceived  as  motion.  With  this  Hobbes's  programme  of  a 
mechanical  science  of  nature  is  fulfilled.  The  heavens  and 
the  earth  are  made  subject  to  the  same  law  of  gravitation. 
How  far  Newton  himself  adhered  to  the  narrow  meaning  of 
mechanism  (motion  from  pressure  and  impulse),  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that,  though  he  is  often  honored  as  the 
creator  of  the  dynamical  view  of  nature,  he  rejected  actio 
indistans  as  absurd,  and  deemed  it  indispensable  to  assume 
some  "  cause  "  of  gravity  (consisting,  probably,  in  the  impact 
of  imponderable  material  particles).  It  was  his  disciples 
who  first  ventured  to  proclaim  gravity  as  the  universal 
force  of  matter,  as  the  "primary  quality  of  all  bodies"  (so 
Roger  Cotes  in  the  preface  to  the  second  edition  of  the 
Principia,  1713). 

Newton  resembles  Boyle  in  uniting  profound  piety  with 
the  rigor  of  scientific  thought.  He  finds  the  most  certain 
proof  for  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  creator  in  the  won- 
derful arrangement  of  the  world-machine,  which  does  not 
need  after-adjustment  at  the  hands  of  its  creator,  and  whose 
adaptation  he  praises  as  enthusiastically  as  he  uncondition- 
ally rejects  the  mingling  of  teleological  considerations  in 
the  explanation  of  physical  phenomena.  By  this  "physico- 
theological "  argument  he  furnishes  a  welcome  support  to 
deism.  While  the  finite  mind  perceives  in  the  sensorium 
of  the  brain  the  images  of  objects  which   come  to  it  from 

*  That  the  mathematical  view  of  nature,  since  it  leaves  room  for  quantitative 
distinctions  alone,  is  equivalent  to  an  exanimation  of  nature  had  been  clearly 
recognized  by  Poiret.  As  he  significantly  remarked  :  The  principles  of  the 
Cartesian  physics  relate  merely  to  the  "  cadaver"  of  nature  (Erud.,  p.  260). 


NATURAL  PHILOSOPHY  AXD  PSYCHOLOGY.  183 

the  senses,  God  has  all  things  in  himself,  is  immediately 
present  in  all,  and  cognizes  them  without  sense-organs,  the 
expanse  of  the  universe  forming  his  sensorium. 

The  transfer  of  mechanical  views  to  psychical  phenomena 
was  also  accompanied  by  the  conviction  that  no  danger  to 
faith  in  God  would  result  therefrom,  but  rather  that  it 
would  aid  in  its  support.  The  chief  representatives  of  this 
movement,  which  followed  the  example  of  Gay,  were  the 
physician,  David  Hartley*  (1704-57),  and  his  pupil, 
Joseph  Priestley,  +  a  dissenting  minister  and  natural  scien- 
tist (born  1733,  died  in  Philadelphia  1804;  the  discoverer 
of  oxygen  gas,  1774). 

The  fundamental  position  of  these  psychologists  is  ex- 
pressed in  two  principles  :  (1)  all  cognitive  and  motive  life  is 
based  on  the  mechanism  of  psychical  elements,  the  highest 
and  most  complex  inner  phenomena  (thoughts,  feelings, 
volitions)  are  produced  by  the  combination  of  simple  ideas, 
that  is,  they  arise  through  the  "association  of  ideas";  (2) 
all  inner  phenomena,  the  complex  as  well  as  the  simple,  are 
accompanied  by,  or  rather  depend  on,  more  or  less  compli- 
cated physical  phenomena,  viz.,  nervous  processes  and  brain 
vibrations.  Although  Hartley  and  Priestley  are  agreed  in 
their  demand  for  an  associational  and  physiological  treat- 
ment of  psychology,  and  in  the  attempt  to  give  one,  they 
differ  in  this,  that  Hartley  cautiously  speaks  only  of  a 
parallelism,  a  correspondence  between  mental  and  cerebral 
processes,  and  rejects  the  materialistic  interpretation  of 
inner  phenomena,  pointing  out  that  the  heterogeneity  of 
motion  and  ideas  forbids  the  reduction  of  the  latter  to  the 
former,  and  that  psychological  analysis  never  reaches  cor- 
poreal but  only  psychical  elements.  Moreover,  it  is  only 
with  reluctance  that,  conscious  of  the  critical   character  of 

*  Hartley,  Ohseri'ations  on  Man,  his   Frame,  his    Duties,  his  Expectations. 

1749 

\  Priestley,  Hartleys  Theory  of  the  Human  Mind  on  the  Principles  of  the 
Association  of  Ideas.  1775  ;  Disquisitions  relating  to  Matter  and  Spirit.  1777  ; 
The  Doctrine  of  Philosophical  iViecessity,  1777  :  Free  Discussions  of  the  Doc- 
trines of   Materialism.   1778  (against    Richard    Price's    fetter-;    on     Materialism 

and  Philosophical  Necessity").    Cf,  on  both  Schoenlank's  dissertation,  Hartley  und 
Priestley,  die  Begründer  des  Asso  iationi  tnus  in  England,  1882. 


1S4  EX  G  LI  SI  I  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  conclusion,  lie  admits  the  dependence  of  brain  vibra- 
tions on  the  mechanical  laws  of  the  material  world  and  the 
thoroughgoing  determinateness  of  the  human  will,  consol- 
ing himself  with  the  belief  that  moral  responsibility  never- 
theless remains  intact.  Priestley,  on  the  contrary,  boldly 
avows  the  materialistic  and  deterministic  consequences  of 
his  position,  holds  that  psychical  phenomena  are  not  merely 
accompanied  by  material  motions  but  consist  in  them 
(thought  is  a  function  of  the  brain),  and  makes  psychology, 
as  the  physics  of  the  nerves,  a  part  of  physiology.  The 
denial  of  immortality  and  the  divine  origin  of  the  world 
is,  however,  by  no  means  to  follow  from  materialism. 
Priestley  not  only  combated  the  atheism  of  Holbach,  but 
also  entered  the  deistic  ranks  with  works  of  his  own  on 
Natural  Religion  and  the  Corruptions  of  Christianity. 

As  early  as  in  Hartley*  the  principle,  which  is  so  impor- 
tant for  ethics,  appears  that  things  and  actions  (e  .g.,  pro- 
motion of  the  good  of  others)  which  at  first  are  sought 
and  done  because  they  are  means  to  our  own  enjoyment,  in 
time  come  to  have  a  direct  worth  of  their  own,  apart  from 
the  original  egoistic  end.  James  Mill  (1829)  has  repeated 
this  thought  in  later  times.  As  fame  becomes  an  imme- 
diate object  of  desire  to  the  ambitious  man,  and  gold  to 
the  miser,  so,  through  association,  the  impulse  toward  that 
which  will  secure  approval  may  be  transformed  into  the 
endeavor  after  that  which  deserves  approval. 

Among  later  representatives  of  the  Associational  school 
we  may  mention  Erasmus  Darwin  (Zoonomia,  or  the  Laivs 
of  Organic  Life,  1794-96). 

2.  Deism. 

As  Bacon  and  Descartes  had  freed  natural  science, 
Hobbes,  the  state,  and  Grotius,  law  from  the  authority  of 
the  Church  and  had  placed  them  on  an  independent  basis, 
i.  e.,  the  basis  of  nature  and  reason,  so  deism  f  seeks  to  free 

*  Cf.  Jodl.  Geschickte  der  Ethik,  vol.  i.  p.  197  seq. 

fCf.  Lechler's  Geschichte  des  Englischen  Deismus,  1841,  which  is  rigorously 
drawn  from  the  sources.  [Hunt,  History  of  Religious  Thought  in  England, 
1871-73  [1884]  ;  Leslie  Stephen,  History  of  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth 
Century,  1876  [1880];  Cairns,  [InMief  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  1881.I 


ENGLISH  DEISM.  185 

religion  from  Church  dogma  and  blind  historical  faith,  and 
to  deduce  it  from  natural  knowledge.  In  so  far  as  deism 
finds  both  the  source  and  the  test  of  true  religion  in  rea- 
son, it  is  rationalism  ;  in  so  far  as  it  appeals  from  the  super- 
natural light  of  revelation  and  inspiration  to  the  natural 
light  of  reason,  it  is  naturalism  ;  in  so  far  as  revelation  and 
its  records  are  not  only  not  allowed  to  restrict  rational 
criticism,  but  are  made  the  chief  object  of  criticism,  its 
adherents  are  freethinkers. 

The  general  principles  of  deism  may  be  compressed  into 
a  few  theses.  There  is  a  natural  religion,  whose  essential 
content  is  morality  ;  this  comprises  not  much  more  than 
the  two  maxims,  Believe  in  God  and  Do  your  duty.  Posi- 
tive religions  are  to  be  judged  by  this  standard.  The 
elements  in  them  which  are  added  to  natural  religion,  or 
conflict  with  it,  are  superfluous  and  harmful  additions, 
arbitrary  decrees  of  men,  the  work  of  cunning  rulers  and 
deceitful  priests.  Christianity,  which  in  its  original  form 
was  the  perfect  expression  of  the  true  religion  of  rea- 
son, has  experienced  great  corruptions  in  its  ecclesiastical 
development,  from  which  it  must  now  be  purified. 

These  principles  are  supported  by  the  following  argu- 
ments :  Truth  is  one  and  there  is  but  one  true  religion.  If 
the  happiness  of  men  depends  on  the  fulfilment  of  her 
commands,  these  must  be  comprehensible  to  every  man 
and  must  have  been  communicated  to  him  ;  and  since  a 
special  revelation  and  legislation  could  not  come  to  the 
knowledge  of  all,  they  can  be  no  other  than  the  laws  of 
duty  inscribed  on  the  human  heart.  In  order  to  salvation, 
then,  we  need  only  to  know  God  as  creator  and  judge, 
and  to  fulfill  his  commands,  i.  e.,  to  live  a  moral  life.  The 
one  true  religion  has  been  communicated  to  man  in  two 
forms,  through  the  inner  natural  revelation  of  reason, 
and  the  outer  historical  revelation  of  the  Gospel.  Since 
both  have  come  from  God  they  cannot  be  contradictor)'. 
Accordingly  natural  religion  and  the  true  one  among  the 
positive  religions  do  not  differ  in  their  content,  but  only 
in  the  manner  of  their  promulgation.  Reason  tries  his- 
torical religion  by  the  standard  furnished  by  natural  reli- 
gion, and  distinguishes  actual  from  asserted    revelation    by 


£.\<JL/SH  D£I< 

the  harmo:  s  contents  with    reason:  the   deist  be- 

lieves because   of  the   reasonableness   of  its 

these  gs       .:e  because 

the;  iigion  con- 

it  is  incomplete;  if  it  con- 
tains more   it  15  nee  it  imposes  unnecessary 
hrements.     The   authority  of  reason   t  the 
regard  to  the  credibility  of  revelation 
ubr :  indeed,  apart  from  it  there  is  no  means 
und  1  he  acceptance  of  an  external  reve- 
:\d  not  merely  as  alleged  to  be  such 
pos-                                     who  have  already  been  convinced 

aer  light  of  reason. 

:       -    h     . -.        -    -    .     h       .  .  ..  -:        .    .  ;     -  - 

though  only  cursorily  indicated  at  the  beginning, 

is  1  red  in  increasing  detail  as  the  deistic  movement 

continues  on    its    c    iirse.      Natural  religion  is  always  and 

same  -aland  necessary  is  perfect, 

I  original.     As  original,  it  is  the  earliest  religion, 

and  as  old  as  the  world  ;  as  perfect,  it  is  not  capable  of 

rovement,    but    only    of    corruption    and    restoration. 

Twice  it  has  ex  sted       perfect  purity,  as  the  religion  of  the 

:  men  and  as  1  ^ion  of  Christ.     Twice  it  has  been 

corrupt  ^-Christian  period  by  idolatry,  which 

proceed  Egyptian  ship    of    the    dead, 

hie  period  after  Christ  by  the  love  of  miracle  and  blind 

rence    for   authority.      In  both    cases    the   corruption 

has  come  from  power-loving  priests,  who  have  sought  to 

_hten  an  I  the  people  by  incomprehensible  dog- 

s   and  ostentations,   mysterious  ceremonies,   and  found 

their  advantage  in  the  superstition  of  the  multitude, — each 

new  mystery  meaning  a  gain  for  them. 

As  :  corrupted  the  primitive  religion  into  polythe- 

ty  was  corrupted  by  conforming  it  to  the 

prejudices  of  those  to  be  converted,  in  whose  eyes  the  sim- 

>f  the  new  doctrine  would  have  been  no  recommen- 

on  for  it.     The  Jew  sought  in  it  an  echo  of  the  Law,  the 

heathen  longed  for  his  :         rals  and  his  occult  philosophy; 

ith  unprofitable  ceremonial  observances 

and  needless  profundity,  it  was  Judaized  and  heathenized. 


TOLAXD.  187 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  doctrines  of  original  sin,  of  satis- 
faction and  atonement  should  prove  especially  objectionable 
to  the  purely  rational  temper  of  the  deists.  Neither  the 
guilt  of  others  (the  sin  of  our  ancestors)  nor  the  atone- 
ment of  others  (Christ's  death  on  the  cross)  can  be  imputed 
to  us  ;  Christ  can  be  called  the  Savior  only  by  way  of 
metaphor,  only  in  so  far  as  the  example  of  his  death  leads  us 
on  to  faith  and  obedience  for  ourselves.  The  name  atheism, 
which,  it  is  true,  orthodoxy  held  ready  for  every  belief  in- 
correct according  to  its  standard,  was  on  the  contrary 
undeserved.  The  deists  did  not  attack  Christian  revela- 
tion, still  less  belief  in  God.  They  considered  the  atheist 
bereft  of  reason,  and  they  by  no  means  esteemed  his- 
torical revelation  superfluous.  The  end  of  the  latter  was 
to  stir  the  mind,  to  move  men  to  reflection  and  conver- 
sion, to  transform  morals,  and  if  anyone  declared  it  unnec. 
essary  because  it  contains  nothing  but  natural  truths, 
he  was  referred  to  the  works  of  Euclid,  which  certainly 
contain  nothing  which  is  not  founded  in  the  reason,  but 
which  no  one  but  a  fool  will  consider  unnecessary  in  the 
study  of  mathematics. 

That  which  we  have  here  summarized  as  the  general 
position  of  deism,  gained  gradual  expression  through  the 
regular  development  and  specialization  of  deistic  ideas  in 
individual  representatives  of  the  movement.  The  chief 
points  and  epochs  were  marked  by  Toland's  Christianity 
not  Mysterious,  1696;  Collins's  Discourse  of  Freethinking, 
1 71 3;  Tindal's  Christianity  as  Old  as  the  Creation,  1730; 
and  Chubb's  True  Gospel  of  Jesus  Christ,  1738.  The  first 
of  these  demands  a  critique  of  revelation,  the  second  de- 
fends the  right  of  free  investigation,  the  third  declares  the 
religion  of  Christ,  which  is  merely  a  revived  natural  re- 
ligion, to  be  the  oldest  religion,  the  fourth  reduces  it 
entirely  to  moral  life. 

The  deistic  movement  was  called  into  life  by  Lord  Her- 
bert of  Cherbury  (pp.  79-80)  and  continued  by  Locke,  in  so 
far  as  the  latter  had  intrusted  to  reason  the  dis<  rimination 
of  true  from  false  revelation,  and  had  admitted  in  Chris- 
tianity elements  above  reason,  though  not  things  contrary 
to    reason.       Following   Locke,  John    Toland    (1670    \~22) 


I  SS  ENGLISH  DEISM. 

goes  a  step  further  with  the  proof  that  the  Gospel  not  only 
contains  nothing  contrary  to  reason,  but  also  nothing  above 
reason,  and  that  no  Christian  doctrine  is  to  be  called  mys- 
terious. To  the  demand  that  we  should  worship  what  we 
do  not  comprehend,  he  answers  that  reason  is  the  only 
basis  of  certitude,  and  alone  decides  on  the  divinity  of 
the  Scriptures,  by  a  consideration  of  their  contents.  The 
motive  which  impels  us  to  assent  to  a  truth  must  lie  in 
reason,  not  in  revelation,  which,  like  all  authority  and  expe- 
rience, is  merely  the  way  by  which  we  attain  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  truth  ;  it  is  a  means  of  instruction,  not  a  ground 
of  conviction.  All  faith  has  knowledge  and  understanding 
for  its  conditions,  and  is  rational  conviction.  Before  we 
can  put  our  trust  in  the  Scriptures,  we  must  be  convinced 
that  they  were  in  fact  written  by  the  authors  to  whom 
they  are  ascribed,  and  must  consider  whether  these  men, 
their  deeds,  and  their  works,  were  worthy  of  God.  The  fact 
that  God's  inmost  being  is  for  us  inscrutable  does  not  make 
him  a  mystery,  for  even  the  common  things  of  nature  are 
known  to  us  only  by  their  properties.  Miracles  are  also 
in  themselves  nothing  incomprehensible  ;  they  are  simply 
enhancements  of  natural  laws  beyond  their  ordinary  opera- 
tions, by  supernatural  assistance,  which  God  vouchsafes  but 
rarely  and  only  for  extraordinary  ends.  Toland  explains 
the  mysteries  smuggled  into  the  ethical  religion  of  Chris- 
tianity as  due  to  the  toleration  of  Jewish  and  heathen 
customs,  to  the  entrance  of  learned  speculation,  and  to 
the  selfish  inventions  of  the  clergy  and  the  rulers.  The 
Reformation  itself  had  not  entirely  restored  the  original 
purity  and   simplicity. 

Thus  far  Toland  the  deist.  In  his  later  writings,  the  five 
Letters  to  Serena,  1704,  addressed  to  the  Prussian  queen, 
Sophia  Charlotte,  and  the  Pant  heist  icon  (Cosmopoli,  1720), 
he  advances  toward  a  hylozoistic  pantheism. 

The  first  of  the  Letters  discusses  the  prejudices  of  man- 
kind;  the  second,  the  heathen  doctrine  of  immortality ;  the 
third,  the  origin  of  idolatry  ;  while  the  fourth  and  fifth  are 
devoted  to  Spinoza,  the  chief  defect  in  whose  philosophy 
is  declared  to  be  the  absence  of  an  explanation  of  motion. 
Motion  belongs  to  the  notion  of  matter  as  necessarily  as 


COLLINS.  189 

extension  and  impenetrability.  Matter  is  always  in  motion  ; 
rest  is  only  the  reciprocal  interference  of  two  moving  forces. 
The  differences  of  things  depend  on  the  various  move- 
ments of  the  particles  of  matter,  so  that  it  is  motion  which 
individualizes  matter  in  general  into  particular  things.  As 
the  Letters  ascribe  the  purposive  construction  of  organic 
beings  to  a  divine  reason,  so  the  Pantheisticon  also  stops 
short  before  it  reaches  the  extreme  of  naked  materialism. 
Everything  is  from  the  whole;  the  whole  is  infinite,  one, 
eternal,  all-rational.  God  is  the  force  of  the  whole,  the 
soul  of  the  world,  the  law  of  nature.  The  treatise  includes 
a  liturgy  of  the  pantheistic  society  with  many  quotations 
from  the  ancient  poets. 

Anthony  Collins  (1676-1729),  in  his  Discourse  of  Free- 
thinking,  shows  the  right  of  free  thought  (Y.  e.,  of  judgment 
on  rational  grounds)  in  general,  from  the  principle  that  no 
truth  is  forbidden  to  us,  and  that  there  is  no  other  way  by 
which  we  can  attain  truth  and  free  ourselves  from  super- 
stition, and  the  right  to  apply  it  to  God  and  the  Bible  in 
particular,  from  the  fact  that  the  clergy  differ  concerning 
the  most  important  matters.  The  fear  that  the  differences 
of  opinion  which  spring  from  freethinking  may  endanger 
the  peace  of  society  lacks  foundation  ;  on  the  contrary,  it 
is  only  restriction  of  the  freedom  of  thought  which  leads  to 
disorders,  by  weakening  moral  zeal.  The  clergy  are  the 
only  ones  who  condemn  liberty  of  thought.  It  is  sacrilege 
to  hold  that  error  can  be  beneficial  and  truth  harmful.  As 
a  proof  that  freethinking  by  no  means  corrupts  character, 
Collins  gives  in  conclusion  a  list  of  noble  freethinkers  from 
Socrates  down  to  Locke  and  Tillotson.  Among  the  replies 
to  the  views  of  Collins  we  may  mention  the  calmly  objective 
Boyle  Lectures  by  Ibbot,  and  the  sharp  and  witty  letter  of 
Richard  Bentley,  the  philologist.  Neither  of  these  attacks 
Collins's  leading  principle,  both  fully  admitting  the  right  to 
employ  the  reason,  even  in  religious  questions;  but  they 
dispute  the  implication  that  freethinking  is  equivalent  to 
contentious  opposition.  On  the  one  hand,  they  maintain 
that  Collins's  thinking  is  too  free,  that  is,  unbridled,  hasty, 
presumptuous,  and  paradoxical  ;  on  the  other,  that  it  is  not 
free  enough  (from  prejudice). 


190  ENGLISH  DEISM. 

After  Shaftesbury  had  based  morality  on  a  natural 
instinct  for  the  beautiful  and  had  made  it  independent 
of  religion,  as  well  as  served  the  cause  of  free  thought  by 
a  keenly  ironical  campaign  against  enthusiasm  and  ortho- 
dox}-, and  Clarke  had  furnished  the  representatives  of 
natural  religion  a  useful  principle  of  morals  in  the  objective 
rationality  of  things,  the  debate  concerning  prophecy  and 
miracles*  threatened  to  dissipate  the  deistic  movement  into 
scattered  theological  skirmishes.  At  this  juncture  Matthew 
Tindal  (1657-1733)  led  it  back  to  the  main  question.  His 
Christianity  as  Old  as  the  Creation  is  the  doomsday  book 
of  deism.  It  contains  all  that  has  been  given  above  as  the 
core  of  this  view  of  religion.  Christ  came  not  to  bring  in 
a  new  doctrine,  but  to  exhort  to  repentance  and  atone- 
ment, and  to  restore   the  law  of  nature,  which  is  as  old  as 

*  The  chief  combatant  in  the  conflict  over  the  argument  from  prophecy, 
which  was  called  forth  by  Whiston's  corruption  hypothesis,  was  Collins  [A  Dis- 
course of  the  Grounds  and  Reasons  of  the  Christian  Religion,  1724).  Christianity 
is  based  on  Judaism  ;  its  fundamental  article  is  that  Jesus  is  the  prophesied 
Messiah  of  the  Jews,  its  chief  proof  the  argument  from  Old  Testament 
prophecy,  which,  it  is  true,  depends  on  the  typical  or  allegorical  interpretation 
of  the  passages  in  question.  Whoever  rejects  this  cuts  away  the  ground  from 
under  the  Christian  revelation,  which  is  only  the  allegorical  import  of  the  revelation 
of  the  Jews. — The  second  proof  of  revelation,  the  argument  from  miracles,  was 
shaken  by  Thomas  Woolston  (Six  Discourses  on  the  Miracles  of  our  Saviour, 
1727-30),  by  his  extension  of  the  allegorical  interpretation  to  these  also.  He 
supported  himself  in  this  by  the  authority  of  the  Church  Fathers,  and,  above 
all,  by  the  argument  that  the  accounts  of  the  miracles,  if  taken  literally,  contradict 
all  sense  and  understanding.  The  unavoidable  doubts  which  arise  concerning  the 
literal  interpretation  of  the  resurrection  of  the  dead,  the  healing  of  the  sick,  the 
driving  out  of  devils,  and  the  other  miracles,  prove  that  these  were  intended  only 
as  symbolic  representations  of  the  mysterious  and  wonderful  effects  which  Jesus 
was  to  accomplish.  Thus  Jairus's  daughter  means  the  Jewish  Church,  which  is  to 
be  revived  at  the  second  coming  of  Christ;  Lazarus  typifies  humanity,  which  will 
be  raised  again  at  the  last  day  ;  the  account  of  the  bodily  resurrection  of  Jesus  is 
a  svmbol  of  his  spiritual  resurrection  from  his  grave  in  the  letter  of  Scripture. 
Sherlock,  whose  Trial  of  the  Witnesses  of  the  Resurrection  of  Jesus  was  long 
considered  a  cogent  answer  to  the  attacks  of  Woolston,  was  opposed  by  Peter 
Annet,  who,  without  leaving  the  refuge  of  figurative  interpretation  open,  pro- 
ceeded still  more  regardlessly  in  the  discovery  of  contradictory  and  incredible 
elements  in  the  Gospel  reports,  and  declared  all  the  scriptural  writers  together 
to  be  liars  and  falsifiers.  If  a  man  believes  in  miracles  as  supernatural  inter- 
ferences with  the  regular  course  of  nature  (and  they  must  be  so  taken  if  they  are 
to  certify  to  the  divine  origin  of  the  Scriptures),  he  makes  God  mutable,  and 
natural  laws  imperfect  arrangements  which  stand  in  need  of  correction.  The 
truth  of  religion  is  independent  of  all  history. 


TIXDAL,    CHUBB.  191 

the  creation,  as  universal  as  reason,  and  as  unchange- 
able as  God,  human  nature,  and  the  relations  of  things, 
which  we  should  respect  in  our  actions.  Religion  is  moral- 
ity; more  exactly,  it  is  the  free,  constant  disposition  to  do 
as  much  good  as  possible,  and  thereby  to  promote  the 
glory  of  God  and  our  own  welfare.  For  the  harmony  of 
our  conduct  with  the  rules  of  reason  constitutes  our 
perfection,  and  on  this  depends  our  happiness.  Since  God 
is  infinitely  blessed  and  self-sufficient  his  purpose  in  the 
moral  law  is  man's  happiness  alone.  Whatever  a  positive 
religion  contains  beyond  the  moral  law  is  superstition, 
which  puts  emphasis  on  worthless  trivialities.  The  true 
religion  occupies  the  happy  mean  between  miserable  un- 
faith,  on  the  one  hand,  and  timorous  superstition,  wild 
fanaticism,  and  pietistical  zeal  on  the  other.  In  proclaim- 
ing the  sovereignty  of  reason  in  the  sphere  of  religion  as 
well  as  elsewhere,  we  are  only  openly  demanding  what  our 
opponents  have  tacitly  acknowledged  in  practice  (e.  g.,  in 
allegorical  interpretation)  from  time  immemorial.  God  has 
endowed  us  with  reason  in  order  that  we  should  by  it 
distinguish  truth  from  falsehood. 

Thomas  Chubb  (1679-1747),  a  man  of  the  people  (he 
was  a  glove  maker  and  tallow-chandler),  and  from  171 5  on  a 
participant  in  deistic  literature  and  concerned  to  adapt  the 
new  ideas  to  the  men  of  his  class,  preached  in  The  True  Gos- 
pel of  Jesus  Christ  an  honorable  working-man's  Christianity. 
Faith  means  obedience  to  the  law  of  reason  inculcated  by 
Christ,  not  the  acceptance  of  the  facts  reported  about  him. 
The  gospel  of  Christ  was  preached  to  the  poor  before  his 
death  and  his  asserted  resurrection  and  ascension.  It  is 
probable  that  Christ  really  lived,  because  of  the  great 
effect  of  his  message;  but  he  was  a  man  like  other  men. 
His  gospel  is  his  teaching,  not  his  history,  his  own  teach- 
ing, not  that  of  his  followers — the  reflections  of  the  apos- 
tles are  private  opinions.  Christ's  teaching  amounts,  in 
effect,  to  these  three  fundamental  principles:  (1)  Conform 
to  the  rational  law  of  love  to  God  and  one's  neighbor ;  this  is 
the  only  ground  of  divine  acceptance.  (2)  After  transgres- 
sion of  the  law,  repentance  and  reformation  are  the  only 
grounds  of  divine  grace  and   forgiveness.     (3)  At  the  last 


192  ENGLISH  DEISM. 

day  every  one  will  be  rewarded  according  to  his  works. 
By  proclaiming  these  doctrines,  by  carrying  them  out  in  his 
own  pure  life  and  typical  death,  and  by  founding  religio- 
ethical  associations  on  the  principle  of  brotherly  equality, 
Christ  selected  the  means  best  fitted  for  the  attainment  of 
his  purpose,  the  salvation  of  human  souls.  His  aim  was  to 
assure  men  of  future  happiness  (and  of  the  earthly  happi- 
ness connected  therewith),  and  to  make  them  worthy  of  it ; 
and  this  happiness  can  only  be  attained  when  from  free 
conviction  we  submit  ourselves  to  the  natural  moral  law, 
which  is  grounded  on  the  moral  fitness  of  things.  Every- 
thing which  leads  to  the  illusion  that  the  favor  of  God  is 
attainable  by  any  other  means  than  by  righteousness  and 
repentance,  is  pernicious  ;  as,  also,  the  confusion  of  Chris- 
tian societies  with  legal  and  civil  societies,  which  pursue 
entirely  different  aims. 

Thomas  Morgan  {The  Moral  Philosopher,  a  Dialogue  be- 
tween the  Christian  Deist,  Philalethes,  and  the  Christian 
Jew,  Theophanes,  1737  seq.)  stands  on  the  same  ground  as 
his  predecessors,  by  holding  that  the  moral  truth  of  things 
is  the  criterion  of  the  divinity  of  a  doctrine,  that  the  Chris- 
tian religion  is  merely  a  restoration  of  natural  religion,  and 
that  the  apostles  were  not  infallible.  Peculiar  to  him  are 
the  application  of  the  first  of  these  principles  to  the  Mosaic 
law,  with  the  conclusion  that  this  was  not  a  revelation  ;  the 
complete  separation  of  the  New  Testament  from  the  Old  (the 
Church  of  Christ  and  the  expected  kingdom  of  the  Jewish 
Messiah  are  as  opposed  to  each  other  as  heaven  and  earth) ; 
and  the  endeavor  to  give  a  more  exact  explanation  of  the 
origin  of  superstition,  the  pre-Christian  manifestations  of 
which  he  traces  back  to  the  fall  of  the  angels,  and  those 
since  Christ  to  the  intermixture  of  Jewish  elements.  He 
seeks  to  solve  his  problem  by  a  detailed  critique  of  Israelit- 
ish  history,  which  is  lacking  in  sympathy  but  not  in  spirit, 
and  in  which,  introducing  modern  relations  into  the  earliest 
times,  he  explains  the  Old  Testament  miracles  in  part  as 
myths,  in  part  as  natural  phenomena,  and  deprives  the 
heroes  of  the  Jews  of  their  moral  renown.  The  Jewish  his- 
torians are  ranked  among  the  poets  ;  the  God  of  Israel  is 
reduced  to  a  subordinate,  local  tutelary  divinity;  the  moral 


MORGAN,    BOLIXGBROKE.  193 

law  of  Moses  is  characterized  as  a  civil  code  limited  to  ex- 
ternal conduct,  to  national  and  mundane  affairs,  with  merely 
temporal  sanctions,  and  the  ceremonial  law  as  an  act  of 
worldly  statecraft ;  David  is  declared  a  gifted  poet,  musician, 
hypocrite,  and  coward  ;  the  prophets  are  made  professors  of 
theology  and  moral  philosophy  ;  and  Paul  is  praised  as  the 
greatest  freethinker  of  his  time,  who  defended  reason 
against  authority  and  rejected  the  Jewish  ritual  law  as  indif- 
ferent. Whatever  is  spurious  in  Christianity  is  a  remnant  of 
Judaism,  all  its  mysteries  are  misunderstood  and  falsely  (*.  c, 
literally)  applied  allegories.  Out  of  regard  for  Jewish  prej- 
udices Christ's  death  was  figuratively  described  as  sacrificial, 
as  in  earlier  times  Moses  had  been  forced  to  yield  to  the 
Egyptian  superstitions  of  his  people.  Morgan  looks  for 
the  final  victory  of  the  rational  morality  of  the  pure,  Pau- 
line, or  deistic  Christianity  over  the  Jewish  Christianity  of 
orthodoxy.  Among  the  works  of  his  opponents  the  follow- 
ing deserve  mention  :  William  Warburton's  Divine  Legation 
of  Moses,  and  Samuel  Chandler's  Vindication  of  the  History 
of  the  Old  Testament. 

It  maybe  doubted  whether  Bolingbroke  (died  1751  ;  cf. 
p.  203)  is  to  be  classed  among  the  deists  or  among  their  oppo- 
nents. On  the  one  hand,  he  finds  in  monotheism  the 
original  true  religion,  which  has  degenerated  into  supersti- 
tion through  priestly  cunning  and  fantastical  philosophy; 
in  primitive  Christianity,  the  system  of  natural  religion, 
which  has  been  transformed  into  a  complicated  and  con- 
tentious science  by  its  weak,  foolish,  or  deceitful  adher- 
ents ;  in  theology,  the  corruption  of  religion  ;  in  Bacon, 
Descartes,  and  Locke,  types  of  untrammeled  investigation. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  seeks  to  protect  revelation  from  the 
reason  whose  cultivation  he  has  just  commended,  and  to 
keep  faith  and  knowledge  distinct,  while  he  demands  tint 
the  Bible,  with  all  the  undemonstrable  and  absurd  elements 
which  it  contains,  be  accepted  on  its  own  authority.  Reli- 
gion is  an  instrument  indispensable  to  the  government  for 
keeping  the  people  in  subjection.  Only  the  fear  of  a  higher 
power,  not  the  reason,  holds  the  masses  in  check  ;  and  the 
freethinkers  do  wrong  in  taking  a  bit  out  of  the  mouth  of 
the  sensual  multitude,  when  it  were  better  to  add  to  those 
already  there. 


194  ENGLISH  DEISM. 

As  Hume,  the  skeptic,  leads  empiricism  to  its  fall,  so 
Hume,  the  philosopher  of  religion  (see  below),  leads  deism 
toward  dissolution.  Among  those  who  defended  revealed 
Christianity  against  the  deistical  attacks  we  may  mention 
the  names  of  Conybeare  (1732)  and  Joseph  Butler  (1736). 
The  former  argues  from  the  imperfection  and  mutability 
of  our  reason  to  like  characteristics  in  natural  religion. 
Butler  (cf.  p.  206)  does  not  admit  that  natural  and  revealed 
religion  are  mutually  exclusive.  Christian  revelation  lends 
a  higher  authority  to  natural  religion,  in  which  she 
finds  her  foundation,  and  adapts  it  to  the  given  relations 
and  needs  of  mankind,  adding,  however,  to  the  rational 
law  of  virtue  new  duties  toward  God  the  Son  and  God  the 
Holy  Ghost.  It  is  evident  that  in  order  to  be  able  to  deal 
with  their  opponents,  the  apologetes  are  forced  to  accom- 
modate themselves  to  the  deistic  principle  of  a  rational  crit- 
icism of  revelation. 

Notwithstanding  the  fear  which  this  principle  inspired  in 
the  men  of  the  time,  it  soon  penetrated  the  thought  even 
of  its  opponents,  and  found  its  way  into  the  popular  mind 
through  the  channels  of  the  Illumination.  Although  it 
was  often  defended  and  applied  with  violence  and  with  a 
superfluous  hatred  of  the  clergy,  it  forms  the  justifiable 
element  in  the  endeavors  of  the  deists.  It  is  a  common- 
place to-day  that  everything  which  claims  to  be  true  and 
valid  must  justify  itself  before  the  criticism  of  reason ; 
but  then  this  principle,  together  with  the  distinction 
between  natural  and  positive  religion  based  upon  it,  exerted 
an  enlightening  and  liberating  influence.  The  real  flaw  in 
the  deistical  theory,  which  was  scarcely  felt  as  such,  even  by 
its  opponents,  was  its  lack  of  religious  feeling  and  all  his- 
torical sense,  a  lack  which  rendered  the  idea  acceptable 
that  religions  could  be  "  made,"  and  priestly  falsehoods 
become  world-moving  forces.  Hume  was  the  first  to  seek 
to  rise  above  this  unspeakable  shallowness.  There  was  a 
remarkable  conflict  between  the  ascription  to  man,  on  the 
one  hand,  of  an  assured  treasure  of  religious  knowledge  in 
the  reason,  and  the  abandonment  of  him,  on  the  other,  to  the 
juggling  of  cunning  priests  and  despots.  Thus  the  deists 
had    no    sense    either    for    the    peculiarities    of   an   inward 


ENGLISH  ETHICS.  195 

religious  feeling,  which,  in  happy  prescience,  rises  above 
the  earthly  circle  of  moral  duties  to  the  world  beyond,  or  for 
the  involuntary,  historically  necessary  origin  and  growth  of 
the  particular  forms  of  religion.  Here,  again,  we  find  that 
turning  away  from  will  and  feeling  to  thought,  from 
history  to  nature,  from  the  oppressive  complexity  of  that 
which  has  been  developed  to  the  simplicity  of  that  which 
is  original,  which  we  have  noted  as  one  of  the  most  prom- 
inent characteristics  of  the  modern  period. 

3.  Moral  Philosophy. 

The  watchword  of  deism  was"  independence  in  religion  "; 
that  of  modern  ethical  philosophy  is  >*  independence  in 
morals."  Hobbes  had  given  this  out  in  opposition  to  the 
mediaeval  dependence  of  ethics  on  theology  ;  now  it  was 
turned  against  himself,  for  he  had  delivered  morality  from 
ecclesiastical  bondage  only  to  subject  it  to  the  no  less 
oppressive  and  unworthy  yoke  of  the  civil  power.  Selfish 
consideration,  so  he  had  taught,  leads  men  to  transfer  by 
contract  all  power  to  the  ruler.  Right  is  that  which  the 
sovereign  enjoins,  wrong  that  which  he  forbids.  Thus 
morality  was  conceived  in  a  purely  negative  way  as  justice, 
and  based  on  interest  and  agreement.  Cumberland,  recog- 
nizing the  one-sidedness  of  the  first  of  these  positions, 
announces  the  principle  of  universal  benevolence,  at  which 
Bacon  had  hinted  before  him,  and  in  which  he  is  followed 
by  the  school  of  Shaftesbury.  Opposition  to  the  founda- 
tion of  ethics  on  self-love  and  convention,  again,  springs  up 
in  three  forms,  one  idealistic,  one  logical,  and  one  aesthetic. 
Ethical  ideas  have  not  arisen  artificially  through  shrewd 
calculation  and  agreement,  but  have  a  natural  origin. 
Cudvvorth,  returning  to  Plato  and  Descartes,  assumes  an 
innate  idea  of  the  good.  Clarke  and  Wollaston  base  moral 
distinctions  on  the  rational  order  of  things,  and  characterize 
the  ethically  good  action  as  a  logical  truth  translated  into 
practice.  Shaftesbury  derives  ethical  ideas  and  actions 
from  a  natural  instinct  for  judging  the  good  and  the  beau- 
tiful. Moreover,  Hobbcs's  ethics  of  interest  experiences, 
first,  correction  at  the  hands  of  Locke  (who,  along  with  a 
complete  recognition  of  the  "legal  "  character  of  the  good, 


196  ENGLISH  ETHICS. 

distinguishes  the  sphere  of  morality  from  that  of  mere  law, 
and  brings  it  under  the  law  of  "reputation,"  hence  of  a 
"  tacit  "  agreement),  and  then  a  frivolous  intensification 
under  Mandeville  and  Bolingbroke.  A  preliminary  conclu- 
sion is  reached  in  the  ethical  labors  of  Hume  and  Smith. 

Richard  Cumberland  {De  Legibus  Natura,  \6j2)  turns  to 
experience  with  the  questions,  In  what  does  morality  con- 
sist ?  Whence  does  it  arise?  and  What  is  the  nature  of 
moral  obligation  ?  and  finds  these  answers  :  Those  actions 
are  good,  or  in  conformity  to  the  moral  law  of  nature,  which 
promote  the  common  good  {commune  bonum  summa  lex). 
Individual  welfare  must  be  subordinated  to  the  good  of  all, 
of  which  it  forms  only  a  part.  The  psychological  roots  of 
virtuous  action  are  the  social  and  disinterested  affections, 
which  nature  has  implanted  in  all  beings,  especially  in  those 
endowed  with  reason.  There  is  nothing  in  man  more  pleas- 
ing to  God  than  love.  We  recognize  our  obligation  to  the 
virtue  of  benevolence,  or  that  God  commands  it,  from  the 
rewards  and  punishments  which  we  perceive  to  follow  the 
fulfillment  or  non-fulfillment  of  the  law, — the  subordination 
of  individual  to  universal  good  is  the  only  means  of  attain- 
ing true  happiness  and  contentment.  Men  are  dependent 
on  mutual  benevolence.  He  who  labors  for  the  good  of  the 
whole  system  of  rational  beings  furthers  thereby  the  wel- 
fare of  the  individual  parts,  among  whom  he  himself  is 
one  ;  individual  happiness  cannot  be  separated  from  gen- 
eral happiness.  All  duties  are  implied  in  the  supreme  one  : 
Give  to  others,  and  preserve  thyself.  This  principle  of 
benevolence,  advanced  by  Cumberland  with  homely  sim- 
plicity, received  in  the  later  development  of  English  ethics, 
for  which  it  pointed  out  the  way,  a  more  careful  foundation. 

The  series  of  emancipations  of  morality  begins  with  the 
Intellectual  System  of  Ralph  Cudworth  {The  Intellectual 
System  of  the  Universe,  1678;  A  Treatise  concerning  Eter- 
nal and  Immutable  Morality,  173 1).  Ethical  ideas  come 
neither  from  experience  nor  from  civil  legislation  nor  from 
the  will  of  God,  but  are  necessary  ideas  in  the  divine  and 
the  human  reason.  Because  of  their  simplicity,  univer- 
sality, and  immutability,  it  is  impossible  for  them  to  arise 
from   experience,  which    never  yields  anything   but    that 


CUDIVOKTH,    CLARKE.  197 

which  is  particular  and  mutable.  It  is  just  as  impossible 
that  they  should  spring  from  political  constitutions,  which 
have  a  temporal  origin,  which  are  transitory,  and  which 
differ  from  one  another.  For  if  obedience  to  positive  law 
is  right  and  disobedience  wrong,  then  moral  distinctions 
must  have  existed  before  the  law  ;  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
obedience  to  the  civil  law  is  morally  indifferent,  then  more 
than  ever  is  it  impossible  that  this  should  be  the  basis  of 
the  moral  distinctions  in  question.  A  law  can  bind  us  only 
in  virtue  of  that  which  is  necessarily,  absolutely,  or  per  se 
right  ;  therefore  the  good  is  independent,  also,  of  the  will 
of  God.  The  absolutely  good  is  an  eternal  truth  which 
God  does  not  create  by  an  act  of  his  will,  but  which  he 
finds  present  in  his  reason,  and  which,  like  the  other  ideas, 
he  impresses  on  created  spirits.  On  the  a  priori  ideas 
depends  the  possibility  of  science,  for  knowledge  is  the 
perception  of  necessary  truth. 

In  agreement  with  Cudworth  that  the  moral  law  is  de- 
pendent neither  on  human  compact  nor  on  the  divine  will, 
Samuel  Clarke  (died  1729)  finds  the  eternal  principles  of 
justice,  goodness,  and  truth,  which  God  observes  in  his  gov- 
ernment of  the  universe,  and  which  should  also  be  the  guide 
of  human  action,  embodied  in  the  nature  of  things  or  in 
their  properties,  powers,  and  relations,  in  virtue  of  which 
certain  things,  relations,  and  modes  of  action  are  suited  to 
one  another,  and  others  not.  Morality  is  the  subjective 
conformity  of  conduct  to  this  objective  fitness  of  things; 
the  good  is  the  fitting.  Moral  rules,  to  which  we  are  bound 
by  conscience  and  by  rational  insight,  are  valid  independ- 
ently of  the  command  of  God  and  of  all  hope  or  fear  in 
reference  to  the  life  to  come,  although  the  principles 
of  religion  furnish  them  an  effective  support,  and  one 
which  is  almost  indispensable  in  view  of  the  weakness  of 
human  nature.  They  are  not  universally  observed,  indeed, 
but  universally  acknowledged  ;  even  the  vicious  man  can- 
not refrain  from  praising  virtue  in  others.  He  who  is  in- 
duced by  the  voice  of  passion  to  act  contrary  to  the  eternal 
relations  or  harmony  of  things,  contradicts  his  own  reason 
in  thus  undertaking  to  disturb  the  order  of  the  universe  ; 
he  commits  the  absurdity  of  willing  that  things  should  be 


19s  ENGLISH  ETHICS. 

that  which  they  are  not.  Injustice  is  in  practice  that 
which  falsity  and  contradiction  are  in  theoretical  affairs. 
In  his  well-known  controversy  with  Leibnitz,  Clarke 
defends  the  freedom  of  the  will  against  the  determinism 
of   the  German  philosopher. 

In  William  Wollaston  (died  1724),  with  whom  the  logical 
point  of  view  becomes  still  more  apparent,  Clarke  found  a 
thinker  who  shared  his  convictions  that  the  subjective  moral 
principle  of  interest  was  insufficient,  and,  hence,  an  objective 
principle  to  be  sought ;  that  morality  consists  in  the  suita- 
bleness of  the  action  to  the  nature  and  destination  of  the 
object,  and  that,  in  the  last  analysis,  it  is  coincident  with 
truth.  The  highest  destination  of  man  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
to  know  the  truth,  and,  on  the  other,  to  express  it  in  actions. 
That  act  is  good  whose  execution  includes  the  affirmation 
(and  its  omission  the  negation)  of  a  truth.  According  to 
the  law  of  nature,  a  rational  being  ought  so  to  conduct 
himself  that  he  shall  never  contradict  a  truth  by  his  actions, 
i.  e.,  to  treat  each  thing  for  what  it  is.  Every  immoral 
action  is  a  false  judgment  ;  the  violation  of  a  contract  is  a 
practical  denial  of  it.  The  man  who  is  cruel  to  animals 
declares  by  his  act  that  the  creature  maltreated  is 
something  which  in  fact  it  is  not,  a  being  devoid  of  feel- 
ing. The  murderer  acts  as  though  he  were  able  to  restore 
life  to  his  victim.  He  who,  in  disobedience  toward  God, 
deals  with  things  in  a  way  contrary  to  their  nature,  behaves 
as  though  he  were  mightier  than  the  author  of  nature. 
To  this  equation  of  truth  and  morality  happiness  is  added 
as  a  third  identical  member.  The  truer  the  pleasures  of  a 
being  the  happier  it  is;  and  a  pleasure  is  untrue  whenever 
more  (of  pain)  is  given  for  it  than  it  is  worth.  A  rational 
being  contradicts  itself  when  it  pursues  an  irrational 
pleasure. — The  course  of  moral  philosophy  has  passed  over 
the  logical  ethics  of  Clarke  and  Wollaston  as  an  abstract 
and  unfruitful  idiosyncrasy,  and  it  is  certain  that  with  both 
of  these  thinkers  their  plans  were  greater  than  their  per- 
formances. But  the  search  for  an  ethical  norm  which 
should  be  universally  valid  and  superior  to  the  individual 
■will,  did  not  lack  justification  in  contrast  to  the  sub- 
jectivism of  the  other  two  schools  of  the  time — the  school 


SHAFTESBURY.  199 

of   interest  and    the  school   of   benevolence,  which    made 
virtue  a  matter  of  calculation  or  of  feeling. 

The  English  ethics  of  the  period  culminates  in  Shaftes- 
bury (1671-1713),  who,  reared  on  the  principles  of  his 
grandfather's  friend  Locke,  formed  his  artistic  sense  on  the 
models  of  classical  antiquity,  to  recall  to  the  memory  of  his 
age  the  Greek  ideal  of  a  beautiful  humanity.  Philosophy, 
as  the  knowledge  of  ourselves  and  that  which  is  truly  good, 
a  guide  to  morality  and  happiness  ;  the  world  and  virtue,  a 
harmony  ;  the  good,  the  beautiful  as  well ;  the  whole,  a  con- 
trolling force  in  the  particular — these  views,  and  his  taste- 
ful style  of  exposition,  make  Shaftesbury  a  modern  Greek; 
it  is  only  his  bitterness  against  Christianity  which  betrays 
the  son  of  the  new  era.  Among  the  studies  collected  under 
the  title  Characteristics  of  Men,  Manners,  Opinions,  Times, 
171 1,  the  most  important  are  those  on  Enthusiasm,  on  Wit 
and  Humor,  on  Virtue  and  Merit,  and  the  Moralists.* 

Shaftesbury's  fundamental  metaphysical  concept  is  aes- 
thetic :  unity  in  variety  is  for  him  the  all-pervasive  law  of 
the  world.  In  every  case  where  parts  work  in  mutual 
dependence  toward  a  common  result,  there  rules  a  central 
unity,  uniting  and  animating  the  members.  The  lowest  of 
these  substantial  unities  is  the  ego,  the  common  source  of  our 
thoughts  and  feelings.  But  as  the  parts  of  the  organism  are 
governed  and  held  together  by  the  soul,  so  individuals  are 
joined  with  one  another  into  species  and  genera  by  higher 
unities.  Each  individual  being  is  a  member  in  a  system  of 
creatures,  which  a  common  nature  binds  together.  Moreover, 
since  order  and  harmony  are  spread  throughout  the  world, 
and  no  one  thing  exists  out  of  relation  to  all  others  and  to 
the  whole,  the  universe  must  be  conceived  as  animated  by 
a  formative  power  which  works  purposively  ;  this  all-ruling 
unity  is  the  soul  of  the  world,  the  universal  mind,  the  Deity. 
The  finality  and  beauty  of  those  parts  of  the  world  which 
we  can  know  justifies  the  inference  to  a  like  constitution  of 
those  which  are  unapproachable,  so  thai  we  may  be  certain 
that  the  numerous  evils  which  we  find   in   the  details,  work 

"Georg  V.  (li/ycki  has  written  on  Shaftesbury's  philosophy,  [876.  (('f. 
Fowler's  Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson,  English  Philosophers  Series,  1882. — Tr.J 


200  ENGLISH   ETHICS. 

for  the  good  of  a  system  superior  to  them,  and  that  all 
apparent  imperfections  contribute  to  the  perfection  of  the 
whole.  As  our  philosopher  makes  use  of  the  idea  of  the 
world-harmony  to  support  theism  and  the  theodicy,  so, 
further,  he  derives  the  content  of  morality  from  it,  thus 
giving  ethics  a  natural  basis  independent  of  self-interest  and 
conventional  fancies. 

A  being  is  good  when  its  impulses  toward  the  preservation 
and  welfare  of  the  species  is  strong,  and  those  directed  to  its 
own  good  not  too  strong.  The  virtue  of  a  rational  being 
is  distinguished  from  the  goodness  of  a  merely  "  sensible 
creature  "  by  the  fact  that  man  not  only  possesses  impulses, 
but  reflects  upon  them,  that  he  approves  or  disapproves 
his  own  conduct  and  that  of  others,  and  thus  makes  his 
affections  the  object  of  a  higher,  reflective,  judging  affec- 
tion. This  faculty  of  moral  distinctions,  the  sense  for  right 
and  wrong,  or,  which  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  for  beauty 
and  ugliness,  is  innate;  we  approve  virtue  and  condemn 
vice  by  nature,  not  as  the  result  of  a  compact,  and  from  this 
natural  feeling  for  good  and  evil  exercise  develops  a  cul- 
tivated moral  taste  or  tact.  And  when,  further,  the  reason, 
by  means  of  this  faculty  of  judgment,  gains  control  over  the 
passions,  man  becomes  an  ethical  artist,  a  moral  virtuoso. 

Virtue  pleases  by  its  own  worth  and  beauty,  not  because 
of  any  external  advantage.  We  must  not  corrupt  the  love 
of  the  good  for  its  own  sake  by  mixing  with  it  the  hope  of 
future  reward,  which  at  the  best  is  admissible  only  as  a 
counter-weight  against  evil  passions.  When  Shaftesbury 
speaks  of  future  bliss,  his  highest  conception  of  the  heavenly 
life  is  uninterrupted  friendship,  magnanimity,  and  nobility, 
as  a  continual  rewarding  of  virtue  by  new  virtue. 

The  good  is  the  beautiful,  and  the  beautiful  is  the  har- 
monious, the  symmetrical ;  hence  the  essence  of  virtue  con- 
sists in  the  balance  of  the  affections  and  passions.  Of  the 
three  classes  into  which  Shaftesbury  divides  the  passions, 
one,  including  the  "  unnatural "  or  unsocial  affections,  as 
malevolence,  envy,  and  cruelty,  which  aim  neither  at  the 
good  of  the  individual  nor  that  of  others,  is  always 
and  entirely  evil.  The  two  other  classes,  the  social  (or 
'natural")   affections    and    the   "self-affections,"    may   be 


SHA  F  TESE  URY.  201 

virtuous  or  vicious,  according  to  their  degree,  /'.  <?.,  accord- 
ing to  the  relation  of  their  strength  to  that  of  the  other 
affections.  In  itself  a  benevolent  impulse  is  never  too 
strong  ;  it  can  become  so  only  in  comparison  with  self-love, 
or  in  respect  to  the  constitution  of  the  individual  in  ques- 
tion, and  conversely.  Commonly  the  social  impulses  do  not 
attain  the  normal  standard,  while  the  selfish  exceed  it ;  but 
the  opposite  case  also  occurs.  Excessive  parental  tender- 
ness, the  pity  which  enervates  and  makes  useless  for  aid, 
religious  zeal  for  making  converts,  passionate  partisanship, 
are  examples  of  too  violent  social  affections  which  interfere 
with  the  activity  of  the  other  inclinations.  Just  as  errone- 
ous, on  the  other  side,  is  the  neglect  of  one's  own  good.  For 
although  the  possession  of  selfish  inclinations  does  not  make 
a  man  virtuous,  yet  the  lack  of  them  is  a  moral  defect, 
since  they  are  indispensable  to  the  general  good.  No  one 
can  be  useful  to  others  who  does  not  keep  himself  in  a  con- 
dition for  service.  The  impulse  to  care  for  private  welfare 
is  good  and  necessary  in  so  far  as  it  comports  with  the 
general  welfare  or  contributes  to  this.  The  due  propor- 
tion between  the  social  passions,  which  constitute  the  direct 
source  of  good,  and  those  of  self-love,  consists  in  subordi- 
nating the  latter  to  the  former.  The  kinship  of  this 
ethics  of  harmony  with  the  ethical  views  of  antiquity  is 
evident.  It  is  completed  by  the  eudemonistic  conclusion 
of  the  system. 

As  the  harmony  of  impulses  constitutes  the  essence  of 
virtue,  so  also  it  is  the  way  to  true  happiness.  Experience 
shows  that  unsocial,  unsympathetic,  vicious  men  are  misera- 
ble ;  that  love  to  society  is  the  richest  source  of  happiness; 
that  even  pity  for  the  suffering  of  others  occasions  more 
pleasure  than  pain.  Virtue  secures  us  the  love  and  respect 
of  others,  secures  us,  above  all,  the  approval  of  our  own 
conscience,  and  true  happiness  consists  in  satisfaction  with 
ourselves.  The  search  after  this  pure,  constant,  spiritual 
pleasure  in  the  good,  which  is  never  accompanied  by 
satiety  and  disgust,  should  not  be  called  self-seeking;  he 
alone  takes  pleasure  in  the  good  who  is  already  good  him- 
self. 

Shaftesbury  is  not   well  disposed   toward  positive  Chris- 


20  2  ENGLISH  ETHICS. 

tianity,  holding  that  it  has  made  virtue  mercenary  by  its 
promises  of  heavenly  rewards,  removed  moral  questions 
entirely  out  of  this  world  into  the  world  to  come,  and 
taught  men  most  piously  to  torment  one  another  out  of 
pure  supernatural  brotherly  love.  In  opposition  to  such 
transcendental  positions  Shaftesbury,  a  priest  of  the 
modern  view  of  the  world,  gives  virtue  a  home  on  earth, 
seeks  the  hand  of  Providence  in  the  present  world,  and 
teaches  men  to  reach  faith  in  God  by  inspiring  contempla- 
tion of  the  well-ordered  universe.  Virtue  without  piety  is 
possible,  indeed,  though  not  complete.  But  morality  is 
first  and  fixed,  hence  it  is  the  condition  and  the  criterion 
of  genuine  religion.  Revelation  does  not  need  to  fear  free 
rational  criticism,  for  the  Scriptures  are  accredited  by 
their  contents.  Besides  reason,  banter  is  with  Shaftesbury 
a  second  means  for  distinguishing  the  genuine  from  the 
spurious:  ridicule  is  the  test  of  truth,  and  wit  and  humor 
the  only  cure  for  enthusiasm.  With  these  he  scourges  the 
over-pious  as  religious  parasites,  who  for  safety's  sake 
prefer  to  believe  too  much  rather  than  too  little. 

Before  Shaftesbury's  theory  of  the  moral  sense  and  the 
disinterested  affections  had  gained  adherents  and  devel- 
opers, the  danger,  which  indeed  had  not  always  been 
escaped,  that  man  might  content  himself  with  the  satisfac- 
tion of  possessing  noble  impulses,  without  taking  much  care 
to  realize  them  in  useful  actions,  called  forth  byway  of  reac- 
tion a  paradoxical  attempt  at  an  apology  for  vice.  Mande- 
ville,  a  London  physician  of  French  extraction,  and  born  in 
Holland,  had  aroused  attention  by  his  poem,  The  Grumbling 
Hive;  or  Knaves  Turned  Honest,  1706,  and  in  response  to 
vehement  attacks  upon  his  work,  had  added  a  commentary 
to  the  second  edition,  The  Fable  of  the  Bees  ;  or  Private 
Vices  Public  Benefits,  17 14.  The  moral  of  the  fable  is  that  the 
welfare  of  a  society  depends  on  the  industry  of  its  members, 
and  this,  in  turn,  on  their  passions  and  vices.  Greed, 
extravagance,  envy,  ambition,  and  rivalry  are  the  roots  of  the 
acquisitive  impulse,  and  contribute  more  to  the  public  good 
than  benevolence  and  the  control  of  desire.  Virtue  is  good 
for  the  individual,  it  is  true,  since  it  makes  him  contented 
with   himself  and   acceptable   to   God   and   man,  but  great 


MANDEVILLE,    BOLINGBROKE.  203 

states  require  stronger  motives  to  labor  and  industry  in 
order  to  be  prosperous.  A  people  among  whom  frugality, 
self-denial,  and  quietness  of  spirit  were  the  rule  would  remain 
poor  and  ignorant.  Besides  holding  that  virtue  furthers 
the  happiness  of  society,  Shaftesbury  makes  a  second  mis- 
take in  assuming  that  human  nature  includes  unselfish 
inclinations.  It  is  not  innate  love  and  goodness  that  make 
us  social,  but  our  passions  and  weaknesses  (above  all,  fear) ; 
man  is  by  nature  self-seeking.  All  actions,  including  the 
so-called  virtues,  spring  from  vanity  and  egoism  ;  thus  it 
has  always  been,  thus  it  is  in  every  grade  of  society.  In 
social  life,  indeed,  we  dare  not  display  all  these  desires 
openly,  nor  satisfy  them  at  will.  Shrewd  lawgivers  have 
taught  men  to  conceal  their  natural  passions  and  to  limit 
them  by  artificial  ones,  persuading  them  that  renunciation 
is  true  happiness,  on  the  ground  that  through  it  we  attain 
the  supreme  good — reputation  among,  and  the  esteem  of 
our  fellows.  Since  then  honor  and  shame  have  become  the 
strongest  motives  and  have  incited  men  to  that  which  is 
called  virtue,  i.  e.,  to  actions  which  apparently  imply  the 
sacrifice  of  selfish  inclinations  for  the  good  of  society,  while 
they  are  really  done  out  of  pride  and  self-love.  By  con- 
stantly feigning  noble  sentiments  before  others  man  comes, 
finally,  to  deceive  himself,  believing  himself  a  being  whose 
happiness  consists  in  the  renunciation  of  self  and  all  that 
is  earthly,  and  in  the  thought  of  his  moral  excellence. — The 
crass  assumptions  in  Mandeville's  reasoning  are  evident  at 
a  glance.  After  analyzing  virtue  into  the  suppression  of 
desire,  after  labeling  the  impulse  after  moral  approbation 
vanity,  lawful  self-love  egoism,  and  rational  acquisitiveness 
avarice,  it  was  easy  for  him  to  prove  that  it  is  vice  which 
makes  the  individual  industrious  and  the  state  prosperous, 
that  virtue  is  seldom  found,  and  that  if  it  were  universal 
it  would  become  injurious  to  society. 

With  different  shading  and  with  less  onc-sidedness,  Boling- 
broke  (cf.  p.  193)  defended  the  standpoint  of  naturalism. 
God  has  created  us  for  happiness  in  common  ;  we  are  des- 
tined to  assist  one  another.  Happiness  is  attainable  in 
society  alone,  and  society  cannot  exist  without  justice  and 
benevolence,     lie  who  exercises  virtue,  i.  e.t  promotes  the 


204  EXGLISH  ETHICS. 

good  of  the  species,  promotes  at  the  same  time  his  own 
good.  All  actions  spring  from  self-love,  which,  guided  at 
first  by  an  immediate  instinct,  and  later,  by  reason  devel- 
oped through  experience,  extends  itself  over  ever  widening 
spheres.  We  love  ourselves  in  our  relatives,  in  our  friends, 
further  still,  in  our  country,  finally,  in  humanity,  so  that 
self-love  and  social  love  coincide,  and  we  are  impelled  to 
virtue  by  the  combined  motives  of  interest  and  duty.  This 
is  an  ethic  of  common  sense  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
cultured  man  of  the  world — which  at  the  proper  time  has 
the  right,  no  doubt,  to  gain  itself  a  hearing. 

Meanwhile  Shaftesbury's  ideas  had  impressed  Hutcheson 
and  Butler,  according  to  the  peculiarities  of  each.  Both  of 
these  writers  deem  it  necessary  to  explain  and  correct  the 
distinction  between  the  selfish  and  the  benevolent  affections 
by  additions,  which  were  of  influence  on  the  ethics  of  Hume  ; 
both  devote  their  zeal  to  the  new  doctrine  of  feelings  of 
reflection  or  moral  taste,  in  which  the  former  gives  more 
prominence  to  the  aesthetic,  merely  judging  factor,  the 
latter  to  the  active  or  mandatory  one. 

Francis  Hutcheson*  (died  1747),  professor  at  Glasgow,  in 
his  posthumous  System  of  Moral  Philosophy,  1755,  which 
had  been  preceded  by  an  Inquiry  concerning  the  Original 
of  our  Ideas  of  Beauty  and  Virtue,  1725,  pursues  the  double 
aim  of  showing  against  Hobbes  and  Locke  the  originality 
and  disinterestedness  both  of  benevolence  and  of  moral 
approval.  Virtue  is  not  exercised  because  it  brings  advan- 
tage to  the  agent,  nor  approved  on  account  of  advantage 
to  the  observer. 

(1)  The  benevolent  affections  are  entirely  independent 
of  self-love  and  regard  for  the  rewards  of  God  and  of  man, 
nay,  independent  even  of  the  lofty  satisfaction  afforded  by 
self-approbation.  This  last,  indeed,  is  vouchsafed  to  us  only 
when  we  seek  the  good  of  others  without  personal  aims : 
the  joy  of  inward  approval  is  the  result  of  virtue,  not  the 
motive  to  it.  If  love  were  in  reality  a  concealed  egoism, 
it  would  yield  to  control  in  cases  where  it  promises  advan- 
tage, which,  as  experience  shows,  is  not  the  fact.  Benev- 
olence is  entirely  natural,  and  as  universal  in  the  moral 
*  Cf.  Fowler's  treatise,  cited  p.  199. — Tr. 


HUTCHESON.  205 

world  as  gravitation  in  the  corporeal ;  and  like  gravitation 
further  in  that  its  intensity  increases  with  propinquity 
— the  nearer  the  persons,  the  greater  the  love.  Benev- 
olence is  more  widespread  than  malevolence  ;  even  the 
criminal  does  more  innocent  and  kind  acts  in  his  life  than 
criminal  ones — the  rarity  of  the  latter  is  the  reason  why  so 
much  is  said  about  them. 

(2)  Moral  judgment  is  also  entirely  uninfluenced  by 
consideration  of  the  advantageous  or  disadvantageous 
results  for  the  agent  or  the  spectator.  The  beauty  of  a 
good  deed  arouses  immediate  satisfaction.  Through  the 
moral  sense  we  feel  pleasure  at  observing  a  virtuous  action, 
and  aversion  when  we  perceive  an  ignoble  one,  feelings 
which  are  independent  of  all  thought  of  the  rewards  and 
punishments  promised  by  God,  as  well  as  of  the  utility  or 
harm  for  ourselves.  Hutcheson  argues  a  complete  distinc- 
tion between  moral  approval  and  the  perception  of  the  agree- 
able and  the  useful,  from  the  facts  that  we  judge  a  benevo- 
lent action  which  is  forced,  or  done  from  motives  of  personal 
advantage,  quite  differently  from  one  inspired  by  love ; 
that  we  pay  esteem  to  high-minded  characters  whether 
their  fortunes  be  good  or  ill  ;  and  that  we  are  moved  with 
equal  force  by  fictitious  actions,  as,  for  instance,  on  the 
stage,  and  by  those  which  really  take  place. 

(3)  A  few  further  particulars  may  be  emphasized  from 
the  comprehensive  systematization  which  Hutcheson  indus- 
triously and  thoughtfully  gave  to  Shaftesbury's  ideas. 
Two  points  reveal  the  forerunner  of  Hume.  First,  the 
role  assigned  to  the  reason  in  moral  affairs  is  merely  sub- 
sidiary. Our  motive  to  action  is  never  the  knowledge  of 
a  true  proposition,  but  always  simply  a  wish,  affection,  or 
impulse.  Ultimate  ends  are  given  by  the  feelings  alone; 
the  reason  can  only  discover  the  means  thereto.  Sec- 
ondly, the  turbulent,  blind,  rapidly  passing  passions  are 
distinguished  from  the  calm,  permanent  affections,  which 
are  mediated  by  cognition.  The  latter  arc  the  nobler; 
among  them,  in  turn,  the  highest  place  is  occupied  by 
those  conducive  to  the  general  good,  whose  worth  is  still 
further  determined  by  the  extent  of  their  objects.  From 
this  is  derived    the    law   that  a  kind  affection   receives  the 


2o6  ENGLISH  ETHICS. 

more  lively  approval,  the  more  calm  and  deliberate  it  is, 
the  higher  the  degree  of  happiness  experienced  by  the  ob- 
ject of  the  action,  and  the  greater  the  number  of  persons 
affected  by  it.  Patriotism  and  love  of  mankind  in  general 
are  higher  virtues  than  affection  for  friends  and  children. 
As  the  goal  of  the  self-regarding  affections,  perfection 
makes  its  appearance — for  the  first  time  in  English  ethics — 
by  the  side  of  happiness. 

Joseph  Butler*  (1692-1752  ;  Sermons  on  Human  Nature, 
1726;  cf.  p.  194)  maintains  still  more  strictly  than  Hutch 
eson  the  immediateness  both  of  the  affections  and  the  moral 
estimation  of  them.  He  declares  that  even  the  self-regard- 
ing impulses  as  such  are  un-egoistic,  and  makes  moral  judg- 
ment leave  out  of  view  all  consequences,  either  foreseen  or 
present,  whereas  his  predecessor  had  resolved  the  goodness 
of  the  action  into  its  advantageous  effects  (not  for  the  agent 
and  the  spectator,  but  for  its  object  and)  for  society.  The 
conscience — so  Butler  terms  the  moral  sense — directly  ap- 
proves or  disapproves  characters  and  actions  in  themselves, 
no  matter  what  good  or  ill  they  occasion  in  the  world. 
We  judge  a  mode  of  action  good,  not  because  it  is  useful  to 
society,  but  because  it  corresponds  to  the  demands  of  the 
conscience.  This  must  be  unconditionally  obeyed,  what- 
ever be  the  issue.  We  must  not  act  contrary  to  truth  and 
justice,  even  if  it  should  seem  to  bring  about  more  happi- 
ness than  misery. — Butler,  too,  furnishes  material  for 
the  ethics  of  Hume,  by  his  revival  of  the  separation,  pre- 
viously defended  by  the  Stoics,  of  desire  and  passion  from 
self-love  or  interest.  Self-love  desires  a  thing  because  it 
expects  pleasure  from  it,  but  the  natural  impulses  impel 
us  toward  their  objects  immediately,  i.  e.,  without  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  pleasure  to  be  gained  ;  and  repetition 
is  necessary  before  the  artificial  motive  of  egoistic  pleas- 
ure-seeking can  be  added  to  the  natural  motive  of  inborn 
desire.  Self-love  always  presupposes  original,  immediate 
affections. 

The  English  moral  science  of  the  century  is  brought  to 
a  conclusion  by   Adam    Smith  f  (1723-90),  the    celebrated 

*  Cf.  Collins's  Butler,  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics.   i88r. — Tr. 
f  Cf.  Farrer's  Adam  Smith,  English  Philosophers  Series,  1880. — Tr. 


ADAM  SMITH.  207 

founder  of  political  economy.*  Smith  not  only  takes  into 
consideration — like  his  greater  friend,  Hume — al!  the  prob- 
lems proposed  by  his  predecessors,  but,  further  (in  his  TJicory 
of  Moral  Sentiments,  1759,  published  while  he  was  professor 
at  Glasgow),  combines  the  various  attempts  at  their  solution, 
not  by  eclectic  co-ordination  but  by  working  them  over  for 
himself,  and  arranges  them  on  a  uniform  principle,  thus 
accomplishing  a  work  which  has  not  yet  received  due  recog- 
nition beyond  the  limits  of  his  native  land.  He  reached 
this  comprehensive  moral  principle  by  recognizing  the  full 
bearing  of  a  thought  which  Hume  had  incidentally  expressed, 
that  moral  judgment  depends  on  participation  in  the  feelings 
of  the  agent,  and  by  following  out  with  fine  psychological 
observation  this  sympathy  of  men  into  its  first  and  last 
manifestations.  In  this  way  a  twofold  kind  of  morality 
was  revealed  to  him  :  mere  propriety  of  behavior  and  real 
merit  in  action.  On  the  one  hand,  that  is,  the  sympathy  of 
the  spectator — as  Hume  has  one-sidedly  emphasized — is 
directed  to  the  utility  of  the  consequences  (or  to  the 
"  merit  ")  of  the  action,  and,  on  the  other,  to  the  fitness  of 
the  motives  (or  their  "  propriety  ").  An  action  is  proper 
when  the  impartial  spectator  is  able  to  sympathize  with  its 
motive,  and  meritorious  if  he  can  sympathize  also  with  its 
end  or  effect ;  i.  e.,  if,  in  the  first  case,  the  feelings  are  suitable 
to  their  objects  (neither  too  strong  nor  too  weak),  and,  in 
the  second  case,  the  consequences  of  the  act  are  advanta- 
geous to  others.  Merit  =  propriety  -f-  utility.  The  main 
conclusion  is  this:  Sympathy  is  that  by  means  of  which 
virtue  is  recognized  and  approved,  as  well  as  that  which 
is  approved  as  virtue ;  it  is  ratio  cognosccndi  as  well  as 
ratio  essendi,  the  criterion  as  well  as  the  source  of  moral- 
ity. Thus  Smith  endeavors  to  solve  the  two  principal 
problems  of  English  ethics — the  criterion  and  the  origin  of 
virtue — with  a  common  answer. 

"  Sympathy  "  denotes  primarily  nothing  more  than  the 
innate  and  purely  formal  power  of  imitating  to  a  certain 
degree  the    feelings  of  others.     From  this  modest  germ  is 

*  The  epoch-making  work,  with  which  he  called  economic  science  into  exist- 
ence, The  Wealth  of  Nations,  appeared  in  1776.  Cf.  Wilhelm  Hassbach, 
Untersuchungen  über  Adam  Smith,  Leipsic,  1891. 


2o8  ENGLISH  ETHICS. 

developed  by  a  progressive  growth  the  wide-spreading  tree 
of  morality:  moral  judgment,  the  moral  imperative  with 
its  religious  sanction,  and  ethical  character.  Accord- 
ingly we  may  distinguish  different  stages  in  the  develop- 
ment of  sympathy — the  psychological  stage  of  mere  fellow- 
feeling,  the  aesthetic  stage  of  moral  appreciation,  the 
imperative  stage  of  moral  precepts,  which  further  on  are 
construed  as  commands  of  God  (the  famous  Kantian  defini- 
tion of  religion  was  announced  in  Glasgow  a  generation 
earlier 'than  in  Königsberg),  finally,  the  concluding  stage 
wherein  these  laws  of  duty  are  taken  up  into  the  disposi- 
tion. Besides  these,  there  results  from  the  mechanism  of 
the  sympathetic  feelings  a  series  of  phenomena,  which, 
although  they  do  not  entirely  conform  to  the  ethical  stand- 
ard, yet  exercise  a  salutary  effect  on  the  permanence  of 
society  ;  e.g.,  our  exceptional  judgment  of  the  deeds  of  the 
great,  the  rich,  and  the  fortunate,  as  also  the  higher  worth 
ascribed  to  good  (and,  conversely,  the  greater  guilt  to 
bad)  intentions  when  successfully  carried  out  into  action, 
in  comparison  with  those  which  fall  short  of  their  result. 

The  first,  the  purely  psychological  stage,  includes  three 
cases.  The  spectator  sympathizes  (i)  with  the  feelings  of 
the  agent ;  (2)  with  the  gratitude  or  anger  of  the  person 
affected  by  the  action  ;  (3)  the  person  observed  sympa- 
thizes in  return  with  the  imitative  and  judging  feelings  of 
the  spectator. 

The  fundamental  laws  of  sympathy  are  as  follows  :  We 
are  roused  to  imitate  the  feeling  of  another  by  the  perception 
either  of  its  signs  (its  natural  consequences  or  its  natural 
expression  in  visible  and  audible  motions),  or  of  its  causes 
(the  circumstances  and  experiences  which  occasion  it),  the 
latter  exercising  a  more  potent  influence  than  the  former. 
The  wooden  leg  of  the  beggar  is  more  effective  in  exciting 
our  pity  than  his  anxious  air;  the  sight  of  dental  instru- 
ments is  more  eloquent  than  the  plaints  of  the  sufferer  from 
toothache.  In  order  to  be  able  to  imitate  vividly  the  feel- 
ings of  a  person,  we  must  know  the  causes  of  them. — The 
feeling  of  the  specator  is,  on  the  average,  less  intense  than 
that  of  the  person  observed,  so  long  as  the  latter  does  not 
control  and  repress  his  emotions  in  view  of  the  calmness  of 


ADAM  SMITH.  209 

the  former.  The  difference  of  intensity  between  the  origi- 
nal and  the  sympathetic  feelings  differs  widely  with  the 
various  classes  of  emotions.  It  is  difficult  to  take  part  in 
feelings  which  arise  from  bodily  conditions,  but  easy  to  share 
those  in  the  production  of  which  the  imagination  is  con- 
cerned— hence  easier  to  share  in  hope  and  fear  than  in 
pleasure  and  pain. — We  sympathize  more  readily  with  feel- 
ings which  are  agreeable  to  the  observer,  the  observed,  and 
other  participants  than  with  such  as  are  not  so ;  more 
willingly,  therefore,  with  cheerfulness,  love,  benevolence 
than  with  grief,  hatred,  malevolence.  This  is  not  only  true 
of  temporary  affections,  but  especially  of  those  general 
dispositions  which  depend  on  a  more  or  less  happy  situation 
in  life ;  we  sympathize  more  vividly  with  the  fortunes 
of  the  rich  and  noble,  because  we  consider  them  happier 
than  the  poor  and  lowly.  Wealth  and  high  rank  are  objects 
of  general  desire  chiefly  because  their  possessor  enjoys  the 
advantage  of  knowing  that  whatever  gives  him  joy  or  sor- 
row always  arouses  similar  feelings  in  countless  other  men. 
The  root  of  all  ambition  is  the  wish  to  rule  over  the  hearts 
of  our  fellows  by  compelling  them  to  make  our  feelings  their 
own  ;  the  central  nerve  of  all  happiness  consists  in  seeing 
our  own  sensations  shared  by  those  about  us  and  reflected 
back,  as  it  were,  from  manifold  mirrors.  Small  annoy- 
ances often  have  a  diverting  effect  on  the  spectator; 
great  success  easily  excites  his  envy  ;  great  sorrows  and 
minor  joys,  on  the  contrary,  are  always  sure  of  our  sym- 
pathy, Hence  the  morose  man,  to  whom  everything  is  an 
occasion  of  ill-humor,  is  nowhere  welcome,  and  the  man  of 
cheerful  disposition,  who  rejoices  in  each  little  event  and 
whose  good   spirits   are  contagious,  everywhere. 

Not  less  admirable  than  the  fine  gift  of  observation 
which  guides  Smith  in  his  discovery  of  the  primary  mani- 
festations and  the  laws  of  sympathy  is  the  skill  with  which 
he  deduces  moral  phenomena,  from  the  simplest  to  the 
most  complex — moral  judgment,  the  moral  law,  its  appli- 
cation to  one's  own  conduct,  the  conscience — from  the  inter- 
change of  sympathetic  feelings.  From  involuntary  com- 
parison of  the  representative  feeling  of  the  spectator  with 
its  original  in  the  person  observed  arises  an  agreeable  or 


2io  ENGLISH    ETHICS. 

disagreeable  feeling  of  judgment, a  judgment  of  value,  appro- 
bating or  rejecting  the  latter.  This  is  approving  when  the 
intensity  of  the  original  harmonizes  with  that  of  the  copy, 
disapproving  when  the  former  exceeds  or  fails  to  attain  the 
latter.  In  the  one  case  the  emotion  is  judged  suitable  to 
the  object  which  causes  it  ;  in  the  other,  too  violent  or 
too  weak.  It  is  always  a  certain  mean  of  passion  which, 
as  "  proper,"  receives  approval  (esteem,  love,  or  admira- 
tion). In  the  case  of  the  social  passions  excess  is  more 
readily  condoned,  in  the  case  of  the  unsocial  and  selfish 
ones,  defect;  hence  we  judge  the  over-sensitive  more 
leniently  than  the  over-vengeful.  Anger  must  be  well- 
grounded  and  must  express  itself  with  great  moderation 
to  arouse  in  the  spectator  a  like  degree  of  sympathetic 
resentment.  For  here  the  sympathy  of  the  spectator  is 
divided  between  two  parties,  and  fellow-feeling  with  the 
angry  one  is  weakened  by  fear  for  the  person  menaced 
by  him,  whereas,  in  the  case  of  kind  affections,  sympathy 
is  increased  by  doubling.  While  our  judgment  of  pro- 
priety or  decorum  rests  on  simple  participation  in  the 
sentiments  of  the  agent,  our  judgment  of  merit  and  dement 
is  based,  in  addition,  on  sympathy  with  the  feelings  of 
gratitude  or  resentment  experienced  by  the  person  on 
whom  the  action  terminates.  An  act  is  meritorious  if  it 
appears  to  us  to  deserve  thanks  and  reward,  ill-deserving 
if  it  seems  to  merit  resentment  and  punishment.  Nature 
has  inscribed  on  the  heart,  apart  from  all  reflection  on  the 
utility  of  punishment,  an  independent,  immediate,  and 
instinctive  approbation  of  the  sacred  law  of  retribution. 
This  is  the  point  at  which  a  hitherto  purely  contemplative 
sympathy  passes  over  into  an  active  impulse,  which  pre- 
pares us  to  support  the  victim  of  attack  and  insult  in  his 
defense  and  revenge. 

This  participation  in  the  circumstances  and  feelings  of 
others  is  a  reciprocal  phenomenon.  The  spectator  takes 
pains  to  share  the  sentiments  of  the  person  observed  ;  and 
the  latter,  on  his  part,  endeavors  to  reduce  the  emotions 
which  move  him  to  a  degree  which  will  render  participation 
in  them  possible  for  the  former.  In  these  reciprocal  efforts 
we  have  the  beginnings  of  the  two  classes  of  virtues — the 


ADAM  SMITH.  211 

gentle,  amiable  virtues  of  sympathy  and  sensibility,  and  the 
exalted,  estimable  virtues  of  self-denial  and  self-command. 
Both  of  these  conditions  of  mind,  however,  are  considered 
virtues  only  when  they  are  manifested  in  unusual  intensity: 
humanity  is  a  remarkably  delicate  fellow-feeling,  greatness 
of  soul  a  rare  degree  of  self-command.  (The  consideration 
for  those  about  one  which  is  ethically  demanded  is  given, 
moreover,  to  a  certain  extent  involuntarily.  The  man  in 
trouble  and  the  merry  man  alike  restrain  themselves  in  the 
company  of  persons  who  are  indifferent,  or  in  an  opposite 
mood,  while  they  give  rein  to  their  emotions  when  with 
those  similarly  affected.  Joy  is  enhanced  by  sympathy,  and 
grief  mitigated.)  Thus  the  perfection  of  human  nature  and 
the  divinely  willed  harmony  among  the  feelings  of  men  are 
dependent  on  every  man  feeling  little  for  himself  and  much 
for  others;  on  his  holding  his  selfish  inclinations  in  check 
and  giving  free  course  to  his  benevolent  ones.  This  is  the 
injunction  of  Christianity  as  well  as  of  nature.  And  as,  on 
the  one  hand,  the  content  of  the  moral  law  is  thus  deduced 
from  sympathy,  so,  on  the  other,  this  yields  the  formal  cri- 
terion of  good  :  Look  upon  thy  sentiments  and  actions  in 
the  light  in  which  the  impartial  spectator  would  see  them. 
Conscience  is  the  spectator  taken  up  into  our  own  breast. 
It  remains  to  consider  the  origin  of  this  third,  imperative 
stage. 

From  daily  experience  of  the  fact  that  we  judge  the  con- 
duct of  others,  and  they  ours,  and  from  the  wish  to  gain  their 
approval,  arises  the  habit  of  subjecting  our  own  actions  to 
criticism.  We  learn  to  look  at  ourselves  through  the  eyes 
of  others,  we  assign  the  spectator  and  judge  a  place  in  our 
own  heart,  we  make  his  calm  objective  judgment  our  own, 
and  hear  the  man  within  calling  to  us:  Thou  art  respon- 
sible for  thy  acts  and  intentions.  In  this  way  we  are 
placed  in  a  position  to  overcome  two  great  delusions,  one 
of  passion,  which  overestimates  the  present  at  the  expense 
of  the  future,  and  one  of  self-love,  which  overestimates  the 
individual  at  the  expense  of  other  men;  delusions  from 
which  the  impartial  spectator  is  free,  for  the  pleasure  of 
the  moment  seems  to  him  no  more  desirable  than  pleasure 
to  come,  and  one  person  is  just  the  same  to  him  as  another. 


212  ENGLISH  ETHICS. 

Through  comparison  of  like  cases  in  the  exercise  of  self- 
examination  certain  rules  or  principles  are  formed  concern- 
ing what  is  right  and  good.  Reverence  for  these  general 
rules  of  living  is  called  the  sense  of  duty.  The  last  step  in 
the  process  consists  in  our  enhancement  of  the  binding 
authority  of  moral  rules  by  looking  on  them  as  com- 
mands of  God.  Here  Smith  adds  subtle  discussions  of  the 
question,  in  what  cases  actions  ought  to  be  done  simply  out 
of  regard  for  these  abstract  maxims,  and  in  what  others  we 
welcome  the  co-operation  of  a  natural  impulse  or  passion. 
We  ought  to  be  angry  and  to  punish  with  reluctance,  merely 
because  reason  enjoins  it,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  we  should 
be  benevolent  and  grateful  from  affection  ;  she  is  not  a 
model  wife  who  performs  her  duties  merely  from  a  sense  of 
duty,  and  not  from  inclination  also.  Further,  in  all  cases 
where  the  rules  cannot  be  formulated  with  perfect  exact- 
ness and  definiteness  (as  they  can  in  the  case  of  justice), 
and  are  not  absolutely  valid  without  exception,  reverence 
for  them  must  be  assisted  by  a  natural  taste  for  modifying 
and  supplementing  the  general  maxims  to  suit  particular 
instances. 

In  this  sketch  of  the  course  of  Smith's  moral  philosophy 
much  that  is  fine  and  much  that  is  of  importance  has  of 
necessity  been  passed  over — his  excellent  analysis  of  the 
relations  of  benevolence  and  justice,  and  numerous  descrip- 
tions of  traits  of  character,  e.  g.,  his  ingenious  parallel 
between  pride  and  vanity.  We  may  briefly  mention,  in 
conclusion,  his  observations  on  the  irregularities  of  moral 
judgment.  Prosperity  and  success  exert  an  influence  on 
this,  which,  though  hurtful  to  its  purity,  must,  on  the 
whole,  be  considered  advantageous  to  mankind.  Our 
lenience  toward  the  defects  of  princes,  the  great,  and  the 
rich,  and  our  over-praise  for  their  excellent  qualities  are,  from 
the  moral  standpoint,  an  injustice,  but  one  which  has  this 
advantage,  that  it  encourages  ambition  and  industry,  and 
maintains  social  distinctions  intact,  which  without  loyalty 
and  respect  toward  superiors  would  be  broken  down.  For 
most  men  the  road  to  fortune  coincides  with  the  path  to 
virtue.  Again,  it  is  a  beneficent  provision  of  nature  that 
we  put  a  higher  estimate  on  a  successfully  executed  act  of 


ADAM    SMITH.  213 

benevolence,  and  reward  it  more,  than  a  kind  intention 
which  fails  of  execution  ;  that  we  judge  and  punish  the 
purposed  crime  which  is  not  carried  out  more  leniently 
than  the  one  which  is  completed  ;  that  we  even  ascribe  a  cer- 
tain degreeof  accountability  to  an  unintentionalact  of  good 
or  evil — although  in  these  cases  the  moralist  is  compelled  to 
see  an  ethically  unjustifiable  corruption  of  the  judgment 
by  external  success  or  failure  beyond  the  control  of  the 
agent.  The  first  of  these  irregularities  does  not  allow  the 
man  of  good  intentions  to  content  himself  with  noble 
desires  merely,  but  spurs  him  on  to  greater  endeavors  to 
carry  them  out — man  is  created  for  action  ;  the  second 
protects  us  from  the  inquisitorial  questioning  of  motives, 
for  it  is  easy  for  the  most  innocent  to  fall  under  grave 
suspicion.  To  this  inconsistency  of  feeling  we  owe  the 
necessary  legal  principle  that  deeds  only,  not  intentions, 
are  punishable.  God  has  reserved  for  himself  judgment 
concerning  dispositions.  The  third  irregularity,  that  he 
who  inflicts  unintentional  injury  is  not  guilty,  even 
in  his  own  eyes,  but  yet  seems  bound  to  make  atonement 
and  reparation,  is  useful  in  so  far  as  it  warns  everyone 
to  be  prudent,  while  the  corresponding  illusion,  in  virtue 
of  which  we  are  grateful  to  an  involuntary  benefactor — 
for  instance,  the  bearer  of  good  tidings — and  reward  him,  is 
at  least  not  harmful,  for  any  reason  appears  sufficient  for  the 
bestowal  of  kind  intentions  and  actions. 

It  is  impossible  to  explain  in  brief  the  relation  of  Smith's 
ethical  theory  to  his  political  economy.  His  merit  in  the 
former  consists  in  his  comprehensive  and  characteristic 
combination  of  the  results  reached  by  his  predecessors,  and 
in  his  preparation  for  Kantian  views,  so  far  as  this  was  pos- 
sible from  the  empirical  standpoint  of  the  English.  His 
impartial  spectator  was  the  forerunner  of  the  categorical 
imperative. 

English  ethics  after  Smith  ma}',  almost  without  excep- 
tion, be  termed  eclecticism.  This  is  true  of  Ferguson  {Insti- 
tutes of  Moral  Philosophy,  1769);  of  Palcy  (1785);  of  the 
Scottish  School  (Dtigald  Stewart,  1793).  Bentham's  utili- 
tarianism was  the  first  to  bring  in  a  new  phase. 


2  14  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

4.  Theory  of  Knowledge. 

(a)  Berkeley. — George    Berkeley,    a    native     of     Ireland, 
Bishop  of  Cloyne  (1685- 1753  ;  An  Essay  toward  a  New  The- 
ory of  Vision,  1709;  A   Treatise  concerning  tJie  Principles  of 
Human   Knowledge,    1710;    Three  Dialogues  between  Hylas 
and  Philo  nous,  1 7 1 3  ;  Aleiphron,  or  the  Minute  Philosopher, 
1732,  against  the  freethinkers  ;    Works,  17 84.     Fraser's  edi- 
tion of  the  Collected  Works  appeared  in  1871,  in  four  vol- 
umes),* is  related  to  Locke  as  Spinoza  to  Descartes.     He 
notices  blemishes  and  contradictions  allowed  by  his  prede- 
cessor to  remain,  and,  recognizing  that  the  difficulty  is  not 
to  be  remedied  by  minor  corrections  and  artificial  hypothe- 
ses,  goes  back  to  the   fundamental  principles,  takes  these 
tijro  more  earnestly  than  their  author,  and,  by  carrying    them 
at       <r    o\\K.    more    strictly,  arrives  at    a    new    view    of   the   world. 
r       ^    "\W^The  points  in  Locke's  doctrines  which  invited  a  further  ad- 
H x^yy^      .vance  were  the  following:  Locke  proclaims  that  our  knowl- 
^f5*^  .^^edge  extends  no  further  than  our  ideas,  and  that  truth  con- 
w  sists  in  the  agreement  of  ideas  among  themselves,  not  in  the 

agreement  of  ideas  with  things.  But  this  principle  had 
scarcely  been  announced  before  it  was  violated.  In  spite  of 
his  limitation  of  knowledge  to  ideas,  Locke  maintains  that 
we  know  (if  not  the  inner  constitution,  yet)  the  qualities 
and  powers  of  things  without  us,  and  have  a  "  sensitive  " 
certainty  of  their  existence.  Againstthis,  it  is  to  be  said  that 
there  are  no  primary  qualities,  that  is,  qualities  which  exist 
without  as  well  as  within  us.  Extension,  motion,  solidity, 
which  are  cited  as  such,  are  just  as  purely  subjective  states 
in  us  as  color,  heat,  and  sweetness.  Impenetrability  is 
nothing  more  than  the  feeling  of  resistance,  an  idea,  there- 
fore, which  self-evidently  can  be  nowhere  else  than  in 
the  mind  experiencing  it.  Extension,  size,  distance,  and 
motion  are  not  even  sensations  (we  see  colors  only,  not 
quantitative  determinations),  but  relations  which  we  in 
thinking  add  to  the  sense-qualities  (secondary  qualities),  and 
which  we  are  not  able  to  represent  apart  from  them ;  their 

*  Cf.  also  Fraser's  Berkeley  (Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics)  1881  ;  Fraser's 
Selections  from  Berkeley,  4th  ed.,  1891  ;  and  Krauth's  edition  of  the  Principles, 
1874,  with  notes  from  several  sources,  especially  those  translated  from  Ueber> 
weg. — Tr. 


BERKELEY.  215 

relativity  alone  would  forbid  us  to  consider  them  objective. 
And  material  substances,  the  "support  "  of  qualities  invented 
by  the  philosophers,  are  not  only  unknown,  but  entirely  non- 
existent. Abstract  matter  is  a  phrase  without  meaning, 
and  individual  things  are  collections  of  ideas  in  us,  nothing 
more.  If  we  take  away  all  sense-qualities  from  a  thing,  abso- 
lutely nothing  remains.  Our  ideas  are  not  merely  the  only 
objects  of  knowledge,  but  also  the  only  existing  things — 
nothing  exists  except  minds  and  their  ideas.  Spirits  alone 
are  active  beings,  they  only  are  indivisible  substances,  and 
have  real  existence,  while  the  being  of  bodies  (as  dependent, 
inert,  variable  beings,  which  are  in  a  constant  process  of 
becoming)  consists  alone  in  their  appearance  to  spirits  and 
their  being  perceived  by  them.  Incogitative,  hence  passive, 
beings  are  neither  substances,  nor  capable  of  producing  ideas 
in  us.  Those  ideas  which  we  do  not  ourselves  produce  are 
the  effects  of  a  spirit  which  is  mightier  than  we.  With  this 
a  second  inconsistency  was  removed  which  had  been  over- 
looked by  Locke,  who  had  ascribed  active  power  to  spirits 
alone  and  denied  it  to  matter,  but  at  the  same  time  had 
made  the  former  affected  by  the  latter.  If  external 
sense  is  to  mean  the  capacity  for  having  ideas  occasioned 
by  the  action  of  external  material  things,  then  there  is  no 
external  sense.  A  third  point  wherein  Locke  had  not  gone 
far  enough  for  his  successor,  concerned  the  favorite  English 
doctrine  of  nominalism.  Locke,  with  his  predecessors,  had 
maintained  that  all  reality  is  individual,  and  that  universals 
exist  only  in  the  abstracting  understanding.  From  this 
point  Berkeley  advances  a  step  further,  the  last,  indeed,  which 
was  possible  in  this  direction,  by  bringing  into  question  the 
possibility  even  of  abstract  ideas.  As  all  beings  are  particu- 
lar things,  so  all  ideas  are  particular  ideas. 

Berkeley  looks  on  the  refutation  of  these  two  fundamen- 
tal mistakes — the  assumption  of  general  ideas  in  the  mind. 
and  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  material  world  outside  it 
— as  his  life  work,  holding  them  the  chief  sources  .if  ,d  lieism, 
doubt,  and  philosophical  discord.  The  first  of  these  errors 
arises  from  the  use  of  language.  Because  we  employ  words 
which  denote  more  than  one  object,  we  have  believed  our- 
selves warranted    in    concluding   that    we   have    ideas  which 


2i6  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

correspond  to  the  extension  of  the  words  in  question,  and 
which  contain  only  those  characteristics  which  are  uniformly 
found  in  all  objects  so  named.  This,  however,  is  not  the 
case.'::'  We  speak  of  many  things  which  we  cannot  repre- 
sent: names  do  not  always  stand  for  ideas.  The  definition 
of  the  word  triangle  as  a  three-sided  figure  bounded  by 
straight  lines,  makes  demands  upon  us  which  our  faculties 
of  imagination  are  never  fully  able  to  meet;  for  the  triangle 
that  we  represent  to  ourselves  is  always  either  right-angled 
or  oblique-angled,  and  not — as  we  must  demand  from  the 
abstract  conception  of  the  figure — both  and  neither  at  once. 
The  name  "man  "  includes  men  and  women,  children  and 
the  aged,  but  we  are  never  able  to  represent  a  man  except 
as  an  individual  of  a  definite  age  and  sex.  Nevertheless  we 
are  in  a  position  to  make  a  safe  use  of  these  non-presentative 
but  useful  abbreviations,  and  by  means  of  a  particular  idea  to 
develop  truths  of  wider  application.  This  takes  place  when, 
in  the  demonstration,  those  qualities  are  not  considered 
which  distinguish  the  idea  from  others  with  a  like  name. 
In  this  case  the  given  idea  stands  for  all  others  which 
are  known  by  the  same  name;  the  representative  idea  is  not 
universal,  but  serves  as  such.  Thus  when  I  have  demon- 
strated the  proposition,  the  sum  of  all  the  angles  of  a  triangle 
is  equal  to  two  right  angles,  for  a  given  triangle,  I  do  not 
need  to  prove  it  for  every  triangle  thereafter.  For  not  only 
the  color  and  size  of  the  triangle  are  indifferent,  but  its  other 
peculiarities  as  well;  the  question  whether  it  is  right-angled 
or  obtuse-angled,  whether  it  has  equal  sides,  whether  it  has 
equal  or  unequal  angles,  is  not  mentioned  in  the  demonstra- 
tion, and  has  no  influence  upon  it.  Abstracto,  exist  only  in 
this  sense.  In  considering  the  individual  Paul  I  can  attend 
exclusively  to  those  charcteristics  which  he  has  in  common 
with  all  men  or  with  all  living  beings,  but  it  is  impossible 
for  me  to  represent  this  complex  of  common  qualities  apart 
from  his  individual  peculiarities.  Self-observation  shows 
that  we  have  no  general  concepts ;  reason,  that  we  can  have 

*  Against  the  Berkeleyan  denial  of  abstract  notions  the  popular  philosopher, 
Joh.  Jak.  Engel,  directed  an  essay,  Ueber  die  Realität  allgemeiner  Begriffe 
(Engel's  Schriften,  vol.  x.),  to  which  attention  has  been  called  by  O.  Liebmann, 
Analysis  der  Wirklichkeit,  2d  ed.,  p.  473. 


BERKELE  V.  217 

none,  for  the  combination  of  opposite  elements  in  one  idea 
would  be  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Motion  in  general, 
neither  swift  nor  slow,  extension  in  general,  at  once  great 
and  small,  abstract  matter  without  sensuous  determinations 
—these  can  neither  exist  nor  be  perceived. 

The  "materialistic",  hypothesis — so  Berkeley  terms  the 
assumption  that  a  material  world  exists  apart  from  perceiving 
mind,  and  independently  of  being  perceived — is,  first,  unnec- 
essary, for  the  facts  which  it  is  to  explain  can  be  explained 
as  well,  or  even  better,  without  it ;  and,  second,  false,  since  it 
is  a  contradiction  to  suppose  that  an  object  can  exist  unper- 
ceived,  and  that  a  sensation  or  idea  is  the  copy  of  anything 
itself  not  a  sensation  or  idea.  Ideas  are  the  only  objects  of 
the  understanding.  Sensible  qualities  (white,  sweet)  are 
subjective  states  of  the  soul ;  sense  objects  (sugar),  sensation- 
complexes.  If  sensations  need  a  substantial  support,  this  is 
the  soul  which  perceives  them,  not  an  external  thing  which 
can  neither  perceive  nor  be  perceived.  Single  ideas,  and 
those  combined  into  objects,  can  exist  nowhere  else  than  in 
the  mind;  the  being  of  sense  objects  consists  in  their  being 
perceived  {esse  est percipi).  I  see  light  and  feel  heat,  and 
combine  these  sensations  of  sight  and  touch  into  the  sub- 
stance fire,  because  I  know  from  experience  that  they  con- 
stantly accompany  and  suggest  each  other.*  The  assump- 
tion of  an  "object"  apart  from  the  idea  is  as  useless  as  its 
existence  would  be.  Why  should  God  create  a  world  of 
real  things  without  the  mind,  when  these  can  neither  enter 
into  the  mind,  nor  (because  unperceived)  be  copied  by  its 
ideas,  nor  (because  they  themselves  lack  perception  and 
power)  produce  ideas  in  it?  Ideas  signify  nothing  but  them- 
selves, i.  e.,  affections  of  the  subject. 

The  further  question  arises,  What  is  the  origin  of  ideas? 
Men  have  been  led  into  this  erroneous  belief  in  the  reality 
of  the  material  world  by  the  fact  that  certain  ideas  arc  nol 
subject  to  our  will,  while  others  are.      Sensations  are  «list  i n - 

*  The  fire  that  I  see  is  not  the  cause  of  the  pain  which  I  experience  in 
approaching  it,  but  the  visual  image  of  the  flame  is  only  a  sign  which  warns  nie 
not  to  go  too  near.  If  I  look  through  a  microscope  I  see  a  different  object  from 
the  one  perceived  with  the  naked  eye.  Two  persons  never  sec  the  same  objei  t, 
they  merely  have  like  sensations. 


-iS  THEORY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

guished  from  the  ideas  of  imagination,  which  we  can  excite 
and  alter  at  pleasure,  by  their  greater  strength,  liveli- 
ness, and  distinctness,  by  their  steadiness,  regular  order,  and 
coherence,  and  by  the  fact  that  they  arise  without  our  aid 
and  whether  we  will  or  no.  Unless  these  ideas  are  self- 
originated  they  must  have  an  external  cause.  This,  how- 
ever, can  be  nothing  else  than  a  willing,  thinking  Being; 
for  without  will  it  could  not  be  active  and  act  upon  me, 
and  without  ideas  of  its  own  it  could  not  communicate  ideas 
to  me.  Because  of  the  manifoldness  and  regularity  of 
our  sensations  the  Being  which  produces  them  must,  fur- 
ther, possess  infinite  power  and  intelligence.  The  ideas  of 
imagination  are  produced  by  ourselves,  real  perceptions 
are  produced  by  God.  The  connected  whole  of  divinely 
produced  ideas  we  call  nature,  and  the  constant  regularity 
in  their  succession,  the  laws  of  nature.  The  invariableness 
of  the  divine  working  and  the  purposive  harmony  of  creation 
reveal  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Almighty  more 
clearly  than  "astonishing  and  exceptional  events."  When 
we  hear  a  man  speak  we  reason  from  this  activity  to  his 
existence.  How  much  less  are  we  entitled  to  doubt  the 
existence  of  God,  who  speaks  to  us  in  the  thousandfold 
works  of  nature. 

The  natural  or  created  ideas  which  God  impresses  on  us 
are  copies  of  the  eternal  ideas  which  he  himself  perceives, 
not,  indeed,  by  passive  sensation,  but  through  his  creative 
reason.  Accordingly  when  it  was  maintained  that  things 
do  not  exist  independently  of  perception,  the  reference  was 
not  to  the  individual  spirit,  but  to  all  spirits.  When  I  turn 
my  eyes  away  from  an  object  it  continues  to  exist,  indeed, 
after  my  perception  has  ended — in  the  minds  of  other  men 
and  in  that  of  the  Omnipresent  One.  The  pantheistic 
conclusion  of  these  principles,  in  the  sense  of  Geulincx  and 
Malebranche,*  which  one  expects,  was  really  suggested  by 

*  The  example  of  Arthur  Collier  shows  that  the  same  results  which  Berke- 
ley reaches  empirically  can  be  obtained  from  the  standpoint  of  rationalism. 
Following  Malebranche,  and  developing  further  the  idealistic  tendencies  of  the 
latter,  Collier  had,  independently  of  Berkeley,  conceived  the  doctrine  of  the 
"  non-existence  or  impossibility  of  an  external  world  ":  but  had  not  worked  it 
out  in  his  Clavis  Universalis,  1713,  until  after  the  appearance  of  Berkeley's 
chief  work,  and  not  without  consideration  of  this.      The  general  point  of  view 


BERKELEY.  219 

Berkeley.  Everything  exists  only  in  virtue  of  its  participa- 
tion in  the  one,  permanent,  all-comprehensive  spirit;  indi- 
vidual spirits  are  of  the  same  nature  with  the  universal  reason, 
only  they  are  less  perfect,  limited,  and  not  pure  activity, 
while  God  is  passionless  intelligence.  But  if,  in  the  last 
analysis,  God  is  the  cause  of  all,  this  does  not  hold  of  the 
free  actions  of  men,  least  of  all  of  wicked  ones.  The  free- 
dom of  the  will  must  not  be  rejected  because  of  the  contra- 
dictions which  its  acceptance  involves;  motion,  also,  and 
mathematical  infinity  imply  incomprehensible  elements.  In 
the  philosophy  of  nature  Berkeley  prefers  the  teleological 
to  the  mechanical  view,  since  the  latter  is  able  to  discover 
the  laws  of  phenomena  only,  but  not  their  efficient  and  final 
causes.  Sense  and  experience  acquaint  us  merely  with  the 
course  of  phenomenal  effects;  the  reason,  which  opens  up  to 
us  the  realm  of  causation,  of  the  spiritual,  is  the  only  sure 
guide  to  science  and  truth.  The  understanding  does  not 
feel,  the  senses  do  not  know.  We  have  no  (sensuous) 
idea  of  other  spirits,  but  only  a  notion  of  them;  instead  of 
themselves  we  perceive  their  activities  merely,  from  which 
we  argue  to  souls  like  ourselves,  while  we  know  our  own 
mind  by  immediate  self-consciousness.* 

In  contrast  to  the  fearlessness  with  which  Berkeley  pro- 
pounds his  spiritualism,  his  anxious  endeavors  to  take  away 
the  appearance  of  paradox  from  his  immatcrialistic  doc- 
trine, and  to  show  its  complete  agreement  with  common 
sense,  excite  surprise.  Even  the  common  man,  he  argues, 
desires  nothing  more  than  that  his  perceptions  be  real; 
the  distinction  between  idea  and  object  is  an  invention 
of  philosophers.  Here  Berkeley  cannot  be  acquitted  of  a 
certain  sophistical  play  upon  the  term  "idea,"  which,  in 
fact,  is  ambiguous.  lie  understands  by  it  tliat  which  the 
soul  perceives  (its  immediate,  inner  object),  but  the  popular 

and  the  arguments  are  the  same  :  Existence  is  equivalent  to  being  perceived  by 
God  ;  the  creation  of  a  real  world  of  matter  apart  from  the  ideal  world  in  God 
and  from  sensuous  perceptions  in  us  would  have  been  a  superfluous  device,  etc. 
*  It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that  this  immediate  knowledge  oi  our 
selves  is  also  "  not  after  the  manner  of  an  idea  or  sensation."  Our  knowledge 
of  -spirits  is  always  mediated  by  "  notions  "  not  by  "  ideas  "  in  the  strict  sense, 
that  is,  not  by  "images."  Cf.  Principles,  §£  27,  135  Stq.t  especially  in  the 
second  edition. — Tr. 


2^o  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

mind,  that  through  which  the  soul  perceives  an  object.  The 
reality  of  an  idea  in  us  is  different  from  the  idea  of  a  real  thing, 
or  from  the  reality  of  that  which  is  perceived  without  us  by 
means  of  the  idea,  and  it  is  just  this  last  meaning  which  com- 
mon sense  affirms  and  Berkeley  denies.  In  any  case  it  was 
a  work  of  great  merit  to  have  transferred  the  existence  of 
objects  beyond  our  ideas,  of  things-in-themselves,  out  of  the 
region  of  the  self-evident  into  the  region  of  the  problematical. 
We  never  get  beyond  the  circle  of  our  ideas,  and  if  we  posit 
a  thing-in-itself  as  the  ground  and  object  of  the  idea,  this 
also  is  simply  a  thought,  an  idea.  For  us  there  is  no  being 
except  that  of  the  perceiver  and  the  perceived.  Later  we 
shall  meet  two  other  forms  of  idealism,  in  Leibnitz  and 
Fichte.  Both  of  these  agree  with  Berkeley  that  spiritual 
beings  alone  are  active,  and  active  beings  alone  real,  and  that 
the  being  of  the  inactive  consists  in  their  being  perceived. 
But  while  in  Berkeley  the  objective  ideas  are  impressed 
upon  finite  spirits  by  the  Infinite  Spirit  from  without  and 
singly,  with  Leibnitz  they  appear  as  a  fullness  of  germs, 
which  God  implanted  together  in  the  monads  at  the  begin- 
ning, and  which  the  individual  develops  into  consciousness, 
and  with  Fichte  they  become  the  unconscious  productions 
of  the  Absolute  Ego  acting  in  the  individual  egos.  For  the 
two  former  as  many  worlds  exist  as  there  are  individual 
spirits,  their  harmony  being  guaranteed,  in  the  one  case,  by 
the  consistency  of  God's  working,  and,  in  the  other,  by  his 
foresight.  For  Fichte,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  but  one 
world,  for  the  absolute  is  not  outside  the  individual  spirits, 
but  the  uniformly  working  force  within  them. 

'b) Hume. — David  Hume  was  born  in  Edinburgh  in  171 1, 
and  died  in  the  same  city,  1776.  His  position  as  librarian, 
which  he  held  in  the  place  of  his  birth,  1752-57,  gave  the 
opportunity  for  his  History  of England '(17 '54-62).  His  chief 
work,  the  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  which,  however,  found 
few  readers,  was  composed  during  his  first  residence  in 
France  in  1734-37.  Later  he  worked  over  the  first  book  of 
this  work  into  his  Enquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding 
(1748);  the  second  book  into  A  Dissertation  on  the  Passions; 
and  the  third  into  An  Enquiry  concerning  the  Principles  of 
Morals.     These,  and   others  of  his  essays,  found  so  much 


HUME.  221 

favor  that,  during  his  second  sojourn  in  France,  as  secretary 
to  Lord  Hertford,  in  1763-66,  he  was  already  honored  as 
a  philosopher  of  world-wide  renown.  Then,  after  serving 
for  some  time  as  Under-Secretary  of  State,  he  retired  to 
private  life  at  home  (1769). 

The  three  books  of  the  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  which 
appeared  in  1739-40,  are  entitled  Of  the  Understanding,  Of 
the  Passions,  Of  Morals.  Of  the  five  volumes  of  the  Essays, 
the  first  contains  the  Essays  Moral,  Political,  and  Literary, 
1741-42;  the  second,  the  Enquiry  concerning  Human  Under- 
standing, 1748;  the  third,  the  Enquiry  concerning  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Morals,  1 75 1  ;  the  fourth,  the  Political  Discourses, 
17S2;  the  fifth,  1757,  the  Four  Dissertations,  including  that 
On  the  Passions  and  the  Natural  History  of  Religion.  After 
Hume's  death  appeared  the  Autobiography,  1777;  the 
Dialogues  concerning  Natural  Religion,  1779;  and  the  two 
small  essays  on  Suicide  and  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul, 
1783.*  The  Philosophical  Works  were  published  in  1827, 
and  frequently  afterward. f 

Hume's  object,  like  that  of  Berkeley,  is  the  improvement 
of  Locke's  doctrine  of  knowledge.  In  several  respects  he 
does  not  go  so  far  as  Berkeley,  in  others  very  much  farther. 
In  agreement  with  Berkeley's  ultra-nominalism,  which  com- 
bats even  the  possibility  of  abstract  ideas,  he  yet  does  not  fol- 
low him  to  the  extent  of  denying  external  reality.  On  the 
other  hand,  he  carries  out  more  consistently  Berkeley's  hint 
that  immediate  sensation  includes  less  than  is  ascribed  to  it 
{e.g.,  that  by  vision  we  perceive  colors  only,  and  not  dis- 
tance, etc.),  as  well  as  his  principle — destructive  to  the  cer- 
tainty of  our  knowledge  of  nature — that  there  is  no  causality 
among  phenomena;  and  brings  the  question  of  substance  to 
the  negative  conclusion,  that  there  is  no  need  whatever  for 
a  support    for  groups  of  qualties,  and,  therefore,   that  sub- 

*Or  1777.  cf.  Green  and  Grose's  edition,  vol.  iii.  p.  67  seq. — Tk. 

f  Among  the  works  on  Hume  we  may  mention  Jodl's  prize  treatise,  1872, 
and  Huxley's  Hume  (English  Men  of  Letters),  1879.  [The  i<-.idrr  may  be 
referred  also  to  Knight's  Ih<»ir  (Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics),  [886  J 
to  T.  H.  (Irecn's  "  Introductions"  in  (Irren  and  ( '.rose's  edition  of  the  collected 
works  in  four  volumes,  1874  (new  ed.  1880-00),  which  is  now  standard  ;  and  to 
Selby-Bigge's  reprint  of  the  original  edition  of  the  Treatise,  I  vol.,  1888,  with 
a  valuable  Analytical  Index. 


2  22  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

stantiality  is  to  be  denied  to  immaterial  as  well  as  to 
material  beings.  The  points  in  Locke's  philosophy  which 
seemed  to  Hume  to  need  completion  were  different  from 
those  at  which  Berkeley  had  struck  in.  The  antithesis  of 
rational  and  empirical  knowledge  is  more  sharply  conceived  ; 
the  combination  of  ideas  is  not  left  to  the  choice  of  the 
understanding  but  placed  under  the  dominion  of  psycho- 
logical laws;  and  to  the  distinction  between  outer  and  inner 
experience  (to  the  former  of  which  priority  is  conceded,  on 
the  ground  that  we  must  have  had  an  external  sensation 
before  we  can,  through  reflection,  be  conscious  of  it  as  an 
internal  phenomenon),  there  is  added  a  second,  as  important 
as  the  other  and  crossing  it,  between  impressions  and  ideas, 
of  which  the  former  are  likewise  made  prior  to  the  latter. 

Everyone  will  acknowledge  the  considerable  difference 
between  a  sensation  actually  present  (of  heat,  for  instance) 
and  the  mere  idea  of  one  previously  experienced,  or  shortly 
to  come.  This  consists  in  the  greater  force,  liveliness,  and 
vividness  of  the  former.  Although  these  two  classes  of 
states  (the  idea  of  a  landscape  described  by  a  poet  and  the 
perception  of  a  real  one,  anger  and  the  thought  of  anger) 
are  only  quantitatively  distinct,  they  are  scarcely  ever  in 
danger  of  being  confused — the  most_  lively  idea  is  always  less 
so  than  the  weakest  perception.  The  actual,  outer  or  inner, 
sensations  may  be  termed  impressions;  the  weaker  images 
of  memory  or  imagination,  which  they  leave  behind  them, 
ideas.  Since  nothing  can  gain  entrance  to  the  soul  except 
through  the  two  portals  of  outer  and  inner  experience,  there 
is  no  idea  which  has  not  arisen  from  an  impression  or  several 
such ;  every  idea  is  the  image  and  copy  of  an  impression. 
But  as  the  understanding  and  imagination  variously  com- 
bine, separate,  and  transpose  the  elements  furnished  by 
the  senses  and  lingering  in  memory,  the  possibility  of  error 
arises.  A  hidden,  and,  therefore  more  dangerous  source  of 
error  consists  in  the  reference  of  an  idea  to  a  different 
impression  than  the  one  of  which  it  is  the  copy.  The  con- 
cepts substance  and  causality  are  examples  of  such  false 
reference. 

The  combination  of  ideas  takes  place  without  freedom,  in 
a  purely  mechanical  way  according  to  fixed  rules,  which  in 


HUME.  223 

the  last  analysis  reduce  to  three  fundamental  laws  of  associa- 
tion :  Ideas  are  associated  (r)  according  to  their  resemblance 
and  contrast;  (2)  according  to  their  contiguity  in  space  and 
time;  (3)  according  to  their  causal  connection.  Mathematics 
is  based  on  the  operation  of  the  first  of  these  laws,  on  the 
immediate  or  mediate  knowledge  of  the  resemblance,  con- 
trariety, and  quantitative  relations  of  ideas;  the  descriptive 
and  experimental  part  of  the  sciences  of  nature  and  of  man 
on  the  second ;  religion,  metaphysics,  and  that  part  of 
physical  and  moral  science  which  goes  beyond  mere  obser- 
vation on  the  third.  The  theory  of  knowledge  has  to  deter- 
mine the  boundaries  of  human  understanding  and  the  degree 
of  credibility  to  which  these  sciences  are  entitled. 

The  objects  of  human  thought  and  inquiry  are  either  rela- 
tions of  ideas  or  matters  of  fact.  To  the  former  class  belong 
the  objects  of  mathematics,  the  truths  of  which,  since  they 
are  analytic  (i.  e.,  merely  explicate  in  the  predicate  the 
characteristics  already  contained  in  the  subject,  and  add 
nothing  new  to  this),  and  since  they  concern  possible  rela- 
tions only,  not  reality,  possess  intuitive  or  demonstrative 
certainty.  It  is  only  propositions  concerning  quantity  and 
number  that  are  discoverable  a  priori  by  the  mere  opera- 
tion of  thought,  without  dependence  on  real  existence,  and 
that  can  be  proved  from  the  impossibility  of  their  oppo- 
sites — mathematics  is  the  only  demonstrative  science^) 

We  reach  certainty  in  matters  of  fact  by  direct  perception, 
or  by  inferences  from  other  facts,  when  they  transcend  the 
testimony  of  our  senses  and  memory.  These  arguments 
from  experience  are  of  an  entirely  different  sort  from  the 
rational  demonstrations  of  mathematics;  as  the  contrary 
of  a  fact  is  always  thinkable  (the  proposition  that  the  sun 
will  not  rise  to-morrow  implies  no  logical  contradiction), 
they  yield,  strictly  speaking,  probability  only,  no  matter 
how  strong  our  conviction  of  their  accuracy  may  be.  Never- 
theless it  is  advisable  to  separate  this  species  of  inferences 
from  experience — whose  certainty  is  not  doubted  except 
by  the  philosophers — from  uncertain  probabilities,  as  a 
class  intermediate  between  the  latter  and  demonstrative 
truth  (demonstrations — proofs — probabilities).  All  reason- 
ings concerning  matters  of  fact  arc  based  on  the  relation   of 


224  THEORY   OF  KXOW  LEDGE. 

cause  and  effect.  Whence,  then,  do  we  obtain  the  knowledge 
of  cause  and  effect?  Not  by  a  priori  thought.  Pure  reason 
is  able  only  to  analyze  concepts  into  their  elements,  not  to 
connect  new  predicates  with  them.  All  its  judgments  are 
analytic,  while  synthetic  judgments  rest  on  experience. 
Judgments  concerning  causation  belong  in  this  latter  class, 
for  effects  are  entirely  distinct  from  causes;  the  effect  is  not 
contained  in  the  cause,  nor  the  latter  in  the  former.  In  the 
case  of  a  phenomenon  previously  unknown  we  cannot  tell 
from  what  causes  it  has  proceeded,  nor  what  its  effect  will 
be.  We  argue  that  fire  will  warm  us,  and  bread  afford 
nourishment,  because  we  have  often  perceived  these  causal 
pairs  closely  connected  in  space  and  time.  But  even  experi- 
ence does  not  vouchsafe  all  that  we  desire.  It  shows 
nothing  more  than  the  coexistence  and  succession  of  phe- 
nomena and  events;  while  the  judgment  itself,  c.  g.,  that 
the  motion  of  one  body  stands  in  causal  connection  with 
that  of  another,  asserts  more  than  mere  contiguity  in  space 
and  time,  it  affirms  not  merely  that  the  one  precedes  the 
other,  but  that  it  produces  it — not  merely  that  the  second 
follows  the  first,  but  that  it  results  from  it.  The  bond  which 
connects  the  two  events,  the  force  that  puts  forth  the  second 
from  the  first,  the  necessary  connection  between  the  two 
is  not  perceived,  but  added  to  perception  by  thought,  con- 
strued into  it."  What,  then,  is  the  occasion  and  what  the 
warrant  for  transforming  perceived  succession  in  time  into 
causal  succession,  for  substituting  must  for  is,  for  interpret- 
ing the  observed  connection  of  factjnto  a  necessary  connec- 
tion which  always  eludes  observation? 

We  do  not  causally  connect  every  chance  pair  of  succes- 
sive events,  but  those  only  which  have  been  repeatedly 
observed  together.  The  wonder  is,  then,  that  through  oft- 
repeated  observation  of  certain  objects  we  come  to  believe 
that  we  know  something  about  the  behavior  of  other  like 
objects,  and  the  further  behavior  of  these  same  ones.  From 
the  fact  that  I  have  seen  a  given  apple  fall  ten  times  to  the 

*  The  weakness  of  the  concept  of  cause  had  been  recognized  before  Hume 
by  the  skeptic,  J.  Glanvil  (1636-80).  Causality  itself  cannot  be  perceived  ;  we 
infer  it  from  the  constant  succession  of  two  phenomena,  without  being  able  to 
show  warrant  for  the  transformation  of  thereafter  into  thereby. 


HUME.  225 

ground,  I  infer  that  all  the  apples  in  the  world  do  the  same 
when  loosened,  instead  of  flying  upward,  which,  in  itself,  is 
quite  as  thinkable;  I  infer  further  that  this  has  always  been 
the  case,  and  will  continue  to  be  so  to  all  eternity.  Where 
is  the  intermediate  link  between  the  proposition,  "I  have 
found  that  such  an  object  has  always  been  attended  with 
such  an  effect,"  and  this  other,  "I  foresee  that  other  objects 
which  are,  in  appearance,  similar,  will  be  attended  with 
similar  effects"?  This  postulate,  that  the  future  will  be  like 
the  past,  and  that  like  causes  will  have  like  effects,  rests  on 
a  purely  psychological  basis.  In  virtue  of  the  laws  of  asso- 
ciation the  sight  of  an  object  or  event  vividly  recalls  the 
image  of  a  second,  often  observed  in  connection  with  the 
former,  and  leads  us  involuntarily  to  expect  its  appearance 
anew.  The  idea  of  causal  connection  is  based  on  feeling 
(the  feeling  of  inner  determination  to  pass  from  one  idea  to  a 
second),  not  upon  insight ;  it  is  a  product  of  the  imagination, 
not  of  the  understanding.  From  the  habitual  perception  of 
two  events  in  connection  (sunshine  and  heat)  arises  the 
mental  determination  to  think  of  the  second  when  we  per- 
ceive the  first,  and,  anticipating  the  senses,  to  count  on  its 
appearance.  It  is  now  possible  to  state  of  what  impression 
the  idea  of  the  causal  nexus  is  the  copy  :  the  impression  on 
which  it  is  based  is  the  habitual  transition  from  the  idea  of 
a  thing  to  its  customary  attendant.  Hence  the  idea  of 
causality  has  a  purely  subjective  significance,  not  the  objec- 
tive one  which  we  ascribe  to  it.  It  is  impossible  to  deter- 
mine whether  there  is  a  real  necessity  of  becoming  corre- 
sponding to  the  felt  necessity  of  thought.  In  life  we  never 
doubt  the  fact,  but  for  science  our  conviction  of  the  uni- 
formity of  nature  remains  a  merely  probable  (though  a  very 
highly  probable)  conviction.  Complete  certainty  is  vouch* 
safed  only  by  rational  demonstration  and  immediate 
experience.  The  necessary  bond  which  we  postulate 
between  cause  and  effect  can  neither  be  demonstrated  nor 
feh-) 

(Tf  all  experiential  reasonings  depend  on  tin-  idea  of  caus- 
ality, and  this  has  no  other  support  than  subjective  incut. \\ 
habit,  it  follows  that  all  knowledge  of  nature  which  goes 
beyond  mere  observed  fact  is  not  knowledge  (neither  demon- 


226  THEORY    OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

strative  knowledge  nor  knowledge  of  fact),  but  belief.*  The 
probability  of  our  belief  in  the  regularity  of  natural 
phenomena  increases,  indeed,  with  every  new  verification  of 
the  assumptions  based  thereon;  but,  as  has  been  shown,  it 
never  rises  to  absolute  certainty.  Nevertheless  inferences 
from  experience  are  trustworthy  and  entirely  sufficient  for 
practical  life,  and  the  aim  of  the  above  skeptical  deliverances 
was  not  to  shake  belief — only  a  fool  or  a  lunatic  can  doubt 
in  earnest  the  immutability  of  nature — but  only  to  make  it 
clear  that  it  is  mere  belief,  and  not,  as  hitherto  held,  demon- 
strative or  factual  knowledge.  Our  doubt  is  intended  to 
define  the  boundary  between  knowledge  and  belief,  and 
to  destroy  that  absolute  confidence  which  is  a  hindrance 
rather  than  a  help  to  investigation.  We  should  recognize 
it  as  a  wise  provision  of  nature  that  the  regulation  of  our 
thoughts  and  the  belief  in  the  objective  validity  of  our 
anticipation  of  future  events  have  not  been  confided  to  the 
weak,  inconstant,  inert,  and  fallacious  reason,  but  to  a 
powerful  instinct.  In  life  and  action  we  are  governed  by 
this  natural  impulse,  in  spite  of  all  the  scruples  of  the 
skeptical  reason. 

In  Hume's  earlier  work  his  destructive  critique  of  the 
idea  of  cause  is  accompanied  by  a  deliverance  in  a  similar 
strain  on  the  concept  of  substance,  which  is  not  included 
in  the  shorter  revision.  Substances  are  not  perceived 
through  impressions,  but  only  qualities  and  powers.  The 
unknown  something  which  is  supposed  to  have  qualities,  or 
in  which  these  are  supposed  to  inhere,  is  an  unnecessary 
fiction  of  the  imagination)  A  permanent  similarity  of  attri- 
butes by  no  means  requires  a  self-identical  support  for  these. 
j\  thing  is  nothing  more  than  a  collection  of  qualities,  to 
which  we  give  a  special  name  because  they  are  always  found 
together.  The  idea  of  substance,  like  the  idea  of  cause,  is 
founded  in  a  subjective  habit  which  we  erroneously  objectify) 
The  impression  from  which  it  has  arisen  is  our  inner  per- 
ception that  our  thought  remains  constant  in  the   repeated 

*  Hume  distinguishes  belief  as  a  form  of  knowledge  from  religious  faith,  both 
in  fact  and  in  name.  In  the  Treatise — the  passage  is  wanting  in  the  Enquiry — 
our  conviction  of  the  external  existence  of  the  objects  of  perception  is  also 
ascribed  to  the  former,  which  later  formed  Jacobi's  point  of  departure.  Religious 
faith  is  referred  to  revelation. 


HUME.  227 

experience  of  the  same  group  of  qualities  (whenever  I  see 
sugar,  I  do  the  same  thing,  that  is,  I  combine  the  qualities 
white  color,  sweet  taste,  hardness,  etc.,  with  one  another), 
or  the  impression  of  a  uniform  combination  of  ideas.  The 
idea  of  substance  becomes  erroneous  through  the  fact  that 
we  refer  it  not  to  the  inner  activity  of  representation,  to 
which  it  rightly  belongs,  but  to  the  external  group  of  quali- 
ties, and  make  it  a  real,  permanent  substratum  for  the 
latter.  Mental  substances  disappear  along  with  material 
substances.  The  soul  or  mind  is,  in  reality,  nothing  more 
than  the  sum  of  our  inner  states,  a  collection  of  ideas  which 
flow  on  in  a  continuous  and  regular  stream ;  it  is  like  a 
stage,  across  which  feelings,  perceptions,  thoughts,  and 
volitions  are  passing  while  it  does  not  itself  come  into  sight. 
A  permanent  self  or  ego,  as  a  substratum  of  ideas,  is  not  per- 
ceived ;  there  is  no  invariable,  permanent  impression.  That 
which  leads  to  the  assumption  of  personal  identity  is  only 
the  frequent  repetition  of  similar  trains  of  ideas,  and  the 
gradual  succession  of  our  ideas,  which  is  easily  confused 
with  constancy.  Thus  robbed  of  its  substantiality,  the  soul 
has  no  further  claims  to  immateriality  and  immortality,  and 
suicide  ceases  to  be  a   crime!*) 

Is  Hume  roundly  to  be  called  a  skeptic ?f  He  never 
impugned  the  validity  of  mathematical  reasonings,  nor 
experimental  truths  concerning  matters  of  fact;  in  regard  to 
the  former  his  thought  is  rationalistic,  in  regard  to  the  latter 
it  is  empirical  or,  more  accurately,  sensationalistic.  His 
attitude  toward  the  empirical  sciences  of  nature  and  of  mind 

*  Cf.  the  essays  on  Suicide  and  the  Immortality  of  the  Sou/,  1783,  whose 
authorship  by  Hume,  however,  is  not  absolutely  established  [cf.  Green  and 
(irose,  as  above,  p.  221,  note  first. — Tk.] 

f  In  the  Essay,  Hume  describes  his  own  standpoint  as  mitigated  or  academ- 
ical skepticism  in  antithesis  to  the  Cartesian,  which  from  doubl  and  through 
doubt  hopes  to  reach  the  indubitable,  and  to  the  excessive  skepticism  of  Pyr- 
rhonism, which  cripples  the  impulse  to  inquiry.  This  moderate  skepticism  asks 
us  only,  after  resisting  the  tendency  to  unreflecting  conclusions,  to  m  >kc  a  duty 
of  deliberation  and  caution  in  judging,  and  to  restrain  inquiry  within  those  fields 
which  are  accessible  to  our  knowledge,  i.  f. ,  the  fields  of  mathematics  and 
empirical  fact.  In  the  Treatise  Hume  had  favored  a  sharper  skepticism  and 
extended  his  doubt  more  widely,  <?.,£■.,  even  to  the  trustworthiness  of  geometry, 
Cf.  on  this  point  Ed.  (Jrimrn,  Zur  Geschichte  Jes  Erkenntnissproblems,  1890, 
p.  559  se<- 


228  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

is  that  of  a  semi-skeptic  or  probabilist,  in  so  far  as  they  go 
beyond  the  establishment  of  facts  to  the  proof  of  connections 
under  law  and  to  inferences  concerning  the  future.  Habit  is 
for  him  a  safe  guide  for  life,  although  it  does  not  go  beyond 
probabilities;  absolute  knowledge  is  unattainable  for  us,  but 
not  indispensable.  Toward  metaphysics,  as  an  alleged 
science  of  the  suprasensible,  he  takes  up  an  entirely  nega. 
tive  attitude.  If  an  argument  from  experience  is  to  be 
assured  of  merely  that  degree  of  probability  which  is  sufficient 
for  belief,  it  must  not  only  have  a  well-established  fact  (an 
impression  or  memory-image)  for  its  starting  point,  but, 
together  with  its  conclusion,  it  must  keep  within  the  limits 
of  possible  experience.  The  limits  of  possible  experience 
are  also  the  limits  of  the  knowable ;  inferences  to  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  the  soul  after  death  and  to  the  being 
of  God  are  vain  sophistry  and  illusion.  According  to  the 
famous  conclusion  of  the  Essay,  all  volumes  which  contain 
anything  other  than  "abstract  reasonings  concerning  quantity 
or  number"  or  "experimental  reasonings  concerning  matter 
of  fact  and  existence"  deserve  to  be  committed  to  the 
flames.  In  view  of  this  limitation  of  knowledge  to  that 
which  is  capable  of  exact  measurement  and  that  which  is 
present  in  experience,  as  well  of  the  principle  that  the  ele- 
ments added  by  thought  are  to  be  sharply  distinguished 
from  the  positively  given  (the  immediate  facts  of  percep- 
tion), we  must  agree  with  those  who  call  Hume  the  father 
of  modern  positivism."* 

As  a  philosopher  of  religion  Hume  is  the  finisher  and 
destroyer  of  deism.  Of  the  three  principles  of  the  deists — 
religion,  its  origin  and  its  truth  are  objects  of  scientific 
investigation;  religion  has  its  origin  in  the  reason  and  the 
consciousness  of  duty  ;  natural  religion  is  the  oldest,  the  posi- 
tive religions  are  degenerate  or  revived  forms  of  natural 
religion — he  accepts  the  first,  while  rejecting  the  other  two. 
Religion  may  correspond  to  reason  or  contradict  it,  but  not 
proceed  from  it.  Religion  has  its  basis  in  human  nature, 
yet  not  in  its  rational  but  its  sensuous  side  ;  not  in  the  specu- 
lative desire  for  knowledge,  but  in  practical  needs;  not  in  the 

*  So  Volkelt,  Erfahrung  und  Denken,  1886,  p.  105. 


HUME.  229 

contemplation  of  nature,  but  in  looking  forward  with  fear  or 
joy  to  the  changing  events  of  human  life.  Anxiety  and 
hope  concerning  future  events  lead  us  to  posit  unseen 
powers  as  directing  our  destiny,  and  to  seek  their  favor. 
The  capriciousness  of  fortune  points  to  a  plurality  of  gods; 
the  tendency  to  conceive  all  things  like  ourselves  gives  them 
human  characteristics;  the  powerful  impression  made  by  all 
that  comes  within  the  sphere  of  the  senses  incites  us  to  con- 
nect the  divine  power  with  visible  objects;  the  allegorical 
laudation  and  deification  of  eminent  men  leads  to  a  com- 
pleted polytheism.  That  this  and  not  (mono-)  theism  was 
the  original  form  of  religion,  Hume  assumes  to  be  a  fact  for 
historical  times,  and  a  well-founded  conjecture  for  prehis- 
toric ages.  Those  who  hold  that  humanity  began  with  a 
perfect  religion  find  it  difficult  to  explain  the  obscuration 
of  the  truth,  endow  immature  ages  with  a  developed  use  of 
the  reason  which  they  can  scarcely  have  possessed,  make 
error  grow  worse  with  increasing  culture,  and  contradict  the 
historical  progress  upward  which  is  everywhere  else  observed. 
The  philosophical  knowledge  of  God  is  a  very  late  product 
of  mature  reflection  ;  even  monotheism,  as  a  popular  religion, 
did  not  arise  from  rational  reflection,  although  its  chief  prin- 
ciple is  in  agreement  with  the  results  of  philosophy,  but 
from  the  same  irrational  motives  as  polytheism.  Its  origin 
from  polytheism  is  accomplished  by  the  transformation  of 
the  leading  god  (the  king  of  the  gods  or  the  tutelary  deity 
of  the  nation)  through  the  fear  and  emulous  flattery  of  his 
votaries  into  the  one,  infinite,  spiritual  ruler  of  the  world. 
Amid  the  folly  of  the  superstitious  herd,  however,  this  refined 
idea  is  not  long  preserved  in  its  purity;  the  more  exalted 
the  conception  entertained  of  the  supreme  deity,  the  more 
imperatively  the  need  makes  itself  felt  for  the  interpolation 
between  this  being  and  mankind  of  mediators  and  demi- 
gods, partaking  more  of  the  human  nature  of  the  worshipers 
and  more  familiar  to  them.  Later  a  new  purification  takes 
place,  so  that  the  history  of  religion  shows  a  continuous 
alternation  of  the  lower  and  higher  forms. 

After  depriving  theism  of  its  prerogative  of  originality, 
Hume  further  takes  away  from  it  its  fame  as  in  every 
respect  the    best   religion.      It    is  disadvantageous!}-    <  1  ist  in- 


230  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

guished  from  polytheism  by  the  fact  that  it  is  more  intoler- 
ant, makes  its  followers  pusillanimous,  and,  by  its  incompre- 
hensible dogmas,  puts  their  faith  to  severer  tests;  while  it 
is  on  a  level  with  polytheism  in  that  most  of  its  adherents 
exalt  belief  in  foolish  mysteries,  fanaticism,  and  the  observ- 
ance of  useless  customs  above  the  practice  of  virtue. 

The  Natural  History  of  Religion,  which  far  outbids  the 
conclusions  of  the  deists  by  its  endeavors  to  explain  religion, 
not  on  rational,  but  on  historical  and  psychological  grounds, 
and  to  separate  it  entirely  from  knowledge  by  relegating  it 
to  the  sphere  of  practice,  leaves  the  possibility  of  a  philo- 
sophical knowledge  of  God  an  open  question.  The  Dia- 
logues concerning  Natural  Religion  greatly  diminish  this 
hope.  The  most  cogent  argument  for  the  intelligence  of 
the  world-ground,  the  teleological  argument,  is  a  hypothesis 
which  has  grave  weaknesses,  and  one  to  which  many  other 
equally  probable  hypotheses  may  be  opposed.  The  finite 
world,  with  its  defects  and  abounding  misery  amid  all  its 
order  and  adaptation,  can  never  yield  an  inference  to  an 
infinite,  perfect  unit-cause,  to  an  all-powerful,  all-wise,  and 
benevolent  deity.  To  this  the  eleventh  section  of  the 
Enquiry  adds  the  argument,  that  it  is  inadmissible  to  ascribe 
to  the  inferred  cause  other  properties  than  those  which  are 
necessary  to  explain  the  observed  effect.  The  tenth  section 
of  the  same  Essay  argues  that  there  is  no  miracle  supported 
by  a  sufficient  number  of  witnesses  credible  because  of  their 
intelligence  and  honesty,  and  free  from  a  preponderance  of 
contradictory  experiences  and  testimony  of  greater  proba- 
bility. In  short,  the  reason  is  neither  capable  of  reaching 
the  existence  of  God  by  well-grounded  inference  nor  of 
comprehending  the  truth  of  the  Christian  religion  with  its 
accompanying  miracles.  That  which  transcends  experience 
cannot  be  proven  and  known,  but  only  believed  in.  Who- 
ever is  moved  by  faith  to  give  assent  to  things  which  con- 
tradict all  custom  and  experience,  is  conscious  of  a  continued 
miracle  in  his  own  person. 

Hume  never  denied  the  existence  of  God,  never  directly 
impugned  revelation.  His  final  word  is  doubt  and  uncer- 
tainty. It  is  certain  that  his  counsel  not  to  follow  the 
leadership  of  the  reason  in  religious  matters,  but  to  submit 


HUME.  231 

ourselves  to  the  power  of  instinct  and  common  opinion,  M-as 
Jess  earnest  and  less  in  harmony  with  the  nature  of  the  phi- 
losopher than  his  other  advice,  to  take  refuge  from  the  strife 
of  the  various  forms  of  superstition  in  the  more  quiet,  though 
dimmer  regions  of — naturally,  the  skeptical — philosophy. 
Hume's  originality  and  greatness  in  this  field  consist  in  his 
genetic  view  of  the  historical  religions.  They  are  for  him 
errors,  but  natural  ones,  grounded  in  the  nature  of  man, 
"sick  men's  dreams,"  whose  origin  and  course  he  searches 
out  with  frightful  cold-bloodedness,  with  the  dispassionate 
interest  of  the  dissector) 

In  his  moral  philosophy  *  Hume  shows  himself  the 
empiricist  only,  not  the  skeptic.  The  laws  of  human  nature 
are  capable  of  just  as  exact  empirical  investigation  as  those 
of  external  nature;  observation  and  analysis  promise  even 
more  brilliant  success  in  this  most  important,  and  yet  hitherto 
so  badly  neglected,  branch  of  science  than  in  physics.  As 
knowledge  and  opinion  have  been  found  reducible  to  the 
associative  play  of  ideas,  and  the  store  of  ideas,  again,  to 
original  impressions  and  shown  derivable  from  these;  so 
man's  volition  and  action  present  themselves  as  results  of 
the  mechanical  working  of  the  passions,  which,  in  turn, 
point  further  back  to  more  primitive  principles.  The  ulti- 
mate motives  of  all  action  are  pleasure  and  pain,  to  which 
we  owe  our  ideas  of  good  and  evil.  The  direct  passions, 
desire  and  aversion,  joy  and  sorrow,  hope  and  fear,  are  the 
immediate  effects  of  these  original  elements.  From  1  In- 
direct arise  in  certain  circumstances  the  indirect  passions, 
pride  and  humility,  love  and  hatred  (together  with  respect 
and  contempt);  the  first  two,  if  the  objects  which  excite 
feeling  are  immediately  connected  with  ourselves,  the  latter, 
when  pleasure  and  pain  are  aroused  by  the  accomplish- 
ments or  the  defeets  of  others.  While  love  and  hate  are 
always  conjoined  with  a  readiness  for  action,  with  benevo 
lence  or  anger,  pride  and  humility  arc  pure,  self-centered, 
inactive  emotions. 

All    moral   phenomena,  will,  moral   judgment,  conscience, 
virtue,  are  nol  simple  and  original  data,  but  ol  a  composite 

*  Cf.  G.  von  Gizycki,  Die  Ethik  David  ffumes,  1S78. 


-j2  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

or  derivative  nature.  They  are  without  exception  products 
of  the  regular  interaction  of  the  passions.  With  such  views 
there  can  be,  of  course,  no  question  of  a  freedom  of  the  will. 
If  anyone  objects  to  determinism,  that  virtues  and  vices,  if 
they  are  involuntary  and  necessary,  are  not  praise-  or  blame- 
worthy, he  is  to  be  referred  to  the  applause  paid  to  beauty 
and  talent,  which  are  considered  meritorious,  although  they 
are  not  dependent  upon  our  choice.  The  legal  attitude  of 
theology  and  law  first  caused  all  desert  to  be  based  upon 
freedom,  whereas  the  ancient  philosophers  spoke  unhesitat- 
ingly of  intellectual  virtues. 

Hume  does  not,  like  nearly  all  his  predecessors  and  con- 
temporaries, find  the  determining  grounds  of  volition  in 
ideas,  but  in  the  feelings.  After  curtailing  the  rights  of  the 
reason  in  the  theoretical  field  in  favor  of  custom  and  instinct, 
he  dispossesses  her  also  in  the  sphere  of  practice.  Impassive 
reason,  judging  only  of  truth  and  falsehood,  is  an  inactive 
faculty,  which  of  itself  can  never  inspire  us  with  inclination 
and  desire  toward  an  object,  can  never  itself  become  a  motive. 
It  is  only  capable  of  influencing  the  will  indirectly,  through 
the  aid  of  some  affection.  Abstract  relations  of  ideas,  and 
facts  as  well,  leave  us  entirely  indifferent  so  long  as  they 
fail  to  acquire  an  emotional  value  through  their  relation  to 
our  state  of  mind.  When  we  speak  of  a  victory  of  rea- 
son over  passion  it  is  nothing  but  a  conquest  of  one  passion 
by  another,  i.  e.,  of  a  violent  passion  by  a  calm  one.  That 
which  is  commonly  called  reason  here  is  nothing  but  one 
of  those  general  and  calm  affections  (V.  g.,  the  love  of  life) 
which  direct  the  will  to  a  distant  good,  without  exciting  any 
sensible  emotion  in  the  mind;  by  passion  we  commonly 
understand  the  violent  passions  only,  which  engender  a 
marked  disturbance  in  the  soul  and  the  production  of  which 
requires  a  certain  propinquity  of  the  object.  A  man  is  said 
to  be  industrious  "from  reason,"  when  a  calm  desire  for 
money  makes  him  laborious.  It  is  a  mistake  to  consider  all 
violent  passions  powerful,  and  all  calm  ones  weak.  The 
prevalence  of  calm  affections  constitutes  the  essence  of 
strength  of  mind. 

As  reason  is  thus  degraded  from  a  governor  of  the  will  to 
a  "slave  of  the  passions,"  so,  further,  judgment  concerning 


HUME.  233 

right  and  wrong  is  taken  away  from  her.  Moral  distinc- 
tions are  determined  by  our  sense  of  the  agreeable  and  the 
disagreeable.  We  pass  an  immediate  judgment  of  taste  on 
the  actions  of  our  fellow-men;  the  good  pleases,  evil  dis- 
pleases. The  sight  of  virtue  gives  us  satisfaction  ;  that  of 
vice  repels  us.  Accordingly  an  action  or  trait  of  mind  is 
virtuous  when  it  calls  forth  in  the  observer  an  agreeable, 
disinterested  sentiment   of  approbation. 

What,  then,  are  the  actions  which  receive  such  general 
approval,  and  how  is  the  praise  to  be  explained  which  the 
spectator  bestows  on  them?  We  approve  such  traits  of 
character  as  are  immediately  agreeable  or  useful,  either  to 
the  person  himself  or  to  others.  This  yields  four  classes  of 
praiseworthy  qualities.  The  first  class,  those  which  are 
agreeable  to  the  possessor  (quite  apart  from  any  utility  to 
himself  or  to  others),  includes  cheerfulness,  greatness  of 
mind,  courage,  tranquillity,  and  benevolence;  the  second, 
those  immediately  agreeable  to  others,  modesty,  good  man- 
ners, politeness,  and  wit ;  the  third,  those  useful  to  ourselves, 
strength  of  will,  industry,  frugality,  strength  of  body,  intelli- 
gence and  other  mental  gifts.  The  fourth  class  comprises 
the  highest  virtues,  the  qualities  useful  to  others,  benevo- 
lence and  justice.  Pleasure  and  utility  are  in  all  cases  the 
criterion  of  merit.  The  monkish  virtues  of  humility  and 
mortification  of  the  flesh,  which  bring  no  pleasure  or 
advantage  either  to  their  possessor  or  to  society,  are  con- 
sidered meritorious  by  no  one  who  understands  the  subject. 

If  the  moral  value  of  actions  is  thus  made  to  depend  on 
their  effects,  we  cannot  dispense  with  the  assistance  of 
reason  in  judging  moral  questions,  since  it  alone  can  inform 
us  concerning  these  results  of  action.  Reason,  however,  is 
not  sufficient  to  determine  us  to  praise  or  blame.  Nothing 
but  a  sentiment  can  induce  us  to  give  the  preference  to 
beneficial  and  useful  tendencies  over  pernicious  ones.  This 
feeling  is  evidently  no  other  than  satisfaction  in  the  happiness 
of  men  and  uneasiness  in  view  of  their  misery — in  short,  it  is 
sympathy.  By  means  of  the  imagination  we  enter  into  the 
experiences  of  Others  and  participate  in  their  foy  and  sorrow. 
Whatever  depresses  or  rejoices  them,  what  ever  inspires 
them    with    pride,   fills    us    with    similar    emotions.       I «Vom 


234  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

the  habit  of  sympathetically  passing  moral  judgment  on 
the  actions  of  others,  and  of  seeing  our  own  judged  by  them, 
is  developed  the  further  one  of  keeping  a  constant  watch 
over  ourselves  and  of  considering  our  dispositions  and  deeds 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  good  of  others.  This  custom  is 
called  conscience.  Allied  to  this  is  the  love  of  reputation, 
which  continually  leads  us  to  ask,  How  will  our  behavior 
appear  in  the  eyes  of  those  with  whom  we  associate? 

Within  the  fourth  and  most  important  class,  the  social 
virtues,  Hume  distinguishes  between  the  natural  virtues 
of  humanity  and  benevolence  and  the  artificial  virtues  of 
justice  and  fidelity.  The  former  proceed  from  our  inborn 
sympathy  with  the  good  of  others,  while  the  latter,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  not  to  be  derived  from  a  natural  passion,  an 
instinctive  love  of  humanity,  but  are  the  product  of  reflection 
and  art,  and  take  their  origin  in  a  social  convention. 

In  order  that  an  action  may  gain  the  approval  of  the 
spectator  two  other  things  are  required  besides  its  salutary 
effects:  it  must  be  a  mark  of  character,  of  a  permanent  dis- 
position, and  it  must  proceed  from  disinterested  motives. 
Hume  is  obliged  by  this  latter  position  to  show  that  disin- 
terested benevolence  actually  exists,  that  the  unselfish  affec- 
tions do  not  secretly  spring  from  self-love.  To  cite  only  one 
of  the  thousand  examples  of  benevolence  in  which  no  dis- 
cernible interest  is  concerned,  we  desire  happiness  for  our 
friends  even  when  we  have  no  expectation  of  participating 
in  it.  The  accounts  of  human  selfishness  are  greatly  over- 
drawn, and  those  who  deduce  all  actions  from  it  make  the 
mistake  of  taking  the  inevitable  consequences  of  virtue — the 
pleasure  of  self-approval  and  of  being  esteemed  by  others — 
for  the  only  motives  to  virtue.  Because  virtue,  in  the  out- 
come, produces  inner  satisfaction  and  is  praised  by  others, 
it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  practiced  merely  for  the  sake 
of  these  agreeable  consequences.  Self-love  is  a  secondary 
impulse,  whose  appearance  at  all  presupposes  primary 
impulses.  Only  after  we  have  experienced  the  pleasure 
which  comes  from  the  satisfaction  of  such  an  original  im- 
pulse {e.  g.,  ambition),  can  this  become  the  object  of  a  con- 
scious reflective  search  after  pleasure,  or  of  egoism.  Power 
brings  no  enjoyment  to  the  man  by  nature  devoid  of  ambi- 


HUME.  235 

tion,  and  he  who  is  naturally  ambitious  does  not  desire  fame 
because  it  affords  him  pleasure,  but  conversely,  fame  affords 
him  pleasure  because  he  desires  it.  The  natural  propensity 
which  terminates  directly  on  the  object,  without  knowledge 
or  foresight  of  the  pleasurable  results,  comes  first,  and 
egoistic  reflection  directed  toward  the  hoped-for  enjoyment 
can  develop  only  after  this  has  been  satisfied.  The  case  is 
the  same  with  benevolence  as  with  the  love  of  fame.  It  is 
implanted  in  the  constitution  of  our  minds  as  an  original 
impulse  immediately  directed  toward  the  happiness  of 
other  men.  After  it  has  been  exercised  and  its  exercise 
rewarded  by  self-satisfaction,  admiration,  thanks,  and  recip- 
rocation, it  is  indeed  possible  for  the  expectation  of  such 
agreeable  consequences  to  lead  us  to  the  repetition  of  benefi- 
cent acts.  But  the  original  motive  is  not  an  egoistic 
regard  for  useful  consequences.  If,  from  the  force  of  the 
passion  alone,  vengeance  may  be  so  eagerly  pursued  that 
every  consideration  of  personal  quiet  and  security  is  silenced, 
it  may  also  be  conceded  that  humanity  causes  us  to  for- 
get our  own  interests.  Nay,  further,  the  social  affections, 
as  Shaftesbury  has  proven,  are  the  strongest  of  all,  and  the 
man  will  rarely  be  found  in  whom  the  sum  of  the  benevolent 
impulses  will  not  outweigh  that  of  the  selfish  ones. 

In  the  section  on  justice  Hume  attacks  the  contract 
theory.  Law,  property,  and  the  sacredness  of  contracts 
exist  first  in  society,  but  not  first  in  the  state.  The  obliga- 
tion to  observe  contracts  is,  indeed,  made  stronger  by  the 
civil  law  and  civil  authority,  but  not  created  by  them.  Law 
arises  from  convention,  i.  c,  not  from  a  formal  contract,  but 
a  tacit  agreement,  a  sense  of  common  interest,  and  this 
agreement,  in  turn,  proceeds  from  an  original  propensity  to 
enter  into  social  relations.  The  unsocial  and  law  less  state 
of  nature  is  a  philosophical  fiction  which  has  never  existed  ; 
men  have  always  been  social.  They  have  all  at  least  been 
born  into  the  society  of  the  family,  and  they  know  no 
more  terrible  punishment  than  isolation.  States  are  not 
created,  however,  by  a  voluntary  act,  but  have  their  roots 
in    history.     The  que, tion   at    issue  between    Hobbes  and 

Hume  was  thus  adjusted  at  a  later  period  by  Kant:  tin- 
state,  it  is  true,  has  not  historically  arisen    from  a  contract, 


^36  THE   SCOTTISH  SCHOOL. 

yet  it  is  allowable  and  useful  to  consider  it  under  the  aspect 
ol  a  contract  as  a  regulative  idea. 

Only  once  since  David  Hume,  in  Herbert  Spencer,  has 
the  English  nation  produced  a  mind  of  like  comprehensive 
power.  Hume  and  Locke  form  the  culminating  points  of 
English  thought.  They  are  national  types,  in  that  in  them 
the  two  fundamental  tendencies  of  English  thinking,  clear- 
ness of  understanding  and  practical  sense,  were  manifested 
in  equal  force.  In  Locke  these  worked  together  in  har- 
monious co-operation.  In  Hume  the  friendly  alliance  is 
broken,  the  common  labor  ceases;  each  of  the  two  demands 
its  full  rights;  a  painful  breach  opens  up  between  science 
and  life.  Reason  leads  inevitably  to  doubt,  to  insight  into 
its  own  weakness,  while  life  demands  conviction.  The 
doubter  cannot  act,  the  agent  cannot  know.  It  is  true  that 
a  substitute  is  found  for  defective  knowledge  in  belief  based 
upon  instinct  and  custom ;  but  this  is  a  makeshift,  not  a 
solution  of  the  problem,  an  acknowledgment  of  the  evil, 
not  a  cure  for  it.  Further,  Hume's  greatness  does  not  con- 
sist in  the  fact  that  he  preached  modesty  to  the  contending 
parties,  that  he  banished  the  doubting  reason  into  the  study 
and  restricted  life  to  belief  in  probabilities,  but  in  the  men- 
tal strength  which  enabled  him  to  endure  sharp  contradic- 
tions, and,  instead  of  an  overhasty  and  easy  reconciliation, 
to  suspend  the  one  impulse  until  the  other  had  made  its 
demands  thoroughly,  completely,  and  regardlessly  heard. 
Though  he  is  distinguished  from  other  skeptics  by  the  fact 
that  he  not  only  shows  the  fundamental  conceptions  of 
our  knowledge  of  nature  and  the  principles  of  religion 
uncertain  and  erroneous,  but  finds  necessary  errors  in  them 
and  acutely  uncovers  their  origin  in  the  lawful  workings 
of  our  inner  life,  yet  his  historical  influence  essentially 
rests  on  his  skepticism.  In  his  own  country  it  roused  in 
the  "Scottish  School"  the  reaction  of  common  sense,  while 
in  Germany  it  helped  to  wake  a  kindred  but  greater  spirit 
from  the  bonds  of  his  dogmatic  slumbers,  and  to  fortify  him 
for  his  critical  achievements. 

(e)  The  Scottish  School. — Priestley's  associational  psy- 
chology, Berkeley's  idealism,  and  Hume's  skepticism  are 
legitimate   deductions    from    Locke's    assumption   that   the 


RE  ID.  237 

immediate  objects  of  thought  are  not  things  but  ideas,  and 
that  judgment  or  knowledge  arises  from  the  combination 
of  ideas  originally  separate.  The  absurdity  of  the  conse- 
quences shows  the  falsity  of  the  premises.  The  true  phi- 
losophy must  not  contradict  common  sense.  It  is  not  cor- 
rect to  look  upon  the  mind  as  a  sheet  of  white  paper  on 
which  experience  inscribes  single  characters,  and  then  to 
make  the  understanding  combine  these  originally  discon- 
nected elements  into  judgments  by  means  of  comparison, 
and  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  the  object  come  in  as  a  later 
result  added  to  the  ideas  by  reflection.  It  is  rather  true 
that  the  elements  discovered  by  the  analysis  of  the  cognitive 
processes  are  far  from  being  the  originals  from  which  these 
arise.  It  is  not  isolated  ideas  that  come  first,  but  judg- 
ments, self-evident  axioms  of  the  understanding,  which  form 
part  of  the  mental  constitution  with  which  God  has  endowed 
us;  and  sensation  is  accompanied  by  an  immediate  belief  in 
the  reality  of  the  object.  Sensation  guarantees  the  presence 
of  an  external  thing  possessing  a  certain  character,  although 
it  is  not  an  image  of  this  property,  but  merely  a  sign  for 
something  in  no  wise  resembling  itself. 

This  is  the  standpoint  of  the  founder  *  of  the  Scottish 
School,  Thomas  Reid  (1710-96,  professor  in  Aberdeen  and 
Glasgow ;  An  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind  on  the  Principles 
of  Common  Sense,  1764;  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers  of 
Man,  1785,  Essays  on  the  Active  Potvcrs,  1788,  together  under 
the  title,  Essays  on  the  Powers  of  the  Human  Mind.  C  'ollcctcJ 
Works,  1804,  and  often  since,  especially  the  edition  by  I  Iamil- 
ton,  with  valuable  notes  and  dissertations,  7th  ed.,  2  vols., 
1872).  We  may  recognize  in  it  a  revival  of  the  common 
notions  of  Herbert,  as  well  as  a  transfer  of  the  innate  faculty 
of  judgment  inculcated  by  the  ethical  and  aesthetic  writers 
from  the  practical  to  the  theoretical  field;  the  "common 
sense"  of  Reid  is  an  original  sense  for  truth,  as  the  "taste" 
of  Shaftesbury  and  Hutcheson  was  a  natural  sense  for  tin- 
good  and  the  beautiful.  Like  Jacobi  at  a  later  period,  Reid 
points  out  that  mediate,  reasoned  knowledge  presupposes 
a  knowledge    which    is    immediate,   and    all     inference    and 

*  In  the  sense  of  "chief  founder"  ;  cf.  McCosh's  Scottish  Philosophy,  1875, 
pp.  36,  68  seq.,  which  is  the  standard  authority  on  the  school  as  a  whole. — Tr. 


-\>S  THE   SCOTTISH  SCHOOL. 

demonstration,  fixed,  undemonstrable,  immediately  certain 
fuiulaiiH-nt.il  truths.  The  fundamental  judgments  or  princi- 
ples of  common  sense,  which  are  true  for  us,  even  if  [pos- 
sibly j  not  true  in  themselves,  are  discoverable  by  observation 
(empirical  rationalism).  In  the  enumeration  of  them  two 
dangers  are  to  be  avoided  :  we  must  neither  raise  contingent 
principles  to  the  position  of  axioms,  nor,  from  an  exagger- 
ated endeavor  after  unity,  underestimate  the  number  of 
these  self-evident  principles.  Reid  himself  is  always  more 
sparing  with  them  than  his  disciples.  He  distinguishes  two 
classes :  first  principles  of  necessary  truth,  and  first  principles 
of  contingent  truth  or  truth  of  fact.  As  first  principles  of 
necessary  truth  he  cites,  besides  the  axioms  of  logic  and 
mathematics,  grammatical,  aesthetic,  moral,  and  metaphysical 
principles  (among  the  last  belong  the  principles:  "That  the 
qualities  which  we  perceive  by  our  senses  must  have  a 
subject,  which  we  call  body,  and  that  the  thoughts  we  are 
conscious  of  must  have  a  subject,  which  we  call  mind"; 
"that  whatever  begins  to  exist,  must  have  a  cause  which 
produced  it").  He  lays  down  twelve  principles  as  the  basis  of 
our  knowledge  of  matters  of  fact,  in  which  his  reference  to  the 
doubt  of  Berkeley  and  Hume  is  evident.  The  most  impor- 
tant of  these  are:  "The  existence  of  everything  of  which  I 
am  conscious";  "that  the  thoughts  of  which  I  am  conscious, 
are  the  thoughts  of  a  being  which  I  call  myself,  my  mind, 
my  person";  "our  own  personal  identity  and  continued 
existence,  as  far  back  as  we  remember  anything  distinctly"; 
"that  those  things  do  really  exist  which  we  distinctly 
perceive  by  our  senses,  and  are  what  we  perceive  them  to 
be";  "that  we  have  some  degree  of  power  over  our  actions, 
and  the  determinations  of  our  will";  "that  there  is  life 
and  intelligence  in  our  fellow-men  ";  "that  there  is  a 
certain  regard  due  ...  to  human  authority  in  matters 
of  opinion";  "that,  in  the  phenomena  of  nature,  what  is  to 
be,  will  probably  be  like  what  has  been  in  similar  circum- 
stances." 

The  widespread  and  lasting  favor  experienced  by  this 
theory,  with  its  invitation  to  forget  all  earnest  work  in  the 
problems  of  philosophy  by  taking  refuge  in  common  sense, 
shows  that  a  general  relaxation  had  succeeded  the  energetic 


FOLLOWERS  OF  RELD.  239 

endeavors  which  Hume  had  demanded  of  himself  and  of  his 
readers.  With  this  declaration  of  the  infallibility  of  com- 
mon consciousness,  the  theory  of  knowledge,  which  had 
been  so  successfully  begun,  was  incontinently  thrust  aside, 
although,  indeed,  empirical  psychology  gained  by  the 
industrious  investigation  of  the  inner  life  by  means  of  self- 
observation.  James  Beattie  continued  the  attack  on  Hume 
in  his  Essay  on  the  Nature  and  Immutability  of  Truth  in 
Opposition  to  Sophistry  and  Skepticism,  1770,  on  the  principle 
that  wisdom  must  never  contradict  nature,  and  that  whatever 
our  nature  compels  us  to  believe,  hence  whatever  all  agree 
in,  is  true.  In  his  briefer  dissertations  Beattie  discussed 
Memory  and  Imagination,  Fable  and  Romance,  the  Effects  of 
Poetry  and  Music,  Laughter,  the  Sublime,  etc.  While  Beat- 
tie  had  given  the  preference  to  psychological  and  aesthetic 
questions,  James  Oswald  (1772)  appealed  to  common  sense 
in  matters  of  religion,  describing  it  as  an  instinctive  faculty 
of  judgment  concerning  truth  and  falsehood.  The  most 
eminent  among  the  followers  of  Reid  was  Dugald  Stewart 
(professor  in  Edinburgh;  Elements  of  the  Philosophy  of 
the  Human  Mind,  1 792-1 827;  Collected  Works,  edited  by 
Hamilton,  1854-58),  who  developed  the  doctrines  of  the 
master  and  in  some  points  modified  them.  Thomas  Brown 
(1778-1820),  who  is  highly  esteemed  by  Mill,  Spencer,  and 
Bain,  approximated  the  teachings  of  Reid  and  Stewart  to 
those  of  Hume.  The  philosophy  of  the  Scottish  School  was 
long  in  favor  both  in  England  and  in  France,  where  it  was 
employed  as  a  weapon  against  materialism. 

By  way  of  appendix  we  may  mention  the  beginnings  of 
a  psychological  aesthetics  in  Henry  Home  (Lord  Karnes, 
1696-1782),  and  Edmund  Burke  (1728-97).*  Home,  in 
ethics  a  follower  of  Hutcheson,  is  fond  of  supporting  his 
aesthetic  views  by  examples  from  Shakspere.  Beauty  (chap. 
iii.)  appears  to  belong  to  the  object  itself,  but  in  reality  it  is 
only  an  effect,  a  "secondary  quality,"  of  the  object;  like 
color,  it  is  nothing  but  an  idea  in  the  mind,  "for  an  object 
is  said  to  be  beautiful  for  no  other  reason  but  that  it 
appears    so    to  the  spectator."      It     arises   from    regularity, 

*  Home,  Elements  of  Criticism,  17O2.  I'urke,  A  Philosophical  Inquiry  into 
the  Origin  0/  our  Idea»  0/  the  Sublime  ami  the  Beautiful,  1 756. 


240  THE   SCOTTISH  SCHOOL. 

proportion,  order,  simplicity — properties  which  belong  to 
sublimity  as  well  (chap,  iv.),  but  to  which  they  are  by  no 
means  so  essential,  since  it  is  satisfied  with  a  less  degree  of 
them.  While  the  beautiful  excites  emotions  of  sweetness 
and  gayety,  the  sublime  rouses  feelings  which  are  agreeable, 
it  is  true,  but  which  are  not  sweet  and  gay,  but  strong  and 
more  serious.  Burke's  explanation  goes  deeper.  He 
derives  the  antithesis  of  the  sublime  and  the  beautiful  from 
the  two  fundamental  impulses  of  human  nature,  the  instinct 
of  self-preservation  and  the  social  impulse.  Whatever  is 
contrary  to  the  former  makes  a  strong  and  terrible  impres- 
sion on  the  soul ;  whatever  favors  the  latter  makes  a  weak 
but  agreeable  one.  The  terrible  delights  us  (first  depres- 
sing and  then  exalting  us),  when  we  merely  contemplate  it, 
without  being  ourselves  affected  by  the  danger  or  the  pain — 
this  is  the  sublime.  On  the  other  hand,  that  is  beautiful 
which  inspires  us  with  tenderness  and  affection  without  our 
desiring  to  possess  it.  Sublimity  implies  a  certain  great- 
ness, beauty,  a  certain  smallness.  Delight  in  both  is  based 
on  bodily  phenomena.  Terror  moderated  exercises  a 
beneficent  influence  on  the  nerves  by  stimulating  them  and 
giving  them  tension  ;  the  gentle  impression  of  beauty  exerts 
a  quieting  effect  upon  them.  The  disturbances  caused  by 
the  former,  and  the  recovery  induced  by  the  latter,  are 
both  conducive  to  health,  and  hence,  experienced  as 
pleasures. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

In  the  last  decade  of  the  seventeenth  century  France  had 
yielded  the  leadership  in  philosophy  to  England.  Whereas 
Hobbes  had  in  Paris  imbibed  the  spirit  of  the  Galilean  and 
Cartesian  inquiry,  while  Bacon,  Locke,  and  even  Hume  had 
also  visited  France  with  advantage,  now  French  thinkers 
take  the  watchword  from  the  English.  Montesquieu  and 
Voltaire,  returning  from  England  in  the  same  year  (1729), 
acquaint  their  countrymen  with  the  ideas  of  Locke  and  his 
contemporaries.  These  are  eagerly  caught  up;  are,  step  by 
step,  and  with  the  logical  courage  characteristic  of  the 
French  mind,  developed  to  their  extreme  conclusions;  and, 
at  the  same  time,  spread  abroad  in  this  heightened  form 
among  the  people  beyond  the  circles  of  the  learned,  nay, 
even  beyond  the  educated  classes.  The  English  tempera- 
ment is  favorable  neither  to  this  advance  to  extreme 
revolutionary  inferences  nor  to  this  propagandist  tendency- 
Locke  combines  a  rationalistic  ethics  with  his  semi- 
sensational  theory  of  knowledge ;  Newton  is  far  from  find- 
ing in  his  mechanical  physics  a  danger  for  religious 
beliefs;  the  deists  treat  the  additions  of  positive  religion 
rather  as  superfluous  ballast  than  as  hateful  unreason ; 
Bolingbroke  wishes  at  least  to  conceal  from  the  people  the 
illuminating  principles  which  he  offers  to  the  higher 
classes.  Such  halting  where  farther  progress  threatens  to 
become  dangerous  to  moral  interests  does  more  honor  to 
the  moral,  than  to  the  logical,  character  of  the  philoso- 
pher. But  with  the  transfer  of  these  ideas  to  France,  the  wall 
of  separation  is  broken  down  between  the  theory  of  know- 
ledge and  the  theory  of  ethics,  between  natural  philosophy 
and  the  philosophy  of  religion  ;  sensationalism  forces  its  way 
from  the  region  of  theory  into  the  sphere  of  practice,  and 
the  mechanical  theory  is  transformed  from  a  principal  of  phys- 


-4-  THE   FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

ical  interpretation  into  a  metaphysical  view  of  the  world  of 
an  atheistical  character.  Naturalism  is  everywhere  deter- 
mined to  have  its  own  :  if  knowledge  comes  from  the  senses, 
then  morality  must  be  rooted  in  self-interest;  whoever  con- 
fines natural  science  to  the  search  for  mechanical  causes  must 
not  postulate  an  intelligent  Power  working  from  design, 
even  to  explain  the  origin  of  things  and  the  beginning  of 
motion — has  no  right  to  speak  of  a  free  will,  an  immortal 
soul,  and  a  deity  who  has  created  the  world.  Further,  as 
Bayle's  proof  that  the  dogmas  of  the  Church  were  in  all 
points  contradictory  to  reason  had,  contrary  to  its  author's 
own  wishes,  exerted  an  influence  hostile  to  religion,  and 
as,  moreover,  the  political  and  social  conditions  of  the  time 
incited  to  revolt  and  to  a  break  with  all  existing  institutions, 
the  philosophical  ideas  from  over  the  Channel  and  the  con- 
dition of  things  at  home  alike  pressed  toward  a  revolutionary 
intensification  of  modern  principles,  which  found  compre- 
hensive expression  in  the  atheists'  Bible,  the  System  of 
Nature  of  Baron  Holbach,  1770.  The  movement  begins  in 
the  middle  of  the  thirties,  when  Montesquieu  commences 
to  naturalize  Locke's  political  views  in  France,  and  Voltaire 
does  the  same  service  for  Locke's  theory  of  knowledge,  and 
Newton's  natural  philosophy,  which  had  already  been  com- 
mended by  Maupertuis.  The  year  1748,  the  year  also  of 
Hume's  Essay,  brings  Montesquieu's  chief  work  and 
La  Mettrie's  Man  a  Machine.  While  the  Encyclopedia,  the 
herald  of  the  Illumination,  begun  in  1 75 1 ,  is  advancing  to 
its  completion  (1772,  or  rather  1780),  Condillac  (1754)  and 
Bonnet  (1755)  develop  theoretical  sensationalism,  and  Hel- 
vetius  (On  Mind,  1758;  in  the  same  year,  D'Alembert's 
Elements  of  Philosoph)')  practical  sensationalism.  Rous- 
seau, engaged  in  authorship  from  175 1  and  a  contributor 
to  the  Encyclopedia  until  1757  comes  into  prominence, 
1762,  with  his  two  chief  works,  Emile  and  the  Social  Con- 
tract. Parallel  with  these  we  find  interesting  phenomena  in 
the  field  of  political  economy:  Morelly's  communistic  Code 
of  Nature  (1755),  the  works  of  Quesnay  (1758),  the  leader 
of  the  physiocrats,  and  those  of  Turgot,  1774. 

Our  discussion  takes  up,  first,  the  introduction  and  popu- 
larization of  English  ideas;  then,  the  further  development 


MONTESQUIEU.  243 

of  these  into  a  consistent  sensationalism,  into  the  morality 
of  interest,  and  into  materialism ;  finally,  the  reaction 
against  the  illumination  of  the  understanding  in  Rousseau's 
philosophy  of  feeling.* 

I.  The  Entrance  of  English  Doctrines. 

Montesquieu  f  (1689-1755)  made  Locke's  doctrine  of 
constitutional  monarchy  and  the  division  of  powers 
(pp.  179-180),  with  which  he  joins  the  historical  point  of  view 
of  Bodin  and  the  naturalistic  positions  of  the  time,  the 
common  property  of  the  cultivated  world.  Laws  must  be 
adapted  to  the  character  and  spirit  of  the  nation;  the  spirit 
of  the  people,  again,  is  the  result  of  nature,  of  the  past, 
of  manners,  of  religion,  and  of  political  institutions.  Nature 
has  bestowed  many  gifts  on  the  Southern  peoples,  but  few 
on  those  of  the  North;  hence  the  latter  need  freedom,  while 
the  former  readily  dispense  with  it.  Warm  climates  pro- 
duce greater  sensibility  and  passionateness,  cold  ones, 
muscular  vigor  and  industry;  in  the  temperate  zones 
nations  are  less  constant  in  their  habits,  their  vices,  and 
their  virtues.  The  laws  of  religion  concern  man  as  man, 
those  of  the  state  concern  him  as  a  citizen ;  the  former  have 
for  their  object  the  moral  good  of  the  individual,  the  latter, 
the  welfare  of  society;  the  first  aim  at  immutable,  the 
second  at  mutable  good.  Laws  and  manners  are  closely 
interrelated.  Right  is  older  than  the  state,  and  the  law  of 
justice  holds  even  in  the  state  of  nature ;  but  in  order  to 
assure  peace  positive  right  is  required  in  three  forms, 
international,  political,  and  civil. 

Each  of  the  four  political  forms  has  a  passion  for  its  under- 
lying-principle :  despotism  has  fear;  monarchy,  honor  (per- 
sonal and  class  prejudice)  ;  aristocracy,  the  moderation  of  the 
nobility;  democracy,  political  virtue,  which  subordinates 
personal  to  general  welfare,  and  especially  the  inclination  to 

*  On  the  whole  chapter  cf.  Damiron,  M '/moires pour  Sen/it  a  VHistoire  de  la 
Philosophie  au  XVIII.  Si/ele,  3  vols.,  1858-64;  and  John  Morley's  Voltaire, 
1872  [1886],  Rousseau,  1873  [1886],  and  Diderot  and  the  Encyclopedists  t  1878 
[new  ed.,  1886]. 

\  Montesquieu,  Persian  Letters,  172 1;  Considerations  on  the  Causes  of  the 
Greatness  of  the  Romans  and  of  their  Decadence,  1734;    Spirit  of  Laics,  I  748. 


244  THE   FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

equality  and  frugality.  While  republics  are  destroyed  by 
extravagance,  lust,  and  self-seeking,  a  monarchy  can  dispense 
with  civil  virtue,  patriotism,  and  moral  disinterestedness, 
since  in  it  false  honor,  luxury,  and  wantonness  subserve  the 
public  good.  Great  states  tend  toward  despotism  ;  smaller 
ones  toward  aristocracy,  or  a  democratic  republicanism  ;  for 
those  of  medium  size  monarchy,  which  is  intermediate 
between  the  two  former,  is  the  best  form  of  constitution. 
Although  Montesquieu,  in  his  Lcttres  Pcrsancs,  shows  himself 
enthusiastic  for  the  federal  republics  of  Switzerland  and  the 
Netherlands,  his  opinions  are  different  after  his  return  from 
England,  and  in  his  Esprit  des  Lois  he  praises  the  English 
form  of  government  as  the  ideal  of  civil  liberty. 

Political  freedom  consists  in  liberty  to  do  (not  what  we 
wish,  but)  what  we  ought,  or  in  doing  that  which  the  laws 
allow.  Such  lawful  freedom  is  possible  only  where  the 
constitution  of  the  state  and  criminal  legislation  inspire  the 
citizen  with  a  sense  of  security.  In  order  to  prevent  misuse 
of  the  supreme  power,  the  different  authorities  in  the  state 
must  be  divided  so  that  they  shall  hold  one  another  in  check. 
In  particular  Montesquieu  demands  for  the  judicial  power 
absolute  independence  of  the  executive  power  (which  Locke 
had  termed  the  federative)  as  well  as  of  the  legislative  power. 
The  last  belongs  to  parliament,  which  includes  in  its  two 
houses  an  aristocratic  and  a  democratic  element. 

Voltaire*  (1694-1778) — he  himself  had  made  this  anagram 
from  his  name,  Arouet  1(e)  j(eune) — seemed  by  his  many- 
sided  receptivity  almost  made  to  be  the  interpreter  of 
English  ideas;  in  the  words  of  Windelband,  he  "combines 
Newton's  mechanical  philosophy  of  nature,  Locke's  noetical 
empiricism,  and  Shaftesbury's  moral  philosophy  under 
the  deistic  point  of  view."  The  same  qualities  which 
made  him  the  first  journalist,  enabled  him  to  free  philo- 
sophy from  its  scholastic  garb,  and,  by  concentrating 
it  on  the  problems  which  press  most  upon  the  lay  mind 
(God,  freedom,  immortality),  to  make  it  a.  living  force  among 
the  people.  His  superficiality,  as  Erdmann  acutely 
remarks,  was  his  strength.  True  religion,  so  reason 
teaches  us,  consists  in  loving  God  and  in  being  just  and  for- 
*  David  Friedrich  Strauss,   Voltaire,  sechs  Vorträge,  1870. 


VOLTAIRE,    CONDILLAC.  245 

bearing  to  our  fellow-men  as  to  our  brothers;  morality  is 
so  natural  and  necessary  that  it  is  no  wonder  that  all 
philosophers  since  Zoroaster  have  inculcated  the  same 
principles.  The  less  of  dogma  the  better  the  religion ; 
atheism  is  not  so  bad  as  superstition,  which  teaches  men  to 
commit  crimes  with  an  easy  conscience.  He  considered  it 
the  chief  mission  of  his  life  to  destroy  these  two  miserable 
errors.  He  endeavored  to  controvert  atheism  by  rational 
arguments,  while  with  passionate  hatred  and  contemptuous 
wit  he  attacked  positive  Christianity  and  his  persecutors, 
the  priesthood.  The  existence  of  God  is  for  him  not 
merely  a  moral  postulate,  but  a  result  of  scientific  reasoning. 
One  of  his  famous  sayings  was:  "If  God  did  not  exist  it 
would  be  necessary  to  invent  him  ;  but  all  nature  cries  out 
to  us  that  he  exists."  He  defends  immortality  in  spite  of 
theoretical  difficulties,  because  of  its  practical  necessity; 
his  attitude  toward  the  freedom  of  the  will,  which  he  had 
energetically  defended  in  the  beginning,  grows  constantly 
more  skeptical  with  increasing  age.  His  position  in  regard 
to  the  question  of  evil  experiences  a  similar  change — the 
Lisbon  earthquake  made  him  an  opponent  of  optimism, 
though  he  had  previously  favored  it. 

2.  Theoretical  and   Practical  Sensationalism. 

We  turn  next  from  the  popular  introduction  and  dissem- 
ination of  Locke's  doctrines,  which  left  their  contents 
unchanged,  to  their  principiant  development  by  the  French 
sensationalists.  Condillac  (1715-80)  always  thinks  of  his 
work  as  a  completion  of  Locke's,  whose  Essay  he  held  not 
to  have  gone  down  to  the  final  root  of  the  cognitive 
process.  Locke  did  not  go  far  enough,  Condillac  thinks,  in 
his  rejection  of  innate  elements;  he  failed  to  trace  out  the 
origin  of  perception,  reflection,  cognition,  and  volition,  as 
also  the  relation  between  the  external  senses,  the  internal 
sense,  and  the  combining  intellect,  which  he  discussed  as 
separate  sources,  the  two  former  of  particular,  and  the  last 
of  complex,  ideas;  in  short,  he  omitted  to  inquire  into  the 
origin  of  the  first  function  of  the  soul.  Berkeley  was  right 
in  feeling  that  a  simplification  was  needed  here;  l>ut  by 
erroneously  reducing  outer  perception  to  inner  perception, 


246  THE   FRENCH  ILLUMINATION: 

he  reached  the  absurd  conclusion  of  denying  the  external 
world.  The  true  course  is  just  the  opposite  of  this — the 
one  already  taken  by  the  Bishop  of  Cork,  Peter  Browne 
(died  1735;  The  Procedure,  Extent,  and  Limits  of  the 
Human  Understanding,  I 7 28) :  understanding  and  reflection 
must  be  reduced  to  sensation.  All  psychical  functions 
are  transformed  sensations.  The  soul  has  only  one 
original  faculty,  that  of  sensation ;  all  the  others,  the- 
oretical and  practical  alike,  are  acquired,  i.  e.,  they  have 
gradually  developed  from  the  former.  Condillac  is  related 
to  Locke  as  Fichte  to  Kant ;  in  the  former  case  the  transi- 
tion is  mediated  by  Browne,  in  the  latter  by  Reinhold. 
Each  crowns  the  work  of  his  predecessor  with  a  unifying 
conclusion ;  each  demands  and  offers  a  genetic  psychology 
which  finds  the  origin  of  all  the  spiritual  functions — from 
sensation  and  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  up  to  rational 
cognition  and  moral  will — in  a  single  fundamental  power  of 
the  soul.  But  there  is  a  great  difference,  materially  as  well 
as  formally,  between  these  kindred  undertakings,  a  differ- 
ence corresponding  to  that  between  Locke's  empiricism  and 
Kant's  idealism.  The  idea  of  ends,  which  controls  the 
course  of  thought  in  Fichte  as  in  Leibnitz,  is  entirely  lack- 
ing in  Condillac;  that  which  is  first  in  time,  sensation,  is  for 
the  Science  of  Knowledge  and  the  Monadology  only  the 
beginning,  not  the  essence,  of  psychical  activity,  while 
Condillac  makes  no  distinction  between  beginning  and 
ground,  but  expressly  identifies  principe  and  commencement. 
With  Fichte  and  Leibnitz  sensation  is  immature  thought, 
with  Condillac  thought  is  refined  sensation.  The  former 
teach  a  teleological,  the  latter  a  mechanical  mono-dynamism. 
The  Science  of  Knowledge,  moreover,  makes  a  very  serious 
task  of  the  deduction  of  the  particular  psychical  function» 
from  the  original  power,  while  Condillac  takes  it  extraor- 
dinarily easy.  Good  illustrations  of  his  way  of  effacing 
distinctions  instead  of  explaining  them  are  given  by  such 
monotonously  recurring  phrases  as  memory  is  "nothing 
but"  modified  sensation;  comparison  and  simultaneous 
attention  to  two  ideas  "are  the  same  thing";  sensation 
"gradually  becomes"  comparison  and  judgment;  reflection 
is  "in  its  origin"  attention  itself;  speech,  thought,  and  the 


COX  DILL  AC.  247 

formation  of  general  notions  are  "at  bottom  the  same" ;  the 
passions  are  "only"  various  kinds  of  desire;  understanding 
and  will  spring  "from  one  root,"  etc. 

The  demand  for  a  single  fundamental  psychical  power 
comes  from  Descartes,  and  Condillac  does  not  hesitate  to 
retain  the  word  penser  itself  as  a  general  designation  for  all 
mental  functions.  Similarly  he  holds  fast  to  the  dualism 
between  extension  and  sensation  as  reciprocally  incompati- 
ble properties,  opposes  the  soul  as  the  "simple"  subject  of 
thought  to  "divisible"  matter,  and  sees  in  the  affections  of 
the  bodily  organs  merely  the  "occasions"  on  which  the  soul 
of  itself  alone  exercises  its  sensitive  activity.  Even  free- 
dom— the  supremacy  of  thought  over  the  passions — is 
maintained,  in  striking  contrast  to  the  whole  tendency  of 
his  doctrine  and  to  the  openly  announced  principle,  that 
pleasure  controls  the  attention  and  governs  all  our  actions. 
He  has  just  as  little  intention  of  doubting  the  existence  of 
God.  All  is  dependent  on  God.  He  is  our  lawgiver;  it 
is  in  virtue  of  his  wisdom  that  from  small  beginnings — 
perception  and  need — the  most  splendid  results,  science 
and  morality,  are  developed  under  the  hands  of  man. 
Whoever  undertakes  to  complain  that  He  has  concealed 
from  us  the  nature  of  things  and  granted  us  to  know 
relations  alone,  forgets  that  we  need  no  more  than  this. 
We  do  not  exist  in  order  to  know ;  to  live  is  to  enjoy. 

The  theme  of  the  Treatise  on  the  Sensations,  1754,  is: 
Memory,  comparison,  judgment,  abstraction,  and  reflection 
(in  a  word,  cognition)  are  nothing  but  different  forms  of  atten- 
tion ;  similarly  the  emotions,  the  appetites,  and  the  will,  noth- 
ing but  modifications  of  desire;  while  both  alike  take  their 
origin  in  sensation.  Sensation  is  the  sole  source  and  the  sole 
content  of  the  life  of  the  mind  as  a  whole.  To  prove  these 
positions  Condillac  makes  use  of  the  fiction  of  a  statue,  in 
which  one  sense  awakes  after  another,  first  the  lowest  of 
the  senses,  smell,  and  last  the  most  valuable,  the  sense  of 
touch,  which  compels  us  (by  its  perception  of  density  or 
resistance)  to  project  our  sensations,  and  thus  wakes  in  us 
the  idea  ot  an  external  world.  In  themselves  sensations 
aii-  merely  subjective  states,  modes  of  our  own  being; 
without  the  sense  of  touch  \\c  would  ascribe  odor,  sound. 


248  THE  FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

and  color  to  ourselves.  Condillac  distinguishes  between 
sensation  and  ideas  in  a  twofold  sense,  as  mere  ideas  (the 
memory  or  imagination  of  something  not  present),  and  as 
ideas  of  objective  things  (the  image,  representative  of  a 
bod)-) ;  this  latter  sense  is  meant  when  he  says,  touch  sen- 
sat  ions  only  are  also  ideas. 

For  the  details  of  the  deduction,  which  often  makes  very 
happy  use  of  a  rich  store  of  psychological  material,  the 
reader  must  be  referred  to  the  more  extended  expositions. 
Here  we  can  only  cite  as  examples  the  chief  among  the 
genetic  definitions.  Perceptions  (impressions)  and  con- 
sciousness are  the  same  thing  under  different  names.  A 
lively  sensation,  in  which  the  mind  is  entirely  occupied, 
becomes  attention,  without  the  necessity  of  assuming  an 
additional  special  faculty  in  the  mind.  Attention,  by  its 
retentive  effect  on  the  sensation,  becomes  memory.  Double 
attention — to  a  new  sensation,  and  to  the  lingering  trace  of 
the  previous  one — is  comparison  ;  the  recognition  of  a  relation 
(resemblance  or  difference)  between  two  ideas  is  judgment ; 
the  separation  of  an  idea  from  another  naturally  connected 
with  it,  by  the  aid  of  voluntary  linguistic  symbols,  is 
abstraction  ;  a  series  of  judgments  is  reflection  ;  and  the  sum 
total  of  inner  phenomena,  that  wherein  ideas  succeed  one 
another,  the  ego  or  person.  All  truths  concern  relations 
among  ideas.  The  tactual  idea  of  solidity  accustoms  us 
to  project  the  sensations  of  the  other  senses  also,  to  trans- 
fer them  thither  where  they  are  not ;  hence  arise  the  ideas 
of  our  body,  of  external  objects,  and  of  space.  If  we  per- 
ceive several  such  projected  qualities  together,  we  refer 
them  to  a  substratum — substance,  which  we  know  to 
exist,  although  not  what  it  is.  By  force  we  mean  the 
unknown,  but  indubitably  existent,  cause  of  motion. 

There  are  no  indifferent  mental  states;  every  sensation  is 
accompanied  by  pleasure  or  pain.  Joy  and  pain  give  the 
determining  law  for  the  operation  of  our  faculties.  The  soul 
dwells  longer  on  agreeable  sensations;  without  interest,  ideas 
would  pass  away  like  shadows.  The  remembrance  of  past 
impressions  more  agreeable  than  the  present  ones  is  need ; 
from  this  springs  desire  (de'sir),  then  the  emotions  of 
love,  hate,  hope,  fear,  and  astonishment ;  finally,  the  will  as 


BONNET.  249 

an  unconditional  desire  accompanied  by  the  thought  of  its 
possible  fulfillment.  All  inclinations,  good  and  bad  alike, 
spring  from  self-love.  The  predicates  "good"  and  "beauti- 
ful" denote  the  pleasure-giving  qualities  of  things,  the 
former,  that  which  is  agreeable  to  smell  and  taste  (and  the 
passions),  the  latter,  that  which  pleases  sight,  hearing,  feeling 
(and  the  intellect).  Morality  is  the  conformity  of  our  actions 
to  laws,  which  men  have  established  by  convention  with 
mutual  obligations.  In  this  way  the  good,  which  at  first 
was  the  servant  of  the  passions,  becomes  their  lord. 

Man's  superiority  to  the  brute  depends  on  the  greater 
perfection  of  his  sense  of  touch  ;  on  the  greater  variety  of 
his  wants  and  his  associations  of  ideas;  on  the  idea  of 
death,  which  leads  him  to  seek  not  merely  the  avoidance 
of  pain  but  also  self-preservation ;  and  the  possession 
of  language.  Without  denomination  no  abstractions,  no 
thought,  no  handing  down  of  knowledge.  Although  all 
that  is  mental  has  its  origin,  in  the  last  analysis,  in  simple 
sensations,  its  development  requires  emancipation  from  the 
sensuous,  and  language  is  the  means  for  freeing  ourselves 
from  the  pressure  of  sensations  by  the  generalization  and 
combination  of  ideas. 

A  more  moderate  representative  of  sensationalism  was 
Charles  Bonnet,  who  later  exercised  a  considerable  influence 
in  Germany,  especially  until  Tetens  (1720-93;  Essay  in 
Psychology,  or  Considerations  on  the  Operations  of  the  Soul, 
1755;  Analytical  Essay  on  the  Faculties  of  the  Soul,  1760; 
Philosophical  Palingenesis,  or  Ideas  on  the  Past  and  the  Future 
of  Living  Beings,  1769,  including  a  defense  of  Christianity; 
Collected  Works,  1779).  Sensations,  to  which  he,  too, 
reduces  all  mental  life,  are,  in  his  view,  reactions  of  the 
immaterial  soul  to  sense  stimuli,  which  operate  merely  as 
occasional  causes.  On  the  other  hand,  he  emphasizes  more 
strongly  than  Condillac  the  dependence  of  psychical  phe- 
nomena on  physiological  conditions,  and  endeavors  to  show 
definite  brain  vibrations  as  the  basis  not  only  of  habit, 
memory,  and  the  association  of  ideas,  but  also  of  the 
higher  mental  operations.  In  harmony  with  these  views  he 
adheres  to  determinism,  and  finds  the  motive  of  all  endeavor 
in    self-love,  and    its   ultimate  aim    in    happiness.       To   the 


^5°  THE  FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

latter  the  hope  of  immortality  is  indispensable.  The  link- 
between  Bonnet's  theory  of  the  thoroughgoing  dependence 
of  the  soul  on  the  body  and  his  orthodox  convictions,  is 
formed  by  his  idea  of  an  imperishable  ethereal  body,  which 
enables  the  soul  in  the  life  to  come  to  remember  its  life  on 
earth  and,  after  the  dissolution  of  the  present  material  body, 
to  acquire  a  new  one.  Animals  as  well  as  men  share  in  the 
continuance  of  existence  and  the  transition  to  a  higher  stage. 

The  material  earnestness  of  these  thinkers  is  in  sharp  con- 
trast to  the  superficial  and  frivolous  manner  in  which  Hel- 
vetius  (17 1 5-71)  carries  out  sensationalism  in  the  sphere  of 
ethics.  His  chief  work,  On  Mind,  came  out  in  1758;  and  a 
year  after  his  death,  the  work  On  Man,  his  Intellectual 
Faculties  and  his  Education.  The  search  for  pleasure  or 
self-love  is,  as  Helvetius  thinks  he  has  discovered  for  the 
first  time,*  the  only  motive  of  action ;  the  laws  of  interest 
reign  in  the  moral  world  as  the  laws  of  motion  in  the 
physical  world;  justice  and  love  for  our  neighbors  are  based 
on  utility  ;  we  seek  friends  in  order  to  be  amused,  aided,  and, 
in  misfortune,  compassionated  by  them;  the  philanthropist 
and  the  monster  both  seek  only  their  own  pleasure. 

Helvetius  draws  the  proof  for  these  positions  from  Con- 
dillac.  Recollection  and  judgment  are  sensation.  The  soul 
is  originally  nothing  more  than  the  capacity  for  sensation ; 
it  receives  the  stimulus  to  its  development  from  self-love, 
i.  e.,  from  powerful  passions  such  as  the  love  of  fame,  on 
the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  from  hatred  of  ennui, 
which  induces  man  to  overcome  the  indolence  natural  to 
him  and  to  submit  himself  to  the  irksome  effort  of 
attention — without  passion  he  would  remain  stupid.  The 
sum  of  ideas  collected  in  him  is  called  intellect.  All  dis- 
tinctions among  men  are  acquired,  and  concern  the  intellect 
only,  not  the  soul :  that  which  is  innate — sensibility  and 
self-love — is  the  same  in  all ;  differences  arise  only  through 
external  circumstances,  through  education.  Man  is  the 
pupil  of  all  that  environs  him,  of  his  situation  and  his  chance 

*  In  reality  not  only  English  moralists,  but  also  some  among  his  country- 
men, had  anticipated  him  in  the  position  that  all  actions  proceed  from  selfish- 
ness, and  that  virtue  is  merely  a  refined  egoism.  Thus  La  Rochefoucauld  in  his 
Maxims  {Reflexions,  ou  Sentences  et  Maximes  Morales,  1665),  La  Bruyere  (Les 
Characteres  et  les  Mceurs  de  ce  Sie'cle,  1687),  and  La  Mettrie  (cf.  pp.  251-253). 


HELVETIUS,    LA    METTRIE.  25 1 

experience.  The  most  important  instrument  in  education 
is  the  law;  the  function  of  the  lawgiver  is  to  connect  public 
and  personal  welfare  by  means  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
and  thus  to  elevate  morality.  A  man  is  called  virtuous  when 
his  stronger  passions  harmonize  with  the  general  interest. 
Unfortunately  the  virtues  of  prejudice,  which  do  not  con- 
tribute to  the  public  good,  are  more  honored  among  most 
nations  than  the  political  virtues,  to  which  alone  real  merit 
belongs.  And  self-interest  is  always  the  one  motive  to  just 
and  generous  action;  we  serve  only  our  own  interests  in 
furthering  the  welfare  of  the  community.  As  the  promul- 
gator of  these  doctrines  was  himself  a  kind  and  generous 
man,  Rousseau  could  make  to  him  the  apt  reply:  You 
endeavor  in  vain  to  degrade  yourself  below  your  own  level ; 
your  spirit  gives  evidence  against  your  principles;  your 
benevolent  heart  discredits  your  doctrines. 

The  morality  of  enlightened  self-love  or  "intelligent  self- 
interest"  appears  in  a  milder  form  in  Maupertuis  {Works, 
1752),  and  Frederick  the  Great,*  to  the  latter  of  whom 
D'Alembert  objected  by  letter  that  interest  could  never 
generate  the  sense  of  duty  and  reverence  for  the  law. 

3.  Skepticism  and  Materialism. 

The  ideas  thus  far  developed  move  in  a  direction  whose 
further  pursuit  inevitably  issues  in  materialism.  Diderot, 
the  editor  of  the  Encyclopedia  of  the  Sciences,  Arts,  and 
Trades  (175 1-72),  which  gathered  all  the  currents  of  the 
Illumination  into  one  great  stream  and  carried  them  to  the 
open  sea  of  popular  culture,  reflects  in  his  intellectual 
development  the  dialectical  movement  from  deism  through 
skepticism  to  atheism  and  materialism,  and  was  a  co- 
laborer  in  the  work  which  brought  the  whole  movement 
to  a  conclusion,  Molbach's  System  of  Nature.  Two  decades, 
however,  before  the  latter  work,  the  outcome  of  a  long 
development  of  thought,  appeared,  the  physician  La 
Mcttrief   (1709-51)   had   promulgated   materialism,   though 

*  Essay  on  Self-love  ns  a  Principle  of  Morals,  1 770,  printed  in  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  Academy  of  Sciences.     Cf.  on  Frederick,  Ed.  Zeller,  1886. 

f  La  Mettrie  was  horn  at  St.  Male-,  and  educated  in  Paris,  and  in  I  .eyden  under 
Boerhave  ;  he  died  in  Berlin,  whither  Frederick  the  Great  had  called  him  after 


25 «  THE   FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

rather  in  an  anthropological  form  than  as  a  world-system, 
and  with  cynical  satisfaction  in  the  violation  of  traditional 
beliefs — in  his  Natural  History  of  the  Soul,  1745,  in  a  dis- 
guised form,  and,  undisguised,  in  his  Man  a  Machine,  1748 
— and  at  the  same  time  {A nti- Seneca,  or  Discourse  on 
Happiness,  1748)  had  sketched  out  for  Helvetius  the  outlines 
of  the  sensationalistic  morality  of  interest.  While  ill  with 
a  violent  fever  he  observed  the  influence  of  the  heightened 
circulation  of  the  blood  on  his  mental  tone,  and  in- 
ferred that  thought  is  the  result  of  the  bodily  organization. 
The  soul  can  only  be  known  from  the  body.  The  senses, 
the  best  philosophers,  teach  us  that  matter  is  never  with- 
out form  and  motion ;  and  whether  all  matter  is  sentient 
or  not,  certainly  all  that  is  sentient  is  material,  and  every 
part  of  the  organism  contains  a  vital  principle  (the  heart 
of  a  frog  beats  for  an  hour  after  its  removal  from  the  body; 
the  parts  of  cut-up  polyps  grow  into  perfect  animals). 
All  ideas  come  from  without,  from  the  senses;  without  sense- 
impressions  no  ideas,  without  education,  few  ideas,  the  mind 
of  a  man  grown  up  in  isolation  remains  entirely  undevel- 
oped ;  and  since  the  soul  is  entirely  dependent  on  the  bodily 
organs,  along  with  which  it  originates,  grows,  and  declines, 
it  is  subject  to  mortality.  Not  only  animals,  as  Descartes 
has  shown,  but  men,  who  differ  from  the  brutes  only  in 
degree,  are  mere  machines ;  by  the  soul  we  mean  that  part 
of  the  body  which  thinks,  and  the  brain  has  fine  muscles 
for  thinking  as  the  leg  its  coarse  ones  for  walking. 

If  man  is  nothing  but  body,  there  is  no  other  pleasure 
than  that  of  the  body.  There  is  a  difference,  however, 
between  sensuous  pleasure,  which  is  intense  and  brief,  and 
intellectual  pleasure,  which  is  calm  and  lasting.  The  edu- 
cated man  will  prefer  the  latter,  and  find  in  it  a  higher  and 
more  noble  happiness;  but  nature  has  been  just  enough 
to  grant  the  common  multitude,  in  the  coarser  pleasures, 
a  more  easily  attainable  happiness.  Enjoy  the  moment, 
till  the  farce  of  life  is  ended!  Virtue  exists  only  in  society, 
which  restrains  from  evil  by  its  laws,  and  incites  to  good  by 

he  had  been  driven  out  of  his  native  land  and  from  Holland.  On  La  Mettrie 
cf.  Lange,  History  of  Materialism,  vol.  ii.  pp.  49-91  ;  and  DuBois-Reymond's 
Address,  1875. 


LA    METTRIE,   DIDEROT.  253 

rousing  the  love  of  honor.  The  good  man,  who  subor- 
dinates  his  own  welfare  to  that  of  society,  acts  under  the 
same  necessity  as  the  evil-doer;  hence  repentance  and  pangs 
of  conscience,  which  increase  the  amount  of  pain  in  the 
world,  but  are  incapable  of  effecting  amendment,  are  use- 
less and  reprehensible:  the  criminal  is  an  ill  man,  and  must 
not  be  more  harshly  punished  than  the  safety  of  society 
requires.  Materialism  humanizes  and  exercises  a  tranquil- 
izing  influence  on  the  mind,  as  the  religious  view  of  the 
world,  with  its  incitement  to  hatred,  disturbs  it ;  materialism 
frees  us  from  the  sense  of  guilt  and  responsibility,  and  from 
the  fear  of  future  suffering.  A  state  composed  of  atheists 
is  not  only  possible,  as  Bayle  argued,  but  it  would  be  the 
happiest  of  all  states. 

Among  the  editors  of  the  Encyclopedia,  the  mathematician 
D'Alembert  {Elements  of  Philosophy,  1758)  remained  loyal  to 
skeptical  views.  Neither  matter  nor  spirit  is  in  its  essence 
knowable ;  the  world  is  probably  quite  different  from 
our  sensuous  conception  of  it.  As  Diderot  (1713-84), 
and  the  Encyclopedia  with  him,  advanced  from  skepticism 
to  materialism,  D'Alembert  retired  from  the  editorial  board 
(1757),  after  Rousseau,  also,  had  separated  himself  from  the 
Encyclopedists.  Diderot*  was  the  leading  spirit  in  the 
second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  as  Voltaire  in  the 
first  half.  His  lively  and  many-sided  receptivity,  active 
industry,  clever  and  combative  eloquence,  and  enthusiastic 
disposition  qualified  him  for  this  role  beyond  all  his 
contemporaries,  who  testify  that  they  owe  even  more  to 
his  stimulating  conversation  than  to  his  writings.  He  com- 
menced by  bringing  Shaftesbury's  Inquiry  into  I  'irhic  and 
Merit  to  the  notice  of  his  countrymen  ;  and  then  turned  his 
sword,  on  the  one  hand,  against  the  atheists,  to  refute 
whom,  he  thought,  a  single  glance  into  the  microscope  was 
sufficient,  and,  on  the  other,  against  the  traditional  belief 
in  a  God  of  anger  and  revenge,  who  takes  pleasure  in 
bathing  in  the  tears  of  mankind.  Then  followed  a  period  of 
skepticism,  which    is  well    illustrated   by   the  prayer   in    the 

*  Works  in  twenty-two  vols.,  Paris,  Urine,  182 1  ;  latest  edition,  1875  ,r<v/.  Cf. 
on  Diderot  the  fine  work  by  Karl  Rosenkranz,  Diderofs  Leben  und  Wirkt, 
1866. 


^54  THE   FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

Thoughts  on  the  Interpretation  of  Nature,  1754:  O  God?  I 
do  not  know  whether  thou  art,  but  I  will  guide  my  thoughts 
and  actions  as  though  thou  didst  see  me  think  and  act,  etc. 
Under  the  influence  of  Holbach's  circle  he  finally  reached 
(in  the  Conversation  between  D'Alembert  and  Diderot,  and 
D'Alemberfs  Dream,  written  in  1769,  but  not  published 
until  1830,  in  vol.  iv.  of  the  Memoires,  Correspondance,  et 
Ouvrages  Ine'dits  de  Diderot}  the  position  of  naturalistic 
monism — there  exists  but  one  great  individual,  the  All. 
Though  he  had  formerly  distinguished  thinking  substance 
from  material  substance,  and  had  based  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  on  the  unity  of  sensation  and  the  unity  of  the  ego,  he 
now  makes  sensation  a  universal  and  essential  property  of 
matter  {la  pierre  sent),  declares  the  talk  about  the  simplicity 
of  the  soul  metaphysico-theological  nonsense,  calls  the 
brain  a  self-playing  instrument,  ridicules  self-esteem,  shame, 
and  repentance  as  the  absurd  folly  of  a  being  that  imputes 
to  itself  merit  or  demerit  for  necessary  actions,  and  recog- 
nizes no  other  immortality  than  that  of  posthumous  fame. 
But  even  amid  these  extreme  conclusions,  his  enthusiasm 
for  virtue  remains  too  intense  to  allow  him  to  assent  to  the 
audacious  theories  of  La  Mettrie  and  Helvetius. 

French  natural  science  also  tended  toward  materialism. 
Buff  on  {Natural  History,  1749  seq.)  endeavors  to  facilitate 
the  mechanical  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  life  by  the 
assumption  of  living  molecules,  from  which  visible  organisms 
are  built  up.  Robinet  {On  Nature,  1761  seg.),  availing  himself 
of  Spinozistic  and  Leibnitzian  conceptions,  goes  still  further, 
in  that  he  endows  every  particle  of  matter  with  sensation, 
looks  on  the  whole  world  as  a  succession  of  living  beings  with 
increasing  mentality,  and  subjects  the  interaction  of  the 
material  and  psychical  sides  of  the  individual,  as  well  as  the 
relation  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  the  universe,  to  a  law  of 
harmonious  compensation. 

The  System  of  Nature,  1770,  which  bore  on  its  title  page 
the  name  of  Mirabaud,  who  had  died  1760,  proceeded  from 
the  company  of  freethinkers  accustomed  to  meet  in  the 
hospitable  house  of  Baron  von  Holbach  (died  1789),  a  native 
of  the  Palatinate.  Its  real  author  was  Holbach  himself, 
although  his  friends  Diderot,  Naigeon,  Lagrange,  the  mathe- 


HOLBACH.  255 

matician,  and  the  clever  Grimm  (died  1807)  seem  to  have 
co-operated  in  the  preparation  of  certain  sections.  The 
cumbrous  seriousness  and  the  dry  tone  of  this  systematic 
combination  of  the  radical  ideas  which  the  century  had 
produced,  were  no  doubt  the  chief  causes  of  its  unsympa- 
thetic reception  by  the  public.  Similarly  unsuccessful  was 
the  popular  account  of  materialism  with  which  Holbach 
followed  it,  in  1772,  and  Hclvetius's  excerpts  from  the 
Syst  on  of  Nature,  1774. 

Holbach  applies  himself  to  the  despiritualization  of 
nature  and  the  destruction  of  religious  prejudices  with 
sincere  faith  in  the  sacred  mission  of  unbelief — the  happi- 
ness of  humanity  depends  on  atheism.  "O  Nature,  sov- 
ereign of  all  beings,  and  ye  her  daughters,  Virtue,  Reason, 
and  Truth,  be  forever  our  only  divinities."  What  has  made 
virtue  so  difficult  and  so  rare?  Religion,  which  divides  men 
instead  of  uniting  them.  What  has  so  long  delayed  the 
illumination  of  the  reason,  and  the  discovery  of  truth? 
Religion  with  its  mischievous  errors,  God,  spirit,  freedom, 
immortality.  Immortality  exists  only  in  the  memory  of 
later  generations;  man  is  the  creature  of  a  day;  nothing  is 
permanent  but  the  great  whole  of  nature  and  the  eternal 
law  of  universal  change.  Can  a  clock  broken  into  a  thou- 
sand pieces  continue  to  mark  the  hours?  The  senseless 
doctrine  of  freedom  was  invented  only  to  solve  the  senseless 
problem  of  the  justification  of  God  in  view  of  the  existence  of 
evil.  Man  is  at  every  moment  of  his  life  a  passive  instrument 
in  the  hands  of  necessity ;  the  universe  is  an  immeasurable  and 
uninterrupted  chain  of  actions  and  reactions,  an  eternal  round 
of  interchanging  motions,  ruled  by  laws,  a  change  in  which 
would  at  once  alter  the  nature  of  all  things.  The  most 
fatal  error  is  the  idea  of  human  and  divine  spirits,  which  has 
been  advanced  by  philosophers  and  adopted  with  applause 
by  fools.  The  opinion  that  man  is  divided  into  two  sub- 
stances is  based  on  the  fact  that,  of  the  changes  in  our 
body,  we  directly  perceive  only  the  external  molar  move- 
ments, while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  inner  motions  of  the 
invisible  molecules  are  known  only  by  their  effects.  These 
latter  have  been  ascribed  to  the  mind,  which,  moreover,  we 
have  adorned  with  properties  whose  emptiness  is  manifested 


256  THE  FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

by  the  fact  that  they  are  all  mere  negations  of  that  which  we 
know.  Experience  reveals  to  us  only  the  extended,  the  cor- 
poreal, the  divisible — but  the  mind  is  to  be  the  opposite  of 
all  three,  yet  at  the  same  time  to  possess  the  power  (how,  no 
man  can  tell)  of  acting  on  that  which  is  material  and  of  being 
acted  upon  by  it.  In  thus  dividing  himself  into  body  and 
soul,  man  has  in  reality  only  distinguished  between  his  brain 
and  himself.  Man  is  a  purely  physical  being.  All  so-called 
spiritual  phenomena  are  functions  of  the  brain,  special  cases 
of  the  operation  of  the  universal  forces  of  nature.  Thought 
and  volition  are  sensation,  sensation  is  motion.  The  mov- 
ing forces  in  the  moral  world  are  the  same  as  those  in  the 
physical  world ;  in  the  latter  they  are  called  attraction  and 
repulsion,  in  the  former,  love  and  hate ;  that  which  the 
moralist  terms  self-love  is  the  same  instinct  of  self-preserva- 
tion which  is  familiar  in  physics  as  the  force  of  inertia. 

As  man  has  doubled  himself,  so  also  he  has  doubled 
nature.  Evil  gave  the  first  impulse  to  the  formation  of  the 
idea  of  God,  pain  and  ignorance  have  been  the  parents  of 
superstition ;  our  sufferings  were  ascribed  to  unknown  pow- 
ers, of  which  we  were  in  fear,  but  which,  at  the  same  time,  we 
hoped  to  propitiate  by  prayer  and  sacrifice.  The  wise  turned 
with  their  worship  and  reverence  toward  a  more  worthy 
object,  to  the  great  All;  and,  in  fact,  if  we  seek  to  give  the 
word  God  a  tenable  meaning,  it  signifies  active  nature.  The 
error  lay  in  the  dualistic  view,  in  the  distinction  between 
nature  and  itself,  i.  e.,  its  activity,  and  in  the  belief  that 
the  explanation  of  motion  required  a  separate  immaterial 
Mover.  This  assumption  is,  in  the  first  place,  false,  for 
since  the  All  is  the  complex  of  all  that  exists  there  can  be 
nothing  outside  it ;  motion  follows  from  the  existence  of 
the  universe  as  necessarily  as  its  other  properties;  the  world 
does  not  receive  it  from  without,  but  imparts  it  to  itself  by  its 
own  power.  In  the  second  place  the  assumption  is  useless; 
it  explains  nothing,  but  confuses  the  problems  of  natural 
science  to  the  point  of  insolubility.  In  the  third  place  it  is 
self-contradictory,  for  after  theology  has  removed  the  Deity 
as  far  away  from  man  as  possible,  by  means  of  the  negative 
metaphysical  predicates,  it  finds  itself  necessitated  to  bring 
the  two  together  again  through  themoral  attributes— which 


HOLBACH.  257 

are  neither  compatible  with  one  another  nor  with  the  meta- 
physical— and  crowns  the  absurdity  by  the  assurance  that  we 
can  please  God  by  believing  that  which  is  incomprehensible. 
Finally,  the  assumption  is  dangerous;  it  draws  men  away 
from  the  present,  disturbs  their  peace  and  enjoyment,  stirs 
up  hatred,  and  thus  makes  happiness  and  morality  impos- 
sible. If,  then,  utility  is  the  criterion  of  truth,  theism — even 
in  the  mild  form  of  deism — is  proven  erroneous  by  its  dis- 
astrous consequences.     All  error  is  bane. 

Matter  and  motion  are  alike  eternal.  Nature  is  an  active, 
self-moving,  living  whole,  an  endless  chain  of  causes  and 
effects.  All  is  in  unceasing  motion,  all  is  cause  (nothing  is 
dead,  nothing  rests),  all  is  effect  (there  is  no  spontaneous 
motion,  none  directed  to  an  end).  Order  and  disorder  are 
not  in  nature,  but  only  in  our  understanding;  they  are 
abstract  ideas  to  denote  that  which  is  conformable  to  our 
nature  and  that  which  is  contrary  to  it.  The  end  of  the 
All  is  itself  alone,  is  life,  activity;  the  universal  goal  of 
particular  beings,  like  that  of  the  universe,  is  the  conser- 
vation of  being. 

Anthropology  is  for  Holbach  essentially  reduced  to  two 
problems,  the  deduction  of  thought  from  motion,  and  of 
morality  from  the  physical  tendency  to  self-preservation. 
The  forces  of  the  soul  are  no  other  than  those  of  the  body. 
All  mental  faculties  develop  from  sensation  ;  sensations  are 
motions  in  the  brain  which  reveal  to  us  motions  without  the 
brain.  All  the  passions  may  be  reduced  to  love  and  hate, 
desire  and  aversion,  and  depend  upon  temperament,  on 
the  individual  mixture  of  the  fluid  parts.  Virtue  is  the 
equilibrium  of  the  fluids.  All  human  actions  proceed  from 
interest.  Good  and  bad  men  are  distinguished  only  by 
their  organizations,  and  by  the  ideas  they  form  concerning 
happiness.  With  the  same  necessity  as  that  of  the  act 
itself,  follow  the  love  or  contempt  of  fellow-men,  l  he  pleasure 
of  self-esteem  and  the  pain  of  repentance  (regret  for  evil 
consequences,  hence  no  evidence  of  freedom).  Neither 
responsibility  nor  punishment  is  done  away  with  by  this 
necessity — have  we  not  the  right  to  protect  ourselves 
against  the  stream  which  damages  our  fields,  by  building 
dikes    and    altering  its    course?     The    end   of   endeavor   is 


258  THE   FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

permanent  happiness,  and  this  can  be  attained  through  virtue 
ahme  The  passions  which  are  useful  to  society  compel 
the  affection  and  approval  of  our  fellows.  In  order  to 
interest  others  in  our  welfare  we  must  interest  ourselves  in 
theirs — nothing  is  more  indispensable  to  man  than  man. 
The  clever  man  acts  morally,  interest  binds  us  to  the  good; 
love  for  others  means  love  for  the  means  to  our  own  happi- 
ness. Virtue  is  the  art  of  making  ourselves  happy  through 
the  happiness  of  others.  Nature  itself  chastises  immorality, 
since  she  makes  the  intemperate  unhappy.  Religion  has 
hindered  the  recognition  of  these  rules,  has  misunderstood 
the  diseases  of  the  soul,  and  applied  false  and  ineffective 
remedies;  the  renunciation  which  she  requires  is  opposed 
to  human  nature.  The  true  moralist  recognizes  in  medicine 
the  key  to  the  human  heart;  he  will  cure  the  mind  through 
the  body,  control  the  passions  and  hold  them  in  check  by 
other  passions  instead  of  by  sermons,  and  will  teach  men 
that  the  surest  road  to  personal  ends  is  to  labor  for  the 
public  good.  Illumination  is  the  way  to  virtue  and  to 
happiness. 

Volney  (Chassebceuf,  died  1820 ;  Catechism  of  the  French 
Citizen,  1793,  later  under  the  title  Natural  Lazv  or  Physical 
Principles  of  Morals  deduced  from  the  Organization  of 
Man  and  of  the  Universe;  further,  The  Rums ;  Complete 
Works,  1821)  belongs  among  the  moralists  of  self-love, 
although,  besides  the  egoistic  interests,  he  takes  account  of 
the  natural  sympathetic  impulses  also.  This  is  still  more  the 
case  with  Condorcet  {Sketch  of  an  Historical  Vietv  of  the 
Progress  of  the  Human  Mind,  1794),  who  was  influenced  alike 
by  Condillac  and  by  Turgot,  and  who  defends  a  tendency 
toward  universal  perfection  both  in  the  individual  and  in  the 
race.  Besides  the  selfish  affections,  which  are  directed  as 
much  to  the  injury  as  to  the  support  of  others,  there  lies  in 
the  organization  of  man  a  force  which  steadily  tends  toward 
the  good,  in  the  form  of  underived  feelings  of  sympathy  and 
benevolence,  from  which  moral  self-judgment  is  developed 
by  the  aid  of  reflection.  The  aire  of  true  ethics  and  social 
art  is  not  to  make  the  "great"  virtues  universal,  but  to 
make  them  needless;  the  nearer  the  nations  approximate  to 
mental  and   moral  perfection,  the  less  they  stand    in  need 


CONDORCET,   DESTUTT  DE  TRACY.  259 

of  these — happy  the  people  in  which  good  deeds  are  so 
customary  that  scarcely  an  opportunity  is  left  for  heroism. 
The  chief  instrument  for  the  moral  cultivation  of  the  people 
is  the  development  of  the  reason,  the  conscience,  and  the 
benevolent  affections.  Habituation  to  deeds  of  kindness 
is  a  source  of  pure  and  inexhaustible  happiness.  Sympa- 
thy with  the  good  of  others  must  be  so  cultivated  that  the 
sacrifice  of  personal  enjoyment  will  be  a  sweeter  joy  than 
the  pleasure  itself.  Let  the  child  early  learn  to  enjoy  the 
delight  of  loving  and  of  being  loved.  We  must,  finally, 
strive  toward  the  gradual  diminution  of  the  inequalities  of 
capacity,  of  property,  and  between  ruler  and  ruled,  for  to 
abolish  them  is  impossible. 

Of  the  remaining  philosophers  of  the  revolutionary  period 
mention  may  be  made  of  the  physician  Cabanis  {Relations 
of  the  Physical  and  the  Moral  in  Ma?i,  1799),  and  Destutt  de 
Tracy  {Elements  of  Ideology,  1801  seq.).  The  former  is  a 
materialist  in  psychology  (the  nerves  are  the  man,  ideas  are 
secretions  of  the  brain),  considers  consciousness  a  property 
of  organic  matter  (the  soul  is  not  a  being,  but  a  faculty), 
and  makes  moral  sympathy  develop  out  of  the  animal 
instincts  of  preservation  and  nourishment.  De  Tracy, 
also,  derives  all  psychical  activity  from  organization  and 
sensation.  His  doctrine  of  the  will,  though  but  briefly 
sketched,  is  interesting.  The  desires  have  a  passive  and  an 
active  side  (corresponding  to  the  twofold  action  of  the 
nerves,  on  themselves  and  on  the  muscles);  on  the  one  hand, 
they  are  feelings  of  pleasure  or  pain,  and  on  the  other,  they 
lead  us  to  action — will  is  need,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
the  source  of  the  means  for  satisfying  this  need.  Both 
these  feelings  and  the  external  movements  arc  probably 
based  upon  unconscious  organic  motions.  The  will  is 
rightly  identified  with  the  personality,  it  is  the  ego  itself, 
the  totality  of  the  physico-psychical  life-  of  man  attaining 
to  self-consciousness.  The  inner  or  organic  life  consists  in 
the  self-preserving  functions  of  the  individual,  (he  outer  or 
animal  life,  in  the  functions  of  relation  (of  sense,  * > f  mo- 
tion, of  speech,  of  reproduction);  individual  interests  are 
rooted  in  the  former,  sympathy  in  the  latter.  The  primal 
good    is    freedom,    or  the  power  to  do   what    we    will  ;    the 


26o  THE  FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

highest    tiling  in  life    is    love.     In  order  to  be  happy  we 
must  avoid  punishment,  blame,  and  pangs  of  conscience. 

4.  Rousseau's  Conflict  with  the  Illumination. 

The  Genevese,  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau  *  (1712-78),  stands 
in  a  similar  relation  of  opposition  to  the  French  Illumina- 
tion as  the  Scottish  School  to  the  English,  and  Herder  and 
Jacobi  to  the  German.  He  points  us  away  from  the  cold 
sophistical  inferences  of  the  understanding  to  the  immediate 
conviction  of  feeling;  from  the  imaginations  of  science  to 
the  unerring  voice  of  the  heart  and  the  conscience;  from 
the  artificial  conditions  of  culture  to  healthy  nature. 
The  vaunted  Illumination  is  not  the  lever  of  progress,  but 
the  source  of  all  degeneration  ;  morality  does  not  rest  on 
the  shrewd  calculation  of  self-interest,  but  on  original  social 
and  sympathetic  instincts  (love  for  the  good  is  just  as  natural 
to  the  human  heart  as  self-love;  enthusiasm  for  virtue  has 
nothing  to  do  with  our  interest ;  what  would  it  mean  to 
give  up  one's  life  for  the  sake  of  advantage?);  the  truths  of 
religion  are  not  objects  of  thought,  but  of  pious  feeling. 

Rousseau  commenced  his  career  as  an  author  with  the 
Discourse  on  the  Sciences  and  the  Arts,  1750  (the  discussion 
of  a  prize  question,  crowned  by  the  Academy  of  Dijon), 
which  he  describes  as  entirely  pernicious,  and  the  Discourse 
on  the  Origin  and  the  Bases  of  the  Inequality  among  Meny 
1753.  By  nature  man  is  innocent  and  good,  becoming  evil 
only  in  society.  Reflection,  civilization,  and  egoism  are 
unnatural.  In  the  happy  state  of  nature  pity  and 
innocent  self-love  {amour  de  soi ")  ruled,  and  the  latter  was 
first  corrupted  by  the  reason  into  the  artificial  feeling  of 
selfishness  {amour  propre)  in  the  course  of  social  develop- 
ment— thinking  man  is  a  degenerate  animal.  Property  has 
divided  men  into  rich  and  poor;  the  magistracy,  into  strong 
and  weak  ;  arbitrary  power,  into  masters  and  slaves.  Wealth 
generated  luxury  with  its  artificial  delights  of  science  and 
the  theater,  which  make  us  more  unhappy  and  evil  than  we 
otherwise  are;  science,  the  child  of  vice,  becomes  in  turn 
the  mother  of  new  vices.     All  nature,  all  that  is  characteris- 

*  Cf.  Brockerhoff,  Leipsic,  1863-74  ;  L.  Moreau,  Paris,  1870. 


ROUSSEAU.  261 

tic,  all  that  is  good,  has  disappeared  with  advancing  culture; 
the  only  relief  from  the  universal  degeneracy  is  to  be 
hoped  for  from  a  return  to  nature  on  the  part  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  society  alike — from  education  and  a  state 
conformed  to  nature.  The  novel  Emile  is  devoted  to  the 
pedagogical,  and  the  Social  Contract,  or  the  Principles  of 
Political  Law,  to  the  political  problem.  Both  appeared  in 
1762,  followed  two  years  later  by  the  Letters  from  the 
Mountain,  a  defense  against  the  attacks  of  the  clergy.  In 
these  later  writings  Rousseau's  naturalistic  hatred  of  reason 
appears  essentially  softened. 

Social  order  is  a  sacred  right,  which  forms  the  basis  of  all 
others.  It  does  not  proceed,  however,  from  nature — no 
man  has  natural  power  over  his  fellows,  and  might  con- 
fers no  right — consequently  it  rests  on  a  contract.  Not, 
however,  on  a  contract  between  ruler  and  people.  The  act 
by  which  the  people  chooses  a  king  is  preceded  by  the  act 
in  virtue  of  which  it  is  a  people.  In  the  social  contract 
each  devotes  himself  with  his  powers  and  his  goods  to  the 
community,  in  order  to  gain  the  protection  of  the  latter. 
With  this  act  the  spiritual  body  politic  comes  into  being, 
and  attains  its  unity,  its  ego,  its  will.  The  sum  of  the 
members  is  called  the  people;  each  member,  as  a  participant 
in  the  sovereignty,  citizen,  and,  as  bound  to  obedience 
to  the  law,  subject.  The  individual  loses  his  natural  free- 
dom, receiving  in  exchange  the  liberty  of  a  citizen,  which  is 
limited  by  the  general  will,  and,  in  addition,  property  rights 
in  all  that  he  possesses,  equality  before  tin-  law,  and  moral 
freedom,  which  first  really  makes  him  master  of  himself. 
The  impulse  of  mere  desire  is  slavery,  obedience  to  self- 
imposed  law,  freedom.  The;  sovereign  is  the  people,  law 
the  general  popular  will  directed  to  the  common  good, 
the  supreme  goods,  "freedom and  equality,"  the  chief  objects 
of  legislation.     The  lawgiving  power  is-  the  moral  will  of  the 

body  politic,  the  government  (magistracy,  prince)  its  execu- 
tive physical  power;  the  former  is  its  heart,  the  litter  its 
brain.  Rousseau  calls  the  governmenl  the  middle  term 
between  the  head  of  the  state  ami  1  he  individual,  or  between 
the  citizen  as  lawgiver  and  as  subject  the  sovereign  (the 
people»  commands,  the  governmenl  executes,  the  subject 


26a  THE  FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

obeys.  The  act  by  which  the  people  submits  itself  to  its 
head  is  not  a  contract,  but  merely  a  mandate;  whenever  it 
chooses  it  can  limit,  alter,  or  entirely  recall  the  delegated 
power.  In  order  to  security  against  illegal  encroachments  on 
the  part  of  the  government,  Rousseau  recommends  regular 
assemblies  of  the  people,  in  which,  under  suspension  of  gov- 
ernmental authority,  the  confirmation,  abrogation,  or  altera- 
tion of  the  constitution  shall  be  determined  upon.  Even 
the  establishment  of  the  articles  of  social  belief  falls  to  the 
sovereign  people.  The  essential  difference  between  Rous- 
seau's theory  of  the  state  and  that  of  Locke  and  Montes- 
quieu consists  in  his  rejection  of  the  division  of  powers 
and  of  representation  by  delegates,  hence  in  its  unlimited 
democratic  character.  A  generation  after  it  was  given  to  the 
world,  the  French  Revolution  made  the  attempt  to  translate 
it  into  practice.  "The  masses  carried  out  what  Rousseau 
himself  had  thought,  it  is  true,  but  never  willed  " 
(Windelband). 

Rousseau's  theory  of  education  is  closely  allied  to  Locke's 
(cf.  p.  1 80),  whose  leading  idea — the  development  of  individu- 
ality— was  entirely  in  harmony  with  the  subjectivism  of  the 
philosopher  of  feeling.  Posterity  has  not  found  it  a  difficult 
task  to  free  the  sound  kernel  therein  from  the  husks  of  exag- 
geration and  idiosyncrasy  which  surrounded  it.  Among 
the  latter  belong  the  preference  of  bodily  over  intellectual 
development,  and  the  unlimited  faith  in  the  goodness  of 
human  nature.  Exercise  the  body,  the  organs,  the  senses 
of  the  pupil,  and  keep  his  soul  unemployed  as  long  as  pos- 
sible;  for  the  first,  take  care  only  that  his  mind  be  kept 
free  from  error  and  his  heart  from  vice.  In  order  to  secure 
complete  freedom  from  disturbance  in  this  development,  it 
is  advisable  to  isolate  the  child  from  society,  nay,  even  from 
the  family,  and  to  bring  him  up  in  retirement  under  the 
guidance  of  a  private  tutor. 

As  the  Swiss  republican  spoke  in  Rousseau's  politics,  so 
his  religious  theories*  betray  the  Genevan  Calvinist.  "The 
Savoyard  Vicar's  Profession  of  Faith"  (in  Entile)  proclaims 
deism  as  a  religion  of  feeling.  The  rational  proofs  brought 
forward  for  the  existence  of  God — from  the  motion  of  matter 

*Cf.  Ch.  Borgeaud,  Rousseaus  Religionsphilosopkie,  Geneva  and  Leipsic,  1883. 


ROUSSEAU.  263 

in  itself  at  rest,  and  Trom  th;  finality  of  the  world — are  only 
designed,  as  he  declares  by  letter,  to  confute  the  materialists, 
and  derive  their  impregnability  entirely  from  the  inner 
evidence  of  feeling,  which  amid  the  vacillation  of  the 
reason  pro  and  con  gives  the  final  decision. 

If  we  limit  our  inquiry  to  that  which  is  alone  of  impor- 
tance for  us,  and  rely  on  the  evidence  of  feeling,  it  cannot 
be  doubted  that  I  myself  exist  and  feel ;  that  there  exists 
an  external  world  which  affects  me;  that  thought,  compari- 
son or  judgment  concerning  relations  is  different  from 
sensation  or  the  perception  of  objects — for  the  latter  is  a 
passive,  but  the  former  an  active  process;  that  I  myself 
produce  the  activity  of  attention  or  consideration ;  that, 
consequently,  I  am  not  merely  a  sensitive  or  passive,  but 
also  an  active  or  intelligent  being.  The  freedom  of  my 
thought  and  action  guarantees  to  me  the  immateriality  of 
my  soul,  and  is  that  which  distinguishes  me  from  the  brute. 
The  life  of  the  soul  after  the  decay  of  the  body  is  assured 
to  me  by  the  fact  that  in  this  world  the  wicked  triumphs, 
while  the  good  are  oppressed.  The  favored  position  which 
man  occupies  in  the  scale  of  beings — he  is  able  to  look  over 
the  universe  and  to  reverence  its  author,  to  recognize  order 
and  beauty,  to  love  the  good  and  to  do  it;  and  shall  he, 
then,  compare  himself  to  the  brute? — fills  me  with  emotion 
and  gratitude  to  the  benevolent  Creator,  who  existed  before 
all  things,  and  who  will  exist  when  they  all  shall  have 
vanished  away,  to  whom  all  truths  are  one  single  idea,  all 
places  a  point,  all  times  a  moment.  The  how  of  freedom,  of 
eternity,  of  creation,  of  the  action  of  my  will  upon  matter, 
etc.,  is,  indeed,  incomprehensible  to  me,  but  that  these  are 
so,  my  feeling  makes  me  certain.  The  worthiest  employment 
of  my  reason  is  to  annihilate  itself  before  God.  "The  more 
I  strive  to  contemplate  his  infinite  essence  the  less  ,1,,  I  con- 
ceive it.  Hut  it  is,  and  that  suffices  me.  The  less  I  conceive 
it,  the  more  I  adore." 

In  the  depths  of  my  heart  I  find  the  rules  for  my  conduct 
engraved  by  nature  in   ineffaceable   characters.      Everything 

is  gOOd     that     I    feel    to     be     so.        Tile     Cons»  ietlie     is     tile     most 

enlightened  of  all  philosophers,  and  as  sale  .1  guide  for  the 
soul  as  instinct  for  the   body.     The   infallibility  of  its   judg- 


264  THE   FRENCH  ILLUMINATION. 

ment  is  evidenced  by  the  agreement  of  different  peoples; 
amid  the  surprising  differences  of  manners  you  will  every- 
where find  the  same  ideas  of  justice,  the  same  notions  of 
good  and  evil.  Show  me  a  land  where  it  is  a  crime  to  keep 
one's  word,  to  be  merciful,  benevolent,  magnanimous,  where 
the  upright  man  is  despised  and  the  faithless  honored  !  Con- 
science enjoins  the  limitation  of  our  desires  to  the  degree 
to  which  we  are  capable  of  satisfying  them,  but  not  their 
complete  suppression — all  passions  are  good  when  we 
control  them,  all  evil  when  they  control  us. 

In  the  second  part  of  the  "Profession  du  Foi  du  Vicaire 
Savoyard"  Rousseau  turns  from  his  attacks  on  sensational- 
ism, materialism,  atheism,  and  the  morality  of  interest,  to 
the  criticism  of  revelation.  Why,  in  addition  to  natural 
religion,  with  its  three  fundamental  doctrines,  God,  free- 
dom, and  immortality,  should  other  special  doctrines  be 
necessary,  which  rather  confuse  than  clear  up  our  ideas  of 
the  Great  Being,  which  exact  from  us  the  acceptance  of 
absurdities,  and  make  men  proud,  intolerant,  and  cruel — 
whereas  God  requires  from  us  no  other  service  than  that  of 
the  heart?  Every  religion  is  good  in  which  men  serve  God 
in  a  befitting  manner.  If  God  had  prescribed  one  single 
religion  for  us,  he  would  have  provided  it  with  infallible 
marks  of  its  unique  authenticity.  The  authority  of  the 
fathers  and  the  priesthood  is  not  decisive,  for  every  religion 
claims  to  be  revealed  and  alone  true;  the  Mohammedan  has 
the  same  right  as  the  Christian  to  adhere  to  the  religion  of 
his  fathers.  Since  all  revelation  comes  down  to  us  by 
human  tradition,  reason  alone  can  be  the  judge  of  its 
divinity.  The  careful  examination  of  the  documents,  which 
are  written  in  ancient  languages,  would  require  an  amount 
of  learning  which  could  not  possibly  be  a  condition  of 
salvation  and  acceptance  with  God.  Miracles  and  prophecy 
are  not  conclusive,  for  how  are  we  to  distinguish  the  true 
among  them  from  the  false?  If  we  turn  from  the  external 
to  the  internal  criteria  of  the  doctrines  themselves,  even 
here  no  decision  can  be  reached  between  the  reasons  pro 
and  con  (the  author  puts  the  former  into  the  mouth  of  a 
believer,  and  the  latter  into  that  of  a  rationalist);  even  if 
the  former  outweighed  the  latter,  the  difficulty  would  still 


ROUSSEAU.  265 

remain  of  reconciling  it  with  God's  goodness  and  justice 
that  the  gospel  has  not  reached  so  many  of  mankind,  and 
of  explaining  how  those  to  whom  the  divinity  of  Christ  is 
now  proclaimed  can  convince  themselves  of  it,  while  his  con- 
temporaries misjudged  and  crucified  him.  In  my  opinion, 
I  am  incapable  of  fathoming  the  truth  of  the  Christian  reli- 
gion and  its  value  to  those  who  confess  it.  The  investigation 
of  the  reason  ends  in  "  reverential  doubt  ";  I  neither  accept 
revelation  nor  reject  it,  but  I  reject  the  obligation  to  accept 
it.  My  heart,  however,  judges  otherwise  than  the  reflection 
of  my  intellect ;  for  this  the  sacred  majesty  and  exalted 
simplicity  of  the  Scriptures  are  a  most  cogent  proof  that 
they  are  more  than  human,  and  that  He  whose  history  they 
contain  is  more  than  man.  The  touching  grace  and  pro- 
found wisdom  of  his  words,  the  gentleness  of  his  conduct, 
the  loftiness  of  his  maxims,  his  mastery  over  his  passions, 
abundantly  prove  that  he  was  neither  an  enthusiast  nor  an 
ambitious  sectary.  Socrates  lived  and  died  like  a  philos- 
opher, Jesus  like  a  God.  The  virtues  of  justice,  patriotism, 
and  moderation  taught  by  Socrates,  had  been  exercised  by 
the  great  men  of  Greece  before  he  inculcated  them.  But 
whence  could  Jesus  derive  in  his  time  and  country  that  lofty 
morality  which  he  alone  taught  and  exemplified?  Things 
of  this  sort  are  not  invented.  The  inventor  of  such  deeds 
would  be  more  wonderful  than  the  doer  of  them.  Thus 
again,  in  the  question  of  revealed  religion,  the  voice  of  the 
heart  triumphs  over  the  doubts  of  the  reason,  as,  in  the 
question  of  natural  religion,  it  had  done-  over  the  objections 
of  opponents.  It  is  true,  however,  that  this  enthusiasm  is 
paid  not  to  the  current  Christianity  of  the  priests,  but  to 
the  real  Christianity  of  the  gospel. 

Rousseau  was  the  conscience  of  France,  which  rebelled 
against  the  negations  and  the  bald  emptiness  of  the  materi- 
alistic and  atheistic  doctrines.  By  vindicating  with  fervid 
eloquence  the  participation  of  the  whole  man  in  the  hi 
questions,  in  opposition  to  the  one-sided  illumination  of  the 
understanding,  he  became  a  prc-Kantian  defender  of  the 
faith  of  practical  reason.  His  emphatic  summons  aroused 
aloud  and  lasting  echo,  especially  in  Germany,  in  the  hearts 
of  Goethe,  Kant,  and  Fichte. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

LEIBNITZ. 

In  the  contemporaries  Spinoza  and  Locke,  the  two 
schools  of  modern  philosophy,  the  Continental,  starting 
from  Descartes,  and  the  English,  which  followed  Bacon, 
had  reached  the  extreme  of  divergence  and  opposition. 
Spinoza  was  a  rationalistic  pantheist,  Locke,  an  empirical 
individualist.  With  Leibnitz  a  twofold  approximation 
begins.  As  a  rationalist  he  sides  with  Spinoza  against 
Locke,  as  an  individualist  with  Locke  against  Spinoza. 
But  he  not  only  separated  rationalism  from  pantheism,  but 
also  qualified  it  by  the  recognition  (which  his  historical 
tendencies  had  of  themselves  suggested  to  him)  of  a  relative 
justification  for  empiricism,  since  he  distinguished  the  factual 
truths  of  experience  from  the  necessary  truths  of  reason, 
gave  to  the  former  a  noetical  principle  of  their  own,  the 
principle  of  sufficient  reason,  and  made  sensation  an  indis- 
pensable step  to  thought. 

To  the  tendencies  thus  manifested  toward  a  just  estimation 
and  peaceful  reconciliation  of  opposing  standpoints,  Leibnitz 
remained  true  in  all  the  fields  to  which  he  devoted  his  activity. 
Thus,  in  the  sphere  of  religion,  he  took  an  active  part  in  the 
negotiations  looking  toward  the  reunion  of  the  Protestant 
and  Catholic  Churches,  as  well  as  in  those  concerning  the 
union  of  the  Lutheran  and  the  Reformed.  Himself  a  stimu- 
lating man,  he  yet  needed  stimulation  from  without.  He 
was  an  astonishingly  wide  reader,  and  declared  that  he  had 
never  found  a  book  that  did  not  contain  something  of  value. 
With  a  ready  adaptability  to  the  ideas  of  others  he  combined 
a  remarkable  power  of  transformative  appropriation ;  he 
read  into  books  more  than  stood  written  in  them.  The 
versatility  of  his  genius  was  unlimited :  jurist,  historian, 
diplomat,  mathematician,  physical  scientist,  and  philoso- 
pher, and  in  addition  almost  a  theologian  and  a  philologist 

266 


LEIBXITZ.  267 

— he  is  not  only  at  home  in  all  these  departments,  because 
versed  in  them,  but  everywhere  contributes  to  their 
advancement  by  original  ideas  and  plans.  In  such  a 
combination  of  productive  genius  and  wealth  of  knowledge 
Aristotle  and  Leibnitz  are  unapproached. 

Gottfried  Wilhelm  Leibnitz  was  born  in  1646  at  Leipsic, 
where  his  father  (Friederich  Leibnitz,  died  1652)  was 
professor  of  moral  philosophy;  in  his  fifteenth  year  he 
entered  the  university  of  his  native  city,  with  law  as  his 
principal  subject.  Besides  law,  he  devoted  himself  with 
quite  as  much  of  ardor  to  philosophy  under  Jacob  Thoma- 
sius  (died  1684,  the  father  of  Christian  Thomasius),  and  to 
mathematics  under  E.  Weigel  in  Jena.  In  1663  (with  a 
dissertation  entitled  De  Principio  Individui)  he  became 
Bachelor,  in  1664  Master  of  Philosophy,  and  in  1666,  at 
Altdorf,  Doctor  of  Laws,  and  then  declined  the  professor- 
ship extraordinary  offered  him  in  the  latter  place.  Having 
made  the  acquaintance  of  the  former  minister  of  the  Elector 
of  Mayence,  Freiherr  von  Boineburg,  in  Nuremberg,  he  went, 
after  a  short  stay  at  Frankfort-on-the-Main,  to  the  court  of 
the  Elector  at  Mayence,  at  whose  request  he  devoted  him- 
self to  the  reform  of  legal  procedure,  besides  writing,  while 
there,  on  the  most  diverse  subjects.  In  1672  he  went  to 
Paris,  where  he  remained  during  four  years  with  the 
exception  of  a  short  stay  in  London.  The  special  purpose 
of  the  journey  to  Paris — to  persuade  Louis  XIV.  to  under- 
take a  campaign  in  Egypt,  in  order  to  divert  him  from 
his  designs  upon  Germany — was  not  successful ;  but  Leib- 
nitz was  captivated  by  the  society  of  the  Parisian  scholars, 
among  them  the  mathematician,  Huygens.  From  the  end 
of  1676  until  liis  death  in  1716  Leibnitz  lived  in  Hanover, 
whither  he  had  been  called  by  Johann  Friedrich,  as  court 
councillor  and  librarian.  The  successor  of  this  prince, 
Ernst  August,  who,  with  his  wife  Sophie,  and  his  daughter 
Sophie  Charlotte,  showed  great  kindness  to  the  philosopher, 
wished  him  to  write  a  history  of  the  princely  house  of 
Brunswick;  and  a  journey  which  he  made  in  order  to  study 
for  this  purpose  was  extended  as  far  as  Vienna  and  Rome. 
Upon  his  return  he  tool.-  charge  of  the  Wolfenbüttel  library 
in  addition  to  his  other  engagements. 


?6S  LEIBNITZ. 

The  marriage  of  the  Princess  Sophie  Charlotte  with 
Frederick  of  Brandenburg,  the  first  king  of  Prussia,  brought 
Leibnitz  into  close  relations  with  Berlin.  At  his  suggestion 
the  Academy  (Society)  of  Sciences  was  founded  there  in 
'  1700,  and  he  himself  became  its  first  president.  In  Charlot- 
tenburg  he  worked  on  his  principal  work,  the  New  Essays 
concerning  the  Human  Understanding,  which  was  aimed  at 
Locke,  but  the  publication  of  which  was  deferred  on  account 
of  the  death  of  the  latter  in  the  interim  (1704),  and  did  not 
take  place  until  1765,  in  Raspe's  collective  edition.  The 
death  of  the  Prussian  queen  in  1705  interrupted  for  several 
years  the  Theodicy,  which  had  been  undertaken  at  her 
request,  and  which  did  not  appear  until  1710.  In  Vienna, 
where  he  resided  in  171 3-14,  Leibnitz  composed  a  short 
statement  of  his  system  for  Prince  Eugen;  this,  according 
to  Gerhardt,  was  not  the  sketch  in  ninety  paragraphs,  familiar 
under  the  title  Monadology,  which  was  first  published  in  the 
original  by  J.  E.  Erdmann  in  his  excellent  Complete  Edition 
of  the  Philosophical  Works  of  Leibnitz,  1840,  but  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Nature  and  of  Grace,  which  appeared  two  years 
after  the  author's  death  in  L ' Ettropc  Savante.  While  Ernst 
August,  as  well  as  the  German  emperor  and  Peter  the  Great, 
distinguished  the  philosopher,  who  was  not  indifferent  to 
such  honors,  by  the  bestowal  of  titles  and  preferments,  his 
relations  with  the  Hanoverian  court,  which  until  then  had 
been  so  cordial,  grew  cold  after  the  Elector  Georg  Ludwig 
ascended  the  English  throne  as  George  I.  The  letters  which 
Leibnitz  interchanged  with  his  daughter-in-law7,  gave  rise 
to  the  correspondence,  continued  to  his  death,  with  Clarke, 
who  defended  the  theology  of  Newton  against  him.  The 
contest  for  priority  between  Leibnitz  and  Newton  concern- 
ing the  invention  of  the  differential  calculus  was  later  settled 
by  the  decision  that  Newton  invented  his  method  of  fluxions 
first,  but  that  Leibnitz  published  his  differential  calculus 
earlier  and  in  a  more  perfect  form.  The  variety  of  pursuits 
in  which  Leibnitz  was  engaged  was  unfavorable  to  the 
development  and  influence  of  his  philosophy,  in  that  it 
hindered  him  from  working  out  his  original  ideas  in  syste- 
matic form,  and  left  him  leisure  only  for  the  composition 
of  shorter  essays.     Besides  the  two  larger  works  mentioned 


METAPHYSICS:    THE   MONADS.  269 

above,  the  New  Essays  and  the  Theodicy,  we  have  of  philo- 
sophical works  by  Leibnitz  only  a  series  of  private  letters, 
and  articles  for  the  scientific  journals  (the  Journal des  Savants 
in  Paris,  and  the  Acta  Eruditorum  in  Leipsic,  etc.),  among 
which  may  be  mentioned  as  specially  important  the  New 
System  of  Nature,  and  of  the  Interaction  of  Substances  as 
well  as  of  the  Union  which  exists  between  the  Soul  and  the 
Body,  1695,  which  was  followed  during  the  next  year  by  three 
explanations  of  it,  and  the  paper  De  Ipsa  Natura,  1698. 
Previous  to  Erdmann  (1840)  the  following  had  deserved 
credit  for  their  editions  of  Leibnitz  :  Feller,  Kortholt,  Gruber, 
Raspe,  Dutens,  Feder,  Guhrauer  (the  German  works),  and 
since  Erdmann,  Pertz,  Foucher  de  Careil,  Onno  Klopp,  and 
especially  J.  C.  Gerhardt.  The  last  named  published  the 
mathematical  works  in  seven  volumes  in  1849-63,  and 
recently,  Berlin,  1875-90,  the  philosophical  treatises,  also  in 
seven  volumes.*  In  our  account  of  the  philosophy  of 
Leibnitz  we  begin  with  the  fundamental  metaphysical  con- 
cepts, pass  next  to  his  theory  of  living  beings  and  of  man 
(theory  of  knowledge  and  ethics),  and  close  with  his  inquiries 
into  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

1.  Metaphysics :  the  Monads,  Representation,  the 
Pre-established  Harmony ;  the  Laws  of  Thought 
and  of  the  World. 

Leibnitz  develops  his  new  concept  of  substance,  the 
monad,  +    in    conjunction    with,   yet    in   opposition    to,   the 

*Wehave  a  life  of  Leibnitz  by  ('•.  E.  Guhrauer,  jubilee  edition,  Breslau, 
1  -  i'i  I  Mackie's  Life,  Boston,  1845  is  based  on  Guhrauer],  Among  recenl  works 
on  Leibnitz,  we  note  the  little  work  by  Merz,  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics, 
1884,  and  Ludwig  Stein's  Leibniz  und  Spinoza,  Berlin,  [890,  in  which  with  the 
aid  of  previously  unedited  material  the  relations  <>f  Leibnitz  to  Spinoza  (whom  he 
at  The  Hague  on  his  return  journey  from  Paris)  are  discussed,  and  the 
attempt  is  made  to  trace  the  development  of  the  theory  of  monads,  down  to 
1697.  The  new  exposition  of  the  Leibnitzian  monadology  by  Ed,  Dillman, 
which  has  ju>t  appeared,  we  have  nol  yel  been  able  to  examine  [The  English 
reader  may  be  referred  further  to  Dewey's  Leibniz  in  Griggs's  Philosophical 
Classics,  1888,  and  Duncan's  Philosophical  Works  of  Leibnitz  (selections  trans- 
lated, with  notes),  New  Ihnen,   [890,  as  well  as  to  the  work  of  Merz  already 

nient  ionerl. — Tk.  ) 

+  According  to  L,  Stein's  conjecture,  Leibnitz  took  the  expression  Monad, 
which  he  employs  after  1696,  from  the  younger  (Franc.  Mercurius)  van  I  lei- 
mont. 


2JO  LEIB  XI  TZ. 

Cartesian  and  the  atomistic  conceptions.  The  Cartesians  are 
right  when  they  make  the  concept  of  substance  the  cardinal 
point  in  metaphysics  and  explain  it  by  the  concept  of  inde- 
pendence. But  they  are  wrong  in  their  further  definition  of 
this  second  concept.  If  we  take  independence  in  the  sense 
of  unlimitedness  and  aseity,  we  can  speak,  as  the  example 
of  Spinoza  shows,  of  only  one,  the  divine  substance. 
If  the  Spinozistic  result  is  to  be  avoided,  we  must  substi- 
tute independent  action  for  independent  existence,  self- 
activity  for  self-existence.  Substance  is  not  that  which  exists 
through  itself  (otherwise  there  would  be  no  finite  sub- 
stances), but  that  which  acts  through  itself,  or  that  which 
contains  in  itself  the  ground  of  its  changing  states.  Sub- 
stance is  to  be  defined  by  active  force,*  by  which  we  mean 
something  different  from  and  better  than  the  bare  possibility 
or  capacity  of  the  Scholastics.  The  potentia  sive  facultas, 
in  order  to  issue  into  action,  requires  positive  stimulation 
from  without,  while  the  vis  activa  (like  an  elastic  body)  sets 
itself  in  motion  whenever  no  external  hindrance  opposes. 
Substance  is  a  being  capable  of  action  {la  substance  est  tin 
etre  capable  d' action).  With  the  equation  of  activity  and 
existence  {quod  non  agit,  non  existif)  the  substantiality  which 
Spinoza  had  taken  away  from  individual  things  is  restored  to 
them  :  they  are  active,  consequently,  in  spite  of  their  limited- 
ness,  substantial  beings  {quod  agit,  est  substantia  singularis). 
Because  of  its  inner  activity  every  existing  thing  is  a  deter- 
minate individual,  and  different  from  every  other  being. 
Substance  is  an  individual  being  endowed  with  force. 

The  atomists  are  right  when  they  postulate  for  the  expla- 
nation of  phenomenal  bodies  simple,  indivisible,  eternal 
units,  for  every  composite  consists  of  simple  parts.  But 
they  are  wrong  when  they  regard  these  invisible,  minute 
corpuscles,  which  are  intended  to  subserve  this  purpose 
as  indivisible:  everything  that  is  material,  however  small 
it  be,  is  divisible  to  infinity,  nay,  is  in  fact  endlessly 
divided.     If  we  are  to  find  indivisible  units,  we  must  pass 

♦Francis  Glisson  (1596-1677,  professor  of  medicine  in  Cambridge  and  Lon- 
don) had  as  early  as  1671,  conceived  substances  as  forces  in  his  treatise  De  Natura 
Substantia:  Energetica.  That  Glisson  influenced  Leibnitz,  as  maintained  by 
H.  Marion  (Paris,  18S0),  has  not  been  proven  ;  cf.  L.  Stein,  p.  184. 


METAPHYSICS:    THE  MO X ADS.  271 

over  into  the  realm  of  the  immaterial  and  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  bodies  are  composed  of  immaterial  con- 
stituents. Physical  points,  the  atoms,  are  physical,  but  not 
points  ;  mathematical  points  are  indivisible,  but  not  real ; 
metaphysical  or  substantial  points,  the  incorporeal,  soul- 
like units,  alone  combine  in  themselves  indivisibility  and 
reality — the  monads  are  the  true  atoms.  Together  with 
indivisibility  they  possess  immortality ;  as  it  is  impossible  fcr 
them  to  arise  and  perish  through  the  combination  and  sepa- 
ration of  parts,  they  cannot  come  into  being  or  pass  out 
of  it  in  any  natural  way  whatever,  but  only  by  creation 
or  annihilation.  Their  non-spatial  or  punctual  character 
implies  the  impossibility  of  all  external  influence,  the  monad 
develops  its  states  from  its  own  inner  nature,  has  need  of  no 
other  thing,  is  sufficient  unto  itself,  and  therefore  deserves 
the  Aristotelian  name,  entelechy. 

Thus  two  lines  of  thought  combine  in  the  concept  of  the 
monad.  Gratefully  recognizing  the  suggestions  from  both 
sides,  Leibnitz  called  Cartesianism  the  antechamber  of  the 
true  philosophy,  and  atomism  the  preparation  for  the  theory 
of  monads.  From  the  first  it  followed  that  the  substances 
were  self-acting  forces;  from  the  second,  that  they  were 
immaterial  units.  Through  the  combination  of  both  de- 
terminations we  gain  information  concerning  the  kind  of 
force  or  activity  which  constitutes  the  being  of  the  monad: 
the  monads  are  representative  forces.  There  is  nothing 
truly  real  in  the  world  save  the  monads  and  their  repre- 
sentations [ideas,  perceptions]. 

In  discussing  the  representation  in  which  the  being  and 
activity  of  the  monads  consist,  we  must  not  think  directly 
of  the  conscious  activity  of  the  human  soul.  Representa- 
tion has  in  Leibnitz  a  wider  meaning  than  that  usually 
associated  with  the  word.  The  distinction,  which  has 
become  of  the  first  importance  for  psychology,  between 
mere  representation  and  conscious  representation,  or 
between  perception  and  appcrccpt  ion,  may  be  besl  explained 
by  the  example  of  the  sound  of  the  waves.  The  roar  which 
we  perceive  in  the  vicinity  of  the  sea-beach  is  composed  of 
the  numerous  sounds  of  the  single  waves.  Each  single 
sound  is  of  itself  too  small  to  be  heard  ;  nevertheless  it  must 


272  LEIBNITZ. 

make  an  impression  on  us,  if  only  a  small  one,  since  other- 
wise their  total — as  a  sum  of  mere  nothings — could  not  be 
heard.  The  sensation  which  the  motion  of  the  single  wave 
causes  is  a  weak,  confused,  unconscious,  infinitesimal  per- 
ception {petite,  insensible  perception),  which  must  be  com- 
bined with  many  similar  minute  sensations  in  order  to 
become  strong  and  distinct,  or  to  rise  above  the  threshold 
of  consciousness.  The  sound  of  the  single  wave  is  felt,  but 
not  distinguished,  is  perceived,  but  not  apperceived.  These 
obscure  states  of  unconscious  representation,  which  are 
present  in  the  mind  of  man  along  with  states  of  clear 
consciousness,  make  up,  in  the  lowest  grade  of  existence, 
the  whole  life  of  the  monad.  There  are  beings  which  never 
rise  above  the  condition  of  deep  sleep  or  stupor. 

In  conformity  with  this  more  inclusive  meaning,  percep- 
tion is  defined  as  the  representation  of  the  external  in  the 
internal,  of  multiplicity  in  unity  {rcpresentatio  multitudinis 
in  unitate).  The  representing  being,  without  prejudice 
to  its  simplicity,  bears  in  itself  a  multitude  of  relations  to 
external  things.  What  now  is  the  manifold,  which  is 
expressed,  perceived,  or  represented,  in  the  unit,  the 
monad?  It  is  the  whole  world.  Every  monad  represents 
all  others  in  itself,  is  a  concentrated  all,  the  universe  in 
miniature.  Each  individual  contains  an  infinity  in  itself 
{substantia  infinitas  actioncs  simul  exereet),  and  a  supreme 
intelligence,  for  which  every  obscure  idea  would  at  once 
become  distinct,  would  be  able  to  read  in  a  single  monad 
the  whole  universe  and  its  history — all  that  is,  has  been,  or 
will  be ;  for  the  past  has  left  its  traces  behind  it,  and  the 
future  will  bring  nothing  not  founded  in  the  present:  the 
monad  is  freighted  with  the  past  and  bears  the  future  in  its 
bosom.      Every   monad    is  thus  a  mirror  of  the  universe,  * 

*The  objection  has  been  made  against  Leibnitz,  and  not  without  reason,  that 
strictly  speaking  there  is  no  content  for  the  representation  of  the  monads, 
although  he  appears  to  offer  them  the  richest  of  all  contents,  the  whole  world. 
The  "  All  "  which  he  makes  them  represent  is  itself  nothing  but  a  sum  of  beings, 
also  representative.  The  objects  of  representation  are  merely  representing  sub- 
jects; the  monad  A  represents  the  monads  from  B  to  Z,  while  these  in  turn  do 
notiiing  more  than  represent  one  another.  The  monad  mirrors  mirrors — 
where  is  the  thing  that  is  mirrored?  The  essence  of  substance  consists  in 
being  related  to  others,  which  themselves  are  only  points  of  relation  ;  amid  mere 
relativities  we  never  reach  a  real.     That  which  prevented  Leibnitz  himself  from 


METAPHYSICS:  REPRESENTATIOX.  273 

but  a  living  mirror  {miror  vivant  de  Vunivers),  which  gener- 
ates the  images  of  things  by  its  own  activity  or  develops 
them  from  inner  germs,  without  experiencing  influences  from 
without.  The  monad  has  no  windows  through  which  any- 
thing could  pass  in  or  out,  but  in  its  action  is  dependent 
only  on  God  and  on  itself. 

All  monads  represent  the  same  universe,  but  each  one- 
represents  it  differently,  that  is,  from  its  particular  point  of 
view — represents  that  which  is  near  at  hand  distinctly,  and 
that  which  is  distant  confusedly.  Since  they  all  reflect  the 
same  content  or  object,  their  difference  consists  only  in  the 
energy  or  degree  of  clearness  in  their  representations.  So 
far  then,  as  their  action  consists  in  representation,  distinct 
representation  evidently  coincides  with  complete,  unhindered 
activity,  confused  representation  with  arrested  activity,  or 
passivity.  The  clearer  the  representations  of  a  monad  the 
more  active  it  is.  To  have  clear  and  distinct  perceptions  only 
is  the  prerogative  of  God  ;  to  the  Omnipresent  everything  is 
alike  near.  He  alone  is  pure  activity;  all  finite  beings  are 
passive  as  well,  that  is,  so  far  as  their  perceptions  are  not 
clear  and  distinct.  Retaining  the  Aristotelian-Scholastic 
terminology,  Leibnitz  calls  the  active  principle  form,  the 
passive  matter,  and  makes  the  monad,  since  it  is  not,  like 
God,  purus  actus  and  pure  form,  consist  of  form  (cntelechy, 
soul)  and  matter.  This  matter,  as  a  constituent  of  the 
monad,  does  not  mean  corporeality,  but  only  the  ground  for 
the  arrest  of  its  activity.  The  materia  prima  (the  principle 
of  passivity  in  the  monad)  is  the  ground,  the  materia  secunda 
(the  phenomenon  of  corporeal  mass)  the  result  of  the  indis- 
tinctness of  the  representations.  For  a  group  of  monads 
appears  as  a  body  when  it  is  indistinctly  perceived.  Who- 
ever deprives  the  monad  of  activity  falls  into  the  error  of 
Spinoza;  whoever  takes  away  its  passivity  or  matter  falls 
into  the  opposite  error,  for  he  deifies  individual  beings. 

recognizing  this  empty  formalism  was,  no  doubt,  the  fad  thai  for  him  the  men 
form  <>f  representation  was  al  once  filled  \\  iili  :i  manifold  experiential  content,  with 
tin-  whole  wealth  of  spiritual  life,  and  thai  tin  quantitative  differences  in  represi  n 
tat  ion,  which  for  him  meant  also  degrees  of  feeling,  desire,  action,  and  progress, 
imperceptibly  look  on  the  qualitative  vividness  "f  individual  characteristics. 
Moreover,  it  must  noi   be  overlooked  thai   the  spiritual  beings  represent  nol 

in«  rely  the  universe  hut   (he  Deity  .is  well,  hence  a  very  rich  objei  t, 


274  LEIBNITZ, 

No  monad  represents  the  common  universe  and  its  indi- 
vidual parts  just  as  well  as  the  others,  but  either  better  or 
worse.  There  are  as  many  different  degrees  of  clearness 
and  distinctness  as  there  are  monads.  Nevertheless  certain 
classes  may  be  distinguished.  By  distinguishing  between 
clear  and  obscure  perceptions,  and  in  the  former  class 
between  distinct  and  confused  ones — a  perception  is  clear 
when  it  is  sufficiently  distinguished  from  others,  distinct 
when  its  component  parts  are  thus  distinguished — Leibnitz 
reaches  three  principal  grades.  Lowest  stand  the  simple  or 
naked  monads,  which  never  rise  above  obscure  and  uncon- 
scious perception  and,  so  to  speak,  pass  their  lives  in  a 
swoon  or  sleep.  If  perception  rises  into  conscious  feeling, 
accompanied  by  memory,  then  the  monad  deserves  the 
name  of  soul.  And  if  the  soul  rises  to  self-consciousness 
and  to  reason  or  the  knowledge  of  universal  truth,  it  is 
called  spirit.  Each  higher  stage  comprehends  the  lower, 
since  even  in  spirits  many  perceptions  remain  obscure  and 
confused.  Hence  it  was  an  error  when  the  Cartesians  made 
thought  or  conscious  activity — by  which,  it  is  true,  the 
spirit  is  differentiated  from  the  lower  beings — to  such  a 
degree  the  essence  of  spirit  that  they  believed  it  necessary 
to  deny  to  it  all  unconscious  perceptions. 

From  perception  arises  appetition,  not  as  independent 
activity,  but  as  a  modification  of  perception  ;  it  is  nothing 
but  the  tendency  to  pass  from  one  perception  to  another 
(/'appctit  est  la  tendance  a1' line  perception  ä  une  autre)  ; 
impulse  is  perception  in  process  of  becoming.  Where 
the  perceptions  are  conscious  and  rational  appetition  rises 
into  will.  All  monads  are  self-active  or  act  spontaneously, 
but  only  the  thinking  ones  are  free.  Freedom  is  the  spon- 
taneity of  spirits.  Freedom  does  not  consist  in  undeter- 
mined choice,  but  in  action  without  external  compulsion 
according  to  the  laws  of  one's  own  being.  The  monad 
develops  its  representations  out  of  itself,  from  the  germs 
which  form  its  nature.  The  correspondence  of  the  different 
pictures  of  the  world,  however,  is  grounded  in  a  divine 
arrangement,  through  which  the  natures  of  the  monads  have 
from  the  beginning  been  so  adapted  to  one  another  that 
the  changes  in    their  states,   although  they  take    place    in 


ME  TA  PH  YSICS  :  PRE-ESTABLISHED  //A  RMON  V.  275 

each  according  to  immanent  laws  and  without  external 
influence,  follow  an  exactly  parallel  course,  and  the  result  is 
the  same  as  though  there  were  a  constant  mutual  interac- 
tion. This  general  idea  of  a  pre-established  harmony  finds 
special  application  in  the  problem  of  the  interaction  between 
body  and  soul.  Body  and  soul  are  like  two  clocks  so 
excellently  constructed  that,  without  needing  to  be  regu- 
lated by  each  other,  they  show  exactly  the  same  time. 
Over  the  numberless  lesser  miracles  with  which  occasion- 
alism burdened  the  Deity,  the  one  great  miracle  of  the  pre- 
established  harmony  has  an  undeniable  advantage.  As 
one  great  miracle  it  is  more  worth)'  of  the  divine  wisdom 
than  the  many  lesser  ones,  nay,  it  is  really  no  miracle  at 
all,  since  the  harmony  does  not  interfere  with  natural 
laws,  but  yields  them.  This  idea  may  even  be  freed  from 
its  theological  investiture  and  reduced  to  the  purely 
metaphysical  expression,  that  the  natures  of  the  monads,  by 
which  the  succession  of  their  representations  is  determined 
in  conformity  with  law,  consist  in  nothing  else  than  the  sum 
of  relations  in  which  this  individual  thing  stands  to  all  other 
parts  of  the  world,  wherein  each  member  takes  account  of 
all  others  and  at  the  same  time  is  considered  by  them,  and 
thus  exerts  influence  as  well  as  suffers  it.  In  this  way  the 
•external  idea  of  an  artificial  adaptation  is  avoided.  The 
essence  of  each  thing  is  simply  the  position  which  it  occupies 
in  the  organic  whole  of  the  universe;  each  member  is 
related  to  every  other  and  shares  actively  and  passively  in 
the  life  of  all  the  rest.  The  history  of  the  universe  is  a 
single  great  process  in  numberless  reflections. 

The  metaphysics  of  Leibnitz  begins  with  the  concept  of 
representation  and  ends  with  the  harmony  of  the  universe. 
The  representations  were  multiplicity  (the  endless  plurality 
of  the  represented)  in  unity  (the  unity  of  the  representing 
monad);  the  harmony  is  unity  (order,  congruity  of  the 
world-image)  in  multiplicity  (the  infinitely  manifold  degrees 
of  clearness  in  the  representations).  All  monads  repre- 
sent the  same  universe;  each  one  minors  it  differently. 
The  unity,  as  well  as  the  difference,  could  not  be  greater 
than  it  is;  every  possible  degree  of  distinctness  of  r<  presen- 
tation is  present    in   each   single   monad,  and   yet   there  is  a 


2 -j  6  LEIBNITZ. 

single  harmonic  accord  in  which  the  unnumbered  tones 
unite.  Now  order  amid  diversity,  unity  in  variety  makeup 
the  concept  of  beauty  and  perfection.  If,  then,  this  world 
shows,  as  it  does,  the  greatest  unity  in  the  greatest  multi- 
plicity, so  that  there  is  nothing  wanting  and  nothing 
superfluous,  it  is  the  most  perfect,  the  best  of  all  possible 
worlds.  Even  the  lowest  grades  contribute  to  the  perfection 
of  the  whole  ;  their  disappearance  would  mean  a  hiatus ;  and 
if  the  unclear  and  confused  representations  appear  imperfect 
when  considered  in  themselves,  yet  they  are  not  so  in  refer- 
ence to  the  whole;  for  just  on  this  fact,  that  the  monad  is 
arrested  in  its  representation  or  is  passive,  i.e.,  conforms  itself 
to  the  others  and  subordinates  itself  to  them,  rest  the  order 
and  connection  of  the  world.  Thus  the  idea  of  harmony 
forms  the  bridge  between  the  Monadology  and  optimism. 

As  in  regard  to  the  harmony  of  the  universe  we  found  it 
possible  to  distinguish  between  a  half-mythical,  narrative 
form  of  presentation  and  a  purely  abstract  conception,  so 
we  may  make  a  similar  distinction  in  the  doctrine  of  crea- 
tion. This  actual  world  has  been  chosen  by  God  as  the  best 
among  many  other  conceivable  worlds.  Through  the  will  of 
God  the  monads  of  which  the  world  consists  attained  their 
reality;  as  possibilities  or  ideas  they  were  present  in  the 
mind  of  God  (as  it  were,  prior  to  their  actualization),  present, 
too,  with  all  the  distinctive  properties  and  perfections 
that  they  now  exhibit  in  a  state  of  realization,  so  that  their 
merely  possible  or  conceivable  being  had  the  same  content 
as  their  actual  being,  and  their  essence  is  not  altered  or 
increased  by  their  existence.  Now,  since  the  impulse 
toward  actualization  dwells  in  every  possible  essence,  and  is 
the  more  justifiable  the  more  perfect  the  essence,  a  com- 
petition goes  on  before  God,  in  which,  first,  those  monod- 
possibilities  unite  which  are  mutually  compatible  or 
compossible,  and,  then,  among  the  different  conceivable 
combinations  of  monads  or  worlds  that  one  is  ordained  for 
entrance  into  existence  which  shows  the  greatest  possible 
sum  of  perfection.  It  was,  therefore,  not  the  perfection  of 
the  single  monad,  but  the  perfection  of  the  system  of  which 
it  forms  a  necessary  part,  that  was  decisive  as  to  its  admis- 
sion into  existence.     The  best  world  was  known   through 


LAWS   OF    THOUGHT  A  YD   OF   THE    WORLD.  277 

God's  wisdom,  chosen  through  his  goodness,  and  realized 
through  his  power.*  The  choice  was  by  no  means  arbi- 
trary, but  wholly  determined  by  the  law  of  fitness  or  of 
the  best  {principe  du  meilleur)\  God's  will  must  realize 
that  which  his  understanding  recognizes  as  most  perfect. 
It  is  at  once  evident  that  in  the  competition  of  the  possi- 
ble worlds  the  victory  of  the  best  was  assured  by  the  lex 
mclioris,  apart  from  the  divine  decision. 

This  law  is  the  special  expression  of  a  more  general  one, 
the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  which  Leibnitz  added,  as 
of  equal  authority,  to  the  Aristotelian  laws  of  thought. 
Things  or  events  are  real  (and  assertions  true)  when 
there  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  their  existence,  and  for  their 
determinate  existence.  The  principium  rationis  sufficientis 
governs  our  empirical  knowledge  of  contingent  truths  or 
truths  of  fact,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  pure  rational 
knowledge  of  necessary  or  eternal  (mathematical  and 
metaphysical)  truths  rests  on  the  principium  contradictionis. 
The  principle  of  contradiction  asserts,  that  is,  Whatever 
contains  a  contradiction  is  false  or  impossible;  whatever 
contains  no  contradiction  is  possible;  that  whose  opposite 
contains  a  contradiction  is  necessary.  Or  positively  formu- 
lated as  the  principle  of  identity,  everything  and  every 
representative  content  is  identical  with  itself.f     Upon  this 

*  In  regard  to  the  dependence  of  the  world  on  God,  there  is  a  certain  con- 
flict noticeable  in  Leibnitz  between  the  metaphysical  interests  involved  in  the 
substantiality  of  individual  beings,  together  with  the  moral  interests  involved  in 
guarding  against  fatalism,  and  the  opposing  interests  of  religion.  On  the  one 
side,  creation  is  for  him  only  an  actualization  of  finished,  unchangeable  pos- 
sibilities, on  the  other,  he  teaches  with  the  mediaeval  philosophers  that  this  was 
not  accomplished  by  a  single  act  of  realization,  that  the  world  has  rued  of 
conservation,  i.  f.,  of  continuous  creation. 

f  Within  the  knowledge  of  reason,  as  well  as  in  experiential  knowli 
further  distinction  is  made  between  primal)'  truths  (which  need  no  proof) 
and  derived  truths.  The  highest  truths  of  reason  are  the  identical  principles, 
which  are  self-evident  ;  from  these  intuitive  truths  all  others  are  to  be  derived 
by  demonstration — proof  is  analysis  and,  as  free  from  contradictions,  demon  itra- 
tion.  The  primitive  truths  of  experience  are  the  immediate  facts  of  consciousness  ; 
whatever  is  inferred  from  them  is  less  certain  than  demonstrative  knowledge. 
Nevertheli  •  cperience  is  not  to  be  estimated  at  alow  value;  it  is  through  il 
alone  that  we  can  assure  ourselves  <>f  the  reality  of  the  objects  ot  thought, 
while  necessary    truths  guarantee    only   that  a   predicate   musl    be    ascribed    to   .1 

subject  (<f.  g. ,  a  circle),  but  make  no  deliverance  as  to  whether  this  subject  exists 

<or  not. 


278  LEIBNITZ. 

antithesis  between  the  rational  laws  of  contradiction  and 
sufficient  reason — which,  however,  is  such  only  for  us  men, 
while  the  divine  spirit,  which  cognizes  all  things  a  priori,  is 
able  to  reduce  even  the  truths  of  fact  to  the  eternal  truths — 
Leibnitz  bases  his  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  necessity. 
That  is  metaphysically  necessary  whose  opposite  involves 
a  contradiction  ;  that  is  morally  necessary  or  contingent 
which,  on  account  of  its  fitness,  is  preferred  by  God  to  its 
(equally  conceivable)  opposite.  To  the  latter  class  belongs, 
further,  the  physically  necessary:  the  necessity  of  the  laws 
of  nature  is  only  a  conditional  necessity  (conditioned  by 
the  choice  of  the  best);  they  are  contingent  truths  or 
truths  of  fact.  The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  holds 
for  efficient  as  well  as  for  final  causes,  and  between  the  two 
realms  there  is,  according  to  Leibnitz,  the  most  complete 
correspondence.  In  the  material  world  every  particular 
must  be  explained  in  a  purely  mechanical  way,  but  the 
totality  of  the  laws  of  nature,  the  universal  mechanism 
itself,  cannot  in  turn  be  mechanically  explained,  but  only 
on  the  basis  of  finality,  so  that  the  mechanical  point  of  view 
is  comprehended  in,  and  subordinated  to,  the  teleologicaL 
Thus  it  becomes  clear  how  Leibnitz  in  the  ratio  sufficiens 
has  final  causes  chiefly  in  mind. 

To  the  broad  and  comprehensive  tendency  which  is 
characteristic  of  Leibnitz's  thinking,  philosophy  owes  a 
further  series  of  general  laws,  which  all  stand  in  the  closest 
relation  to  one  another  and  to  his  monadological  and 
harmonistic  principles,  viz.,  the  law  of  continuity,  the  law 
of  analogy,  the  law  of  the  universal  dissimilarity  of  things 
or  of  the  identity  of  indiscernibles,  and,  finally,  the  law  of 
the  conservation  of  force. 

The  most  fundamental  of  these  laws  is  the  lex  continui. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  forbids  every  leap,  on  the  other,  all 
repetition  in  the  series  of  beings  and  the  series  of  events. 
Member  must  follow  member  without  a  break  and  without 
superfluous  duplication  ;  in  the  scale  of  creatures,  as  in  the 
course  of  events,  absolute  continuity  is  the  rule.  Just  as  in 
the  monad  one  state  continually  develops  from  another,  the 
present  one  giving  birth  to  the  future,  as  it  has  itself  grown 
out  of  the  past,  just  as  nothing  persists,  as  nothing  makes  its 


LAWS   OF    THOUGHT  AXD  OF    THE    WORLD.  279 

entrance  suddenly  or  without  the  way  being  prepared  for  it, 
and  as  all  extremes  are  bound  together  by  connecting  links 
and  gradual  transitions, — so  the  monad  itself  stands  in  a 
continuous  gradation  of  beings,  each  of  which  is  related  to 
and  different  from  each.  Since  the  beings  and  events  form 
a  single  uninterrupted  series,  there  are  no  distinctions  of  kind 
in  the  world,  but  only  distinctions  in  degree.  Rest  and 
motion  are  not  opposites,  for  rest  may  be  considered  as 
infinitely  minute  motion  ;  the  ellipse  and  the  parabola  are 
not  qualitatively  different,  for  the  laws  which  hold  for  the 
one  may  be  applied  to  the  other.  Likeness  is  vanishing 
unlikeness,  passivity  arrested  activity,  evil  a  lesser  good, 
confused  ideas  simply  less  distinct  ones,  animals  men  with 
infinitely  little  reason,  plants  animals  with  vanishing  con- 
sciousness, fluidity  a  lower  degree  of  solidity,  etc.  In  the 
whole  world  similarity  and  correspondence  rule,  and  it  is 
everywhere  the  same  as  here — between  apparent  opposites 
there  is  a  distinction  in  degree  merely,  and  hence,  analog}-. 
In  the  macrocosm  of  the  universe  things  go  on  as  in  the 
microcosm  of  the  monad  ;  every  later  state  of  the  world  is 
prefigured  in  the  earlier,  etc.  If,  on  the  one  side,  the  law  of 
analogy  follows  as  a  consequence  from  the  law  of  contin- 
uity, on  the  other,  we  have  the principium  {identitatis)  indis- 
cernibilium.  As  nature  abhors  gaps,  so  also  it  avoids  the 
superfluous.  Every  grade  in  the  series  must  be  represented, 
but  none  more  than  once.  There  are  no  two  things,  no  two 
events  which  are  entirely  alike.  If  they  were  exactly  alike 
they  would  not  be  two,  but  one.  The  distinction  between 
them  is  never  merely  numerical,  nor  merely  local  and  tem- 
poral, but  always  an  intrinsic  difference  :  each  thing  is  dis- 
tinguished from  every  other  by  its  peculiar  nature.  This 
law  holds  both  for  the  truly  real  (the  monads)  and  for  the 
phenomenal  world — you  will  never  find  two  leaves  exactly 
alike.  By  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  force,  Leibnitz 
corrects  the  Cartesian  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of 
motion,  and  approaches  the  point  of  view  <>f  the  pn  1  nl 
day.  According  to  Descartes  it  is  the  sum  of  actual  motions 
which  remains  constant  ;  according  to  Leibnitz,  the  sum  of 
the  active  forces;    while,  according  to  the  modern  theory, 

it     is    the   sum    of   the    active    and     the    latent    or   potential 


-'So  LEI  BX I  TZ. 

forces — a  distinction,  moreover,  of  which  Leibnitz  himself 
made  use. 

We  now  turn  from  the  formal  framework  of  general  laws, 
to  the  actual,  to  that  which,  obeying  these  laws,  constitutes 
the  living  content  of  the  world. 

2.  The  Organic  World. 

A  living  being  is  a  machine  composed  of  an  infinite 
number  of  organs.  The  natural  machines  formed  by  God 
differ  from  the  artificial  machines  made  by  the  hand  of  man, 
in  that,  down  to  their  smallest  parts,  they  consist  of 
machines.  Organisms  are  complexes  of  monads,  of  which 
one,  the  soul,  is  supreme,  while  the  rest,  which  serve  it,  form 
its  body.  The  dominant  monad  is  distinguished  from  those 
which  surround  it  as  its  body  by  the  greater  distinctness  of 
its  ideas.  The  supremacy  of  the  soul-monad  consists  in  this 
one  superior  quality,  that  it  is  more  active  and  more  perfect, 
and  clearly  reflects  that  which  the  body-monads  represent 
but  obscurely.  A  direct  interaction  between  soul  and  body 
does  not  take  place ;  there  is  only  a  complete  correspond- 
ence, instituted  by  God.  He  foresaw  that  the  soul  at  such 
and  such  a  moment  would  have  the  sensation  of  warmth,  or 
would  wish  an  arm-motion  executed,  and  has  so  ordered  the 
development  of  the  body-monads  that,  at  the  same  instant, 
they  appear  to  cause  this  sensation  and  to  obey  this  impulse 
to  move.  Now,  since  God  in  this  foreknowledge  and 
accommodation  naturally  paid  more  regard  to  the  perfect 
beings,  to  the  more  active  and  more  distinctly  perceiving 
monads  than  to  the  less  perfect  ones,  and  subordinated  the 
latter,  as  means  and  conditions,  to  the  former  as  ends,  the 
soul,  prior  to  creation,  actually  exercised  an  ideal  influence 
— through  the  mind  of  God — upon  its  body.  Its  activity  is 
the  reason  why  in  less  perfect  monads  a  definite  change,  a 
passion  takes  place,  since  the  action  was  attainable  only  in 
this  way,  "compossible"  with  this  alone.*  The  monads 
which  constitute  the  body  are  the  first  and  direct  object  of 
the  soul ;  it  perceives  them  more  distinctly  than  it  perceives, 
through  them,  the  rest  of  the  external  world.     In  view  of 

*  Cf.  Gustav  Class,  Die  metaphysischen  Voraussetzungen  des  Leibnizischen 
Determinismus,  Tübingen,  1874. 


THE   ORGANIC    WORLD.  281 

the  close  connection  of  the  elements  of  the  organism  thus 
postulated,  Leibnitz,  in  the  discussions  with  Father  Des 
Bosses  concerning  the  compatibility  of  the  Monadology  with 
the  doctrine  of  the  Church,  especially  with  the  real  presence 
of  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  Supper,  consented,  in  favor  of 
the  dogma,  to  depart  from  the  assumption  that  the  simple 
alone  could  be  substantial  and  to  admit  the  possibility  of 
composite  substances,  and  of  a  "substantial  bond"  con- 
necting the  parts  of  living  beings.  It  appears  least  in 
contradiction  with  the  other  principles  of  the  philosopher 
to  assign  the  role  of  this  vinculum  substantielle  to  the  soul 
or  central  monad  itself. 

Everything  in  nature  is  organized ;  there  are  no  soulless 
bodies,  no  dead  matter.  The  smallest  particle  of  dust  is 
peopled  with  a  multitude  of  living  beings  and  the  tiniest 
drop  of  water  swarms  with  organisms:  every  portion  of 
matter  may  be  compared  to  a  pond  filled  with  fish  or  a 
garden  full  of  plants.  This  denial  of  the  inorganic  does  not 
release  our  philosopher  from  the  duty  of  explaining  its 
apparent  existence.  If  we  thoughtfully  consider  bodies,  we 
perceive  that  there  is  nothing  lifeless  and  non-representative. 
But  the  phenomenon  of  extended  mass  arises  for  our  confused 
sensuous  perception,  which  perceives  the  monads  composing 
a  body  together  and  regards  them  as  a  continuous  unity. 
Body  exists  only  as  a  confused  idea  in  the  feeling  subject; 
since,  nevertheless,  a  reality  without  the  mind,  namely,  an 
immaterial  monad-aggregate,  corresponds  to  it,  the  phe- 
nomenon of  body  is  a  well-founded  one  {phenomenon  bene 
fundatuni).  As  matter  is  merely  something  present  in  sen- 
sation or  confused  representation,  so  space  and  time  are  also 
nothing  real,  neither  substances  nor  properties,  but  only 
ideal  things — the  former  the  order  of  coexistences,  the  latter 
the  order  of  successions. 

If  there  are  no  soulless  bodies,  there  arc  also  no  bodiless 
souls;  the  soul  is  always  joined  with  an  aggregate  <>f  sub- 
ordinate monads,  though  not  always  with  the  same  oiks. 
Single  monads  are  constantly  passing  into  its  body,  or  into 
its  service,  while  others  arc  passing  out;  it  is  involved  in  a 
continuous  process  of  bodily  transformation.  Usually  the 
change  goes  on  slow!)'  and  with  a  constant   replacement  of 


*»a  LEIBNITZ. 

the  parts  thrown  off.  If  it  takes  place  quickly  men  call  it 
birth  or  death.  Actual  death  there  is  as  little  as  there  is 
an  actual  genesis;  not  the  soul  only,  but  every  living  thing 
is  imperishable.  Death  is  decrease  and  involution,  birth 
increase  and  evolution.  The  dying  creature  loses  only  a 
portion  of  its  bodily  machine  and  so  returns  to  the  slum- 
berous or  germinal  condition  of  "involution,"  in  which  it 
existed  before  birth,  and  from  which  it  was  aroused  through 
conception  to  development.  Pre-existence  as  well  as  post- 
existence  must  be  conceded  both  to  animals  and  to  men. 
Leuwenhoek's  discovery  of  the  spermatozoa  furnished  a 
welcome  confirmation  for  this  doctrine,  that  all  individuals 
have  existed  since  the  beginning  of  the  world,  at  least  as 
preformed  germs.  The  immortality  of  man,  conformably 
to  his  superior  dignity,  differs  from  the  continued  existence 
of  all  monads,  in  that  after  his  death  he  retains  memory  and 
the  consciousness  of  his  moral  personality. 

3.  Man  :  Cognition  and  Volition. 

In  reason  man  possesses  reflection  or  self-conscious- 
ness as  well  as  the  knowledge  of  God,  of  the  universal,  and  of 
the  eternal  truths  or  a  priori  knowledge,  while  the  animal 
is  limited  in  its  perception  to  experience,  and  in  its 
reasoning  to  the  connection  of  perceptions  in  accordance 
with  memory.  Man  differs  from  higher  beings  in  that  the 
majority  of  his  ideas  are  confused.  Under  confused 
ideas  Leibnitz  includes  both  sense-perceptions — anyone 
who  has  distinct  ideas  alone,  as  God,  has  no  sense- 
perceptions — and  the  feelings  which  mediate  between  the 
former  and  the  perfectly  distinct  ideas  of  rational  thought. 
The  delight  of  music  depends,  in  his  opinion,  on  an  uncon- 
scious numbering  and  measuring  of  the  harmonic  and 
rhythmic  relations  of  tones,  aesthetic  enjoyment  of  the 
beautiful  in  general,  and  even  sensuous  pleasure,  on  the 
confused  perception  of  a  perfection,  order,  or  harmony. 

The  application  of  the  lex  continui  to  the  inner  life  has  a 
very  wide  range.  The  principal  results  are:  (1)  the  mind 
always  thinks;  (2)  every  present  idea  postulates  a  previous 
one  from  which  it  has  arisen;  (3)  sensation  and  thought 
differ  only  in  degree ;  (4)  in  the  order  of  time,  the  ideas  of 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  283 

sense  precede  those  of  reason.  We  are  never  wholly 
without  ideas,  only  we  are  often  not  conscious  of  them.  If 
thought  ceased  in  deep  sleep,  we  could  have  no  ideas  on 
awakening,  since  every  representation  proceeds  from  a 
preceding  one,  even  though  it  be  unconscious. 

In  the  thoughtful  New  Essays  concerning  the  Human 
Understanding  Leibnitz  develops  his  theory  of  knowledge 
in  the  form  of  a  polemical  commentary  to  Locke's  chief 
work.*  According  to  Descartes  some  ideas  (the  pure  con- 
cepts) are  innate,  according  to  Locke  none,  according  to 
Leibnitz  all.  Or:  according  to  Descartes  some  ideas  (sensu- 
ous perceptions)  come  from  without,  according  to  Locke 
all  do  so,  according  to  Leibnitz  none.  Leibnitz  agrees  with 
Descartes  against  Locke  in  the  position  that  the  mind 
originally  possesses  ideas;  he  agrees  with  Locke  against 
Descartes,  that  thought  is  later  than  sensation  and  the 
knowledge  of  universals  later  than  that  of  particulars.  The 
originality  which  Leibnitz  attributes  to  intellectual  ideas 
is  different  from  that  which  Descartes  had  ascribed  and 
Locke  denied  to  them.  They  are  original  in  that  they  do 
not  come  into  the  soul  and  are  not  impressed  upon  it  from 
without ;  they  are  not  original  in  that  they  can  develop 
only  from  previously  given  sense-ideas;  again,  they  are 
original  in  that  they  can  be  developed  from  confused  ideas 
only  because  they  are  contained  in  them  implicite  or  as  pre- 
dispositions. Thus  Leibnitz  is  able  to  agree  with  both  his 
predecessors  up  to  a  certain  point :  with  the  one,  that 
the  pure  concepts  have  their  origin  within  the  mind ; 
with  the  other,  that  they  are  not  the  earliest  knowledge, 
but  arc  conditioned  by  sensations.  This  synthesis,  how- 
ever, was  possible  only  because  Leibnitz  looked  on  sensation 
differently  from  both  the  others.  If  sensation  is  to  be  the 
mother  of  thought,  and  the  latter  at  the  same  time  to 
preserve  its  character  as  original,  i.e.,  as  something  not 
obtained  from  without,  sensation  must,  first,  include  an  un- 
conscious thinking  in  itself,  and,  secondly,  must  itself  receive 

*  A  careful  comparison  of  Locke's  thi  ory  of  knowledge  \\  iili  that  "I  Leibnitz 
is  j^ivt-ii  by  G.  Hartenstein,  Abhandlungen  tl<-r  k.  sacks,  Gesellschaft  tier 
Wissenschaften,  Leipsic,  [865,  included  in  Hartenstein^  Historisch  philos- 
ophische Abhandlungen,  1870. 


284  LEIBNITZ. 

a  title  to  originality  and  spontaneity.  As  the  Catholic 
dogma  added  the  immaculate  conception  of  the  mother  to 
that  of  the  Son,  so  Leibnitz  transfers  the  (virginal)  origin 
of  rational  concepts,  independent  of  external  influence,  to 
sensations.  The  monad  has  no  windows.  It  bears  ger- 
minally  in  itself  all  that  it  is  to  experience,  and  nothing  is 
impressed  on  it  from  without.  The  intellect  should  not  be 
compared  to  a  blank  tablet,  but  to  a  block  of  marble  in 
whose  veins  the  outlines  of  the  statue  are  prefigured. 
Ideas  can  only  arise  from  ideas,  never  from  external  im- 
pressions or  movements  of  corporeal  parts.  Thus  all  ideas 
are  innate  in  the  sense  that  they  grow  from  inner  germs; 
we  possess  them  from  the  beginning,  not  developed 
(explicitc),  but  potentially,  that  is,  we  have  the  capacity  to 
produce  them.  The  old  Scholastic  principle  that  "there  is 
nothing  in  the  understanding  which  was  not  previously  in 
sense"  is  entirely  correct,  only  one  must  add,  except  the 
understanding  itself,  that  is,  the  faculty  of  developing  our 
knowledge  out  of  ourselves.  Thought  lies  already  dormant 
in  perception.  With  the  mechanical  position  (sensuous 
representation  precedes  and  conditions  rational  thought) 
is  joined  the  teleological  position  (sensuous  representations 
exist,  in  order  to  render  the  origin  of  thoughts  possible), 
and  with  this  purposive  determination,  sensation  attains  a 
higher  dignity :  it  is  more  than  has  been  seen  in  it  before, 
for  it  includes  in  itself  the  future  concept  of  the  under- 
standing in  an  unconscious  form,  nay,  it  is  itself  an  imperfect 
thought,  a  thought  in  process  of  becoming.  Sensation  and 
thought  are  not  different  in  kind,  and  if  the  former  is  called  a 
passive  state,  still  passivity  is  nothing  other  than  diminished 
activity.  Both  are  spontaneous;  thought  is  merely  spon- 
taneous in  a  higher  degree. 

By  making  sensation  and  feeling  the  preliminary  step  to 
thought,  Leibnitz  became  the  founder  of  that  intellectualism 
which,  in  the  system  of  Hegel,  extended  itself  far  beyond  the 
psychological  into  the  cosmical  field,  and  endeavored  to 
conceive  not  only  all  psychical  phenomena  but  all  reality 
whatsoever  as  a  development  of  the  Idea  toward  itself.  This 
conception,  which  may  be  characterized  as  intellectualistic 
in  its  content,  presents  itself  on  its  formal  side  as  a  quantita- 


ETHICS.  285 

tive  way  of  looking  at  the  world,  which  sacrifices  all  qualita- 
tive antitheses  in  order  to  arrange  the  totality  of  being  and 
becoming  in  a  single  series  with  no  distinctions  but  those  of 
degree.  If  Leibnitz  here  appears  as  the  representative  of  a 
view  of  the  world  which  found  in  Kant  a  powerful  and 
victorious  opponent,  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  he  prepared  the 
way  by  his  conception  of  innate  ideas  for  the  Critique  of 
Reason.  By  his  theory  of  knowledge  he  forms  the  transition 
link  between  Descartes  and  Kant,  since  he  interprets  neces- 
sary truths  not  as  dwelling  in  the  mind  complete  and  explicit 
from  the  start,  but  as  produced  or  raised  into  consciousness 
only  on  the  occasion  of  sensuous  experience.  It  must  be 
admitted,  moreover,  that  this  in  reality  was  only  a  resto- 
ration of  Descartes's  original  position,  i.  e.,  a  deliverance 
of  it  from  the  misinterpretations  and  perversions  which  it 
had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  adherents  and  opponents  alike, 
but  which  Descartes,  it  is  true,  had  failed  to  render  impos- 
sible from  the  start  by  conclusive  explanations.  The  author 
of  the  theory  of  innate  ideas  certainly  did  not  mean  what 
Locke  foists  upon  him,  that  the  child  in  the  cradle  already 
possesses  the  ideas  of  God,  of  thought,  and  of  extension  in 
full  clearness.  But  whether  Leibnitz  improved  or  only 
restored  Descartes,  it  was  in  any  case  an  important  advance 
when  experience  and  thought  were  brought  into  more  defi- 
nite relation,  and  the  productive  force  in  rational  concepts 
was  secured  to  the  latter  and  the  occasion  of  their  production 
to  the  former. 

The  unconscious  or  minute  ideas,  which  in  noetics  had 
served  to  break  the  force  of  Locke's  objections  against  the 
innateness  of  the  principles  of  reason,  are  in  ethics  brought 
into  the  field  against  indetcrminism.  They  are  invoked 
whenever  we  believe  ourselves  to  act  without  cause,  from 
pure  choice,  or  contrary  to  the  motives  present.  In  this 
last  case,  a  motive  which  is  very  strong  in  itself  is  overcome 
by  the  united  power  of  many  in  themselves  weaker,  The 
will  is  always  determined,  and  that  by  an  idea  (of  ends), 
which  generally  is  of  a  very  complex  nature,  and  in  which 
the  stronger  side  d<  <  ides  1 1"'  issue.  An  absolute  equilibrium 
of  motives  is  impossible:  the  world  cannot  be:  divided  into 
two  entirely  similar  parts  (this  in  opposition  to  "Buridan 's 


286  LEIBNITZ. 

ass").  A  spirit  capable  of  looking  us  through  and  through 
would  be  able  to  calculate  all  our  volitions  and  actions 
beforehand. 

In  spite  of  this  admitted  inevitableness  of  our  resolutions 
and  actions,  the  predicate  of  freedom  really  belongs  to  them, 
and  this  on  two  grounds.  First,  they  are  only  physically  or 
morally,  not  metaphysically,  necessary;  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  is  true,  they  cannot  happen  otherwise,  but  their  opposite 
involves  no  logical  contradiction  and  remains  conceivable. 
To  express  this  thought  the  formula,  often  repeated  since, 
that  our  motives  only  impel,  incite,  or  stimulate  the  will, 
but  do  not  compel  it  {inclinant,  non  necessitanf),  was  chosen, 
but  not  very  happily.  Secondly,  the  determination  of  the 
will  is  an  inner  necessitation,  grounded  in  the  being's  own 
nature,  not  an  external  compulsion.  The  agent  determines 
himself  in  accordance  with  his  own  nature,  and  for  this  each 
bears  the  responsibility  himself,  for  God,  when  he  brought 
the  monads  out  of  possibility  into  actuality,  left  their 
natures  as  they  had  existed  before  the  creation  in  the  form 
of  eternal  ideas  in  His  understanding.  Though  Leibnitz  thus 
draws  a  distinction  beween  his  deterministic  doctrine  and 
the  "fatalism"  of  Spinoza,  he  recognizes  a  second  concept 
of  freedom,  which  completely  corresponds  to  Spinoza's.  A 
decision  is  the  more  free  the  more  distinct  the  ideas  which 
determine  it,  and  a  man  the  more  free  the  more  he  withdraws 
his  will  from  the  influence  of  the  passions,  i.  c,  confused 
ideas,  and  subordinates  it  to  that  of  reason.  God  alone 
is  absolutely  free,  becaus0  he  has  no  ideas  which  are  not 
distinct.  The  bridge  between  the  two  conceptions  of 
freedom  is  established  by  the  principle  that  reason  con- 
stitutes the  peculiar  nature  of  man  in  a  higher  degree 
than  the  sum  of  his  ideas;  for  it  is  reason  which  distin- 
guishes him  from  the  lower  beings.  According  to  the  first 
meaning  of  freedom  man  is  free,  according  to  the  second, 
which  coincides  with  activity,  perfection,  and  morality,  he 
should  become  free. 

Morality  is  the  result  of  the  natural  development  of  the 
individual.  Every  being  strives  after  perfection  or  increased 
activity,  i.  e.,  after  more  distinct  ideas.  Parallel  to  this  the- 
oretical advance  runs  a  practical  advance  in  a  twofold  form : 


THEOLOGY.  287 

the  increasing  distinctness  of  ideas,  or  enlightenment,  or 
wisdom,  raises  the  impulse  to  transitory,  sensuous  pleasure 
into  an  impulse  to  permanent  delight  in  our  spiritual  perfec- 
tion, or  toward  happiness,  while,  further,  it  opens  up  an 
insight  into  the  connection  of  all  beings  and  the  harmony 
of  the  world,  in  virtue  of  which  the  virtuous  man  will  seek- 
to  promote  the  perfection  and  happiness  of  others  as  well  as 
his  own,  i.  e.,  will  love  them,  for  to  love  is  to  find  pleasure  in 
the  happiness  of  others.  To  promote  the  good  of  all,  again, 
is  the  same  as  to  contribute  one's  share  to  the  world- 
harmony  and  to  co-operate  in  the  fulfillment  of  God's  pur- 
poses. Probity  and  piety  are  the  same.  They  form  the 
highest  of  the  three  grades  of  natural  right,  which  Leibnitz 
distinguishes  as  Jus  strictum  (mere  right,  with  the  principle  : 
Injure  no  one),  cequitas  (equity  or  charity,  with  the  maxim  : 
To  each  his  due),  and  probitas  sive  pictas  (honorableness 
joined  with  religion,  according  to  the  command:  Lead  an 
upright  and  morally  pure  life).  They  may  also  be  desig- 
nated as  commutative,  distributive,  and  universal  justice. 
Belief  in  God  and  immortality  is  a  condition  of  the  last. 

4.  Theology  and  Theodicy. 

God  is  the  ground  and  the  end  of  the  world.  All  beings 
strive  toward  him,  as  all  came  out  from  him.  In  man  the 
general  striving  toward  the  most  perfect  Being  rises  into 
conscious  love  to  God,  which  is  conditioned  by  the  knowl- 
edge of  God  and  produces  virtuous  action  as  its  effect. 
Enlightenment  and  virtue  are  the  essential  constituents  of 
religion  ;  all  else,  as  cultus  and  dogma,  have  only  a  derivative 
value.  Religious  ceremonies  are  an  imperfect  expression 
of  the  practical  element  in  piety,  as  the  doctrines  of  faith 
are  a  weak  imitation  of  the  theoretical.  It  is  a  direct 
contradiction  of  the  intention  of  the  Divine  Teacher  when 
occult  formulas  and  ceremonies,  which  have  no  connection 
with  virtue,  are  made  the  chief  thing.  The  points  in  which 
the  creeds  agree  are  more  important  than  those  l>v  which 
they  are  differentiated.  Natural  religion  has  found  its  most 
perfect  expression  in  Christianity,  although  paganism  and 
Judaism   had    also  grasped   portions  of    the  truth.       Salva- 


2SS  LEIBNITZ. 

tion  is  not  denied  to  the  heathen,  for  moral  purity  is  suffi- 
cient to  make  one  a  partaker  of  the  grace  of  God.  The 
religion  of  the  Jews  elevated  monotheism,  which,  it  is  true, 
made  its  appearance  among  the  heathen  in  isolated  philos- 
ophers, but  was  never  the  popular  religion,  into  a  law;  but 
it  lacked  the  belief  in  immortality.  Christianity  made  the 
religion  of  the  sage  the  religion  of  the  people. 

Whatever  of  positive  doctrine  revelation  has  added  to 
natural  religion  transcends  the  reason,  it  is  true,  but  does 
not  contradict  it.  It  contains  no  principles  contrary  to  rea- 
son (whose  opposite  can  be  proved),  but,  no  doubt,  prin- 
ciples above  reason,  i.  e.,  such  as  the  reason  could  not 
have  found  without  help  from  without,  and  which  it  cannot 
fully  comprehend,  though  it  is  able  approximately  to  under- 
stand them  and  to  defend  them  against  objections.  Hence 
Leibnitz  defended  the  Trinity,  which  he  interpreted  as 
God's  power,  understanding,  and  will,  the  eternity  of  the 
torments  of  hell  (which  brought  him  the  commendation  of 
Lessing),  and  other  dogmas.  Miracles  also  belong  among 
the  things  the  how  and  why  of  which  we  are  not  in  a  position 
to  comprehend,  but  only  the  that  and  what.  Since  the 
laws  of  nature  are  only  physically  or  conditionally  necessary, 
i.  c,  have  been  enacted  only  because  of  their  fitness  for  the 
purposes  of  God,  they  may  be  suspended  in  special  cases 
when  a  higher  end  requires  it. 

While  the  positive  doctrines  of  faith  cannot  be  proved — 
as,  on  the  other  hand,  they  cannot  be  refuted — the  principles 
of  natural  religion  admit  of  strict  demonstration.  The  usual 
arguments  for  the  existence  of  God  are  useful,  but  need 
amendment.  The  ontological  argument  of  Descartes,  that 
from  the  concept  of  a  most  perfect  Being  his  existence 
follows,  is  correct  so  soon  as  the  idea  of  God  is  shown  to 
be  possible  or  free  from  contradiction.  The  cosmological 
proof  runs:  Contingent  beings  point  to  a  necessary,  self- 
existent  Being,  the  eternal  truths  especially  presuppose  an 
eternal  intelligence  in  which  they  exist.  If  we  ask  why  any- 
thing whatever,  or  why  just  this  world  exists,  this  ultimate 
ground  of  things  cannot  be  found  within  the  world.  Every 
contingent  thing  or  event  has  its  cause  in  another.  How- 
ever far  we  follow  out  the  series  of  conditions,   we   never 


THEODICY.  289 

reach  an  ultimate,  unconditioned  cause.  Consequently  the 
sufficient  reason  for  the  series  must  be  situated  without  the 
world,  and,  as  is  evident  from  the  harmony  of  things,  can 
only  be  an  infinitely  wise  and  good  Being.  Here  the  teleo- 
logical  proof  comes  in :  From  the  finality  of  the  world  we 
reason  to  the  existence  of  a  Being,  as  the  author  of  the 
world,  who  works  in  view  of  ends  and  who  wills  and  carries 
out  that  which  is  best, — to  the  supreme  intelligence,  good- 
ness, and  power  of  the  Creator.  A  special  inferential  value 
accrues  to  this  position  from  the  system  of  pre-established 
harmony — it  is  manifest  that  the  complete  correspondence 
of  the  manifold  substances  in  the  world,  which  are  not  con- 
nected with  one  another  by  any  direct  interaction,  can  pro- 
ceed only  from  a  common  cause  endowed  with  infinite  intelli- 
gence and  power. 

The  possibility  of  proving  the  existence  of  one  omnipotent 
and  all-beneficent  God,  and  the  impossibility  of  refuting  the 
positive  dogmas,  save  the  harmony  of  faith  and  reason,  which 
Bayle  had  denied.  The  conclusion  of  the  New  Essays  and  the 
opening  of  the  Theodicy  are  devoted  to  this  theme.  The 
second  part  gives,  also  against  Bayle,  the  justification  of 
God  in  view  of  the  evil  in  the  world.  Si  Dens  est,  nude 
malum  ?  Optimism  has  to  reckon  with  the  facts  of  experi- 
ence, and  to  show  that  this  world,  in  spite  of  its  undeniable 
imperfections,  is  still  the  best  world.  God  could  certainly 
have  brought  into  actuality  a  world  in  which  there  would 
have  been  less  imperfection  than  in  ours,  but  it  would  at 
the  same  time  have  contained  fewer  perfections.  No  world 
whatever  can  exist  entirely  free  from  evil,  entirely  without 
limitation — whoever  forbids  God  to  create  imperfect  beings 
forbids  him  to  create  a  world  at  all.  Certain  evils — in 
general  terms,  the  evil  of  finitude — are  entirely  inseparable 
from  the  concept  of  created  beings;  imperfection  attaches 
to  every  created  thing  as  such.  Other  evils  God  has 
permitted  because  it  was  only  through  them  that  certain 
higher  goods,  which  ought  not  to  be  renounced,  could  he- 
brought  to  pass.  Think  of  the  lofty  feelings,  noble  resolves, 
and  great  deeds  which  war  occasions,  think  of  national 
enthusiasm,  readiness  for  sacrifice,  and  defiance  of  death — 
all   these  would  be  given  over,  if  war  should  he  taken  out  of 


290  LEIB  XI  TZ. 

the  work!   on  account  of  the  suffering  which    it  also   brings 
in  its  train. 

If  we  turn  from  the  general  principles  to  their  application' 
in  detail,  we  find  a  separate  proof  for  the  inevitableness  or 
salutary  nature  of  each  of  the  three  kinds  of  evil — the  meta- 
physical evil  of  created  existence,  the  physical  evil  of 
suffering  (and  punishment),  and  the  moral  evil  of  sin. 
Metaphysical  evil  is  absolutely  unavoidable,  if  a  world  is  to 
exist  at  all;  created  beings  without  imperfection,  finiteness, 
limitation,  are  entirely  inconceivable — something  besides 
gods  must  exist.  The  physical  evil  of  misery  finds  its 
justification  in  that  it  makes  for  good.  First  of  all,  the 
amount  of  suffering  is  not  so  great  as  it  appears  to  discon- 
tented spirits  to  be.  Life  is  usually  quite  tolerable,  and 
vouchsafes  more  joy  and  pleasure  than  grief  and  hardship  ;  in 
balancing  the  good  and  the  evil  we  must  especially  remember 
to  reckon  on  the  positive  side  the  goods  of  activity,  of 
health,  and  all  that  which  affords  us,  perchance,  no  percep- 
tible pleasure,  but  the  removal  of  which  would  be  felt 
as  an  evil  {Theodicy,  ii.  §  251).  Most  evils  serve  to  secure 
us  a  much  greater  good,  or  to  ward  off  a  still  greater  evil. 
Would  a  brave  general,  if  given  the  choice  of  leaving  the 
battle  unwounded,  but  also  without  the  victory,  or  of 
winning  the  victory  at  the  cost  of  a  wound,  hesitate  an 
instant  to  choose  the  latter?  Other  troubles,  again,  must 
be  regarded  as  punishment  for  sins  and  as  means  of  reforma- 
tion ;  the  man  who  is  resigned  to  God's  will  may  be  certain 
that  the  sufferings  which  come  to  him  will  turn  out  for  his 
good.  Especially  if  we  consider  the  world  as  a  whole,  it  is 
evident  that  the  sum  of  evil  vanishes  before  the  sum  of 
good.  It  is  wrong  to  look  upon  the  happiness  of  man  as 
the  end  of  the  world.  Certainly  God  had  the  happiness  of 
rational  beings  in  mind,  but  not  this  exclusively,  for  they 
form  only  a  part  of  the  world,  even  if  it  be  the  highest  part. 
God's  purpose  has  reference  rather  to  the  perfection  of  the 
whole  system  of  the  universe.  Now  the  harmony  of  the 
universe  requires  that  all  possible  grades  of  reality  be  rep- 
resented, that  there  should  be  indistinct  ideas,  sense,  and 
corporeality,  not  merely  a  realm  of  spirits,  and  with  these,  con- 
ditions of  imperfection,  feelings  of  pain,  and  theoretical  and 


THEODICY.  291 

moral  errors  are  inevitably  given.  The  connection  and  the 
order  of  the  world  demands  a  material  element  in  the 
monad,  but  happiness  without  alloy  can  never  be  the  lot  of 
a  spirit  joined  to  a  body.  Thirdly,  in  regard  to  moral  evil 
also  we  receive  the  assurance  that  the  sum  of  the  bad  is  much 
less  than  that  of  the  good.  Then,  moral  evil  is  connected 
with  metaphysical  evil:  created  beings  cannot  be  absolutely 
perfect,  hence,  also,  not  morally  perfect  or  sinless.  But,  in 
return  for  this,  there  is  no  being  that  is  absolutely  imperfect, 
none  only  and  entirely  evil.  With  this  is  joined  the  well- 
known  principle  of  the  earlier  thinkers,  that  evil  is  nothing 
actual,  but  merely  deprivation,  absence  of  good,  lack  of 
clear  reason  and  force  of  will.  That  which  is  real  in  the 
evil  action,  the  power  to  act,  is  perfect  and  good,  and,  as 
force,  comes  from  God — the  negative  or  evil  element  in  it 
comes  from  the  agent  himself  ;  just  as  in  the  case  of  two 
ships  of  the  same  size,  but  unequally  laden,  which  drift  with 
the  current,  the  speed  comes  from  the  stream  and  the 
retardation  from  the  load  of  the  vessels  themselves.  God  is 
not  responsible  for  sin,  for  he  has  only  permitted  it,  not  willed 
it  directly,  and  man  was  already  evil  before  he  was  created. 
The  fact  that  God  foresaw  that  man  would  sin  does  not 
constrain  the  latter  to  commit  the  evil  deed,  but  this  follows 
from  his  own  (eternal)  being,  which  God  left  unaltered  when 
he  granted  him  existence.  The  guilt  and  the  responsibility 
fall  wholly  on  the  sinner  himself.  The  permission  of  evil  is 
explained  by  the  predominantly  good  results  which  follow 
from  it  (not,  as  in  physical  evil,  for  the  sufferer  himself,  but 
for  others)— from  the  crime  of  Sextus  Tarquinius  sprang  a 
great  kingdom  with  great  men  (cf.  the  beautiful  myth  in 
connection  with  a  dialogue  of  Laurentius  Valla,  Theodicy, 
iii.  413-416).  Finally,  reference  is  made  again  to  the  con- 
tribution which  evil  makes  to  the  perfection  of  the  whole. 
Evil  has  the  same  function  in  the  world  as  the  discords  in  a 
piece  of  music,  or  the  shadows  in  a  painting  the  beauty  is 
heightened  by  the  contrast.  The  good  needs  a  foil  in  order 
to  come  out  distinctly  and  to  be  felt  in  all  its  excellence. 

In  the  Leibnitzian  theodicy  the  hast   satisfactory  pari    is 
the  justification  of  moral  evil.      We  miss  the    view  defended 

in  such  grand  outlines  by   Hegel,  and   so  ingeniously  by 


292  LEIBNITZ. 

Fechner,  that  the  good  is  not  the  flower  of  a  quiet,  unmo- 
lested development,  but  the  fruit  of  energetic  labor ;  that 
it  has  need  of  its  opposite ;  that  it  not  merely  must  approve 
itself  in  the  battle  against  evil  without  and  within  the  acting 
subject,  but  that  it  is  only  through  this  conflict  that  it  is 
attainable  at  all.  Virtue  implies  force  of  will  as  well  as 
purity,  and  force  develops  only  by  resistance.  Although 
he  does  not  appreciate  the  full  depth  of  the  significance  of 
pain,  Leibnitz's  view  of  suffering  deserves  more  approval 
than  his  questionable  application  to  the  ethical  sphere  of 
the  quantitative  view  of  the  world,  with  its  interpretation  of 
evil  as  merely  undeveloped  good.  But,  in  any  case,  the  com- 
passionate contempt  of  the  pessimism  of  the  day  for  the 
"shallow"  Leibnitz  is  most  unjustifiable. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 
THE  GERMAN  ILLUMINATION. 

I.  The  Contemporaries  of  Leibnitz. 

The  period  between  Kepler  and  Leibnitz  in  Germany  was 
very  poor  in  noteworthy  philosophical  phenomena.  The 
physicist,  Christoph  Sturm  *  of  Altdorf  (died  1703),  was 
a  follower  of  Descartes,  Joachim  Jungius  f  (died  1657)  a 
follower  of  Bacon,  though  not  denying  with  the  latter  the 
value  of  the  mathematical  method  in  natural  science.  Hier- 
onymus  Hirnhaym,  Abbot  at  Prague  {The  Plague  of  the  Hu- 
man Race,  or  the  Vanity  of  Human  Learning,  1676),  declared 
the  thirst  for  knowledge  of  his  age  a  dangerous  disease, 
knowledge  uncertain,  since  no  reliance  can  be  placed  on 
sense-perception  and  the  principles  of  thought  contradict 
the  doctrines  of  faith,  and  harmful,  since  it  contributes 
nothing  to  salvation,  but  makes  its  possessors  proud  and 
draws  them  away  from  piety.  He  maintained,  further,  that 
divine  authority  is  the  only  refuge  for  man,  and  moral  life 
the  true  science.  Side  by  side  with  such  skepticism  Hirn- 
haym's  contemporary,  the  poet  Angelus  Silesius  (Joh. 
Scheffler,  died  1667),.  defended  mysticism.  The  teacher  of 
natural  law,  Samuel  Pufcndorf  %  O632-94,  professor  in 
Heidelberg  and  Lund,  died  in  Berlin),  aimed  to  mediate 
between  Grotius  and  Hobbcs.  Natural  law  is  demon- 
strable, its  real  ground  is  the  will  of  God,  its  noetical 
ground  (not  revelation,  but)  reason  and  observation  of  the 
(social)  nature  of  man,  and  the  fundamental  law  the 
promotion    of   universal   good.       The  individual   must    not 

*  Chr.  Sturm  :  Physica  Coneiliatrix,  C687;  Physica  Electiva,  vol.  i.  1697,  vol.  ii. 
with  preface  by  Chr.  Wolff,  1722  ;  Compendium  Univcrsalium  sen  Metaphysiea 
Kut  lidea. 

f  J.  Jung,  Logica  Hamburgiensis,  1638;  cf.  Guhrauer,  1^59. 

\  Pufendorf :  Elementa  [mi  Universalis,  1000;  De  Statu  Imperii  Germanicix 
1667,  under  the  pseudonym  Monzambano  ;  De  Jure  Natura  el  Gentium,  l6j2, 
and  an  abstract  of  this,  De  Officio  ffominii  et  Civis,  1673. 

■93 


294  CONTEMPORARIES  OF  LEIBNITZ. 

violate  the  interests  of  society  in  satisfying  his  impulse  to 
self-preservation,  because  his  own  interests  require  social 
existence,  and,  consequently,  respect   for  its  conditions. 

Pufendorf  was  followed  by  Christian  Thomasius  *  (1655- 
1728;  professor  of  law  at  the  University  of  Halle  from  its 
foundation  in  1694).  He  was  the  first  instructor  who 
ventured  to  deliver  lectures  in  the  German  language — in 
Leipsic  from  1687 — and  at  the  same  time  was  the  editor 
of  the  first  learned  journal  in  German  {Teutsche  Monate, 
Geschichte  der  Weisheit  und  Thorheit).  In  Thomasius  the 
characteristic  features  of  the  German  Illumination  first  came 
out  in  full  distinctness,  namely,  the  avoidance  of  scholas- 
ticism in  expression  and  argument,  the  direct  relation  of 
knowledge  to  life,  sober  rationality  in  thinking,  heedless 
eclecticism,  and  the  demand  for  religious  tolerance. 
Philosophy  must  be  generally  intelligible,  and  practically 
useful,  knowledge  of  the  world  (not  of  God);  its  form,  free 
and  tasteful  ratiocination;  its  object,  man  and  morals;  its 
first  duty,  culture,  not  learning;  its  highest  aim,  happiness; 
its  organ  and  the  criterion  of  every  truth,  common  sense.  He 
alone  gains  true  knowledge  who  frees  his  understanding  from 
prejudice  and  judges  only  after  examining  for  himself;  the 
joy  of  mental  peace  is  given  to  no  one  who  does  not  free 
his  heart  from  foolish  desires  and  vehement  passions,  and 
devote  it  to  virtue,  to  "rational  love."  The  positive  doc- 
trines of  Thomasius  have  less  interest  than  this  general  stand- 
point, which  prefigured  the  succeeding  period.  He  divides 
practical  philosophy  into  natural  law  which  treats  of  the 
Justum,  politics  which  treats  of  the  decorum,  and  ethics 
which  treats  of  the  houestu/n.  Justice  bids  us,  Do  not  to 
others  what  you  would  not  that  others  should  do  to  you  ; 
decorum,  Do  to  others  as  you  would  that  they  should  do 
to  you  ;  and  morality,  Do  to  yourself  as  you  would  that 
others  should  do  to  themselves.  The  first  two  laws  relate 
to  external,  the  third  to  internal,  peace ;  legal  duties  may 
be  enforced  by  compulsion,  moral  duties  not. 

If  Thomasius   was   the  leader  of  those   popular  philoso- 

*  Thomasius  :  Institutionum  Jurisprudential  Divines  Libri  Tres,  1688  ;  Fun- 
damenta  Juris  Natura  et  Gentium,  1705,  both  in  Latin  ;  in  German,  appeared  in 
1691-96  the  Introduction  and  Application  of  Rational  and  Moral  Philosophy. 


TSCHIRXHAUSEN.  295 

phers  who,  unconcerned  about  systematic  continuity, 
discussed  every  question  separately  before  the  tribunal  of 
common  sense,  and  found  in  their  lack  of  allegiance  to  any 
philosophical  sect  a  sufficient  guarantee  of  the  unpreju- 
dicedness  and  impartiality  of  their  reflections,  Count 
Walter  von  Tschirnhausen  (1651-170S;  Medecina  Mentis 
sive  Artis  Inveniendi  Prcecepta  Generalia,  1687),  a  friend  of 
Spinoza  and  Leibnitz,  became  the  prototype  of  another  group 
of  the  philosophers  of  the  Illumination.  This  group 
favored  eclecticism  of  a  more  scientific  kind,  by  starting 
from  considerations  of  method  and  seeking  to  overcome 
the  antithesis  between  rationalism  and  empiricism.  While 
fully  persuaded  of  the  validity  and  necessity  of  the  mathe- 
matical method  in  philosophical  investigations,  as  well  as 
elsewhere,  Tschirnhauscn  still  holds  it  indispensable  that  the 
deductions,  on  the  one  hand,  start  from  empirical  facts, 
and,  on  the  other,  that  they  be  confirmed  by  experiments. 
Inner  experience  gives  us  four  primal  facts,  of  which  the 
chief  is  the  certainty  of  self-consciousness.  The  second, 
that  many  things  affect  us  agreeably  and  many  disagree- 
ably, is  the  basis  of  morals;  the  third,  that  some  things  are 
comprehensible  to  us  and  others  not,  the  basis  of  logic ;  the 
fourth,  that  through  the  senses  we  passively  receive 
impressions  from  without,  the  basis  of  the  empirical  sciences, 
in  particular,  of  physics.  Consequently  consciousness,  will, 
understanding,  and  sensuous  representation  (imaginatid), 
together  with  corporeality,  are  our  fundamental  concepts. 
Not  perception  {percept 'id),  but  conception  {eoneeptio) 
alone  gives  science ;  that  which  we  can  "conceive"  is  true; 
the  understanding  as  such  cannot  err,  but  undoubtedly 
tin-  imagination  can  lead  us  to  confuse  the  merely  perceived 
with  that  which  is  conceived.  The  method  of  science  is 
geometrical  demonstration,  which  starts  from  (genetic)  defini- 
tions, and  from  their  analysis  obtains  axioms,  from  their 
combination,    theorems.       That     which     is    thus    proved    a 

priori  must,  as  already  remarked,  be  confirmed  a  posteriori. 
The    highest    of   all    sciences   is    natural    philosophy,    since 

it     considers    not     sense-objects    on!_\-,   iint     (like     mathe 
mat  i  cs)  the  objects  of  reason  only,  but  the  actual  it  self  in  its 
true  character.      Hence   it    is  the    divine   science,  while   the 


2  g6  WOLFF. 

human  sciences  busy  themselves  only  with  our  ideas  or  the 
relations  of  things  to  us. 

2.  Christian  Wolff. 

Christian  Wolff  was  born  at  Breslau  in  1679,  studied 
theology  at  Jena,  and  in  addition  mathematics  and  phil- 
osophy, habilitated  at  Leipsic  in  1703,  and  obtained, 
through  the  instrumentality  of  Leibnitz,  a  professor- 
ship of  mathematics  at  Halle,  in  1706.  His  lectures, 
which  soon  extended  themselves  over  all  philosophical 
disciplines,  met  with  great  success.  This  popularity,  as 
well  as  the  rationalistic  tendency  of  his  thinking,  aroused 
the  disfavor  of  the  pietists,  Francke  and  Lange,  who 
succeeded,  in  1723,  in  securing  from  King  Frederick 
William  I.  his  removal  from  his  chair  and  his  expulsion 
from  the  kingdom.  Finding  a  refuge  in  Marburg,  he  was 
called  back  to  Halle  by  Frederick  the  Great  a  short  time 
after  the  latter's  ascension  of  the  throne.  Here  he  taught 
and  wrote  zealously  until  his  death  in  1754.  In  his  lectures, 
as  well  as  in  half  of  his  writings,"  he  followed  the  example 
of  Thomasius  in  using  the  German  language,  which  he 
prepared  in  a  most  praiseworthy  manner  for  the  expression 
of  philosophical  ideas  and  furnished  with  a  large  part  of 
the  technical  terms  current  to-day.  Thus  the  terms  Ver- 
hältniss  (relation),  Vorstellung  (representation,  idea), 
Bewusstsein  (consciousness),  stetig  {continuus),  come  from 
Wolff,  as  well  as  the  distinction  between  Kraft  (power)  and 
Vermögen  (faculty),  and  between  Grund  (ground)  and 
Ursache  (cause),  f     Another  great  service  consisted  in  the 

*  Reasonable  Thoughts  on  the  Powers  of  the  Human  Understanding,  1712; 
Reasonable  Thoughts  on  God,  the  World,  and  the  Soul  of  Man,  also  on  All 
Things  in  General,  1719  (Notes  to  this  1724)  ;  Reasonable  Thoughts  on  the 
Conduct  of  Man,  1720;  Reasonable  Thoughts  on  the  Social  Life  of  Matt,  1721  ; 
Reasonable  Thoughts  on  the  Operations  of  Nature,  1723  ;  Reasonable  Thoughts 
on  the  Purposes  of  Natural  Things,  1724  ;  Reasonable  Thoughts  on  the  Parts 
of  Man,  Animals,  and  Plants,  1725,  all  in  German.  Besides  these  there  are 
extensive  Latin  treatises  (1728-53)  on  Logic,  Ontology,  Cosmology,  Empirical 
and  Rational  Psychology,  Natural  Theology,  and  all  branches  of  Practical 
Philosophy.  Detailed  extracts  may  be  found  in  Erdmann's  Versuch  einer 
■wissenschaftlichen  Darstellung,  ii.  2.  The  best  account  of  the  Wolffian  philosophy 
has  been  given  by  Zeller  (pp.  211-273). 

fEucken,  Geschichte  der  Terminologie,^.  133-134. 


WOLFF.  297 

reduction  of  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz  to  a  systematic 
form,  by  which  he  secured  a  dissemination  for  it  which 
otherwise  it  would  scarcely  have  obtained.  But  he  did 
not  possess  sufficient  originality  to  contribute  anything 
remarkable  of  his  own,  and  it  showed  little  self-knowledge 
when  he  became  indignant  at  the  designation  Leibnitzio- 
Wolffian  philosophy,  which  was  first  used  by  his  pupil, 
Bilfinger.  The  alterations  which  he  made  in  the  doc- 
trines of  Leibnitz  are  far  from  being  improvements,  and  the 
parts  which  he  rejected  are  just  the  most  characteristic  and 
thoughtful  of  all.  Such  at  least  is  the  opinion  of  thinkers 
to-day,  though  this  mutilation  and  leveling  down  of  the 
most  daring  of  Leibnitz's  hypotheses  was  perhaps  entirely 
advantageous  for  Wolff's  impression  on  his  contemporaries ; 
what  appeared  questionable  to  him  would  no  doubt  have 
repelled  them  also.  Leibnitz's  two  leading  ideas,  the 
theory  of  monads  and  the  pre-established  harmony,  were 
most  of  all  affected  by  this  process  of  toning  down. 
Wolff  weakens  the  former  by  attributing  a  representative 
power  only  to  actual  souls,  which  are  capable  of  con- 
sciousness, although  he  holds  that  bodies  are  com- 
pounded of  simple  beings  and  that  the  latter  are  endowed 
with  (a  not  further  defined)  force.  He  limits  the  applica- 
tion of  the  pre-established  harmony  to  the  relation  of  body 
and  soul,  which  to  Leibnitz  was  only  a  case  especially 
favorable  for  the  illustration  of  the  hypothesis.  By  such 
trifling  the  real  meaning  of  both  these  ideas  is  sacrificed 
and  their  bloom  rubbed  off. — While  depth  is  lacking  in 
Wolff's  thinking,  he  is  remarkable  for  his  power  of  sys- 
tematization,  his  persevering  diligence,  and  his  logical 
earnestness,  so  that  the  praise  bestowed  on  him  by  Kant, 
that  he  was  the  author  of  the  spirit  of  thoroughness  in  Ger- 
many, was  well  deserved.  He,  too,  finds  the  end  of  philos- 
ophy in  the  enlightenment  of  the  understanding,  the 
improvement  of  the  heart,  and,  ultimately,  in  the  promo- 
tion of  the-  happiness  of  mankind.  But  while  Thomasius 
demanded  as  a  condition  of  such  universal  intelligibility 
and  usefulness  that,  discarding  the  scholastic  garb,  philoso- 
phy should  appear  in  the  form  of  easy  ratiocination,  Wolff, 
on     the    other     hand,    regards    methodical     procedure     and 


^9S  WOLFF. 

certainty  in  results  as  indispensable  to  its  usefulness,  and, 
in  order  to  this  certainty,  insists  on  distinctness  of  concep- 
tion and  cogency  of  proof.  He  demands  a  philosophic/,  et 
cert  a  et  utilis.  If,  finally,  his  methodical  deliberateness, 
especially  in  his  later  works,  leads  him  into  wearisome 
diffuseness,  this  pedantry  is  made  good  by  his  genuinely 
German,  honest  spirit,  which  manifests  itself  agreeably  in 
his  judgment  on  practical  questions. 

Wolff  reaches  his  division  of  the  sciences  by  combining 
the  two  psychological  antitheses — the  higher  (rational) 
and  lower  (sensuous)  faculties  of  cognition  and  appetition. 
On  the  first  is  based  the  distinction  between  the  rational 
and  the  empirical  or  historical  method  of  treatment.  The 
latter  concerns  itself  with  the  actual,  the  former  with  the 
possible  and  necessary,  or  the  grounds  of  the  actual ;  the 
one  observes  and  describes,  the  other  deduces.  The 
antithesis  of  cognition  and  appetition  gives  the  basis  for  the 
division  into  theoretical  and  practical  philosophy.  The 
former,  called  metaphysics,  is  divided  into  a  general  part, 
which  treats  of  being  in  general  whether  it  be  of  a  corporeal 
or  a  spiritual  nature,  and  three  special  parts,  according  to 
their  principal  subjects,  the  world,  the  soul,  and  God, — 
hence  into  ontology,  cosmology,  psychology,  and  theology. 
The  science  which  establishes  rules  for  action  and  regards 
man  as  an  individual  being,  as  a  citizen,  and  as  the  head  or 
member  of  a  family,  is  divided  (after  Aristotle)  into  ethics, 
politics,  and  economics,  which  are  preceded  by  practical 
philosophy  in  general,  and  by  natural  law.  The  introduction 
to  the  two  principal  parts  is  furnished  by  formal  logic. 

Philosophy  is  the  science  of  the  possible,  i.  c,  of  that 
which  contains  no  contradiction ;  it  is  science  from  con- 
cepts, its  principle,  the  law  of  identity,  its  form,  demon- 
stration, and  its  instrument,  analysis,  which  in  the  predicate 
explicates  the  determinations  contained  in  the  concept  of 
the  subject.  In  order  to  confirm  that  which  has  been  deduced 
from  pure  concepts  by  the  facts  of  experience,  psycliologia 
rationalis  is  supplemented  by  psychologia  empirica,  rational 
cosmology  by  empirical  physics,  and  speculative  theology 
by  an  experimental  doctrine  of  God  (teleology).  Wolff  gives 
no  explanation  how  it  comes  about   that   the  deliverances 


WOLFF'S  FOLLOWERS.  299 

of  the  reason  agree  so  beautifully  with  the  facts  of  experi- 
ence;  in  his  naive,  unquestioning  belief  in  the  infallibility 
of  the  reason  he  is  a  typical  dogmatist. 

A  closer  examination  of  the  Wolffian  philosophy  seems 
unnecessary,  since  its  most  essential  portions  have  already 
been  discussed  under  Leibnitz  and  since  it  will  be  necessary 
to  recur  to  certain  points  in  our  chapter  on  Kant. 
Therefore,  referring  the  reader  to  the  detailed  accounts  in 
Erdmann  and  Zeller,  we  shall  only  note  that  Wolff's 
ethics  opposes  the  principle  of  perfection  to  the  English 
principle  of  happiness  (that  is  good  which  perfects  man's 
condition,  and  this  is  life  in  conformity  with  nature  or 
reason,  with  which  happiness  is  necessarily  connected); 
that  he  makes  the  will  determined  by  the  understanding, 
and  assigns  ignorance  as  the  cause  of  sin  ;  that  his  philoso- 
phy of  religion,  which  argues  for  a  natural  religion  in 
addition  to  revealed  religion  (experiential  and  rational 
proofs  for  the  existence  of  God,  and  a  deduction  of  his 
attributes),  and  sets  up  certain  tests  for  the  genuineness  of 
revelation,  favors  a  rationalism  which  was  flexible  enough 
to  allow  his  pupils  either  to  take  part  in  orthodox  move- 
ments or  to  advance  to  a  deism  hostile  to  the  Church. 

Among  the  followers  of  Wolff,  Alexander  Baumgarten 
(1714-62)  deserves  the  first  place,  as  the  founder  of  Ger- 
man aesthetics  {/Esthetica,  1750  seq.).  He  perceives  a  gap 
in  the  system  of  the  philosophical  sciences.  This  contains  in 
ethics  a  guide  to  right  volition,  and  in  logic  a  guide  to  correct 
thinking,  but  there  are  no  directions  for  correct  feeling,  no 
aesthetic.  The  beautiful  would  form  the  subject  of  tin's 
discipline.  For  the  perfection  (the  harmonious  unity  of  a 
manifold,  which  is  pleasant  to  the  spectator),  which  mani- 
fests itself  to  the  will  as  the  good  and  to  the  clear  thinking 
of  the  understanding  as  the  true,  appears  according  to 
Leibnitz  -to  con  fused  sensuous  percepl  ion  as  beauty.  From 
this  on  the  name  aesthetics  was  established  for  the  I  heory  <>f 
the  beautiful,  though  in  Kant's  greal  work  it  is  used  in  its 
literal  meaning  as  the  doctrine  of  sense,  of  the  faculty 
of  sensation-,  or  intuitions.  Baumgarten's  pupils  and  fol- 
lowers, the  aesthetic  writer  G.  F.  Meier  al  Halle,  Baumeister, 
and  others,  contributed  like  himself  to  the  dissemination  of 


joo  WOLFF'S  OPPONENTS. 

the  Wolffian  system  by  their  manuals  on  different  branches 
of  philosophy.  To  this  school  belong  also  the  following: 
Thümmig  [Institutiones  Philosophies  Wolfiaiue,  1725-26); 
the  theologian  Siegmund  Baumgarten  at  Halle,  the  elder 
brother  of  the  aesthete  ;  the  mathematician  Martin  Knutzen, 
Kant's  teacher;*  the  literary  historian  Gottsched  f  at 
Leipsic ;  and  G.  Ploucquet,  who  in  his  Methodus  Calculandi 
in  Logicis,  with  a  Commentatio  de  Arte  Characteristica  Uni- 
versali] appended  to  his  Principia  de  Sudstantiis  et  Phcenom- 
enis,  1753,  took  up  again  Leibnitz's  cherished  plan  for  a 
logical  calculus  and  a  universal  symbolic  language.  The 
psychologist  Kasimir  von  Creuz  {Essay  on  the  Soul,  in  two 
parts,  1753-54),  and  J.  H.  Lambert,;};  whom  Kant  deemed 
worthy  of  a  detailed  correspondence,  take  up  a  more 
independent  position,  both  demanding  that  the  Wolffian 
rationalism  be  supplemented  by  the  empiricism  of  Locke, 
and  the  latter,  moreover,  in  anticipation  of  the  Critique  of 
Reason,  pointing  very  definitely  to  the  distinction  between 
content  and  form  as  the  salient  point  in  the  theory  of 
knowledge. 

Among  the  opponents  of  the  Wolffian  philosophy,  all 
of  whom  favor  eclecticism,  A.  Rüdiger  §  and  Chr.  Aug. 
Crusius,  I  who  was  influenced  by  Rüdiger,  and,  like  him,  a 
professor  at  Leipsic,  are  the  most  important.  Rüdiger 
divides  philosophy  according  to  its  objects,  "  wisdom,  justice, 
prudence,"  into  three  parts — the  science  of  nature  (which 
must  avoid  one-sided  mechanical  views,  and  employ  ether, 
air,  and  spirit  as  principles  of  explanation);  the  science  of 
duty  (which,  as  metaphysics,  treats  of  duties  toward  God, 
as  natural  law,  of  duties  to  our  neighbor,  and  deduces  both 

*  Benno  Erdmann,  M.  Knutzen  und  seine  Zeit,  1876. 

\  Th.  W.  Danzel,  Gottsched  und  seine  Zeit,  1848. 

%  Lambert :  Cosmological  Letters,  1761  ;  New  Organen,  1764  ;  Groundwork  of 
Architectonics,  1771.  Bernouilli  edited  some  of  Lambert's  papers  and  his  cor- 
respondence. 

§  Rüdiger  :  Disputatio  de  eo  quod  Omnes  Ldece  Oriantur  a  Sensione,  1704  ; 
Philosophic/,  Synthetica,  1707  ;    Physica  Divina,  1716  ;    Philosophic.  Pragmatica, 

I723- 

||  Crusius  :  De  Usu  et  Limitibus  Principii  Rationis,  1743;  Directions  how  to 
Live  a  Rational  Life  (theory  of  the  will  and  of  ethics),  1744  ;  A  Sketch  of  the 
Necessary  Truths  of  Reason,  1745  ;  Way  to  the  Certainty  and  Trustworthiness 
of  Human  Knowledge,  1747. 


WOLFF'S  OPPONENTS.  3QI 

from  the  primary  duty  of  obedience  to  the  will  of  God); 
and  the  science  of  the  good  (in  which  Rüdiger  follows  the 
treatise  of  the  Spaniard,  Gracian,  on  practical  wisdom). 
Crusius  agrees  with  Rüdiger  that  mathematics  is  the  science 
of  the  possible,  and  philosophy  the  science  of  the  actual, 
and  that  the  latter,  instead  of  imitating  to  its  own  disadvan- 
tage the  deductive-analytical  method  of  geometry,  must, 
with  the  aid  of  experience  and  with  attention  to  the  proba- 
bility of  its  conclusions,  rise  to  the  highest  principles  syn- 
thetically. Besides  its  deduction  the  determinism  of  the 
Wolffian  philosophy  gave  offense,  for  it  was  believed  to 
endanger  morals,  justice,  and  religion.  The  will,  the 
special  fundamental  power  of  the  soul  (consisting  of  the 
impulses  to  perfection,  love,  and  knowledge),  is  far  from 
being  determined  by  ideas;  it  is  rather  they  which  depend 
on  the  will.  The  application  of  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason,  which  is  wrongly  held  to  admit  of  no  exception, 
must  be  restricted  in  favor  of  freedom.  For  the  rest,  we 
may  note  concerning  Crusius  that  he  derives  the  principle 
of  sufficient  reason  (everything  which  is  now,  and  before 
was  not,  has  a  cause)  and  the  principle  of  contingency 
from  the  principles  of  contradiction,  inseparability,  and 
incompatibility,  and  these  latter  from  the  principle  of 
conceivability ;  that  he  rejects  the  ontological  argument, 
and  makes  the  ground  of  obligation  in  morality  consist  in 
obedience  toward  God,  and  its  content  in  perfection. 
Among  the  other  opponents  of  the  Wolffian  philosophy,  we 
may  mention  the  theologian  Budde  (us)  *  {Institutiones 
Philosophies  Eclectics,  1705) ;  Darjcs  (who  taught  in  Jena  and 
Frankfort-on-the-Oder;  The  Way  to  Truth,  1755);  and 
Crousaz  (1744). 

3.  The  Illumination  as  Scientific  and  as  Popular 
Philosophy. 

After  a  demand  for  the  union  of  Leibnitz  and  Locke,  <>f 
rationalism  and  empiricism,  had  been  raised  within  the 
Wolffian  school  itself,  and  still  more  directly  in  the  camp 
of    its    opponents,   under    the    increasing  influence    of    the 

*  J.  J.  Brucker  (Historia  Cfitica  Philosophies,  5  vols.,  1742-44;  2d  c<!.,  6 
vols.,  1766-67)  was  a  pupil  of  Budde, 


302  MENDELSSOHN. 

empirical  philosophy  of  England,*  eclecticism  in  the 
spirit  of  Thomasius  took  full  possession  of  the  stage  in  the 
Illumin.it ion  period.  There  was  the  less  hesitation  in  com- 
bining principles  derived  from  entirely  different  postulates 
without  regard  to  their  systematic  connection,  as  the  inter- 
est in  scholastic  investigation  gave  place  more  and  more  to 
the  interest  in  practical  and  reassuring  results.  Metaphysics, 
noetics,  and  natural  philosophy  were  laid  aside  as  useless 
subtleties,  and,  as  in  the  period  succeeding  Aristotle,  man 
as  an  individual  and  whatever  directly  relates  to  his  welfare 
— the  constitution  of  his  inner  nature,  his  duties,  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  existence  of  God — became 
the  exclusive  subjects  of  reflection.  The  fact  that,  besides 
ethics  and  religion,  psychology  was  chosen  as  a  favorite 
field,  is  in  complete  harmony  with  the  general  temper  of  an 
age  for  which  self-observation  and  the  enjoyment  of  tender 
and  elevated  feelings  in  long,  delightfully  friendly  letters 
and  sentimental  diaries  had  become  a  favorite  habit. 
Hand  in  hand  with  this  narrowing  of  the  content  of  phil- 
osophy went  a  change  in  the  form  of  presentation.  As 
thinkers  now  addressed  themselves  to  all  cultivated  peo- 
ple, intelligibility  and  agreeableness  were  made  the  prime 
requisites;  the  style  became  light  and  flowing,  the 
method  of  treatment  facile  and  often  superficial.  This 
is  true  not  only  of  the  popular  philosophers  proper — who, 
as  Windelband  pertinently  remarks  (vol.  i.  p.  563),  did  not 
seek  after  the  truth,  but  believed  that  they  already  pos- 
sessed it,  and  desired  only  to  disseminate  it;  who  did  not 
aim  at  the  promotion  of  investigation,  but  the  instruction  of 
the  public — but  to  a  certain  extent,  also,  of  those  who  were 
conscious  of  laboring  in  the  service  of  science.  Among  the 
representatives  of  the  more  polite  tendency  belong,  Moses 
Mendelssohn  f  (1729-86);  Thomas  Abbt  (On  Death  for 
the  Fatherland,  1761  ;   On  Merit,   1765);     J.  J.  Engel  (The 

*  The  influence  of  the  English  philosophers  on  the  German  philosophy  of  the 
eighteenth  century  is  discussed  by  Gustav  Zart,  1881. 

f  Mendelssohn  :  Letters  on  the  Sensations,  1755  ;  On  Evidence  in  the  Meta- 
physical Sciences,  a  prize  essay  crowned  by  the  Academy,  1764  ;  Phado,  or  on 
Immortality,  \7b~1  ;  Jerusalem,  1783  ;  Morning  Hours,  or  on  the  Existence  of 
God,  1785  ;  To  the  Friends  of  Lessing  (against  Jacobi),  1786;  Works,  1843-44. 
Cf.  on  Mendelssohn,  Kayserling,  1856,  1862,  1883. 


CARVE,    TE TEN'S.  303 

Philosopher  for  the  World,  1775);  G.  S.  Steinbart  {The 
Christian  Doctrine  of  Happiness,  1778);  Ernst  Platncr 
{Philosophical  Aphorisms,  1776,  1782;  on  Platncr  cf.  M. 
Heinze,  1880);  G.  C.  Lichtenberg  (died  1799;  Miscel- 
laneous Writings,  1800  seq.;  a  selection  is  given  in  Reclames 
Bibliothek);  Christian  Garve  (died  1798;  Essays,  1792  seq.; 
Translations  front  the  Ethical  Works  of  Aristotle,  Cicero, 
and  Ferguson);  and  Friedrich  Nicolai  *  (died  181 1).  Eber- 
hard, Feder,  and  Meiners  will  be  mentioned  later  among 
the  opponents  of  the  Kantian  philosophy. 

Among  the  psychologists  J.  N.  Tetens,  whose  Philosoph- 
ical Essays  on  Human  Nature,  1776-77,  show  a  remarkable 
similarity  to  the  views  of  Kant,f  takes  the  first  rank. 
The  two  thinkers  evidently  influenced  each  other.  The  three 
fold  division  of  the  activities  of  the  soul,  "  knowing,  feeling, 
and  willing,"  which  has  now  become  popular  and  which 
appears  to  us  self-evident,  is  to  be  referred  to  Tetens,  from 
whom  Kant  took  it ;  in  opposition  to  the  twofold  division 
of  Aristotle  and  Wolff  into  "cognition  and  appetition,"  he 
established  the  equal  rights  of  the  faculty  of  feeling — which 
had  previously  been  defended  by  Sulzer  (175 1),  the  aesthetic 
writer,  and  by  Mendelssohn  (1755,  1763,  1785).  Besides 
Tetens,  the  following  should  be  mentioned  among  the 
psychologists:  Tetens's  opponent,  Johann  Lossius  (1775), 
an  adherent  of  Bonnet;  D.  Tiedemann  {Inquiries  concerning 
Man,  from  1777),  who  was  estimable  also  as  a  historian  of 
philosophy  {Spirit  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  1791-97);  Von 
Irwing  (1772  seq. ;  2d  ed.,  1777);  and  K.  Ph.  Moriz  {Maga- 
zin rjur  Erfahrungsseelenlehre \  from  1785).  Basedow  (died 
1790),  Campe  (died  1818),  and  J.  H.  Pestalozzi  (1745-1827) 
did  valuable  work  in  pedagogics. 

One  of  the  clearest  and  most  acute  minds  among  the 
philosophers  of  the  Illumination  was   the   deist   Hermann 

*  Nicolai  :  Library  of  Belles  Lettres,  from  1757  ;  Letters  011  the  Most  Recent 
Gernian  Literature,  from  1759  ;  Universal  German  Library,  from  1705  ;  .\ .  ..■ 
Universal  German  Library,  1 793-1 805. 

\  Sensation  gives  the  content,  ami  tin-  undei  standing  spontaneously  produces 
the  form,  of  knowledge.  The  only  objectivity  <>f  knowledge  whii  h  we  can  attain 
consists  in  the  subjective  necessity  of  the  forms  of  thought  01  the  ideas  ol  rela- 
tion. Perception  enables  us  to  cognize  phenomena  only,  nol  the  tru<  essence  of 
things  and  of  ourselves,  etc. 


3°4  REIMARUS. 

Samuel  Reimarus*  (1694-176S),  from  1728  professor  in 
Hamburg.  He  attacks  atheism,  in  whatever  form  it  may 
present  itself,  with  as  much  zeal  and  conviction  as  he 
shows  in  breaking  down  the  belief  in  revelation  by  his  inex- 
orable criticism  (in  his  Defense,  communicated  in  manuscript 
to  a  few  friends  only).  He  obtains  his  weapons  for  this 
double  battle  from  the  Wolffian  philosophy.  The  existence 
of  an  extramundane  deity  is  proved  by  the  purposive  arrange- 
ment of  the  world,  especially  of  organisms,  which  aims  at  the 
good — not  merely  of  man,  as  the  majority  of  the  physico- 
theologists  have  believed,  but — of  all  living  creatures.  To 
believe  in  a  special  revelation,  i.  e.,  a  miracle,  in  addition  to 
such  a  revelation  of  God  as  this,  which  is  granted  to  all  men, 
and  is  alone  necessary  to  salvation,  is  to  deny  the  perfection 
of  God,  and  to  do  violence  to  the  immutability  of  his  provi- 
dence. To  these  general  considerations  against  the  credi- 
bility of  positive  revelation  are  to  be  added,  as  special  argu- 
ments against  the  Jewish  and  Christian  revelations,  the 
untrustvvorthiness  of  human  testimony  in  general,  the  con- 
tradictions in  the  biblical  writings,  the  uncertainty  of  their 
meaning,  and  the  moral  character  of  the  persons  regarded 
as  messengers  of  God,  whose  teachings,  precepts,  and  deeds 
in  nowise  correspond  to  their  high  mission.  Jewish  history 
is  a  "tissue  of  sheer  follies,  shameful  deeds,  deceptions,  and 
cruelties,  the  chief  motives  of  which  were  self-interest  and  lust 
for  power."  The  New  Testament  is  also  the  work  of  man  ;  all 
talk  of  divine  inspiration,  an  idle  delusion,  the  resurrection 
of  Christ,  a  fabrication  of  the  disciples;  and  the  Protestant 
system,  with  its  dogmas  of  the  Trinity,  the  fall  of  man, 
original  sin,  the  incarnation,  vicarious  atonement,  and 
eternal  punishment,  contrary  to  reason.  The  advance  of 
Reimarus  beyond  Wolff  consists  in  the  consistent  applica- 
tion of  the  criteria  for  the  divine  character  of  revelation, 
which  Wolff  had  set  up  without  making  a  positive,  not  to 

*  H.  S.  Reimarus  :  Discussions  on  the  Chief  Truths  of  Natural  Religion, 
1754  ;  General  Consideration  of  the  Instincts  of  Animals,  i"jb2  ;  Apology  or 
Defense  for  the  Rational  Worshipers  of  God.  Fragments  of  the  last  of  these 
works,  which  was  kept  secret  during  its  author's  life,  were  published  by  Lessing 
(the  well-known  "  Wolffenbiittel  Fragments,"  from  1774).  A  detailed  table  of 
contents  is  to  be  found  in  Reimarus  und  seine  Schutzschrift,  1862,  by  D.  Fr. 
Strauss,  included  in  the  fifth  volume  of  his  Gesammelte  Schriften. 


LESSIXG.  305 

speak  of  a  negative,  use  of  them.  His  weakness  *  consists 
in  the  fact  that,  on  the  one  hand,  he  contented  himself  with 
a  rationalistic  interpretation  of  the  biblical  narratives,  instead 
of  pushing  on — as  Semler  did  after  him  at  Halle  (1725- 
91) — to  a  historical  criticism  of  the  sources,  and,  on  the 
other,  held  fast  to  the  alternative  common  to  all  the  deists, 
"Either  divine  or  human,  either  an  actual  event  or  a 
fabrication,"  without  any  suspicion  of  that  great  inter- 
mediate region  of  religious  myth,  of  the  involuntary  and 
pregnant  inventions  of  the  popular  fancy. 

The  philosophico-religious  standpoint  of  G.  E.  Lessing 
(1729-81),  in  whom  the  Illumination  reached  its  best 
fruitage,  was  less  one-sided.  Apart  from  the  important 
aesthetic  impulses  which  flowed  from  the  Laocoon  (1766)  and 
the  Hamburg  Dramaturgy  (1767-69),  his  philosophical 
significance  rests  on  two  ideas,  which  have  had  important 
consequences  for  the  religious  conceptions  of  the  nineteenth 
century:  the  speculative  interpretation  of  certain  dogmas 
(the  Trinity,  etc.),  and  the  application  of  the  Leibnitzian 
idea  of  development  to  the  history  of  the  positive  religions. 
By  both  of  these  he  prepared  the  way  for  Hegel.  In  regard 
to  his  relation  to  his  predecessors,  Lessing  sought  to  mediate 
between  the  pantheism  of  Spinoza  and  the  individualism  of 
Leibnitz;  and  in  his  comprehension  of  the  latter  showed 
himself  far  superior  to  the  Wolffians.  He  can  be  called 
a  Spinozist  only  by  those  who,  like  Jacobi,  have  this  title 
ready  for  everyone  who  expresses  himself  against  a  tran- 
scendent, personal  God,  and  the  unconditional  freedom  of 
the  will.  Moreover,  in  view  of  his  critical  and  dialectical, 
rather  than  systematic,  method  of  thinking,  we  must  guard 
against  laying  too  great  stress  on  isolated  statements 
by  him.f 

Lessing  conceives  the  Deity  as  the  supreme,  all-compre- 
hensive, living  unity,  which  excludes  neither  a  certain  kind  of 
plurality  nor  even  a  certain  kind  of  change;  without  life  and 

*  Cf.  '  >.  Pfleiderer,  Philosophy  of Religion,  vol.  i.  \>.  102,  p.  too 

f  A  caution  which  Gideon  Spickei  {Lessings  Welttinst  hauung,  1883)  counsels 

us  nut  to  forget,  even  in  view  of  the  oft  <  it  id  avowal  of  determinism,  "  I  thank 
God  that  I  must,  and  that  I  must  the  best."  Among  the  numerous  treatises  <>n 
Lessing  we  may  note  those  by  <•.  K.  Schwarz  (1S54),  ami  /(Hit  (in  Sybel'a 
Historische  Zeitschrift,  1870,  incorporated  in  the  second  collection  of  Zeller's 


3°6  LESSIMG. 

action,  without  the  experience  of  changing  states,  the  life  of 
God  would  be  miserably  wearisome.  Things  are  not  out  of, 
but  in  him  ;  nevertheless  (as  "contingent")  they  are  distinct 
from  him.  The  Trinity  must  be  understood  in  the  sense  of 
immanent  distinctions.  God  has  conceived  himself,  or  his 
perfections,  in  a  twofold  manner:  he  conceived  them  as 
united  and  himself  as  their  sum,  and  he  conceived  them 
as  single.  Now  God's  thinking  is  creation,  his  ideas  actual- 
ities. By  conceiving  his  perfections  united  he  created  his 
eternal  image,  the  Son  of  God ;  the  bond  between  God 
representing  and  God  represented,  between  Father  and 
Son,  is  the  Holy  Spirit.  But  when  he  conceived  his  perfec- 
tions singly  he  created  the  world,  in  which  these  manifest 
themselves  divided  among  a  continuous  series  of  par- 
ticular beings.  Every  individual  is  an  isolated  divine  perfec- 
tion ;  the  things  in  the  world  are  limited  gods,  all  living,  all 
with  souls,  and  of  a  spiritual  nature,  though  in  different 
degrees.  Development  is  everywhere;  at  present  the  soul 
has  five  senses,  but  very  probably  it  once  had  less  than  five, 
and  in  the  future  it  will  have  more.  At  first  the  actions  of 
men  were  guided  by  obscure  instinct;  gradually  the  reason 
obtained  influence  over  the  will,  and  one  day  will  govern 
it  completely  through  its  clear  and  distinct  cognitions. 
Thus  freedom  is  attained  in  the  course  of  history — the 
rational  and  virtuous  man  consciously  obeys  the  divine  order 
of  the  world,  while  he  who  is  unfree  obeys  unconsciously. 

Lessing  shares  with  the  deistic  Illumination  the  belief 
in  a  religion  of  reason,  whose  basis  and  essential  content 
are  formed  by  morality ;  but  he  rises  far  above  this  level  in 
that  he  regards  the  religion  of  reason  not  as  the  beginning 
but  as  the  goal  of  the  development,  and  the  positive  reli- 
gions as  necessary  transition  stages  in  its  attainment. 
As  natural  religion  differs  in  each  individual  according  to 
his  feelings  and  powers,  without  positive  enactments  there 
would    be  no  unity  and  community    in    religious    matters. 

Vorträge  und  Abhandlungen,  1877)  ;  and  on  his  theological  position,  that  of 
K.  Fischer  on  Lessing's  Nathan  der  Weise,  1864,  as  well  as  J.  H.  Witte's 
Philosophie  unserer  Dichterheroen,  vol.  i.  (f.essing  and  Herder),  1880.  [Cf.  in 
English,  Sime,  2  vols.,  1877,  and  Encyclopcedia  Britannica,  vol.  xiv.  pp.  478- 
482.— Tr.] 


LESSING.  307 

Nevertheless  the  statutory  and  historical  element  is  not 
a  graft  from  without,  but  a  shell  organically  grown  around 
natural  religion,  indispensable  for  its  development,  and 
to  be  removed  but  gradually  and  by  layers — when  the 
inclosed  kernel  has  become  ripe  and  firm.  The  history 
of  religions  is  an  education  of  the  human  race  through 
divine  revelation ;  so  teaches  his  small  but  thoughtful 
treatise  of  1780.*  As  the  education  of  the  individual  man 
puts  nothing  extraneous  into  him,  but  only  gives  him  more 
quickly  and  easily  that  which  he  could  have  reached  of  him- 
self, so  human  reason  is  illuminated  by  revelation  con- 
cerning things  to  which  it  could  have  itself  attained,  only 
that  without  God's  help  the  process  would  have  been  longer 
and  more  difficult — perhaps  it  would  have  wandered  about 
for  many  millions  of  years  in  the  errors  of  polytheism,  ff  God 
had  not  been  pleased  by  a  single  stroke  (his  revelation  to 
Moses)  to  give  it  a  better  direction.  And  as  the  teacher 
does  not  impart  everything  to  the  pupil  at  once,  but  con- 
siders the  state  of  development  reached  by  him  at  each  given 
period,  so  God  in  his  revelation  observes  a  certain  order 
and  measure.  To  the  rude  Jewish  people  he  revealed  him- 
self first  as  a  national  God,  as  the  God  of  their  fathers;  they 
had  to  wait  for  the  Persians  to  teach  them  that  the  God 
whom  they  had  hitherto  worshiped  as  the  most  powerful 
among  other  gods  was  the  only  one.  Although  this  lowest 
stage  in  the  development  of  religion  lacked  the  belief  in 
immortality,  yet  it  must  not  be  lightly  valued;  let  us 
acknowledge  that  it  was  an  heroic  obedience  for  men  to 
observe  the  laws  of  God  simply  because  they  are  the  laws 
of  God,  and  not  because  of  temporal  or  future  rewards! 
The  first  practical  teacher  of  immortality  was  Christ;  with 
him  the  second  age  of  religion  begins:  the  first  good  book 
of  elementary  instruction,  the  Old  Testament,  from  which 
man  had  hitherto  learned,  was  followed  by  the  second,  bet- 
ter one,  the  New  Testament.  As  we  now  can  dispense 
with  the  first  primer  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
unity  of  God,  and  as  we  gradually  begin  to  be  able  to  dis- 
pense with  the  second  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  so  this  New  Testament  may   easily 

*  Die  Erziehung  des  Mcnschcngeschlects. 


3°8  LESSING. 

contain  still  further  truths,  which  for  the  present  we  wonder 
at  as  revelations,  until  the  reason  shall  learn  to  derive  them 
from  other  truths  already  established.  Lessing  himself 
makes  an  attempt  at  a  philosophical  interpretation  of  the 
dogmas  of  the  Trinity  (see  above),  of  original  sin,  and  of 
atonement.  Such  an  advance  from  faith  to  knowledge, 
such  a  development  of  revealed  truths  into  proved  truths 
of  reason,  is  absolutely  necessary.  We  cannot  dispense 
with  the  truths  of  revelation,  but  we  must  not  remain  con- 
tent with  simply  believing  them,  but  must  endeavor  to  com- 
prehend them  ;  for  they  have  been  revealed  in  order  that  they 
may  become  rational.  They  are,  as  it  were,  the  sum  which 
the  teacher  of  arithmetic  tells  his  pupils  beforehand  so  that 
they  may  guide  themselves  by  it ;  but  if  they  content  them- 
selves with  this  solution — which  was  given  merely  as  a 
guide — they  would  never  learn  to  calculate.  Hand  in  hand 
with  the  advance  of  the  understanding  goes  the  progress  of 
the  will.  Future  recompenses,  which  the  New  Testament 
promises  as  rewards  of  virtue,  are  means  of  education,  and 
will  gradually  fall  into  disuse:  in  the  highest  stage,  the 
stage  of  purity  of  heart,  virtue  will  be  loved  and  practiced 
for  its  own  sake,  and  no  longer  for  the  sake  of  heavenly 
rewards.  Slowly  but  surely,  along  devious  paths  which  are 
yet  salutary,  we  are  being  led  toward  that  great  goal.  It 
will  surely  come,  the  time  of  consummation,  when  man 
will  do  the  good  because  it  is  good,  this  time  of  the  new, 
eternal  Gospel,  this  third  age,  this  "Christianity  of  reason." 
Continue,  Eternal  Providence,  thine  imperceptible  march; 
let  me  not  despair  of  thee  because  it  is  imperceptible,  not 
even  when  to  me  thy  steps  seem  to  lead  backward.  It  is 
not  true  that  the  straight  line  is  always  the  shortest. 

With  the  thought  that  every  individual  must  traverse 
the  same  course  as  that  by  which  the  race  attains  its  perfec- 
tion, Lessing  connects  the  idea  of  the  transmigration  of 
souls.  Why  may  not  the  individual  man  have  been  present 
in  this  world  more  than  once?  Is  this  hypothesis  so  ridicu- 
lous because  it  is  the  oldest? 

If  Lessing  abandoned  the  ranks  of  the  deists  by  his 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  positive  religions  contain 
truth    in    a   gradual    process    of    purification,    by  his    free 


KANT'S  RELATION    TO    THE   ILLUMINATION.  3°9 

criticism,  on  the  other  hand,  he  broke  with  the  orthodox, 
whose  idolatrous  reverence  for  the  Bible  was  to  him  an 
abomination.  The  letter  is  not  the  spirit,  the  Bible  is  not 
religion,  nor  yet  its  foundation,  but  only  its  records.  Con- 
tingent historical  truths  can  never  serve  as  a  proof  of 
the  necessary  truths  of  reason.  Christianity  is  older  than 
the  New  Testament. 

Already,  in  the  case  of  Lessing,  we  may  doubt,  in  view 
of  his  historical  temper  and  of  certain  speculative  tendencies, 
whether  he  is  to  be  included  among  the  Illuminati.  In  the 
case  of  Kant  a  decided  protest  must  be  raised  against  such 
a  classification.  When  Hegel  numbers  him  among  the 
philosophers  of  the  Illumination,  on  account  of  his  lack  of 
rational  intuition,  and  some  theologians  on  account  of  his 
religious  rationalism,  the  answer  to  the  former  is  that  Kant 
did  not  lack  the  speculative  gift,  but  only  that  it  was  sur- 
passed by  his  gift  of  reflection,  and,  to  the  latter,  that  in 
regard  to  the  positive  element  in  religion  he  judged  very 
differently  from  the  deists  and  appreciated  the  historical 
element  more  justly  than  they — if  not  to  the  same  extent  as 
Lessing  and  Herder.  We  do  not  need  to  lay  great  stress  on 
the  fact  that  Kant  had  a  lively  consciousness  that  he  was 
making  a  contribution  to  thought,  and  that  the  Illumination 
contemplated  this  new  doctrine  without  comprehending  it,  in 
order  to  recognize  that  the  difference  between  his  efforts 
and  achievements  and  those  of  the  Illumination  is  far 
greater  than  their  kinship.  For  although  Kant  is  upon 
common  ground  with  it,  in  so  far  as  he  adheres  to  its 
motto,  "Have  courage  to  use  thine  own  understanding, 
become  a  man,  cease  to  trust  thyself  to  the  guidance  of 
others,  and  free  thyself  in  all  fields  from  the  yoke  of  author- 
ity," and,  although  besides  such  formal  injunctions  to  free- 
dom of  thought,  he  also  shares  in  certain  material  tenden- 
cies and  convictions  (the  turning  from  the  world  t<>  man, 
the  attempt  at  a  synthesis  of  reason  and  experience,  and 
the  belief  in  a  religion  of  reason);  yet  in  method  and 
results,  he  stands  like  a  giant  among  a  race  of  dwarfs,  like 
•one  instructed,  who  judges  from  principles,  among  men  of 
opinion,  who  merely  stick  results  together,  a  methodical 
systematize!'   among    well-meaning    but    impotent    eclectics. 


31°  THE   FAITH  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  philosophy  of  the  Illumination  is  related  to  that  of 
Kant  as  argument  to  science,  as  halting  mediation  to  prin- 
cipiant  resolution,  as  patchwork  to  creation  out  of  full 
resources,  yet  at  the  same  time  as  wish  to  deed  and  as 
negative  preparation  to  positive  achievement.  It  was  unde- 
niably of  great  value  ^o  the  Kantian  criticism  that  the 
Illumination  had  created  a  point  of  intersection  for  the 
various  tendencies  of  thought,  and  had  brought  about  the 
approximation  and  mutual  contact  of  the  opposing  systems 
which  then  existed,  while,  at  the  same  time,  it  had  crumbled 
them  to  pieces,  and  thus  awakened  the  need  for  a  new,  more 
firmly  and  more  deeply  founded  system. 

4.  The   Faith   Philosophy. 

The  philosophers  of  feeling  or  faith  stand  in  the  same 
relation  to  the  German  Illumination  as  Rousseau  to  the 
French.  Here  also  the  rights  of  feeling  are  vindicated 
against  those  of  the  knowing  reason.  Among  the  distin- 
guished representatives  of  this  anti-rationalistic  tendency 
Hamann  led  the  way,  Herder  was  the  most  prolific,  and 
Jacobi  the  clearest.  That  the  fountain  of  certitude  is  to  be 
sought  not  in  discriminating  thought,  but  in  intuition, 
experience,  revelation,  and  tradition  ;  that  the  highest  truths 
can  be  felt  only  and  not  proved  ;  that  all  existing  things  are 
incomprehensible,  because  individual — these  are  convic- 
tions which,  before  Jacobi  defended  them  as  based  on 
scientific  principles,  had  been  vehemently  proclaimed  by 
that  singular  man,  J.  G.  Hamann  (died  1788)  of  Königs- 
berg. From  an  unprinted  review  by  Hamann,  Herder  drew 
the  objections  which  his  "Metacritique"  raises  against  Kant's 
Critique  of  Reason — that  the  division  of  matter  and  form, 
of  sensibility  and  understanding,  is  inadmissible;  that  Kant 
misunderstood  the  significance  of  language,  which  is  just 
where  sensibility  and  understanding  unite,  etc. 

In  Herder  *  (1 744-1 803  ;  after  1  yj6  Superintendent-General 
in  Weimar)  the  philosophy  of  feeling  gained  a  finer,  more 
perspicuous  and  harmonious  nature,  who  shared  Lessing's 
interest  in  history  and  his  tendency  to  hold   fast  equally  to 

*  On  Herder  cf.  the  biography  by  R.  Haym,  2  vols.,  1877,  1885  ;  and  the 
■work  by  Witte  which  has  been  referred  to  above  (p.  306,  note). 


HERDER.  3 1 1 

pantheism  and  to  individualism.  God  is  the  all-one,  infinite, 
spiritual  (non-personal)  primal  force,  which  wholly  reveals 
itself  in  each  thing  {God :  Dialogues  on  the  System  of 
Spinoza,  1787).  To  the  life,  power,  wisdom,  and  goodness 
of  God  correspond  the  life  and  perfection  of  the  universe 
and  of  individual  creatures,  each  of  which  possesses  its  own 
irreplaceable  value  and  bears  in  itself  its  future  in  germ. 
Everywhere,  one  and  the  same  life  in  an  ascending  series  of 
powers  and  forms  with  imperceptible  transitions.  Always, 
an  inner  and  an  outer  together;  no  power  without  organ,  no 
spirit  without  a  body.  As  thought  is  only  a  higher  stage 
of  sensation,  which  develops  from  the  lower  by  means  of 
language — reason,  like  sense,  is  not  a  productive  but  a  recep- 
tive faculty  of  knowing,  perceiving  (" 'Verne 'knien ") — so  the 
free  process  of  history  is  only  the  continuation  and  comple- 
tion of  the  nature-process  {Ideas  for  the  Philosophy  of  the  His- 
tory of  Mankind,  1784  seq.).  Man,  the  last  child  of  nature 
and  her  first  freedman,  is  the  nodal  point  where  the  physical 
series  of  events  changes  into  the  ethical ;  the  last  member 
of  the  organisms  of  earth  is  at  the  same  time  the  first  in 
the  spiritual  development.  The  mission  of  history  is  the 
unfolding  of  all  the  powers  which  nature  has  concentrated  in 
man  as  the  compendium  of  the  world;  its  law,  that  every- 
where on  our  earth  everything  be  realized  that  can  be  real- 
ized there;  its  end,  humanity  and  the  harmonious  develop- 
ment of  all  our  capacities.  As  nature  forms  a  single  great 
organism,  and  from  the  stone  to  man  describes  a  con- 
nected development,  so  humanity  is  a  one  great  individual 
which  passes  through  its  several  ages,  from  infancy  (the 
Orient),  through  boyhood  (Eygpt  and  Phoenicia),  youth 
(Greece),  and  manhood  (Rome),  to  old  age  (the  Christian 
world).  The  spirit  stands  in  the  (.losest  dependence  upon 
nature,  and  nature  is  concerned  in  history  throughout.  The 
finer  organization  of  his  brain,  the  possession  of  hands, 
above  all,  his  erect  position,  make  man,  man  and  endow 
him  with  reason.  Similarly  it  is  natural  conditions, climate, 
the  character  of  the  soil,  the  surrounding  animal  and  vege- 
table life,  etc.,  thai  play  an  essential  part  in  determining 
the  manners,  the  characters,  and  the  destinies  of  nations. 
The  connection  of  nature  with  history  bv means  of  the  eon- 


3"  THE   FAITH  PHILOSOPHY. 

cept  of  development  and  through  the  idea  that  the  two 
merely  represent  different  stages  of  the  same  fundamental 
process,  made  Herder  the  forerunner  of  Schelling. 

His  polemic  against  Kant  in  the  Metaeritique,  1799 
(against  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason),  and  the  dialogue 
Calligone,  1800  (against  the  Critique  of  Judgment),  \s  less 
pleasing.  These  are  neither  dignified  in  tone  nor  essen- 
tially of  much  importance.  In  the  former  the  distinction 
between  sensibility  and  reason  is  censured,  and  in  the  latter 
the  separation  of  the  beautiful  from  the  true  and  the  good, 
but  Kant's  theory  of  aesthetics  is  for  the  most  part  grossly 
misunderstood.  The  "disinterested"  satisfaction  Herder 
makes  a  cold  satisfaction ;  the  harmonious  activity  of  the 
cognitive  powers,  a  tedious,  apish  sport ;  the  satisfaction 
"without  a  concept,"  judgment  without  ground  or  cause. 
The  positive  elements  in  his  own  views  are  more  valuable. 
Pleasure  in  mere  form,  without  a  concept,  and  without  the 
idea  of  an  end,  is  impossible.  All  beauty  must  mean  or 
express  something,  must  be  a  symbol  of  inner  life;  its 
ground  is  perfection  or  adaptation.  Beauty  is  that  sym- 
metrical union  of  the  parts  of  a  being,  in  virtue  of  which  it 
feels  well  itself  and  gives  pleasure  to  the  observer,  who 
sympathetically  shares  in  this  well-being.  The  charm  and 
value  of  the  Calligonc  lie  more  in  the  warmth  and  clearness 
with  which  the  expressive  beauty  of  single  natural  phenom- 
ena is  described  than  in  the  abstract  discussion. 

Friedrich  Heinrich  Jacobi  (1743-18 19)  gave  the  most 
detailed  statement  of  the  position  of  the  philosophy  of 
feeling,  and  the  most  careful  proof  of  it.  He  was  born  in 
Düsseldorf,  the  son  of  a  manufacturer ;  until  1794  he  lived 
in  his  native  place  and  at  his  country  residence  in  Pempel- 
fort;  later  he  resided  in  Holstein,  and,  from  1805,  in 
Munich,  where,  in  1807-13,  he  was  president  of  the  Acad- 
emy of  Sciences.  Of  his  works,  collected  in  five  volumes, 
1812-25,  we  are  here  chiefly  concerned  with  the  letters  On 
the  Doctrine  of  Spinoza,  1785;  David  Hume  on  Faith,  or 
Idealism  and  Realism,  1787;  and  the  treatise  On  Divine 
Things,  181 1,  which  called  out  Schelling's  merciless 
response,  Memorial  of  facobi.  Besides  Hume  and  Spinoza, 
the  sensationalism  of  Bonnet  and  the  criticism  of  Kant  had 


JA  COB  I.  313 

made  the  most  lasting  impression  on  Jacobi.  His  relation 
to  Kant  is  neither  that  of  an  opponent  nor  of  a  supporter  and 
popularizer.  He  declares  himself  in  accord  with  Kant's 
critique  of  the  understanding  (the  understanding  is  merely 
a  formal  function,  one  which  forms  and  combines  concepts 
only,  but  does  not  guarantee  reality,  one  to  which  the 
material  of  thought  must  be  given  from  elsewhere  and  for 
which  the  suprasensible  remains  unattainable);  in  regard 
to  the  critique  of  reason  he  raises  the  objection  that  it 
makes  the  Ideas  mere  postulates,  which  possess  no  guaran- 
tee for  their  reality.  The  critique  of  sensibility  appears 
to  him  still  more  unsatisfactory,  as  it  does  not  explain  the 
origin  of  sensations.  Without  the  concept  of  the  "thing-in- 
itself "  one  cannot  enter  the  Kantian  philosophy,  and  with 
it  one  cannot  remain  there.  Fichte  has  drawn  the  correct 
conclusion  from  the  Kantian  premises;  idealism  is  the 
unavoidable  result  of  the  Critique  of  Reason  and  foretold  by 
it  as  the  Messiah  was  foretold  by  John  the  Baptist.  And 
by  the  evil  fruit  we  know  the  evil  root :  the  idealistic  theory 
is  philosophical  nihilism,  for  it  denies  the  reality  of  the 
external  world,  as  the  materialism  of  Spinoza  denies  a 
transcendent  God  and  the  freedom  of  the  will.  Real  it  y 
slips  away  from  both  these  systems — they  are  the  only  con- 
sistent ones  there  are — material  reality  escaping  from  the 
former  and  suprasensible  reality  from  the  latter;  and  this 
must  be  so,  because  reality,  of  whatever  kind  it  be,  cannot 
be  known,  but  only  believed  and  felt.  The  actual,  the 
existence  of  the  noumenal  as  well  as  of  the  external  world, 
even  the  existence  of  our  own  body,  makes  itself  known  to 
us  through  revelation  alone;  the  understanding  compre- 
hends relations  only;  the  certainty  that  a  thing  exists  is 
attained  only  through  experience  and  faith.  Sense  and 
reason  arc  the  organs  of  faith,  and  hence  the  true  sources 
of  know  ledge  ;  the  former  apprehends  the  natural,  the  latter 
the  supernatural,  while  for  the  understanding  is  left  only 
the  analysis  and  combination  of  given  intuitions. 

Philosoph)'  as  a  science  from  concepts  must  necessarily 
prove  atheistic  and  fatalistic.  Conception  and  proof  mean 
deduction  from  conditions.  How  shall  that  which  has  no 
cause  from  which  to  explain  it,  the  unconditioned,  God,  and 


3 '4  THE   FAITH  PHILOSOPHY. 

freedom,  be  comprehended  and  proved?  Demonstration 
rises  along  the  chain  of  causes  to  the  universe  alone,  not  to  a 
transcendent  Creator;  mediate  knowledge  is  confined  to  the 
sphere  of  conditioned  being  and  mechanical  becoming. 
The  intuitive  knowledge  of  feeling  alone  leads  us  beyond 
this,  and  along  with  the  wonderful,  the  inconceivable 
power  of  freedom  in  ourselves,  which  is  above  all  nature, 
shows  us  the  primal  source  of  all  wonders,  the  transcendent 
God  above  us.  The  inference  from  our  own  spiritual,  self- 
conscious,  free  personality  to  that  of  God  is  no  unauthor- 
ized anthropomorphism — in  the  knowledge  of  God  we  may 
fearlessly  deify  our  human  existence,  because  God,  when  he 
created  man,  gave  his  divine  nature  human  form.  Reason 
and  freedom  are  the  same :  the  former  is  theoretical,  the 
latter  practical  elevation  to  the  suprasensible.  Neverthe- 
less virtue  is  not  based  upon  an  inflexible,  despotic, 
abstractly,  formal  law,  but  upon  an  instinct,  which,  however, 
does  not  aim  at  happiness.  Thus  Jacobi  attempts  to  medi- 
ate between  the  ethics  of  the  Illumination  and  the  ethics  of 
Kant,  by  agreeing  with  the  former  in  regard  to  the  origin 
of  virtue  (it  arises  from  a  natural  impulse),  and  with  the 
latter  in  regard  to  its  nature  (it  consists  in  disinterested- 
ness). Hence  with  the  Illumination  he  rejects  the  impera- 
tive form,  and  with  Kant  the  eudemonistic  end.  At  the 
same  time  he  endeavors  to  introduce  Herder's  idea  of 
individuality  into  ethics,  by  demanding  that  morality  assume 
a  special  form  in  each  man.  Schiller  and  the  romantic 
school  take  from  Jacobi  their  ideal  of  the  "beautiful  soul," 
which  from  natural  impulse  realizes  in  its  action,  and  still 
more  in  its  being,  the  good  in  an  individual  way. 


PART  II. 
FROM  KANT  TO  THE  PRESENT  TIME. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

KANT. 

The  suit  between  empiricism  and  rationalism  had  con- 
tinued for  centuries,  but  still  awaited  final  decision.  Are 
all  our  ideas  the  result  of  experience,  or  are  they  (wholly  or 
in  part)  an  original  possession  of  the  mind  ?  Are  they 
received  from  without  (by  perception),  or  produced  from 
within  (by  self-activity)  ?  Is  knowledge  a  product  of 
sensation  or  of  pure  thought  ?  All  who  had  thus  far  taken 
part  in  this  discussion  had  resembled  partisans  or  advocates 
rather  than  disinterested  judges.  They  had  given  less 
attention  to  investigation  than  to  the  defense  of  the  tradi- 
tional theses  of  their  schools  ;  they  had  not  endeavored  to 
obtain  results,  but  to  establish  results  already  determined  ; 
and,  along  with  real  arguments,  popular  appeals  had  not 
been  despised.  Each  of  the  opposing  schools  had  given 
variations  on  a  definite  theme, and  whenever  timid  attempts 
had  been  made  to  bring  the  two  melodies  into  harmony 
they  had  met  with  no  approval. 

The  proceedings  thus  far  had  at  least  made  it  evident  to 
the  unbiased  hearer  that  each  of  the  two  parties  made 
extravagant  claims,  and,  in  the  end,  fell  into  self-contra-  f 
diction.  If  the  claim  of  empiricism  is  true,  that  all  our  \ 
concepts  ariseTromlperception  Jthen  not  only  the  science  of  / 
jthe  supfasensibje,  which  it  denies,  but  also  the  science  of  ' 
the  objects  of  experience^  about  which  it  concerns  Itself,  is 
impossible.  For  perception  informs  us  concerning  single" 
cases  merely,  it  can  never  comprehend  all  cases,  it  yields  no 
necessary  and  universal  truth  [but  knowledge  which  is  not 


\ 


jiö  KANT. 

apodictically  valid  for  every  reasoning  being  and  for  all 
cases  is  not  worthy  the  name.  The  very  reasons  which 
were  intended  to  prove  the  possibility  of  knowledge  give  a 
direct  inference  to  its  impossibility.  The  empirical  phil- 
osophy destroys  itself,  ending  with  Hume  in  skepticism 
and  probabilism.  Rationalism  is  overtaken  by  a  different, 
and  yet  an  analogous  fate — it  breaks  up  into  a  popular 
eclecticism.  It  believes  that  it  has  discovered  an  infallible 
criterion  of  truth  in  the  clearness  and  distinctness  of  ideas, 
and  a  sure  example  for  philosophical  method  in  the 
method  of  mathematics.  In  both  points  it  is  wrong. 
The  criterion  of  truth  is  insufficient,  for  Spinoza  and 
Leibnitz  built  up  their  opposing  theories — the  pantheism 
of  the  one  and  the  monadology  of  the  other — from  equally 
clear  and  distinct  conceptions  ;  tried  by  this  standard  indi- 
vidualism is  just  as  true  as  pantheism.  Mathematics, 
again,  does  not  owe  its  unquestioned  acceptance  and  cogent 
force  to  the  clearness  and  distinctness  of  its  conceptions, 
but  to  the  fact  that  these  are  capable  of  construction  in 
intuition.  The  distinction  between  mathematics  and  meta- 
physics was  overlooked,  namely,  that  mathematical  thought 
can  transform  its  conceptions  into  intuitions,  can  generate 
its  objects  or  sensuously  present  them,  which  philosophical 
thought  is  not  in  a  position  to  do.  The  objects  of  the 
latter  must  be  given  to  it,  and  to  the  human  mind  they  are 
given  in  no  other  way  than  through  sensuous  intuition. 
Metaphysics  seeks  to  be  a  science  of  the  real,  but  it  is  im- 
possible to  conjure  being  out  of  thought ;  reality  cannot  be 
proved  from  concepts,  it  can  only  be  felt.  In  making  the 
unperceivable  and  suprasensible  (the  real  nature  of  things, 
the  totality  of  the  world,  the  Deity,  and  immortality)  the 
special  object  of  philosophy,  rationalism  looked  on  the 
understanding  as  a  faculty  of  knowledge  by  which  objects 
are  given.  In  reality  objects  can  never  be  given  through 
concepts  ;  these  only  render  it  possible  to  think  objects 
given  in  some  other  way  (by  intuition).  It  is  true  that 
concepts  of  the  suprasensible  exist,  but  nothing  can  be 
known  through  them,  there  is  nothing  intuitively  given 
to  be  subsumed   under  them. 

With  this  failure  to  perceive  the  intuitive  element  in  math- 


EMPIRICISM  AND  RATIONALISM.  3*7 

ematics  was  joined  the  mistake  of  overlooking  its  synthetic 
character.  The  syllogistic  method  of  presentation  em- 
ployed in  the  Euclidean  geometry  led  to  the  belief  that 
the  more  special  theorems  had  been  derived  from  the  sim- 
pler ones,  and  these  from  the  axioms,  by  a  process  of  con- 
ceptual analysis  ;  while  the  fact  is  that  in  mathematics  all 
progress  is  by  intuition  alone,  the  syllogism  serving  merely 
to  formulate  and  explain  truths  already  attained,  but  not  to 
supply  new  ones.  Following  the  example  of  mathematics 
thus  misunderstood,  the  mission  of  philosophy  was  made 
to  consist  in  the  development  of  the  truths  slumbering  in 
pregnant  first  principles  by  means  of  logical  analysis.  If 
only  there  were  metaphysical  axioms!  If  we  only  did  not 
demand,  and  were  not  compelled  to  demand,  of  true  science 
that  [it  increase  our  knowledge,  and  not  merely  give  an 
analytical  explanation  of  knowledge.  When  once  the  clear- 
ness and  distinctness  of  conceptions  had  been  taken  in  so 
purely  formal  a  sense,  it  was  inevitable  that  in  the  end,  as 
productivity  became  less,  the  principle  should  be  weakened 
down  to  a  mere  demand  for  the  explanation  and  elucidation 
of  the  metaphysical  ideas  present  in  popular  conscious- 
ness. Thus  the  rationalistic  current  lost  itself  in  the 
shallow  waters  of  the  Illumination,  which  soon  gave  as 
ready  a  welcome  to  the  empirical  theories — since  these  also 
were  able  to  legitimate  themselves  by  clear  and  distinct 
conceptions — as  it  had  given  to  the  results  of  the  rational- 
istic systems. 

It  was  thus  easy  to  see  that  each  of  the  contending 
parties  had  been  guilty  of  one-sidedness,  and  that  in  order 
to  escape  this  a  certain  mean  must  be  assumed  between 
the  two  extremes;  but  it  was  a  much  more  difficult  mat- 
ter to  discover  the  due  middle  ground.  Neither  of  the 
opposing  standpoints  is  so  correct  as  its  defenders  believe, 
and  neither  so  false  as  its  opponents  maintain.  Where, 
then,  on  cither  side,  does  the  mistaken  narrowness  begin, 
and  how  far  does  the  justification  of  each  extend  ? 

The  conflict  centers,  first,  about  the  question  concerning 
the  origin  of  human  knowledge  and  the  sphere  of  its  validity. 
Rationalism  is  justified  when  it  asserts  that  some  ideas  do 
not  come  from  the  senses.     If  knowledge  is  to  be  possible, 


3i8  KANT. 

some  concepts  cannot  originate  in  perception,  those, 
namely,  by  which  knowledge  is  constituted,  for  if  they 
should,  it  would  lack  universality  and  necessity.  The  sole 
organ  of  universally  valid  knowledge  is  reason.  Empiri- 
cism, on  the  other  hand,  is  justified  when  it  asserts  that  the 
experiential  alone  is  knowable.  Whatever  is  to  be  know- 
able  must  be  given  as  a  real  in  sensuous  intuition.  The 
only  organ  of  reality  is  sensibility.  Rationalism  judges 
correctly  concerning  the  origin  of  the  most  important 
classes  of  ideas;  empiricism  concerning  the  sphere  of  their 
validity.  The  two  may  be  thus  combined  :  some  concepts 
(those  which  produce  knowledge)  take  their  origin  in 
reason  or  are  a  priori,  but  they  are  valid  for  objects  of 
experience  alone.  The  conflict  concerns,  secondly,  the  use 
of  the  deductive  (syllogistic)  or  the  inductive  method. 
Empiricism,  through  its  founder  Bacon,  had  recommended 
induction  in  place  of  the  barren  syllogistic  method,  as 
the  only  method  which  would  lead  to  new  discoveries.  It 
demands,  above  all  things,  the  extension  of  knowledge. 
Rationalism,  on  the  contrary,  held  fast  to  the  deductive 
method,  because  the  syllogism  alone,  in  its  view,  furnishes 
knowledge  valid  for  all  rational  beings.  It  demands,  first 
of  all,  universality  and  necessity  in  knowledge.  Induction 
has  the  advantage  of  increasing  knowledge,  but  it  leads  only 
to  empirical  and  comparative,  not  to  strict  universality. 
The  syllogism  has  the  advantage  of  yielding  universal  and 
necessary  truth,  but  it  can  only  explicate  and  establish 
knowledge,  not  increase  it.  May  it  not  be  possible  so  to  do 
justice  to  the  demands  of  both  that  the  advantages  which 
they  seek  shall  be  combined,  and  the  disadvantages  which 
have  been  feared,  avoided  ?  Are  there  not  cognitions  which 
increase  our  knowledge  (are  synthetic)  without  being  empir- 
ical, which  are  universdly  and  necessarily  valid  (a  priori) 
without  being  analytic?  From  these  considerations  arises 
the  main  question  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason:  How 
are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible? 

The  philosophy  of  experience  had  overestimated  sense 
and  underestimated  the  understanding,  when  it  found 
the  source  of  all  knowledge  in  the  faculty  of  percep- 
tion and  degraded  the  faculty  of  thought  to    an  almost 


EMPIRICISM  A. YD   A' A  TIOXALISM.  319 

wholly  inactive  recipient  of  messages  coming  to  it  from 
without.  From  the  standpoint  of  empiricism  concepts  (Ideas) 
deserve  confidence  only  in  so  far  as  they  can  legitimate 
themselves  by  their  origin  in  sensations  (impressions).  It 
overlooks  the  active  character  of  all  knowing.  Among  the 
rationalists,  on  the  other  hand,  we  find  an  underestimation 
of  the  senses  and  an  overestimation  of  the  understand- 
ing. They  believe  that  sense  reveals  only  the  deceptive 
exterior  of  things,  while  reason  gives  their  true  non- 
sensuous  essence.  That  which  the  mind  perceives  of  things 
is  deceptive,  but  that  which  it  thinks  concerning  them  is  true. 
The  former  power  is  the  faculty  of  confused,  the  latter  the 
faculty  of  distinct  knowledge.  Sense  is  the  enemy  rather 
than  the  servant  of  true  knowledge,  which  consists  in 
the  development  and  explication  of  pregnant  innate  con- 
ceptions and  principles.  These  philosophers  forget  that  we 
can  never  reach  reality  by  conceptual  analysis  ;  and  that 
the  senses  have  a  far  greater  importance  for  knowledge 
than  merely  to  give  it  an  impulse  ;  that  it  is  they  which 
supply  the  understanding  with  real  objects,  and  so  with 
the  content  of  knowledge.  Beside  the  (formal)  activity 
(of  the  understanding),  cognition  implies  a  passive  factor, 
a  reception  of  impressions.  Neither  sense  alone  nor  the 
understanding  alone  produces  knowledge,  but  both  cogni- 
tive powers  are  necessary,  the  active  and  the  passive,  the 
conceptual  and  the  intuitive.  Here  the  question  arises, 
How  do  concept  and  intuition,  sensuous  and  rational 
knowledge,  differ,  and  what  is  the  basisof  their  congruence  ? 
Notwithstanding  their  different  points  of  departure  and 
their  variant  results,  the  two  main  tendencies  of  modern 
philosophy  agree  in  certain  points.  If  the  conflict  between 
the  two  schools  and  their  onc-sidedness  suggested  the  idea 
of  supplementing  the  conclusions  of  the  one  by  those  of 
the  other,  the  recognition  of  the  incorrectness  of  their 
common  convictions  furnished  the  occasion  to  go  beyond 
them  and  to  establish  a  new,  a  higher  point  of  view  above 
them  both,  as  also  above  the  eclecticism  which  sought  to 
unite  the  opposing  principles.  The  errors  common  to  both 
concern,  in  the  first  place,  the  nature  <>f  judgment  and  the 
difference  between  sensibility  and  understanding.     Neither 


32°  KANT. 

side  had  recognized  that  the  peculiar  character  of  judg- 
ment consists  in  active  connection.  The  rationalists  made 
judgment  an  active  function,  it  is  true,  but  a  mere  activity 
of  conscious  development,  of  elucidation  and  analytical 
inference,  which  does  not  advance  knowledge  a  single 
step.  The  empiricists  described  it  as  a  process  of  compari- 
son and  discrimination,  as  the  mere  perception  and  recog- 
nition of  the  relations  and  connections  already  existing 
between  ideas  ;  while  in  reality  judgment  does  not 
discover  the  relations  and  connections  of  representations, 
but  itself  establishes  them.  In  the  former  case  the  syn- 
thetic moment  is  ignored,  in  the  latter  the  active  moment. 
The  imperfect  view  of  judgment  was  one  of  the  reasons  for 
the  appearance  of  extreme  theories  concerning  the  origin 
of  ideas  in  reason  or  in  perception.  Rationalism  regards 
even  those  concepts  which  have  a  content  as  innate, 
whereas  it  is  only  formal  concepts  which  are  so.  Em- 
piricism regards  all,  even  the  highest  formal  concepts 
(the  categories),  as  abstracted  from  experience,  whereas 
experience  furnishes  only  the  content  of  knowledge,  and 
not  the  synthesis  which  is  necessary  to  it.  On  the  one 
hand  too  much,  and  on  the  other  too  little,  is  regarded  as 
the  original  possession  of  the  understanding.  JThe  question 
"What  concepts  are  innate?"  can  be  decided  only  by 
answering  the  further  question,  What  are  the  concepts 
through  which  the  faculty  of  judgment  connects  the  re- 
presentations obtained  from  experience  ?  These  connective 
concepts,  these  formal  instruments  of  synthesis  are  a  priori. 
The  agreement  of  the  two  schools  is  still  greater  in 
regard  to  the  relation  of  sense  and  understanding,  notwith- 
standing the  apparently  sharp  contrast  between  them. 
The  empiricist  considers  thought  transformed,  sublimated 
perception,  while  the  rationalist  sees  in  perception  only 
confused  and  less  distinct  thought.  For  the  former  con- 
cepts are  faded  images  of  sensations,  for  the  latter  sen- 
sations are  concepts  which  have  not  yet  become  clear  ;  the 
difference  is  scarcely  greater  than  if  the  one  should  call  ice 
frozen  water,  and  the  other  should  prefer  to  call  water 
melted  ice.  Both  arrange  intuition  and  thought  in  a 
single  series,  and  derive  the  one  from  the  other  by  enhance- 


CRITICISM.  321 

ment  or  attenuation.  Both  make  the  mistake  of  recogniz- 
ing only  a  difference  in  degree  where  a  difference  in  kind 
exists.  In  such  a  case  only  an  energetic  dualism  can 
afford  help.  Sense  and  understanding  are  not  one  and  the 
same  cognitive  power  at  different  stages,  but  two  hetero- 
geneous faculties.  Sensation  and  thought  are  not  different 
in  degree,  but  in  kind.  As  Descartes  began  with  the  meta- 
physical dualism  of  extension  and  thought,  so  Kant  begins 
with  the  noetical  dualism  of  intuition  and  thought. 

Much  more  serious,  however,  than  any  of  the  mistakes  yet 
mentioned  was  a  sin  of  omission  of  which  the  two  schools 
were  alike  guilty,  and  the  recognition  and  avoidance  of 
which  constituted  in  Kant's  own  eyes  the  distinctive  char- 
acter of  his  philosophy  and  its  principiant-advance  beyond 
preceding  systems.  The  pre-Kantian  thinker  had  proceeded 
to  the  discussion  of  knowledge  without  raising  the  question  of 
the  possibility  of  knoivledge.  He  had  approached  things  in 
the  full  confidence  that  the  human  mind  was  capable  of 
cognizing  them,  and  with  a  naive  trust  in  the  power  of 
reason  to  possess  itself  of  the  truth.  His  trust  was  naive 
and  ingenuous,  because  the  idea  that  it  could  deceive  him 
had  never  entered  his  mind.  Now  no  matter  whether  this 
belief  in  man's  capacity  for  knowledge  and  in  the  possibil- 
ity of  knowing  things  is  justifiable  or  not,  and  no  matter 
how  far  it  may  be  justifiable,  it  was  in  any  case  untested  ;  so 
that  when  the  skeptic  approached  with  his  objections  the 
dogmatist  was  defenseless.  All  previous  philosophy,  so  far 
as  it  had  not  been  skeptical,  had  been,  according  to  Kant's 
expression,  dogmatic  ;  that  is,  it  had  held  as  an  article  of 
faith,  and  without  precedent  inquiry,  that  we  possess  the 
power  of  cognizing  objects.  It  had  not  asked  how  this  is 
possible;  it  had  not  even  asked  what  knowledge  is,  what 
may  and  must  be  demanded  of  it,  and  by  what  means  our 
reason  is  in  a  position  to  satisfy  such  demands.  It  had 
left  human  intelligence  and  its  extent  uninvestigated. 
The  skeptic,  on  the  other  hand,  had  been  no  more  thorough. 
He  had  doubted  and  denied  man's  capacity  for  knowledge 
just  as  uncritically  as  the  dogmatist  had  believed  and  pre- 
supposed it.  He  had  directed  his  ingenuity  againsl  the 
theories   of    dogmatic    philosophy,  instead    of   toward   the 


322  A' A  XT. 

fundamental  question  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge. 
Human  intelligence,  which  the  dogmatist  had  approached 
with  unreasoned  trust  and  the  skeptic  with  just  as  unrea- 
soned distrust,  is  subjected,  according  to  the  plan  of  the 
critical  philosopher,  to  a  searching  examination.  For  this 
reason  Kant  termed  his  standpoint  "criticism,"  and  his 
undertaking  a  "  Critique  of  Reason."  Instead  of  assert- 
ing and  denying,  he  investigates  how  knowledge  arises,  of 
what  factors  it  is  composed,  and  how  far  it  extends.  He 
inquires  into  the  origin  and  extent  of  knowledge,  into  its 
sources  and  its  limits,  into  the  grounds  of  its  existence  and 
of  its  legitimacy.  The  Critique  of  Reason  finds  itself  con- 
fronted by  two  problems,  the  second  of  which  cannot  be 
solved  until  after  the  solution  of  the  first.  The  investiga- 
tion of  the  sources  of  knowledge  must  precede  the  inquiry 
into  the  extent  of  knowledge.  Only  after  the  conditions  of 
knowledge  have  been  established  can  it  be  ascertained  what 
objects  are  attainable  by  it.  Its  sphere  cannot  be  deter- 
mined except  from  its  origin. 

Whether  the  critical  philosopher  stands  nearer  to  the 
skeptic  or  to  the  dogmatist  is  rather  an  idle  question.  He 
is  specifically  distinct  from  both,  in  that  he  summons  and 
guides  the  reason  to  self-contemplation,  to  a  methodical 
examination  of  its  capacity  for  knowledge.  Where  the  one 
had  blindly  trusted  and  the  other  suspected  and  denied,  he 
investigates  ;  they  overlook,  he  raises  the  question  of  the 
possibility  of  knowledge.  The  critical  problem  does  not 
mean,  Does  a  faculty  of  knowledge  exist  ?  but,  Of  what 
powers  is  it  composed  ?  are  all  objects  knowable  which 
have  been  so  regarded?  Kant  does  not  ask  whether,  but 
how  and  by  what  means,  knowledge  is  possible.  Everyone 
who  gives  himself  to  scientific  reflection  must  postulate 
that  knowledge  is  possible,  and  the  demand  of  the  noetical 
theorists  of  the  day  for  a  philosophy  absolutely  without 
assumptions  is  quite  incapable  of  fulfillment.  Nay,  in 
order  to  be  able  to  begin  his  inquiry  at  all,  it  was  necessary 
for  Kant  to  assume  still  more  special  postulates ;  for  that 
a  cognition  of  cognition  is  possible,  that  there  is  a  critical, 
self-investigating  reason  could,  at  first,  be  only  a  matter  of 
belief.     This   would   not   have    excluded   a  supplementary 


KANT'S  DEVELOPMENT.  323 

detailed  statement  concerning  the  how  of  this  self-knowl- 
edge, concerning  the  organ  of  the  critical  philosophy.  But 
Kant  never  gave  one,  and  the  omission  subsequently  led  to 
a  sharp  debate  concerning  the  character  and  method  of 
the  Critique  of  Reason.  On  this  point,  if  we  may  so 
express  it,  Kant  remained  a  dogmatist. 

Kant  felt  himself  to  be  the  finisher  of  skepticism  ;  but 
this  was  chiefly  because  he  had  received  the  strongest  impulse 
to  the  development  of  his  critique  of  knowledge  from 
Hume's  inquiries  concerning  causation.  Brought  up  in  the 
dogmatic  rationalism  of  the  Wolffian  school,  to  which 
he  remained  true  for  a  considerable  period  as  a  teacher 
and  \vriter(till  about  1760),  although  at  the  same  time  he  was 
inquiring  with  an  independent  spirit,  Kant  was  gradually 
won  over  through  the  influence  of  the  English  philosophy  to 
the  side  of  empirical  skepticism.  Then — as  the  result,  no 
doubt,  of  reading  the  Nouvcanx  Essais  of  Leibnitz,  published 
in  1765 — he  returned  to  rationalistic  principles,  until  finally, 
after  a  renewal  of  empirical  influences,*  he  took  the  position 
crystallized  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  1781,  which, 
however,  experienced  still  other,  though  less  considerable, 
changes  in  the  sequel,  just  as  in  itself  it  shows  the  traces 
of  previous  transformations. 

It  would  be  a  most  interesting  task  to  trace  in  the  writ- 
ings which  belong  to  Kant's  pre-critical  period  the  growth 
and  development  of  the  fundamental  critical  positions. 
Here,  however,  we  can  only  mention  in  passing  the  sub- 
jects of  his  reflection  and  some  of  the  most  striking  antici- 
pations and  beginnings  of  his  epoch-making  position. 
Even  his  maiden  work,  Thoughts  on  the  True  Estimation  of 
Vis  Viva,  1747,  betokens  the  mediating  nature  of  its  author. 
In  this  it  is  argued  that  when  men  of  profound  and  pene- 
trating minds  maintain  exactly  opposite  opinions,  attention 
must  be  chiefly  directed  to  some  intermediate  principle 
to  a  certain  degree  compatible  with  the  correctness  of 
both   parties.     The  question  under  discussion  was  whether 

*Cf.  II.  Vaihingens  Kommentar  tu  Kants  Kritik  der  reinen  \'rr>iuuft,ycA. 
i.,  l88r,  pp.  48-49.  This  is  a  work  marked  by  acuteness,  great  industry,  and 
an  objective  point  of  view  which  meritsrespect.  The  second  volume,  which 
treats  of  the  Transcendental  Esthetic,  appeared  in  l8q2. 


3«4  KANT. 

the  measure  of  vis  viva  is  equal,  as  the  Cartesians  thought, 
to  the  product  of  the  mass  into  the  velocity,  or,  according 
to  the  Leibnitzians,  to  the  product  of  the  mass  into  the 
square  of  the  velocity.  Kant's  unsatisfactory  solution  of  the 
problem — the  law  of  Descartes  holds  for  dead,  and  that 
of  Leibnitz  for  living  forces — drew  upon  him  the  derision 
of  Lessing,  who  said  that  he  had  endeavored  to  estimate 
living  forces  without  having  tested  his  own.  A  similar 
tendency  toward  compromise — this  time  it  is  a  synthesis 
of  Leibnitz  and  Newton — is  seen  in  his  Habilitationsschrift, 
Principiorum  Primorum  Cognitionis  Metaphysics  Nova  Diln- 
eidatio,  1755,  and  in  the  dissertation  Monadologia  Physicay 
1756.  The  former  distinguishes  between  ratio  esscndi  and 
ratio  cognoscendi,  rejects  the  ontological  argument,  and  de- 
fends determinism  against  Crusius  on  Leibnitzian  grounds. 
In  the  Physical  Monadology  Kant  gives  his  adherence  to 
dynamism  (matter  the  product  of  attraction  and  repulsion), 
and  makes  the  monads  or  elements  of  body  fill  space  with- 
out prejudice  to  their  simplicity.  A  series  of  treatises  is 
devoted  to  subjects  in  natural  science:  The  Effect  of  the 
Tides  in  retarding  the  Earth's  Rotation  ;  The  Obsolescence 
of  the  Earth;  Fire  (Inaugural  Dissertation),  Earthquakes, 
and  the  Theory  of  the  Winds.  The  most  important  of 
these,  the  General  Natural  History  and  Theory  of  the 
Heavens,  1755,  which  for  a  long  time  remained  unnoticed, 
and  which  was  dedicated  to  Frederick  II.,  developed  the 
hypothesis  (carried  out  forty  years  later  by  Laplace  in  igno- 
rance of  Kant's  work)  of  the  mechanical  origin  of  the  uni- 
verse and  of  the  motion  of  the  planets.  It  presupposes 
merely  the  two  forces  of  matter,  attraction  and  repulsion, 
and  its  primitive  chaotic  condition,  a  world-mist  with  ele- 
ments of  different  density.  It  is  noticeable  that  Kant 
acknowledges  the  failure  of  the  mechanical  theory  at  two 
points  :  it  is  brought  to  a  halt  at  the  origin  of  the  organic 
world  and  at  the  origin  of  matter.  The  mechanical 
cosmogony  is  far  from  denying  creation  ;  on  the  contrary, 
the  proof  that  this  well-ordered  and  purposive  world  neces- 
sarily arose  from  the  regular  action  of  material  forces  under 
law  and  without  divine  intervention,  can  only  serve  to 
support  our  assumption  of  a  Supreme  Intelligence  as  the 


THE  PRE-CRITICAL    WRITINGS.  325 

author  of  matter  and  its  laws ;  the  belief  is  necessary, 
just  because  nature,  even  in  its  chaotic  condition,  can  act 
only  in  an  orderly  and  regular  way. 

The  empirical  phase  of  Kant's  development  is  represented 
by  the  writings  of  the  6o's.  The  False  Subtlety  of  the  Four 
Syllogistic  Figures,  1762,  asserts  that  the  first  figure  is  the 
only  natural  one,  and  that  the  others  are  superfluous  and  need 
reduction  to  the  first.  In  the  Only  Possible  Foundation  for 
a  Demonstration  of  the  Existence  of  God,  1763,  which,  in  the 
seventh  Reflection  of  the  Second  Division,  recapitulates 
the  cosmogony  advanced  in  the  Natural  History  of  the 
Heavens,  the  discussions  concerning  being  ("  existence  "  is 
absolute  position,  not  a  predicate  which  increases  the  sum 
of  the  qualities  but  is  posited  in  a  merely  relative  way),  and 
the  conclusion,  prophetical  of  his  later  point  of  view,  "  It  is 
altogether  necessary  that  we  should  be  convinced  of  the 
existence  of  God,  but  not  so  necessary  that  his  existence 
should  be  dcjuonstrated,"  are  more  noteworthy  than  the  argu- 
ment itself.  Tin's  runs:  All  possibility  presupposes  some- 
thing actual  wherein  and  whereby  all  that  is  conceivable  is 
given  as  a  determination  or  a  consequence.  That  actuality 
the  destruction  of  which  would  destroy  all  possibility  is 
absolutely  necessary.  Therefore  there  exists  an  absolutely 
necessary  Being  as  the  ultimate  real  ground  of  all  possi- 
bility; this  Being  is  one,  simple,  unchangeable,  eternal, 
the  ens  realissimum  and  a  spirit.  The  Attempt  to  intro- 
duce the  Notion  of  Negative  Quantities  into  Philosophy, 
1763,  distinguishes — contrary  to  Crusius — between  logical 
opposition,  contradiction  or  mere  negation  {a  and  not -a, 
pleasure  and  the  absence  of  pleasure,  power  and  lack  of 
power),  and  real  opposition,  which  cannot  be  explained  by 
logic  (+ a  and  —a,  pleasure  and  pain,  capital  and  debts, 
attraction  and  repulsion  ;  in  real  opposition  both  determi- 
nations are  positive,  but  in  opposite  directions).  Parallel 
with  this  it  distinguishes,  also,  between  logical  ground 
and  real  ground.  The  prize  essay,  Inquiry  coin  truing  the 
Clearness  (Evidence)  of  the  Principles  of  Natural  Theology 
and  Ethics,  1764,  draws  a  sharp  distinction  between  mathe- 
matical and  metaphysical  knowledge,  and  wains  philosophy 
against  the  hurtful  imitation  of  the  geometrical  method,  in 


3-6  KANT. 

place  of  which  it  should  rather  take  as  an  example  the 
method  which  Newton  introduced  into  natural  science. 
Quantity  constitutes  the  object  of  mathematics,  qualities, 
the  object  of  philosophy  ;  the  former  is  easy  and  simple, 
the  latter  difficult  and  complicated — how  much  more  com- 
prehensible the  conception  of  a  trillion  is  than  the  philo- 
sophical idea  of  freedom,  which  the  philosophers  thus  far 
have  been  unable  to  make  intelligible.  In  mathematics  the 
general  is  considered  under  symbols  in  concreto,  in  philoso- 
phy, by  means  of  symbols  in  abstracto ;  the  former  con- 
structs its  object  in  sensuous  intuition,  while  the  object  of 
the  latter  is  given  to  it,  and  that  as  a  confused  concept  to 
be  decomposed.  Mathematics,  therefore,  may  well  begin 
with  definitions,  since  the  conception  which  is  to  be 
explained  is  first  brought  into  being  through  the  definition, 
while  philosophy  must  begin  by  seeking  her  conceptions. 
In  the  former  the  definition  is  first  in  order,  and  in  the  lat- 
ter almost  always  last  ;  in  the  one  case  the  method  is 
synthetic,  in  the  other  it  is  analytic.  It  is  the  function  of 
mathematics  to  connect  and  compare  clear  and  certain  con- 
cepts of  quantity  in  order  to  draw  conclusions  from  them  ; 
the  function  of  philosophy  is  to  analyze  concepts  given 
in  a  confused  state,  and  to  make  them  detailed  and 
definite.  Philosophy  has  also  this  disadvantage,  that  it  pos- 
sesses very  many  undecomposable  concepts  and  undemon- 
strable  propositions,  while  mathematics  has  only  a  fewsuch. 
"Philosophical  truths  are  like  meteors,  whose  brightness 
gives  no  assurance  of  their  permanence.  They  vanish,  but 
mathematics  remains.  Metaphysics  is  without  doubt  the 
most  difficult  of  all  human  sciences  {Einsichten),  but  a  meta- 
physic  has  never  yet  been  written  ";  for  one  cannot  be  so 
kind  as  to  "  apply  the  term  philosophy  to  all  that  is  con- 
tained in  the  books  which  bear  this  title."  In  the  closing 
paragraphs,  on  the  ultimate  bases  of  ethics,  the  stern  features 
of  the  categorical  imperative  are  already  seen,  veiled  by  the 
English  theory  of  moral  sense,  while  the  attractive  Observa- 
tions on  the  Feeling  of  the  Beautiful  and  the  Sublime,  which 
appeared  in  the  same  year,  still  naively  follow  the  empir- 
ical road. 

The    empirical   phase  reaches    its    skeptical  termination 


THE   PRE-CRiriCAL    WRITINGS.  327 

in  the  satire  Dreams  of  a  Ghost-seer  explained  by  the 
Dreams  of  Metaphysics,  1766,  which  pours  out  its  ingenious 
sarcasm  impartially  on  spiritualism_and  on  the  assumed 
knowledge  of  the  suprasensible.  Here  Kant  is  already 
clearly  conscious  of  his  new  problem,  a  theory  of  the  limits  of 
human  reason,  conscious  also  that  the  attack  on  this  prob- 
lem is  to  be  begun  by  a  discussion  of  the  question  of  space. 
This  second  question  had  been  for  many  years  a  fre- 
quent subject  of  his  reflections;*  and  it  was  this  part  of 
the  general  critical  problem  that  first  received  definitive 
solution^.  In  the  Latin  dissertation  On  the  Form  and  Princi- 
ples of  the  Sensible  and  Intelligible  World,  lyjo,  which  con- 
cludes the  pre-critical  period,  and  which  was  written  on  the 
occasion  of  his  assumption  of  his  chair  as  ordinary  profes- 
sor, the  critique  of  sensibility,  the  new  theory  of  space  and 
time,  is  set  forth  in  approximately  the  same  form  as  in  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  while  the  critique  of  the  under- 
standing and  of  reason,  the  theory  of  the  categories  and 
the  Ideas  and  of  the  sphere  of  their  validity,  required  for 
its  completion  the  intellectual  labor  of  several  more  years. 
For  this  essay,  De  Mundi  Seusibilis  atque  Intelligibilis 
Forma  et  Principiis,  leaves  unchallenged  the  possibility  of 
a  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves  and  of  God,  thus  show- 
ing that  its  author  has  abandoned  the  skepticism  main- 
tained in  the  Dreams  of  a  Ghost-seer,  and  has  turned  anew 
to  dogmatic  rationalism,  whose  final  overthrow  required 
another  swing  in  the  direction  of  skeptical  empiricism. 
In  regard  to  the  progress  of  this  latter  phase  of  opinion,  the 
letters  to  M.  Herz  are  almost  the  only,  though  not  very 
valuable,  source  of  information. 

The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  appeared  in  1781,  much  later 
than  Kant  had  hoped  when  he  began  a  work  on  "The 
Limits  of  Sensibility  and  Reason,"  and  a  second,  altered 
edition    in    i/H/.f     After  the  Prolegomena  to  every  Future 

*  New  Theory  of  Motion  and  Rest,  1758;  On  the  First  Ground  of  the  Distinc- 
tion of  Positions  in  Space,  1768  ;  besides  several  of  the  works  mentioned  above. 

f  There  has  been  much  discussion  and  much  lias  been  written  concerning  the 
relation  of  the  two  editions.  In  opposition  to  Schopenhauer  and  Kuno  Fischer 
it  must  be  maintained  that  the  alterations  in  the  second  edition  consist  in  giving 

greater  prominence  to  realistic  elements,  which  in  the  first  edition  remained  in 

the  background,  though  present  even  there. 


3^8  KANT. 

Metaphysic  which  may  present  itself  as  Science,  1783,  had 
given  a  popular  form  to  the  critical  doctrine  of  knowledge, 
it  was  followed  by  the  critical  philosophy  of  ethics  in  the 
Foundation  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Ethics,  1785,  and  the 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  1788  ;  by  the  critical  aesthetics 
and  teleology  in  the  Critique  of  Judgment,  1790  ;  and  by 
the  critical  philosophy  of  religion  in  Religion  within  the 
Limits  of  Reason  Only,  1793*  (consisting  of  four  essays,  of 
which  the  first,  "  Of  Radical  Evil,"  had  already  appeared 
in  the  Berliner  Monatsschrift  in  1792).  The  Metaphysical 
Elements  of  Natural  Science,  1786,  and  the  Metaphysics 
of  Ethics,  1797  (in  two  parts,  "  Metaphysical  Elements  of 
the  Theory  of  Right,"  and  "  Metaphysical  Elements  of  the 
Theory  of  Virtue  "),  are  devoted  to  the  development  of  the 
system.  The  year  1798  brought  two  more  larger  works, 
the  Conflict  of  the  Faculties  and  the  Anthropology.  Of 
the  reviews,  that  on  Herder's  Ideen  maybe  mentioned,  and 
among  the  minor  essays,  the  following  :  Idea  for  a  Universal 
History  in  a  Cosmopolitan  Sense,  Answer  to  the  Question  : 
What  is  Illumination  ?  both  in  1784  ;  What  docs  it  mean  to 
Orient  oneself  in  Thought?  1786;  On  the  Use  of  Teleolog- 
ical  Principles  in  Philosophy,  1788  ;  On  a  Discovery  according 
to  which  all  Recent  Criticism  of  Pure  Reason  is  to  be  su- 
perseded by  a  Previous  One,  1 790 ;  On  the  Progress  of  Met- 
aphysics since  the  Time  of  Wolff ;  On  Philosophy  in  General, 
The  End  of  all  Things,  1794;  On  Everlasting  Peace,  1795. 
Kant's  Logic  was  published  by  Jäsche  in  1800;  his  Physical 
Geography  and  his  Observations  on  Pedagogics  by  F.  T. 
Rink  in  1803  >  h's  lectures  on  the  Philosophical  Theory  of 
Religion  (1817  ;  2d.  ed.,  1830)  and  on  Metaphysics  (1821  ;  cf. 
Benno  Erdmann  in  the  Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vol.  xix. 
1883,  p.  129  seq.,  and  vol.  xx.  1884,  p.  65  seq.)  by  Pölitz.  If 
we  may  judge  by  the  specimens  given  by  Reiche  in  X.heAlt- 
preussische  Monatsschrift,  1882-84,  and  by  Krause  himself,f 

*  This  publication  was  the  occasion  of  a  conflict  between  Kant  and  the 
censorship  concerning  the  right  of  free  religious  inquiry  ;  cf.  Dilthey  in  the 
Archiv  für  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  vol.  iii.  iSgo,  pp.  418-450. 

f  A.  Krause:  /.  Kant  wider  K.  Fischer,  zum  ersten  Male  mit  Hülfe  des  verloren 
gewesenen  Kantischen  Hauptwerkes  vertheidigt,  1884  (in  reply,  K.  Fischer,  Das 
Streber-  und Gründerthum  in  der  Litteratur,  1884);  also,  Das  nachgelassene  Werk 
I.  Kants,  mit  Belegen  populär-wissenschaftlich  dargestellt,   1888. 


WORK'S.  329 

the  promised  publication  of  a  manuscript  of  Kant's 
last  years,  now  in  possession  of  the  Hamburg  pastor, 
Albrecht  Krause,  and  which  discusses  the  transition  from 
the  metaphysical  elements  of  natural  science  to  physics, 
will  hardly  meet  the  expectations  which  some  have  cher- 
ished concerning  it.  Benno  Erdmann  has  issued  Nach- 
träge zu  Kants  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft  aus  Kants  Nach- 
lass,  1881,  and  Reflexionen  Kants  zur  kritischen  Philoso- 
phie aus  handschriftlichen  Aufzeichnungen — the  first  vol- 
ume first  Heft  {Reflexionen  zur  Anthropologie)  appearing 
in  1882,  the  second  volume  (Reflexionen  zur  Kritik  der 
reinen  Vernunft,  aus  Kants  Handexemplar  von  Baumgar  t- 
ens  Mctaphysicd)  in  1884.  Max  Müller  has  made  an  English 
translation  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  2  vols.,  1881.* 

The  best  complete  edition  of  the  works  of  Kant  is  the 
second  edition  of  Hartenstein,  in  eight  volumes,  1867-68, 
which  is  chronologically  arranged  and  excellently  gotten 
up.  Simultaneously  with  the  first  edition  of  Hartenstein 
in  ten  volumes,  in  1838  seq.,  appeared  the  edition  in  twelve 
volumes  by  K.  Rosenkranz  and  F.  W.  Schubert  (contain- 
ing in  the  last  volumes  a  biography  of  Kant  by  Schubert, 
and  a  history  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  by  Rosenkranz, 
1842).  Kehrbach's  edition  of  the  principal  works  in  Rec- 
lam's  Universal-Bibliothek,  with  the  pagination  of  the 
original  and  collective  editions  (1877  Sf4-)>  ls  more  valuable 
than  Von  Kirchmann's  edition  of  the  complete  works  in 
his  Philosophische  Bibliothek. 

Among  the  works  on  Kant  those  of  Kuno  Fischer  (vols, 
iii.-iv.  of  the  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophic,  3d  ed.,  1882  ; 
also  Kant's  Leben  und  die  Grundlagen  seiner  Lehre,  i860) 
take  the  first  place.  The  writings  of  Liebmann,  Cohen, 
Stadler,  Riehl,  Volkelt,  and  others  will  be  mentioned  later, 

*  Besides  this  (centenary)  translation  the  English  reader  may  be  referred  to 
the  earlier  version  of  Meiklejohn  in  Holm's  Library  ;  to  the  versions  of  the  Pro- 
legomena by  Bax  (also  in  Bohn's  Library,  and  including  the  Metaphysical 
Elements  of  Natural  Science},  and  Mahaffy  and  Bernard,  new  ed.,  1889;  to 
Abbot's  Kant's  '/'henry  ,<J  Ethics,  4th  ed.,  1889,  containing  the  I'ounJation  of 
the  Metaphysics  of  Ethics  and  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  entire,  with  por- 
tions of  the  Metaphysics  of  Ethics  and  Religion  within  the  Limits  of  Reason 
Only  ;  to  Bernard's  translation  of  the  Kritik  of  Judgment,  1  *<)2  ;  and  to 
Watson's  Selections  from  Kant,  2d  ed.,  1888  (in  Sneath's  Modern  Philosophers, 
1892). — Tr. 


33°  KANT. 

in  connection  with  the  neo-Kantian  movement ;  here  we 
may  give  some  of  the  more  important  monographs  and 
essays,  selected  from  the  enormously  developed  Kantian 
literature  : 

Ad.  Böhringer,  Kants  erkenntnisstheoretischer  Idealismus,  1888;  K. 
Dieterich,  Die  Kantische  Philosophie  in  ihrer  inneren  Entwickelungs- 
geschichte,  2  parts,  1885  (first  published  separately,  Kant  und  Newton, 
1877  ;  Kant  und  Rousseau,  1878)  ;  W.  Dilthey,  Aus  den  Rostocker  Kant- 
handschriften  in  the  Archiv  für  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  vols,  ii.-iii. 
1889-90;  M.  W.  Drobisch,  Kants  Ding  an  sich  und  sein  Erfahrungs- 
begriff,  1885  ;  B.  Erdmann,  Kants  Kritizismus  in  der  I.  und  II. 
Auflage  der  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  1878;  the  same,  Kants  Pro- 
legomena herausgegeben  und  erläutert,  1878,  Introduction  (in  reply  Emil 
Arnoldt,  Kants  Prolegomena  flicht  doppelt  redigiert,  1879;  cf.  also 
H.  Vaihinger,  Die  Erdmann- Ar noldtsche  Kontroverse  in  the  Philoso- 
phische Monatshefte,  vol.  xvi.  1880)  ;  Franz  Erhardt,  Kritik  der 
Kantischen  Antinomienlehre,  1888;  R.  Eucken,  Ueber  Bilder  und 
Gleichnisse  bei  Kant,  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vol.  lxxxiii.  1883, 
reprinted  in  his  Beiträge  zur  Geschichte  der  neuere7i  Philosophie,  1886  ; 
F.  Frederichs,  Der  phänomenale  Idealismus  Berkeleys  und  Kants, 
1871  ;  the  same,  Kants  Prinzip  der  Ethik,  1879  ;  Ed.  von  Hartmann, 
Das  Ding  an  sich  und  seine  Beschaffenheit,  1871,  in  the  2d  ed.,  1875, 
and  the  3d,  1885,  entitled  Kritische  Grundlegung  des  transzendentalen 
Realismus ;  C.  Hebler,  Kantiana,  in  his  Philosophische  Aufsätze, 
1869  ;  Alfred  Hegler,  Die  Psychologie  in  Kants  Ethik,  1891  ;  A.  Holder, 
Darstellung  der  Kantischen  Erkenntnisstheorie ,  1873  >  J-  Jacobson, 
Die  Auffindung  des  Apriori,  1876;  the  same,  Ueber  die  Beziehutigen 
zwischen  Kategorien  und  Urtheilsformen,  1877;  Wilhelm  Koppelmann, 
Kants  Lehre  vom  analytischen  Uriheil,  Philosoph.  Monatshefte,  vol. 
xxi.  1885  ;  the  same,  Lotzes  Stellung  zu  Kants  Kritizismus,  Zeit- 
schrift für  Philosophie,  vol.  lxxxviii.  1886  ;  the  same,  Kants  Lehre  votn 
kategorischen  Imperativ,  1888  ;  the  same,  Kant  und  die  Grundlagen 
der  Christlichen  Religion,  1890  ;  E.  Laas,  Kants  Analogien  der  Erfah- 
rung, 1876;  the  same,  Emige  Bemerkungen  zur  Transzendentalphi- 
losophie, Strassburg  Abhandlungen,  1884;  J.  Mainzer,  Die  kritische 
Epoche  in  der  Lehre  von  der  Einbildungskraft,  1881  ;  J.  B.  Meyer, 
Kants  Psychologie,  1870;  F.  Paulsen,  Was  Kant  uns  sein  kann, 
Vierteljahrsschrift  für  wissenschaf tliche  Philosophie,  1881  ;  B.  Pünjer, 
Die  Religionslehre  Kants,  1874;  R.  Quaebicker,  Kants  und  Herbarts 
metaphysische  Grundausich  ten  über  das  Wesen  der  Seele,  1870;  J. 
Rehmke,  Physiologie  und  Kantianismus,  address  in  Eisenach,  1883 ; 
Rud.  Reicke,  Lose  Blätter  aus  Kants  Nachlass,  1889  (on  this  H.  Vaihin- 
ger in  the  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vol.  xevi.  1889)  ;  O.  Riedel,  Die 
monadologischen  Bestimmungen  in  Kants  Lehre  vom  Ding  an  sich, 
dissertation  at  Kiel,  1884;  O.  Schneider,  Die  psychologische  Entwicke- 
lung  des  Apriori,  1883  ;  the  same,  Transzeudentalpsychologie,  1891  ;  F. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY.  331 

Staudinger,  Noumena,  1884 ;  M.  Steckelmacher,  Die  formale  Logik 
Kants,  Breslau  Prize  Essay,  1879;  A.  Stern,  Die  Beziehung  Garves  zu 
Kant,  nebst  ungedruckten  Briefen,  1884;  C.  Stumpf,  Psychologie  und 
Erkenntnisstheorie,  Abhandlungen  der  bayerischen  Akademie  der  Wis- 
senschaften, 1891  ;  G.  Thiele,  Kants  intellectuelle  Anschauung  als 
Grundbegriff  seines  Kritizismus,  1876;  the  same,  Die  Philosophie 
Kants  nach  ihrem  systematischen  Zusammenhange  und  ihrer  logisch- 
historischen Entwickelung,  I.  (i)  Kants  vorkritische  Naturphilosophie, 
1882;  (2)  Kants  vorkritische  Erkenntnisstheorie,  1887;  Ad.  Trendelen- 
burg, Ueber  eine  Lücke  in  Kants  Beweis  von  der  ausschliessenden  Sub- 
jectivität  des  Raumes  und  der  Zeit  in  vol.  iii.  of  his  Historische  Beiträge 
zur  Philosophie,  1867  ;  Ueberhorst,  Kants  Lehre  von  dem  Verhältnisse 
der  Kategorien  zu  der  Erfahrung,  1878  ;  H.  Vaihinger,  Eine  Blattver- 
setzung in  Kants  Prolegomena,  Philosoph.  Monatshefte,  vol.  xv.  1879; 
the  same,  Zu  Kants  Widerlegung  des  Idealismus,  Strassburg  Abhand- 
lungen, 1884;  J.  Walter,  Zum  Gedacht niss  Kants,  Festrede,  1881  ;  Th. 
Weber,  Zur  Kritik  der  Kantischen  Erkenntnisstheorie  (from  the  Zeit- 
schrift für  Philosophie),  1882  ;  W.  Windelband,  Ueber  die  verschiedenen 
Phasen  der  Kantischen  Lehre  vom  Ding  an  sich,  Vierteljahrsschrift 
für  wissenschaftliche  Philosophie,  1877  (cf.  the  same  author's  Geschichte 
der  neueren  Philosophie,  §  58)  ;  J.  Witte,  Beiträge  zum  Verständniss 
Kants,  1874  ;  the  same,  Kantischer  Kritizismus  gegenüber  unkritischen/ 
Dilettantismus  (against  A.  Stöhr),  1885  ;  Wohlrabe,  Kants  Lehre  vom 
Gewissen,  1889;  E.  Zeller,  Ueber  das  Kantische  Moralprinzip,  1880; 
R.  Zimmermann,  Ueber  Kants  Widerlegung  des  Idealtsmus  von  Berke- 
ley, 1871  ;  the  same,  Ueber  Kants  mathematisches  Vorurt heil  und  des- 
sen Folgen,  1 87 1 . 

Popular  expositions  have  been  given  by  the  following:  K.  Fortlage 
(in  his  Philos.  Vorträge,  1869)  ;  E.  Last,  Mehr  Licht  I  Die  Haupsätze 
Kants  und  Schopenhauers,  1879;  the  same,  Die  realistie/ie  und  die 
idealistische  Anschauung  entwickelt  an  Kants  Idealität  von  Raum  und 
Zeit,  1884;  H.  Romundt,  Antaeus,  neuer  Aufbau  der  Lehre  Kants 
über  Seele,  Freiheit,  und  Gott,  1882  ;  the  same,  Grundlegung  zur  Re- 
form der  Philosophie,  vereinfachte  und  erweiterte  Darstellung  von 
Kants  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  1885;  the  same,  Die  Vollendung 
des  Socrates,  Kants  Grundlegung  zur  Reform  der  Sittenlehre ;  the 
same,  Ein  neuer  Paulus,  Kants  Grundlegung  zu  einer  sicheren  Lehre 
von  der  Religion,  1886;  the  same,  Die  drei  Fragen  Kants,  1887;  A. 
Krause,  Populäre  Darstellung  von  Kants  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft, 
1881  ;  K.  Lasswitz,  Die  Lehre  Kants  von  der  Idealität  des  Raumes 
und  der  Zeit,  [883;  Wilhelm  Münz,  Die  Grundlagen  der  Kant /sehen 
Erkenntnisstheorie,  2d  ed.,  1885. 

Among  foreigners  Villers,  Cousin,  Molen,  Desdouits,  Cantoni,  1'.. 
Oiird  [ .-/  ( 'ritii  al .  1, ,  <>uut  of  the  Philosophy  of  Kant,  1  Hjj  ;  The  (  ritical 

Philosophy   of     Immanuel    Kant,    2    vols.,     [889],    Adamson    [On     the 

Philosophy  of  Kant,  1879,  and  a  valuable  article  in  the  Encyclopedia 
Britanniea,    91h    ed.,    vol.    xiii.],    Stirling    |  Text-book    to    Kant,   1881], 


332  KANT, 

[Watson.  Kant  and  his  English  Critics,  i98i],  Morris  [Kant's  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason,  Griggs's  Philosophical  Classics,  1882],  [Wallace,  Kant, 
Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics,  1882;  Porter,  Kant's  Ethics,  Griggs's 
Philosophical  Classics,  1886;  )&reeftM«tf*?ro?  Works,  vol.  ii.,  1886. — Tr.], 
have  among  others  made  contributions  to  Kantian  literature.  Of  the 
older  works  we  may  mention  the  dictionaries  of  E.  Schmid,  1788,  and 
Mellin  (in  six  volumes),  1797  sea.,the  critique  of  the  Kantian  philosophy 
*in  the  first  volume  of  Schopenhauer's  chief  work,  1819,  and  the  essay  of 
C.  H.  Weisse,'/«  welchem  Sinne  hat  sich  die  deutsche  Philosophie  jetzt 
wieder  an  Kant  zu  orientieren,  1847. 

Kant's  outward  life  was  less  eventful  and  less  changeful 
than  his  philosophical  development.*  'Born  in  Königsberg 
in  1724,  the  son  of  J.  G.  Cant,  a  saddler  of  Scottish 
descent,  his  home  and  school  training  were  both  strict  and 
of  a  markedly  religious  type.  He  was  educated  at  the 
university  of  his  native  city,  and  for  nine  years,  from  1746 
on,  filled  the  place  of  a  private  tutor.  In  1755  he  became 
Docent,  in  1770  ordinary  professor  in  Königsberg,  serving 
also  for  six  years  of  this  time  as  under-librarian.  He 
seldom  left  his  native  city  and  never  the  province.  The 
clearness  which  marked  his  extremely  popular  lectures  on 
physical  geography  and  anthropology  was  due  to  his 
diligent  study  of  works  of  travel,  and  to  an  unusually 
acute  gift  of  observation,  which  enabled  him  to  draw  from 
his  surroundings  a  comprehensive  knowledge  of  the  world 
and  of  man.  He  ceased  lecturing  in  1797,  and  in  1804 
old  age  ended  a  life  which  had  always,  even  in  minute 
detail,  been  governed  by  rule.  A  man  of  extreme  devotion 
to  duty,  particularity,  and  love  of  truth,  and  an  amiable, 
bright,  and  witty  companion,  Kant  belongs  to  the  acute 
rather  than  to  the  profound  thinkers.  Among  his  mani- 
fold endowments  the  tendency  to  combination  and  the 
faculty  of  intuition  (as  the  Critique  of  Judgment  especially 
shows)  are  present  to  a  noticeable  degree,  yet  not  so  mark- 
edly as  the  power  of  strict  analysis  and  subtle  discrimina- 
tion. So  that,  although  a  mediating  tendency  is  rightly 
regarded  as  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  Kantian 

*  The  following  have  done  especially  valuable  service  in  the  investigation  of 
the  development  of  Kant's  doctrine  :  Paulsen  ( Versuch  einer  Entwickelungs~ 
geschickte  der  Kantischen  Erkenntnisstheorie ,  1875),  B.  Erdmann,  Vaihinger, 
and  Windelband.  Besides  Hume  and  Leibnitz,  Newton,  Loeke,  Shaftesbury, 
Rousseau,  and  Wolff  exercised  an  important  influence  on  Kant. 


THE   MAIN  AND   SUBORDINATE   QUESTIONS.  333 

thinking,  it  must  also  be  remembered  that  synthesis  is 
everywhere  preceded  by  a  mighty  work  of  analysis,  and 
that  this  still  exerts  its  power  even  after  the  adjustment  is 
complete.  Thus  Kant  became  the  energetic  defender  of 
a  qualitative  view  of  the  world  in  opposition  to  the  quan- 
titative view  of  Leibnitz,  for  which  antitheses  (e.  g.,  sensa- 
tion and  thought,  feeling  and  cognition,  good  and  evil, 
duty  and  inclination)  fade  into  mere  differences  of  degree. 

In  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  we  have  indicated  how 
the  new  ideal  of  knowledge,  under  whose  banner  Kant 
brought  about  a  reform  of  philosophy,  grew  out  of  the 
conflict  between  the  rationalistic  (dogmatic)  and  the 
empirical  (skeptical)  systems.  This  combines  the  Baconian 
ideal  of  the  extension  of  knowledge  with  the  Cartesian 
ideal  of  certainty  in  knowledge.  It  is  synthetic  judgments 
alone  which  extend  knowledge,  while  analytic  judgments 
are  explicative  merely.*  A  priori  judgments  alone  are 
perfectly  certain,  absolutely  universal,  and  necessarily 
valid;  while  a  posteriori  judgments  are  subjectively  valid 
merely,  lack  necessity,  and,  at  best,  yield  only  relative 
universality. f  All  analytic  judgments  are  a  priori,  all 
empirical  or  a  posteriori  judgments  are  synthetic.  Between 
the  two  lies  the  object  of  Kant's  search.  Do  synthetic 
judgments  a  priori  exist,  and  how  are  they  possible? 

Two   sciences   discuss    the    how,    and    a    third    the   if  of 

/"  All  bodies  are  extended  "  is  an  analytic  judgmentl  'fall  bodies  possess 
wlight,"  a  synthetic  judgment.!  The  former  explicates  the  concept  of  the  sub- 
ject by  bringing  into  notice  an  idea  already  contained  in  it  and  belonging  to  the 
definition  as  a  part  thereof ;  it  is  based  on  the  law  of  contradiction  :  an  un- 
extended  body  is  a  self-contradictory  concept.  The  latter,  on  the  contrary, 
goes  beyond  the  concept  of  the  subject  and  adds  a  predicate  which  had  not 
been  thought  therein.  It  is  experience  which  teaches  us  that  weight  is  joined 
to  matter,  a  fact  which  cannot  be  derived  from  the  concept  of  matter. 
Almost  all  mathematical  principles  are  synthetic,  and  here,  as  will  be  shown,  it 
is  not  experience  but  "pure  intuition"  which  permits  us  to  go  beyond  the 
concept  and  add  a  new  mark  to  it. 

f  The  Scholastics  applied  the  term  a  priori  to  knowledge  from  causes  (from 
that  which  preced(  >  and  a  po  '  >  i<>>-i  to  knowledge  from  effects.  Kant,  fol- 
lowing Leibnitz  and  Lambert,  uses  the  term-,  tu  designate  the  antithesis,  knowl- 
edge from  reason  and  knowledge  from  experience.  An  a  priori  judgment  is 
a  judgment  obtained  without  the   aid  of  experience.       When  the  principle  from 

which  it  is  derived  is  also  independent  of  experience  it  is  absolutely  a  priori. 

Otherwise  it  is  relatively  a  priori. 


334  KANT. 

such  judgments,  which,  at  the  same  time,  are  ampliative 
and  absolutely  universal  ancf  necessary.  The  first  two  sci- 
ences are  pure  mathematics  and  pure  natural  science,  of 
which  the  former  is  protected  against  doubt  concerning  its 
legitimacy  by  its  evident  character,  and  the  latter,  by  the 
constant  possibility  of  verification  in  experience ;  each, 
moreover,  can  point  to  the  continuous  course  of  its  develop- 
ment. All  this  is  absent  in  the  third  science,  metaphysics,  as 
science  of  the  suprasensible,  and  to  its  great  disadvantage. 
Experiential  verification  is  in  the  nature  of  things  denied 
to  a  presumptive  knowledge  of  that  which  is  beyond  expe- 
rience ;  it  lacks  evidence  to  such  an  extent  that  there  is 
scarcely  a  principle  to  be  found  to  which  all  metaphysicians 
assent,  much  less  a  metaphysical  text-book  to  compare  with 
Euclid  ;  there  is  so  little  continuous  advance  that  it  is 
rather  true  that  the  later  comers  are  likely  to  overthrow 
all  that  their  predecessors  have  taught.  In  metaphysics, 
therefore,  which,  it  must  be  confessed,  is  actual  as  a  natural 
tendency,  the  question  is  not,  as  in  the  other  two  sciences, 
concerning  the  grounds  of  its  legitimacy,  but  concerning 
this  legitimacy  itself.  Mathematics  and  pure  physics  form 
synthetic  judgments  a  priori,  and  metaphysics  does  the 
same.  But  the  principles  of  the  two  former  are  unchal- 
lenged, while  those  of  the  third  are  not.  In  the  former 
case  the  subject  for  investigation  is,  Whence  this  authority  ? 
in  the  latter  case,  Is  she  thus  authorized? 

Thus  the  main  question,  How  are  synthetic  judgments 
a  priori  possible  ?  divides  into  the  subordinate  questions, 
How  is  pure  mathematics  possible?  How  is  pure  natural 
science  possible,  and,  How  is  metaphysics  (in  two  senses : 
metaphysics  in  general,  and  metaphysics  as  science)  pos- 
sible ?  The  Transcendental  ^Esthetic  (the  critique  of  sensi-  / 
bility  or  the  faculty  of  intuition)  answers  the  first  of  these 
questions  ;  the  Transcendental  Analytic  (the  critique  of  the 
understanding),  the  second  ;  and  the  Transcendental  Dia- 
lectic (the  critique  of  "reason"  in  the  narrower  sense) 
and  the  Transcendental  Doctrine  of  Method  (Mctliodcnlehrc), 
the  third.  The  Analytic  and  the  Dialectic  are  the  two 
parts  of  the  Transcendental  "  Logic  "  (critique  of  the  faculty 
of  thought),  which,  together  with   the  ^Esthetic,  forms  the 


THE  MAIN  AND   SUBORDINATE   QUESTIONS.  335 

Transcendental  "Doctrine  of   Elements"  [Elementarlehre), 
in  contrast   to  the  Doctrine  of   Method.      The  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason   follows  this  scheme  of  subordinate  division, 
while   the  Prolegomena  co-ordinates   all    four  parts   in  the 
manner  first  mentioned. 

Let  us  anticipate  the  answers.  Pure  mathematics  is 
possible,  because  there  are  pure  or  a  priori  intuitions  (space 
and  time),  and  pure  natural  science  or  the  metaphysics  of 
phenomena,  because  there  are  a  priori  co?icepts  (categories) 
and  principles  of  the  pure  understanding.  Metaphysics 
as  a  presumptive  science  of  the  suprasensible  has  been 
possible  in  the  form  of  unsuccessful  attempts,  because 
there  are  Ideas  or  concepts  of  reason  which  point  beyond 
experience  and  look  as  though  knowable  objects  were 
given  through  them  ;  but  as  real  science  it  is  not  possible, 
because  the  application  of  the  categories  is  restricted  to 
the  limits  of  experience,  while  the  objects  thought  through 
the  Ideas  cannot  be  sensuously  given,  and  all  assumed 
knowledge  of  them  becomes  involved  in  irresolvable  con- 
tradictions (antinomies). /On  the  other  hand,  a  science  is 
possible  and  necessary  to  teach  the  correct  use  of  the  cate- 
gories, which  may  be  applied  to  phenomena  alone,  and  of 
the  Ideas,  which  may  be  applied  only  to  our  knowledge  of 
things  (and  our  volition),  and  to  determine  the  origin  and 
the  limits  of  our  knowledge — that  is  to  say,  a  transcen- 
dental philosophy.  In  regard  to  metaphysics  (knowledge 
from  pure  reason),  then,  this  is  the  conclusion  reached: 
Rejection  of  transcendent  metaphysics  (that  which  goes 
beyond  experience),  recognition  and  development  of 
immanent  metaphysics  (that  which  remains  within  the 
limits  of  possible  experience).  It  is  not  possible  as  a 
metaphysic  of  things  in  themselves;  it  is  possible  as  a 
metapliysic  of  nature  (of  the  totality  of  phenom- 
ena),^and  as  a  metaphysic  of  knowledge  (critique  of 
reason).') 

The  interests  of  the  reason  are  not  exhausted,  however, 
by  the  question,  What  can  we  know?  but  include  two 
further  questions,  What  ought  we  to  do?  and,  Wh.it 
may  we  hope  ?  Thus  to  the  metaphysics  of  nature  there 
is    added   a    metaphysics    of    morals,   and    to  the  critique 


336  KANT. 

of  theoretical  reason,  a  critique  of  practical  reason  or 
of  the  will,  together  with  a  critique  of  religious  belief. 
For  even  if  a  "  knowledge  "  of  the  suprasensible  is  denied 
to  us,  yet  "practical"  grounds  are  not  wanting  for  a  suffi- 
ciently certain  "  conviction  "  concerning  God,  freedom,  and 
immortality. 

After  carrying  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  syn- 
thetic judgments  a  priori  from  the  knowledge  of  nature 
over  to  the  knowledge  of  our  duty,  Kant  raises  it,  in  the 
third  place,  in  regard  to  our  judgment  concerning  the  sub- 
jective and  objective  purposiveness  of  things,  or  concerning 
their  beauty  and  their  perfection,  and  adds  to  his  critique 
of  the  intellect  and  the  will  a  critique  of  the  faculty  of  aes- 
thetic and  teleological  judgment. 

The  Kantian  philosophy  accordingly  falls  into  three  parts, 
one  theoretical,  one  practical  (and  religious),  one  aesthetic 
and  teleological. 

Before  advancing  to  our  account  of  the  first  of  these 
parts,  a  few  preliminary  remarks  are  indispensable  concern- 
ing the  presuppositions  involved  in  Kant's  critical  work 
and  on  the  method  which  he  pursues.  The  presuppositions 
are  partly  psychological,  partly  (as  the  classification  of  the 
forms  of  judgment  and  inference,  and  the  twofold  division 
of  judgments)  logical,  either  in  the  formal  or  the  transcen- 
dental sense,  and  partly  metaphysical  (as  the  thing  in 
itself).  Kant  takes  the  first  of  these  from  the  psy- 
chology of  his  time,  by  combining  the  Wolffian  classifi- 
cation of  the  faculties  with  that  of  Tetens,  and  thus 
obtains  six  different  faculties :  lower  (sensuous)  and 
higher  (intellectual)  faculties  of  cognition,  of  feeling,  and 
of  appetition  ;  or  sensibility  (the  capacity  for  receiving 
representations  through  the  way  in  which  we  are  affected 
by  objects),  understanding  (the  faculty  of  producing  rep- 
resentations spontaneously  and  of  connecting  them)  ;  the 
sensuous  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain,  taste;  desire,  and 
will.  The  understanding  in  the  wide  sense  is  equivalent  to 
the  higher  faculty  of  cognition,  and  divides  further  into 
understanding  in  the  stricter  sense  (faculty  of  concepts), 
judgment  (faculty  of  judging),  and  reason  (faculty  of  infer- 


THE   PRESUPPOSITIONS.  337 

ence).  Of  these  the  first  gives  laws  to  the  faculty  of  cog- 
nition or  to  nature,  the  second  laws  to  taste,  and  the  third 
laws  to  the  will. 

The  most  important  of  the  fundamental  assumptions 
concerns  the  relation,  the  nature,  and  the  mission  of  the 
two  faculties  of  cognition.  These  do  not  differ  in  degree, 
through  the  possession  of  greater  or  less  distinctness — for 
there  are  sensuous  representations  which  are  distinct  and 
intellectual  ones  which  are  not  so — but  specifically  :  Sen- 
sibility is  the  faculty  of  intuitions,  understanding  the 
faculty  of  concepts.  Intuitions  are  particular,  concepts  gen- 
eral representations.  The  former  relate  to  objects  directly, 
the  latter  only  indirectly  (through  the  mediation  of  other 
representations).  In  intuition  the  mind  is  receptive,  in 
conception  it  acts  spontaneously^  .^Through  intuitions 
objects  are  given  to  us;  through  concepts  they  are  thought." 
It  results  from  this  that  neither  of  the  two  faculties  is  of 
itself  sufficient  for  the  attainment  of  knowledge,  for  cogni- 
tion is  objective  thinking,  the  determination  of  objects,  the 
unifying  combination  or  elaboration  of  a  given  manifold,  the 
forming  of  a  material  content.  Rationalists  and  empiri- 
cists alike  have  been  deceived  in  regard  to  the  necessity  for 
co-operation  between  the  senses  and  the  understanding. 
Sensibility  furnishes  the  material  manifold,  which  of  itself 
it  is  not  able  to  form,  while  the  understanding  gives  the 
unifying  form,  to  which  of  itself  it  cannot  furnish  a  content. 
"Intuitions  without  concepts  arc  blind"  (formless,  unin- 
telligible), "  concepts  without  intuitions  are  empty  "  (with- 
out content).  In  the  one  case,  form  and  order  arc  wanting, 
in  the  other,  the  material  to  be  formed.  The  two  faculties 
are  thrown  back  on  each  other,  and  knowledge  can  arise 
only  from  their  union} 

^  certain  degree  of  form  is  attained  in  sense,  it  is  true, 
since  the  chaos  of  sensations  is  ordered  under  the  "  forms  of 
intuition,"  space  and  time,  which  arc  an  original  possession 
of  the  intuiting  subject,  but  this  is  not  sufficient,  without 
the  aid  of  the  understanding,  for  the  genesis  of  knowledge. 
In  view  of  the  a  priori  nature  of  space  and  time,  though 
without  detraction  from  their  intuitive  character  (they 
are  immediate  particular  representations),  we  may  assign 


53s  KANT. 

pure  sensibility  to  the  higher  faculty  of  cognition  and  speak 
of  an  intuiting  reason. 

The  forms  of  intuition  and  of  thought  come  from  within, 
they  lie  ready  in  the  mind  a  priori,  though  not  as  com- 
pleted representations.  They  are  functions,  necessary 
actions  of  the  soul,  for  the  execution  of  which  a  stimulus 
from  without,  through  sensations,  is  necessary,  but  which, 
when  once  this  is  given,  the  soul  brings  forth  spontaneously. 
The  external  impulse  merely  gives  the  soul  the  occasion 
for  such  productive  acts,  while  their  grounds  and  laws 
are  found  in  its  own  nature.  In  this  sense  Kant  terms 
them  "originally  acquired,"  and  in  the  Introduction  to  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  declares  that  although  it  is  indu- 
bitable that  "  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience 
(impressions  of  sense),  yet  it  does  not  all  arise  from  experi- 
ence." That  a  representation  or  cognition  is  a  priori*  does 
not  mean  that  it  precedes  experience  in  time,  but  that 
(apart  from  the  merely  exciting,  non-productive  stimula- 
tion through  impressions  already  mentioned)  it  is  inde- 
pendent of  all  experience,  that  it  is  not  derived  or  borrowed 
from  experience. 

The  material  of  intuition  and  thought  is  given  to  the 
soul,  received  by  it  ;  it  arises  through  the  action  of  objects 
upon  the  senses,  and  is  always  empirical.  Intuition  is  the 
only  organ  of  reality  ;  in  sensation  the  presence  of  a  real 
object  as  the  cause  of  the  sensation  is  directly  revealed. 
When  Kant's  transcendental  idealism  was  placed  by 
a  reviewer  on  a  level  with  the  empirical  idealism  of 
Berkeley,  which  denies  the  existence  of  the  external  world, 
he  distinctly  asserted  that  it  had  never  entered  his  mind  to 
question  the  reality  of  external  things.  Further,  after  the 
existence  of  real  things  affecting  the  senses  had  been  trans- 
formed in  his  mind  from  a  basis  of  the  investigation  into  an 
object   of  inquiry,  he  endeavored  to   defend  this  assump- 

*  The  terms  a  priori  representation  and  pure  representation  (concept,  intui- 
tion) are  equivalent  ;  but  in  judgments,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  distinction. 
A  judgment  is  a  priori  when  the  connection  takes  place  independently  of  experi- 
ence, no  matter  whether  'he  concepts  connected  are  a  priori  or  not.  Tf  the  former 
is  the  case  the  a  priori  judgment  is  pure  (mixed  with  nothing  empirical)  ;  if  the 
latter,  it  is  mixed. 


METHOD.  339 

tion  (which  at  first  he  had  naively  borrowed  from  the 
realism  of  pre-scientific  thought)  by  arguments,  but  with- 
outany  satisfactory  result.* 

On  the  basis  of  the  inseparability  of  sensibility  and 
understanding  the  ideal  of  knowledge — an  extension  of 
knowledge  to  be  attained  by  a  priori  means  (p.  333) — experi- 
ences a  remarkable  addition  in  the  position  that  the  rational 
synthesis  thus  obtained  must  be  a  knowledge  of  reality, 
must  be  applied  to  matter  given  in  intuition.  To  the  ques- 
tion, "  How  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible  ?  "  is 
joined  a  second  equally  legitimate  inquiry,  "  How  do  they 
become  objectively  valid,  or  applicable  to  objects  of  experi- 
ence ?  "  The  principle  from  which  their  validity  is  proved — 
they  are  applicable  to  objects  of  experience  because  with- 
out them  experience  would  not  be  possible,  because  they  are 
conditions  of  experience — like  the  criterion  of  apriority  (strict 
universality  and  necessity),  is  one  of  the  noetic  assump- 
tions of  the  critical  theory. f.' 

Inasmuch  as  its  investigation  relates  to  the  conditions 
of  experience  the  Kantian  criticism  follows  a  method 
which  it  itself  terms  transcendental.  Heretofore,  when  the 
metaphysical  method  had  been  adopted,  the  object  had 
been  the  suprasensible;  and  when  knowledge  had  been 
made  the  object  of  investigation,  the  method  followed 
had  been  empirical,  psychological.  Kant  had  the  right 
to  consider  himself  the  creator  of  noetics,  for  he  showed 
it  the  transcendental  point  of  view.  Knowledge  is  an 
object  of  experience,  but  its  conditions  are  not.  The 
object  is  to  explain  knowledge,  not  merely  to  describe  it 
psychologically, — to  establish  a  new  science  of  knowledge 
from  principles,  from  pure  reason;  ^That  which  lies  beyond 
experience  is  scaled  from  our  {nought;  that  which  lies  on 
this  side  of  it  is  still  uninvestigated,  though  capable  and 
worthy  of  investigation,  and  in  extreme  need  thereof. 
Criticism  forbids  the  transcendent  use  of  reason  (trans- 
cending experience)  ;  it    permits,  demands,  and  itself  exer- 

*  The  task  of  confirming  the  existence  of  tilings  in  themselves  changes  under 
his  hands  into  another,  that  of  proving  the  existence  of  external  phenomena! 
•'  That  external  objects  are  real  as  representations  "  Berkeley  had  never  disputed. 

f  Cf.  Vaihinger,  Kommentar,  i.  pp.  425-430. 


34°  KANT. 

cises  the  transcendental*  use  of  it,  which  explains  an 
experiential  object,  knowledge,  from  its  conditions,  which 
are  not  empirically  given. 

There  is,  apparently,  a  contradiction  between  the  empi- 
ristic  result  of  the  Critique  of  Reason  (the  limitation 
of  knowledge  to  objects  of  experience)  and  its  rational- 
istic proofs  (which  proceed  metaphysically,  not  empirically), 
and,  in  fact,  a  considerable  degree  of  opposition  really 
exists.  Kant  argues  in  a  metaphysical  way  that  there  can 
be  no  metaphysics.  This  contradiction  is  solved  by  the 
distinction  which  has  been  mentioned  between  that  which 
is  beyond,  and  that  which  lies  within,  the  boundary  of 
experience.  That  metaphysic  is  forbidden  which  on  the 
objective  side  soars  beyond  experience,  but  that  pure 
rational  knowledge  is  permissible  and  necessary  which 
develops  from  principles  the  grounds  of  experiential 
knowledge  existing  in  the  subject.  In  the  Kantian  school, 
however,  these  complementary  elements, — empirical  result,' 
transcendental  or  metaphysical,  properly  speaking,  pro- 
physical  method, — were  divorced,  and  the  one  emphasized, 
favored,  and  further  developed  at  the  expense  of  the  other. 
The  empiricists  hold  to  the  result,  while  they  either  weaken 
or  completely  misunderstand  the  rationalism  of  the 
method  :  the  a  priori  factor,  says  Fries,  was  not  reached  by 
a  priori,  but  by  a  posteriori,  means,  and  there  is  no  other 
way  by  which  it  could  have  been  reached.  The  construct- 
ive thinkers,  Fichte  and  his  successors,  adopt  and  con- 
tinue the  metaphysical  method,  but  reject  the  empirical 
result.  Fichte's  aim  is  directed  to  a  system  of  necessary, 
unconscious  processes  of  reason,  among  which,  rejecting 
the  thing  in  itself,  he  includes  sensation.  According  to 
Schelling  nature  itself  is  a  priori,  a  condition  of  con- 
sciousness.      This    discrepancy    between     foundation    and 

*  Kant  applies  the  term  transcendental  to  the  knowledge  (the  discovery,  the 
proof)  of  the  a  priori  factor  and  its  relation  to  objects  of  experience.  Unfor- 
tunately he  often  uses  the  same  word  not  only  to  designate  the  a  priori  ele- 
ment itself,  but  also  as  a  synonym  for  transcendent.  In  all  three  cases  its  oppo- 
site is  empirical,  namely,  empirico-psychological  investigation  by  observation  in 
distinction  from  noetical  investigation  from  principles  ;  empirical  origin  in 
distinction  from  an  origin  in  pure  reason,  and  empirical  use  in  distinction  from 
application  beyond  the  limits  of  experience. 


SPACE   AND    TIME   INTUITIONS  A    PRIORI.  341 

result  continues  in  an  altered  form  even  among  contem- 
porary thinkers — as  a  discussion  whether  the  "main  pur- 
pose "  of  Criticism  is  to  be  found  in  the  limitation  of 
knowledge  to  possible  experience,  or  the  establishment  of 
a  priori  elements — though  many,  in  adherence  to  Kant's 
own  view,  maintain  that  the  metaphysics  of  knowledge 
and  of  phenomena  (immanent  rationalism)  is  the  only 
legitimate  metaphysics. 

I.  Theory  of  Knowledge. 

(a)  The  Pure  Intuitions  (Trnnspfinriental  jEsthgfcjtfL — The 
first  part  of  the  Critique  of  Reason,  the  Transcendental 
./Esthetic,  lays  down  the  position  that  space  and  time  are  not 
independent  existences,  not  real  beings,  and  not  properties 
or  relations  which  would  belong  to  things  in  themselves 
though  they  were  not  intuited,  vmt^JÖri/is  of  our  intuition. 
which  have  their  basis  in  the  subjective  constitution  of 
our,  the  human,  mind.  If  we  separate  from  sensuous  intui- 
tion all  that  the  understanding  thinks  in  it  through  its 
concepts,  and  all  that  belongs  to  sensation,  these  two  forms 
of  intuition  remain,  which  may  be  termed  pure  intuitions, 
since  they  can  be  considered  apart  from  all  sensation.  As 
subjective  conditions  (lying  in  the  nature  of  the  subject) 
through  which  alone  a  thing  can  become  an  object  of  intui- 
tion for  us,  they  precede  all  empirical  intuitions  or  are 
a  priori. 

Space  and  time  are  neither  substantial  receptacles  which 
contain  all  that  is  real  nor  orders  inhering  in  things  in  them- 
selves, but  forms  of  intuition.  Now  all  our  representations 
are  either  pure  or  empirical  in  their  origin,  and  either 
intuitive  or  conceptual  in  character.  Kant  advances 
four  proofs  for  the  position  that  space  and  time  are 
not  empirical  and  not  concepts,  but  pure  intuitions: 
(i)  Time  is  not  an  empirical  concept  which  has  been 
abstracted  from  experience.  For  the  coexistence  or 
succession  of  phenomena,  i.  c.,  their  existence  at  the 
same  time  or  at  different  times  (from  which,  as  many 
believe,  the  representation  of  time  is  abstracted),  itself 
presupposes   time — a  coexistence   or   succession  is  possible 


342  KANT. 

only  in  time.  It  is  no  less  false  that  space  is  abstracted 
from  the  empirical  space  relations  of  external  phenomena, 
their  existence  outside  and  beside  one  another,  or  in  dif- 
ferent places,  for  it  is  impossible  to  represent  relative  situa- 
tion except  in  space.  Therefore  experience  does  not 
make  space  and  time  possible  ;  but  space  and  time  first  of 
all  make  experience  possible,  the  one  outer,  the  other  inner 
experience.  They  are  postulates  of  perception,  not  abstrac- 
tions from  it.  (2)  Time  is  a  necessary  representation  a 
priori.  We  can  easily  think  all  phenomena  away  from  it, 
but  we  cannot  remove  time  itself  in  view  of  phenomena 
in  general ;  we  can  think  time  without  phenomena,  but  not 
phenomena  without  time.  The  same  is  true  of  space  in 
reference  to  external  objects.  Both  are  conditions  of  the 
possibility  of  phenomena^  (3)  Time  is  not  a  discursive  or 
general  concept.  For  there  is  but  one  time.  And  different 
times  do  not  precede  the  one  time  as  the  constituent 
parts  of  which  it  is  made  up,  but  are  mere  limitations  of 
it  ;  the  part  is  possible  only  through  the  whole.  In  the 
same  way  the  various  spaces  are  only  parts  of  one  and  the 
same  space,  and  can  be  thought  in  it  alone.  But  a  repres- 
entation which  can  be  given  only  by  a  single  object  is  a  par- 
ticular representation  or  an  intuition.  Because,  therefore,  of 
the  oneness  of  space  and  time,  the  representation  of  each  is 
an  intuition.  The  a  priori,  immediate  intuition  of  the  one 
space  is  entirely  different  from  the  empirical,  general  con- 
ception of  space,  which  is  abstracted  from  the  various 
spaces.  (4)  Determinate  periods  of  time  arise  by  limita- 
tion of  the  one,  fundamental  time.  Consequently  this 
original  time  must  be  unlimited  or  infinite,  and  the  repres- 
entation of  it  must  be  an  intuition,  not  a  concept.  Time 
contains  in  itself  an  endless  number  of  representations  (its 
parts,  times),  but  this  is  never  the  case  with  a  generic  con- 
cept, which,  indeed,  is  contained  as  a  partial  representation 
in  an  endless  number  of  representations  (those  of  the  indi- 
viduals having  the  same  name),  and,  consequently,  compre- 
hends them  all  under  itself,  but  which  never  contains  them 
in  itself.  The  general  concept  horse  is  contained  in  each 
particular  representation  of  a  horse  as  a  general  character- 
istic, and  that  of  justice  in  each  representation  of  a  definite 


SPACE  AND    TIME  INTUITIONS  A    PRIORI.  343 

just  act  ;  time,  however,  is  not  contained  in  the  different 
times,  but  they  are  contained  in  it.  Similarly  the  relation 
of  infinite  space  to  the  finite  spaces  is  not  the  logi- 
cal relation  of  a  concept  to  examples  of  it,  but  the 
intuitive  relation  of  an  unlimited  whole  to  its  limited 
parts.. 

The  Prolegomena  employs  as  a  fifth  proof  for  the  intui- 
tive character  of  space,  an  argument  which  had  already 
appeared  in  the  essay  On  the  Ultiviate  Ground  of  the 
Distinction  of  Positions  in  Space.  There  are  certain  spatial 
distinctions  which  can  be  grasped  by  intuition  alone, 
and  which  are  absolutely  incapable  of  comprehension 
through  the  understanding — for  example,  those  of  right 
and  left,  above  and  below,  before  and  behind.  No  logical 
marks  can  be  given  for  the  distinction  between  the  object 
and  its  image  in  the  mirror,  or  between  the  right  ear  and 
the  left.  The  complete  description  of  a  right  hand  must, 
in  all  respects  (quality,  proportionate  position  of  parts, 
size  of  the  whole),  hold  for  the  left  as  well;  but,  despite  the 
complete  similarity,  the  one  hand  cannot  be  exactly  super- 
imposed on  the  other  ;  the  glove  of  the  one  cannot  be  worn 
on  the  other.  This  difference  in  direction,  which  has  sig- 
nificance only  when  viewed  from  a  definite  point,  and  the 
impossibility  mentioned  of  a  congruence  between  an  object 
(right  hand)  and  its  reflected  image  (left  hand)  can 
be  understood  only  by  intuition;  they  must  be  seen  and 
felt,  and  cannot  be  made  clear  through  concepts,  and,  con- 
sequently, can  never  be  explained  to  a  being  which  lacks 
the  intuition  of  space. 

In  the  "  transcendental  "  exposition  of  space  and  time 
Kant  follows  this  "  metaphysical  "  exposition,  which  had  to 
prove  their  non-empirical,  and  non-discursive,  hence  theii 
a  priori  and  intuitive,  character,  with  the  proof  that  onl\ 
such  an  explanation  of  space  and  time  could  make  it  con- 
ceivable how  synthetic  cognitions  a  priori  can  arise  from 
them.  (The  principles  of  mat  hematics  are  of  this  Kind. 
The  synthetic  character  of  geometrical  truths  is  explained 
by  the  intuitive  nature  of  space,  their  apodictic  character 
by  its  apriority,  and  their  objective  reality  or  applica- 
bility to   empirical  objects   by  the   fact    that    space    is    the 


344  KANT. 

condition   of   (external)  perception.      The  like  is   true   of 
arithmetic  and  time. 

If  space  were  a  mere  concept,  no  proposition  could  be 
derived  from  it  which  should  go  beyond  the  concept  and 
extend  our  knowledge  of  its  properties.  The  possibility 
of  such  extension  or  synthesis  in  mathematics  depends  on 
the  fact  that  spatial  concepts  can  always  be  presented 
or  "constructed  "  in  intuition.  The  geometrical  axiom  that 
in  the  triangle  the  sum  of  two  sides  is  greater  than  the 
third  is  derived  from  intuition,  by  describing  the  triangle 
in  imagination  or,  actually,  on  the  board.  Here  the  object 
is  given  through  the  cognition  and  not  before  it. — If  space 
and  time  were  empirical  representations  the  knowledge 
obtained  from  them  would  lack  necessity,  which,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  it  possesses  in  a  marked  degree.  While 
experience  teaches  us  only  that  something  is  thus  or 
so,  and  not  that  it  could  not  be  otherwise,  the  axioms, 
(space  has  only  three  dimensions,  time  only  one  ;  only  one 
straight  line  is  possible  between  two  points,)  nay,  all  the 
propositions  of  mathematics  are  strictly  universal '  and 
apodictically  certain  :  we  are  entirely  relieved  from  the 
necessity  of  measuring  all  triangles  in  the  world  in  order  to 
find  out  whether  the  sum  of  their  angles  is  equal  to  two 
right  angles,  and  we  do  not  need,  as  in  the  case  of  judg- 
ments of  experience,  to  add  the  limitation,  so  far  as  it 
is  yet  known  there  are  no  exceptions  to  this  ruTeT)  The 
apriority  is  the  ratio  essendi  of  the  strict  necessity 
involved  in  the  "  it  must  be  so  "  {des  Soseinmiissens),  while 
the  latter  is  the  ratio  cognoscendi  of  the  former.  (Now  since 
the  necessity  of  mathematical  judgments  can  only  be 
explained  through  the  ideality  of  space,  this  doctrine  is 
perfectly  certain,  not  merely  a  probable  hypothesis. — The 
validity  of  mathematical  principles  for  all  objects  of  per- 
ception, finally,  is  based  on  the  fact  that  they  are  rules 
under  which  alone  experience  is  possible  for  usj  It 
should  be  mentioned,  further,  that  the  conceptions  of 
change  and  motion  (change  of  place)  are  possible  only 
through  and  in  the  representation  of  time.  No  concept 
could  make  intelligible  the  possibility  of  change,  that  is,  of 
the  connection  of  contradictory  predicates  in  one  and  the 


INFERENCES.  345 

same  thing,  but  the  intuition  of  succession  easily  succeeds 
in  accomplishing  it. 

\The  argument  is  followed  by  conclusions  and  explana- 
tions based  upon  it;  (i)  Space  is  the  form  of  the  outer, 
time  of  the  inner,  sense.  Through  the  outer  sense  external 
objects  are  given  to  us,  and  through  the  inner  sense  our 
own  inner  states.  But  since  all  representations,  whether 
they  have  external  things  for  their  objects  or  not,  belong 
in  themselves,  as  mental  determinations,  to  our  inner 
state,  time  is  the  formal  condition  of  all  phenomena  in 
general,  directly  of  internal  (psychical)  phenomena,  and, 
thereby,  indirectly  of  external  phenomena  also>  (2)  The 
validity  of  the  relations  of  space  and  time  cognizable  a 
priori  is  established  for  all  objects  of  possible  experience, 
but  is  limited  to  these.  They  are  valid  for  all  phenomena 
(for  all  things  which  at  any  time  may  be  given  to  our 
senses),  but  only  for  these,  not  for  things  as  they  are  in 
themselves)  They  have  "  empirical  reality,  but,  at  the  same 
time,  transcendental  ideality."  As  external  phenomena 
all  things  are  beside  one  another  in  space,  and  all  phe- 
nomena whatever  are  in  time  and  of  necessity  under 
temporal  relations  ;  in  regard  to  all  things  which  can  occur 
in  our  experience,  and  in  so  far  as  they  can  occur,  space 
and  time  are  objectively,  therefore  empirically,  real.  But 
they  do  not  possess  absolute  reality  (neither  subsistent 
reality  nor  the  reality  of  inherence)  ;  for  if  we  abstract  from 
our  sensuous  intuition  both  vanish,  and,  apart  from  the  sub- 
ject (TV.  />.,  the  transcendental  subject,  concerning  which 
more  below),  they  are  naught.)  It  is  only  from  man's  point 
of  view  that  we  can  speak  of  space,  and  of  extended,  move- 
able, changeable  things;  for  we  can  know  nothing  concern- 
ing the  intuitions  of  other  thinking  beings,  we  have 
no  means  of  discovering  whether  they  are  bound  by  the 
same  conditions  which  limit  our  intuitions,  and  which  for 
us  are  universally  valid.  (3)  Nothing  which  is  intuited  in 
space  is  a  thing  in  itself.  What  we  call  external  objects  are 
nothing  but  mere  representations  of  our  sensibility,  whose 
true  correlative,  the  tltiiig  in  itself, cannot  be  known  by  ever 
so  deep  penetration  into  the  phenomenon  ;  such  properties 
as  belong  to  things  in  themselves  can  never  be   given  to  us 


34Ö  KANT. 

through  the  senses.  Similarly  nothing  that  is  intuited  in 
time  is  a  thing  in  itself,  so  that  we  intuit  ourselves  only  as 
we  appear  to  ourselves,  and  not  as  we  are} 

The  merely  empirical  reality  of  space  and  time,  the 
limitation  of  their  validity  to  phenomena,  leaves  the  cer- 
tainty of  knowledge  within  the  limits  of  experience  intact ; 
for  we  are  equally  certain  of  it,  whether  these  forms  neces- 
sarily belong  to  things  in  themselves,  or  only  to  our  intu- 
itions of  things.  The  assertion  of  their  absolute  reality,  on 
the  other  hand,  involves  us  in  sheer  absurdities  (that  is,  it 
necessitates  the  assumption  of  two  infinite  nonentities 
which  exist,  but  without  being  anything  real,  merely  in 
order  to  comprehend  all  reality,  and  on  one  of  which  even 
our  own  existence  would  be  dependent),  in  view  of  which 
the  origin  of  so  peculiar  a  theory  as  the  idealism  of  Berke- 
ley appears  intelligible.  The  critical  theory  of  space  and 
time  is  so  far  from  being  identical  with,  or  akin  to,  the 
theory  of  Berkeley,  that  it  furnishes  the  best  and  only 
defense  against  the  latter.  If  anyone  assumes  the  absolute 
or  transcendental  reality  of  these  forms,  it  is  impossible  for 
him  to  prevent  everything,  including  even  our  own  exist- 
ence, from  being  changed  thereby  into  mere  illusion.  But 
the  critical  philosopher  is  far  from  degrading  bodies  to 
mere  illusion;  external  phenomena  are  just  as  real  for 
him  as  internal  phenomena,  though  only  as  phenomena,  it 
is  true,  as  (possible)  representations. 

Phenomenon  and  illusion  are  not  the  same.  The  tran- 
scendental distinction  between  phenomena  and  things  in 
themselves  must  not  be  confused  with  the  distinction  com- 
mon to  ordinary  life  and  to  physics,  in  accordance  with 
which  we  call  the  rainbow  a  mere  appearance  (better,  illu- 
sion), but  the  combination  of  sun  and  rain  which  gives  rise 
to  this  illusion  the  thing  in  itself,  as  that  which  in  universal 
experience  and  in  all  different  positions  with  respect  to  the 
senses,  is  thus  and  not  otherwise  determined  in  intuition,  or 
that  which  essentially  belongs  to  the  intuition  of  the  object, 
and  is  valid  for  every  human  sensibility  (in  antithesis  to  that 
which  only  contingently  belongs  to  it,  and  is  valid  only  for  a 
special  position  or  organization  of  this  or  that  sense).  Simi- 
larly an  object  always  appears  to  grow  smaller  as  its  distance 


IDEALITY  AND  REALITY.  347 

increases,  while  in  itself  it  is  and  remains  of  some  fixed 
size.  And  this  use  of  words  is  perfectly  correct,  in  the 
physical  or  empirical  sense  of  "  in  itself  ";  but  in  the  tran- 
scendental  sense  the  raindrops,  also,  together  with  their 
form  and  size,  are  themselves  mere  phenomena,  the  "  in 
itself"  of  which  remains  entirely  unknown  to  us.  Kant, 
moreover,  does  not  wish  to  see  the  subjectivity  of  the 
forms  of  intuition  placed  on  a  level  with  the  subjec- 
tivity of  sensations  or  explained  by  this,  though  he  accepts 
it  as  a  fact  long  established.  The  sensations  of  color,  of 
tone,  of  temperature  are,  no  doubt,  like  the  representation 
of  space  in  that  they  belong  only  to  the  subjective  consti- 
tution of  the  sensibility,  and  can  be  attributed  to  objects 
only  in  relation  to  our  senses.  But  the  great  difference 
between  the  two  is  that  these  sense  qualities  may  be 
different  in  different  persons  (the  color  of  the  rose  may 
seem  different  to  each  eye),  or  may  fail  to  harmonize 
with  any  human  sense  ;  that  they  are  not  a  priori  in  the  same 
strict  sense  as  space  and  time,  and  consequently  afford  no 
knowledge  of  the  objects  of  possible  experience  independ- 
ently of  perception  ;  and  that  they  are  connected  with  the 
phenomenon  only  as  the  contingently  added  effects  of 
a  particular  organization,  while  space,  as  the  condition  of 
external  objects,  necessarily  belongs  to  the  phenomenon 
or  intuition  of  them.  //  is  through  space  alone  that  it  is 
possible  for  things  to  be  external  objects  for  us.  The  subjec- 
tivity of  sensation  is  individual,  while  that  of  space  and 
time  is  general  or  universal  to  mankind  ;  the  former  is 
empirical,  individually  different,  and  contingent,  the  latter 
a  priori  and  necessary.  Space  alone,  not  sensation,  is  a 
conditio  sine  qua  non  of  external  perception.  Space  and 
time  art-  the  sole  a  priori  elements  of  the  sensibility;  all 
other  sensuous  concepts,  even  motion  and  change,  presup- 
pose perception  ;  the  movable  in  space  and  the  succession 
of  properties  in  an  existing  thing  are  empirical  data. 

In  confirmation  <>f  the  theory  that  all  objects  of  the 
senses  are  mere  phenomena,  the  fact  is  adduced  that  (with 
the  exception  of  the  will  and  the  feelings,  which  are  not 
cognitions)  nothing  is  given  us  through  the  senses  but  re- 
presentations of  relations,  while  a  thing  in  itself  cannot  be 


348  KANT. 

known  by  mere  relations.  The  phenomenon  is  a  sum  total 
of  mere  relations.  In  regard  to  matter  we  know  only 
extension,  motion,  and  the  laws  of  this  motion  or  forces 
(attraction,  repulsion,  impenetrability),  but  all  these  are 
merely  relations  of  the  thing  to  something  else,  that  is, 
external  relations?)  Where  is  the  inner  side  which  underlies 
this  exterior,  and  which  belongs  to  the  object  in  itself? 
This  is  never  to  be  found  in  the  phenomenon,  and  no  mat- 
ter how  far  the  observation  and  analysis  of  nature  may 
advance  (a  work  with  unlimited  horizons!)  they  reach 
nothing  but  portions  of  space  occupied  by  matter  and 
effects  which  matter  exercises,  that  is,  nothing  beyond 
that  which  is  comparatively  internal,  and  which,  in  its 
turn,  consists  of  external  relations.  The  absolutely  inner 
side  of  matter  is  a  mere  fancy  ;  and  if  the  complaint  that 
the  "  inner  side  "  of  things  is  concealed  from  us  is  to  mean 
that  we  do  not  comprehend  what  the  things  which  appear 
to  us  may  be  in  themselves,  it  is  unjust  and  irrational,  for 
it  demands  that  we  should  be  able  to  intuit  without  senses, 
in  other  words,  that  we  should  be  other  than  men.  (The 
transcendent  questions  concerning  the  noumenon  of  things 
are  unanswerable ;  we  know  ourselves,  even,  only  as 
phenomena  !  A  phenomenon  consists  in  nothing  but  the 
relation  of  something  in  general  to  the  senses.^ 

It  is  indubitable  that  something  corresponds  to  phe- 
nomena, which,  by  affecting  our  sensibility,  occasions 
sensations  in  us,  and  thereby  phenomena.  The  very  word, 
the  very  concept,  "  phenomenon,"  indicates  a  relation  to 
something  which  is  not  phenomenon,  to  an  object  not 
dependent  on  the  sensibility.  What  this  may  be  continues 
hidden  from  us,  for  knowledge  is  impossible  without  intui- 
tion. Things  in  themselves  are  unknowable.  Neverthe- 
less the  idea  (it  must  be  confessed,  the  entirely  empty  idea) 
of  this  "transcendental  object,"  as  an  indeterminate  some- 
what =  x  which  underlies  phenomena,  is  not  only  allowable, 
but,  as  a  limiting  concept,  unavoidable  in  order  to  confine 
the  pretensions  of  sense  to  the  only  field  which  is  acces- 
sible to  it,  that  is,  to  the  field  of  phenomena. 

The  inference  "  space  and  time  are  nothing  but  represen- 
tations and  representations   are  in  us,  therefore  space  and 


THINGS  IN    THEMSELVES,   PHENOMENA.  349 

time  as  well  as  all  phenomena  in  them,  bodies  with  their 
forces  and  motions,  are  in  us,"  does  not  accurately  express 
Kant's  position,  for  he  might  justly  reply  that,  according 
to  him,  bodies  as  phenomena  are  in  different  parts  in  space 
from  that  which  we  assign  to  ourselves,  and  thus  without 
us ;  that  space  is  the  form  of  external  intuition,  and 
through  it  external  objects  arise  for  us  from  sensations  ; 
but  that,  in  regard  to  the  things  in  themselves  which  affect 
us,  we  are  entirely  ignorant  whether  they  are  within  or 
without  us. 

It  can  easily  be  shown  by  literal  quotations  that  there 
were  distinct  tendencies  in  Kant,  especially  in  the  first 
edition  of  his  principal  work,  toward  a  radical  idealism 
which  doubts  or  denies  not  merely  the  cognizability,  but 
also  the  existence  of  objects  external  to  the  subject  and  its 
representations,  and  which  degrades  the  thing  in  itself  to  a 
mere  thought  in  us,  or  completely  does  away  with  it  {e.g., 
"  The  representation  of  an  object  as  a  thing  in  general 
is  not  only  insufficient,  but,  .  .  .  independently  of  empir- 
ical conditions,  in  itself  contradictory  ").  But  these  expres- 
sions indicate  only  a  momentary  inclination  toward  such  a 
view,  not  a  binding  avowal  of  it,  and  they  are  outweighed 
by  those  in  which  idealism  is  more  or  less  energetically 
rejected.  \That  which  .according  to  Kant  exists  outside 
the  representation  of  the  individual  is  twofold  :  (i)  the 
unknown  tilings  in  themselves  with  their  problematical  char- 
acteristics, as  the  ground  of  phenomena  :  (2)  the  phenom- 
ena "themselves"  with  their  knowablc  immanent  laws, 
and  their  relations  in  space  and  time,  as  possible  represen- 
tations^; When  I  turn  my  glance  away  from  the  rose  its 
redness  vanishes,  since  this  predicate  belongs  to  it  only  in 
so  far  and  so  long  as  it  acts  in  the  light  on  my  visual  appa- 
ratus. What,  then,  is  left?  Thatthingin  itself,  of  course, 
which,  when  it  appears  tome,  calls  forth  in  me  the  intuition 
of  the  rose.  But  there  is  still  something  else  remaining — 
the  phenomenon  of  the  rose,  with  its  size,  its  form,  and  its 
motion  in  the  wind.  For  these  are  predicates  which  must 
be  attributed  to  the  phenomenon  itself  as  the  object  of  my 
representation.  If  the  rose,  as  determined  in  space  and 
time,  vanished  when  I  turned  my  head  away,  it  could  not, 


35°  KANT. 

unless  intuited  by  a  subject,  experience  or  exert  effects  in 
space  and  time,  could  not  lose  its  leaves  in  the  wind  and 
strew  the  ground  with  its  petals.  Perception  and  thought 
inform  me  not  merely  concerning  events  of  which  I  am  a 
witness,  but  also  of  others  which  have  occurred,  or  which 
will  occur,  in  my  absence.  The  process  of  stripping  the 
leaves  from  the  rose  has  actually  taken  place  as  a  phenome- 
non and  does  not  first  become  real  by  my  subsequent  repres- 
entation of  it  or  inference  to  it.  The  things  and  events  of 
the  phenomenal  world  exist  both  before  and  after  my  per- 
ception, and  are  something  distinct  from  my  subjective  and 
momentary  representations  of  them.  The  space  and  time, 
however,  in  which  they  exist  and  happen  are  not  furnished 
by  the  intuiting  individual,  but  by  the  supra-individual, 
transcendental  consciousness  or  generic  reason  of  the  race. 
The  phenomenon  thus  stands  midway  between  its  objective 
ground  (the  absolute  thing  in  itself)  and  the  subject,  whose 
common  product  it  is,  as  a  relative  thing  in  itself,  as  a  reality 
which  is  independent  of  the  contingent  and  changing 
representation  of  the  individual,  empirical  subject,  which  is 
dependent  for  its  form  on  the  transcendental  subject,  and 
which  is  the  only  reality  accessible  to  us,  yet  entirely 
valid  for  us.  The  phenomenal  world  is  not  a  contingent 
and  individual  phenomenon,  but  one  necessary  for  all  beings 
organized  as  we  are,  a  phenomenon  for  humanity.  My 
representations  are  not  the  phenomena  themselves,  but 
images  and  signs  through  which  I  cognize  phenomena,  i.  e., 
real  things  as  they  are  for  me  and  for  every  man  (not  as 
they  are  in  themselves).  The  reality  of  phenomena  consists 
in  the  fact  that  they  can  be  perceived  by  men,  and  the 
objective  validity  of  my  knowledge  of  them  in  the  fact  that 
every  man  must  agree  in  it.  The  laws  which  the  under- 
standing (not  the  individual  understanding!)  imposes  upon 
nature  hold  for  phenomena,  because  they  hold  for  every 
man.  Objectivity  is  universal  validity.  If  the  world  of 
phenomena  which  is  intuited  and  known  by  us  wears  a  dif- 
ferent appearance  from  the  world  of  things  in  themselves, 
this  does  not  justify  us  in  declaring  it  to  be  mere  seeming 
and  dreaming;  a  dream  which  all  dream  together,  and 
which  all  must  dream,  is  not  a  dream,  but  reality.     As  we 


THINGS  IN   THEMSELVES,   PHENOMENA.  35 l 

must  represent  the  world,  so  it  is,  though  for  us,  of  course, 
and  not  in  itself. 

Many  places  in  Kant's  works  seem  to  argue  against  the 
intermediate  position  here  ascribed  to  the  world  of  phe- 
nomena— according  to  which  it  is  less  than  things  in 
themselves  and  more  than  subjective  representation — 
which,  since  they  explain  the  phenomenon  as  a  mere  repres- 
entation, leave  room  for  only  two  factors  (on  the  one  hand, 
the  thing  in  itself  =  that  in  the  thing  which  cannot  be  repre- 
sented ;  on  the  other,  the  thing  for  me  =  my  representation 
of  the  thing).  In  fact,  the  distinction  between  the  phe- 
nomenon "itself  "and  the  representation  which  the  indi- 
vidual now  has  of  it  and  now  does  not  have,  is  far  from 
being  everywhere  adhered  to  with  desirable  clearness  ;  and 
wherever  it  is  impossible  to  substitute  that  which  has  been 
represented  and  that  which  may  be  represented  or  possi- 
ble intuitions  for  "  mere  representations  in  me,"  we  must 
acknowledge  that  there  is  a  departure  from  the  stand- 
point which  is  assumed  in  some  places  with  the  greatest  dis- 
tinctness. The  latter  finds  unequivocal  expression,  among 
other  places,  in  the  "  Analogies  of  Experience  "  and  the 
"  Deduction  of  the  Pure  Concepts  of  the  Understanding," 
§  2,  No.  4  (first  edition).  The  second  of  these  passages 
speaks  of  one  and  the  same  universal  experience,  in  which 
all  perceptions  are  represented  in  thoroughgoing  and  regu- 
lar connection,  and  of  the  thoroughgoing  affinity  of  phe- 
nomena as  the  basis  of  the  possibility  of  the  association  of 
representations.  This  affinity  Is  ascribed  to  the  objects  of 
the  senses,  not  to  the  representations,  whose  association  is 
rather  the  result  of  the  affinity,  and  not  to  the  things  in 
themselves,  in  regard  to  which  the  understanding  has  no 
legislative  power. 

The  relation  between  the  thing  in  itself  and  the  phenom- 
enon is  also  variable.  Now  they  are  regarded  as  entirely 
heterogeneous  (that  which  can  never  be  intuited  exists  in 
a  mode  opposed  to  that  of  the  intuited  ;m<l  intuitablc),  and 
now  as  analogous  to  each  other  (non-intuitable  properties 
of  the  thing  in  itself  correspond  to  the  intuitable  character- 
istics of  the  phenomenon).  The  former  is  the  case  when  it 
is  said   that  phenomena  are  in  space  and  time,  while  things 


35 2  KANT. 

in  themselves  are  not  ;  that  in  the  first  of  these  classes 
natural  causation  rules,  and  in  the  second  freedom  ;  that  in 
the  one«conditioned  existence  alone  is  found,  in  the  other 
unconditioned.*  But  just  as  often  things  in  themselves 
and  phenomena  are  conceived  as  similar  to  one  another, 
as  two  sides  of  the  same  object, f  of  which  one,  like  the 
counter-earth  of  the  Pythagoreans,  always  remains  turned 
away  from  us,  while  the  other  is  turned  toward  us,  but  does 
not  reveal  the  true  being  of  the  object.  According  to  this 
each  particular  thing,  state,  relation,  and  event  in  the 
world  of  phenomena  would  have  its  real  counterpart  in  the 
noumenal  sphere  :  un-extended  roses  in  themselves  would 
lie  back  of  extended  roses,  certain  non-temporal  processes 
back  of  their  growth  and  decay,  intelligible  relations  back  of 
their  relations  in  space.  This  is  approximately  the  relation 
of  the  two  conceptions  as  in  part  taught  by  Lotze  himself, 
in  part  represented  by  him  as  taught  by  Kant.  Herbart's 
principle,  "  So  much  seeming,  so  much  indication  of  being  " 
{wie  viel  Schein  so  viel  Hindeutung  aufs  Sein),  might  also  be 
cited  in  this  connection.  That  which  continually  impelled 
Kant,  in  spite  of  his  proclamation  of  the  unknowableness 
of  things  in  themselves,  to  form  ideas  about  their  character, 
was  the  moral  interest,  but  this  sometimes  threw  its  influ- 
ence in  favor  of  their  commensurability  with  phenomena 
and  sometimes  in  the  opposite  scale.  For  in  his  ethics 
Kant  needs  the  intelligible  character  or  man  as  noumenon, 
and  must  assume  as  many  men  in  themselves  (to  be  con- 
sistent, then,  in  general,  as  many  beings  in  themselves)  as 
there  are  in  the  world  of  phenomena.  But  for  practical  rea- 
sons,  again,  the   causality  of  the  man  in  himself  must  be 

*  Kant's  conjectures  concerning  a  common  ground  of  material  and  mental 
phenomena,  and  those  concerning  the  common  root  of  sensibility  and  under- 
standing, show  the  same  tendency.  On  the  one  hand,  duality,  on  the  other, 
unity. 

\  "  Phenomenon,  which  always  has  two  sides,  the  one  when  the  object  in  itself 
is  considered  (apart  from  the  way  in  which  it  is  intuited,  and  just  because  of 
which  fact  its  character  always  remains  problematical),  the  other  when  we  regard 
the  form  of  the  intuition  of  this  object,  which  must  be  sought  not  in  the  object 
in  itself,  but  in  the  subject  to  whom  the  object  appears,  while  it  nevertheless 
actually  and  necessarily  belongs  to  the  phenomenon  of  this  object."  "  This  pred- 
icate " — sc.,  spatial  quality,  extension — "is  attributed  to  things  only  in  so  far 
as  they  appear  to  us." 


THINGS  IN    THEMSELVES,   PHENOMENA.  353 

thought  of  as  entirely  different  from,  and  opposed  to,  the 
mechanical  causality  of  the  sense  world.  Kant's  judgment 
is,  also,  no  more  stable  concerning  the  value  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  suprasensible,  which  is  denied  to  us.  "  I  do  not 
need  to  know  what  things  in  themselves  may  be,  because  a 
thing  can  never  be  presented  to  me  otherwise  than  as  a  phe- 
nomenon." And  yet  a  natural  and  ineradicable  need  of 
the  reason  to  obtain  some  conviction  in  regard  to  the  other 
world  is  said  to  underlie  the  abortive  attempts  of  meta- 
physics ;  and  Kant  himself  uses  all  his  efforts  to  secure  to 
the  practical  reason  the  satisfaction  of  this  need,  though  he 
has  denied  it  to  the  speculative  reason,  and  to  make  good 
the  gap  in  knowledge  by  faith.  From  the  theoretical 
standpoint  an  extension  of  knowledge  beyond  the  limits  of 
phenomena  appears  impossible,  but  unnecessary  ;  from  the 
practical  standpoint  it  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  possible  and 
indispensable. 

There  is,  then,  a  threefold  distinction  to  be  made: 
(i)  Things  in  themselves,  which  can  never  be  the  object  of 
our  knowledge,  because  our  forms  of  intuition  are  not  valid 
for  them.  (2)  Phenomena,  things  for  us,  nature  or  the 
totality  of  that  which  either  is  or,  at  least,  may  be  the 
object  of  our  knowledge  (here  belong  the  possible  inhab- 
itants of  the  moon,  the  magnetic  matter  which  pervades  all 
bodies,  and  the  forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion,  though 
the  first  have  never  been  observed,  and  the  second  is  not 
perceptible  on  account  of  the  coarseness  of  our  senses,  and 
the  last,  because  forces  in  general  arc  not  perceptible; 
nature  comprehends  everything  whose  existence  "  is  con- 
nected with  our  perceptions  in  a  possible  experience"*). 
(3)  Our  representations  of  phenomena,  i.  c,  that  of  the  lat- 
ter which  actually  enters  into  the  consciousness  of  the 
empirical  individual.  In  the  realm  of  things  in  themselves 
there  is  no  motion  whatever,  but  at  most  an  intelligible  cor- 
relate of  this  relation;  in  the  world  of  phenomena,  tin- 
world  of  physics,  the  earth  moves  around  the  sun;  in   the 

*"  Nothing  is  actually  given  to  tis  but  the  perception  and  the  empirical 
progress  from  this  to  other  possible  perceptions."  "  To  call  a  phenomenon  a 
real  thing  antecedent  to.perccption,  means  .  .  .  that  in  the progress  oj V.v/><  run« 
we  must  meet  with  such  a  perception." 


354  KANT. 

sphere  of  representation  the  sun  moves  around  the  earth. 
It  is  true,  as  has  been  said,  that  Kant  sometimes  ignores  the 
distinction  between  phenomena  as  related  to  noumena  and 
phenomena  as  related  to  representations  ;  and,  as  a  result  of 
this,  that  the  phenomenon  is  either  completely  volatilized 
into  the  representation*  or  split  up  into  an  objective  half 
independent  of  us  and  a  representative  half  dependent  on 
us,  of  which  the  former  falls  into  the  thing  in  itself, f  while 
the  latter  is  resolved  into  subjective  states  of  the  ego. 

After  the  possibility  and  the  legitimacy  of  synthetic 
judgments  a  priori  have  been  proved  for  pure  mathematics 
upon  the  basis  of  the  pure  intuitions,  there  emerges,  in  the 
second  place,  the  problem  of  the  possibility  of  a  priori 
syntheses  in  pure  natural  science,  or  the  question,  Do  pure 
concepts  exist?  And  after  this  has  been  answered  in  the 
affirmative,  the  further  questions  come  up,  Is  the  application 
of  these,  first,  to  phenomena,  and  second,  to  things  in  them- 
selves, possible  and  legitimate,  and  how  far? 

(b)  The  Concepts  and  Principles  of  the  Pure  Understand- 
ing (Transcendental  Analytic). — Sensations,  in  order  to 
become  "  intuition  "  or  the  perception  of  a  phenomenon, 
needed  to  be  ordered  in  space  and  time  ;  in  order  to  become 
"  experience"  or  a  unified  knowledge  of  objects,  intuitions 
need  a  synthesis  through  concepts.  In  order  to  objective 
knowledge  the  manifold  of  intuition  (already  ordered  by  its 
arrangement  in  space  and  time)  must  be  connected  in  the 
unity   of  the   concept.     Sensibility  gives   the  manifold   to 

*  Phenomena  "  are  altogether  in  me,"  "  exist  only  in  our  sensibility  as  a  modi- 
fication of  it."  "  There  is  nothing  in  space  but  that  which  is  actually  repre- 
sented in  it."  Phenomena  are  "mere  representations,  which,  if  they  are  not 
given  in  us  (in  perception)  nowhere  exist." 

\  Here  Kant  is  guiby  of  the  fault  which  he  himself  has  censured,  of  confusing 
the  physical  and  transcendental  meanings  of  "  in  itself."  He  forgets  that  the 
thing,  if  it  is  momentarily  not  intuited  or  represented  by  me,  anH  therefore  is 
not  immediately  given  for  me  as  an  individual,  is  nevertheless  still  present  for 
me  as  man,  is  mediately  given,  that  is,  is  discoverable  by  future  search. 
That  which  is  without  my  present  consciousness  is  not  for  this  reason  without 
all  human  consciousness.  In  fact,  Kant  often  overlooks  the  distinction  between 
actual  and  possible  intuition,  so  that  for  him  the  "objects"  of  the  latter  slip 
out  of  space  and  time  and  into  the  thing  in  itself.  To  the  "transcendental 
object  we  may  ascribe  the  extent  and  connection  of  our  possible  perceptions, 
and  say  that  it  is  given  in  itself  before  all  experience."  In  it  "the  real  things 
of  the  past  are  given." 


ANALYTIC  OF  CONCEPTS.  355 

be  connected,  the  understanding  the  connecting  unity. 
The  former  is  able  to  intuit  only,  the  latter  only  to  think; 
knowledge  can  arise  only  as  the  result  of  their  union. 
Intuitions  depend  on  affections,  concepts  on  functions, 
that  is,  on  unifying  acts  of  the  understanding. 

To  discover  the  pure  forms  of  thought  it  is  neces- 
sary to  isolate  the  understanding,  just  as  an  isolation  of 
the  sensibility  was  necessary  above  in  order  to  the  discov- 
ery of  the  pure  forms  of  intuition.  We  obtain  the  eje- 
ments  of  the  pure  knowledge  of  the  understanding  by  re- 
jecting all  that  is  intuitive  and  empirical.  These  elements.-^ _*-- 
must  be  pure,  must  be  concepts,  further,  not  derivative  or 
composite,  but  fundamental  concepts,  and  their  number 
must  be  complete.  This  completeness  is  guaranteed  only 
when  the  pure  concepts  or  categories  "are  sought  according  to 
some  common  principle,  which  assigns  to  each'its  position 
in  the  connection  of  the  whole,  and  not  (as  with  Aristotle) 
collected  by  occasional,  unsystematic  inquiries  undertaken 
at  random.  The  table  of  the  forms  of  judgment  will 
serve  as  a  guide  for  the  discovery  of  the  categories. 
Thought  is  knowledge  through  concepts;  the  understand- 
ing can  make  no  other  use  of  concepts  than  to  judge  by 
means  of  them.  Hence,  since  the  understanding  is  the 
faculty  of  judging,  the  various  kinds  of  connection  in  judg- 
ment must  yield  the  various  pure  "connective-concepts" 
{Verknüpf nngsbcgriffe. — K.  Fischer)  or  categories. 

In  regard  to  quantity,  every  judgment  is  universal,  par- 
ticular, or  singular  ;  in  regard  to  quality,  affirmative,  nega- 
tive, or  infinite;  in  regard  to  relation,  categorical,  hypo- 
thetical, or  disjunctive;  and  in  regard  to  modality,  prob- 
lematical, assertory,  or  apodictic.  To  these  twelve  forms 
of  judgment  correspond  as  many  categories,  viz.,  I.,  Unity, 
Plurality,  Totality;  II.,  Reality,  Negation,  Limitation; 
III.,  Subsistence  and  Inherence  (Substance  and  Accident), 
Causality  and  Dependence  (Cause  and  Effect),  Community 
(Reciprocity  between  the  Active  and  the  Passive); 
IV.,  Possibility — Impossiblity,  Existence — Non-existence, 
Necessity — Contingency. 

The  first  six  of  these  fundamental  concepts,  which  have 
no  correlatives,    constitute   the   mathematical,   the  second 


356  KANT. 

six,  which  appear  in  pairs,  the  dynamical  categories.  The 
former  relate  to  objects  of  (pure  or  of  empirical)  intui- 
tion, the  latter  to  the  existence  of  these  objects  (in  relation 
to  one  another  or  to  the  understanding).  Although  all 
other  a  priori  division  though  concepts  must  be  dichoto- 
mous,  each  of  the  four  heads  includes  three  categories,  the 
third  of  which  in  each  case  arises  from  the  combination  of 
the  second  and  first,*  but,  nevertheless,  is  an  original  (not  a 
derivative)  concept,  since  this  combination  requires  a  special 
actus  of  the  understanding.  Universality  or  totality  is 
plurality  regarded  as  unity,  limitation  is  reality  combined 
with  negation,  community  is  the  reciprocal  causality 
of  substances,  and  necessity  is  the  actuality  given  by  pos- 
sibility itself.  Kant  omits,  as  unnecessary  here,  the  useful, 
easy,  and  not  unpleasant  task  of  noting  the  great  number 
of  derivative  concepts  a  priori  (predicables)  which  spring 
from  the  combination  of  these  twelve  original  concepts 
(predicaments  =  categories)  with  one  another,  or  with  the 
modes  of  pure  sensibility, — the  concepts  force,  action,  pas- 
sion, would  belong  as  subsumptions  under  causality, 
presence  and  resistance  under  community,  origin,  extinc- 
tion, and  change  under  modality, — since  his  object  is 
not  a  system,  but  only  the  principles  of  one.  His  liking 
or  even  love  for  this  division  according  to  quantity,  quality, 
relation,  and  modality,  which  he  always  has  ready  as  though 
it  were  a  universal  key  for  philosophical  problems,  reveals 
a  very  strong  architectonic  impulse,  against  which  even  his 
ever  active  skeptical  tendency  is  not  able  to  keep  up  the 
battle. 

In  view  of  the  derivation  of  the  forms  of  thought  from 
the  forms  of  judgment  Kant  does  not  stop  to  give  a  detailed 
proof  that  the  categories  are  concepts,  and  that  they  are 
pure.  Their  discursive  (not  intuitive)  character  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  th~ir  reference  to  the  object  is  mediate 
only  (and    not,  as    in    the    case    of    intuition,   immediate), 

*  Concerning  this  "  neat  observation,"  Kant  remarked  that  it  might  "perhaps 
have  important  consequences  in  regard  to  the  scientific  form  of  all  knowledge 
of  reason."  This  prophecy  was  fulfilled,  although  in  a  different  sense  from  that 
which  floated  before  his  mind.  Fichte  and  Hegel  composed  their  "thought- 
symphonies  "  in  the  three-four  time  given  by  Kant. 


DEDUCTION  OF    THE    CATEGORIES.  357 

and  their  a  priori  origin,  from  the  necessity  which  they 
carry  with  them,  and  which  would  be  impossible  if  their 
origin  were  empirical.  Here  Kant  starts  from  Hume's 
criticism  of  the  idea  of  cause.  The  Scottish  skeptic  had 
said  that  the  necessary  bond  between  cause  and  effect  can 
neither  be  perceived  nor  logically  demonstrated ;  that, 
therefore,  the  relation  of  causality  is  an  idea  which  we — 
with  what  right  ? — add  to  perceived  succession  in  time. 
This  doubt  (without  the  hasty  conclusions),  says  Kant,  must 
be  generalized,  must  be  extended  to  the  category  of  sub- 
stance (which  had  been  already  done  by  Hume,  pp.  226-7, 
though  the  author  of  the  Critique  of  Reason  was  not  aware 
of  the  fact),  and  to  all  other  pure  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing. Then  we  may  hope  to  kindle  a  torch  at  the 
spark  which  Hume  struck  out.  The  problem  "  It  is 
impossible  to  see  why,  because  something  exists,  some- 
thing else  must  necessarily  exist,"  is  the  starting  point  alike 
of  Hume's  skepticism  and  Kant's  criticism.  The  former 
recognized  that  the  principle  of  causality  is  neither  empirical 
nor  analytic,  and  therefore  concluded  that  it  is  an  inven- 
tion of  reason,  which  confuses  subjective  with  objective 
necessity.  The  latter  shows  that  in  spite  of  its  subjective 
origin  it  has  an  objective  value;  that  it  is  a  truth  which  is 
independent  of  all  experience,  and  yet  valid  for  all  who 
have  experience,  and  for  all  that  can  be  experienced. 

Of  the  two  questions,  "  How  can  the  concepts  which 
spring  from  our  understanding  possess  objective  validity?" 
and,  "  How  (through  what  means  or  media)  does  their  appli- 
cation to  objects  of  experience  take  place  ?  "  the  first  is 
answered  in  the  Deduction  of  the  Pure  Concepts  of  the 
Understanding,  and  the  second  in  the  chapter  on  their 
Schematism. 

The  Deduction,  the  most  difficult  portion  of  the  Critique, 
shows  that  the  objective  validity  of  the  categories,  as  con- 
cepts of  objects  in  general,  depends  on  the  fact  that  through 
tlicm  alone  experience  as  far  as  regards  the  form  of  thought 
is  possible,  i.  c,  it  is  only  through  them  that  any  object  what- 
ever can  bethought.  All  knowledge  consists  in  judgments  ; 
all  judgments  contain  a  connection  of  representations; 
all  connection — whether  it  be  conscious  or  not,  whether  it 


35 8  KANT. 

relates  to  concepts  or  to  pure  or  empirical  intuitions — is  an 
act  of  the  understanding ;  it  cannot  be  given  by  objects, 
but  only  spontaneously  performed  by  the  subject  itself. 
We  cannot  represent  anything  as  connected  in  the  object 
unless  we  have  ourselves  first  connected  it.  The  connection 
includes  three  conceptions:  that  of  the  manifold  to  be 
connected  (which  is  given  by  intuition),  that  of  the  act  of 
synthesis,  and  that  of  the  unity;  this  last  is  two-fold,  an 
objective  unity  (the  conception  of  an  object  in  general  in 
which  the  manifold  is  united),  and  a  subjective  unity  (the 
unity  of  consciousness  under  which  or,  rather,  through 
which  the  connection  is  effected).  The  categories  represent 
the  different  kinds  of  combination,  each  one  of  these,  again, 
being  completed  in  three  stages,  which  are  termed  the 
Synthesis  of  Apprehension  in  Intuition,  the  Synthesis  of 
Reproduction  in  Imagination,  and  the  Synthesis  of  Recogni- 
tion in  Concepts.  If  I  wish  to  think  the  time  from  one 
noon  to  the  next,  I  must  (i)  grasp  (apprehend)  the  manifold 
representations  (portions  of  time)  in  succession  ;  (2)  retain 
or  renew  (reproduce)  in  thought  those  which  have  pre- 
ceded in  passing  to  those  which  follow  ;  (3)  be  conscious 
that  that  which  is  now  thought  is  the  same  with  that 
thought  before,  or  know  again  (recognize)  the  reproduced 
representation  as  the  one  previously  experienced.  If  the 
mind  did  not  exercise  such  synthetic  activity  the  manifold 
of  representation  would  not  constitute  a  whole,  would 
lack  the  unity  which  consciousness  alone  can  impart  to  it. 
Without  this  one  consciousness,  concepts  and  knowledge 
of  objects  would  be  wholly  impossible.  The  unity  of  pure 
self-consciousness  or  of  "  transcendental  apperception  " 
is  the  postulate  of  all  use  of  the  understanding.  In  the 
flux  of  internal  phenomena  there  is  no  constant  or  abiding 
self,  but  the  unchangeable  consciousness  here  demanded  is 
a  precedent  condition  of  all  experience,  and  gives  to  phe- 
nomena a  connection  according  to  laws  which  determine  an 
object  for  intuition,  i.  e.,  the  conception  of  something  in 
which  they  are   necessarily  connected.*     Reference   to  an 

*  Object  is  "that  which  opposes  the  random  or  arbitrary  determination  of  our 
cognitions,"  and  which  causes  "  them  to  be  determined  in  a  certain  way  a 
priori." 


SCHEMA  T/SM.  359 

object  is  nothing  other  than  the  necessary  unity  of  con- 
sciousness. The  connective  activity  of  the  understanding, 
and  with  it  experience,  is  possible  only  through  "the  syn- 
thetic unity  of  pure  apperception,"  the  "  I  think,"  which 
must  be  able  to  accompany  all  my  representations,  and 
through  which  they  first  become  mine. 

Experience  (in  the  strict  sense)  is  distinguished  from 
perception  (experience  in  the  wide  sense)  by  its  objectivity 
or  universal  validity.  A  judgment  of  perception  (the  sun 
shines  upon  the  stone  and  the  stone  becomes  warm)  is 
only  subjectively  valid  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  a  judg- 
ment of  experience  (the  sun  warms  the  stone)  aims  to  be 
valid  not  only  forme  and  my  present  condition,  but  always, 
for  me  and  for  everyone  else.  If  the  former  is  to  become 
the  latter,  an  a  priori  concept  must  be  added  to  the 
perception  (in  the  above  case,  the  concept  of  cause),  under 
which  the  perception  is  subsumed.  The  category  deter- 
mines the  perceptions  in  view  of  the  form  of  the  judgment, 
gives  to  the  judgment  its  reference  to  an  object,  and  thus 
gives  to  the  percepts,  or  rather,  concepts  (sunshine  and 
warmth),  necessary  and  universally  valid  connection.  The 
"reason  why  the  judgments  of  others"  must  "agree 
with  mine  "  is  "  the  unity  of  the  object  to  which  they  all 
relate,  with  which  they  agree,  and  hence  must  also  all  agree 
with  one  another." 

Though  the  categories  take  their  origin  in  the  nature  of 
the  subject,  they  are  objective  and  valid  for  objects  of 
experience,  because  experience  is  possible  alone  through 
them.  They  are  not  the  product,  but  the  ground  of  expe- 
rience. The  second  difficulty  concerns  their  applicability 
to  phenomena,  which  are  wholly  disparate.  By  what 
means  is  the  gulf  between  the  categories,  which  are  con- 
cepts and  a  priori,  and  perceptions,  which  are  intuitous  and 
empirical,  bridged  over?  The  connei  ting  link  is  supplied 
by  the  imagination,  as  the  fa<  ulty  which  mediates  between 
sensibility  and  understanding  to  provide  a  concept  with 
its    image,  and    consists  in    the  intuition  of  time,    which, 

in  common  with  the    Categories,  has    an    a   priori  character, 

and,    in    common    with    perceptions,   an    intuitive    charac 
ter,  so    that    it    is   at   once     pure  and   sensuous.       The   sub- 


3°°  KANT. 

sumption  of  phenomena  or  empirical  intuitions  under 
the  category  is  effected  through  the  Schemata*  of  the  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding,  i.  c,  through  a  priori  deter- 
minations of  time  according  to  rules,  which  relate  to  time- 
series,  time-content,  time-order,  and  tivae-comprekension,  and 
indicate  whether  I  have  to  apply  this  or  that  category  to  a 
given  object. 

Each  category  has  its  own  schema.  The  schema  of 
quantity  is  number,  as  comprehending  the  successive  addi- 
tion of  homogeneous  parts.  Filled  time  (being  in  time)  is 
the  schema  of  reality,  empty  time  (not-being  in  time)  the 
schema  of  negation,  and  more  or  less  filled  time  (the  inten- 
sity of  sensation,  indicating  the  degree  of  reality)  the 
schema  of  limitation.  Permanence  in  time  is  the  sign  for 
the  application  of  the  category  of  substance  ;f  regular  suc- 
cession, for  the  application  of  the  concept  of  cause ;  the 
coexistence  of  the  determinations  of  one  substance  with 
those  of  another,  the  signal  for  their  subsumption  under 
the  concept  of  reciprocity.  The  schemata  of  possibility, 
actuality,  and  necessity,  finally,  are  existence  at  any  time 
whatever  (whensoever),  existence  at  a  definite  time,  and 
existence  at  all  times.  By  such  schematic  syntheses  the 
pure  concept  is  brought  near  to  the  empirical  intuition,  and 
the  way  is  prepared  for  an  application  of  the  former  to  the 
latter,  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  for  the  subsumption  of 
the  latter  under  the  former. 

As  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  schematism  permits  a  pres- 
entation of  the  categories  in  time  intuition  antecedent  to 

*  The  schema  is  not  an  empirical  image,  but  stands  midway  between  this  (the 
particular  intuition  of  a  definite  triangle  or  dog)  and  the  unintuitable  concept, 
as  a  general  intuition  (of  a  triangle  or  a  dog  in  general,  which  holds  alike  for 
right-  and  oblique  angled  triangles,  for  poodles  and  pugs),  or  as  a  rule  for  deter- 
mining our  intuition  in  accordance  with  a  concept. 

f  This  determination  is  important  for  psychology.  Since  the  inner  sense 
shows  nothing  constant,  but  everything  in  a  continual  flux, — for  the  permanent 
subject  of  our  thoughts  is  an  identical  activity  of  the  understanding,  not  an  in- 
tuitable  object, — the  concept  of  substance  is  not  applicable  to  psychical  phe- 
nomena. Representations  of  a  permanent  (material  substances)  exist,  indeed, 
but  not  permanent  representations.  The  abiding  self  (ego,  soul)  which  we 
posit  back  of  internal  phenomena  is,  as  the  Dialectic  will  show,  a  mere  Idea, 
which,  or,  rather,  the  object  of  which,  maybe  "  thought "  as  substance,  it  is 
true,  but  cannot  be  "given"  in  intuition,  hence  cannot  be  "known." 


ANALYTIC  OF  PRINCIPLES.  361 

all  experience,  the  possibility  is  given  of  synthetic  judg- 
ments a  priori  concerning  objects  of  possible  experience. 
Such  judgments,  in  so  far  as  they  are  not  based  on  higher 
and  more  general  cognitions,  are  termed  "  principles," 
and  the  system  of  them — to  be  given,  with  the  table  of  the 
categories  as  a  guide,  in  the  Analytic  of  Principles  or  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Faculty  of  Judgment — furnishes  the  out- 
lines of  "pure  natural  science."  When  thus  the  rules  of 
the  subsumption  to  be  effected  have  been  found  in  the  pure 
concepts,  and  the  conditions  and  criteria  of  the  subsump- 
tion in  the  schemata,  it  remains  to  indicate  the  principles 
which  the  understanding,  through  the  aid  of  the  schemata, 
actually  produces  a  priori  from  its  concepts. 

The  principle  of  quantity  is  the  Axiom  of  Intuition, 
the  principle  of  quality  the  Anticipation  of  Perception  ; 
the  principles  of  relation  are  termed  Analogies  of  Experi- 
ence, those  of  modality  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought 
in  General.  The  first  runs,  "  All  intuitions  are  extensive 
quantities  "  ;  the  second,  "  In  all  phenomena  sensation,  and 
the  real  which  corresponds  to  it  in  the  object,  has  an  inten- 
sive quantity,  i.  e.,  a  degree."  The  principle  of  the  "Anal- 
ogies" is,  "  All  phenomena,  as  far  as  their  existence  is  con- 
cerned, are  subject  a  priori  to  rules,  determining  their 
mutual  relation  in  time"  (in  the  second  edition  this  is 
stated  as  follows  :  "  Experience  is  possible  only  through 
the  representation  of  a  necessary  connection  of  percep, 
tions").  As  there  are  three  modes  of  time,  there  result 
three  "  Analogies,"  the  principles  of  permanence,  of  suc- 
cession (production),  and  of  coexistence.  These  arc:  (1) 
"  In  all  changes  of  phenomena  the  substance  is  permanent, 
and  its  quantum  is  neither  increased  nor  diminished  in 
nature."  (2)  "  All  changes  take  place  according  to  the  law 
of  connection  between  cause  and  effect";  or,  "  Everything 
that  happens  (begins  to  be)  presupposes  something  on  which 
it  follows  according  to  a  rule."  (3)  "All  substances,  in  so 
far  as  they  are  coexistent,  stand  in  complete  community, 
that  is,  reciprocity,  one  to  another."  And,  finally,  the 
three  "  Postulates  "  :  "  That  which  agrees  wit  h  the  formal 
conditions  of  experience  (in  intuition  and  in  concepts)  is 
possible."      "That   which   is  connected  with   the   material 


36  2  KANT. 

conditions  of  experience  (sensation)  is  actual  "  (perception 
is  the  only  criterion  of  actuality).  "  That  which,  in  its 
connection  with  the  actual,  is  determined  by  universal  con- 
ditions of  experience,  is  (exists  as)  necessary." 

As  the  categories  of  substance  and  causality  are  specially 
preferred  to  the  others  by  Kant  and  the  Kantians,  and  are 
even  proclaimed  by  some  as  the  only  fundamental  con- 
cepts, so  also  the  principles  of  relation  have  an  established 
reputation  for  special  importance.  The  leading  ideas  in 
the  proofs  of  the  "Analogies  of  Experience" — for  in  spite 
of  their  underivative  character  the  principles  require,  and 
are  capable  of,  proof — may  next  be  noted. 

The  time  determinations  of  phenomena,  the  knowledge 
of  their  duration,  their  succession,  and  their  coexistence, 
form  an  indispensable  part  of  our  experience,  not  only  of 
scientific  experience,  but  of  everyday  experience  as  well. 
How  is  the  objective  time-determination  of  things  and 
events  possible  ?  If  the  matter  in  hand  is  the  determina- 
tion of  the  particulars  of  a  fight  with  a  bloody  ending,  the 
witnesses  are  questioned  and  testify :  We  heard  and  saw 
how  A  began  the  quarrel  by  insulting  B,  and  the  latter 
answered  the  insult  with  a  blow,  whereupon  A  drew  his 
knife  and  wounded  his  opponent.  Here  the  successior  of 
perceptions  on  the  part  of  the  persons  present  is  accepted 
as  a  true  reproduction  of  the  succession  of  the  actual  events. 
But  the  succession  of  perceptions  is  not  always  the  sure 
indication  of  an  actual  succession :  the  trees  along  an 
avenue  are  perceived  one  after  the  other,  while  they  are  in 
reality  coexistent.  We  might  now  propose  the  following 
statement  :  The  representation  of  the  manifold  of  phe- 
nomena is  always  successive,  I  apprehend  one  part  after 
another.  I  can  decide  whether  these  parts  succeed  one 
another  in  the  object  also,  or  whether  they  are  coexistent, 
by  the  fact  that,  in  the  second  case,  the  series  of  my 
perceptions  is  reversible,  while  in  the  first  it  is  not.  lean, 
if  I  choose,  direct  my  glance  along  the  avenue  in  such  a  way 
that  I  shall  begin  the  second  time  with  the  tree  at  which  I  left 
off  the  first  time  ;  if  I  wish  to  assure  myself  that  the  parts 
of  a  house  are  coexistent,  I  cause  my  eye  to  wander  from 
the  upper  to  the  lower  portions,  from   the  right  side  to  the 


OBJECTIVE  TIME    RELA  TIONS  OF  PHENOMENA.      363 

left,  and  then  to  perform  the  same  motions  in  the  opposite 
direction.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  left  to  my  choice 
to  hear  the  thunder  either  before  or  after  I  see  the  lightning, 
or  to  see  a  passing  wagon  now  here,  now  there,  but  in  these 
cases  I  am  bound  in  the  succession  of  my  sensuous  repres- 
entations. The  possibility  of  interchange  in  the  series  of 
perceptions  proves  an  objective  coexistence,  the  impossi- 
bility of  this,  an  objective  succession.  But  this  criterion 
is  limited  to  the  immediate  present,  and  fails  us  when  a 
time  relation  between  unobserved  phenomena  is  to  be 
established.  If  I  go  at  evening  into  the  dining  room  and 
see  a  vessel  of  bubbling  water,  which  is  to  be  used  in  mak- 
ing tea,  over  a  burning  spirit  lamp,  whence  do  I  derive  the 
knowledge  that  the  water  began,  and  could  begin,  to  boil 
only  after  the  alcohol  had  been  lighted,  and  not  before? 
Because  I  have  often  seen  the  flame  precede  the  boiling  of 
the  water,  and  in  this  the  irreversibility  of  the  two  per- 
ceptions has  guaranteed  to  me  the  succession  of  the  events 
perceived  ?  Then  I  may  only  assume  that  it  is  very 
probable,  not  that  it  is  certain,  that  in  this  case  also  the 
order  of  the  two  events  has  been  the  same  as  I  have  observed 
several  times  before.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  we 
all  assert  that  the  water  could  not  have  come  into  a  boiling 
condition  unless  the  generation  of  heat  had  preceded  ;  that 
in  every  case  the  fire  must  be  there  before  the  boiling  of  the 
water  can  commence.  Whence  do  we  derive  this  must  ? 
Simply  and  alone  from  the  thought  of  a  causal  connection 
between  the  two  events.  Every  phenomenon  must  follow 
in  time  that  phenomenon  of  which  it  is  the  effect,  and 
must  precede  that  of  which  it  is  the  cause.  It  is  through 
the  relation  of  causality,  and  through  this  alone,  that  the 
objective  time  relation  of  phenomena  is  determined.  If 
nothing  preceded  an  event  on  which  it  must  follow  accord- 
ing to  a  rule, *  then  all  succession  in  perception  would  be 
subjective  merely,  and  nothing  whatever  would  be  objec- 
tively determined  by  it  as  to  what  was  the  antecedent 
and  what  the  consequent  in  the  phenomenon  itself.  We 
should  then  have  a  mere   play  of  representations  withoul 

*  "  A  reality  following  on  an  empty  time,  that  is,  a  beginning  of  existence  pre 
ceded  by  no  state  of  thing  ,  can  as  little  l>c  apprehended  as  empty  time  itself." 


364  KANT. 

significance  for  the  real  succession  of  events.  Only  the 
thought  of  a  rule,  according  to  which  the  antecedent  state 
contains  the  necessary  condition  of  the  consequent  state, 
justifies  us  in  transferring  the  time  order  of  our  representa- 
tions to  phenomena.*  Nay,  even  the  distinction  between 
the  phenomenon  itself,  as  the  object  of  our  representa- 
tions, and  our  representations  of  it,  is  effected  only  by 
subjecting  the  phenomenon  to  this  rule,  which  assigns  to 
it  its  definite  position  in  time  after  another  phenomenon 
by  which  it  is  caused,  and  thus  forbids  the  inversion  of  the 
perceptions.  We  can  derive  the  rule  of  the  understanding 
which  produces  the  objective  time  order  of  the  manifold 
from  experience,  only  because  we  have  put  it  into  experi- 
ence, and  have  first  brought  experience  into  being  by  means 
of  the  rule.  We  recapitulate  in  Kant's  own  words  :  The 
objective  (time)  relation  of  phenomena  remains  undeter- 
mined by  mere  perception  (the  mere  succession  in  my  appre- 
hension, if  it  is  not  determined  by  means  of  a  rule  in  rela- 
tion to  an  antecedent,  does  not  guarantee  any  succession  in 
the  object).  In  order  that  this  may  be  known  as  deter- 
mined, the  relation  between  the  two  states  must  be  so  con- 
ceived (through  the  understanding's  concept  of  causality) 
that  it  is  thereby  determined  with  necessity  which  of  them 
must  be  taken  as  coming  first,  and  which  second,  and  not 
conversely.  Thus  it  is  only  by  subjecting  the  succession 
of  phenomena  to  the  law  of  causality  that  empirical  knowl- 
edge of  them  is  possible.  Without  the  concept  of  cause 
no  objective  time  determination,  and  hence,  without  it,  no 
experience. 

That  which  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  does  for  the 
succession  f  of  phenomena,  the  relation  of  reciprocity 
does  for  their  coexistence,  and  that  of  substance  and  acci- 
dent for  their  duration.  Since  absolute  time  is  not  an 
object  of  perception,  the  position  of  phenomena  in  time  can- 

*  "  If  phenomena  were  things  in  themselves  no  one  would  be  able,  from  the 
succession  of  the  representations  of  their  manifold,  to  tell  how  this  is  connected 
in  the  object." 

f  Against  the  objection  that  cause  and  effect  are  frequently,  indeed  in  most 
cases,  simultaneous  {c .  g.,  the  heated  stove  and  the  warmth  of  the  room),  Kant 
remarks  that  the  question  concerns  the  order  of  time  merely,  and  not  the  lapse 


OBJECTIVE   TIME   RELATIONS  OF  PHENOMENA.       365 

not  be  directly  determined,  but  only  through  a  concept  of 
the  understanding.  When  I  conclude  that  two  objects  (the 
earth  and  the  moon)  must  be  coexistent,  because  percep- 
tions of  them  can  follow  upon  one  another  in  both  ways,  I 
do  this  on  the  presupposition  that  the  objects  themselves 
reciprocally  determine  their  position  in  time,  hence  are  not 
isolated,  but  stand  in  causal  community  or  a  relation  of 
reciprocal  influence.  It  is  only  on  the  condition  of  reci- 
procity between  phenomena,  through  which  they  form  a 
whole,  that  I  can  represent  them  as  coexistent. 

Coexistence  and  succession  can  be  represented  only  in  a 
permanent  substratum  ;  they  are  merely  the  modes  in  which 
the  permanent  exists.  Since  time  (in  which  all  change  takes 
place,  but  which  itself  abides  and  does  not  change)  in 
itself  cannot  be  perceived,  the  substratum  of  simultaneity 
and  succession  must  exist  in  phenomena  themselves:  the 
permanent  in  relation  to  which  alone  all  the  time  relations 
of  phenomena  can  be  determined,  is  substance  ;  that  which 
alters  is  its  determinations,  accidents,  or  special  modes  of 
existing.  Alteration,  i,  e.,  origin  and  extinction,  is  true  of 
states  only,  which  can  begin  and  cease  to  be,  and  not  of  sub- 
stances, which  change  {sich  verändern),  i.  e.,  pass  from  one 
mode  of  existence  into  another,  but  do  not  alter  {wechseln), 
i.  e.,  pass  from  non-existence  into  existence,  or  the  reverse. 
It  is  the  permanent  alone  that  changes,  and  its  states 
alone  that  begin  and  cease  to  be.  The  origin  and  extinc- 
tion of  substances,  or  the  increase  and  diminution  of  their 
quantum,  would  remove  the  sole  condition  of  the  empirical 
unity  of  time  ;  for  the  time  relations  of  the  coexistent 
and  the  successive  can  be  perceived  only  in  an  identical 
substratum,  in  a  permanent,  which  exists  always.  The  law 
"From  nothing  nothing  comes,  and  nothing  can  return 
to  nothing,"  is  everywhere  assumed  and  has  been  fre- 
quently   advanced,   but   never    yet   proved,    for,  indeed,   it 

of  time.  The  ball  lyingon  a  soft  cushion  is  simultaneous,  it  is  true,  with  its  effect, 
the  depression  in  the  cushion.  "  But  I,  nevertheless,  distinguish  the  two  by 
the  time  relation  of  dynamical  connection.  Kor  if  I  place  the  ball  on  tin- 
cushion,  its  previously  smooth  surface  is  followed  by  a  depression,  but  if  there  is 
a  depression  in  the  cushion  (I  know  not  whence)  a  leaden  ball  does  not  follow 
from  it." 


366  KANT. 

is  impossible  to  prove  it  dogmatically.  Here  the  only 
possible  proof  for  it,  the  critical  proof,  is  given  :  the 
principle  of  permanence  is  a  necessary  condition  of  expe- 
rience. The  same  argument  establishes  the  principle  of 
sufficient  reason,  and  the  principle  of  the  community  of 
substances,  together  with  the  unity  of  the  world  to  be 
inferred  from  this.  The  three  Analogies  together  assert: 
"All  phenomena  exist  in  one  nature  and  must  so  exist, 
because  without  such  a  unity  a  priori  no  unity  of  expe. 
rience,  and  therefore  no  determination  of  objects  in  expe- 
rience, would  be  possible." — In  connection  with  the  Postu- 
lates the  same  transcendental  proof  is  given  for  a  series 
of  other  laws  of  nature  a  priori,  viz.,  that  in  the  course  of 
the  changes  in  the  world — for  the  causal  principle  holds 
only  for  effects  in  nature,  not  for  the  existence  of  things 
as  substances — there  can  be  neither  blind  chance  nor  a 
blind  necessity  (but  only  a  conditional,  hence  an  intelligible, 
necessity);  and,  further,  that  in  the  series  of  phenomena, 
there  can  be  neither  leap,  nor  gap,  nor  break,  and  hence  no 
void — in  mundo  non  datur  casus,  non  datur  fatum,  non  datur 
sa/tus,  non  datur  hiatus. 

While  the  dynamical  principles  have  to  do  with  the  rela- 
tion of  phenomena,  whether  it  be  to  one  another  (Analo- 
gies), or  to  our  faculty  of  cognition  (Postulates),  the 
mathematical  relate  to  the  quantity  of  intuitions  and  sen- 
sations, and  furnish  the  basis  for  the  application  of  mathe- 
matics to  natural  science.*  An  extensive  quantity  is  one  in 
which  the  representation  of  the  parts  makes  the  representa- 
tion of  the  whole  possible,  and  so  precedes  it.  I  cannot 
represent  a  line  without  drawing  it  in   thought,  i.  e.,  with- 

*  In  each  particular  science  of  nature,  science  proper  (/.  e.,  apodictically 
certain  science)  is  found  only  to  the  extent  in  which  mathematics  can  be  ap- 
plied therein.  For  this  reason  chemistry  can  never  be  anything  more  than  a 
systematic  art  or  experimental  doctrine  ;  and  psychology  not  even  this,  but 
only  a  natural  history  of  the  i-nner  sense  or  natural  description  of  the 
soul.  That  which  Kant's  Metaphysical  Elements  of  ATatural  Science, 
1786 — in  four  chapters,  Phoronomy,  Dynamics,  Mechanics,  and  Phe- 
nomenology— advances  as  pure  physics  or  the  metaphysics  of  corporeal  na- 
ture, is  a  doctrine  of  motion.  The  fundamental  determination  of  matter  (of 
a  somewhat  which  is  to  be  the  object  of  the  external  senses)  is  motion,  for  it  is 
only  through  motion  that  these  senses  can  be  affected,  and  the  understanding 
itself  reduces  all  other  predicates  of  matter  to  this.     The  second  and  most 


UNDERSTANDING  PRESCRIBES  LA  WS  TO  NA  TÜRE.      367 

out  producing  all  parts  of  it  one  after  the  other,  starting 
from  a  point.  All  phenomena  are  intuited  as  aggregates 
or  as  collections  of  previously  given  parts.  That  which 
geometry  asserts  of  pure  intuition  (i.  e.,  the  infinite  divisi- 
bility of  lines)  holds  also  of  empirical  intuition.  An  inten- 
sive quantity  is  one  which  is  apprehended  only  as  unity, 
and  in  which  plurality  can  be  represented  only  by  approxi- 
mation to  negation  =  o.  Every  sensation,  consequently 
every  reality  in  phenomena,  has  a  degree,  which,  however 
small  it  may  be,  is  never  the  smallest,  but  can  always  be 
still  more  diminished  ;  and  between  reality  and  negation 
there  exists  a  continuous  connection  of  possible  smaller 
intermediate-sensations,  or  an  infinite  series  of  ever  decreas- 
ing degrees.  The  property  of  quantities,  according  to 
which  no  part  in  them  is  the  smallest  possible  part,  and  no 
part  is  simple,  is  termed  their  continuity.  All  phenomena 
are  continuous  quantities,  i.  e.,  all  their  parts  are  in  turn 
(further  divisible)  quantities.  Hence  it  follows,  first,  that  a 
proof  for  an  empty  space  or  empty  time  can  never  be  drawn 
from  experience,  and  secondly,  that  all  change  is  also  con- 
tinuous. "It  is  remarkable,"  so  Kant  ends  his  proof  of  the 
Anticipation,  "that  of  quantities  in  general  we  can  know 
one  quality  only  a  priori,  namely,  their  continuity,  while  with 
regard  to  quality  (the  real  of  phenomena)  nothing  is  known 
to  us  a  priori  but  their  intensive  quantity,  that  is,  that  they 
must  have  a  degree.  Everything  else  is  left  to  experience." 
The  outcome  of  the  Analytic  of  Principles  sounds  bold 
enough.  The  understanding  is  the  lawgiver  of  nature:  "  It 
does  not  draw  its  laws  a  priori  from  nature,  but  prescribes 
them  to  it";  the  principles  of  the  pure  understanding  arc 

valuable  part  of  the  work  defines  matteras  the  movable,  that  which  fills  space 
by  its  moving  force,  and  recognizes  two  original  forces,  repulsive,  expansive 
superficial  force  or  force  of  contact,  by  which  a  body  resists  the  entrance-  of 
other  bodies  into  its  own  space,  and  attractive,  penetrative  force  or  the  force 
which  works  at  a  distance,  in  virtue  of  which  all  particles  of  matter  attract 
one  another.  In  order  to  a  determinate  filling  of  space  the  cooperation  of  both 
fundamental  forces  is  required.  In  opposition  to  the  mechanical  theory  of  the 
atomists,  which  explains  forces  from  matter  and  makes  them  inhere  in  it,  Kant 
holds  fast  to  the  dynamical  view  which  he  hail  early  adopted  (<  f.  p.  324), 
according  to  which  forces  are  the  primary  factor  and  matter  is  constituted  by 
them. 


368  KANT. 

the  most  universal  laws  of  nature,  the  empirical  laws  of 
nature  only  particular  determinations  of  these.  All  order 
and  regularity  take  their  origin  in  the  spirit,  and  are  put 
into  objects  by  this.  Universal  and  necessary  knowledge 
remained  inexplicable  so  long  as  it  was  assumed  that  the 
understanding  must  conform  itself  to  objects ;  it  is  at 
once  explained  if,  conversely,  we  make  objects  conform 
themselves  to  the  understanding.  This  is  a  reversal  of 
philosophical  opinion  which  may  justly  be  compared  to  the 
Copernican  revolution  in  astronomy  ;  it  is  just  as  paradox- 
ical as  the  latter,  but  just  as  incontestably  true,  and  just  as 
rich  in  results.  The  sequel  will  show  that  this  strangely 
sounding  principle,  that  things  conform  themselves  to  our 
representations  and  the  laws  of  nature  are  dependent  on 
the  understanding,  is  calculated  to  make  us  humble  rather 
than  proud.  Our  understanding  is  lawgiver  within  the 
limits  of  its  knowledge,  no  doubt,  but  it  knows  only  within 
the  limits  of  its  legislative  authority  ;  nature,  to  which  it 
dictates  laws,  is  nothing  but  a  totality  of  phenomena  ;  be- 
yond the  limits  of  the  phenomenal,  where  its  commands 
become  of  no  effect,  its  wishes  also  find  no  hearing. 

In  the  second  edition  the  Analytic  of  Principles  contains 
as  a  supplement  a  "  Refutation  of  Idealism,"  which,  in 
opposition  to  Descartes's  position  that  the  only  immediate 
experience  is  Inner  experience,  from  which  we  reach  outer 
experience  by  inference  alone,  argues  that,  conversely,  it  is 
only  through  outer  experience,  which  is  immediate  experi- 
ence proper,  that  inner  experience — as  the  consciousness 
of  my  own  existence  in  time — is  possible.  For  all  time 
determination  presupposes  something  permanent  in  per- 
ception, and  this  permanent  something  cannot  be  in  me  (the 
mere  representation  of  an  external  thing),  but  only  actually 
existing  things  which  I  perceive  without  me.  There  is, 
further,  a  chapter  on  the  "  Ground  of  the  Distinction  of  all 
Objects  in  general  into  Phenomena  and  Noumena,"  with  an 
appendix  on  the  Amphiboly  (ambiguity)  of  the  Concepts  of 
Reflection.  The  latter  shows  that  the  concepts  of  compar- 
ison :  identity  and  difference,  agreement  and  opposition,  the 
internal  and  the  external,  matter  and  form,  acquire  entirely 
different  meanings  when  they  relate  to  phenomena  and  to 


PHENOMENA    AND  NO  UM  ENA.  369 

things  in  themselves  (in  other  words,  to  things  in  their  rela- 
tion to  the  sensibility,  and  in  relation  to  the  understanding 
merely) ;  and  further,  in  a  criticism  of  the  philosophy  of 
Leibnitz,  reproaches  him  with  having  intellectualized 
phenomena,  while  Locke  is  said  to  have  sensationalized 
the  concepts  of  the  understanding. 

The  chapter  on  the  distinction  between  phenomena  and 
noumena  very  much  lessens  the  hopes,  aroused,  perchance, 
by  the  establishment  of  the  non-empirical  origin  of  the  cat- 
egories, for  an  application  of  these  not  confined  to  any  ex- 
perience. Although  the  categories,  that  is,  are  in  their 
origin  entirely  independent  of  all  experience  (so  much  so 
that  they  first  make  experience  possible),  they  are  yet  con- 
fined in  their  application  within  the  bounds  of  possible  ex- 
perience. They  "  serve  only  to  spell  phenomena,  that  we 
may  be  able  to  read  them  as  experience,"  and  when  applied 
to  things  in  themselves  lose  all  significance.*  Similarly  the 
principles  which  spring  from  them  are  "  nothing  more  than 
principles  of  possible  experience,"  and  can  be  referred  to 
phenomena  alone,  beyond  which  they  are  arbitrary  combina- 
tions without  objective  reality.  Things  in  themselves  may 
be  thought,  but  they  can  never  be  known  ;  for  knowledge, 
besides  the  empty  thought  of  an  object,  implies  intuitions 
which  must  be  subsumed  under  it  or  by  which  the  object 
must  be  determined.  In  themselves  the  pure  concepts  relate 
to  all  that  is  thinkable,  not  merely  to  that  which  can  be 
experienced,  but  the  schemata,  which  assures  their  applica- 
bility in  the  field  of  experience,  at  the  same  time  limit 
them  to  this  sphere.  The  schematism  makes  the  immanent 
use  of  the  categories,  and  thus  a  metaphysics  of  phenomena, 

*  "  A  pure  use  of  the  categories  is  no  doubt  possible,  that  is,  not  self-contra- 
dictory, but  it  lias  no  kind  of  objective  validity,  because  it  refers  to  no  intuition 
to  which  it  is  meant  to  impart  the  unity  of  an  object.  The  categories  remain 
forever  mere  functions  of  thought  by  which  no  object  can  be  given  to  me,  but 
by  which  I  can  only  think  whatever  may  be  given  to  me  in  intuition  "  {Critique 
of  Purr  Reason,  Max  Midler's  translation,  vol.  ii.  p.  220.  Without  the  con- 
dition of  sensuous  intuition,  for  which  they  supply  the  synthesis,  tin-  categories 
have  no  relation  to  any  definite  object  ;  for  without  this  condition  they  contain 
nothing  but  the  logical  function,  or  the  form  of  the  concept,  by  means  of  which 
alone  nothing  can  be  known  and  distinguished  as  to  any  object  belonging  to  it 
{Ibid.,  pp.  213,  214). 


37°  KANT. 

possible,  but  the  transcendent  use  of  them,  and  conse- 
quently the  metaphysics  of  the  suprasensible,  impossible. 
The  case  would  be  different  if  our  intuition  were  intellectual 
instead  of  sensuous,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  if  our 
understanding  were  intuitive  instead  of  discursive  ;  then 
the  objects  which  we  think  would  not  need  to  be  given  us 
from  another  source  (through  sensuous  intuition),  but  w  ould 
be  themselves  produced  in  the  act  by  which  we  thought 
them.  The  divine  spirit  may  be  such  an  archetypal,  cre- 
ative understanding  {intellectus  archetypus),  which  generates 
objects  by  its  thought;  the  human  spirit  is  not  such,  and 
therefore  is  confined,  with  its  knowledge,  within  the  circle 
of  possible  perception. — The  conception  of  "  intellectual 
intuition "  leads  to  a  distinction  in  regard  to  things  in 
themselves:  in  its  negative  meaning  noumenon  denotes  a 
thing  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  the  object  of  our  sensuous  intui- 
tion, in  its  positive  meaning  a  thing  which  is  the  object  of 
a  non-sensuous  intuition.  The  positive  thing  in  itself  is  a 
problematical  concept;  its  possibility  depends  on  the  exist- 
ence of  an  intuitive  understanding,  something  about  which 
we  are  ignorant.  The  negative  thing  in  itself  cannot  be 
known,  indeed,  but  it  can  be  thought ;  and  the  representa- 
tion of  it  is  a  possible  concept,  one  which  is  not  self-contra- 
dictory* (a  principle  which  is  of  great  importance  for 
practical  philosophy).  Still  further,  it  is  an  indispensable 
concept,  which  shows  that  the  boundary  where  our  intui- 
tion ends  is  not  the  boundary  of  the  thinkable  as  well ;  and 
even  if  it  affords  no  positive  extension  of  knowledge  f  it  is, 
nevertheless,  very  useful,  since  it  sets  bounds  to  the  use  of 

*  The  thing  in  itself  denotes  the  object  in  so  far  as  it  can  be  thought  by  us, 
but  not  intuited,  and  consequently  not  determined  by  intuitions,  i.  e.,  cannot 
be  known.  It  is  only  through  the  schematism  that  the  categories  are  limited  to 
phenomena  O.  Liebmann  {Kant  und  die  Epigonen,  p.  27,  and  passim)  over- 
looks or  ignores  this  when  he  says  :  Kant  here  allows  himself  to  "recognize 
an  object  emancipated  from  the  forms  of  knowledge,  therefore  an  irrational 
object,  i.  e.,  to  represent  something  which  is  not  representable — wooden  iron." 
The  thing  in  itself  is  insensible,  but  not  irrational,  and  the  forms  of  intuition 
and  forms  of  thought  joined  by  Li^bmann  under  the  title  forms  of  knowledge 
have  in  Kant  a  by  no  means  equal  rank. 

f  A  category  by  itself,  freed  from  all  conditions  of  intuition  (e.g.,  the  repres- 
entation of  a  substance  which  is  thought  without  permanence  in  time,  or  of  a 
cause  which  should  not  act  in  time),  can  yield  no  definite  concept  of  an  object. 


THE   IDEAS  OF  REASON.  371 

the  understanding,  and  thus,  as  it  were,  negatively  extends 
our  knowledge.  That  which  lies  beyond  the  boundary,  the 
"how  are  they  possible"  {IViemöglichkcit)  of  things  in 
themselves  is  shrouded  in  darkness,  but  the  boundary 
itself,  i.  e.,  the  "  that  they  are  possible  "  {Dassmöglichkeif), 
of  things  in  themselves,  and  the  unknowableness  of  their 
nature,  belongs  to  that  which  is  within  the  boundary  and 
lies  in  the  light.  In  this  way  Kant  believed  that  the  cate- 
gories of  causality  and  substance  might  be  applied  to  the 
relation  of  things  in  themselves  to  phenomena  without 
offending  against  the  prohibition  of  their  transcendent  use, 
since  here  the  boundary  appeared  only  to  be  touched,  and 
not  overstepped. 

Though  the  concepts  of  the  understanding  possess  a 
cognitive  value  in  the  sphere  of  phenomena  alone,  the  hope 
still  remains  of  gaining  an  entrance  into  the  suprasensible 
sphere  through  the  concepts  of  reason.  It  is  indubitable 
that  our  spirit  is  conscious  of  a  far  higher  need  than  that 
for  the  mere  connection  of  phenomena  into  experience  ; 
it  is  that  which  cannot  be  experienced,  the  Ideas  God, 
freedom,  and  immortality,  which  form  the  real  end  of  its 
inquiry.  Can  this  need  be  satisfied,  and  how?  Can  this 
end  be  attained,  and  reality  be  given  to  the  Ideas?  This  is 
the  third  question  of  the  Critique  of  Reason. 

(c)  The  Reason's  Ideas  of  the  Unconditioned  (Transcenden- 
tal Dialectic). — "  All  our  knowledge  begins  with  the  senses, 
proceeds  thence  to  the  understanding,  and  ends  with 
reason."  The  understanding  is  the  faculty  of  rules,  reason 
the  faculty  of  principles.  The  categories  of  the  under- 
standing are  necessary  concepts  which  make  experience 
possible,  and  which,  therefore,  can  always  be  given  in  expe- 
rience ;  the  Ideas  of  reason  are  necessary  concepts  to  which 
no  corresponding  object  can  be  given.  Each  of  the  Ideas 
gives  expression  to  an  unconditioned.  How  does  the  con- 
cept of  the  unconditioned  arise,  and  what  service  does 
it  perform  for  knowledge? 

As  perceptions  are  connected  by  the  categories  in  the 
unity  of  the  understanding,  and  thus  are  elevated  into  expe- 
rience, so  the  manifold  knowledge  of  experience  needs  a 
higher  unity,  the  unity  of   reason,  in   order  to  form  a  con- 


372  KANT. 

nected  system.  This  is  supplied  to  it  by  the  Ideas — which, 
consequently,  do  not  relate  directly  to  the  objects  of  intui- 
tion, but  only  to  the  understanding  and  its  judgments — in 
order,  through  the  concept  of  the  unconditioned,  to  give 
completion  to  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding,  which 
always  moves  in  the  sphere  of  the  conditioned,  i.  e.,  to 
give  it  the  greatest  possible  unity  together  with  the 
greatest  possible  extension.  The  concept  of  the  absolute 
grows  out  of  the  logical  task  which  is  incumbent  on 
reason,  i.  e.,  inference,  and  it  may  be  best  explained  from 
this  as  a  starting  point.  In  the  syllogism  the  judgment 
asserted  in  the  conclusion  is  derived  from  a  general  rule, 
the  major  premise.  The  validity  of  this  general  propo- 
sition is,  however,  itself  conditional,  dependent  on  higher 
conditions.  Then,  as  reason  seeks  the  condition  for 
each  conditioned  moment,  and  always  commands  a  further 
advance  in  the  series  of  conditions,  it  acts  under  the  Idea 
of  the  totality  of  conditions,  which,  nevertheless,  since  it  can 
never  be  given  in  experience,  does  not  denote  an  object, 
but  only  an  heuristic  maxim  for  knowledge,  the  maxim, 
namely,  never  to  stop  with  any  one  condition  as  ultimate, 
but  always  to  continue  the  search  further.  The  Idea  of  the 
unconditioned  or  of  the  completeness  of  conditions  is  a 
goal  which  we  never  attain,  but  which  we  are  continually 
to  approach.  The  categories  and  the  principles  of  the 
understanding  were  constitutive  principles,  the  Ideas  are 
regulative  merely;  their  function  is  to  guide  the  under- 
standing, to  give  it  a  direction  helpful  for  the  connection 
of  knowledge,  not  to  inform  it  concerning  the  actual  char- 
acter of  things. 

Since  reason  is  the  faculty  of  inference  (as  the  under- 
standing was  found  to  be  the  faculty  of  judgment),  the 
forms  of  the  syllogism  perform  the  same  service  for  us  in 
our  search  for  the  Ideas  as  the  forms  of  judgment  in  the 
discovery  of  the  categories.  To  the  categorical,  hypothet- 
ical, and  disjunctive  syllogisms  correspond  the  three  con- 
cepts of  reason,  the  soul  or  the  thinking  subject,  the  world 
or  the  totality  of  phenomena,  and  God,  the  original  being 
or  the  supreme  condition  of  the  possibility  of  all  that  can 
be  thought.      By  means  of  these  we  refer  all  inner  phe- 


THE  IDEAS:    THE   SOUL,    THE    WORLD,    GOD.  373 

nomena  to  the  ego  as  their  (unknown)  common  subject, 
think  all  beings  and  events  in  nature  as  ordered  under  the 
comprehensive  system  of  the  (never  to  be  experienced) 
universe,  and  regard  all  things  as  the  work  of  a  supreme 
(unknowable)  intelligence.  These  Ideas  are  necessary 
concepts ;  not  accidental  products  nor  mere  fancies,  but 
concepts  sprung  from  the  nature  of  reason  ;  their  use  is 
legitimate  so  long  as  we  remember  that  we  can  have  a 
problematical  concept  of  objects  corresponding  to  them, 
but  no  knowledge  of  these  ;  that  they  are  problems  and 
rules  for  knowledge,  never  objects  and  instruments  of  it. 
Nevertheless  the  temptation  to  regard  these  regulative 
principles  as  constitutive  and  these  problems  as  knowable 
objects  is  almost  irresistible  ;  for  the  ground  of  the  invol- 
untary confusion  of  the  required  with  the  given  absolute 
lies  not  so  much  in  the  carelessness  of  the  individual  as  in 
the  nature  of  our  cognitive  faculty.  The  Ideas  carry  with 
them  an  unavoidable  illusion  of  objective  reality,  and  the 
sophistical  inferences  which  spring  from  them  are  not  so- 
phistications of  men,  but  of  pure  reason  itself,  are  natural 
misunderstandings  from  which  even  the  wisest  cannot  free 
himself.  At  best  we  can  succeed  in  avoiding  the  error,  not 
in  doing  away  with  the  transcendental  illusion  from  which 
it  proceeds.  We  can  see  through  the  illusion  and  avoid 
the  erroneous  conclusions  built  upon  it,  not  shake  off  the 
illusion  itself. 

On  this  erroneous  objective  use  of  the  Ideas  three  so- 
called  sciences  are  based  :  speculative  psychology,  specu- 
lative cosmology,  and  speculative  theology,  which,  together 
with  ontology,  constitute  the  stately  structure  of  the 
(Wolffian)  metaphysics.  The  Critique  of  Reason  com- 
pletes its  work  of  destruction  when,  as  Dialectic  (Logic  of 
Illusion),  it  follows  the  refutation  of  dogmatic  ontology — 
developed  in  the  Analytic — which  believed  that  it  knew 
things  in  themselves  through  the  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing, with  a  refutation  of  rational  psychology,  rational 
cosmology,  and  rational  theology.  It  shows  that  the  first 
is  founded  on  paralogisms,  and  the  second  entangled  in 
irreconcilable  contradictions,  while  the  third  makes  vain 
efforts  to  prove  the  existence  of  the  Supreme  Being. 


374  KANT. 

(i)  The  Paralogisms  of  Rational  Psychology.  The  trans- 
cendental self-consciousness  or  pure  ego  which  accompanies 
and  connects  all  my  representations,  the  subject  of  all  judg- 
ments which  I  form,  is,  as  the  Analytic  recognized,  the  pre- 
supposition of  all  knowing  (pp.  358-359),  but  as  such  it  can 
never  become  an  object  of  knowledge.  We  must  not  make  a 
given  object  out  of  the  subject  which  never  can  be  a  predi- 
cate, nor  substitute  a  real  thinking  substance  for  the  logical 
subject  of  thought,  nor  revamp  the  unity  of  self-conscious- 
ness into  the  simplicity  and  identical  personality  of  the 
soul.  The  rational  psychology  of  the  Wolffian  school  is 
guilty  of  this  error,  and  whatever  of  proof  it  advances  for  the 
substantiality,  simplicity,  and  personality  of  the  soul,  and, 
by  way  of  deduction,  for  its  immateriality  and  immor- 
tality as  well  as  for  its  relation  to  the  body,  is  based  upon 
this  substitution,  this  ambiguity  of  the  middle  term,  and 
therefore  upon  a  quaternio  tcrminorum, — all  its  conclu- 
sions are  fallacious.  It  is  allowable  and  unavoidable  to  add 
in  thought  an  absolute  subject,  the  unity  of  the  ego,  to 
inner  phenomena  ;  *  it  is  inadmissible  to  treat  the  Idea  of 
the  soul  as  a  knowable  thing.  In  order  to  be  able  to  apply 
the  category  of  substance  to  it,  we  would  have  to  lay  hold 
of  a  permanent  in  intuition  such  as  cannot  be  found  in  the 
innersense.  Empirical  psychology,  then,  alone  remains  for 
the  extension  of  our  knowledge  of  mental  life,  while  rational 
psychology  shrivels  up  from  a  doctrine  into  a  mere  disci- 
pline, which  watches  that  the  limits  of  experience  are  not 
overstepped.  But  even  as  a  mere  limiting  determination 
it  has  great  value.  For,  along  with  the  hope  of  proving  the 
immateriality  and  immortality  of  the  soul,  the  fear  of  see- 
ing them  disproved  is  also  dissipated  ;  materialism  is  just 
as  unfounded  as  spiritualism,  and  if  the  conclusions  of  the 
latter  concerning  the  soul  as  a  simple,  immaterial  substance 
which  survives  the  death  of  the  body,  cannot  be  proved,  yet 

*  The  rational  concept  of  the  soul  as  a  simple,  independent  intelligence  does 
not  signify  an  actual  being,  but  only  expresses  certain  principles  of  systematic 
unity  in  the  explanation  of  psychical  phenomena,  viz.,  "  To  regard  all  determi- 
nations as  existing  in  one  subject,  all  powers,  as  far  as  possible,  as  derived  from 
one  fundamental  power,  all  change  as  belonging  to  the  states  of  one  and  the 
same  permanent  being,  and  to  represent  all  phenomena  in  space  as  totally  dis- 
tinct from  acts  of  thought." 


THE  ANTINOMIES.  375 

we  need  not,  for  that  reason,  regard  them  as  erroneous,  for 
the  opposite  is  as  little  susceptible  of  demonstration.  The 
whole  question  belongs  not  in  the  forum  of  knowledge,  but 
in  the  forum  of  faith,  and  that  which  we  gain  by  the  proof 
that  nothing  can  be  determined  concerning  it  by  theoretical 
reasoning  (viz.,  assurance  against  materialistic  objections) 
is  far  more  valuable  than  what  we  lose. 

(2)  The  Antinomies  of  Rational  Cosmology.  If  in  its 
endeavor  to  spin  metaphysical  knowledge  concerning  the 
nature  of  the  spirit  and  the  existence  of  the  soul  after 
death  out  of  the  concept  of  the  thinking  ego  the  reason 
falls  into  the  snare  of  an  ambiguous  terminus  medius,  the 
difficulties  which  frustrate  its  attempts  to  use  the  Idea  of  the 
world  in  the  extension  of  its  knowledge  a  priori  are  of 
quite  a  different  character.  Here  the  formal  correctness  of 
the  method  of  inference  is  not  open  to  attack.  It  may  be 
proved  with  absolute  strictness  (and  in  the  apagogical 
or  indirect  form,  from  the  impossibility  of  the  contrary) 
that  the  world  has  a  beginning  in  time,  and  also  that 
it  is  limited  in  space  ;  that  every  compound  substance  con- 
sists of  simple  parts  ;  that,  besides  the  causality  according 
to  the  laws  of  nature,  there  is  a  causality  through  freedo7n, 
and  that  an  absolutely  necessary  Being  exists,  either  as  a  part 
of  the  world  or  as  the  cause  of  it.  But  the  contrary  may 
be  proved  with  equal  stringency  (and  indirectly,  as  before): 
The  world  is  infinite  in  space  and  time;  there  is  nothing 
simple  in  the  world  ;  there  is  no  freedom,  but  everything  in 
the  world  takes  place  entirely  according  to  the  laws  of  na- 
ture; and  there  exists  no  absolutely  necessary  Being  either 
within  the  world  or  without  it.  This  is  the  famous  doctrine 
of  the  conflict  of  the  four  cosmological  theses  and  antith- 
eses or  of  the  Antinomy  of  Pure  Reason,  the  discovery 
of  which  indubitably  exercised  a  determining  influence 
upon  the  whole  course  of  the  Kantian  Critique  of  Reason, 
and  which  forms  one  of  its  poles.  The  transcendental  ideal- 
ism, the  distinction  between  phenomena  and  noumena,  and 
the  limitation  of  knowledge  to  phenomena,  all  receive  sig- 
nificant confirmation  from  the  Antithetic.  Without  tin- 
critical  idealism  (that  which  is  intuited  in  space  and  time, 
and  known   through  the  categories,  is  merely  the   phenom- 


376  KANT. 

enon  of  things,  whose  "in  itself"  is  unknowable),  the  an- 
tinomies would  be  insoluble.  How  is  reason  to  act  in  view 
of  the  conflict?  The  grounds  for  the  antitheses  are  just  as 
conclusive  as  those  for  the  theses;  on  neither  side  is  there 
a  preponderance  which  could  decide  the  result.  Ought 
reason  to  agree  with  both  parties  or  with  neither? 

The  solution  distinguishes  the  first  two  antinomies,  as 
the  mathematical,  from  the  second  two,  as  the  dynamical 
antinomies  ;  in  the  former,  since  it  is  a  question  of  the 
composition  and  division  of  quanta,  the  conditions  may  be 
homogeneous  with  the  conditioned,  in  the  latter,  hetero- 
geneous. In  the  former,  thesis  and  antithesis  are  alike 
false,  since  both  start  from  the  inadmissible  assumption 
that  the  universe  (the  complete  series  of  phenomena)  is 
given,  while  in  fact  it  is  only  required  of  us  (is  an  Idea). 
The  world  does  not  exist  in  itself,  but  only  in  the  empirical 
regress  of  phenomenal  conditions,  in  which  we  never  can 
reach  infinity  and  never  the  limitation  of  the  world  by  an 
empty  space  or  an  antecedent  empty  time,  for  infinite 
space,  like  empty  space  (and  the  same  holds  in  regard  to 
time),  is  not  perceivable.  Consequently  the  quantity  of  the 
world  is  neither  finite  nor  infinite.  The  question  of  the 
quantity  of  the  world  is  unanswerable,  because  the  concept 
of  a  sense-world  existing  by  itself  {before  the  regress)  is  self- 
contradictory.  Similarly  the  problem  whether  the  composite 
consists  of  simple  elements  is  insoluble,  because  the  assump- 
tion that  the  phenomenon  of  body  is  a  thing  in  itself, 
which,  antecedent  to  all  experience,  contains  all  the 
parts  that  can  be  reached  in  experience — in  other  words, 
that  representations  exist  outside  of  the  representative 
faculty — is  absurd.  Matter  is  infinitely  divisible,  no  doubt, 
yet  it  does  not  consist  of  infinitely  numerous  parts,  and 
just  as  little  of  a  definite  number  of  simple  parts,  but  the 
parts  exist  merely  in  the  representation  of  them,  in  the 
division  (decomposition),  and  this  goes  as  far  as  possible  ex- 
perience extends.  The  case  is  different  with  the  dynamical 
antinomies,  where  thesis  and  antithesis  can  both  be  true,  in 
so  far  as  the  former  is  referred  to  things  in  themselves  and 
the  latter  to  phenomena.  The  contradiction  vanishes  if  we 
take  that  which  the  thesis  asserts  and  the  antithesis  denies 


THE  ANTINOMIES.  377 

in  different  senses.  The  fact  that  in  the  world  of  phenomena 
the  causal  nexus  proceeds  without  interruption  and  without 
end,  so  that  there  is  no  room  in  it  either  for  an  absolutely- 
necessary  Being  or  for  freedom,  does  not  conflict  with  this 
other,  that  beyond  the  world  of  sense  there  may  exist  an 
omnipotent,  omniscient  cause  of  the  world,  and  an  intelli- 
gible freedom  as  the  ground  of  our  empirically  necessary 
actions.  "  May  exist,"  since  for  the  critical  philosopher, 
who  has  learned  that  every  extension  of  knowledge  beyond 
the  limits  of  experience  is  impossible,  the  question  can 
concern  only  the  conceivability  of  the  world-ground  and  of 
freedom.  This  possibility  is  amply  sufficient  to  give  a 
support  for  faith,  as,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  indispensable  in 
order  to  satisfy  at  once  the  demands  of  the  understanding 
and  of  reason,  especially  to  satisfy  their  practical  interests. 
For  if  it  were  not  possible  to  resolve  the  apparent  contra- 
diction, and  to  show  its  members  capable  of  reconciliation, 
it  would  be  all  over  either  with  the  possibility  of  experi- 
ential knowledge  or  with  the  basis  of  ethics  and  religion. 
Without  unbroken  causal  connection,  no  nature  ;  without 
freedom,  no  morality  ;  and  without  a  Deity,  no  religion.  Of 
special  interest  is  the  solution  of  the  third  antinomy,  which 
is  accomplished  by  means  of  the  valuable  (though  in  the 
form  in  which  it  is  given  by  Kant,  untenable)  conception  of 
the  intelligible  character*  Man  is  a  citizen  of  two  worlds. 
As  a  being  of  the  senses  (phenomenon)  he  is  subject  in  bis 
volition  and  action  to  the  control  of  natural  necessity, 
while  as  a  being  of  reason  (thing  in  itself)  he  is  free.  For 
science  his  acts  are  the  inevitable  results  of  precedent 
phenomena,  which,  in  turn,  are  themselves  empirically 
caused  ;  nevertheless  moral  judgment  holds  him  responsible 
for  his  acts.  In  the  one  case,  they  are  referred  to  his  em- 
pirical character,  in  the  other,  to  his  intelligible  character. 
Man  cannot  act  otherwise  than  he  does  act,  if  he  be  what 
he  is,  but  he  need  not  be  as  he  is  ;  the  moral  constitution  of 
the  intelligible  character,  which  reflects  itself  in  the  empir- 

*  On  the  difficulties  in  t lie  way  of  lliis  theory  and  the  possibility  of  their 
removal  cf.  R.  Falckenberg.  Ueber  den  intelligiblen  Character \  zur  Kritik  der 
Kantischen  Freiheitslehre  ( from  the  Zeitschrift  fiir  Philosophie,  vol.  lxxv.), 
Halle,  1879. 


3?8  KANT. 

ical  character,  is  his  own  work,  and  its  radical  transfor- 
mation (moral  regeneration)  his  duty,  the  fulfillment  of 
which  is  demanded,  and,  hence,  of  necessity  possible. 

(3)  Speculative  Theology.  The  principle  of  complete 
determination,  according  to  which  of  all  the  possible 
predicates  of  things,  as  compared  with  their  opposites,  one 
must  belong  to  each  thing,  relates  the  thing  to  be  deter- 
mined to  the  sum  of  all  possible  predicates  or  the  Idea 
of  an  ens  rcalissimnm,  which,  since  it  is  the  representation 
of  a  single  being,  may  be  called  the  Ideal  of  pure  reason. 
From  this  prototype  things,  as  its  imperfect  copies,  derive 
the  material  of  their  possibility;  all  their  manifold  deter- 
minations are  simply  so  many  modes  of  limiting  the  concept 
of  the  highest  reality,  which  is  their  common  substratum, 
just  as  all  figures  are  possible  only  as  different  ways  of 
limiting  infinite  space.  Or  better:  the  derivative  beings 
are  not  related  to  the  ideal  of  the  original  Being  as  limita- 
tions to  the  sum  of  the  highest  reality  (on  which  view  the 
Supreme  Being  would  be  conceived  as  an  aggregate  consist- 
ing of  the  derivative  beings,  whereas  these  presuppose  it, 
and  hence  cannot  constitute  it),  but  as  consequences  to 
a  ground.  But  reason  does  not  remain  content  with  this 
entirely  legitimate  thought  of  the  dependence  of  finite 
things  on  the  ideal  of  the  Being  of  all  beings,  as  a  relation  of 
concepts  to  the  Idea,  but,  dazzled  by  an  irresistible  illusion, 
proceeds  to  realize,  to  hypostatize,  and  to  personify  this 
ideal,  and,  since  she  herself  is  dimly  conscious  of  the  ille- 
gitimacy of  such  a  transformation  of  the  mere  Idea  into  a 
given  object,  devises  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God. 
Reason,  moreover,  would  scarcely  be  induced  to  regard 
a  mere  creation  of  its  thought  as  a  real  being,  if  it 
were  not  compelled  from  another  direction  to  seek  a 
resting  place  somewhere  in  the  regress  of  conditions,  and 
to  think  the  empirical  reality  of  the  contingent  world  as 
founded  upon  the  rock  of  something  absolutely  necessary. 
There  is  no  being,  however,  which  appears  more  fit  for  the 
prerogative  of  absolute  necessity  than  that  one  the  concept 
of  which  contains  the  therefore  to  every  wherefore,  and  is 
in  no  respect  defective  ;  in  other  words,  rational  theology 
joins  the  rational  ideal  of  the  most  perfect  Being  with  the 


CRITIQUE    OF   SPECULATIVE    THEOLOGY.  379 

fourth  cosmological  Idea  of  the  absolutely  necessary 
Being. 

The  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  may  be  attempted  in 
three  ways  :  we  may  argue  the  existence  of  a  supreme  cause 
either  by  starting  from  a  definite  experience  (the  special 
constitution  and  order  of  the  sense-world,  that  is,  its  pur- 
posiveness),  or  from  an  indefinite  experience  (any  existence 
whatever),  or,  finally,  abstracting  from  all  experience,  from 
mere  concepts  a  priori.  But  neither  the  empirical  nor  the 
transcendent  nor  the  intermediate  line  of  thought  leads 
to  the  goal.  The  most  impressive  and  popular  of  the 
proofs  is  the  pliysico-tkeological  argument.  But  even  if  we 
gratuitously  admit  the  analogy  of  natural  products  with 
the  works  of  human  art  (for  the  argument  is  not  able  to 
prove  that  the  purposive  arrangement  of  the  things  in  the 
world,  which  we  observe  with  admiration,  is  contingent, 
and  could  only  have  been  produced  by  an  ordering,  rational 
principle,  not  self-produced  by  their  own  nature  according 
to  general  mechanical  laws),  this  can  yield  an  inference  only 
to  an  intelligent  author  of  the  purposive  form  of  the  world, 
and  not  to  an  author  of  its  matter,  only,  therefore,  to  a 
world-architect,  not  to  a  world-creator.  Further,  since  the 
cause  must  be  proportionate  to  the  effect,  this  argument  can 
prove  only  a  very  wise  and  wonderfully  powerful,  but  not 
an  omniscient  and  omnipotent,  designer,  and  so  cannot  give 
any  definite  concept  of  the  supreme  cause  of  the  world. 
In  leaping  from  the  contingency  of  the  purposive  order  of 
the  world  to  the  existence  of  something  absolutely  neces- 
sary and  thence  to  an  all-comprehensive  reality,  the  teleo- 
logical  argument  abandons  the  ground  of  experience  and 
passes  over  into  the  cosmological  argument ',  which  in  its  turn 
is  merely  a  concealed  ontological  argument  (these  two  differ 
only  in  the  fact  that  the  cosmological  proof  argues  from 
the  antecedently  given  absolute  necessity  of  a  being  t<>   its 

unlimited   reality,  and   flu-   ontological,  conversely,    from 

supreme  reality  to  necessary  existence).  The  weaknesses 
of  the  cosmological  argument  in  its  fust  half  consist  in  the 
fact  that,  in  tin-  inference  from  tie-  contingent  to  a  cause  for 

it,  it  oversteps  the  boundary  of  the  sense-world,  and,  in  the 
inference    from    the    impossibility   of  an     infinite    series    of 


380  KANT. 

conditions  to  a  first  cause,  it  employs  the  subjective  prin- 
ciple of  investigation — to  assume  hypothetically  a  necessary 
^^ukiiT^e  ground  in  behalf  of  the  systematic  unity  of  knowl- 
edge— as  an  objective  principle  applying  to  things  in  them- 
selves. The  ontological  argument,  finally,  which  the  two 
nominally  empirical  arguments  hoped  to  avoid,  but  in  which 
in  the  end  they  were  forced  to  take  refuge,  goes  to  wreck  on 
the  impossibility  of  dragging  out  of  an  idea  the  existence 
of  the  object  corresponding  to  it.  Existence  denotes 
nothing  further  than  the  position  of  the  subject  with  all 
the  marks  which  are  thought  in  its  concept — that  is,  its 
relation  to  our  knowledge,  but  does  not  itself  belong  to 
the  predicates  of  the  concept,  and  hence  cannot  be  analyt- 
ically derived  from  the  latter.  The  content  of  the  concept 
is  not  enriched  by  the  addition  of  being;  a  hundred  real 
dollars  do  not  contain  a  penny  more  than  a  hundred  con- 
ceived dollars.  All  existential  propositions  are  synthetic; 
hence  the  existence  of  God  cannot  be  demonstrated  from 
the  concept  of  God.  It  is  a  contradiction,  to  be  sure,  to 
say  that  God  is  not  almighty,  just  as  it  is  a  contradiction 
to  deny  that  -a  triangle  has  three  angles:  if  I  posit  the  con- 
cept I  must  not  remove  the  predicate  which  necessarily 
belongs  to  it.  If  I  remove  the  subject,  however,  together 
with  its  predicate  (the  almighty  God  is  not),  no  contradic- 
tion arises,  for  in  that  case  nothing  remains  to  be  con- 
tradicted. 

Thus  all  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  a  necessary  being 
are  shown  to  be  illusory,  and  the  basis  of  speculative  theology 
uncertain.  Nevertheless  the  idea  of  God  retains  its  validity, 
and  the  perception  of  the  inability  of  reason  to  demonstrate 
its  objective  reality  on  theoretical  grounds  has  great  value. 
For  though  the  existence  of  God  cannot  be  proved,  it  is 
true,  by  way  of  recompense,  that  it  cannot  be  disproved  ; 
the  same  grounds  which  show  us  that  the  assertion  of  his 
existence  is  based  on  a  weak  foundation  suffice  also  to 
prove  every  contrary  assertion  unfounded.  And  should 
practical  motives  present  themselves  to  turn  the  scale  in 
favor  of  the  assumption  of  a  supreme  and  all-sufficient 
Being,  reason  would  be  obliged  to  take  sides  and  to  follow 
these   grounds,  which,  it    is  true,  are   not  objectively  suffi- 


SIGNIFICANCE   OF    THE  IDEAS.  381 

dent,*  but  still  preponderant,  and  than  which  we  know  none 
better.  After,  however,  the  objective  reality  of  the  idea  of 
God  is  guaranteed  from  the  standpoint  of  ethics,  there  re- 
mains for  transcendental  theology  the  important  negative 
duty  ("censorship,"  Ccnsur)oi  exactly  determining  the  con- 
cept of  the  most  perfect  Being  (as  a  being  which  through 
understanding  and  freedom  contains  the  first  ground  of 
all  other  things),  of  removing  from  it  all  impure  elements, 
and  of  putting  an  end  to  all  opposite  assertions,  whether 
atheistic,  deistic  (deism  maintains  the  possibility  of  knowing 
the  existence  of  an  original  being,  but  declares  all  further 
determination  of  this  being  impossible),  or  (in  the  dogmatic 
sense)  anthropomorphic.  Theism  is  entirely  possible  apart 
from  a  mistaken  anthropomorphism,  in  so  far  as  through 
the  predicates  which  we  take  from  inner  experience 
(understanding  and  will)  we  do  not  determine  the  concept 
of  God  as  he  is  in  himself,  but  only  analogically, ,f  in  his 
relation  to  the  world.  That  concept  serves  only  to  aid 
us  in  our  contemplation  of  the  world, \  not  as  a  means 
of  knowing  the  Supreme  Being  himself.  For  speculative 
purposes  it  remains  a  mere  ideal,  yet  a  perfectly  faultless 
one,  which  completes  and  crowns  the  whole  of  human 
knowledge. 

Thus  the  value  of  the  Ideas  is  twofold.  By  showing  the 
untenableness  of  atheism,  fatalism,  and  naturalism,  they 
clear  the  way  for  the  objects  of  faith.  By  providing  nat- 
ural science  with   the   standpoint  of  a  systematical    unity 

*"  They  need  favor  to  supply  their  la^k  of  legitimate  claims."  Of  them- 
selves alone,  therefore,  they  are  unable  to  yield  any  theological  knowledge,  but 
they  are  fitted  to  prepare  the  understanding  for  it,  and  to  give  emphasis  to  other 
possible  (moral)  proofs. 

\  We  halt  at  the  boundary  of  the  legitimate  use  of  reason,  without  overstep 
ping  it,  when  we  limit  our  judgment  to  the  relation  of  the  world  to  the  Supreme 
Being,  and  in  this  allow  ourselves  a  symbolical  anthropomorphism  only, 
which  in  reality  has  reference  to  our  language  alone  and  not  to  the  object. 

X"  We  are  compelled  to  look  mi  the  world  as  if  it  were  the  work  of  a 
supreme  intelligence  and  will."  "  We  may  confidently  derive  the  phenomena 
of  the  world  and  their  existence  from  other  (phenomena),  as  if  no  necessary 
being  existed,  and  yet  unceasingly  strive  after  completeness  in  the  derivation, 
as  though  such  a  being  were  presupposed  as  a  supreme  ground."  In  sinnt, 
physical  (mechanical)  explanation,  and  a  theistic  point  of  view  or  teleological 
judgment. 


382  KANT. 

through  teleological  connection,  they  make  an  extension  of 
the  use  of  the  understanding  possible  within  the  realm  of 
experience,*  though  not  beyond  it.  The  systematic  devel- 
opment of  the  Kantian  teleology,  which  is  here  indicated  in 
general  outlines  only,  is  found  in  the  second  part  of  the 
Critique  of  Judgment ;  while  the  practical  philosophy,  which 
furnishes  the  only  possible  proof,  the  moral  proof,  for  the 
reality  of  the  Ideas,  erects  on  the  site  left  free  by  the 
removal  of  the  airy  summer-houses  of  dogmatic  metaphysics 
the  solid  mansion  of  critical  metaphysics,  that  is,  the  meta- 
physics of  duties  and  of  hopes.  "  I  was  obliged  to  destroy 
knowledge  in  order  to  make  room  for  faith."  The  transition 
from  the  impossible  theoretical  or  speculative  knowledge  of 
things  in  themselves  to  the  possible  "  practical  knowledge  " 
of  them  (the  belief  that  there  is  a  God  and  a  future  world)  is 
given  in  the  Doctrine  of  Method,  which  is  divided  into  four 
parts  (the  Discipline,  the  Canon,  the  Architectonic,  and  the 
History  of  Pure  Reason),  in  its  second  chapter.  There, 
in  the  ideal  of  the  Summum  Bonum,  the  proof  is  brought 
forward  for  the  validity  of  the  Ideas  God,  freedom,  and 
immortality,  as  postulates  inseparable  from  moral  obliga- 
tion ;  and  by  a  cautious  investigation  of  the  three  stages  of 
assent  (opinion,  knowledge,  and  belief)  both  doctrinal  and 
moral  belief  are  assigned  their  places  in  the  system  of  the 
kinds  of  knowledge. 

We  may  now  sum  up  the  results  of  the  three  parts  of 
Kant's  theoretical  philosophy.  The  pure  intuitions,  the 
categories,  and  the  Ideas  are  functions  of  the  spirit,  and 
afford  non-empirical  {erfahr ungs freie)  knowledge  concern- 
ing the  objects  of  possible  experience  (and  concerning  the 
possibility  of  knowledge).  The  first  make  universal  and 
necessary  knowledge  possible  in  relation  to  the  forms  under 
which  objects  can  be  given  to  us  ;  the  second  make  a  sim- 
ilarly apodictic  knowledge  possible  in  relation  to  the  forms 
under  which  phenomena  must  be  thought;  the  third  make 
possible    a   judgment    of    phenomena    differing    from    this 

*  The  principle  to  regard  all  order  in  the  world  {e.g.,  the  shape  of  the 
earth,  mountains,  and  seas,  the  members  of  animal  bodies)  as  if  it  proceeded 
from  the  design  of  a  supreme  reason  leads  the  investigator  on  to  various  dis- 
coveries. 


THE   CATEGORICAL  IMPERATIVE.  383 

knowledge,  yet  not  in  conflict  with  it.  The  categories  and 
the  Ideas,  moreover,  yield  problematical  concepts  of  objects 
which  are  not  given  to  us  in  intuition,  but  which  may  exist 
outside  of  space  and  time:  things  in  themselves  cannot  be 
known,  it  is  true,  but  they  can  be  thought,  a  fact  of  impor- 
tance in  case  we  should  be  assured  of  their  existence  in 
some  other  way  than  by  sensuous  intuition. 

The  determination  of  the  limits  of  speculative  reason 
is  finished.  All  knowing  and  all  demonstration  is  limited 
to  phenomena  or  possible  experience.  But  the  boundary 
of  that  which  can  be  experienced  is  not  the  boundary  of 
that  which  is,  still  less  of  that  which  ought  tobe;  the 
boundary  of  theoretical  reason  is  not  the  boundary  of 
practical  reason.  We  ought  to  act  morally  ;  in  order  to  be 
able  to  do  this  we  must  ascribe  to  ourselves  the  power  to 
initiate  a  series  of  events  ;  and,  in  general,  we  are  warranted 
in  assuming  everything  the  non-assumption  of  which 
makes  moral  action  impossible.  If  we  were  merely  theo- 
retical, merely  experiential  beings,  we  should  lack  all 
occasion  to  suppose  a  second,  intelligible  world  behind  and 
above  the  world  of  phenomena;  but  we  are  volitional  and 
active  beings  under  laws  of  reason,  and  though  we  are 
unable  to  know  things  in  themselves,  yet  we  may  and 
must  posttdate  them — our  freedom,  God,  and  immortality. 
For  not  only  that  which  is  a  condition  of  experience  is  true 
and  necessary,  but  that,  also,  which  is  a  condition  of 
morality.  The  discovery  of  the  laws  and  conditions  of 
morality  is  the  mission  of  practical  philosophy. 

2.   Theory   of  Ethics. 

The  investigation  now  turns  from  the  laws  of  nature, 
which  express  a  "must,"  to  the  laws  of  will,  in  which  an 
"ought  "  is  expressed,  and  by  which  certain  actions  are  not 
compelled,  but  prescribed.  (If  we  were  merely  rational, 
and  not  at  the  same  time  sensuous  beings,  the  moral  law 
would  determine  the  will  in  the  form  of  a  natural  law; 
since,  however,  the  constant  possibility  of  deviat  ion  is  given 
in  the  sensibility,  or,  rather,  the  moral  standpoint  can  only 
be  attained  by  conquering  the  sensuous  impulses,  therefore 
the   moral   law  speaks  to   us  in  the  form  of  an  "ought,"  of 


3  §4  KANT. 

an  imperative.)  Among  the  laws  of  the  will  or  imperatives, 
also,  there  are  some  which  possess  the  character  of  absolute 
necessity  and  universality,  and  which,  consequently,  are 
a  priori.  As  the  understanding  dictates  laws  to  the  phe- 
nomenal world,  so  practical  reason  gives  a  law  to  itself, 
\s  autonomous  ;  and  as  the  a  priori  laws  of  nature  relate  only 
to  the  form  of  the  objects  of  experience,  so  the  moral 
law  determines  not  the  content,  but  only  the  form  of 
volition:  "Act  only  on  that  maxim  whereby  thou  canst 
at  the  same  time  will  that  it  should  become  a  universal 
law."  The  law  of  practical  reason  is  a  "  categorical 
imperative."  What  does  this  designation  mean,  and  what 
is  the  basis  of  the  formula  of  the  moral  law  which  has 
just  been  given  ? 

Practical  principles  are  either  subjectively  valid,  in  which 
case  they  are  termed  maxims  (volitional  principles  of  the 
individual),  or  objectively  valid,  when  they  are  called  im- 
peratives or  precepts.  The  latter  are  either  valid  under 
certain  conditions  (If  you  wish  to  become  a  clergyman 
you  must  study  theology;  he  who  would  prosper  as  a  mer- 
chant must  not  cheat  his  customers),  or  unconditionally 
valid  (Thou  shalt  not  lie).  All  prudential  or  technical 
rules  are  hypothetical  imperatives,  the  moral  law  is  a  cate- 
gorical imperative.  The  injunction  to  be  truthful  is  not 
connected  with  the  condition  that  we  intend  to  act  morally, 
but  this  general  purpose,  together  with  all  the  special  pur- 
poses belonging  to  it,  to  avoid  lying,  etc.,  is  demanded 
unconditionally  and  of  everyone — as  surely  as  we  are 
rational  beings  we  are  under  moral  obligation,  not  in  order 
to  reputation  here  below  and  happiness  above,  but  without 
all  "  ifs  "  and  "  in  order  to's."  Thou  shalt  unconditionally, 
whatever  be  the  outcome.  And  as  the  moral  law  is  inde- 
pendent of  every  end  to  be  attained,  so  it  suffers  neither 
increase  nor  diminution  in  its  binding  force,  whether  men 
obey  it  or  not.  It  has  absolute  authority,  no  matter 
whether  it  is  fulfilled  frequently  or  seldom,  nay,  whether  it 
is  fulfilled  anywhere  or  at  any  time  whatsoever  in  the  world  ! 

There  is  an  important  difference  between  the  good  which 
we  are  under  obligation  to  do  and  the  evil  which  we  are 
under  obligation  not  to  do,  and  the  goods  and  ills  which 


THE  MORAL  MOTIVES.  385 

we  seek  and  avoid.  The  goods  are  always  relatively  good 
only,  good  for  something — as  means  to  ends — and  a  bad  use 
can  be  made  of  all  that  nature  and  fortune  give  us  as  well  as 
a  good  one.  That  which  duty  commands  is  an  end  in  itself, 
in  itself  good,  absolutely  worthful,  and  no  misuse  of  it  is 
possible.  It  might  be  supposed  that  pleasure,  that  happi- 
ness is  an  ultimate  end.  But  men  have  very  different 
opinions  in  regard  to  what  is  pleasant,  one  holding  one 
thing  pleasurable  and  another  another.  It  is  impossible 
to  discover  by  empirical  methods  what  duty  demands  of  all 
men  alike  and  under  all  circumstances;  the  appeal  is  to  our 
reason,  not  to  our  sensibility.  If  happiness  were  the  end 
of  rational  beings,  then  nature  had  endowed  us  but  poorly 
for  it,  since  instead  of  an  unfailing  instinct  she  has  given  us 
the  weak  and  deceitful  reason  as  a  guide,  which,  with  its 
train,  culture,  science,  art,  and  luxury,  has  brought  more 
trouble  than  satisfaction  to  mankind.  Man  has  a  destiny 
other  than  well-being,  and  a  higher  one — the  formation  of 
good  dispositions:  here  we  have  the  only  thing  in  the 
whole  world  that  can  never  be  used  for  evil,  the  only  thing 
that  does  not  borrow  its  value  from  a  higher  end,  but  itself 
originally  and  inalienably  contains  it,  and  that  gives  value 
to  all  else  that  merits  esteem.  "Nothing  can  possibly  be 
conceived  in  *the  world,  or  even  out  of  it,  which  can  be 
called  good  without  qualification,  except  a  good  will."  Un- 
derstanding, courage,  moderation,  and  whatever  other 
mental  gifts  or  praiseworthy  qualities  of  temperament  may 
be  cited,  as  also  the  gifts  of  fortune,  "are  undoubtedly 
good  and  desirable  in  many  respects,  but  they  may  also 
become  extremely  evil  and  mischievous,  if  the  will  which 
is  to  make  use  of  them  is  not  good."  These  are  the  classic 
words  with  which  Kant  commences  the  Foundation  of  the 
Metaphysics  of  Jit  hies. 

When  does  the  will  deserve  the  predicate  "good  "?  Let 
us  listen  to  the  popular  moral  consciousness,  which  distin- 
guishes three  grades  of  moral  recognition.  He  who  refrains 
from  that  which  is  contrary  to  duty,  no  matter  from  wh.it 
motives — as,  for  example,  t  he  shopkeeper  who  docs  not  elicit 
because  he  knows  that  honesty  is  the  best  policy — receives 
moderate  praise  for  irreproachable  outward  behavior.     We 


3§6  KANT. 

bestow  warmer  praise  and  encouragement  on  him  whom 
ambition  impels  to  industry,  kind  feeling  to  beneficence, 
and  pity  to  render  assistance.  But  he  alone  earns  our 
esteem  who  does  his  duty  for  duty's  sake.  Only  in  this 
third  case,  where  not  merely  the  external  action,  nor 
merely  the  impulse  of  a  happy  disposition,  but  the  will 
itself,  the  maxim,  is  in  harmony  with  the  moral  law,  where 
the  good  is  done  for  the  sake  of  the  good,  do  we  find  true 
■morality,  that  unconditioned,  self-grounded  worth.  The 
man  who  does  that  which  is  in  accordance  with  duty  out  of 
reflection  on  its  advantages,  and  he  who  does  it  from 
immediate — always  unreliable — inclination,  acts  legally ; 
he  alone  acts  morally  who,  without  listening  to  advantage 
and  inclination,  takes  up  the  law  into  his  disposition,  and 
does  his  duty  because  it  is  duty.  The  sole  moral  motive 
is  the  consciousness  of  duty,  respect  for  the  moral  law* 

Here  Kant  is  threatened  by  a  danger  which  he  does  not 
succeed  in  escaping.  The  moral  law  demands  perfect 
purity  in  our  maxims  ;  only  the  idea  of  duty,  not  an  inclina- 
tion, is  to  determine  the  will.  Quite  right.  Further,  the 
one  judging  is  himself  never  absolutely  certain,  even  when 
his  own  volition  is  concerned,  that  no  motives  of  pleasure 
have  mingled  with  the  feeling  of  duty  in  contributing  to  the 
right  action,  unless  that  which  was  morally  demanded  has 
been  contrary  to  all  his  inclinations.  When  a  person  who  is 
not  in  need  and  who  is  free  from  cupidity  leaves  the  money- 
box intrusted  to  his  care  untouched,  or  when  a  man  who 
loves  life  overcomes  thoughts  of  suicide,  I  may  assume 
that  the  former  was  sufficiently  protected  against  the  tempta- 
tion by  his  moderation,  and  the  other  by  his  cheerful  dis- 
position, and  I  rate  their  behavior  as  merely  legal.     When, 

*  The  respect  or  reverence  which  the  law.  and,  derivatively,  the  person  in 
whom  it  is  realized,  compel  from  us,  is,  as  self-produced  through  a  concept  of 
Teason  and  as  the  only  feeling  which  can  be  known  a  priori,  specifically  dif- 
ferent from  all  feelings  of  inclination  or  fear  awakened  by  sensuous  influences. 
As  it  strengthens  and  raises  our  rational  nature,  the  consciousness  of  our 
freedom  and  of  our  high  destination,  but,  at  the  same  time,  humbles  our  sensibility, 
there  is  mingled  with  the  joy  of  exaltation  a  certain  pain,  which  permits  no 
intimate  affection  for  the  stern  and  sublime  law.  It  is  not  quite  willingly  that 
we  pay  our  respect — just  because  of  the  depressing  effect  which  this  feeling  exerts 
on  our  self-love. 


THE  MORAL   MOTIVES.  387 

on  the  other  hand,  an  official  inclined  to  extravagance 
faithfully  manages  the  funds  intrusted  to  him,  or  one  who 
is  oppressed  by  hopeless  misery  preserves  his  life,  although 
he  does  not  love  it,  then  I  may  ascribe  the  abstinence  from 
wrongdoing  to  moral  principles.  This,  too,  may  be  ad- 
mitted. We  are  certain  of  the  morality  of  a  resolution 
only  when  it  can  be  shown  that  no  inclination  was  involved 
along  with  the  maxim.  The  cases  where  the  right  action  is 
performed  in  opposition  to  inclination  are  the  only  ones 
in  which  we  may  be  certain  that  the  moral  quality  of  the 
action  is  unmixed — are  they,  then,  the  only  ones  in  which  a 
moral  disposition  is  present  ?  Kant  rightly  maintains  that 
the  admixture  of  egoistic  motives  beclouds  the  purity  of 
the  disposition,  and  consequently  diminishes  its  moral 
worth.  With  equal  correctness  he  draws  attention  to  the 
possibility  that,  even  when  we  believe  that  we  are  acting 
from  pure  principles,  a  hidden  sensuous  impulse  may  be 
involved.  But  he  leaves  unconsidered  the  possibility  that, 
even  when  the  inclinations  are  favorable  to  right  action, 
the  action  may  be  performed,  not  from  inclination,  but 
because  of  the  consciousness  of  duty.  Given  that  a  man  is 
naturally  industrious,  does  this  happy  predisposition  protect 
him  from  fits  of  idleness?  And  if  he  resists  them,  must 
it  always  be  his  inclination  to  activity  and  never  moral 
principle  which  overcomes  the  temptation  ?  In  yielding 
to  the  danger  of  confounding  the  limits  of  our  certain 
knowledge  of  the  purity  of  motives  with  the  limits  of  moral 
action,  and  in  admitting  true  morality  only  where  action 
proceeds  from  principle  in  opposition  to  the  inclinations, 
Kant  really  deserves  the  reproach  of  rigorism  or  exagger- 
ated purism — sometimes  groundlessly  extended  to  the 
justifiable  strictness  of  his  views — and  the  ridicule  of  the 
well-known  lines  of  Schiller  ("  Scruples  of  Conscience  "  and 
"  Decision  "  at  the  conclusion  of  his  distich-group  "The 
Philosophers  "): 

"The  friends  whom  I  love  I  gladly  would   serve,  but  to  this  inclination 
incites  mc  ; 
And  so  I  am  forced  from  virtue  to  swerve  since  my  act,  through  affec- 
tion, delights  me. 


388  KANT. 

"  The  friends  whom  thou  lovest  thou  must  first  seek  to  scorn,  for  to  no 
other  way  can  I  guide  thee  ; 
'Tis  alone  with  disgust  thou  canst  rightly  perform  the  acts  to  which 
duty  would  lead  thee." 

If  we  return  from  this  necessary  limitation  of  a  ground- 
less inference  (that  true  morality  is  present  only  when 
duty  is  performed  against  our  inclinations,  when  it  is  diffi- 
cult for  us,  when  a  conflict  with  sensuous  motives  has  pre- 
ceded), to  the  development  of  the  fundamental  ethical  con- 
ceptions, we  find  that  important  conclusions  concerning 
the  origin  and  content  of  the  moral  law  result  from  the 
principle  obtained  by  the  analysis  of  moral  judgment: 
this  law  commands  with  unconditional  authority — for 
every  rational  being  and  under  all  circumstances — what  has 
unconditioned  zuorth — the  disposition  which  corresponds  to 
it.  The  universality  and  necessity  (unconditioua/ness)  of 
the  categorical  imperative  proves  that  it  springs  from 
no  other  source  than  reason  itself.  Those  who  derive  the 
moral  law  from  the  will  of  God  subject  it  to  a  condition, 
viz.,  the  immutability  of  the  divine  will.  Those  who  find 
the  source  of  moral  legislation  in  the  pursuit  of  happiness 
make  rational  will  dependent  on  a  natural  law  of  the  sensi- 
bility ;  it  would  be  folly  to  enjoin  by  a  moral  law  that 
which  everyone  does  of  himself,  and  does  superabundantly. 
Moreover,  the  theories  of  the  social  inclinations  and  of  moral 
sense  fail  of  their  purpose,  since  they  base  morality  on  the 
uncertain  ground  of  feeling.  Even  the  principle  of  perfec- 
tion proves  insufficient,  inasmuch  as  it  limits  the  individual 
to  himself,  and,  in  the  end,  like  those  which  have  preceded, 
amounts  to  a  refined  self-love.  Theonomic  ethics,  egoistic 
ethics,  the  ethics  of  sympathy,  and  the  ethics  of  perfection 
are  all  eudemonistic,  and  hence  heteronomic.  The  practi- 
cal reason*  receives  the  law  neither  from  the  will  of  God 
nor  from  natural  impulse,  but  draws  it  out  of  its  own  depths  ; 
it  binds  itself. 

The  grounds  which  establish  the  derivation  of  the  moral 
law  from  the  will  or  reason  itself  exclude  at  the  same  time 

*Will  and  practical  reason  are  identical.  The  definition  runs  :  Will  is  the 
faculty  of  acting  in  accordance  with  the  representation  of  laws. 


FORMAL    CHARACTER   OF   THE  MORAL  LAW.  389 

every  material  determination  of  it.  If  the  categorical  im- 
perative posited  definite  ends  for  the  will,  if  it  prescribed  a 
direction  to  definite  objects,  it  could  neither  be  known  a 
priori  nor  be  valid  for  all  rational  beings:  its  apodictic 
character  forbids  the  admission  of  empirical  elements  of 
every  sort.*  If  we  think  away  all  content  from  the  law  we 
retain  the  form  of  universal  legality,  f  and  gain  the  formula  : 
"  Act  so  that  the  maxim  of  thy  will  can  always  at  the  same 
time  hold  good  as  a  principle  of  universal  legislation."  The 
possibility  of  conceiving  the  principle  of  volition  as  a  uni- 
versal law  of  nature  is  the  criterion  of  morality.  If  you 
are  in  doubt  concerning  the  moral  character  of  an  action  or 
motive  simply  ask  yourself  the  question,  What  would  be- 
come of  humanity  if  everyone  were  to  act  according  to  the 
same  principle  ?  If  no  one  could  trust  the  word  of  another, 
or  count  on  aid  from  others,  or  be  sure  of  his  property 
and  his  life,  then  no  social  life  would  be  possible.  Even 
a  band  of  robbers  cannot  exist  unless  certain  laws  are 
respected  as  inviolable  duties. 

It  was  indispensable  to  free  the  supreme  formula  of 
the  moral  law  from  all  material  determinations,  i.e.,  limita- 
tions. This  does  not  prevent  us,  however,  from  afterward 
giving  the  abstract  outline  a  more  concrete  coloring.  First 
of  all,  the  concept  of  the  dignity  of  persons  in  con- 
trast to  the  utility  of  things  offers  itself  as  an  aid  to  expla- 
nation and  specialization.  Things  are  means  whose  worth 
is  always  relative,  consisting  in  the  useful  or  pleasant 
effects  which  they  exercise,  in  the  satisfaction  of  a  need  or 
of  the  taste,  they  can  be  replaced  by  other  means,  which 
fulfill  the  same  purpose,  and  they  have  a  (market  or  fancy) 
value ;   while  that  which  is  above  all  value  and  admits  of  no 

*  The  moral  law,  therefore,  is  independent  of  all  experience  in  three  respects, 
as  to  its  origin,  its  content,  and  its  validity.  It  springs  from  reason,  it  con- 
tains a  formal  precept  only,  and  its  validity  is  not  concerned,  whether  it  meets 
with  obedience  or  not.  It  declares  what  ought  tobe  done,  even  though  this 
never  should  be  done. 

T  The  "  formal  principle"  of  the  Kantian  ethics  has  nut  very  varied  criti- 
cism. Among  others  Edmund  Pfleiderer  (Kantischer  Kritizismus  und  Eng- 
lische Pin'  md  Zeller  express  themselves  unfavorably,  Fortlage 
and  I.iebmann  (Zur  Analysis  der  Wirklichkeit^  2d  ed.,  1880,  p.  671)  favor- 
ably. 


39°  KANT. 

equivalent  has  an  ultimate  worth  or  dignity,  and  is  an 
object  of  respect.  The  legislation  which  determines  all 
worth,  and  with  this  the  disposition  which  corresponds  to  it, 
has  a  dignity,  an  unconditioned,  incomparable  worth,  and 
lends  its  subjects,  rational  beings  framed  for  morality,  the 
advantage  of  being  ends  in  themselves.  "  Therefore  moral- 
ity, and  humanity  so  far  as  it  is  capable  of  morality,  is  that 
which  alone  possesses  dignity."  Accordingly  the  follow- 
ing formulation  of  the  moral  law  may  be  held  equivalent 
to  the  first  :  "  So  act  as  to  treat  humanity,  whether  in 
thine  own  person  or  in  that  of  any  other,  in  every  case 
as  an  end,  never  as  a  means  only." 

A  further  addition  to  the  abstract  formula  of  the  cate- 
gorical imperative  results  from  the  discussion  of  the  ques- 
tion, What  universal  ends  admit  of  subsumption  under  it, 
i.  e.,  stand  the  test  of  fitness  to  be  principles  of  a  universal 
legislation  ?  Here  again  Kant  stands  forth  as  an  arbiter 
between  the  contending  parties,  and,  with  a  firm  grasp, 
combines  the  useful  elements  from  both  sides  after  winnow- 
ing them  out  from  the  worthless  principles.  The  majority 
of  the  eudemonistic  systems,  along  with  the  promotion  of 
private  welfare,  prescribe  the  furtherance  of  universal 
good  without  being  able  to  indicate  at  what  point  the  pur- 
suit of  personal  welfare  should  give  way  to  regard  for  the 
good  of  others,  while  in  the  perfectionist  systems  the  social 
element  is  wanting  or  retreats  unduly  into  the  background. 
The  principle  of  happiness  represents  moral  empiricism,  the 
principle  of  perfection  moral  rationalism.  Kant  resolves 
the  antithesis  by  restricting  the  theses  of  the  respective 
parties  within  their  proper  limits:  "  Make  thine  own  perfec- 
tion and  the  happiness  of  others  the  end  of  thy  actions  ;" 
these  are  the  only  ends  which  are  at  the  same  time  duties. 
The  perfection  of  others  is  excluded  by  the  fact  that  I  can- 
not impart  to  anyone  a  good  disposition,  for  everyone 
must  acquire  it  for  himself  ;  personal  happiness  by  the 
fact  that  everyone  seeks  it  naturally. 

This  antithesis  (which  is  crossed  by  the  further  distinc- 
tion between  perfect,  i.  e.,  indispensable,  and  imperfect 
duties)  serves  as  a  basis  for  the  division  of  moral  duties 
into    duties    toward    ourselves    and    duties    toward    other 


THE  MORAL  POSTULATES.  39 1 

men.*  The  former  enjoin  the  preservation  and  develop- 
ment of  our  natural  and  moral  powers,  the  latter  are  duties 
of  obligation  (of  respect)  or  of  merit  (of  love).  Since  no  one 
can  obligate  me  to  feel,  we  are  to  understand  by  love  not 
the  pathological  love  of  complacency,  but  only  the  active 
love  of  benevolence  or  practical  sympathy.  Since  it  is  just 
as  impossible  that  the  increase  of  the  evils  in  the  world 
should  be  a  duty,  the  enervating  and  useless  excitation  of 
pity,  which  adds  to  the  pain  of  the  sufferer  the  sympathetic 
pain  of  the  spectator,  is  to  be  struck  off  the  list  of  virtues, 
and  active  readiness  to  aid  put  in  its  place.  In  friendship 
love  and  respect  unite  in  exact  equipoise.  Veracity  is  one 
of  the  duties  toward  self ;  lying  is  an  abandonment  of  human 
dignity  and  under  no  conditions  allowable,  not  even  if  life 
depends  on  it. 

After  it  has  been  settled  what  the  categorical  imperative 
enjoins,  the  further  problem  awaits  us  of  explaining  how  it 
is  possible.  The  categorical  imperative  is  possible  only  on 
the  presupposition  of  our  freedom.  Only  a  free  being  gives 
laws  to  itself,  just  as  an  autonomous  being  alone  is  free.  In 
theoretical  philosophy  the  pure  self-consciousness,  the  "  I 
think',"  denoted  a  point  where  the  thing  in  itself  manifests 
to  us  not  its  nature,  indeed,  but  its  existence.  The 
same  holds  true  in  practical  philosophy  of  the  moral  law. 
The  incontestable  fact  of  the  moral  law  empowers  me 
to  rank  myself  in  a  higher  order  of  things  than  the  merely 
phenomenal  order,  and  in  another  causal  relation  than  that 
of  the  merely  necessary  (mechanical)  causation  of  nature, 
to  regard  myself  as  a  legislative  member  of  an  intelligible 
world,  and  one  independent  of  sensuous  impulses — in  short. 
to  regard  myself  as  free.  Freedom  is  the  ratio  essendi  of 
the  self-given  moral  law,  the  latter  the  ratio  cognoscendi 
of  freedom.  The  law  would  have  no  meaning  if  we  did  nol 
possess  the  power  to  obey  it:   I  can  because  I  ought.      It  is 

*  All  duties  are  toward  men,  not  toward  supra-human  or  infra-human  beings. 
That  which  we  commonly  term  duties  toward  animals,  likewise  the  so-called] 
duties  toward  God,  are  in  reality  duties  toward  <>m  elves.     Cruelty  to  animals 

is  immoral,  because   our  sympathies   arc   blunted   by  it.      To  have  religion  is  a 

duty  to  ourselves,  because  the  view  of   moral    laws  as   laws  of  God  is  an  aid  to 
morality. 


392  KANT. 

true  that  freedom  is  a  mere  Idea,  whose  object  can  never  be 
given  to  me  in  an  experience,  and  whose  reality,  conse- 
quently, cannot  be  objectively  known  and  proved,  but 
nevertheless,  is  required  with  satisfactory  subjective 
necessity  as  the  condition  of  the  moral  law  and  of  the 
possibility  of  its  fulfillment.  I  may  not  say  it  is  certain, 
but,  with  safety,  I  am  certain  that  I  am  free.  Freedom  is 
not  a  dogmatic  proposition  of  theoretical  reason,  but  a 
postulate  of  practical  reason;  and  the  latter  holds  the 
primacy  over  the  former  to  this  extent,  that  it  can  require 
the  former  to  show  that  certain  transcendent  Ideas  of  the 
suprasensible,  which  are  most  intimately  connected  with 
moral  obligation,  are  compatible  with  the  principles  of  the 
understanding.  It  was  just  in  view  of  the  practical  inter- 
ests involved  in  the  rational  concepts  God,  freedom,  immor- 
tality, that  it  was  so  important  to  establish,  at  least,  their 
possibility  (their  conceivability  without  contradiction). 
That,  therefore,  which  the  Dialectic  recognized  as  possible 
is  in  the  Ethics  shown  to  be  real :  Whoever  seeks  to  fulfill  his 
moral  destiny — and  this  is  the  duty  of  every  man — must  not 
doubt  concerning  the  conditions  of  its  possible  fulfillment, 
must,  in  spite  of  their  incomprehensibility,  believe  m  freedom 
and  a  suprasensible  world.  They  are  both  postulates  of 
practical  reason,  i.  e.,  assumptions  concerning  that  which 
is  in  behalf  of  that  which  ought  to  be.  Naturally  the 
interests  of  the  understanding  must  not  be  infringed  upon 
by  those  of  the  will.  The  principle  of  the  complete  causal 
determination  of  events  retains  its  validity  unimpeached 
for  the  sphere  of  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding,  that 
is,  for  the  realm  of  phenomena  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
it  remains  permissible  for  us  to  postulate  another  kind  of 
causality  for  the  realm  of  things  in  themselves,  although  we 
can  have  no  idea  of  its  how,  and  to  ascribe  to  ourselves  a 
free  intelligible  character. 

While  the  Idea  of  freedom  can  be  derived  directly  from 
the  moral  law  as  a  postulate  thereof,  the  proof  of  the  reality 
of  the  two  other  Ideas  is  effected  indirectly  by  means  of  the 
concept  of  the  "  highest  good,"  in  which  reason  con- 
ceives a  union  of  perfect  virtue  and  perfect  happiness.  The 
moral    law  requires  absolute  correspondence   between    the 


THE  MORAL   POSTULATES.  393 

disposition  and  the  commands  of  reason,  or  holiness  of 
will.  But  besides  this  supreme  good  {bonum  suprcmuvi) 
.  of  completed  morality,  the  highest  good  {bonum  consum- 
matum)  further  contains  a  degree  of  happiness  correspond- 
ing to  the  degree  of  virtue.  Everyone  agrees  in  the 
judgment  that,  by  rights,  things  should  go  well  with  the 
virtuous  and  ill  with  the  wicked,  though  this  must  not 
imply  any  deduction  from  the  principle  previously  an- 
nounced that  the  least  impulse  of  self-interest  causes  the 
maxim  to  forfeit  its  worth  :  the  motive  of  the  will  must  never 
be  happiness,  but  always  the  being  worthy  of  happiness. 
The  first  element  in  the  highest  good  yields  the  argument 
for  immortality,  and  the  second  the  argument  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God.  (i)  Perfect  correspondence  between  the  will 
and  the  law  never  occurs  in  this  life,  because  the  sensibility 
never  allows  us  to  attain  a  permanently  good  disposition, 
armed  against  every  temptation  ;  our  will  can  never  be 
holy,  but  at  best  virtuous,  and  our  lawful  disposition  never 
escape  the  consciousness  of  a  constant  tendency  to  trans- 
gression, or  at  least  of  impurity.  Since,  nevertheless,  the 
demands  of  the  (Christian)  moral  law  continue  in  their 
unrelenting  stringency  to  be  the  standard,  we  are  justified 
in  the  hope  of  an  unlimited  continuation  of  our  exist- 
ence, in  order  that  by  constant  progress  in  goodness  we 
may  draw  nearer  in  infinitum  to  the  ideal  of  holiness.  (2) 
The  establishment  of  a  rational  proportion  between  happi- 
ness and  virtue  is  also  not  to  be  expected  until  the 
future  life,  for  too  often  on  earth  it  is  the  evil  man  who 
prospers,  while  the  good  man  suffers.  A  justly  propor- 
tioned distribution  of  rewards  and  punishment  can  only 
be  expected  from  an  infinite  power,  wisdom,  and  goodness, 
which  rules  the  moral  world  even  as  it  has  created  the 
natural  world.  Deity  alone  is  able  to  bring  the  physical 
and  moral  realms  into  harmony,  and  to  establish  the  due 
relation  between  well-being  and  right  action.  This,  the 
moral  argument,  is  the  only  possible  proof  for  the  existence 
of  God.  Theology  is  not  possible  as  speculative,  but  only 
as  moral  theology.  The  certitude  of  faith,  moreover,  is 
only  different  from,  not  less  than,  the  certainty  of  knowl- 
edge, in  so  far  as  it   brings   with    it    not    an   objective,  but  a 


394  KANT. 

subjective,  although  universally  valid,  necessity.  Hence  it 
is  better  to  speak  of  belief  in  God  as  a  need  of  the  reason 
than  as  a  duty  ;  while  a  logical  error,  not  a  moral  one, 
should  be  charged  against  the  atheist.  The  atheist  is 
blind  to  the  intimate  connection  which  exists  between 
the  highest  good  and  the  Ideas  of  the  reason  ;  he  does  not 
see  that  God,  freedom,  and  immortality  are  the  indis- 
pensable conditions  of  the  realization  of  this  ideal. 

Thus  faith  is  based  upon  duty  without  being  itself  duty  : 
ethics  is  the  basis  of  religion,  which  consists  in  our  regard- 
ing moral  laws  as  {instar,  as  if  they  were)  divine  commands. 
They  are  not  valid  or  obligatory  because  God  has  given 
them  (this  would  be  heteronomy),  but  they  should  be 
regarded  as  divine  because  they  are  necessary  laws  of  rea- 
son. Religion  differs  from  ethics  only  in  its  form,  not  in  its 
content,  in  that  it  adds  to  the  conception  of  duty  the  idea 
of  God  as  a  moral  lawgiver,  and  thus  increases  the  influence 
of  this  conception  on  the  will ;  it  is  simply  a  means  for  the 
promotion  of  morality.  Since,  however,  besides  natural 
religion  or  the  pure  faith  of  reason  (the  moral  law  and  the 
moral  postulates),  the  historical  religions  contain  statutory 
determinations  or  a  doctrinal  faith,  it  becomes  the  duty  of 
the  critical  philosopher  to  inquire  how  much  of  this  posi- 
tive admixture  can  be  justified  at  the  bar  of  reason.  In 
this  investigation  the  question  of  the  divine  revelation  of 
dogma  and  ceremonial  laws  is  neither  supra-rationalistically 
affirmed  nor  naturalistically  derived,  but  rationalistically 
treated  as  an  open  question. 

The  four  essays  combined  under  the  title  Religion  within 
the  Limits  of  Reason  Only  treat  of  the  Radical  Evil  in 
Human  Nature,  the  Conflict  of  the  Good  Principle  with  the 
Evil  for  the  Mastery  over  Man,  the  Victory  of  the  Good 
Principle  over  the  Evil  and  the  Founding  of  a  Kingdom  of 
God  upon  Earth,  and,  finally,  Service  and  False  Service 
under  the  Dominion  of  the  Good  Principle,  or  Religion  and 
Priestcraft  ;  or  more  briefly,  the  fall,  the  atonement  (the 
Christ-idea),  the  Church,  and  true  and  false  service  of  God. 

(i)  The  individual  evil  deeds  of  the  empirical  character 
point  to  an  original  fault  of  the  intelligible  character,  a  pro- 
pensity to  evil  dwelling  in  man  and  not  further  deducible. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  395 

This,  although  it  is  self-incurred,  may  be  called  natural 
and  innate,  and  consists  (not  in  the  sensibility  merely,  but) 
in  a  freely  chosen  reversal  of  the  moral  order  of  our  max- 
ims, in  virtue  of  which  the  maxim  of  duty  or  morality  is 
subordinated  to  that  of  well-being  or  self-love  instead  of 
being  placed  above  it,  and  that  which  should  be  the  supreme 
condition  of  all  satisfaction  is  degraded  into  a  mere  means 
thereto.  Morality  is  therefore  a  conversion  from  the  evil  to 
the  good,  and  requires  a  complete  revolution  in  the  dis- 
position, the  putting  on  of  a  new  man,  a  "  new  birth," 
which,  an  act  out  of  time,  can  manifest  itself  in  the  tem- 
poral world  of  phenomena  only  as  a  gradual  transforma- 
tion in  conduct,  as  a  continuous  advance,  but  which,  we  may 
hope,  is  judged  by  him  who  knows  the  heart,  who  regards 
the  disposition  instead  of  particular  imperfect  actions,  as  a 
completed  unity. 

(2)  By  the  eternal  Son  of  God,  for  whose  sake  God  cre- 
ated all  things,  we  are  to  understand  the  ideal  of  the  per- 
fect man,  which  in  truth  forms  the  end  of  creation,  and  is 
come  down  from  heaven,  etc.  To  believe  in  Christ  means 
to  resolve  to  realize  in  one's  self  the  ideal  of  human  nature 
which  is  well  pleasing  to  God,  or  to  make  the  divine  disposi- 
tion of  the  Son  of  God  our  own,  not  to  believe  that  this 
ideal  has  appeared  on  earth  as  an  actual  man,  in  the  person 
of  Jesus  of  Nazareth.  The  only  saving  faith  is  the  belief 
of  reason  in  the  ideal  which  Christ  represents,  and  not  the 
historical  belief  in  his  person.  The  vicarious  atonement  of 
the  ideal  man  for  those  who  believe  on  him  is  to  be  inter- 
preted to  mean  that  the  sufferings  and  sacrifices  (crucifixion 
of  the  flesh)  imposed  by  moral  conversion,  which  are  due  to 
the  sinful  man  as  punishment,  are  assumed  by  the  regen- 
erate man  :  the  new  Adam  bears  the  sufferings  of  the  old. 
In  the  same  way  as  that  in  which  Kant  handles  the  history 
of  Christ  and  the  doctrine  of  justification,  all  biblical  nar- 
ratives and  ccclf  ia  tu  al  doctrines  are  in  public  instruction 
(from  the  pulpit)  to  be  interpreted  morally,  even  where  the 
authors  themselves  had  no  such  meaning  in  mind. 

(3)  The  Church  is  a  society  based  upon  the  laws  of  virt  ue, 

an  ethical  community  or  a  people  of  God,  whose  members 

confirm  each  other   in    the  performance  of  duty  by  example 


396  KANT. 

and  by  the  profession  of  a  common  moral  conviction  :  we 
are  all  brothers,  the  children  of  one  father.  Ideally  there 
is  only  one  (the  universal,  invisible)  Church,  and  its  founda- 
tion the  pure  faith  of  reason;  but  in  consequence  of  a 
weakness  peculiar  to  human  nature  the  foundation  of  an 
actual  church  required  the  addition  of  a  statutory  historical 
faith,  with  claims  to  a  divine  origin,  from  which  a  multitude 
of  visible  churches  and  the  antithesis  of  orthodox  and  here- 
tics have  sprung.  The  history  of  the  Church  since  the 
establishment  of  Christianity  represents  the  conflict  be- 
tween the  historical  faith  and  the  faith  of  reason  ;  its  goal 
is  the  submission  of  the  former  to  the  latter,  as,  indeed,  we 
have  already  begun  to  perceive  that  God  does  not  require 
a  special  service  beyond  the  practice  of  virtue. 

(4)  The  true  service  of  God  consists  in  a  moral  disposi- 
tion and  its  manifestation  :  "All  that  man  supposes  himself 
able  to  do  in  order  to  please  God,  beyond  living  a  good  life, 
is  false  service."  False  service  is  the  false  subordination  of 
the  pure  faith  of  reason  to  the  statutory  faith,  by  which  the 
attainment  of  the  goal  of  religious  development  is  hindered 
and  the  laity  are  brought  into  dangerous  dependence 
upon  the  clergy.  Priestcraft,  hypocrisy,  and  fanaticism 
enter  in  the  train  of  fetich  service.  The  church-faith  is 
destined  little  by  little  to  make  itself  superfluous.  It  has 
been  necessary  as  a  vehicle,  as  a  means  for  the  introduction 
and  extension  of  the  pure  religion  of  morality,  and  it  still 
remains  useful  for  a  time,  until  humanity  shall  become  of 
age  ;  with  man's  entrance  on  the  period  of  youth  and  man- 
hood, however,  the  leading-string  of  holy  traditions,  which 
in  its  time  did  good  service,  becomes  unnecessary,  nay, 
finally,  a  fetter.  (This  relative  appreciation  of  the  positive 
element  in  religion,  in  antithesis  to  the  unthinking  rejection 
of  it  by  the  Illumination,  resembles  the  view  of  Lessing; 
cf.  pp.  306-309.)  Moreover,  since  it  is  a  duty  to  be  a  co- 
worker in  the  transition  from  the  historical  to  the  pure 
religious  faith,  the  clergy  must  be  free  as  scientific  theolo- 
gians, as  scholars  and  authors  to  examine  the  doctrines  of 
faith  and  to  give  expression  to  dissenting  opinions,  while, 
as  preachers  in  the  pulpit,  speaking  under  commission,  they 
are  bound  to  the  creeds.     To  decide  the  articles  of  belief 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  397 

unalterable  would  be  a  crime  against  human  nature,  whose 
primal  destination  is  just  this — to  progress.  To  renounce 
illumination  means  to  trample  upon  the  divine  rights  of 
reason. 

The  "  General  Observations  "  appended  to  each  division 
add  to  the  four  principle  discussions  as  many  collateral  in- 
quiries concerning  Operations  of  Grace,  Miracles,  Myste- 
ries, and  Means  of  Grace,  objects  of  transcendent  ideas, 
which  do  not  properly  belong  in  the  sphere  of  religion 
within  pure  reason  itself,  but  which  yet  border  on  it.  (i) 
We  are  entirely  incapable  of  calling  forth  works  of  grace, 
nay,  even  of  indicating  the  marks  by  which  actual  divine 
illuminations  are  distinguished  from  imaginary  ones ;  the 
supposed  experience  of  heavenly  influences  belongs  in 
the  region  of  superstitious  religious  illusion.  But  their 
impossibility  is  just  as  little  susceptible  of  proof  as  their 
reality.  Nothing  further  can  be  said  on  the  question,  save 
that  works  of  grace  may  exist,  and  perhaps  must  exist  in 
order  to  supplement  our  imperfect  efforts  after  virtue;  and 
that  everyone,  instead  of  waiting  for  divine  assistance, 
should  do  for  his  own  amendment  all  that  is  in  his  power. 
(2)  Kant  judges  more  sharply  in  regard  to  the  belief  in 
miracles,  which  contradict  the  laws  of  experience  without 
in  the  least  furthering  the  performance  of  our  duties.  In 
practical  life  no  one  regards  miracles  as  possible  ;  and  their 
limitation  to  the  past  and  to  rare  instances  does  not  make 
them  more  credible.  (3)  In  so  far  as  the  Christian  myste- 
ries actually  represent  impenetrable  secrets  they  have  no 
bearing  on  moral  conduct;  so  far  as  they  are  morally  valu- 
able they  admit  of  rational  interpretation  and  thus  cease 
to  be  mysteries.  The  Trinity  signifies  the  three  moral 
qualities  or  powers  united  in  the  head  of  the  moral  state: 
the  one  God  as  holy  lawgiver,  gracious  governor,  and  just 
judge.  (4)  The  services  of  the  Church  have  worth  as 
ethical  ceremonies,  as  emblems  of  the  moral  disposition 
(prayer)  and  of  moral  fellowship  (church  attendance,  bap- 
tism, and  the  Lord's  Supper)  ;  but  to  find  in  these  symbolic 
ceremonies  means  of  grace  and  to  seek  to  purchase  the 
favor  of  God  by  them,  is  an  error  of  the  same  kind  as 
sorcery  and  fctichism.     The  right  way  leads  from  virtue  to 


59$  KANT. 

grace,  not  in  the  opposite  direction  ;  piety  without  morality 
is  worthless. 

The  Kantian  theory  of  religion  is  rationalistic  and  mor- 
alistic. The  fact  that  religion  is  based  on  morality  should 
never  be  assailed.  But  the  foundation  is  not  the  building, 
the  origin  not  the  content  and  essence  of  the  thing  itself. 
As  far  as  the  nature  of  religion  is  concerned,  the  Kantian 
view  does  not  exclude  completion  in  the  direction  of 
Schleiermacher's  theory  of  feeling,  just  as  by  its  spec- 
ulative interpretation  of  the  Christian  dogmas  and  its 
appreciation  of  the  history  of  religion  as  a  gradual 
transformation  of  historical  faith  into  a  faith  of  reason,  it 
points  out  the  path  afterward  followed  by  Hegel.  The 
philosophy  of  religion  of  the  future  must  be,  as  some  recent 
attempts  aim  to  be  (O.  Pfleiderer,  Biedermann,  Lipsius),  a 
synthesis  of  Kant,  Schleiermacher,  and  Hegel. 

While  the  moral  law  requires  Tightness  not  only  of  the 
action,  but  also  of  the  disposition,  the  law  of  right  is  satis- 
fied when  the  act  enjoined  is  performed,  no  matter  from 
what  motives.  Legal  right,  as  the  sum  of  the  conditions 
under  which  the  will  of  the  one  can  consist  with  the  will  of 
others  according  to  a  universal  law,  relates  only  to  enforce- 
able actions,  without  concerning  itself  about  motives. 
Private  right  includes  right  in  things  or  property,  personal 
right  or  right  of  contract,  and  real-personal  right  (marriage 
right);  public  right  is  divided  into  the  right  of  states, 
of  nations,  and  of  citizens  of  the  world.  Kant's  theory  of 
punishment  is  original  and  important.  He  bases  it  not 
upon  prudential  regard  for  the  protection  of  society,  or  the 
deterrence  or  reformation  of  the  criminal,  but  upon  the 
exalted  idea  of  retaliation  {jus  talionis),  which  demands 
that  everyone  should  meet  with  what  his  deeds  deserve: 
Eye  for  eye,  life  for  life.  In  politics  Kant  favors  demo- 
cratic theories,  though  less  decidedly  than  Rousseau  and 
Fichte.  As  he  followed  with  interest  the  efforts  after 
freedom  manifested  in  the  American  and  French  Revolu- 
tions, so  he  opposed  an  hereditary  nobility  as  a  hindrance 
to  the  natural  equality  of  rights,  and  demanded  freedom 
for  the  public  expression  of  opinion  as  the  surest  means  of 
guarding  against  revolutions.     The  only  legitimate  form  of 


THEORY  OF  RIGHT.  399 

the  state  is  the  republican,  i.  e.,  that  in  which  the  executive 
power  is  separated  from  the  legislative  power,  in  contrast 
to  despotism,  where  they  are  united  in  one  hand.  The 
best  guaranty  for  just  government  and  civil  liberty  is 
offered  by  constitutional  monarchy,  in  which  the  people 
through  its  representatives  exercises  the  legislative  power, 
the  sovereign  the  executive  power,  and  judges  chosen  by 
the  people  the  judicial  power.  The  contract  from  which 
we  may  conceive  the  state  to  have  arisen  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  an  historical  fact,  but  as  a  rational  idea  or  rule, 
by  which  we  may  judge  whether  the  laws  are  just  or  not : 
that  which  the  people  as  a  whole  cannot  prescribe  for 
itself,  this  cannot  be  prescribed  for  it  by  the  ruler 
(cf.  p.  235).  That  there  is  a  constant  progress — not  only  of 
individuals,  but — of  the  race,  not  merely  in  technical  and 
intellectual,  but  also  in  moral  respects,  is  supported  both 
by  rational  grounds  (without  faith  in  such  progress  we 
could  not  fulfill  our  duty  as  co-laborers  in  it)  and  by 
experiential  grounds  (above  all,  the  unselfish  sympathy 
which  all  the  world  gave  to  the  French  Revolution);  and 
the  never-ending  complaint  that  the  times  are  growing 
worse  proves  only  that  mankind  is  continually  setting  up 
stricter  standards  for  itself.  The  beginning  of  history  is  to 
be  placed  at  the  point  where  man  passes  out  of  the  condi- 
tion of  innocence,  in  which  instinct  rules,  and  begins  to 
subdue  nature,  which  hitherto  he  has  obeyed.  The  goal  of 
history,  again,  is  the  establishment  of  the  perfect  form  of  the 
state.  Nature  itself  co-operates  with  freedom  in  the  gradual 
transformation  of  the  state  based  on  necessity  (Notstaat) 
into  a  rational  state,  inasmuch  as  selfish  competition  and  the 
commercial  spirit  require  peace,  order,  and  justice  for  their 
own  security  and  help  to  bring  them  about.  And  so, 
further,  we  need  not  doubt  thai  humanity  will  constantly 
draw  nearer  to  the  ideal  condition  of  everlasting  peace 
among  the  nations  (guaranteed  by  a  league  of  states 
which  shall  as  a  mediator  settle;  disputes  between  individual 
states),  however  impracticable  the  idea  may  at  present 
appear. 

If  the  bold  declaration  of    Fortlage,  that  in    Kant    the 
system  of  absolute  truth  appeared,  is  true  of  any  one  part 


4°o  KANT. 

of  his  philosophy,  it  is  true  of  the  practical  part,  in  which 
Christian  morality  has  found  its  scientific  expression.  If 
we  may  justly  complain  that  on  the  basis  of  his  sharp  dis- 
tinction between  legality  and  morality,  between  legal  duty 
and  virtue-duty,  Kant  took  into  account  only  the  legal 
side  of  the  institutions  of  marriage  and  of  the  state,  over- 
looking the  fact  that  besides  these  they  have  a  moral  im- 
portance and  purpose,  if  we  may  demand  a  social  ethic  as 
a  supplement  to  his  ethics,  which  is  directed  to  the  duties 
of  the  individual  alone,  yet  these  and  other  well-founded 
desiderata  may  be  attained  by  slight  corrections  and  by 
the  addition  of  another  story  to  the  Kantian  edifice,  while 
the  foundations  are  still  retained.  The  bases  are  immova- 
ble. Autonomy,  absolute  oughtness,  the  formal  character 
of  the  law  of  reason,  and  the  incomparable  worth  of  the 
pure,  disinterested  disposition — these  are  the  corner  stones 
of  the  Kantian,  nay,  of  all  morals. 

3.  Theory  of  the  Beautiful  and  of  Ends  in  Nature. 

We  now  know  the  laws  which  the  understanding  im- 
poses upon  nature  and  those  which  reason  imposes  upon  the 
will.  If  there  is  a  field  in  which  to  be  {Sein)  and  ought  to 
be  {Sollen),  nature  and  freedom,  which  we  have  thus  far 
been  forced  to  consider  antithetical,  are  reconciled — and 
that  there  is  such  a  field  is  already  deducible  from  the 
doctrine  of  the  religious  postulates  (as  practical  truths  or 
assumptions  concerning  what  is,  in  behalf  of  what  ought 
to  be),  and  from  the  hints  concerning  a  progress  in  history 
(in  which  both  powers  co-operate  toward  a  common  goal) — 
then  the  source  of  its  laws  is  evidently  to  be  sought  in  that 
faculty  which  mediates  alike  between  understanding  and 
reason  and  between  knowing  and  feeling:  in  Judgment,  as 
the  higher  faculty  of  feeling.  Judgment,  in  the  general 
sense,  is  the  faculty  of  thinking  a  particular  as  contained  in  a 
universal,  and  exercises  a  twofold  function  :  as  "  determi- 
nant "  judgment  it  subsumes  the  particular  under  a  given 
universal  (a  law),  as  "  reflective  "  it  seeks  the  universal  for 
a  given  particular.  Since  the  former  coincides  with  the 
understanding,  we  are  here  concerned  only  with  the  reflec- 


CRITIQUE    OF  JUDGMENT.  4° I 

tive  judgment,  judgment  in  the  narrower  sense,  which 
does  not  cognize  objects,  but  judges  them,  and  this  accord- 
ing to  the  principle  of  purposiveness.* 

This,  in  turn,  is  of  two  kinds.  An  object  is  really  or 
objectively  purposive  (perfect)  when  it  corresponds  to 
its  nature  or  its  determination,  formally  or  subjectively 
purposive  (beautiful)  when  it  is  conformed  to  the  nature 
of  our  cognitive  faculty.  The  perception  of  purpose  is 
always  accompanied  by  a  feeling  of  pleasure  ;  in  the  first 
case,  where  the  pleasure  is  based  on  a  concept  of  the  ob- 
ject, it  is  a  logical  satisfaction,  in  the  second,  where  it 
springs  only  from  the  harmony  of  the  object  with  our  cog- 
nitive powers,  aesthetic  satisfaction.  The  objects  of  the 
teleological  and  the  aesthetic  judgment,  the  purposive 
and  the  beautiful  products  of  nature  and  art,  constitute  the 
desired  intermediate  field  between  nature  and  freedom  : 
and  here  again  the  critical  question  comes  up,  How,  in 
relation  to  these,  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  are  possible? 

(a)  JEsthetic  Judgment.—  The  formula  holds  of  Kant's 
aesthetics  as  well  as  of  his  theoretical  and  practical  philoso- 
phy, that  his  aim  is  to  overcome  the  opposition  between 
the  empirical  and  the  rationalistic  theories,  and  to  find  a 
middle  course  of  his  own  between  the  two  extremes. 
Neither  Burke  nor  Baumgarten  satisfied  him.  The  Eng- 
lish aesthetics  was  sensational,  the  German,  i.e.,  that  of  the 
Wolffian  school,  rationalistic.  The  former  identified  the 
beautiful  with  the  agreeable,  the  latter  identified  it  with 
the  perfect  or  with  the  conformity  of  the  object  to  its  con- 
cept; in  the  one  case,  aesthetic  appreciation  is  treated  as 
sensuous  pleasure,  in  the  other,  it  is  treated  as  a  lower,  con- 
fused kind  of  knowledge,  its  peculiar  nature  being  in  both 
cases  overlooked.  In  opposition  to  the  sensual ization  of 
aesthetic  appreciation,  its  character    as  judgment   must  be 

*  The  universal  laws  springing  from  the  understanding,  to  whit  li  every  nature 
must  conform  to  become  an  object  "I  experience  for  us,  determine  nothing  con- 
cerning the  particular  form  of  the  given  reality;  we  cannot  deduct  tht  pecial 
laws  of  nature  from  them.  Nevertheless  the  nature  of  oui  cognitive  faculty 
does  not  allow  us  to  at  i  ept  the  empirit  al  manifoldness  of  our  world  ■  <  contingent, 
but  impels  us  to  regard  it  as  purposive  oi  adapted  to  our  knowledge,  and  I.,  look 
upon  these  special  laws  as  if  an  intelligence  had  given  them  in  ordei  to  make  a  sys 
tern  of  experience  possible. 


40  2  ATA  NT. 

maintained  ;  and  in  opposition  to  its  rationalization,  its 
character  as  feeling.  This  relation  of  the  Kantian  aesthetics 
to  that  of  his  predecessors  explains  both  its  fundamental 
tendency  and  the  elements  in  it  which  appear  defective 
and  erroneous.  In  any  case,  Kant  shows  himself  in  this 
field  also  an  unapproachable  master  of  careful  analysis. 

The  first  task  of  aesthetics  is  the  careful  distinction  of  its 
object  from  related  phenomena.  The  beautiful  has  points 
of  contact  with  the  agreeable,  the  good,  the  perfect,  the 
useful,  and  the  true.  It  is  distinguished  from  the  true  by 
the  fact  that  it  is  not  an  object  of  knowledge,  but  of  satis- 
faction. If  we  inquire  further  into  the  difference  between 
the  satisfaction  in  the  beautiful  and  the  satisfaction  in  the 
agreeable,  in  the  good  (in  itself),  and  in  the  (good  for  some- 
thing, as  a  means,  or  in  the)  useful,  which  latter  three  have 
this  in  common,  that  they  are  objects  of  appetition — of 
sensuous  want,  of  moral  will,  of  prudential  desire — it 
becomes  evident  that  the  beautiful  pleases  through  its 
mere  representation  (that  is,  independently  of  the  real  ex- 
istence of  the  object),  and  that  the  delight  in  the  beautiful 
is  a  contemplative  pleasure.  It  is  for  contemplation  only, 
not  to  be  sensuously  enjoyed  nor  put  to  practical  use  ;  and, 
further,  its  production  is  not  a  universal  duty.  Sensuous, 
prudential,  or  moral  appetition  has  always  an  "  interest  " 
in  the  actual  existence  of  the  object  ;  the  beautiful,  on  the 
other  hand,  calls  forth  a  disinterested  satisfaction. 

According  to  quality  the  beautiful  is  the  object  of  a  dis- 
interested, free  (bound  by  no  interest),  and  sportive  satisfac- 
tion. According  to  quantity  and  modality  the  judgment 
of  taste  claims  universal  and  necessary  validity,  without 
this  being  based  upon  concepts.  This  posits  further  dif- 
ferences between  the  beautiful  and  the  agreeable  and  the 
good.  The  good  also  pleases  universally,  but  it  pleases 
through  concepts  ;  the  agreeable  as  well  as  the  beautiful 
pleases  without  a  concept,  but  it  does  not  please  uni- 
versally. 

That  which  pleases  the  reason  through  the  concept  is 
good;  that  which  pleases  the  senses  in  sensation  is  agree- 
able. That  which  pleases  universally  and  necessarily  with- 
out a  concept  is  beautiful.     Moral  judgment   demands   the 


THE  BEAUTIFUL.  4°  3 

assent  of  all,  and  its  universal  validity  is  demonstrable. 
The  judgment  concerning  the  agreeable  is  not  capable  of 
demonstration,  but  neither  does  it  pretend  to  possess 
universal  validity;  we  readily  acknowledge  that  what 
is  pleasant  to  one  need  not  be  so  to  every  other  man.  In 
regard  to  the  beautiful,  on  the  contrary,  we  do  not  content 
ourselves  with  saying  that  tastes  differ,  but  we  expect  it  to 
please  all.  We  expect  everyone  to  assent  to  our  judgment 
of  taste,  although  it  is  able  to  support  itself  by  no  proofs. 

Here  there  is  a  difficulty  :  since  the  judgment  of  taste 
does  not  express  a  characteristic  of  the  object,  but  a  state 
of  mind  in  the  observer,  a  feeling,  a  satisfaction,  it  is  purely 
subjective;  and  yet  it  puts  forth  a  claim  to  be  universally 
communicable.  The  difficulty  can  be  removed  only  on  the 
assumption  of  a  common  aesthetic  sense,  of  a  correspond- 
ing organization  of  the  powers  of  representation  in  all  men, 
which  yields  the  common  standard  for  the  pleasurableness 
of  the  impression.  The  agreeable  appeals  to  that  in  man 
which  is  different  in  different  individuals,  the  beautiful  to 
that  which  functions  alike  in  all  ;  the  former  addresses 
itself  to  the  passive  sensibility,  the  latter  to  the  active 
judgment.  The  agreeable — because  of  the  non-calculable 
differences  in  our  sensuous  inclinations,  which  are  in  part 
conditioned  by  bodily  states — possesses  no  universality 
whatever,  the  good  possesses  an  objective,  and  the  beautiful 
a  subjective  universality.  The  judgment  concerning  the 
agreeable  has  an  empirical,  that  concerning  the  beautiful 
an  a  priori,  determining  ground  :  in  the  former  case,  the 
judgment  follows  the  feeling,  in  the  latter,  it  precedes  it. 

An  object  is  considered  beautiful  (for,  strictly  speaking, 
we  may  say  only  this,  not  that  it  is  beautiful)  when  its 
form  puts  the  powers  of  the  human  mind  in  a  state  of 
harmony,  brings  the  intuitive  and  rational  faculties  into 
concordant  activity,  and  produces  an  agreeable  proportion 
between  the  imagination  and  the  understanding.  In  giv- 
ing the  occasion  for  an  harmonious  play  of  the  cognitive 
activities  (that  is,  for  an  easy  combination  of  the  manifold 
into  unity)  the  beautiful  object  is  purposive  for  us,  for  out 
function  of  apprehension;  it  is — here  we  obtain  a  deter- 
mination of  the  judgment  of  taste   from  the  standpoint  of 


4°4  KANT. 

relation — purposive  without  a  definite  purpose.  We  know 
perfectly  well  that  a  landscape  which  attracts  us  has  not 
been  specially  arranged  for  the  purpose  of  delighting  us,  and 
we  do  not  wish  to  find  in  a  work  of  art  anything  of  an 
intention'to  please.  An  object  is  perfect  when  it  is  pur- 
posive for  itself  (corresponds  to  its  concept)  ;  useful  when 
it  is  purposive  for  our  desire  (corresponds  to  a  practical 
intention  of  man);  beautiful  when  the  arrangement  of  its 
parts  is  purposive  for  the  relation  between  the  fancy  and 
understanding  of  the  beholder  (corresponds  in  an  unusual 
degree  to  the  conditions  of  our  apprehension).  Perfection 
is  internal  (real,  objective)  purposiveness,  and  utility  is 
external  purposiveness,  both  for  a  definite  purpose ; 
beauty,  on  the  other  hand,  is  purposiveness  without  a  pur- 
pose, formal,  subjective  purposiveness.  The  beautiful 
pleases  by  its  mere  form.  The  satisfaction  in  the  perfect 
is  of  a  conceptual  or  intellectual  kind,  the  satisfaction  in 
the  beautiful,  emotional  or  aesthetic  in  character. 

The  combination  of  these  four  determinations  yields  an 
exhaustive  definition  of  the  beautiful  :  The  beautiful  is 
that  which  universally  and  necessarily  arouses  disinterested 
satisfaction  by  its  mere  form  (purposiveness  without  the 
representation  of  a  purpose). 

Since  the  pleasurableness  of  the  beautiful  rests  on  the 
fact  that  it  establishes  a  pleasing  harmony  between  the 
imagination  and  the  understanding,  hence  between  sensu- 
ous and  intellectual  apprehension,  the  aesthetic  attitude  is 
possible  only  in  sensuous-rational  beings.  The  agreeable 
exists  for  the  animal  as  well,  and  the  good  is  an  object 
of  approval  for  pure  spirits  ;  but  the  beautiful  exists  for 
humanity  alone.  Kant  succeeded  in  giving  very  delicate 
and  felicitous  verbal  expression  to  these  distinctions  :  the 
agreeable  gratifies  {vergnügt)  and  excites  inclination 
{Neigung) ;  the  good  is  approved  {gebilligt)  and  arouses 
respect  {Achtung) ;  the  beautiful  "  pleases "  {gefällt)  and 
finds  "  favor  "  {Gunst). 

In  the  progress  of  the  investigation  the  principle  that 
beauty  depends  on  the  form  alone,  and  that  the  concept, 
the  purpose,  the  nature  of  the  object  is  not  taken  into 
account  at  all  in  aesthetic  judgment,  experiences  limita- 


THE  BEAUTIFUL.  4°5 

tion.  In  its  full  strictness  this  applies  only  to  a  definite 
and,  in  fact,  a  subordinate  division  of  the  beautiful,  which 
Kant  marks  off  under  the  name  of  pure  or  free  beauty. 
With  this  he  contrasts  adherent  beauty,  as  that  which  pre- 
supposes a  generic  concept  to  which  its  form  must  cor- 
respond and  which  it  must  adequately  present.  Too 
much  a  purist  not  to  mark  the  coming  in  of  an  intellectual 
pleasure  as  a  beclouding  of  the  "  purity  "  of  the  aesthetic 
satisfaction,  he  is  still  just  enough  to  admit  the  higher 
worth  of  adherent  beauty.  For  almost  the  whole  of  artificial 
beauty  and  a  considerable  part  of  natural  beauty  belong 
to  this  latter  division,  which  we  to-day  term  ideal  and 
characteristic  beauty.  Examples  of  free  or  purely  for- 
mal beauty  are  tapestry  patterns,  arabesques,  fountains, 
flowers,  and  landscapes,  the  pleasurableness  of  which  rests 
simply  on  the  proportion  of  their  form  and  relations,  and 
not  upon  their  conformity  to  a  presupposed  significance 
and  determination  of  the  thing.  A  building,  on  the  con- 
trary— a  dwelling,  a  summer-house,  a  temple — is  considered 
beautiful  only  when  we  perceive  in  it  not  merely  harmoni- 
ous relations  of  the  parts  one  to  another,  but  also  an  agree- 
ment between  the  form  and  the  purpose  or  generic  con- 
cept :  a  church  must  not  look  like  a  chalet.  Here  the 
external  form  is  compared  with  an  inner  nature,  and  har- 
mony is  required  between  form  and  content.  Adherent 
beauty  is  significant  and  expressive  beauty,  which,  although 
the  satisfaction  in  it  is  not  "purely"  aesthetic,  nevertheless 
stands  higher  than  pure  beauty,  because  it  gives  to  the 
understanding  also  something  to  think,  and  hence  busies 
the  whole  spirit. 

The  analytical  investigations  concerning  the  nature  of  the 
beautiful  receive  a  valuable  supplement  in  the  classical 
definition  of  genius.  Kant  gives  two  definitions  of  pro- 
ductive talent,  one  formal  and  one  genetic. 

Natural  beauty  is  a  beautiful  thing;  artificial  beauty,  a 
beautiful  representation  of  a  thing.  The  gift  of  agreeably 
presenting  a  thing  which  in  itself,  perhaps,  is  ugly,  is  called 
taste.  To  judge  of  t  he  beautiful  it  is  sufficient  to  possess 
taste,  but  for  its  production  there  is  still  another  talent 
needed,  spirit  or  genius.      For  an  art  product  can  fulfill  the 


4o6  KANT. 

demands  of  taste  and  yet  not  aesthetically  satisfy ;  while 
formally  faultless,  it  may  be  spiritless. 

While  beautiful  nature  looks  as  though  it  were  art  (as 
though  it  were  calculated  for  our  enjoyment),  beautiful 
art  should  resemble  nature,  must  not  appear  to  be  inten- 
tional though,  no  doubt,  it  is  so,  must  show  a  careful  but 
not  an  overnice  adherence  to  rules  (z.  e.,  not  one  which 
fetters  the  powers  of  the  artist).  This  is  the  case  when  the 
artist  bears  the  rule  in  himself,  that  is,  when  he  is  gifted. 
Genius  is  the  innate  disposition  (through)  which  (nature) 
gives  rules  to  art ;  its  characteristics  are  originality, 
exemplariness,  and  unreflectiveness.  It  does  not  pro- 
duce according  to  definite  rules  which  can  be  learned,  but 
it  is  a  law  in  itself,  it  is  original.  It  creates  instinctively 
without  consciousness  of  the  rule,  and  cannot  describe  how 
it  produces  its  results.  It  creates  typical  works  which 
impel  others  to  follow,  not  to  imitate.  It  is  only  in  art 
that  there  are  geniuses,  i.  e.,  spirits  who  produce  that 
which  absolutely  cannot  be  learned,  while  the  great  men  of 
science  differ  only  in  degree,  not  in  kind,  from  their  imi- 
tators and  pupils,  and  that  which  they  discover  can  be 
learned  by  rule. 

This  establishes  the  criteria  by  which  genius  may  be 
recognized.  If  we  ask  by  what  psychological  factors  it  is 
produced  the  answer  is  as  follows  :  Genius  presupposes  a 
certain  favorable  relation  between  imagination  and  rea- 
son. Genius  is  the  faculty  of  aesthetic  Ideas,  but  an 
aesthetic  Idea  is  a  representation  of  the  imagination  which 
animates  the  mind,  which  adds  to  a  concept  of  the  under- 
standing much  of  ineffable  thought,  much  that  belongs  to  the 
concept  but  which  cannot  be  comprehended  in  a  definite 
concept.  With  the  aid  of  this  idea  Kant  solves  the 
antinomy  of  the  aesthetic  judgment.  The  thesis  is  :  The 
judgment  of  taste  is  not  based  upon  concepts;  for  other- 
wise it  would  admit  of  controversy  (would  be  determinable 
by  proofs).  The  antithesis  is  :  It  is  based  upon  concepts  ; 
for  otherwise  we  could  not  contend  about  it  (endeavor  to 
obtain  assent).  The  two  principles  are  reconcilable,  for 
"concept"  is  understood  differently  in  the  two  cases. 
That   which  the  thesis   rightly   seeks  to   exclude  from  the 


THE  SUBLIME.  4° 7 

judgment  of  beauty  is  the  determinate  concept  of  the  under- 
standing; that  which  the  antithesis  with  equal  justice  pro- 
nounces indispensable  is  the  indeterminate  concept,  the 
aesthetic  Idea. 

The  freest  play  is  afforded  the  imagination  by  poetry, 
the  highest  of  all  arts,  which,  with  rhetoric  ("  insidious," 
on  account  of  its  earnest  intention  to  deceive),  forms  the 
group  termed  arts  of  speech.  To  .the  class  of  formative 
arts  belong  architecture,  sculpture,  and  painting  as  the  art 
of  design.  A  third  group,  the  art  of  the  beautiful  play  of 
sensations,  includes  painting  as  the  art  of  color,  and  music, 
which  as  a  "  fine  "  art  is  placed  immediately  after  poetry, 
as  an  "agreeable"  art  at  the  very  foot  of  the  list,  and 
as  the  play  of  tone  in  the  vicinity  of  the  entertaining 
play  of  fortune  [games  of  chance]  and  the  witty  play  of 
thought.  The  explanation  of  the  comic  (the  ludicrous  is 
based,  according  to  Kant,  on  a  sudden  transformation  of 
strained  expectation  into  nothing)  lays  great  (indeed 
exaggerated)  weight  on  the  resulting  physiological  phenom- 
ena, the  bodily  shock  which  heightens  vital  feeling  and 
favors  health,  and  which  accompanies  the  alternating 
tension  and  relaxation  of  the  mind. 

Besides  free  and  adherent  beauty,  there  is  still  a  third 
kind  of  aesthetic  effect,  the  Sublime.  The  beautiful  pleases 
by  its  bounded  form.  But  also  the  boundless  and  formless 
can  exert  aesthetic  effect  :  that  which  is  great  beyond  all 
comparison  we  judge  sublime.  Now  this  magnitude  is 
either  extensive  in  space  and  time  or  intensive  greatness 
of  force  or  power;  accordingly  there  arc  two  forms  of 
the  sublime.  That  phenomenon  which  mocks  the  power  of 
comprehension  possessed  by  the  human  imagination  or  sur- 
passes every  measure  of  our  intuition,  as  the  ocean  and 
the  starry  heavens,  is  mathematically  sublime.  That  which 
overcomes  all  conceivable  resistance,  as  the  terrible  forces 
of  nature,  conflagrations,  floods,  earthquakes,  hurricanes, 
thunderstorms,  is  dynamically  sublime  or  mighty.  The 
former  is  relative  to  the  cognitive,  the  latter  to  the  appe- 
titive faculty.  The  beautiful  brings  the  imagination  and 
the  understanding  into  accord;  by  the  sublime  the  fancy 
is  brought    into  a  certain    favorable  relation,  not   directly 


4°^  A' A. XT. 

to  be  termed  harmony,  with  reason.  In  the  one  case 
there  arose  a  restful,  positively  pleasurable  mood  ;  here  a 
shock  is  produced,  an  indirect  and  negative  pleasure  pro- 
ceeding from  pain.  Since  the  sublime  exceeds  the  functional 
capability  of  our  sensuous  representations  and  does  violence 
to  the  imagination,  we  first  feel  small  at  the  sight  of  the 
absolutely  great,  and  incapable  of  compassing  it  with  our 
sensuous  glance.  The  sensibility  is  not  equal  to  the  im- 
pression ;  this  at  first  seems  contrary  to  purpose  and  violent. 
This  humiliating  impression,  however,  is  quickly  followed 
by  a  reaction,  and  the  vital  forces,  which  were  at  first  checked, 
are  stimulated  to  the  more  lively  activity.  Moreover,  it  is 
the  sensuous  part  of  man  which  is  humbled  and  the 
spiritual  part  that  is  exalted  :  the  overthrow  of  sensibility 
becomes  a  triumph  for  reason.  The  sight  of  the  sublime, 
that  is,  awakens  the  Idea  of  the  unconditioned,  of  the  infinite. 
This  Idea  can  never  be  adequately  presented  by  an  intui- 
tion, but  can  be  aroused  only  by  the  inadequacy  of  all  that 
is  sensuous  to  present  it  ;  the  infinite  is  presented  through 
the  impossibility  of  presenting  it.  We  cannot  intuit  the 
infinite,  but  we  can  think  it.  In  comparison  with  reason 
(as  the  faculty  of  Ideas,  the  faculty  of  thinking  the  infinite) 
even  the  greatest  thing  that  can  be  given  in  the  sense-world 
appears  small  ;  reason  is  the  absolutely  great.  "That  is 
sublime  the  mere  ability  to  think  which  proves  a  faculty  of 
the  mind  surpassing  every  standard  of  sense."  "That  is 
sublime  which  pleases  immediately  through  its  opposition 
to  the  interest  of  the  senses."  The  conflict  between 
phantasy  and  reason,  the  in  sufficiency  of  the  former  for  the 
attainment  of  the  rational  Idea,  makes  us  conscious  of  the 
superiority  of  reason.  Just  because  we  feel  small  as  sen- 
suous beings  we  feel  great  as  rational  beings.  The  pleasure 
(related  to  the  moral  feeling  of  respect  and,  like  this, 
mingled  with  a  certain  pain)  which  accompanies  this  con- 
sciousness of  inner  greatness  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
imagination,  in  acknowledging  reason  superior,  places  itself 
in  the  appropriate  and  purposive  relation  of  subordination. 
It  is  evident  from  the  foregoing  that  the  truly  sublime  is 
reason,  the  moral  nature  of  man,  his  predisposition  and  desti- 
nation, which    point  beyond  the   present  world.      Schiller 


ORGANIC  NATURE.  4°9 

declares  that  "  in  space  the  sublime  does  not  dwell,"  and 
Kant  says,  "  Sublimity  is  contained  in  none  of  the  things 
of  nature,  but  only  in  our  mind,  in  so  far  as  we  are  conscious 
of  being  superior  to  nature  within  us  and  without  us." 
Nevertheless,  since  in  this  contemplation  we  fix  our  thoughts 
entirely  on  the  object  without  reflecting  on  ourselves,  we 
transfer  the  admiration  of  right  due  to  the  reason  and  its 
Idea  of  the  infinite  by  subreption  to  the  object  by  which 
the  Idea  is  occasioned,  and  call  the  object  itself  sublime, 
instead  of  the  mood  which  it  wakes  in  us. 

If  the  sublime  marks  the  point  where  the  aesthetic 
touches  on  the  boundary  of  the  moral,  the  beautiful  is 
also  not  without  some  relation  to  the  good.  By  showing 
the  agreement  of  sensibility  and  reason,  which  is  demanded 
by  the  moral  law,  realized  in  aesthetic  intuition  (as  a  volun- 
tary yielding  of  the  imagination  to  the  legitimacy  of  the 
understanding),  it  gives  us  the  inspiring  consciousness  that 
the  antithesis  is  reconcilable,  that  the  rational  can  be  pre- 
sented in  the  sensuous,  and  so  becomes  a  "  symbol  of  the 
good." 

(b)  Teleological  Judgment. — Teleological  judgment  is  not 
knowledge,  but  a  way  of  looking  at  things  which  comes 
into  play  where  the  causal  or  mechanical  explanation  fails 
us.  This  is  not  the  case  if  the  purposiveness  is  external, 
relative  to  its  utility  for  something  else.  The  fact  that  the 
sand  of  the  sea-shore  furnishes  a  good  soil  for  the  pine 
neither  furthers  nor  prevents  a  causal  knowledge  of  it. 
Only  inner  purposiveness,  as  it  is  manifested  in  the  prod- 
ucts of  organic  nature,  brings  the  mechanical  explanation 
to  a  halt.  Organisms  are  distinguished  above  inorganic 
forms  by  the  fact  that  of  themselves  they  are  at  once  cause 
and  effect,  that  they  are  self-productive  and  this  both 
as  a  species  (the  oak  springs  from  the  acorn,  and  in  its 
turn  bears  acorns)  and  as  individuals  (self-preservation, 
growth,  and  the  replacement  of  dying  parts  by  new  ones), 
and  also  by  the  fact  that  the  reciprocally  productive  parts 
are  in  their  form  and  their  existence  all  conditioned  by 
the  whole.  This  latter  fact,  that  the  whole  is  the  deter- 
mining ground  for  the  parts,  is  perfectly  obvious  in  the 
products  of   human  art.     For  here  it  is  the  representation 


41°  KANT. 

of  the  whole  (the  idea  of  the  work  desired)  which  as  the 
ground  precedes  the  existence  and  the  form  of  the  parts 
(of  the  machine).  But  where  is  the  subject  to  construct 
organisms  according  to  its  representations  of  ends?  We 
may  neither  conceive  nature  itself  as  endowed  with  forces 
acting  in  view  of  ends,  nor  a  praetermundane  intelligence 
interfering  in  the  course  of  nature.  Either  of  these  sup- 
positions would  be  the  death  of  natural  philosophy :  the 
hylozoist  endows  matter  with  a  property  which  conflicts 
with  its  nature,  and  the  theist  oversteps  the  boundary  of 
possible  experience.  Above  all,  the  analogy  of  the 
products  of  organic  nature  with  the  products  of  human 
technique  is  destroyed  by  the  fact  that  machines  do  not 
reproduce  themselves  and  their  parts  cannot  produce  one 
another,  while  the  organism  organizes  itself. 

For  our  discursive  understanding  an  interaction  between 
the  whole  and  the  parts  is  completely  incomprehensible. 
We  understand  when  the  parts  precede  the  whole  (mechan- 
ically) or  the  representation  of  the  whole  precedes  the 
parts  (teleologically)  ;  but  to  think  the  whole  itself  (not 
the  Idea  thereof)  as  the  ground  of  the  parts,  which  is 
demanded  by  organic  life,  is  impossible  for  us.  It  would 
have  been  otherwise  if  an  intuitive  understanding  had 
been  bestowed  upon  us.  For  a  being  possessing  intel- 
lectual intuition  the  antithesis  between  possibility  and 
actuality,  between  necessity  and  contingency,  between 
mechanism  and  teleology,  would  disappear  along  with  that 
between  thought  and  intuition.  For  such  a  being  every- 
thing possible  (all  that  it  thinks)  would  be  at  the  same  time 
actual  (present  for  intuition),  and  all  that  appears  to  us 
contingent — intentionally  selected  from  several  possibilities 
and  in  order  to  an  end — would  be  necessary  as  well;  with  the 
whole  would  be  given  the  parts  corresponding  thereto, 
and  consequently  natural  mechanism  and  purposive  con- 
nection would  be  identical,  while  for  us,  to  whom  the 
intuitive  understanding  is  denied,  the  two  divide.  Hence 
the  teleological  view  is  a  mere  form  of  human  represen- 
tation, a  subjective  principle.  We  may  not  say  that 
a  mechanical  origin  of  living  beings  is  impossible,  but 
only  that  we  are    unable  to    understand  it.     If  we  knew 


TELEOLOGY.  4*  I 

how  a  blade  of  grass  or  a  frog  sprang  from  mechanical 
forces,  we  would  also  be  in  a  position  to  produce  them. 

The  antinomy  of  the  teleological  judgment — thesis:  all 
production  of  material  things  and  their  forms  must  be 
judged  to  be  possible  according  to  merely  mechanical  laws  ; 
antithesis  :  some  products  of  material  nature  cannot  be 
judged  to  be  possible  according  to  merely  mechanical  laws, 
but  to  judge  them  requires  the  causality  of  final  causes — 
is  insoluble  so  long  as  both  propositions  are  taken  for  con- 
stitutive principles  ;  but  it  is  soluble  when  they  are  taken 
as  regulative  principles  or  standpoints  for  judgment. 
For  it  is  in  no  wise  contradictory,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
continue  the  search  ior  mechanical  causes  as  far  as  this  is 
in  any  way  possible,  and,  on  the  other,  clearly  to  recognize 
that,  at  last,  this  will  still  leave  a  remainder  which  we  can- 
not make  intelligible  without  calling  to  our  aid  the  concept  of 
ends.  Assuming  that  it  were  possible  to  carry  the  explana- 
tion of  life  from  life,  from  ancestral  organisms  (for  the 
generatio  cequivoca  is  an  absurd  theory)  so  far  that  the  whole 
organic  world  should  represent  one  great  family  descended 
from  one  primitive  form  as  the  common  mother,  even  then 
the  concept  of  final  causes  would  only  be  pushed  further 
back,  not  eliminated  :  the  origin  of  the  first  organization 
will  always  resist  mechanical  explanation.  Besides  this 
mission  of  putting  limits  to  causal  derivation  and  of  filling 
the  gap  in  knowledge  by  a  necessary,  although  subjective, 
way  of  looking  at  things,  the  Idea  of  ends  has  still  another, 
the  direct  promotion  of  knowledge  from  efficient  causes 
through  the  discovery  of  new  causal  problems.  Thus,  for 
example,  physiology  owes  the  impulse  to  the  discovery  of 
previously  unnoticed  mechanical  connections (cf.  also  p.  382 
note)  to  the  question  concerning  the  purpose  of  organs. 
As  doctrines  mechanism  and  teleology  are  irreconcilable 
and  impossible  ;  as  rules  or  maxims  of  inquiry  they  are 
compatible,  and  the  one  as   indispensable  as  the  other. 

After  the  problem  <>f  life,  which  is  insoluble  by  means  of 
the  mechanical  explanation,  has  necessitated  the  application 
of  the  concept  of  ends,  the  teleological  principle  must,  at 
least    by    Way    of    experiment,    be     extended    to    the    whole 

of  nature.      This  consideration  culminates  in  the  position 


412  KANT. 

that  man,  as  the  subject  of  morality,  must  be  held  to 
be  the  final  aim  of  the  world,  for  it  is  only  in  regard  to 
a  moral  being  that  no  further  inquiry  can  be  raised  as 
to  the  purpose  of  its  existence.  It  also  repeats  the  moral 
argument  for  the  existence  of  a  supreme  reason,  thus 
supplementing  physico-theology,  which  is  inadequate  to 
the  demonstration  of  one  absolutely  perfect  Deity;  so  that 
the  third  Critique,  like  the  two  preceding,  concludes 
with  the    Idea  of  God  as  an  object  of  practical  faith. 

There  are  three  original  and  pregnant  pairs  of  thoughts 
which  cause  Kant's  name  to  shine  in  the  philosophical  sky 
as  a  star  of  the  first  magnitude  :  the  demand  for  a  critique 
of  knowledge  and  the  proof  of  a  priori  forms  of  knowl- 
edge ;  the  moral  autonomy  and  the  categorical  imperative; 
the  regulative  validity  of  the  Ideas  of  reason  and  the  prac- 
tical knowledge  of  the  transcendent  world.  No  philosoph- 
ical theory,  no  scientific  hypothesis  can  henceforth  avoid 
the  duty  of  examining  the  value  and  legitimacy  of  its  con- 
clusions, as  to  whether  they  keep  within  the  limits  of  the 
competency  of  human  reason  ;  whether  Kant's  determina- 
tion of  the  origin  and  the  limits  of  knowledge  may  count  on 
continued  favor  or  not,  the  fundamental  critical  idea,  that 
reflection  upon  the  nature  and  range  of  our  cognitive  faculty 
is  indispensable,  retains  its  validity  for  all  cases  and  makes 
an  end  of  all  philosophizing  at  random.*  No  ethical  sys- 
tem will  with  impunity  pass  by  the  autonomous  legislation 
of  reason  and  the  unconditional  imperative  (the  admo- 
nition of  conscience  translated  into  conceptual  language) ; 
the  nature  and  worth  of  moral  will  will  be  everywhere 
sought  in  vain  if  they  are  not  recognized  where  Kant  has 
found  them — in  the  unselfish  disposition,  in  that  maxim 
which  is  fitted  to  become  a  general  law  for  all  rational 
beings.  The  doctrine  of  the  Ideas,  finally,  reveals  to  us, 
beyond  the  daylight  of  phenomenal  knowledge,  the  starlit 
landscape  of  another  mode  of  looking  at  things, +  in  which 

*  "  Reason  consists  just  in  this,  that  we  are  able  to  give  account  of  all  our 
concepts,  opinions,  and  assertions,  either  on  objective  or  subjective  grounds." 

f  Those  who  regard  all  future  metaphysics  as  refuted  by  the  Critique  of 
Reason  are  to  be  referred  to  the  positive  side  of  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  Ideas. 


CONCLUSION.  413 

satisfaction  is  afforded  for  the  hitherto  unmet  wishes  of 
the  heart  and  demands  of  the  reason. 

The  effect  of  the  three  Critiques  upon  the  public  was 
very  varied.  The  first  great  work  excited  alarm  by  the 
sharpness  of  its  negations  and  its  destruction  of  dogmatic 
metaphysics,  which  to  its  earliest  readers  appeared  to  be 
the  core  of  the  matter;  Kant  was  for  them  the  universal 
destroyer.  Then  the  Science  of  Knowledge  brought  into 
prominence  the  positive,  boldly  conquering  side,  the  investi- 
gation of  the  conditions  of  empirical  knowledge.  In  later 
times  the  endeavor  has  been  made  to  do  justice  to  both 
sides,  but,  in  opposition  to  the  overbold  procedure  of  the 
constructive  thinkers,  who  had  fallen  into  a  revived  dog- 
matism, more  in  the  spirit  of  caution  and  resignation.  The 
second  great  work  aroused  glowing  enthusiasm  :  "  Kant  is 
no  mundane  luminary,"  writes  Jean  Paul  in  regard  to  the 
Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  "  but  a  whole  solar  system  shin- 
ing at  once."  The  third,  because  of  its  subject  and  by  its 
purpose  of  synthetic  reconciliation  between  fields  hereto- 
fore sharply  separated,  gained  the  sympathy  of  our  poet- 
heroes  Schiller  and  Goethe,  and  awakened  in  a  young,  spec- 
ulative spirit  Ideas  for  a  Philosophy  of  Nature.  Schelling 
reclaimed  the  intuitive  understanding,  which  Kant  had 
problematically  attributed  to  the  primal  spirit,  as  the  prop- 
erty of  the  philosopher,  after  Fichte  had  drawn  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  consciousness  of  the  categorical  impera- 
tive, which  Kant  had  not  thoroughly  investigated,  could  be 
nothing  else  than  intellectual  intuition,  because  in  it  know- 
ing and  doing  coincide.  Fichte,  however,  does  not  derive 
the  material  for  his  system  from  the  Critique  of  Judgment, 
though  he  also  had  a  high  appreciation  of  it,  but  from  the 
two  earlier  Critiques,  the  fundamental  conceptions  of  which 
he — following  the  hint  that  practical  and  theoretical  reason 
are  only  different  applications  of  one  and  the  same  reason 
— brings  into  the  closest  connection.     He   unites  the  cen- 

Kant  admits  that  the  mechanical  explanation  does  not  satisfy  reason,  and 
that,  besides  it,  a  judgment  according  to  Ideas  is  legitimate.  When,  therefore, 
the  speculation  of  the  constructive  school  gives  an  ideal  interpretation  of  the 
world,  it  may  be  regarded  as  an  extended  application  of  "  regulative  principles." 
which  exceeds  its  authority  only  when  it  professes  to  be  "  objective  knowl- 
edge." 


414  FROM  KANT   TO  FICHTE. 

tral  idea  of  the  practical  philosophy,  the  freedom  and 
autonomous  legislation  of  the  will,  with  the  leading  princi- 
ple of  the  theoretical  philosophy,  the  spontaneity  of  the 
understanding,  under  the  original  synthesis  of  the  pure 
ego,  in  order  to  deduce  from  the  activity  of  the  ego  not 
only  the  a  priori  forms  of  knowledge,  but  also,  rejecting 
the  thing  in  itself,  the  whole  content  of  empirical  con- 
sciousness. The  thought  which  intervenes  between  the 
Kantian  Critique  of  Reason  and  the  development  of  thor- 
oughgoing idealism  by  Fichte,  with  its  criticisms  of  and 
additions  to  the  former  and  its  preparation  for  the  latter, 
may  be  glanced  at  in  a  few  supplementary  pages. 

4.  From  Kant  to  Fichte. 

To  begin  with  the  works  which  aided  in  the  extension 
and  recognition  of  the  Kantian  philosophy,  besides  Kant's 
Prolegomena,  the  following  stand  in  the  front  rank: 
Exposition  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  by  the  Königs- 
berg court  preacher,  Johannes  Schulz,  1784;  the  flowing 
Letters  concerning  the  Kantian  Philosophy,  by  K.  L.  Rein- 
hold  in  Wieland's  Deutscher  Merkur,  1786-87  ;  and  the 
Allgemeine  Litteraturzcitung,  in  Jena,  founded  in  1785,  and 
edited  by  the  philologist  Schütz  and  the  jurist  Hufeland, 
which  offered  itself  as  the  organ  of  the  new  doctrine.  Jena 
became  the  home  and  principal  stronghold  of  Kantianism  ; 
while  by  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  almost 
all  German  chairs  belonged  to  it,  and  the  non-philosophical 
sciences  as  well  received  from  it  stimulation  and  guiding 
ideas. 

In  the  camp  of  the  enemy  there  was  no  less  of  activity. 
The  Wolffian,  Eberhard  of  Halle,  founded  a  special  journal 
for  the  purpose  of  opposing  the  Kantian  philosophy:  the 
Philosophisches  Magazin,  1789,  continued  from  1792  as  the 
Philosophisches  Archiv.  The  Illumination  collected  its 
forces  in  the  Philosophische  Bibliothek,  edited  by  Feder  and 
Meiners.  Nicolai  waved  the  banner  of  common  sense 
in  the  Allgemeine  deutscJie  Bibliothek,  and  in  satirical 
romances,  and  was  handled  as  he  deserved  by  the  heroes 
of  poetry  and   philosophy  (cf.   the  Xenien  of  Goethe  and 


RE  IN  HOLD.  4T5 

Schiller,  Kant's  Letter  on  Bookmaking,  and  Fichte's  cut- 
ting disposal  of  him,  Nicolai  's  Life  and  Peculiar  Opinions). 
The  attacks  of  the  faith-philosophers  have  been  already 
noticed  (pp.  310-314). 

The  advance  from  Kant  to  Fichte  was  preparing  alike 
among  friends  and  enemies,  and  this  in  two  points.  The 
demand  was  in  part  for  a  formal  complement  (a  first  prin- 
ciple from  which  the  Kantian  results  could  be  deduced,  and 
by  which  the  dualism  of  sense  and  understanding  could  be 
overcome),  in  part  for  material  correction  (the  removal  of 
the  thing  in  itself)  and  development  (to  radical  idealism). 
Karl  Leonhard  Reinhold  (born  at  Vienna  in  1758  ;  fled 
from  a  college  of  the  St.  Barnabite  order,  1783  ;  in 
1787-94  professor  in  Jena,  and  then  as  the  successor  of 
Tetens  in  Kiel,  where  he  died  in  1823)  undertook  the 
former  task  in  his  Attempt  at  a  New  Theory  of  the  Human 
Faculty  of  Representation,  1789.  Kant's  classical  theory  of 
the  faculty  of  cognition  requires  for  its  foundation  a  theory 
of  the  faculty  of  representation,  or  an  elementary  philoso- 
phy, which  shall  take  for  its  object  the  deduction  of  the  sev- 
eral functions  of  reason  (intuition,  concept,  Idea)  from  the 
original  activity  of  representation.  The  Kantian  philoso- 
phy lacks  a  first  principle,  which,  as  first,  cannot  be  demon- 
strable, but  only  a  fact  immediately  evident  and  admitted 
by  everyone.  The  primal  fact,  which  we  seek,  is  conscious- 
ness. No  one  can  dispute  that  every  representation  con- 
tains three  things:  the  subject,  the  object,  and,  between 
the  two,  the  activity  of  representation.  Accordingly  the 
principle  of  consciousness  runs:  "The  representation  is 
distinguished  in  consciousness  from  the  represented  [object] 
and  the  representing  [subject],  and  is  referred  to  both." 
From  this  first  principle  Reinhold  endeavors  to  deduce  the 
well-known  principles  of  the  material  manifold  given  by  the 
action  of  objects,  and  the  forms  of  representation  spontane- 
ously produced  by  the  subject,  which  combine  this  mani- 
fold into  unity.  When,  a  few  years  later,  Fichte's  Science 
of  Knowledge  brilliantly  succeeded  in  bridging  the  gap 
between  sense  and  understanding  by  means  of  a  first  prin- 
ciple, thus  accomplishing  what  Reinhold  had  attempted, 
the  latter  became  one  of  his  adherents,  only  to  attach  him- 


4i6  G.   E.    SCHULZE,   MAIMON. 

self  subsequently  to  Jacobi,  and  then  to  Bardili  (Outlines 
of  Logic,  1800),  and  to  end  with  a  verbal  philosophy  lacking 
both  in  influence  and  permanence. 

In  Reinhold's  elementary  philosophy  the  thing  in  itself 
was  changed  from  a  problematical,  negative,  merely  limit- 
ing concept  into  a  positive  element  of  doctrine.  Objections 
were  raised  against  Kantianism,  as  thus  dogmatically  modi- 
fied in  the  direction  of  realism,  by  Schulze,  Maimon,  and 
Beck — by  the  first  for  purposes  of  attack,  by  the  second  in 
order  to  further  development,  and  by  the  third  with  an  exe- 
getical  purpose.  Gottlob  Ernst  Schulze,  professor  in  Helm- 
städt,  and  from  18 10  in  Göttingen,  in  his  JEnesidcmus 
(1792,  published  anonymously),  which  was  followed  later 
by  psychological  works,  defended  the  skeptical  position  in 
opposition  to  the  Critique  of  Reason.  Hume's  skepticism 
remains  unrefuted  by  Kant  and  Reinhold.  The  thing  in 
itself,  which  is  to  produce  the  material  of  representation 
by  affecting  the  senses,  is  a  self-contradictory  idea.  The 
application  of  the  category  of  cause  to  things  in  themselves 
violates  the  doctrine  that  the  latter  are  unknowable  and 
that  the  use  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding 
beyond  the  sphere  of  experience  is  inadmissible.  The 
transcendental  philosophy  has  never  proved  that  the  ground 
of  the  material  of  representation  cannot,  just  as  the  form 
thereof,  reside  in  the  subject  itself. 

Side  by  side  with  the  anti-critical  skepticism  of  yEneside- 
mus-Schulze,  Salomon  Maimon  (died  1800;  cf.  Witte,  1876), 
who  was  highly  esteemed  by  the  greatest  philosophers  of 
his  time,  represents  critical  skepticism.  With  Reinhold 
he  holds  consciousness  (as  the  combination  of  a  manifold 
into  objective  unity)  to  be  the  common  root  of  sensibility 
and  understanding,  and  with  Schulze,  the  concept  of  the 
thing  in  itself  to  be  an  imaginary  or  irrational  quantity,  a 
thought  that  cannot  be  carried  out ;  it  is  not  only  unknow- 
able, but  unthinkable.  That  alone  is  knowable  which  we 
ourselves  produce,  hence  only  the  form  of  representation. 
The  matter  of  representation  is  "  given,"  but  this  does  not 
mean  that  it  arises  from  the  action  of  the  thing  in  itself,  but 
only  that  we  do  not  know  its  origin.  Understanding  and 
sense,  or  spontaneity  and  receptivity,  do  not  differ  gener- 


BECK.  417 

ically,  but  only  in  degree,  viz.,  as  complete  and  incomplete 
consciousness.  Sensation  is  an  incomplete  consciousness, 
because  we  do  not  know  how  its  object  arises. 

By  the  removal  of  the  thing  in  itself  yEnesidemus 
Schulze  sought  to  refute  the  Kantian  theory  and  Maimon 
to  improve  it.  Sigismund  Beck  (1761-1840),  in  his  Only 
Possible  Standpoint  from  which  the  Critical  Philosophy  must 
be  Judged,  1796,*  seeks  by  it  to  elucidate  the  Kantian 
theory,  holding  up  idealism  as  its  true  meaning.  In  oppo- 
sition to  the  usual  opinion  that  a  representation  is  true 
when  it  agrees  with  its  object,  he  points  to  the  impossi- 
bility of  comparing  the  one  with  the  other.  Of  objects 
out  of  consciousness  we  can  know  nothing;  after  the 
removal  of  all  that  is  subjective  there  is  nothing  positive 
left  of  the  representation.  Everything  in  it  is  produced 
by  us  ;  the  matter  arises  together  with  the  form  through 
the  "original  synthesis." 

The  last  mentioned  attempts  to  develop  the  Kantian  phi- 
losophy were  so  far  surpassed  by  Fichte's  great  achievement 
that  they  have  received  from  their  own  age  and  from  pos- 
terity a  less  grateful  appreciation  and  remembrance  tlian 
was  essentially  their  due.  A  phenomenon  of  a  different 
sort,  which  is  also  to  be  placed  at  the  threshold  between 
Kant  and  Fichte,  but  which  forms  rather  a  supple- 
ment to  the  noetics  and  ethics  of  the  latter  than  a  link  in 
the  transition  to  them,  has,  on  the  contrary,  gained  an 
honorable  position  in  the  memory  of  the  German  people, 
viz.,  Schiller's  aesthetics. f  In  its  center  stand  the  Kan- 
tian antithesis  of  sensibility  and  reason  and  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  the  two  sides  of  human  nature  brought  about  by 
its  occupation  with  the  beautiful.  Artistic  activity  or  the 
play-impulse  mediates  between  the  lower,  sensuous  matter- 
impulse  and   the-  higher,  rational  form-impulse,  and  unites 

*This  book  forms  the  third  volume  of  his  Expository  Abridgment  of  the 
Critical  Writings  of  Professor  Kant;  in  the  same  year  appeared  the  Outlines  oj 
the  Critical  Philosophy.  Cf.  on  Beck,  Inlthey  in  the  Archiv  Im  <;,  schichte  der 
Philosophic,  vol.  ii.,  1889,  pp.  592-650. 

f  The  most  important  of  Schiller's  aesthetic  essays  are  those  On  Grace  and 
Dignity,  1793  ;  On  Naive  and  Sentimental  Poetry,  1795-96  ;  and  the  Letters  on 
^Esthetic  Education,  intermediate  between  them.  Cf.  Kuno  Fischer,  S,hi//e> 
als  Philosoph,  1858,  2d  cd.  {Schillerschriften,  iii.,  iv.)  1891-92. 


41 8  SCHILLER. 

the  two  in  harmonious  co-operation.  Where  appetite 
seeks  after  satisfaction,  and  where  the  strict  idea  of  duty- 
rules,  there  only  half  the  man  is  occupied  ;  neither  lust  nor 
moral  worth  is  beautiful.  In  order  that  beauty  and  grace 
may  arise,  the  matter-impulse  and  the  form-impulse,  or 
sensibility  and  reason,  must  manifest  themselves  uniformly 
and  in  harmony.  Only  when  he  "  plays  "  is  man  wholly 
and  entirely  man  ;  only  through  art  is  the  development  of 
humanity  possible.  The  discernment  of  the  fact  that  the 
beautiful  brings  into  equilibrium  the  two  fundamental  im- 
pulses, one  or  the  other  of  which  preponderates  in  sensuous 
desire  and  in  moral  volition,  does  not  of  itself  decide  the 
relative  rank  of  artistic  and  moral  activity.  The  recogni- 
tion of  this  mediating  position  of  art  may  be  connected 
with  the  view  that  it  forms  a  transitional  stage  toward  and 
a  means  of  education  for  morality,  as  well  as  with  the  other, 
that  in  it  human  nature  attains  its  completion.  Evidence 
of  both  views  can  be  found  in  Schiller's  writings.  At  first 
he  favors  the  Kantian  moralism,  which  admits  nothing 
higher  than  the  good  will,  and  sets  art  the  task  of  educa- 
ting men  up  to  morality  by  ennobling  their  natural  im- 
pulses. Gradually,  however,  aesthetic  activity  changes  in  his 
view  from  a  preparation  for  morality  into  the  ultimate  goal 
of  human  endeavor.  Peaceful  reconciliation  is  of  more 
worth  than  the  spirit's  hardly  gained  victory  in  the  conflict 
with  the  sensibility;  fine  feeling  is  more  than  rational  voli- 
tion ;  the  highest  ideal  is  the  beautiful  soul,  in  which  incli- 
nation not  merely  obeys  the  command  of  duty,  but  antici- 
pates it  (cf.  p.  314). 


CHAPTER  X. 

FICHTE. 

FICHTE  is  a  Kantian  in  about  the  same  sense  that  Plato 
was  a  Socratic.  Instead  of  taking  up  and  developing 
particular  critical  problems  he  makes  the  vivifying  kernel, 
the  soul  of  criticism,  his  own.  With  the  self-activity 
of  reason  (as  a  real  force  and  as  a  problem)  for  his  fun- 
damental idea,  he  outlines  with  magnificent  boldness  a 
new  view  of  the  world,  in  which  the  idealism  concealed 
in  Kant's  philosophy  under  the  shell  of  cautious  limitations 
was  roused  into  vigorous  life,  and  the  great  Königsberger's 
noble  words  on  the  freedom,  the  position,  and  the  power  of 
the  spirit  translated  from  the  language  of  sober  foresight 
into  that  of  vigorous  enthusiasm.  The  world  can  be  under- 
stood only  from  the  standpoint  of  spirit,  the  spirit  only 
from  the  will.  The  ego  is  pure  activity,  and  all  reality 
its  product.  Fichte's  system  is  all  life  and  action  :  its  aim 
is  not  to  mediate  knowledge,  but  to  summon  the  hearer  and 
reader  to  the  production  of  a  new  and  pregnant  funda- 
mental view,  in  which  the  will  is  as  much  a  participant  as 
the  understanding;  it  begins  not  with  a  concept  <>r  a  prop- 
osition, but  with  a  demand  for  action  (posit  thyself  ;  do 
consciously  what  thou  hast  done  unconsciously  so  often  as 
thou  hast  called  thyself  I  ;  analyze,  then,  the  act  of  self- 
consciousness,  and  cognize  in  their  elements  the  forces 
from  which  all  reality  proceeds);  its  God  is  not  a  com- 
pleted absolute  substance,  but  a  self-real izing  world-order. 
This  inner  vivacity  of  the  Fichtean  principle,  which  recalls 
the  pure  actuality  of  Aristotle's  vovS  and  the  ceaseless 
becoming  of  Heraclitus,  finds  its  complete  parallel  in  the 
fact  that,  although  he  was  wanting  neither  in  logical  con- 
secutivcness  nor  in  the  talent  for  luminous  and  popular 
exposition,  Fichte  felt  continually  driven  to  express  his 
ideas  in   new  forms,  and,  just  when  he  seemed  to  have  suc- 

4»9 


420  FICHTE. 

ceeded  in  saying  what  he  meant  with  the  greatest  clear- 
ness, again  unsatisfied,  to  seek  still  more  exact  and  evident 
renderings  for  his  fundamental  position,  which  proved  so 
difficult  to  formulate. 

The  author  of  the  Wissenschaftsichre  was  the  son  of  a 
poor  ribbon  maker,  and  was  born  at  Rammenau  in  Lusatia 
in  1762.  The  talents  of  the  boy  induced  the  Freiherr  von 
Miltiz  to  give  him  the  advantage  of  a  good  education. 
Fichte  attended  school  in  Meissen  and  in  Pforta,  and  was 
a  student  of  theology  at  the  universities  of  Jena  and  Leip- 
sic.  While  a  tutor  in  Zurich  he  made  the  acquaintance  of 
Lavater  and  Pestalozzi,  as  well  as  of  his  future  wife,  Johanna 
Rahn,  a  niece  of  Klopstock.  Returning  to  Leipsic,  his 
whole  mode  of  thought  was  revolutionized  by  the  Kantian 
philosophy,  in  which  it  was  his  duty  to  instruct  a  pupil. 
This  gives  to  the  mind,  as  his  letters  confess,  an  inconceiv- 
able elevation  above  all  earthly  things.  "  I  have  adopted 
a  nobler  morality,  and,  instead  of  occupying  myself  with 
things  without  me,  have  been  occupied  more  with  myself.'' 
"  I  now  believe  with  all  my  heart  in  human  freedom,  and 
am  convinced  that  only  on  this  supposition  duty  and 
virtue  of  any  kind  are  possible."  "  I  live  in  a  new  world 
since  I  have  read  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason.  Things 
which  I  believed  never  could  be  proved  to  me,  e.  g.,  the 
idea  of  an  absolute  freedom  and  duty,  have  been  proved, 
and  I  feel  the  happier  for  it.  It  is  inconceivable  what 
reverence  for  humanity,  what  power  this  philosophy  gives 
us,  what  a  blessing  it  is  for  an  age  in  which  the  citadels  of 
morality  had  been  destroyed,  and  the  idea  of  duty  blotted 
out  from  all  the  dictionaries  !  "  A  journey  to  Warsaw, 
whither  he  had  been  attracted  by  the  expectation  of 
securing  a  position  as  a  private  tutor,  soon  afforded  him 
the  opportunity  of  visiting  at  Königsberg  the  author  of 
the  system  which  had  effected  so  radical  a  transformation 
in  his  convictions.  His  rapidly  written  treatise,  Essay 
toward  a  Critique  of  All  Revelation,  attained  the  end  to 
which  its  inception  was  due  by  gaining  for  its  author  a 
favorable  reception  from  the  honored  master.  Kant 
secured  for  Fichte  a  tutor's  position  in  Dantzic,  and  a 
publisher   for  his  maiden  work.     When   this  appeared,  at 


FICHTE.  421 

Easter,  1792,  the  name  of  its  author  was  by  oversight 
omitted  from  the  title  page,  together  with  the  preface, 
which  had  been  furnished  after  the  rest  of  the  book  ;  and 
as  the  anonymous  work  was  universally  ascribed  to  Kant 
(whose  religious  philosophy  was  at  this  time  eagerly  looked 
for),  the  young  writer  became  famous  at  a  stroke  as 
soon  as  the  error  was  explained.  A  second  edition  was 
issued  as  early  as  the  following  year. 

After  his  marriage  in  Zurich,  where  he  had  completed 
several  political  treatises  (the  address,  Reclamation  of  the 
Freedom  of  Thought  from  the  Princes  of  Europe,  who  have 
hitherto  suppressed  it,  Ileliopolis  in  the  Last  Year  of  the  Old 
Darkness,  and  the  two  Hefte,  Contributions  tozvard  the 
Correction  of  the  Public  Judgment  on  the  French  Revolution, 
1793),  Fichte  accepted,  in  1794,  a  call  to  Jena,  in  place  of 
Reinhold,  who  had  gone  to  Kiel,  and  whose  popularity  was 
soon  exceeded  by  his  own.  The  same  year  saw  the  birth 
of  the  Wissenschaf tslchrc.  His  stay  in  Jena  was  embittered 
by  conflicts  with  the  clergy,  who  took  offense  at  his  ethical 
lectures  {On  the  Vocation  of  the  Scholar)  held  on  Sunday 
mornings  (though  not  at  an  hour  which  interfered  with 
church  service),  and  with  the  students,  who,  after  they  had 
been  untrue  to  their  decision — which  they  had  formed  as  a 
result  of  these  lectures — to  dissolve  their  societies  or  orders, 
gave  vent  to  their  spite  by  repeatedly  smashing  the  win- 
dows of  Fichte's  residence.  Accordingly  he  took  leave  of 
absence,  and  spent  the  summer  of  1795  in  Osmannstädt. 
The  years  1796-98,  in  which,  besides  the  two  lutroduc- 
tions  to  the  Science  of  Knowledge,  the,  Natural  Right  and 
the  Science  of  lit hies  lone  of  the  most  all  important  work's 
in  German  philosophical  literature)  appeared,  mark-  the 
culmination  of  Fichte's  famous  labors.  The  so-called 
atheistic  controversy*  resulted  in  Fichte's  departure  from 
Jena.  The  Philosophisches  Journal,  which  since  1797  had 
been  edited  by  Fichte  in  association  with  Niet  hammer,  had 
published  an  article  by  Magister  Forberg,  rector  at  Saat- 
feld, entitled  "  The  Development  of  the  Concept  of  Reli- 
gion," and  as  a  conciliating  introduction  to  t  his  ,1  shorl  essay 
by  Fichte,  "On  the  Ground  of  our  Belief  in  a  Divine  Gov- 

*  Cf.  K.ni   August  I  l.i '.--.  /. naisch  ■  Fichtebüchlein,  \ 


422  FICHTE. 

ernment  of  the  World."*  For  this  it  was  confiscated  by 
the  Dresden  government  on  the  charge  of  containing  atheis- 
tical matter,  while  other  courts  were  summoned  to  take  like 
action.  In  Weimar  hopes  were  entertained  of  an  amicable 
adjustment  of  the  matter.  But  when  Fichte,  after  publish- 
ing two  vindications  f  couched  in  vehement  language,  had 
in  a  private  letter  uttered  the  threat  that  he  would 
answer  with  his  resignation  any  censure  proceeding  from 
the  University  Senate,  not  only  was  censure  for  indiscre- 
tion actually  imposed,  but  his  (threatened)  resignation 
accepted. 

Going  to  Berlin,  Fichte  found  a  friendly  government, 
a  numerous  public  for  his  lectures,  and  a  stimulating  circle 
of  friends  in  the  romanticists,  the  brothers  Schlegel,  Tieck, 
Schleiermacher,  etc.  In  the  first  years  of  his  Berlin  resi- 
dence there  appeared  The  Vocation  of  Man,  The  Exclusive 
Commercial  State,  1 800 ;  The  Sun-clear  Report  to  the  Larger 
Public  on  the  Essential  Nature  of  the  New  Philosophy,  and 
the  Answer  to  Reinhold,  1801.  Three  works,  which  were 
the  outcome  of  his  lectures  and  were  published  in  the 
year  1806  {Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age,  The  Nature 
of  the  Scholar,  Way  to  the  Blessed  Life  or  Doctrine  of 
Religion),  for m  a  connected  whole.  In  the  summer  of  1805 
Fichte  filled  a  professorship  at  Erlangen,  and  later,  after 
the   outbreak   of  the  war,  he   occupied    for  a  short   time  a 

*  It  is  a  mistake,  Fichte  writes  here,  referring  to  the  conclusion  of  Forberg's 
article  ("  Is  there  a  God?  It  is  and  remains  uncertain,"  etc.),  to  say  that  it  is 
doubtful  whether  there  is  a  God  or  not.  That  there  is  a  moral  order  of  the 
world,  which  assigns  to  each  rational  individual  his  determined  place  and  counts 
on  his  work,  is  most  certain,  nay,  it  is  the  ground  of  all  other  certitude.  The 
living  and  operative  moral  order  (ordo  ordinans)  is  itself  God  ;  we  need  no 
other  God,  and  can  conceive  no  other.  There  is  no  ground  in  reason  for 
going  beyond  this  world-order  to  postulate  a  particular  being  as  its  cause.  Who- 
ever ascribes  personality  and  consciousness  to  this  particular  being  makes  it  finite; 
consciousness  belongs  only  to  the  individual,  limited  ego.  And  it  is  allowable 
to  state  this  frankly  and  to  beat  down  the  prattle  of  the  schools,  in  order  that 
the  true  religion  of  joyous  well-doing  may  lift  up  its  head. 

\  Appeal  to  the  Public,  and  Formal  Defense  against  the  Charge  of  Atheism, 
1799.  The  first  of  these  maintains  that  Fichte's  standpoint  and  that  of  his 
opponents  are  related  as  duty  and  advantage,  sensible  and  suprasensible,  and 
that  the  substantial  God  of  his  accusers,  to  be  derived  from  the  sensibility,  is, 
as  personified  fate,  as  the  distributer  of  all  happiness  and  unhappiness  to  finite 
beings,  a  miserable  fetich. 


FICHTE.  423 

chair  at  Königsberg,  finding  a  permanent  university  posi- 
tion at  the  foundation  of  the  University  of  Berlin  in  1810. 
His  glowing  Addresses  to  the  German  Nation,  1808,  which 
essentially  aided  in  arousing  the  national  spirit,  have 
caused  his  name  to  live  as  one  of  the  greatest  of  orators  and 
most  ardent  of  patriots  in  circles  of  the  German  people 
where  his  philosophical  importance  cannot  be  understood. 
His  death  in  18 14  was  also  a  result  of  unselfish  labor  in  the 
service  of  the  Fatherland.  He  succumbed  to  a  nervous 
fever  contracted  from  his  wife,  who,  with  self-sacrifice  equal 
to  his  own,  had  shared  in  the  care  of  the  wounded,  and  who 
had  brought  the  contagion  back  with  her  from  the  hospital. 
On  his  monument  is  inscribed  the  beautiful  text,  "  The 
teachers  shall  shine  as  the  brightness  of  the  firmament,  and 
they  that  turn  many  to  righteousness  as  the  stars  that 
shine  forever  and  ever."  Forberg  in  his  journal  records 
this  estimate  :  The  leading  trait  in  Fichte's  character  is 
his  absolute  integrity.  All  his  words  are  weighty  and 
important.  His  principles  are  stern  and  little  modified 
by  affability.  The  spirit  of  his  philosophy  is  proud  and 
courageous,  one  which  does  not  so  much  lead  as  possess 
us  and  carry  us  along.  His  philosophemes  are  inquiries 
in  which  we  see  the  truth  arise  before  our  eyes,  and  which 
just  for  this  reason  lay  the  foundations  of  science  and 
conviction. 

The  philosopher's  son,  Immanuel  Hermann  Fichte  (his 
own  name  was  Johann  Gottlieb),  wrote  a  biography  of  his 
father  (1830;  2d  ed.,  1862),  and  supervised  the  publica- 
tion of  both  the  Posthumous  Works  (1834-35,  3  vols.)  and 
the  Collected  Works  (1845-46,  8  vols.).  The  simple  and 
luminous  Facts  of  Consciousness  of  181 1,  or  181 7  (not  the 
lecture  of  1813  with  the  same  title),  is  especially  valuable 
as  an  introduction  to  the  system.  Among  the  many 
redactions  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre \  the  epoch-making 
Foundation  of 1 'he  whole  Science  of  Knowledge,  1794.  with  the 
two  Introductions  to  the  Science  of  Knowledge,  \y<)7,  takes 
the  first  rank,  while  of  the  practical  works  the  most  im- 
portant  are  the  Foundation  of  Natural  Right  according  to  the 
Principles  of  the  Science  of  Knowledge,  1 796,  and  1  he  System 
of  the  Science  of  lithics  according  to  the   Principles  of  the 


4-4  FICHTE. 

Science  of  Knowledge,  1798,  and  next  to  these  the  Lectures 
on  the  Theory  of  the  State,  1820  (delivered  in  181 3).* 

I.  The  Science  of  Knowledge. 

(a)  The  Problem. — In  Fichte's  judgment  Kant  did  not  suc- 
ceed in  carrying  through  the  transformation  in  thought 
which  it  was  his  aim  to  effect,  because  the  age  did  not  under- 
stand the  spirit  of  his  philosophy.  This  spirit,  and  with  it 
the  great  service  of  Kant,  consists  in  transcendental  idealism, 
which  by  the  doctrine  that  objects  conform  themselves  to 
representations,  not  representations  to  objects,  draws  phil- 
osophy away  from  external  objects  and  leads  it  back  into 
ourselves.  We  have  followed  the  letter,  he  thinks,  instead 
of  the  spirit  of  Kant,  and  because  of  a  few  passages  with  a 
dogmatic  ring,  whose  references  to  a  given  matter,  the  thing 
in  itself,  and  the  like,  were  intended  only  as  preliminary, 
have  overlooked  the  numberless  others  in  which  the  con- 
trary is  distinctly  maintained.  Thus  the  interpreters  of 
Kant,  using  their  own  prejudices  as  a  criterion,  have  read 
into  him  exactly  that  which  he  sought  to  refute,  and  have 
made  the  destroyer  of  all  dogmatism  himself  a  dogmatist  ; 
thus  in  the  Kantianism  of  the  Kantians  there  has  sprung 
up  a  marvelous  combination  of  crude  dogmatism  and  un- 
compromising idealism.  Though  such  an  absurd  mingling 
of  entirely  heterogeneous  elements  may  be  excused  in  the 
case  of  interpreters  and  successors,  who  have  had  to  con- 
struct for  themselves  the  guiding  principle  of  the  whole 
from  their   study  of    the  critical  writings,    yet  we  cannot 

*  At  the  same  time  as  J.  H.  Lowe's  book  Die  Philosophie  Fichtes,  1862,  there 
appeared  in  celebration  of  the  centenary  of  Fichte's  birthyear,  or  birthday,  a 
large  number  of  minor  essays  and  addresses  by  Friedrich  Harms,  A.  L.  Kym, 
Trendelenburg,  Franz  Hoffman,  Karl  Heyder,  F.  C.  Lott,  Karl  Köstlin,  J.  B. 
Meyer,  and  others  (cf.  Reichlin-Meldegg  in  vol.  xlii.  of  the  Zeitschrift  für  Phi- 
losophie). Lasson  has  written,  1863,  on  Fichte's  relation  to  Church  and  state, 
Zeller  on  Fichte  as  a  political  thinker  ( Vorträge  und  Abhandlungen,  1865),  and 
F.  Zimmer  on  his  philosophy  of  religion.  Among  foreign  works  we  may  note 
Adamson's  Fichte,  1881,  and  the  English  translations  of  several  of  Fichte's 
works  by  Kroeger  [Science  of  Knowledge,  1868  ;  Science  of  Rights,  1869 — both 
also,  1889]  and  William  Smith  [Popular  Writings,  4th  ed.,  1889  ;  also  Everett's 
Fichte's  Science  of  Knowledge  (Griggs's  Philosophical  Classics,  1884),  and  sev- 
eral translations  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  including  one  of 
The  Facts  of  Consciousness. — Tr.] 


KANTS  OMISSIONS.  425 

assume  it  in  the  author  of  the  system,  unless  we  believe  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  the  result  of  the  strangest  chance, 
and  not  the  work  of  intellect.  Two  men  only,  Beck,  the 
teacher  of  the  Standpoint,  and  Jacobi,  the  clearest  mind  of 
the  century,  are  to  be  mentioned  with  respect  as  having 
risen  above  the  confusion  of  the  time  to  the  perception  that 
Kant  teaches  idealism,  that,  according  to  him,  the  object 
is  not  given,  but  made. 

Besides  the  perspicuity  which  would  have  prevented 
these  misunderstandings,  Fichte  misses  something  further 
in  Kant's  work.  Considered  as  a  system  Kant's  exposi- 
tions were  incomplete  ;  and,  on  his  own  confession,  his  aim 
was  not  to  furnish  the  science  itself,  but  only  the  founda- 
tion and  the  materials  for  it.  Therefore,  although  the 
Kantian  philosophy  is  established  as  far  as  its  inner  con- 
tent is  concerned,  there  is  still  need  of  earnest  work  to 
systematize  the  fragments  and  results  which  he  gives  into  a 
firmly  connected  and  impregnable  whole.  The  Wissen- 
schaftslehre  takes  this  completion  of  idealism  for  its 
mission.  It  cannot  solve  the  problem  by  a  commentary 
on  the  Kantian  writings,  nor  by  the  correction  and  addition 
of  particulars,  but  only  by  restoring  the  whole  at  a  stroke. 
He  alone  finds  the  truth  who  new  creates  it  in  himself, 
independently  and  in  his  own  way.  Thus  Fichte's  system 
contains  the  same  view  of  the  matter  as  the  critical  system 
— the  author  is  aware,  runs  the  preface  to  the  programme, 
On  the  Concept  of  the  Science  of  Knowledge,  1794,  "  that  he 
never  will  be  able  to  say  anything  at  which  Kant  has  not 
hinted,  immediately  or  mediately,  more  or  less  clearly, 
before  him," — but  in  his  procedure  he  is  entirely  independ- 
ent of  the  Kantian  exposition.  We  shall  first  raise  the 
question,  What  in  the  Kantian  philosophy  is  in  need  of 
completion?  and,  secondly,  What  method  must  be  adopted 
in  completing  it  ? 

Kant  discusses  the  laws  of  intelligence  when  they  are 
already  applied  to  objects,  without  enlightening  us  con- 
cerning the  ground  of  these  laws.  lie  derived  the  pure 
concepts  (the  laws  of  substantiality,  of  causality,  etc.)  from 
(logic,  and  thus  mediately  fromj  experience  instead  of 
deducing  them  from  the  nature  of  intelligence  ;   similarly  he 


426  FICHTE. 

never  furnished  this  deduction  for  the  forms  of  intuition, 
space  and  time.  In  order  to  understand  that  intelligence, 
and  why  intelligence,  must  act  in  just  this  way  (must  think 
just  by  means  of  these  categories),  we  must  prove,  and 
not  merely,  with  Kant,  assert,  that  these  functions  or 
forms  are  really  laws  of  thought — or,  what  amounts  to  the 
same  thing,  that  they  are  conditions  of  self-consciousness. 
Again,  even  if  it  be  granted  that  Kant  has  explained  the 
properties  and  relations  of  things  (that  they  appear  in  space 
and  time,  and  that  their  accidents  must  be  referred  to  sub- 
stances), the  question  still  remains  unanswered,  Whence 
comes  the  matter  which  is  taken  up  into  these  forms?  So 
long  as  the  whole  object  is  not  made  to  arise  before  the 
eyes  of  the  thinker,  dogmatism  is  not  driven  out  of  its  last 
corner.  The  thing  in  itself  is,  like  the  rest,  only  a  thought 
in  the  ego.  If  thus  the  antithesis  between  the  form  and  the 
matter  of  cognition  undergoes  modification,  so,  further,  the 
allied  distinction  between  understanding  and  sensibility 
must,  as  Reinhold  accurately  recognized,  be  reduced  to  a 
common  principle  and  receptivity  be  conceived  as  self- 
limiting  spontaneity.  In  his  practical  philosophy  also 
Kant  left  much  unfinished.  The  categorical  imperative  is 
susceptible  of  further  deduction,  it  is  not  the  principle 
itself,  but  a  conclusion  from  the  true  principle,  from 
the  injunction  to  absolute  sclf-dcpcndencc  on  the  part  of 
reason ;  moreover,  the  nature  of  our  consciousness  of  the 
moral  law  must  be  more  thoroughly  discussed,  and  in 
order  to  gain  a  real,  instead  of  a  merely  formal,  ethics  the 
relation  of  this  law  to  natural  impulse.  Finally,  Kant 
never  discussed  the  foundation  of  philosophy  as  a  whole, 
but  always  separated  its  theoretical  from  its  practical  side, 
and  Reinhold  also  did  nothing  to  remove  this  dualism.  In 
short,  some  things  that  Kant  only  asserted  or  presupposed 
can  and  must  be  proved,  some  that  he  kept  distinct  must 
be  united.     In  what  way  are  both  to  be  accomplished? 

Since  correct  inferences  from  correct  premises  yield  cor- 
rect results,  and  correct  inference  is  easy  to  secure,  every- 
thing depends  on  the  correct  point  of  departure.  If  we 
neglect  this  and  consider  only  the  process  and  the  results 
of  inference,  there  are  two  consistent  systems:  the  dogmatic 


IDEALISM  AND  REALISM.  427 

or  realistic  course  of  thought,  which  seeks  to  derive  repres- 
entations from  things;  and  the  idealistic, which,  conversely, 
seeks  to  derive  being  from  thought.  Now,  no  matter  how 
consistently  dogmatism  may  proceed  (and  when  it  does  so 
it  becomes,  like  the  system  of  Spinoza,  materialism  and 
fatalism  or  determinism,  maintaining  that  all  is  nature, 
and  all  goes  on  mechanically ;  treats  the  spirit  as  a  thing 
among  others,  and  denies  its  metaphysical  and  moral  inde- 
pendence, its  immateriality  and  freedom),  it  may  be  shown  to 
be  false,  because  it  starts  from  a  false  principle.  Thought 
can  never  be  derived  from  being,  because  it  is  not  contained 
therein;  from  being  only  being  can  proceed,  and  never 
representation.  Being,  however,  can  be  derived  from 
thought,  for  consciousness  is  also  being;  nay,  it  is  more 
than  this,  it  is  conscious  being.  And  as  consciousness  con- 
tains both  being  and  a  knowledge  of  this  being,  idealism 
is  superior  to  realism,  because  idealism  includes  the  latter 
as  a  moment  in  itself,  and  hence  can  explain  it,  though  it 
is  not  explicable  by  it.  Dogmatism  makes  the  mistake  of 
going  beyond  consciousness  or  the  ego,  and  working  with 
empty,  merely  formal  concepts.  A  concept  is  empty  when 
nothing  actual  corresponds  to  it,  or  no  intuition  can  be  sub- 
sumed under  it  (here  it  is  to  be  noted  that,  besides  sensu- 
ous intuition,  there  is  an  intellectual  intuition  also;  an 
example  is  found  in  the  ego  as  a  self-intuiting  being).  Phi- 
losophy, indeed,  may  abstract  and  must  abstract,  must  rise 
above  that  which  is  given — for  how  could  she  explain  life 
and  particular  knowledge  if  she  assumed  no  higher  stand- 
point than  her  object?— but  true  abstraction  is  nothing 
other  than  the  separation  of  factors  which  in  experience 
always  present  themselves  together;  it  analyzes  empirical 
consciousness  in  order  to  reconstruct  it  from  its  elements, 
it  causes  empirical  consciousness  to  arise  before  our  eyes, 
it  is  a  pragmatic  history  of  consciousness.  Such  abstraction, 
undertaken  in  order  to  a  genetic  consideration  of  the  ego, 
does  not  go  beyond  experience,  but  penetrates  into  the 
depths  of  experience,  is  not  transcendent,  but  transcendental, 
and,  since;  it  remains  in  close  touch  with  that  which  is 
intuitable,  yields  a  real  philosophy  in  contrast  to  all  merely 
formal  philosophy. 


42%  FICHTE. 

These  theoretical  advantages  of  idealism  are  supple- 
mented by  momentous  reasons  of  a  practical  kind,  which 
determine  the  choice  between  the  two  systems,  besides 
which  none  other  is  possible.  Themoral  law  says:  Thou 
shalt  be  self-dependent.  If  I  ought  to  be  so  I  must  be  able 
to  be  so;  but  if  I  were  matter  I  would  not  be  able.  Thus 
idealism  proves  itself  to  be  the  ethical  mode  of  thought, 
while  the  opposite  mode  shows  that  those  who  favor  it 
have  not  raised  themselves  to  that  independence  of  all  that 
is  external  which  is  morally  enjoined,  for  in  order  to  be  able 
to  know  ourselves  free  we  must  have  made  ourselves  free.* 
Thus  the  philosophy  which  a  man  chooses  depends  on  what 
sort  of  a  man  he  is.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  categorical 
imperative  calls  for  belief  in  the  reality  of  the  external 
world  and  of  other  minds,  this  is  nothing  against  idealism. 
For  idealism  does  not  deny  the  realism  of  life,  but  explains 
it  as  a  necessary,  though  not  a  final,  mode  of  intuition. 
The  dogmatic  mode  of  thought  is  merely  an  explanation 
from  the  standpoint  of  common  consciousness,  and  for 
idealism,  as  the  only  view  which  is  both  scientifically  and 
practically  satisfactory,  this  explanation  itself  needs  explain- 
ing. Realism  and  idealism,  like  natural  impulse  and  moral 
will  in  the  sphere  of  action,  are  both  grounded  in  reason. 
But  idealism  is  the  true  standpoint,  because  it  is  able  to 
comprehend  and  explain  the  opposing  theory,  while  the 
converse  is  not  the  case. 

The  nature,  the  goal,  and  the  methods  of  the  Science  of 
Knowledge  have  now  been  determined.  It  is  genuine, 
thoroughgoing  idealism,  which  raises  the  Kantian  philos- 
ophy to  the  rank  of  an  evident  science  by  deducing  its 
premises  from  a  first  principle  which  is  immediately  cer- 
tain, and  by  removing  the  twofold  dualism  of  intuition 
and  thought,  of  knowledge  and  volition,  viz.,  by  proving 
both  contraries  acts  of  one  and  the  same  ego.  While 
Reinhold    had    sought  a  supreme  truth  as  a  fundamental 

*  Cf.  O.  Liebmann  (Ueber  den  individuellen  Beweis  für  die  Freiheit  des  Wil- 
lens, p.  131,  1866).  "  Here  we  discover  the  noteworthy  point  where  theoret- 
ical and  practical  philosophy  actually  pass  over  into  each  other.  For  this  prin- 
ciple results  :  In  order  to  carry  out  the  individual  proof  for  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  I  must  do  my  duty." 


SCIENCE   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  429 

principle  of  unity,  without  which  the  doctrine  of  knowledge 
would  lack  the  systematic  form  essential  to  science,  while 
Beck  had  interpreted  the  spirit  of  the  Kantian  philosophy 
in  an  idealistic  sense,  and  Jacobi  had  demanded  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  thing  in  itself,  all  these  desires  combined  are 
fulfilled  in  Fichte's  doctrine,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
results  of  the  Critique  of  Reason  are  given  that  evidence 
which  ^Enesidemus-Schulze  had  missed  in  them.  As  an 
answer  to  the  question,  "  How  is  knowledge  brought 
about?"  (as  well  the  knowledge  of  common  sense  as  that 
given  in  the  particular  sciences),  "  how  is  experience  possi- 
ble?", and  as  a  construction  of  common  consciousness  as 
this  manifests  itself  in  life  and  in  the  particular  sciences, 
Fichteanism  adopts  the  name  Science  of  Knowledge,  being 
distinguished  from  the  particular  sciences  by  the  fact  that 
they  discuss  the  voluntary,  and  it  the  necessary,  representa- 
tions or  actions  of  the  spirit.  (The  representation  of  a 
triangle  or  a  circle  is  a  free  one,  it  may  be  omitted  ;  the 
representation  of  space  in  general  is  a  necessary  one,  from 
which  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  abstract.)  How  does 
intelligence  come  to  have  sensations,  to  intuit  space  and 
time,  and  to  form  just  such  categories  (thing  and  property, 
cause  and  effect,  and  not  others  quite  different)?  While 
Kant  correctly  described  these  functions  of  the  intuit- 
ing and  thinking  spirit,  and  showed  them  actual,  they  must 
further  be  proven,  be  shown  necessary  or  deduced. 
Deduced  whence?  From  the  "deed-acts"  (Thathand- 
Iungcn)oi  the  ego  which  lie  at  the  basis  of  all  consciousness, 
and  the  highest  of  which  are  formulated  in  three  principles. 
(b)  The  Three  Principles. — At  the  portal  of  the  Science  of 
Knowledge  we  are  met  not  by  an  assertion,  but  by  a  sum- 
mons— a  summons  to  self-contemplation.  Think-  anything 
whatever  and  observe  what  thou  dost,  and  of  necessity  must 
do,  in  thinking.  Thou  wilt  discover  that  thou  dost  never 
think  an  object  without  thinking  thyself  therewith,  that  it 
is  absolutely  impossible  for  thee  to  abstract  from  thine  ego. 
And  second,  consider  what  thou  dost  when  thou  dost  think 
thine  "ego."  This  means  to  affirm  or  posit  oik's  self,  to  be 
a  subject-object.  The  nature  of  self-consciousness  is  the 
identity  of  the  representing  |  subject  ]  and    the  represented 


43° 


FICHTE. 


[object].  The  pure  ego  is  not  a  fact, but  an  original  doing, 
the  act  of  being  for  self  {Fürsichsein),  and  the  (philosoph- 
ical, or — as  seems  to  be  the  case  according  to  some  pas- 
sages— even  the  common)  consciousness  of  this  doing  an 
intellectual  intuition  ;  through  this  we  become  conscious 
of  the  deed-act  which  is  ever  (though  unconsciously)  per- 
forming. This  is  the  meaning  of  the  first  of  the  principles : 
"  The  ego  posits  originally  and  absolutely  its  own  being," 
or,  more  briefly :  The  ego  posits  itself ;  more  briefly  still: 
I  am.  The  nature  of  the  ego  consists  in  positing  itself  as 
existing. *  "Since,  besides  this  self-cogitation  of  the  ego,  an 
op-position  is  found  among  the  facts  of  empirical  conscious- 
ness (think  only  of  the  principle  of  contradiction),  and  yet, 
besides  the  ego,  there  is  nothing  which  could  be  opposed, 
we  must  assume  as  a  second  principle  :  To  the  ego  there 
is  absolutely  opposited  a  non-ego.  These  two  principles 
must  be  united,  and  this  can  be  accomplished  only  by 
positing  the  contraries  (ego  and  non-ego),  since  they  are 
both  in  the  ego,  as  reciprocally  limiting  or  partially  sublat- 
ing  one  another,  that  is,  each  as  divisible  (capable  of  quanti- 
tative determination).  Accordingly  the  third  principle 
runs:  "The  ego  opposes  in  the  ego  a  divisible  non-ego  to_ 
the  divisible  ego."  From  these  principles  Richte  deduces 
the  three^^W*»£-thought,  identity,  contradiction,  and  suffi- 
cient reason,  and  the  three  categories  of  quality — reality, 
negation,  and  limitation  or  determination.  Instead  of 
following  him  in  these  labors,  we  may  emphasize  the  signifi- 
cance of  his  view  of  the  ego  as  pure  activity  without  an 
underlying  substratum,  with  which  he  carries  dynamism 
over    from    the    Kantian    philosophy    of    nature    to    meta- 

*  The  ego  spoken  of  in  the  first  of  the  principles,  the  ego  as  the  object  of 
intellectual  intuition  and  as  the  ground  and  creator  of  all  being,  is,  as  the  second 
Introduction  to  the  Science  of  Knowledge  clearly  announces,  not  the  individual, 
but  the  T-ness  (Ic/i/ieit)  (which  is  to  be  presupposed  as  the  prius  of  the  manifold  of 
representation,  and  which  is  exalted  ab'>ve  the  opposition  of  subject  and  object), 
mentality  in  general,  eternal  reason,  which  is  common  to  all  and  the  same  in 
all,  which  is  present  in  all  thinking  and  at  the  basis  thereof,  and  to  which 
particular  persons  stand  related  merely  as  accidents,  as  instruments,  as  specia' 
expressions,  destined  more  and  more  to  lose  themselves  in  the  universal  form  of 
reason.  But,  further  still,  a  distinction  must  be  made  between  the  absolute 
ego  as  intuition  (as  the  form  of  I-ness),  from  which  the  Science  of  Knowl- 
edge  starts,  and  the  ego  as  Idea  (as  the  supreme  goal  of  practical  endeavor), 


THE    THREE  PRINCIPLES.  43 1 

physics.  We  must  not  conceive  the  ego  as  something 
which  must  exist  before  it  can  put  forth  its  activities. 
Doing  is  not  a  property  or  consequence  of  being,  but  being 
is  an  accident  and  effect  of  doing.  All  substantiality  is 
derivative,  activity  is  primal ;  being  arises  from  doing.  The 
ego  is  nothing  more  than  self-position  ;  it  exists  not  only 
for  itself  (für  sick),  but  also  through  itself  (Jhtrc/isicTiJ. 

The  actions  expressed  in  the  three  principles  are  never 
found  pure  in  experience,  nor  do  they  represent  isolated 
acts  of  the  ego.  Intelligence  can  think  nothing  without 
thinking  itself  therewith  ;  it  is  equally  impossible  for  it  to 
think  "  I  am"  without  at  the  same  time  thinking  something 
else  which  is  not  itself;  subject  and  object  are  inseparable. 
It  is  rather  true  that  the  acts  of  position  described  are  one 
single,  all-inclusive  act,  which  forms  only  the  first  member 
in  a  connected  system  of  pre-conscious  actions,  through 
which  consciousness  is  produced,  and  the  complete  investi- 
gation of  whose  members  constitutes  the  further  business 
of  the  Science  of  Knowledge  as  a  theory  of  the  nature  of 
reason.  In  this  the  Science  of  Knowledge  employs  a 
method  which,  by  its  rhythm  of  analysis  and  synthesis, 
development  and  reconciliation  of  opposites,  became  the 
model  of  Hegel's  dialectic  method.  The  synthesis  described 
in  the  third  principle,  although  it  balances  thesis  and 
antithesis  and  unites  them  in  itself,  still  contains  contrary 
elements,  in  order  to  whose  combination  a  new  synthesis 
must  be  sought.  In  this,  in  turn,  the  analytic  discovery 
and  the  synthetic  adjustment  of  a  contrariety  is  repeated, 
etc.,  etc.  The  original  synthesis,  moreover,  prescribes  a 
division  of  the  inquiry  into  two  parts,  one  theoretical  and 

with  which  it  ends.  Tn  neither  is  the  ego  conceived  as  individual  ;  in  the 
former  the  I-ness  is  not  yet  determined  to  the  point  of  individuality,  in  the  latter 
individuality  has  disappeared.  Fichte  is  right  when  he  thinks  it  remarkable 
that  "  a  system  whose  beginning  and  end  and  whole  nature  is  aimed  at  forget- 
fulness  of  individuality  in  the  theoretical  sphere  and  denial  of  it  in  the  practical 
sphere  "should  be"  called  egoism."  And  yet  not  only  opponents,  but  even  adher- 
ents of  Fichte,  as  is  shown  by  Friedrich  Schlegel' s  philosophy  of  genius,  have, 
by  confusing  the  pure  and  the  empirical  ego,  been  guilty  of  the  mistake  thus 
censured.  On  the  philosophy  of  the  romanticists  of.  Frdmann's  History,  vol. 
':-  §§  3'4,  3'5  ;  Zeller,  p.  562  seq.;  and  K.  Haym,  Die  Romantische  Schule, 
1870. 


43 2  FICHTE. 

the  other  practical.  For  it  contains  the  following  principles: 
The  ego  posits  itself  as  limited  by  the  non-ego — it  functions 
cognitively ;  and  :  The  ego  posits  itself  as  determining  the 
non-ego — it  functions  volitionally  and  actively. 

(c)  The  Theoretical  Ego. — In  positing  itself  as  determined  by 
the  non-ego,  the  ego  is  at  once  passive  (affected  by  something 
other  than  itself)  and  active  (it  posits  its  own  limitation). 
This  is  possible  only  as  it  posits  reality  in  itself  only 
in  part,  and  transfers  to  the  non-ego  so  much  as  it  does 
not  posit  in  itself.  Passivity  is  diminished  activity,  nega- 
tion of  the  totality  of  reality.  From  reflection  on  this 
relation  between  ego  and  non-ego  spring  the  categories 
of  reciprocal  determination,  of  causality  (the  non-ego 
as  the  cause  of  the  passion  of  the  ego),  and  substantiality 
(this  passion  merely  the  self-limitation  of  the  ego).  The 
conflict  between  the  causality  of  the  non-ego  (by  which  the 
ego  is  affected)  and  the  substantiality  of  the  ego  (in  which 
and  the  activity  of  which  all  reality  is  contained)  is/resolved 
only  by  the  assumption  of  two  activities  (or,  rather,  of  two 
opposite  directions  of  one  activity)  in  the  ego,  one  of 
which  (centrifugal,  expansive)  strives  infinitely  outward 
while  the  other  (centripetal  or  contractile)  sets  a  bound  to 
the  former,  and  drives  the  ego  back  into  itself,  where- 
upon another  excursus  follows,  and  a  new  limitation  and 
return,  etc.  With  every  repetition  of  this  double  act  of 
production  and  reflection  a  special  class  of  representa- 
tions arises.  Through  the  first  limitation  of  the  in  itself 
unlimited  activity  "sensation"  arises  (as  a  product  of 
the  "productive  imagination").  Because  the  ego  produces 
this  unconsciously,  it  appears  to  be  given,  brought  about  by 
influence  from  without.  The  second  stage,  "  intuition,"  is 
reached  when  the  ego  reflects  on  sensation,  when  it 
opposes  to  itself  something  foreign  which  limits  it. 
Thirdly,  by  reflection  on  intuition  an  "  image  "  of  that 
which  is  intuited  is  constructed,  and,  as  such,  distinguished 
from  a  real  thing  to  which  the  image  corresponds  ;  at  this 
point  the  categories  and  the  forms  of  intuition,  space  and 
time,  appear,  which  thus  arise  along  with  the  object.*     The 

*The  object  is  a  product  of  the  ego  only  for  the  observer,  not  for  the 
observed  ego  itself,  to  which,  from  this  standpoint  of  imagination,  it  appears 


THE    THEORETICAL  EGO.  433 

fourth  stadium  is  "  understanding,"  which  steadies  the 
fluctuating  intuition  into  a  concept,  realizes  the  object,  and 
looks  upon  it  as  the  cause  of  the  intuition.  Fifthly, 
"  judgment  "  makes  its  appearance  as  the  faculty  of  free 
reflection  and  abstraction,  or  the  power  to  consider  a 
definite  content  or  to  abstract  from  it.  As  judg- 
ment is  itself  the  condition  of  the  bound  reflection  of  the 
understanding,  so  it  points  in  turn  to  its  condition,  to 
the  sixth  and  highest  stage  of  intelligence,  "  reason,"  by 
means  of  which  we  are  able  to  abstract  from  all  objects 
whatever,  while  reason  itself,  pure  self-consciousness,  is 
that  from  which  abstraction  is  never  possible.  It  is  only 
in  the  highest  stage  that  consciousness  or  a  representation 
of  representation  takes  place.  And  at  the  culmination  of 
the  theoretical  ego  the  point  of  transition  to  the  practical 
ego  appears.  Here  the  ego  becomes  aware  that  in  positing 
itself  as  determined  by  the  non-ego  it  has  only  limited 
itself,  and  therefore  is  itself  the  ground  of  the  whole  content 
of  consciousness;  here  it  apprehends  itself  as  determining 
the  non-ego  or  as  acting,  and  recognizes  as  its  chief  mission 
to  impress  the  form  of  the  ego  as  far  as  possible  on  the 
non-ego,  and  ever  to  extend  the  boundary  further. 

The  "  deduction  of  representation  "  whose  outline  has 
just  been  given  was  the  first  example  (often  imitated 
in  the  school  of  Schelling  and  Hegel)  of  a  constructive 
psychology,  which,  from  the  mission  or  the  concept  of  the 
soul — in  this  case  from  the  nature  of  self-consciousness — 
deduces  the  various  psychical  functions  as  a  system  of 
actions,  each  of  which  is  in  its  place  implied  by  the  rest, 
as  it  in  turn  presupposes  them.  This  is  distinguished  from 
the  sensationalistic  psychology,  which  is  also  genetic  (cf. 
pp.  245-250),  as  well  as  from  the  mechanical  or  associational 
psychology,  which  likewise  excludes  the  idea  of  an  isolated 
coexistence  of  mental  faculties,  by  the  fact  that  it  demands 
a  new  manifestation  of  the  soul-ground  in  order  to  the 
ascent  from  one  member  of  the  series  to  the  next  higher. 

rather  as  a  thing  in  itself  independent  of  the  ego  and  affecting  it.  Further,  it 
must  so  appear,  because  the  ego,  in  its  after  reflection  on  its  productive  activity, 
and  just  by  this  reflection,  transforms  the  productive  action  considered  into  a 
fixed  and  independent  product  found  existing. 


434  FICHTE. 

It  is  also  distinguished  from  sensationalism  by  its  teleolog- 
ical  point  of  view.  For  no  matter  how  much  Fichte,  too, 
may  speak  of  the  mechanism  of  consciousness,  it  is  plain  to 
the  reader  of  the  theoretical  part  of  his  system  not  only 
that  he  makes  this  mechanism  work  in  the  service  of  an 
end,  but  also  that  he  finds  its  origin  in  purposive  activity  of 
the  ego;  while  the  practical  part  gives  further  and  decisive 
confirmation  of  the  fact.  The  danger  and  the  defect  of 
such  a  constructive  treatment  of  psychology — as  we  may 
at  once  remark  for  all  later  attempts — lies  in  imagining  that 
the  task  of  mental  science  has  been  accomplished  and  all 
its  problems  solved  when  each  particular  activity  of  the 
ego  has  been  assigned  its  mission  and  work  for  the  whole, 
and  its  place  in  the  system,  without  any  indication  of  the 
means  through  which  this  destination  can  be  fulfilled. 

(d)  The  Practical  Ego. — The  deduction  of  representation 
has  shown  how  (through  what  unconscious  acts  of  the  ego) 
the  different  stages  of  cognition,  the  three  sensuous  and 
the  three  intellectual  functions  of  representation,  come  into 
being.  It  has  proved  incapable,  however,  of  giving  any 
account  of  the  way  in  which  the  ego  comes  at  one  point 
to  arrest  its  activity,  which  tends  infinitely  outward,  and 
to  turn  it  back  upon  itself.  We  know,  indeed,  that  this 
first  limitation,  through  which  sensation  arises,  and  on 
which  as  a  basis  the  understanding,  by  continued  reflection 
constructs  the  objective  world,  was  necessary  in  order  that 
consciousness  and  knowledge  might  arise.  If  the  ego  did 
not  limit  its  infinite  activity  neither  representation  nor  an 
objective  world  would  exist.  But  why,  then,  are  there  such 
things  as  consciousness,  representation,  and  aworld?  From 
the  standpoint  of  the  theoretical  ego  this  problem,  "  Whence 
the  original  non-ego  or  opposition  (Anstoss),  which  impels 
the  ego  back  upon  itself  ?  "  cannot  be  solved,  since  it  is  only 
through  the  opposition  that  it  itself  arises.  The  "  deduc- 
tion of  the  opposition,"  which  the  theoretical  part  of  the 
Science  of  Knowledge  did  not  furnish,  is  to  be  looked  for 
from  the  practical  part.  The  primacy  of  practical  rea- 
son, already  emphasized  by  Kant,  gives  us  the  answer: 
The  ego  limits  itself  and  is  theoretical,  in  order  to  be  practical. 
The  whole  machinery  of  representation  and  the  represented 


THE  PRACTICAL   EGO.  435 

world  exists  only  to  furnish  us  the  possibility  of  fulfilling 
our  duty.  We  are  intelligence  in  order  that  we  may  be  able 
to  be  will. 

Action,  action — that  is  the  end  of  our  existence.  Action 
is  giving  form  to  matter,  it  is  the  alteration  or  elaboration 
of  an  object,  the  conquest  of  an  impediment,  of  a  lim- 
itation. We  cannot  act  unless  we  have  something  in,  on, 
and  against  which  to  act.  The  world  of  sensation  and 
intuition  is  nothing  but  a  means  for  attaining  our  ethical 
destiny,  it  is  "  the  material  of  our  duty  under  the  form  of 
sense."  The  theoretical  ego  posits  an  object  {Gegenstand) 
that  the  practical  ego  may  experience  resistance  {Wider- 
stand.) No  action  is  possible  without  a  world  as  the  object 
of  action  ;  no  world  is  possible  without  a  consciousness 
which  represents  it ;  no  consciousness  possible  without 
reflection  of  the  ego  on  itself ;  no  reflection  without  lim- 
itation, without  an  opposition  or  non-ego.  The  Anstoss  is 
deduced.  The  ego  posits  a  limit  (is  theoretical)  in  order 
(as  practical)  to  overcome  it.  Our  duty  is  the  o\~\\y  per  se 
(AnsicJi)  of  the  phenomenal  world,  the  only  truly  real 
element  in  it:  "Things  are  in  themselves  that  which  we 
ought  to  make  of  them."  Objectivity  exists  only  to  be 
more  and  more  sublated,  that  is,  to  be  so  worked  up  that 
the  activity  of  the  ego  may  in  it  become  evident. — The 
same  ground  of  explanation  which  reveals  the  necessity  of 
an  external  nature  enables  us  to  understand  why  the  one 
infinite  ego  (the  universal  life  or  the  Deity,  as  Fichte  puts 
it  in  his  later  works)  divides  into  the  many  empirical 
egos  or  individuals,  why  it  does  not  carry  out  its  plan  im- 
mediately, but  through  finite  spirits  as  its  organs.  Action 
is  possible  only  under  the  form  of  the  individual,  only  in 
individuals  are  consciousness  and  morality  possible.  With- 
out resistance,  no  action;  without  conflict,  no  morality. 
Individuality,  it  is  true,  is  to  be  overcome  and  destroyed 
in  moral  endeavor;  but  in  order  to  this  it  must  have  existed. 
Virtue  is  a  conquest  over  external  and  interna  I  nature. 

A  gradat ion  of  practical  functions  corresponding  to  the 
series  of  theoretical  activities  leads  from  feeling  and  striv- 
ing (longing  and  desire)  through  the  system  of  impulses 
(the  impulse  to  representation  or  reflection,  to  production, 


43 6  FICHTE. 

to  satisfaction)  up  to  moral  will  or  the  impulse  to  harmony 
with  self,  which  stands  opposed  to  the  natural  impulses  as 
the  categorical  imperative.  The  practical  ego  mediates 
between  the  theoretical  and  the  absolute  ego.  The  ego 
ought  to  be  infinite  and  self-dependent,  but  finds  itself 
finite  and  dependent  on  a  non-ego — a  contradiction  which 
is  resolved  by  the  ego  becoming  practical,  by  the  fact  that 
in  ever  increasing  measure  it  subdues  nature  to  itself,  and 
by  such  increasing  extension  of  the  boundary  draws 
nearer  and  ever  nearer  to  the  realization  of  its  destination, 
to  become  absolute  ego. 

2.  The  Science  of  Ethics  and  of  Right. 

The  moral  law  demands  the  control  of  the  sensuous  im- 
pulse by  the  pure  impulse.  If  the  former  aims  at  comfort- 
able ease  and  enjoyment,  the  latter  is  directed  toward  satis- 
faction with  one's  self,  to  endeavor  and  self-dependence. 
(Enjoyment  is  inevitable,  it  is  true,  as  satisfaction  where 
any  impulse  whatever  is  carried  out  ;  only  it  must  not  form 
the  end  of  action.)  Morality  is  activity  for  its  own  sake, 
the  radical  evil — from  which  only  a  miracle  can  deliver  us, 
but  a  miracle  which  we  must  ourselves  perform — is  inert- 
ness, lack  of  will  to  rise  above  the  natural  determinateness 
of  the  impulse  of  self-preservation  to  the  clear  conscious- 
ness of  duty  and  of  freedom.  For  the  moral  man  there 
is  no  resting;  each  end  attained  becomes  for  him  the  im- 
pulse to  renewed  endeavor,  each  task  fulfilled  leads  him 
to  a  fresh  one.  Become  self-dependent,  act  autonomously, 
make  thyself  free  ;  let  every  action  have  a  place  in  a  series, 
in  the  continuation  of  which  the  ego  must  become  inde- 
pendent. To  this  formal  and  universal  norm,  again,  there 
is  added  a  special  injunction  for  each  individual.  Each 
individual  spirit  has  its  definite  mission  assigned  to  it  by  the 
world-order  :  each  ought  to  do  that  which  it  alone  should 
and  can  do.  Always  fulfill  thy  moral  vocation,  thy  special 
destination.*  Or  both  in  popular  combination  :  Never  act 
contrary  to  conscience. 

The  elevation  to  freedom  is  accomplished  gradually.     At 

*  Although  Fichte  was  justly  charged  with  surpassing  even  the  abstractness 
of  the  Kantian  ethics  with  his  bald  moral  principle,  the  self-dependence  of  the 


ETHICS.  437 

first  freedom  consists  only  in  the  consciousness  of  the  natural 
impulse,  then  follows  a  breaking  away  from  this  by  means 
of  maxims,  which  in  the  beginning  are  maxims  of  individual 
happiness.  Later  on  a  blind  enthusiasm  for  self-depend- 
ence arises  and  produces  an  heroic  spirit,  which  would 
rather  be  generous  than  just,  which  bestows  sympathy  more 
readily  than  respect ;  true  morality,  however,  does  not  arise 
until,  with  constant  attention  to  the  law  and  continued 
watchfulness  of  self,  duty  is  done  for  its  own  sake.  No 
man  is  for  a  moment  secure  of  his  morality  without  contin- 
ued endeavor.  In  order  to  deliverance  from  the  original  sin 
of  inertness  and  its  train,  cowardice  and  falsity,  men  stand 
in  need  of  examples,  such  as  have  been  given  them  in  the 
founders  of  religions,  to  construe  for  them  the  riddle  of 
freedom.  The  necessary  enlightenment  concerning  moral 
conviction  is  given  by  the  Church,  whose  symbols  are  not 
to  be  looked  upon  as  dogmatic  propositions,  but  only  as 
means  for  the  proclamation  of  the  eternal  verities,  and 
which,  like  the  state  (for  both  are  institutions  based  on 
necessity),  has  for  its  object  to  make  itself  unnecessary  as 
time  goes  on. 

The  system  of  duties  distinguishes  four  classes  of  duties 
on  the  basis  of  the  twofold  opposition  of  universal  (non- 
transferable) and  particular  (transferable)  duties,  and  of 
unconditional  duties  (directed  to  the  whole)  and  condi- 
tional duties  (directed  toward  self).  These  four  classes  are 
the  duties  of  self-preservation,  of  class,  of  non-interference 
with  others,  and  of  vocation.  The  lower  calling  includes 
the  producers,  artisans,  and  tradesmen,  whose  action  termi- 
nates directly  on  nature ;  and  the  higher,  the  scholars, 
teachers  of  the  people  or  clergy,  artists,  and  government 
officials,  who  work  directly  on  the  community  of  rational 
beings.  Fichte's  thoughtful  and  sympathetically  written 
discussion  of  marriage  is  in  pleasant  contrast  to  the  bald, 
purely  legal  view  of  this  relation  adopted  by  Kant. 

Natural  right  is  for  Fichte,  as  for  Kant,  whose  theory  of 
right,  moreover,  appeared  later  than  Fichte's,  entirely  inde- 

ego,  he  deserves  praise  for  having  given  ethics  a  concrete  content  of  indisputable 
soundness  and  utility  by  his  introduction  of  Jacobi's  idea  of  purified  individuality 
(cf.  p.  314). 


45  s  FICHTE. 

pendent  of  ethics,  and  distinguished  from  the  latter  by  its 
exclusive  reference  to  external  conduct  instead  of  to  the 
disposition  and  the  will.  The  rule  of  right  gains  from  the 
moral  law,  it  is  true,  new  sanction  for  conscience,  but  can- 
not be  derived  from  the  law. — The  concept  of  right  is  to  be 
deduced  as  a  necessary  act  of  the  ego,  i.  e.,  to  be  shown  a 
condition  of  self-consciousness.  The  ego  must  posit  itself 
as  an  individual,  and  can  accomplish  this  only  by  positing 
itself  in  a  relation  of  right  to  other  finite  rational  beings; 
without  a  thou,  no  I.  A  finite  rational  being  cannot  posit 
itself  without  ascribing  to  itself  a  free  activity  in  an  external 
sense-world  ;  and  it  cannot  effect  this  latter  unless  (i)  it 
ascribes  free  activity  to  other  beings  as  well,  hence  not  with- 
out assuming  other  finite  rational  beings  outside  itself, 
and  positing  itself  as  standing  in  the  relation  of  right  to 
them  ;  and  unless  (2)  it  ascribes  to  itself  a  material  body 
and  posits  this  as  standing  under  the  influence  of  a  per- 
son outside  it.  But,  further,  Fichte  considers  it  pos- 
sible to  deduce  the  particular  constitution  both  of  the 
external  world  and  of  the  human  body  (as  the  sphere  of  all 
free  actions  possible  to  the  person).  In  the  former  there 
must  be  present  a  tough,  durable  matter  capable  of  resist- 
ance, and  light  and  air  in  order  to  the  possibility  of  inter- 
course between  spirits;  while  the  latter  must  be  an  organ- 
ized, articulated  nature-product,  furnished  with  senses, 
capable  of  infinite  determination,  and  adapted  to  all  con- 
ceivable motions. 

If  a  community  of  free  beings,  such  as  has  been  shown 
the  condition  of  individual  self-consciousness,  is  to  be  pos- 
sible, the  following  must  hold  as  the  law  of  right :  So  limit 
thy  freedom  that  others  may  be  free  along  with  thee. 
This  law  is  conditioned  on  the  lawful  behavior  of  others. 
Where  this  is  lacking,  where  my  fellow  does  not  recognize 
and  treat  me  as  a  free,  rational  being,  the  right  of  coercion 
comes  in ;  coercion,  however,  is  not  to  be  exercised  by 
the  individual  himself — since  then  there  would  be  no 
guaranty  either  for  its  successful  exercise  or  for  the  non- 
violation of  the  legal  limit — but  devolves  upon  the  state. 
The  state  takes  its  origin  in  the  common  will  of  all  to  unite 
for  the  safeguarding   of    their    rights,   and   determines   by 


SECOND  PERIOD.  439 

positive  laws  (intermediate  between  the  law  of  right  and 
legal  judgments)  what  shall  be  considered  rights.  Thus 
there  result  three  subjects  for  natural  right :  original  rights 
or  the  sum  of  that  which  pertains  to  freedom  or  personality 
(inviolability  of  the  body  and  of  property),  the  right  of 
coercion,  and  political  right.  The  aim  of  punishment  is 
the  reform  of  the  evil  doer  and  the  deterrence  of  others. 
Fichte  is  in  agreement  with  Kant  concerning  the  principle 
of  popular  sovereignty  (Rousseau)  and  the  exercise  of  the 
political  power  through  representatives;  but  not  so  con- 
cerning the  guaranties  against  the  violation  of  the  funda- 
mental law  of  the  state.  Instead  of  the  division  of  powers 
recommended  by  Kant  he  demands  supervision  of  the 
rulers  of  the  state  by  ephors,  who,  themselves  without 
any  legislative  or  executive  authority,  shall  suspend  the 
rulers  in  case  they  violate  the  law,  and  call  them  to 
account  before  the  community.  Every  constitution  in 
which  the  rulers  are  not  responsible  is  despotic.  Fichte 
did  not  continue  loyal  to  this  principle,  that  the  state  is 
merely  a  legal  institution.  He  not  only  demands  a  state 
organization  of  labor  by  which  everyone  shall  be  placed 
in  a  position  to  live  from  his  work,  in  the  Natural  Right 
and  the  Exclusive  Commercial  State,  but,  in  his  posthu- 
mous Theory  of  Right;  1812,  he  makes  it  the  chief  duty  of 
the  state  to  lead  men,  by  the  moral  and  intellectual  train- 
ing of  the  people,  to  do  from  insight  what  they  have  hith- 
erto done  from  traditional  belief.  Through  the  education 
of  the  people  the  empirical  state  is  gradually  to  transform 
itself  into  the  rational  state. 

3.  Fichte's  Second  Period :   his  View  of  History   and 
his  Theory  of  Religion. 

Fichte's  transfer  to  Berlin  brought  him  into  more  intimate 
contact  with  the  world,  and  along  with  new  experiences 
and  new  emotions  gave  him  new  problems.  While  a  vig- 
orously developing  religious  sentiment  turned  his  specula- 
tion to  the  relation  of  the  individual  ego  to  the  primal 
source  of  spiritual  life,  empirical  reality  also  acquired  gi  eater 
significance   for  him,  and  the   intellectual,  moral,  and  polit- 


44°  FICHTE. 

ical  situation  of  the  time  especially  attracted  his  attention. 
The  last  required  philosophical  interpretation,  demanded 
at  once  inquiry  into  its  historical  conditions  and  a  consid- 
eration of  the  means  by  which  the  glaring  contradiction 
between  the  condition  of  the  nation  at  the  time  and  the 
ideals  of  reason  could  be  diminished.  The  Addresses  to 
the  German  Nation  outlined  a  plan  for  a  moral  reforma- 
tion of  the  world,  to  start  with  the  education  of  the  Ger- 
man people  ;*  while  the  Characteristics  of  the  Present  Age, 
which  had  preceded  the  Addresses,  defined  the  place  of  the 
age  in  the  general  development  of  humanity.  The  scheme 
of  historical  periods  given  in  the  Characteristics  and 
similarly  in  the  Theory  of  the  State  (innocence — sin — 
supremacy  of  reason,  with  intermediate  stages  between 
each  two)  is  interesting  as  a  forerunner  of  Hegel's  under- 
taking. 

History  is  produced  through  the  interaction  of  the  two 
principles,  faith  and  understanding,  which  are  related  to 
each  other  as  law  and  freedom,  and  strives  toward  a  con- 
dition in  which  these  two  shall  be  so  reconciled  that  faith 
shall  have  entirely  passed  over  into  the  form  of  understand- 
ing, shall  have  been  transformed  into  insight,  and  under- 
standing shall  have  taken  up  the  content  of  faith  into  itself. 
History  begins  with  the  coming  together  of  two  original 
and  primitive  races,  one  of  order  or  faith,  and  one  of  free- 
dom or  understanding,  neither  of  which  would  attain  to 
an  historical  development  apart  from  the  other.  From  the 
legal  race  the  free  race  learns  respect  for  the  law,  as  in 
turn  it  arouses  in  the  former  the  impulse  toward  freedom. 
The  course  of  history  divides  into  five  periods.  In  the 
state  of  "innocence"  or  of  rational  instinct  that  which  is 
rational  is  done  unconsciously,  out  of  natural  impulse  ;    in 

*  "Among  all  nations  you  are  the  one  in  whom  the  germ  of  human  perfec- 
tion is  most  decidedly  present."  The  spiritual  regeneration  of  mankind 
must  proceed  from  the  German  people,  for  they  are  the  one  original  or  primitive 
people  of  the  new  age,  the  only  one  which  has  preserved  its  living  language — 
French  is  a  dead  tongue — and  has  raised  itself  to  true  creative  poetry  and  free 
science.  The  ground  of  distinction  between  Germanism  and  the  foreign  spirit 
lies  in  the  question,  whether  we  believe  in  an  original  element  in  man,  in  the 
freedom,  infinite  perfectibility,  and  eternal  progress  of  our  race,  or  put  no  faith 
in  all  these. 


THEORY  OF  RELIGION.  44 1 

the  state  of  "  commencing  sin  "  the  instinct  for  the  good 
changes  into  an  external  compulsory  authority,  the  law  of 
reason  appears  as  a  ruling  power  from  without,  which  can 
be  disobeyed  as  well  as  obeyed.  We  ourselves  live  in  the 
period  of  "  completed  sinfulness,"  of  absolute  license  and 
indifference  to  all  truth,  of  unlimited  caprice  and  selfish- 
ness. But  however  far  removed  from  the  moral  ideal  this 
age  appears,  in  which  the  individual,  freed  from  all 
restraints,  heeds  naught  except  his  egoistic  desire,  and 
in  his  care  for  his  own  welfare  forgets  to  labor  for  the 
universal,  yet  this  ultimate  goal,  this  doing  from  free 
insight  that  which  in  the  beginning  was  done  out  of  blind 
faith,  cannot  be  attained  unless  authority  shall  have  first 
been  shaken  off  and  the  individual  become  self-depend- 
ent. A  few  signs  already  betoken  the  dawn  of  the  fourth 
era,  that  of  rational  science  or  of  "  commencing  justifica- 
tion," in  which  truth  shall  be  acknowledged  supreme,  and 
the  individul  ego,  at  least  as  cognitive,  shall  submit  itself 
to  the  generic  reason.  Finally,  with  the  era  of  rational  art, 
or  the  state  of  "  completed  justification  and  sanctification," 
wherein  the  will  of  the  individual  shall  entirely  merge  in 
life  for  the  race,  the  end  of  the  life  of  humanity  on  earth — 
the  free  determination  of  all  its  relations  according  to 
reason — will  be  fulfilled. 

In  the  Jena  period  the  religious  life  of  the  ego  simply 
coincided  for  Fichte  with  its  practical  life  ;  piety  coincided 
with  moral  conduct ;  the  Deity  with  the  absolute  ego,  with 
the  moral  law,  with  the  moral  order  of  the  world.  A 
change  subsequently  took  place  in  his  views  on  this 
point.  He  experienced  feelings  which,  at  least  in  quality, 
were  distinct  from  readiness  for  moral  action,  no  matter 
how  intimately  they  are  intertwined  with  this,  and  no 
matter  how  little  they  can  actually  be  separated  from  it; 
religion  is  possible  neither  without  a  metaphysical  belief  in 
a  suprasensiblc  world,  nor  without  obedience  to  the  moral 
law,  yet  in  itself  it  is  not  that  belief  nor  this  action,  but  the 
inner  spirit  which  pervades  and  animates  all  our  thought 
and  action — it  is  life,  love,  blessedness.  And  as  quiet  bless- 
edness is  here  distinguished  from  ceaseless  action,  so  for 
our  thinker  the  inactive  Deity,  the  self-identical  life  of   the 


442  FICHTE. 

absolute,  separates  from  the  active  universal  reason,  which 
in  its  individual  organs  advances  from  task  to  task.  The 
earlier  undivided  and  unique  principle,  the  absolute  ego, 
divides  into  the  IcJiJieit  (moral  law,  world-order),  and  an 
absolute  as  the  ground  thereof.  "  The  spirit  (the  ego,  or, 
as  Fichte  now  prefers  to  say,  knowledge)  an  image  of  God, 
the  world  an  image  of  the  spirit."  The  active  order  of 
the  world  (the  moral  law  which  realizes  itself  in  individ- 
uals) the  immediate,  and  objective  reality  the  mediate, 
revelation  of  the  absolute  ! 

Does  this  view  of  religion,  which  Fichte  incorporates 
also  in  the  later  expositions  of  the  Science  of  Knowledge, 
indicate  an  abandonment  and  denial  of  the  earlier  stand- 
point ?  The  philosophy  of  Fichte's  second  period  is  a  new 
system — so  judge  the  majority  of  the  historians  of  philoso- 
phy. It  is  not  a  transformation,  but  a  completion  of  the 
earlier  system  ;  the  doctrine  promulgated  in  Berlin  con- 
tinues to  be  idealistic,  as  that  advanced  in  Jena  had  itself 
been  pantheistic — this  is  the  opinion  of  Fortlage  and 
Harms,  in  agreement  with  the  philosopher  himself  and 
with  his  son.  Kuno  Fischer,  also,  who  shows  a  constant 
advance  in  the  development  of  Fichteanism,  a  gradual 
transition  "  without  a  break,"  may  be  counted  among  the 
minority  who  hold  that  throughout  his  life  Fichte  taught 
but  one  system.  We  believe  it  our  duty  to  adhere  to  this 
latter  view.  The  Science  of  Knowledge  (the  world  a  pro- 
duct of  the  ego)  enters  as  it  is  into  the  later  form  of  the 
Fichtean  philosophy ;  the  latter  gives  up  none  of  the 
fundamental  positions  of  the  former,  but  only  adds  to  it  a 
culmination,  by  which  the  appearance  of  the  building  is 
altered,  it  is  true,  but  not  the  edifice  itself.  In  the  discus- 
sion of  the  question  the  following  three  have  been  empha- 
sized as  the  most  important  points  of  distinction  between 
the  two  periods:  In  the  earlier  system  God  is  made  equiva- 
lent to  the  absolute  ego  and  the  moral  order  of  the  world, 
in  the  later  he  is  separated  from  these  and  removed 
beyond  them  ;  in  the  former  the  nature  of  God  is  described 
as  activity,  in  the  latter,  as  being  ;  in  the  one,  action  is 
designated  as  the  highest  mission  of  man,  in  the  other, 
blessed  devotion  to  God.     All  three  variations  of  the  later 


SECOND  PERIOD.  443 

doctrine  from  the  earlier  may  be  admitted  without  giving 
up  the  position  that  the  former  is  only  an  extension  of  the 
latter  and  not  an  essential  modification  of  it  (/.  e.,  in  its 
teachings  concerning  the  relation  of  the  ego  and  the  world). 
Fichte  experienced  religious  feelings  the  philosophical 
outcome  of  which  he  worked  into  his  system.  He  now 
knows  a  first  thing  (the  Deity  as  distinct  from  the  absolute 
ego)  and  a  last  thing  (the  inwardness  of  religious  devotion 
to  the  world-ground),  which  he  had  before  not  overlooked, 
much  less  denied,  but  combined  in  one  with  the  second 
(the  absolute  ego  or  the  moral  order  of  the  world)  and  the 
one  before  the  last  (moral  action).  It  is  incorrect  to  say 
that,  in  his  later  doctrine,  Fichte  substituted  the  inact- 
ive absolute  in  place  of  the  active  absolute  ego,  and  the 
quiet  blessedness  of  contemplation  in  place  of  ceaseless 
action.  Not  in  place  of  these,  but  beyond  them,  while  all 
else  remains  as  it  was.  The  categorical  imperative,  the 
absolute  ego  or  knowledge  is  no  longer  God  himself,  but 
the  first  manifestation  of  God,  though  a  necessary  revelation 
of  him.  Religion  had  previously  been  included  for  Fichte 
in  moral  action  ;  now  fellowship  with  God  goes  beyond 
this,  though  morality  remains  its  indispensable  condition 
and  inseparable  companion.  Finally,  how  to  construe  the 
previously  avoided  predicate,  being,  in  relation  to  the 
Deity,  is  shown  by  the  no  less  frequent  designation  of  the 
absolute  as  the  "  Universal  Life."  The  expression  being, 
which  it  must  be  confessed  is  ambiguous,  here  signifies  in 
our  opinion  only  the  quiet,  self-identical  activity  of  the 
absolute,  in  opposition  to  the  unresting,  changeful  activity 
of  the  world-order  and  its  finite  organs,  not  that  inert 
and  dead  being  posited  by  the  ego,  the  ascription  of 
which  to  the  Deity  Fichte  had  forbidden  in  his  essay  which 
had  been  charged  with  atheism,  not  to  speak  of  the  exist- 
ence-mode of  a  particular  self-conscious  and  personal 
being.  Instead  of  speaking  of  a  conversion  of  Fichte  to 
the  position  of  his  opponents,  we  might  rather  venture  the 
paradoxical  assertion,  that,  when  he  characterizes  the  abso- 
lute as  the  only  true  being,  he  intends  to  produce  the  same 
view  in  the  mind  of  the  reader  as  in  his  earlier  years,  when 
he  expressed  himself  against  the  application  of  the  concepts 


444  FICHTE. 

existence,  substance,  and  conscious  personality  to  God,  on 
the  ground  that  they  are  categories  of  sense.  The  chief 
thing,  at  least,  remains  unaltered:  the  opposition  to  a  view 
of  religion  which  transforms  the  sublime  and  sacred  teach- 
ing of  Christianity  "into  an  enervating  doctrine  of 
happiness." 


CHAPTER  XI. 

SCHELLING. 

Friedrich  Wilhelm  Joseph  (von)  Schelling  was 
born  January  27,  1775,  at  Leonberg  (in  Wiirtemberg),  and 
died  August  20,  1854,  at  the  baths  of  Ragatz  (in  Switzer- 
land). In  1790-95  he  attended  the  seminary  at  Tübingen, 
in  company  with  Hölderlin  and  Hegel,  who  were  five 
years  older  than  himself ;  at  seventeen  he  published  a  dis- 
sertation on  the  Fall  of  Man,  and  a  year  later  an  essay  on 
Religious  Myths  ;  and  was  called  in  1798  from  Leipsic — 
where,  after  several  treatises*  in  explanation  of  the  Science 
of  Knowledge,  he  had  issued,  in  1797,  the  Ideas  for  a  Phil- 
osophy of  Nature — to  Jena.  In  the  latter  place  he  became 
acquainted  with  his  future  wife,  Caroline, f  ne'e  Michaelis 
(1763-1809),  widow  of  Böhmerand  at  this  time  the  brilliant 
wife  of  August  Wilhelm  Schlegel.  From  1803  to  1806 
he  served  as  professor  in  Würzburg  ;  then  followed  two 
residences  of  fourteen  years  each  in  Munich,  separated  by 
seven  years  in  Erlangen  :  1806-20  as  Member  of  the  Acad- 
emy of  Sciences  and  General  Secretary  of  the  Academy 
of  the  Plastic  Arts  (he  received  this  latter  position  after 
delivering  on  the  king's  birthday  his  celebrated  address  on 
"The  Relation  of  the  Plastic  Arts  to  Nature,"  1807);  ar,d 
1827-41  as  professor  in  the  newly  established  university, 
and  President  of  the  Academy  of  Sciences.  In  181 2  Schell- 
ing married  his  second  wife,  Pauline  Götter.  Besides  vari- 
ous journals  \  and  the  works  to  be  noticed  later,  two  polemic 

*  On  the  Possibility  of  a  Form  of  Philosophy  in  General,  On  the  Ego  OS 
Principle  of  Philosophy,  both  in  1795  ;  Letters  on  Dogmatism  unit  Criticism, 
1796  ;  P.ssnys  in  Explanation  oj  the  Science  of  Knowledge,  1797. 

f  Karoline,  Letters,  edited  by  G.  Waitz,  1871. 

\  Kritisches  Journal  der  Philosophie  (with  He^el),  1802  ;  Zeitschrift  für 
spekulative  Physik,  1800  (continued  as  Neue  Zeitschrift  für  Spekulative 
Physik);  Jahrbücher  der  Medizin  als  Wissenschaft  (with  Marcus),  1806-08; 
Allgemeine  Zeitschrift  von  Deutschen  für  Deutsche,  1813. 


446  SCHELLING 

treatises  should  be  mentioned,  the  Exposition  of  the  True 
Relation  of  tJic  Philosophy  of  Nature  to  the  Improved  Doe- 
trine  of  Fichte,  1806,  in  which  his  former  friend  is  charged 
with  plagiarism,  and  the  Memorial  of  the  Treatise  on  Divine 
Things  by  Herr  Jacobi,  18 12,  which  answers  a  bitter  attack  of 
Jacobi  still  more  bitterly.  From  this  on  our  philosopher, 
once  so  fond  of  writing,  becomes  silent.*  The  often  prom- 
ised issue  of  the  positive  philosophy,  which  had  already  been 
twice  commenced  in  print  {The  Ages  of  the  World,  1815  ; 
Mythological  Lectures,  1830),  was  both  times  suspended. 
Being  called  to  the  Berlin  Academy  by  Frederick  Wil- 
liam IV.,  in  order  to  counterbalance  the  prevailing  Hegel- 
ianism,  Schelling  delivered  lectures  in  the  university  also 
(on  Mythology  and  Revelation),  which  he  ceased,  how- 
ever, when  notes  taken  by  his  hearers  were  printed  without 
his  consent. f  His  collected  works  were  published  in  four- 
teen volumes  (1856-61)  under  the  care  of  his  son,  K.  E.  A. 
Schelling.^ 

The  leading  motive  in  Schelling's  thinking  is  an  un- 
usually powerful  fancy,  which  gives  to  his  philosophy  a 
lively,  stimulating,  and  attractive  character,  without  making 
it  to  a  like  degree  logically  satisfactory.  If  the  systems 
of  Fichte  and  Hegel,  which  in  their  content  are  closely 
related  to  Schelling's,  impress  us  by  their  logical  severity, 
Schelling  chains  us  by  his  lively  intuition  and  his  suggest- 
ive power  of  feeling  his  way  into  the  inner  nature  of 
things.  With  him  analogies  outweigh  reasons  ;  he  is  more 
concerned  about  the  rich  content  of  concepts  than  about 

*  Besides  a  supplement  to  Die  IVeltalter  and  his  inaugural  lecture  at  Berlin, 
he  published  only  two  prefaces,  one  to  Viktor  Cousin  über  französische  und 
deutsche  Philosophie,  done  into  German  by  Hubert  Beckers,  1834,  and  one  to 
Steffens's  Nachgelassene  Schriften,  1846. 

f  Paulus,  Die  endlich  offenbar  gewordene  positive  Philosophie  der  Offen- 
barung, 1843.  Frauenstädt  had  previously  published  a  sketch  from  this  later 
doctrine,  1842. 

%  On  Schelling  cf.  the  Lectures  by  K.  Rosenkranz,  1843  ;  the  articles  by 
Heyder  in  vol.  xiii.  of  Herzog's  Realencyclopädie  für  protestantische  Theologie, 
1S60,  and  Jodl  in  the  Allgemeine  deutsche  Biographie;  R.  Haym,  Die  romantische 
Schule,  1870  ;  Aus  Schillings  Leben,  in  Briefen,  edited  by  Plitt,  3  vols., 
1869-70.  [Cf.  also  Watson's  Schelling's  Transcendental  Idealism  (Griggs's 
Philosophical  Classics,  1SS2) ;  and  several  translations  from  Schelling  in  the 
Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy. — Tr.] 


SC  HELLING.  447 

their  sharp  definition  ;  and  in  the  endeavor  to  show  the 
unity  of  the  universe,  both  in  the  great  and  in  the  little, 
especially  to  show  the  unity  of  nature  and  spirit,  he  dwells 
longer  on  the  relationship  of  objects  than  on  their  antith- 
eses, which  he  is  glad  to  reduce  to  mere  quantitative  and 
temporary  differences.  He  adds  to  this  an  astonishing 
mobility  of  thought,  in  virtue  of  which  every  offered 
suggestion  is  at  once  seized  and  worked  into  his  own 
system,  though  in  this  the  previous  standpoint  is  uncon- 
sciously exchanged  for  a  somewhat  altered  one.  Schell- 
ing's philosophy  is,  therefore,  in  a  continual  state  of  flux, 
nearly  every  work  shows  it  in  a  new  form,  and  it  is  always 
ideas  from  without  whose  incorporation  has  caused  the 
transition.  Besides  Leibnitz,  Kant,  and  Fichte,  who  were 
already  familiar  to  Schelling  as  a  pupil  at  Tübingen,  it  was 
first  Herder,  then  Spinoza  and  Bruno,  who  exerted  a  trans- 
forming influence  on  his  system,  to  be  followed  later  by 
Neoplatonism  and  Böhme's  mysticism,  and,  finally,  by 
Aristotle  and  the  Gnostics,  not  to  speak  of  his  intercourse 
with  his  contemporaries  Kielmeyer,  Steffens,  Baader, 
Eschenmayer,  and  others.  Omitting  his  early  adherence 
to  Fichte,  at  least  three  periods  must  be  distinguished  in 
Schelling's  thinking.  The  first  period  (1797-1800)  includes 
the  epoch-making  feat  of  his  youth,  the  philosophy  of  nature, 
and,  as  an  equally  legitimate  second  part  of  his  system, 
the  philosophy  of  spirit  or  ti'aiisccndeiital  philosophy.  The 
latter  is  a  supplementary  recasting  of  Fichte's  Science  of 
Knowledge,  while  in  the  former  Schelling  follows  Kant  and 
Herder.  The  second  period,  from  1801,  adds  to  these  two 
co-ordinate  parts,  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the  philoso- 
phy of  spirit,  and  as  a  fundamental  discipline,  a  science 
of  the  absolute,  the  philosophy  of  identity,  which  may  be 
characterized  as  Spinozism  revived  on  a  Fichtean  basis. 
Besides  the  example  of  Spinoza,  Giordano  Bruno  had  most 
influence  on  this  form  of  Schelling's  philosophy.  With 
the  year  1809,  after  the  signs  of  a  new  phase  had  become 
perceptible  from  1804  on,  his  system  enters  on  its  third, 
the  theosophical,  period,  the  period  <>f  the  positive  philoso- 
phy, in  which  we  shall  distinguish  a  mystical  and  a  scholastic 
stage.    The  former  is  represented  by  the  doctrine  of  freedom 


44S  SCHELLING. 

inspired  by  Jacob  Böhme  ;  the  latter,  by  the  philosophy 
of  mythology  and  revelation,  which  goes  back  to  Aristotle 
and  the  Gnostics.  In  the  first  period  the  absolute  for 
Schelling  is  creative  nature  ;  in  the  second,  the  identity  of 
opposites ;  in  the  third  it  is  an  antemundane  process  which 
advances  from  the  not-yet-present  of  the  contraries  to  their 
overcoming.  In  neither  of  these  advances  is  it  Schelling's 
intention  to  break  with  his  previous  teachings,  but  in  each 
case  only  to  add  a  supplement.  That  which  has  hitherto 
been  the  whole  is  retained  as  a  part.  The  philosophy  of 
nature  takes  its  place  beside  the  completed  Fichtean 
transcendental  philosophy,  with  equal  rights,  though 
with  a  reversed  procedure  ;  then  the  theory  of  identity 
assumes  a  place  above  both  ;  finally,  a  positive  (existential) 
philosophy  is  added  to  the  previous  negative  (rational) 
philosophy. 

ia.  Philosophy  of  Nature. 

Schelling  agrees  with  Fichte  that  philosophy  is  transcen- 
dental science,  the  doctrine  of  the  conditions  of  conscious- 
ness, and  has  to  answer  the  question,  What  must  take 
place  in  order  that  knowledge  may  arise  ?  They  agree, 
further,  that  these  conditions  of  knowledge  are  necessary 
acts,  outgoings  of  an  active  original  ground  which  is  not 
yet  conscious  self,  but  seeks  to  become  such,  and  that  the 
material  world  is  the  product  of  these  actions.  Nature 
exists  in  order  that  the  ego  may  develop.  But  while 
Fichte  correctly  understood  the  purpose  of  nature,  to  help 
intelligence  into  being,  he  failed  to  recognize  the  dig- 
nity of  nature,  for  he  deprived  it  of  all  self-dependence, 
all  life  of  its  own,  all  generative  power,  and  treated  it 
merely  as  a  dead  tool,  as  a  passive,  merely  posited  non-ego. 
Nature  is  not  a  board  which  the  original  ego  nails  up 
before  itself  in  order,  striking  against  it,  to  be  driven  back 
upon  itself,  to  be  compelled  to  reflection,  and  thereby 
to  become  theoretical  ego ;  in  order,  further,  working  over 
the  non-ego,  and  transforming  it,  to  exercise  its  prac- 
tical activity  :  but  it  is  a  ladder  on  which  spirit  rises  to 
itself.     Spirit  develops  out  of  nature ;  nature  itself  has  a 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE.  449 

spiritual  element  in  it ;  it  is  undeveloped,  slumbering, 
unconscious,  benumbed  intelligence.  By  transferring  to  na- 
ture the  power  of  self-position  or  of  being  subject,  Schell- 
ing  exalts  the  drudge  of  the  Science  of  Knowledge  to 
the  throne.  The  threefold  division,  "  infinite  original 
activity — nature  or  object — individual  ego  or  subject," 
remains  as  in  Fichte,  only  that  the  first  member  is  not 
termed  pure  ego,  but  nature,  yet  creative  nature,  natura 
naturalis.  Schelling's  aim  is  to  show  how  from  the  object 
a  subject  arises,  from  the  existent  something  represented, 
from  the  representable  a  representer,  from  nature  an  ego. 
He  could  only  hope  to  solve  this  problem  if  he  conceived 
natural  objects — in  the  highest  of  which,  man,  he  makes  con- 
scious spirit  break  forth  or  nature  intuit  itself — as  themselves 
the  products  of  an  original  subject,  of  a  creative  ground 
striving  toward  consciousness.  For  him  also  doing  is  more 
original  than  being.  It  would  not  be  exact,  therefore,  to 
define  the  difference  between  Fichte  and  Schelling  by  saying 
that,  with  the  former,  nature  proceeds  from  the  ego,  and  with 
the  latter  the  ego,  from  nature.  It  is  rather  true  that  with 
them  both  nature  and  spirit  are  alike  the  products  of  a 
third  and  higher  term,  which  seeks  to  become  spirit,  and 
can  accomplish  this  only  by  positing  nature.  In  the 
Science  of  Knowledge,  it  is  true,  this  higher  ground  is 
conceived  as  an  ethical,  in  the  Philosophy  of  Nature  as  a 
physical,  power,  although  one  framed  for  intelligence;  in 
the  former,  moreover,  the  natura  naturata  appears  as  the 
position  once  for  all  of  a  non-spiritual,  in  the  latter  as  a 
progressive  articulated  construction,  with  gradually  increas- 
ing intelligence.  In  the  unconscious  products  of  nature, 
nature's  aim  to  reflect  upon  itself,  to  become  intelligence, 
fails,  in  man  it  succeeds.  Nature  is  the  embryonic  life 
of  spirit.  Nature  and  spirit  are  essentially  identical  : 
"That  which  is  posited  out  of  consciousness  is  in  its 
essence  the  same  as  that  which  is  posited  in  conscious- 
ness also."  Therefore  "  the  knowablc  must  itself  bear 
the  impress  of  the  knower."  Nature  the  preliminary  stage, 
not  the  antithesis,  of  spirit;  history,  a  continuation  of 
physical  becoming;  the  parallelism  between  the  ideal  and 
the  real  development-series — these  arc  ideas  from   Herder 


45°  SCHELLIXG. 

which  Schelling  introduces  into  the  transcendental  philoso- 
phy. The  Kantio-Fichtean  moralism,  with  its  sharp 
contraposition  of  nature  and  spirit,  is  limited  in  the  Natur- 
philosophie  by  Herder's  physicism. 

"Nature  is  a  priori  "  (everything  individual  in  it  is  pre- 
determined by  the  whole,  by  the  Idea  of  a  nature  in  gen- 
eral);  hence  the  forms  of  nature  can  be  deduced  from  the 
concept  of  nature.  The  philosopher  creates  nature  anew, 
he  constructs  it.  Speculative  physics  considers  nature  as 
subject,  becoming,  productivity  (not,  like  empirical  science, 
as  object,  being,  product),  and  for  this  purpose  it  needs, 
instead  of  individualizing  reflection,  an  intuition  directed  to 
the  whole.  To  this  productive  nature,  as  to  the  absolute 
ego  of  Fichte,  are  ascribed  two  opposite  activities,  one 
expansive  or  repulsive,  and  one  attractive,  and  on  these  is 
based  the  universal  law  of  polarity.  The  absolute  produc- 
tivity strives  toward  an  infinite  product,  which  it  never 
attains,  because  apart  from  arrest  no  product  exists.  At 
definite  points  a  check  must  be  given  it  in  order  that  some- 
thing knovvable  may  arise.  Thus  every  product  in  nature  is 
the  result  of  a  positive,  centrifugal,  accelerating,  universaliz- 
ing force,  and  a  negative,  limiting,  retarding,  individualizing 
one.  The  endlessness  of  the  creative  activity  manifests 
itself  in  various  ways:  in  the  striving  for  development  on  the 
part  of  every  product,  in  the  preservation  of  the  genus 
amid  the  disappearance  of  individuals,  in  the  endlessness 
of  the  series  of  products.  Nature's  creative  impulse  is 
inexhaustible,  it  transcends  every  product.  Qualities  are 
points  of  arrest  in  the  one  universal  force  of  nature  ;  all 
nature  is  a  connected  development.  Because  of  the  oppo- 
sition in  the  nature-ground  between  the  stimulating  and  the 
retarding  activity,  the  law  of  duality  everywhere  rules.  To 
these  two  forces,  however,  still  a  third  factor  must  be  added 
as  their  copula,  which  determines  the  relation  or  measure 
of  their  connection.  This  is  the  source  of  the  threefold 
division  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature.  The  magnet  with 
its  union  of  opposite  polar  forces  is  the  type  of  all  con- 
figuration in  nature. 

With  Fichte's  synthetic  method  and  Herder's  naturalistic 
principles    Schelling    combines    Kantian    ideas,    especially 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE.  451 

Kant's  dynamism  (matter  is  a  force-product),*  and  his  view 
of  the  organic  (organisms  are  self-productive  beings,  and 
are  regarded  by  us  as  ends  in  themselves,  because  of  the 
interaction  between  their  members  and  the  whole).  The 
three  organic  functions  sensibility,  irritability,  and  repro- 
duction, on  the  other  hand,  Schelling  took  from  Kiel- 
meyer,  whose  address  On  the  Relations  of  the  Organic 
Forces,  1793,  excited  great  attention.  The  concept  of  life 
is  dominant  in  Schelling's  theory  of  nature.  The  organic 
is  more  original  than  the  inorganic  ;  the  latter  must  be 
explained  from  the  former  ;  that  which  is  dead  must  be 
considered  as  a  product  of  departing  life.  No  less  erroneous 
than  the  theory  of  a  magic  vital  force  is  the  mechanical  inter- 
pretation, which  looks  on  life  merely  as  a  chemical  phe- 
nomenon. The  dead,  mechanical  and  chemical,  forces  are 
merely  the  negative  conditions  of  life  ;  to  them  there  must 
be  added  as  a  positive  force  a  vital  stimulus  external  to  the 
individual,  which  continually  rekindles  the  conflict  between 
the  opposing  activities  on  which  the  vital  process  depends. 
Life  consists,  that  is,  in  the  perpetual  prevention  of  the 
equilibrium  which  is  the  object  of  the  chemical  process. 
This  constant  disturbance  proceeds  from  "  universal  nature," 
which,  as  the  common  principle  of  organic  and  inorganic 
nature,  as  that  which  determines  them  for  each  other,  which 
founds  a  pre-established  harmony  between  them,  deserves 
the  name  of  the  world-soul.  Schelling  thus  recognizes  a 
threefold  nature  :  organized,  inorganic, and  universal  organ- 
izing (according  to  Harms,  cosmical)  nature,  of  which 
the  two  former  arise  from  the  third  and  are  brought  by  it 
into  connection  and  harmony.  (As  Schelling  here  takes 
an  independent  middle  course  between  the  mechanical 
explanation  of  life  and  the  assumption  of  a  specific  vital 
force,  so  in  all  the  burning  physical  questions  of  tin-  time 
he  seeks  to  rise  above  the  contending  parlies  by  means  of 
mediating  solutions.  Tims,  in  the  question  of  "single  or 
double  electricity,"  he  ranges  himself  neither  on  the  side  of 
Franklin  nor  on  that  of  liis  opponents;  in  regard  to  the 
problem    of    light,    endeavors    to    overcome    the    antithesis 

*Schelling  terms  his  philosophy  of  nature   dvnamic  :it<>mism,  since  it    posits 
pure  intensities  as  the  simple  (atoms),  from  which  qualities  are  to  be  explained. 


45 2  SCHELLING. 

between  Newton's  emanation  theory  and  the  undulation 
theory  of  Euler ;  and,  in  his  chapter  on  combustion, 
attacks  the  defenders  of  phlogiston  as  well  as  those  who 
deny  it). 

Schelling's  philosophy  of  nature  *  proposes  to  itself  three 
chief  problems:  the  construction  of  general,  indeterminate, 
homogeneous  matter,  with  differences  in  density  alone,  of 
determinate,  qualitatively  differentiated  matter  and  its  phe- 
nomena of  motion  or  the  dynamical  process,  and  of  the 
organic  process.  For  each  of  these  departments  of  nature 
an  original  force  in  universal  nature  is  assumed — gravity, 
light,  and  their  copula,  universal  life.  Gravity — this  does 
not  mean  that  which  as  the  force  of  attraction  falls  within 
the  view  of  sensation,  for  it  is  the  union  of  attraction  and 
repulsion — is  the  principle  of  corporeality,  and  produces  in 
the  visible  world  the  different  conditions  of  aggregation  in 
solids,  fluids,  and  gases.  Light — this,  too,  is  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  actual  light,  of  which  it  is  the  cause — is  the 
principle  of  the  soul  (from  it  proceeds  all  intelligence,  it 
is  a  spiritual  potency,  the  "  first  subject  "  in  nature),  and 
produces  in  the  visible  world  the  dynamical  processes  mag- 
netism, electricity,  and  chemism.  The  higher  unity  of 
gravity  and  light  is  the  copula  or  life,  the  principle  of  the 
organic,  of  animated  corporeality  or  the  processes  of  growth 
and  reproduction,  irritability,  and  sensibility. 

General  matter  or  the  filling  of  space,  arises  from  the  co- 
operation of  three  forces  :  the  centrifugal,  which  manifests 
itself  as  repulsion  (first  dimension),  the  centripetal,  mani- 
fested as  attraction  (second  dimension),  and  the  synthesis 
of  the  two,  manifested  as  gravity  (third  dimension).  These 
forces  are  raised  by  light  to  a  higher  potency,  and  then 
make  their  appearance  as  the  causes  of  the  dynamical 
process  or  of  the  specific  differences  of  matter.  The  linear 
function  of  magnetism  is  the  condition  of  coherence  ;  the 

*  This  is  contained  in  the  following  treatises :  Ideas  for  a  Philosophy  of 
Nature,  1797  ;  On  the  World-soul,  1798  ;  First  Sketch  of  a  System  of  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Nature,  1799  ;  Universal  Deduction  of  the  Dynamical  Process  or  the 
Categories  of  Physics  (in  the  Zeitschrift  für  spekulative  Physik),  1800.  In  the 
above  exposition,  however,  the  modified  philosophy  of  nature  of  the  second 
period  has  also  been  taken  into  account. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  NATURE.  453 

surface  force  of  electricity,  the  basis  of  the  qualities  per- 
ceivable by  sense;  the  tri-dimensional  force  of  the  chemical 
process,  in  which  the  two  former  are  united,  produces  the 
chemical  qualities.  Galvanism  forms  the  transition  to 
living  nature,  in  which  through  the  operation  of  the 
''copula  "  these  three  dynamical  categories  are  raised  to 
organic  categories.  To  magnetism  as  the  most  general, 
and  hence  the  lowest  force,  corresponds  reproduction  (the 
formative  impulse,  as  nutrition,  growth,  and  production, 
including  the  artistic  impulse)  ;  electricity  develops  into 
irritability  or  excitability ;  the  higher  analogue  to  the 
chemical  process  as  the  most  individual  and  highest  stage 
is  sensibility  or  the  capacity  of  feeling.  (Such  at  least  is 
Schelling's  doctrine  after  Steffens  had  convinced  him  of 
the  higher  dignity  of  that  which  is  individual,  whereas  at 
first  he  had  made  sensibility  parallel  with  magnetism,  and 
reproduction  with  chemism,  because  the  former  two  appear 
most  seldom,  and  the  latter  most  frequently.  Electricity 
and  irritability  always  maintained  their  intermediate 
position.)  With  the  awakening  of  feeling  nature  has 
attained  its  goal — intelligence.  As  inorganic  substances 
are  distinguished  only  by  relative  degrees  of  repulsion  and 
attraction,  so  the  differentiation  of  organisms  is  condi- 
tioned by  the  relation  of  the  three  vital  functions:  in  the 
lower  forms  reproduction  predominates,  then  irritability 
gradually  increases,  while  in  the  highest  forms  both  of 
these  are  subordinated  to  sensibility.  All  species,  how- 
ever, are  connected  by  a  common  life,  all  the  stages  are 
but  arrests  of  the  same  fundamental  force.  This  accentu- 
ation of  the  unity  of  nature,  which  establishes  a  certain 
kinship  between  Schelling's  philosophy  of  nature  and  Dar- 
winism, was  a  great  idea,  which  deserves  the  thanks  of 
posterity  in  spite  of  such  defects  as  its  often  sportive, 
often  heedlessly  bold  reasoning  in  details. 

The  parallelism  of  the  potencies  of  nature,  as  we  have 
developed  it  by  leaving  out  of  account  the  numerous  dif- 
ferences between  the  various  expositions  of  the  Natur- 
philosophie, may  be  shown  by  a  table  : 


454 

SCIIELLING 

I.  Universal  Nature.       II.  Inorganic  Nature. 

III.  Organic  Nature. 

(Organizing) 

;.  Cupula 

3- 

Organization. 

01      .1  e. 

f   Chemical 

Sensibility.               Man. 

' ' ' 

j   Process  (jd 
1    Dimen- 

'           '          ' 

2.   Light 

2.  Dynamical  1   sion.) 

£ 

(Soul). 

Process.     (De-    |    Electric- 

•- 

terminate  mat-  \   ity  (2d  Di- 

1  SÜ 

— 

Irritability.                Male 

b.  At-    I 

ter.)                           mension.) 

*rt 

Animal.                 (=Light). 

traction.  1     i.    Gravity 

1.     Indetermi-    |    Magnet- 

Ü 

\      (Body). 

nate  matter.      1   ism      (ist 

a.  Re- 
pulsion.   J 

|    LHmen- 

Reproduc-             Female 

(  sion.) 

L  tion.     Plant.    (^Gravity). 

lb.  Transcendental  Philosophy. 

The  philosophy  of  nature  explained  the  products  of 
nature  teleologically,  deduced  them  from  the  concept  or 
the  mission  of  nature,  by  ignoring  the  mechanical  origin  of 
physical  phenomena  and  inquiring  into  the  significance  of 
each  stage  in  nature  in  view  of  this  ideal  meaning  of  the 
whole.  It  asks  what  is  the  outcome  of  the  chemical  proc- 
ess for  the  whole  of  nature,  what  is  given  by  electricity, 
by  magnetism,  etc. — what  part  of  the  general  aim  of  nature 
is  attained,  is  realized  through  this  or  that  group  of  phe- 
nomena. The  philosophy  of  spirit  given  in  the  System  of 
Transcendental  Idealism,  1800,  finds  itself  confronted  by 
corresponding  questions  concerning  the  phenomena  of 
intelligence,  of  morals,  and  of  art.  Here  again  Schelling 
does  not  trace  out  the  mechanics  of  the  soul-life,  but  is 
interested  only  in  the  meaning,  in  the  teleological  signifi- 
cance of  the  psychical  functions.  His  aim  is  a  constructive 
psychology  in  the  Fichtean  sense,  a  history  of  conscious- 
ness, and  the  execution  of  his  design  as  well  closely  fol- 
lows the  example  of  the  Wissenschaftslehre. 

Since  truth  is  the  agreement  of  thought  and  its  object, 
every  cognition  necessarily  implies  the  coming  together  of 
a  subjective  and  an  objective  factor.  The  problem  of  this 
coming  together  may  be  treated  in  two  ways.  With  the 
philosophy  of  nature  we  may  start  from  the  object  and 
observe  how  intelligence  is  added  to  nature.  The  tran- 
scendental philosophy  takes  the  opposite  course,  it  takes  its 
position  with  the  subject,  and  asks,  How  is  there  added  to 
intelligence  an  object  corresponding  to  it?  The  transcen- 
dental philosopher  has  need  of  intellectual  intuition  in  order 
to  recognize  the  original  object-positing  actions  of  the  ego, 


TRANSCENDENTAL   PHTLOSOPHY.  455 

which  remain  concealed  from  common  consciousness,  sunk 
in  the  outcome  of  these  acts.  The  theoretical  part  of  the 
system  explains  the  representation  of  objective  reality  (the 
feeling  connected  with  certain  representations  that  we  are 
compelled  to  have  them),  from  pure  self-consciousness, 
whose  opposing  moments,  a  real  and  an  ideal  force,  limit 
each  other  by  degrees, — and  follows  the  development  of 
spirit  in  three  periods  ("epochs").  The  first  of  these  ex- 
tends from  sensation,  in  which  the  ego  finds  itself  limited,  to 
productive  intuition,  in  which  a  thing  in  itself  is  posited  over 
against  the  ego  and  the  phenomenon  between  the  two  ;  the 
second,  from  this  point  to  reflection  (feeling  of  self,  outer 
and  inner  intuition  together  with  space  and  time,  the  cate- 
gories of  relation  as  the  original  categories) ;  the  third, 
finally,  through  judgment,  wherein  intuition  and  concept 
are  separated  as  well  as  united,  up  to  the  absolute  act  of 
will.  Willing  is  the  continuation  and  completion  of  intu- 
ition;  *  intuition  was  unconscious  production,  willing  is 
conscious  production.  It  is  only  through  action  that  the 
world  becomes  objective  for  us,  only  through  interaction 
with  other  active  intelligences  that  the  ego  attains  to  the 
consciousness  of  a  real  external  world,  and  to  the  con- 
sciousness of  its  freedom.  The  practical  part  follows  the 
will  from  impulse  (the  feeling  of  contradiction  between  the 
ideal  and  the  object)  through  the  division  into  moral  law 
and  resistant  natural  impulse  up  to  arbitrary  will.  Obser- 
vations on  legal  order,  on  the  state,  and  on  history  are 
added  as  "supplements."  The  law  of  right,  by  which  un- 
lawful action  is  directed  against  itself,  is  not  a  moral,  but  a 
natural  order,  which  operates  with  blind  necessity.  The 
state,  like  law,  is  a  product  of  the  genus,  and  not  of  indi- 
viduals.    The    ideal  of  a  cosmopolitan  legal   condition   is 

*  With  this  transformation  of  the  antithesis  between  knowledge  and  volition 
into  a  mere  difference  in  degree,  Schelling  sinks  back  to  the  standpoint  of  Leib- 
nitz. In  all  the  idealistic  thinkers  who  start  from  Kant  we  lind  the  endeavor  to 
overcome  the  Critical  dualism  of  understanding  and  will,  as  also  that  between 
intellect  and  sensibility.  Schiller  brings  the  contrary  impulses  of  I  he  ego  into 
ultimate  harmonious  union  in  artistic  activity.  Fichte  traces  them  back  to  a 
common  ground  ;  Schelling  combines  both  these  methods  by  extolling  art  as 
a  restoration  of  the  original  identity.  Ilegel  reduces  volition  to  thought, 
Schopenhauer  makes  intellect  proceed  from  will. 


45  6  SC  HE  LUNG. 

the  goal  of  history,  in  which  caprice  and  conformity 
to  law  are  one,  in  so  far  as  the  conscious  free  action  of 
individuals  subserves  an  unconscious  end  prescribed  by 
the  world-spirit.  History  is  the  never  completed  revelation 
of  the  absolute  (of  the  unity  of  the  conscious  and  the 
unconscious)  through  human  freedom.  We  are  co-authors 
in  the  historical  world-drama,  and  invent  our  own  parts. 
Not  until  the  third  (the  religious)  period,  in  which  he  reveals 
himself  as  "providence,"  will  God  be;  in  the  past  (the 
tragical)  period,  in  which  the  divine  power  was  felt  as 
"  fate,"  and  in  the  present  (the  mechanical)  period,  in  which 
he  appears  as  the  "plan  of  nature,"  God  is  not,  but  is  only 
becoming. 

An  interesting  supplement  to  the  Fichtean  philosophy  is 
furnished  by  the  third,  the  cesthetic,  part  of  the  transcen- 
dental idealism,  which  makes  use  of  Kant's  theory  of  the 
beautiful  in  a  way  similar  to  that  in  which  the  philosophy  of 
nature  had  availed  itself  of  his  theory  of  the  organic.  Art  is 
the  higher  third  in  which  the  opposition  between  theoretical 
and  practical  action,  the  antithesis  of  subject  and  object,  is 
removed  ;  in  which  cognition  and  action,  conscious  and 
unconscious  activity,  freedom  and  necessity,  the  impulse  of 
genius  and  reflective  deliberation  are  united.  The  beauti- 
ful, as  the  manifestation  of  the  infinite  in  the  finite,  shows 
the  problem  of  philosophy,  the  identity  of  the  real  and 
the  ideal,  solved  in  sensuous  appearance.  Art  is  the  true 
organon  and  warrant  of  philosophy;  she  opens  up  to  phi- 
losophy the  holy  of  holies,  is  for  philosophy  the  supreme 
thing,  the  revelation  of  all  mysteries.  Poesy  and  philosophy 
(the  aesthetic  intuition  of  the  artist  and  the  intellectual 
intuition  of  the  thinker)  are  most  intimately  related  ;  they 
were  united  in  the  old  mythology — why  should  not  this 
repeat  itself  in  the  future? 

2.  System  of  Identity. 
The  assertion  which  had  already  been  made  in  the  first 
period  that  "  nature  and  spirit  are  fundamentally  the  same," 
is  intensified  in  the  second  into  the  proposition,  "The 
ground  of  nature  and  spirit,  the  absolute,  is  the  identity 
of  the  real  and  the  ideal,"  and  in  this  form  is  elevated  into 


SYSTEM  OF  IDENTITY.  457 

a  principle.  As  the  absolute  is  no  longer  employed  as  a 
mere  ground  of  explanation,  but  is  itself  made  the  object 
of  philosophy,  the  doctrine  of  identity  is  added  to  the  two 
co-ordinate  disciplines,  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  the 
philosophy  of  spirit,  as  a  higher  third,  which  serves  as  a 
basis  for  them,  and  in  Schelling's  exposition  of  which 
several  phases  must  be  distinguished.* 

Following  Spinoza,  whom  he  at  first  imitated  even  in  the 
geometrical  method  of  proof,  Schelling  teaches  that  there 
are  two  kinds  of  knowledge,  the  philosophical  knowledge 
of  the  reason  and  the  confused  knowledge  of  the  imagina- 
tion, and,  as  objects  of  these,  two  forms  of  existence,  the 
infinite,  undivided  existence  of  the  absolute,  and  the  finite 
existence  of  individual  things,  split  up  into  multiplicity 
and  becoming.  The  manifold  and  self-developing  things 
of  the  phenomenal  world  owe  their  existence  to  isolating 
thought  alone ;  they  possess  as  such  no  true  reality,  and 
speculation  proves  them  void.  While  things  appear  par- 
ticular to  inadequate  representation,  the  philosopher  views 
them  sub  specie  cetcrni,  in  their  per  se,  in  their  totality,  in  the 
identity,  as  Ideas.  To  construe  things  is  to  presentthem 
as  they  are  in  God.  But  in  God  all  things  are  one ;  in  the 
absolute  all  is  absolute,  eternal,  infinitude  itself.  (Accord- 
to  Hegel's  parody,  the  absolute  is  the  night,  in  which  all 
cows  are  black.) 

The  world-ground  appears  as  nature  and  spirit;  yet  in 
itself  it  is  neither  the  one  nor  the  other,  but  the  unity  of 
both  which  is  raised  above  all  contrariety,  the  indifference  of 
objective  and  subjective.  Although  amid  the  finitude  of  the 
things  of  the  world  the  self-identity  of  the  absolute  breaks 
up  into  a  plurality  of  self-developing  individual  existences, 
yet  even  in  the  phenomenal  world  of  individuals  the  unity  of 
the  ground  is  not  entirely  lost :  each  particular  existence  is  a 

*  The  philosophy  of  identity  is  given  in  the  following  treatises  :  Exposition 
of  my  System  of  Philosophy,  1801  ;  Further  Exposition!,  of  the  System  of  Phi- 
losophy, 1802  ;  Bruno,  or  on  the  Divine  and  Natural  Principle  of  Things, 
1803;  Lectures  on  the  Method  of  Academical  Study,  1803;  Aphorisms  by  way 
of  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,  Aphorisms  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Nature  (both  in  the  Jahrbücher  für  Medizin),  1806.  Besides  these  the  follow- 
ing also  bear  on  this  doctrine  :  the  additions  to  the  second  edition  of  the  Ideas, 
1803,  and  the  Exposition,  against  Fichte,  1806. 


458  SCll EL  LING. 

definite  expression  of  the  absolute,  and  to  it  as  such  the 
character  of  identity  belongs,  though  in  a  diminished  degree 
and  mingled  with  difference  (Bruno's  "monads").  The 
world-ground  is  absolute,  the  individual  thing  is  relative, 
identity  and  totality;  nothing  exists  which  is  merely 
objective  or  merely  subjective  ;  everything  is  both,  only 
that  one  or  other  of  these  two  factors  always  predominates. 
This  Schelling  terms  quantitative  difference:  the  phenom- 
ena of  nature,  like  the  phenomena  of  spirit,  are  a  unity  of  the 
real  and  the  ideal,  only  that  in  the  former  there  is  a  pre- 
ponderance of  the  real,  in  the  latter  a  preponderance  of 
the  ideal. 

At  first  Schelling,  in  Neoplatonic  fashion,  maintained 
the  existence  of  another  intermediate  region  between  the 
spheres  of  the  infinite  and  the  finite:  absolute  knowing 
or  the  self-knowledge  of  the  identity.  In  this,  as  the 
"  form  "  of  the  absolute,  the  objective  and  the  subjective 
are  not  absolutely  one,  as  they  are  in  the  being  or 
"essence  "  of  the  absolute,  but  ideally  (potentially)  opposed, 
though  one  realiter.  Later  he  does  away  with  this  distinc- 
tion also,  as  existing  for  reflection  alone,  not  for  rational 
intuition,  and  outbids  his  earlier  determinations  concern- 
ing the  simplicity  of  the  absolute  with  the  principle, 
that  it  is  not  only  the  unity  of  opposites,  but  also  the 
unity  of  the  unity  and  the  opposition  or  the  identity  of  the 
identity,  in  which  fanciful  description  the  dialogue  Bruno 
pours  itself  forth.  A  further  alteration  is  brought  in  by 
characterizing  the  absolute  as  the  identity  of  the  finite  and 
the  infinite,  and  by  equating  the  finite  with  the  real  or 
being,  the  infinite  with  the  ideal  or  knowing.  With  this 
there  is  joined  a  philosophical  interpretation  of  the  Trinity 
akin  to  Lessing's.  In  the  absolute  or  eternal  the  finite  and 
the  infinite  are  alike  absolute.  God  the  Father  is  the 
eternal,  or  the  unity  of  the  finite  and  the  infinite;  the  Son 
is  the  finite  in  God  (before  the  falling  away);  the  Spirit  is 
the  infinite  or  the  return  of  the  finite  into  the  eternal. 

In  the  construction  of  the  real  series  Schelling  proceeds 
still  more  schematically  and  analogically  than  in  the 
Naturphilosophie  of  the  first  period,  the  contents  of  which 
are  here  essentially  reproduced.     With  this  is  closely  con- 


SYSTEM  OF  IDENTITY.  459 

nected  his  endeavor,  in  correspondence  with  the  principles 
of  the  theory  of  identity,  to  show  in  every  phenomenon  the 
operation  of  all  three  moments  of  the  absolute.  In  each 
natural  product  all  three  "  potencies  "  or  stages,  gravity  A1, 
light  A2,  and  organization  A3,  are  present,  only  in  subordina- 
tion to  one  of  their  number.  Since  the  third  potency  is 
never  lacking,  all  is  organic;  that  which  appears  to  us  as 
inorganic  matter  is  only  the  residuum  left  over  from 
organization,  that  which  could  become  neither  plant  nor 
animal.  New  here  is  the  cohesion-series  of  Steffens  (the 
phenomenon  of  magnetism),  in  which  nitrogen  forms 
the  south  pole,  carbon  the  north  pole,  and  iron  the 
point  of  indifference,  while  oxygen,  hydrogen,  and  water 
represent  the  east  pole,  west  pole,  and  indifference  point  in 
electrical  polarity.  In  the  organic  world  plants  represent 
the  carbon  pole,  animals  the  nitrogen  pole  ;  the  former  is 
the  north  pole,  the  latter  the  south.  Moreover,  the  points 
of  indifference  reappear:  the  plant  corresponds  to  water, 
the  animal  to  iron.  Schelling  was  far  outdone  in  fantastic 
analogies  of  this  kind  by  his  pupils,  especially  by  Oken, 
who  in  his  Sketch  of  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,  1805,  com- 
pares the  sense  of  hearing,  for  example,  to  the  parabola,  to  a 
metal,  to  a  bone,  to  the  bird,  to  the  mouse,  and  to  the  horse. 
As  nature  was  the  imaging  of  the  infinite  (unity  or 
essence)  into  the  finite  (plurality  or  form),  so  spirit  is  the 
taking  up  of  the  finite  into  the  infinite.  In  the  spiritual 
realm  also  all  three  divine  original  potencies  are  every- 
where active,  though  in  such  a  way  that  one  is  dominant. 
In  intuition  (sensation,  consciousness,  intuition,  each  in 
turn  thrice  divided)  the  infinite  and  the  eternal  are  subordi- 
nated to  the  finite  ;  in  thought  or  understanding  (concept, 
judgment,  inference,  each  in  three  kinds)  the  finite  and  the 
eternal  are  subordinated  to  the  infinite  ;  in  reason  (which 
comprehends  all  under  the  form  of  the  absolute)  the 
finite  and  tlu-  infinite  ,-uc  subordinated  to  the  eternal.  In- 
tuition is  finite  cognition,  thought  infinite  cognition,  reason 
eternal  cognition.  The  forms  of  the  understanding  do  not 
suffice  for  tin;  knowledge  of  reason  ;  common  logic  with  its 
law  of  contradiction  has  no  binding  authority  for  specula- 
tion, which  starts  with    the    equalization    of    opposites.      In 


460  SCHELLING. 

the  Aphorisms  by  way  of  Introduction  science,  religion,  and 
art  figure  as  stages  of  the  ideal  all,  in  correspondence  with 
the  potencies  of  the  real  all — matter,  motion,  and  organiza- 
tion. Nature  culminates  in  man,  history  in  the  state. 
Reason,  philosophy,  is  the  re-establishment  of  identity,  the 
return  of  the  absolute  to  itself. 

Unconditioned  knowledge,  as  Schelling  maintains  in  his 
encyclopedia,  i.  e.,  his  Lectures  on  the  Method  of  Academical 
Study,  is  the  presupposition  of  all  particular  knowledge. 
The  function  of  universities  is  to  maintain  intact  the  con- 
nection between  particular  knowledge  and  absolute  knowl- 
edge. The  three  higher  faculties  correspond  to  the  three 
potencies  in  the  absolute  :  Natural  Science  and  Medicine 
to  the  real  or  finite;  History  and  Law  to  the  ideal  or 
infinite;  Theology  to  the  eternal  or  the  copula.  There 
is  further  a  faculty  of  arts,  the  so-called  Philosophical 
Faculty,  which  imparts  whatever  in  philosophy  is  teachable. 
The  two  lectures  on  theology  (viii.  and  ix.)  are  especially 
important.  There  are  two  forms  of  religion,  one  of  which 
discovers  God  in  nature,  while  the  other  finds  him  in 
history;  the  former  culminates  in  the  Greek  religion,  the 
latter  in  the  Christian,  and  with  the  founding  of  this  the 
third  period  of  history  (which  Schelling  had  previously 
postponed  into  the  future),  the  period  of  providence  begins. 
In  Christianity  mythology  is  based  on  religion,  not  religion 
on  mythology,  as  was  the  case  in  heathenism.  The  specula- 
tive kernel  of  Christianity  is  the  incarnation  of  God,  already 
taught  by  the  Indian  sages  ;  this,  however,  is  not  to  be 
understood  as  a  single  event  in  time,  but  as  eternal.  It  has 
been  a  hindrance  to  the  development  of  Christianity  that 
the  Bible,  whose  value  is  far  below  that  of  the  sacred  books 
of  India,  has  been  more  highly  prized  than  that  which  the 
patristic  thinking  succeeded  in  making  out  of  its  meager 
contents. 

If,  finally,  we  compare  Schelling's  system  of  identity  with 
its  model,  the  system  of  Spinoza,  two  essential  differences 
become  apparent.  Although  both  thinkers  start  from  a 
principiant  equal  valuation  of  the  two  phenomenal  mani- 
festations of  the  absolute,  nature  and  spirit,  Spinoza  tends 
to   posit   thought   in    dependence   on   extension   (the  soul 


DOCTRINE   OF  FREEDOM.  461 

represents  what  the  body  is),  while  in  Schelling,  conversely, 
the  Fichtean  preference  of  spirit  is  still  potent  (the  state 
and  art  stand  nearer  to  the  absolute  identity  than  the  organ- 
ism, although,  principiantly  considered,  the  greatest  possi- 
ble approximation  to  the  equilibrium  of  the  real  and  the 
ideal  is  as  much  attained  in  the  one  as  in  the  other).  The 
second  difference  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  develop- 
ment is  entirely  lacking  in  Spinoza,  while  in  Schelling  it  is 
everywhere  dominant.  It  reminds  one  of  Lessing  and 
Herder,  who  also  attempted  to  combine  Spinozistic  and 
Leibnitzian  elements. 

3a.  Doctrine  of  Freedom. 

The  system  of  identity  had,  with  Spinoza,  distinguished 
two  worlds,  the  real  world  of  absolute  identity  and  the 
imagined  world  of  differentiated  and  changeable  individual 
things  ;  it  had  traced  back  the  latter  to  the  former  as  its 
ground,  but  had  not  deduced  it  from  the  former.  Whence, 
then,  the  imagination  which,  instead  of  the  unchangeable 
unity,  shows  us  the  changing  manifold  ?  Whence  the  im- 
perfections of  the  finite,  whence  evil  ?  The  pantheism  of 
Spinoza  is  inseparably  connected  with  determinism,  which 
denies  evil  without  explaining  it.  Evil  and  finitucle  demand 
explanation,  not  denial,  and  this  without  the  abandonment 
of  pantheism.  But  explanation  by  what  ?  By  the  absolute, 
for  besides  the  absolute  there  is  naught.  How,  then,  must 
the  pantheistic  doctrine  of  the  absolute  be  transformed  in 
order  that  the  fact  of  evil  and  the  separate  existence  of  the 
finite  may  become  comprehensible?  To  this  task  are 
devoted  the  Inquiries  into  the  Nature  of  Human  Freedom 
{Philosophical  Works,  vol.  i.,  1809,  with  which  should  be 
compared  the  Memorial  of  Jacobi,  1812,  and  the  Answer  to 
Eschcnmayer,  181 3). 

As  early  as  in  the  Brutto,  the  problem  occasionally 
emerges  why  matters  do  not  rest  with  the  original  infinite 
unity  of  the  absolute,  why  the  finite  breaks  away  from 
the  identical  primal  ground.  The  possibility  of  the  separa- 
tion, it  is  answered,  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  finite  is  like 
the  infinite  realiter,  and  yet,  ideally,  is  different  from  it  ; 
the  actuality  of  the  coming  forth,  however,  lies  in  the  non- 


46  2  SCIIELLING. 

deduciblc  self-will  of  the  finite.  Then  after  Eschenmayer* 
{Philosophy  in  its  Transition  to  Not-pJiilosophy,  1803)  had 
characterized  the  procession  of  the  Ideas  out  of  the  God- 
he. id  as  an  impenetrable  mystery  for  thought,  before  which 
philosophy  must  yield  to  faith,  Schelling,  in  the  essay  Re- 
ligion and  Philosophy,  1804,  goes  more  deeply  into  the  prob- 
lem. The  origin  of  the  sense-world  is  conceivable  only 
as  a  breaking  away,  a  spring,  a  falling  away,  which  consists 
in  the  soul's  grasping  itself  in  its  selfhood,  in  its  subordina- 
tion of  the  infinite  in  itself  to  the  finite,  and  in  its  thus 
ceasing  to  be  in  God.  The  procession  of  the  world  from 
the  infinite  is  a  free  act,  a  fact  which  can  only  be  described, 
not  deduced  as  necessary.  The  counterpart  of  this  attain- 
ment of  independence  on  the  part  of  things  or  creation  is 
history  as  the  return  of  the  world  to  its  source.  They  are 
related  to  each  other  as  the  fall  to  redemption.  Both  the 
dismission  of  the  world  and  its  reception  back,  together 
with  the  intervening  development,  are,  however,  events 
needed  by  God  himself  in  order  to  become  actual  God  : 
He  develops  through  the  world.  (A  similar  thought  was 
not  unknown  in  the  Middle  Ages :  if  God  is  to  give  a 
complete  revelation  of  himself  he  must  make  known  his 
grace  ;  and  this  presupposes  sin.  As  the  occasion  of  divine 
grace,  the  fall  is  a  happy,  saving  fault ;  without  it  God 
could  not  have  revealed  himself  as  gracious,  as  forgiving, 
hence  not  completely.)  Schelling's  study  of  Jacob  Böhme, 
to  which  he  was  led  by  Baader,  essentially  contributed  to 
the  concentration  of  his  thought  on  this  point.  The  Expo- 
sition of  the  True  Relation,  etc.,  already  distinctly  betrays 
the  influence  of  this  mystic.  In  correspondence  with 
Böhme's  doctrine  that  God  is  living  God  only  through 
his  inclusion  of  negation  in  himself,  it  is  here  maintained: 
A  being  can  manifest  itself  only  when  it  is  not  merely  one, 
but  has  another,  an  opposition  (the  many),  in  itself,  whereby 
it  is  revealed  to  itself  as  unity.  With  the  addition  of 
certain  Kantian  ideas,  in  particular  the  idea  of  transcen- 
dental freedom  and  the  intelligible  character,  Schelling's 
theosophy  now  assumes  the  following  form: 

*  K.  Ad.  Eschenmayer  was  originally  a  physician,  then,  1811-36,  professor 
of  philosophy  in  Tübingen,  and  died  in  1852  at  Kirchheim  unter  Teck. 


DOCTRINE   OF  FREEDOM.  463 

The  only  way  to  guard  against  the  determinism  and  the 
lifeless  God  of  Spinoza  is  to  assume  something  in  God 
which  is  not  God  himself,  to  distinguish  between  God  as 
existent  and  that  which  is  merely  the  ground  of  his  exist- 
ence or  "nature  in  God."  In  God  also  the  perfect  pro- 
ceeds from  the  imperfect,  he  too  develops  and  realizes 
himself.  The  actual,  perfect  God,  who  is  intelligence, 
wisdom,  goodness,  is  preceded  by  something  which  is 
merely  the  possibility  of  all  this,  an  obscure,  unconscious 
impulse  toward  self-representation.  For  in  the  last  anal- 
ysis there  is  no  being  but  willing  ;  to  willing  alone  belong 
the  predicates  of  the  primal  being,  groundlessness,  eternity, 
independence  of  time,  self-affirmation.  This  "  ground  of 
existence  "  is  an  obscure  "  longing  "  to  give  birth  to  self, 
an  unconscious  impulse  to  become  conscious  ;  the  goal  of 
this  longing  is  the  "  understanding,"  the  Logos,  the  Word, 
wherein  God  becomes  revealed  to  self.  By  the  self-subordi- 
nation of  this  longing  to  the  understanding  as  its  matter 
and  instrument,  God  becomes  actual  God,  becomes  spirit 
and  love.  The  operation  of  the  light  understanding  on  the 
dark  nature-will  consists  in  a  separation  of  forces,  whence 
the  visible  world  proceeds.  Whatever  in  the  latter  is 
perfect,  rational,  harmonious,  and  purposive  is  the  work 
of  the  understanding  ;  the  irrational  remainder,  on  the 
other  hand,  conflict  and  lawlessness,  abortion,  sickness 
and  death,  originates  in  the  dark  ground.  Each  thing  has 
two  principles  in  it  :  its  self-will  it  receives  from  nature 
in  God,  yet,  at  the  same  time,  as  coming  from  the  divine 
understanding,  it  is  the  instrument  of  the  universal  will. 
In  God  the  light  and  dark  principles  stand  in  indis- 
soluble unity,  in  man  they  are  separable.  The  freedom 
of  man's  will  makes  him  independent  of  both  principles; 
going  over  from  truth  to  falsehood,  he  may  strive  to 
make  his  selfhood  supreme  and  to  reduce  the  spiritual  in 
him  to  the  level  of  a  means,  or — with  divine  assistance — 
continuing  in  the  center,  he  may  endeavor  to  subordinate 
the  particular  will  to  the  will  of  love.  Good  consists  in 
overcoming  resistance,  for  in  every  eise  a  thing  can  be 
revealed  only  through  its  opposite.  If  man  yields  to  temp- 
tation   it    is    his   own    guilty   choice.      Evil   is   not    merely 


464  SCHELLING. 

defect,  privation,  but  something  positive,  selfhood  break- 
ing away,  the  reversal  of  the  rightful  order  between  the 
particular  and  the  universal  will.  The  possibility  of  a  separa- 
tion of  the  two  wills  lies  in  the  divine  ground  (it  is  "  per- 
mitted "  in  order  that  by  overmastering  the  self-will  the 
will  of  love  may  approve  itself),  the  actuality  of  evil  is 
the  free  act  of  the  creature.  Freedom  is  to  be  conceived, 
in  the  Kantian  sense,  as  equally  far  removed  from  chance 
or  caprice  and  from  compulsion  :  Man  chooses  his  own 
non-temporal,  intelligible  nature  ;  he  predestinates  himself 
in  the  first  creation,  i.  c,  from  eternity,  and  is  responsible 
for  his  actions  in  the  sense-world,  which  are  the  necessary 
results  of  that  free  primal  act. 

As  in  nature  and  in  the  individual,  so  also  in  the  history 
of  mankind,  the  two  original  grounds  of  things  do  battle 
with  one  another.  The  golden  age  of  innocence,  of  happy 
indecision  and  unconsciousness  concerning  sin,  when  neither 
good  nor  evil  yet  was,  was  followed  by  a  period  of  the  om- 
nipotence of  nature,  in  which  the  dark  ground  of  existence 
ruled  alone,  although  it  did  not  make  itself  felt  as  actual 
evil  until,  in  Christianity,  the  spiritual  light  was  born  in  per- 
sonal form.  The  subsequent  conflict  of  good  against  evil, 
in  which  God  reveals  himself  as  spirit,  leads  toward  a  state 
wherein  evil  will  be  reduced  to  the  position  of  a  potency 
and  everything  subordinated  to  spirit,  and  thus  the  com- 
plete identity  of  the  ground  of  existence  and  the  existing 
God  be  brought  about. 

Besides  this  after-reconciliation  of  the  two  divine  mo- 
ments, Schelling  recognizes  another,  original  unity  of  the 
two.  The  not  yet  unfolded  unity  of  the  beginning  (God 
as  Alpha)  he  terms  indifference  or  groundlessness ;  the 
more  valuable  unity  of  the  end,  attained  by  unfolding  (God 
as  Omega)  is  called  identity  or  spirit.  In  the  former  the 
contraries  are  not  yet  present ;  in  the  latter  they  are  present 
no  longer.  The  groundless  divides  into  two  equally 
eternal  beginnings,  nature  and  light,  or  longing  and  under- 
standing, in  order  that  the  two  may  become  one  in  love, 
and  thereby  the  absolute  develop  into  the  personal  God. 
In  this  way  Schelling  endeavors  to  overcome  the  antithesis 
between  naturalism  and  theism,  between  dualism  and  pan- 


DOCTRINE   OF  FREEDOM.  4^5 

theism,  and  to  remove  the  difficulties  which  arise  for  pan- 
theism from  the  fact  of  evil,  as  well  as  from  the  concepts 
of  personality  and  of  freedom. 

In  the  two  moments  of  the  absolute  (nature  in  God — 
personal  spirit)  we  recognize  at  once  the  antithesis  of  the 
real  and  ideal  which  was  given  in  the  philosophy  of  iden- 
tity. The  chief  difference  between  the  mystical  period 
and  th.e  preceding  one  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  absolute 
itself  is  now  made  to  develop  (from  indifference  to  identity, 
from  the  neither-nor  to  the  as-well-as  of  the  antithesis), 
and  that  there  is  conceded  to  the  sense-world  a  reality 
which  is  more  than  apparent,  more  than  merely  present  for 
imagination.  That  which  facilitated  this  rapid,  almost 
unceasing  change  of  position  for  Schelling,  and  which  at 
the  same  time  concealed  the  fact  from  him,  was,  above  all, 
the  ambiguous  and  variable  meaning  of  his  leading  concepts. 
The  "objective,"  for  example,  now  signifies  unconscious 
being,  becoming,  and  production,  now  represented  reality, 
now  the  real,  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  represented,  but  only 
is.  "  God  "  sometimes  means  the  whole  absolute,  some- 
times only  the  infinite,  spiritual  moment  in  the  absolute. 
Scarcely  a  single  term  is  sharply  defined,  much  less  con- 
sistently used  in  a  single  meaning. 

3b.  Philosophy  of  Mythology  and  Revelation. 

Once  again  Schelling  is  ready  with  a  new  statement  of  the 
problem.  Philosophy  is  the  science  of  the  existent.  In  this, 
however,  a  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  the  ichat 
{quid  sit)  and  the  that  [quod  sit),  or  between  essence  and 
existence.  The  apprehension  of  the  essence,  of  the  con- 
cept, is  the  work  of  reason,  but  this  does  not  go  as  far  as 
actual  being.  Rational  philosophy  cognizes  only  the  uni- 
versal, the  possible,  the  necessary  truths  (whose  contra- 
dictory is  unthinkable),  but  not  the  particular  and  factual. 
This  philosophy  can  only  assert  :  If  anything  exists  it  must 
conform  to  these  laws  ;  existence  is  not  given  with  the  what. 
Hegel  has  ignored  this  distinction  between  the  logical  and 
the  actual,  has  confused  the  rational  and  the  real.  Even 
the  system   of  identity  was  merely  rational,  /.  e.%   negative^ 


466  SCHELL1XG. 

philosophy,  to  which  there  must  be  added,  as  a  second  part, 
a  positive  or  existential  philosophy,  which  does  not,  like 
the  former,  rise  to  the  highest  principle,  to  God,  but  starts 
from  this  supreme  Idea  and  shows  its  actuality. 

The  content  of  this  phase  of  Schelling's  thought*  was  so 
unfruitful,  and  its  influence  so  small,  that  brief  hints  con- 
cerning it  must  here  suffice.  First  of  all,  the  doctrine  of  the 
divine  potencies  and  of  creation  is  repeated  in  altered 
form,  and  then  there  is  given  a  philosophy  of  the  history 
of  religion  as  a  reflection  of  the  theogonic  process  in 
human  consciousness. 

The  potencies  are  now  called  the  infinite  ability  to  be 
(inactive  will,  subject),  pure  being  (being  without  poten- 
tiality, object),  and  spirit,  which  is  free  from  the  one- 
sidednesses  of  mere  potentiality  and  of  mere  being,  and 
master  of  itself  (subject-object);  to  these  is  added,  fur- 
ther— not  as  a  fourth,  but  as  that  which  has  the  three 
predicates  and  is  wholly  in  each — the  absolute  proper,  as 
the  cause  and  support  of  these  attributes.  The  original 
unity  of  the  three  forms  is  dissolved,  as  the  first  raises 
itself  out  of  the  condition  of  a  mere  potency  and  with- 
draws itself  from  pure  being  in  order  to  exist  for  itself ; 
the  tension  extends  itself  to  the  two  others — the  second 
now  comes  out  from  its  selflessness,  subdues  the  first,  and 
so  leads  the  third  back  to  unity.  In  creation  the  three 
potencies  stand  related  as  the  unlimited  Can-be,  the  limit- 
ing Must-be,  and  the  Ought-to-be,  or  operate  as  material, 
formal,  and  final  causes,  all  held  in  undivided  combina- 
tion by  the  soul.  It  was  not  until  the  end  of  creation  that 
they  became  personalities.  Man,  in  whom  the  potencies' 
come  to  rest,  can  divide  their  unity  again;  his  fall  calls 
forth  a  new  tension,  and  thereby  the  world  becomes  a 
world  outside  of  God.  History,  the  process  o  progressive 
reconciliation     between    the    God-estranged     world     and 

*  On  Schelling's  negative  and  positive  philosophy,  published  in  the  four 
volumes  of  the  second  division  of  the  Works,  cf.  Karl  Groos,  Die  reine  Ver- 
nunftwissenschaft, systematische  Darstellung  von  Schillings  negativer  Phi- 
losophie, i88q;  Konstantin  Frantz,  Schillings  positive  Philosophie,  in  three 
parts,  1879-80;  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Gesammelte  Studien  imd  Aufsätze, 
1876,  p.  650  seq.;  Ad.  Planck,  Schellings  nachgelassene  Werke,  1858;  also 
the  essay  by  Heyder,  referred  to,  p.  446,  note  %. 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  MYTHOLOGY  AND  REVELATION.      A^l 

God,  passes  through  two  periods — heathenism,  in  which  the 
second  person  works  as  a  natural  potency,  and  Christianity, 
in  which  it  works  with  freedom.  In  the  discussion  of 
these  positive  philosophy  becomes  a  pliilosopJiy  of  myth- 
ology and  revelation.  The  irresistible  force  of  mythological 
ideas  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  gods  are  not  crea- 
tions of  the  fancy,  but  real  powers,  namely,  these  potencies, 
which  form  the  substance  of  human  conciousness. 

The  history  of  religion  has  for  its  starting-point  the 
relative  monotheism  of  humanity  in  its  original  unity,  and 
for  its  goal  the  absolute  monotheism  of  Christianity. 
With  the  separation  into  nations  polytheism  arises.  This 
is  partly  simultaneous  polytheism  (a  plurality  of  gods 
under  a  chief  god),  partly  successive  polytheism  (an  actual 
plurality  of  divinities,  changing  dynasties  of  several  chief 
gods),  and  develops  from  star  worship  or  Sabeism  up  to  the 
religion  of  the  Greeks.  The  Greek  mysteries  form  the  tran- 
sition from  mythology  to  revelation.  While  in  the  mytho- 
logical process  one  or  other  of  the  divine  potencies  (Ground, 
Son,  Spirit)  was  always  predominant,  in  Christianity  they 
return  into  unity.  The  true  monotheism  of  revelation 
shows  God  as  an  articulated  unity,  in  which  the  opposites 
are  contained,  as  being  overcome.  The  person  of  Christ 
constitutes  the  content  of  Christianity,  who,  in  his  incarna- 
tion and  sacrificial  death,  yields  up  the  independence 
out  of  God  which  had  come  to  him  through  the  fall 
of  man.  The  three  periods  in  the  development  of  the 
Church  (real,  substantial  unity — ideality  or  freedom — the 
reconciliation  of  the  two)  were  foreshadowed  in  the  chief 
apostles:  Peter,  with  his  leaning  toward  the  past,  repre- 
sents the  Papal  Church  ;  Paul  the  thinker  the  Protestant 
Church;  and  the  gentle  John  the  Church  of  the  future. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

SCHELLING'S  CO-WORKERS. 

IN  his  period  of  vigorous  creation  Schelling  was  the  center 
of  an  animated  philosophical  activity.  Each  phase  of  his 
philosophy  found  a  circle  of  enthusiastic  fellow-laborers, 
whom  we  must  hesitate  to  term  disciples  because  of  their 
independence  and  of  their  reaction  on  Schelling  himself. 
Only  G.  M.  Klein  (1776-1820,  professor  in  Würzburg), 
Stutzmann  (died  18 16  in  Erlangen  ;  Philosophy  of  the  Uni- 
verse, 1806;  Philosophy  of  History,  1808),  and  the  historians 
of  philosophy  Ast  and  Rixner  can  be  called  disciples  of 
Schelling.  Prominent  among  his  co-workers  in  the  philos- 
ophy of  nature  were  Steffens,  Oken,  Schubert,  and  Carus  ; 
besides  these  the  physiologist  Burdach,  the  pathologist 
Kieser,  the  plant  physiologist  Nees  von  Esenbeck,  and  the 
medical  thinker  Schelver  {Philosophy  of  Medicine,  1809) 
deserve  mention.  Besides  Hegel,  J.  J.  Wagner  and  Fried- 
rich  Krause  distinguished  themselves  as  independent 
founders  of  systems  of  identity  ;  Troxler,  Suabedissen,  and 
Berger  are  also  to  be  assigned  to  this  group.  Baader  and 
Schleiermacher  were  competitors  of  Schelling  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  religion,  and  Solger  in  aesthetics.  Finally  Fr. 
J.  Stahl  (died  1861  ;  Philosophy  of  Right,  itl^oseq.),  was  also 
influenced  by  Schelling.  There  is  a  wide  divergence  in 
Schelling's  school,  as  J.  E.  Erdmann  accurately  remarks, 
between  the  naturalistic  pantheist  Oken  and  the  mystical 
theosophist  Baader,  in  whom  elements  which  had  been 
united  in  Schelling  appear  divided. 

I.   The  Philosophers   of  Nature. 

Henrik  Steffens*  (a  Norwegian,  1773-1845  ;  professor  in 
Halle,  Breslau,  and  Berlin)  makes  individual  development 
the  goal  of  nature — which   is  first   completely  attained  in 

*  Steffens  :  Contributions  to  the  Inner  Natural  History  of  the  Earth,  1801; 
Caricatures  of  the  Holiest,  1819-21;  Anthropology,  1822. 

468    . 


PHILOSOPHERS   OF  NATURE.  469 

man  and  in  his  peculiarity  or  talent — and  holds  that  the 
catastrophes  of  the  spirit  are  reflected  in  the  history  of  the 
earth.  Lorenz  Oken  *  (1779-185 1  ;  professor  in  Jena  1S07- 
27,  then  in  Munich  and  Zurich)  identifies  God  and  the 
universe,  which  comes  to  self-consciousness  in  man,  the  most 
perfect  animal  ;  teaches  the  development  of  organisms  from 
an  original  slime  (a  mass  of  organic  elements,  infusoria,  or 
cells);  and  looks  on  the  animal  kingdom  as  man  anato- 
mized, in  that  the  animal  world  contains  in  isolated  devel- 
opment that  which  man  possesses  collected  in  minute 
organs — the  worm  is  the  feeling  animal,  the  insect  the  light 
animal,  the  snail  the  touch  animal,  the  bird  the  hearing 
animal,  the  fish  the  smelling  animal,  the  amphibian  the 
taste  animal,  the  mammal  the  animal  of  all  senses. 

While  in  Steffens  geological  interests  predominate,  and 
in  Oken  biological  interests,  Schubert,  Carus,  and  Enne- 
moser  are  the  psychologists  of  the  school.  Gotthilf 
Heinrich  Schubert  f  (1780-1860  ;  professor  in  Erlangen  and 
Munich)  brings  the  human  soul  into  intimate  relation  with 
the  world-soul,  whose  phantasy  gives  form  to  all  that  is 
corporeal,  and  delights  to  dwell  on  the  abnormal  and 
mysterious  phenomena  of  the  inner  life,  the  border-land 
between  the  physical  and  the  psychical,  on  the  unconscious 
and  the  half-conscious,  on  presentiments  and  clairvoyance, 
as  from  another  direction  also  Schelling's  philosophy  was 
brought  into  perilous  connection  with  somnambulism.  A 
second  predominantly  contemplative  thinker  was  Karl 
Gustav  Carus  \  (1 789-1 869  ;  at  his  death  in  Dresden  physi- 
cian to  the  king;  Lectures  on  Psychology,  1831  ;  Psyche, 
1846;  Physis,  185 1),  greatly  distinguished  for  his  services 
to  comparative  anatomy.  Carus  endows  the  cell  with 
unconscious  psychical  life, — a  memory   for  the  past  shows 

*  Oken  :  On  the  Significance  of  the  Bones  of  the  Skull,  1S07  ;  Text-book  of 
the  Philosophy  of  Nature,  [8og  11,  2<1  ed.  I H 3 r ,  3d  ed.  1843  ;  the  journal 
Zra'j,  from  1817.     On  Oken  cf.  C.  G littler,  1885. 

\  G,  II.  Schubert  :  Views  of  the  Park  Side  of  Natural  Science,  1808  ; 
The  Primeval  World  and  the  Fixed  Stars,  [822;  History  of  the  Soul, 
1830  (in  briefer  form,   Text-book  of  the  Science  of  Alan  and  of  the  Soul,  1838). 

X  Not  to  be  confused  with  Friedrich  August  Cams  (1770-1807  ;  professor  in 
Leipsic),  whose  History  of  Psychology,  1808,  torms  tne  third  part  of  his 
posthumous  works. 


47 o  SCHELLIN G'S   CO-WORKERS. 

itself  in  the  inheritance  of  dispositions  and  talents,  just  as 
the  formation  of  milk  in  the  breasts  of  the  pregnant  and 
the  formation  of  lungs  in  the  embryo  betray  a  prevision  of 
the  future, — and  points  out  that  with  the  higher  develop- 
ment of  organic  and  spiritual  life  the  antitheses  constantly 
become  more  articulate  :  individual  differences  are  greater 
among  men  than  among  women,  among  adults  than  among 
children,  among  Europeans  than  among  negroes. 

2.  The  Philosophers  of  Identity. 

It  has  been  said  of  the  Dane  Johann  Erich  von  Berger 
(1772-1833;  from  1814  professor  in  Kiel ;  Universal  Outlines 
of  Science,  1817-27)  that  he  adopted  a  middle  course 
between  Fichte  and  Schelling.  The  same  may  be  asserted 
of  Karl  Ferdinand  Solger  (1780-1819;  at  his  death  pro- 
fessor in  Berlin  ;  Erwin,  Four  Dialogues  on  Beauty  and  Art, 
1815;  Lectures  on  JEsthetics,  edited  by  Heyse,  1829),  who 
points  out  the  womb  of  the  beautiful  in  the  fancy,  and 
introduces  into  aesthetics  the  concept  of  irony,  that  spirit 
of  sadness  at  the  vanity  of  the  finite,  though  this  is  needed 
by  the  Idea  in  order  to  its  manifestation. 

In  Johann  Jacob  Wagner*  (1775-1841  ;  professor  in 
Würzburg)  and  in  J.  P.  V.  Troxler  f  (1 780-1 866)  we  find, 
as  in  Steffens,  a  fourfold  division  instead  of  Schelling's 
triads.  Both  Wagner  and  Troxler  find  an  exact  corre- 
spondence between  the  laws  of  the  universe  and  those  of 
the  human  mind.  Wagner  (in  conformity  to  the  categories 
essence  and  form,  opposition  and  reconciliation)  makes  all 
becoming  and  cognition  advance  from  unity  to  quadruplic- 
ity,  and  finds  the  four  stages  of  knowledge  in  repres- 
entation, perception,  judgment,  and  Idea.  Troxler  shares 
with  Fries  the  anthropological  standpoint,  (philosophy  is 
anthropology,  knowledge  of  the  world  is  self-knowledge), 
and  distinguishes,  besides  the  emotional  nature  or  the  unity 
of   human  nature,  four  constituents  thereof,   spirit,  higher 

*  T-  J.  Wagner:  Ideal  Philosophy,  1804  ;  Mathematical  Philosophy,  1811  ; 
Organon  of  Human  Knowledge,  1S30,  in  three  parts,  System  of  the  World,  of 
Knowledge,  and  of  Language.     On  Wagner  cf.   L.  Rabus,  1862. 

\  Troxler :  Glances  into  the  Nature  of  Man,  1812  ;  Metaphysics,  1828  ;  Logic, 
1830. 


FRIEDRICH  KRAUSE.  47  I 

soul,  lower"  soul  (body,  Leib),  and  body  {Körper),  and  four 
corresponding  kinds  of  knowledge,  in  reverse  order,  sen- 
suous perception,  experience,  reason,  and  spiritual  intuition, 
of  which  the  middle  two  are  mediate  or  reflective  in 
character,  while  the  first  and  last  are  intuitive.  For  D. 
Th.  A.  Suabedissen  also  (i  773—1 835  ;  professor  in  Marburg; 
Examination  of  Man,  1815-18)  philosophy  is  the  science 
of  man,  and  self-knowledge  its  starting  point. 

The  relatively  limited  reputation  enjoyed  in  his  own 
time  and  to-day  by  Friedrich  Krause*  (born  in  Eisenberg 
1781  ;  habilitated  in  Jena  1802  ;  lived  privately  in  Dresden  ; 
became  a  Privatdocent  in  Göttingen  from  1824;  and  died 
at  Munich  1832;  Prototype  of  Humanity,  1812,  and  numer- 
ous other  works)  has  been  due,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the 
appearance  of  his  more  gifted  contemporary  Hegel,  and, 
on  the  other,  to  his  peculiar  terminology.  He  not  only 
Germanized  all  foreign  words  in  a  spirit  of  exaggerated 
purism,  but  also  coined  new  verbal  roots,  {Mai,  Ant,  Or, 
Om)  and  from  these  formed  the  most  extraordinary  combi- 
nations {Vereinselbganzweseninnesein,  Oromlebselbstschauen). 
His  most  important  pupil,  Ahrens  (professor  in  Leipsic, 
died  1874;  Course  of  Philosophy,  1836-38;  Natural  Rights 
1852),  helped  Krause's  doctrine  to  gain  recognition  in 
France  and  Belgium  by  his  fine  translations  into  French  ; 
while  it  was  introduced  into  Spain  by  J.  S.  del  Rio  of 
Madrid  (died  1869). — Since  the  finite  is  a  negative,  the 
infinite  a  positive  concept,  and  hence  the  knowledge  of 
the  infinite  primal,  the  principle  of  philosophy  is  the  abso- 
lute, and  philosophy  itself  knowledge  of  God  or  the 
theory  of  essence.  The  Subjective  Analytic  Course  leads 
from  the  self-viewing  of  the  ego  up  to  the  vision  of  God  ; 
the  Synthetic  Course  starts  from  the  fundamental  Idea,  God, 
and  deduces  from  this  the  partial  Ideas,  or  presents  the 
world  as  the  revelation  of  God.  For  his  attempted  recon- 
ciliation of  theism  and  pantheism  Krause  invented  the 
name  panentheism,  meaning  thereby  that  God  neither  is  the 

*  On  Krause  cf.  P.  Hohlfeld,  Die  Krausescht  Philosophie,  187g;  B.  Martin. 
1881  ;  R.  Eucken,  Zur  Erinnerung  mi  Krause,  Festrede,  t88l.  From  his 
posthumous  works  Hohlfeld  and  Wünsche  have  published  the  Lectures  on 
/Esthetics,  the  System  of  /Esthetics  (both  1882),  and  numerous  other  treatises. 


47 2  SCHELLING'S  CO-WORKERS. 

world  nor  stands  outside  the  world,  but  has  the  world  in 
himself  and  extends  beyond  it.  He  is  absolute  identity, 
nature  and  reason  are  relative  identity,  viz.,  the  identity 
of  the  real  and  ideal,  the  former  with  the  character  of 
reality,  the  latter  with  the  character  of  ideality.  Or, 
the  absolute  considered  from  the  side  of  its  wholeness 
(infinity)  is  nature,  considered  from  the  side  of  its  self- 
hood (unconditionally)  is  reason  ;  God  is  the  common  root 
of  both.  Above  nature  and  reason  is  humanity,  which 
combines  in  itself  the  highest  products  of  both,  the  most 
perfect  animal  body  and  self-consciousness.  The  human- 
ity of  earth,  the  humanity  known  to  us,  is  but  a  very 
small  portion  of  the  humanity  of  the  universe,  which  in  the 
multitude  of  its  members,  which  cannot  be  increased,  con- 
stitutes the  divine  state.  Krause's  most  important  work  is 
his  philosophy  of  right  and  of  history,  with  its  marks  of 
a  highly  keyed  idealism.  He  treats  human  right  as  an 
effluence  of  divine  right ;  besides  the  state  or  legal  union,  he 
recognizes  many  other  associations — the  science  and  the  art 
union,  the  religious  society,  the  league  of  virtue  or  ethical 
union.  His  philosophy  of  history  {General  Theory  of  Life, 
edited  by  Von  Leonhardi,  1843)  follows  the  Fichteo-Hege- 
lian  rhythm,  unity,  division,  and  reunion,  and  correlates  the 
several  ages  with  these.  The  first  stage  is  germinal  life  ; 
the  second,  youth  ;  the  third,  maturity.  The  culmination 
is  followed  by  a  reverse  movement  from  counter-maturity, 
through  counter-youth,  to  counter-childhood,  whereupon 
the  development  recommences — without  cessation.  It  is  to 
be  regretted  that  this  noble-minded  man  joined  to  his  warm- 
hearted disposition,  broad  outlook,  and  rigorous  method  a 
heated  fancy,  which,  crippling  the  operation  of  these 
advantageous  qualities,  led  his  thought  quite  too  far  away 
from  reality.  Ahrens,  Von  Leonhardi,  Lindemann,  and 
Roeder  may  be  mentioned  as  followers  of  Krause. 

3.  The  Philosophers   of  Religion. 

Franz  (von)  Baader,  the  son  of  a  physician,  was  born  in 
Munich  in  1765,  resided  there  as  superintendent  of  mines, 
and,  from  1826,  as  professor  of  speculative  dogmatics, 
and    died    there    also    in    1841.       His    works,    which    con- 


FRANZ    VON  BAADER.  473 

sisted  only  of  a  series  of  brief  treatises,  were  collected  (16 
vols.,  1851-60)  by  his  most  important  adherent,  Franz 
Hoffman*  (at  his  death  in  1881  professor  in  Würzburg). 
Baader  may  be  characterized  as  a  mediaeval  thinker  who 
has  worked  through  the  critical  philosophy,  and  who, 
a  believing,  yet  liberal  Catholic,  endeavors  to  solve  with 
the  instruments  of  modern  speculation  the  old  Scholastic 
problem  of  the  reconciliation  of  faith  and  knowledge.  His 
themes  are,  on  the  one  hand,  the  development  of  God,  and, 
on  the  other,  the  fall  and  redemption,  which  mean  for  him, 
however,  not  merely  inner  phenomena,  but  world-events. 
He  is  in  sympathy  with  the  Neoplatonists,  with  Augus- 
tine, with  Thomas  Aquinas,  with  Eckhart,  with  Paracel- 
sus, above  all,  with  Jacob  Böhme,  and  Böhme's  follower 
Louis  Claude  St.  Martin  (1743-1804),  but  does  not  over- 
look the  value  of  the  modern  German  philosophy. 
With  Kant  he  begins  the  inquiry  with  the  problem  of 
knowledge;  with  Fichte  he  finds  in  self-consciousness  the 
essence,  and  not  merely  a  property,  of  spirit  ;  with  Hegel 
he  looks  on  God  or  the  absolute  spirit  not  only  as  the 
object,  but  also  as  the  subject  of  knowledge.  He  rejects, 
however,  the  autonomy  of  the  will  and  the  spontaneity  of 
thought ;  and  though  he  criticises  the  Cartesian  separation 
between  the  thought  of  the  creator  and  that  of  the  creature, 
he  as  little  approves  the  pantheistic  identification  of  the 
two — human  cognition  participates  in  the  divine,  without 
constituting  a  part  of  it. 

In  accordance  with  its  three  principal  objects,  "  God, 
Nature,  and  Man,"  philosophy  divides  into  fundamental 
science  (logic  or  the  theory  of  knowledge  and  theology), 
the  philosophy  of  nature  (cosmology  or  the  theory  of 
creation  and  physics),  and  the  philosophy  of  spirit  (ethics 
and  sociology).  In  all  its  parts  it  must  receive  religious 
treatment.  Without  God  we  cannot  know  God.  In  our  cog- 
nition of  God  he  is  at  once  knowcr  and  known  ;  our  being 
and  all  being  is  a  being  known  by  him  ;  our  self-conscious- 
ness is  a   consciousness   of   being    known    by  God  :    COgitOT% 

♦Besides  Hoffman,  Lutterbecl<  and  Hornberger  have  described  and 
expounded  Baader's  system.  See  also  Baumann's  paper  in  the  Philosophische 
Monatshefte,  vol.  xiv.,  1878,  p.  321  seq. 


4  74  SCHELLIN  GS   CO-WORKERS. 

ergo  cogito  et  sum;  my  being  and  thinking  are  based  on 
my  being  thought  by  God.  Conscience  is  a  joint  know- 
ing with  God's  knowing  (conscientia).  The  relation  between 
the  known  and  the  knower  is  threefold.  Cognition  is 
incomplete  and  lacks  the  free  co-operation  of  the  knower 
when  God  merely  pervades  {durchwohnt)  the  creature,  as  is 
the  case  with  the  devil's  timorous  and  reluctant  knowl- 
edge of  God.  A  higher  stage  is  reached  when  the  known 
is  present  to  the  knower  and  dwells  with  him  {beiwohnt). 
Cognition  becomes  really  free  and  perfect  when  God  dwells 
in  {inwohnt)  the  creature,  in  which  case  the  finite  reason 
yields  itself  freely  and  in  admiration  to  the  divine  reason, 
lets  the  latter  speak  in  itself,  and  feels  its  rule,  not  as  for- 
eign, but  as  its  own.  (Baader  maintains  a  like  threefoldness 
in  the  practical  sphere  :  the  creature  is  either  the  object  or, 
rather,  the  passive  recipient,  or  the  organ,  or  the  represen- 
tative of  the  divine  action,  i.  e.,  in  the  first  case,  God  alone 
works;  in  the  second,  he  co-operates  with  the  creature; 
in  the  third,  the  creature  works  with  the  forces  and  in 
the  name  of  God.  Joyful  obedience,  conscious  of  its 
grounds,  is  the  highest  freedom).  Knowing  and  loving, 
thought  and  volition,  knowledge  and  faith,  philosophy  and 
dogma  are  as  little  to  be  abstractly  divided  as  thing  and 
self,  being  and  thought,  object  and  subject.  True  freedom 
and  genuine  speculation  are  neither  blind  traditional  belief 
nor  doubting,  God-estranged  thinking,  but  the  free  recog- 
nition of  authority,  and  self-attained  conviction  of  the 
truth  of  the  Church  doctrine. 

Baader  distinguishes  a  twofold  creation  of  the  world 
and  a  double  process  of  development  (an  esoteric  and  an 
exoteric  revelation)  of  God  himself.  The  creation  of  the 
ideal  world,  as  a  free  act  of  love,  is  a  non-deducible  fact  ; 
the  theogonic  process,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  necessary  event 
by  which  God  becomes  a  unity  returning  from  division  to 
itself,  and  so  a  living  God.  The  eternal  self-generation  of 
God  is  a  twofold  birth:  in  the  immanent  or  logical 
process  the  unsearchable  will  (Father)  gives  birth  to  the 
comprehensible  will  (Son)  to  unite  with  it  as  Spirit ;  the 
place  of  this  self-revelation  is  wisdom  or  the  Idea.  In  the 
emanent  or  real  process,  since  desire  or  nature  is  added  to 


SCHLEIERMA  CHER.  475 

the  Idea  and  is  overcome  by  it,  these  three  moments  become 
actual  persons.  In  the  creation  of  the — at  first  imma- 
terial— world,  in  which  God  unites,  not  with  his  essence, 
but  with  his  image  only,  the  same  two  powers,  desire  and 
wisdom,  operate  as  the  principles  of  matter  and  form. 
The  materialization  of  the  world  is  a  consequence  of  the 
fall.  Evil  consists  in  the  elevation  of  selfhood,  which 
springs  from  desire,  into  self-seeking.  Lucifer  fell  because 
of  pride,  and  man,  yielding  to  Lucifer's  temptation,  from 
baseness,  by  falling  in  love  with  nature  beneath  him.  By 
the  creation  of  matter  God  has  out  of  pity  preserved  the 
world,  which  was  corrupted  by  the  fall,  from  the  descent 
into  hell,  and  at  the  same  time  has  given  man  occasion 
for  moral  endeavor.  The  appearance  of  Christ,  the  person- 
ification of  the  moral  law,  is  the  beginning  of  reconcilia- 
tion, which  man  appropriates  through  the  sacrament. 
Nature  participates  in  the  redemption,  as  in  the  corruption. 
Friedrich  Daniel  Ernst  Schleiermacher  was  born  in  1768 
at  Breslau,  and  died  in  1834  in  Berlin,  where  he  had 
become  preacher  at  Trinity  church  in  1809,  professor  of 
theology  in  1810,  member  of  the  philosophical  section  of 
the  Academy  in  181 1,  and  its  secretary  in  1814.  Reared 
in  the  Moravian  schools  at  Niesky  and  Barby,  he  studied 
at  Halle;  and,  between  1794  and  1 804,  was  a  preacher  in 
Landsberg  on  the  Warthe,  in  Berlin  (at  the  Charite  Hospi- 
tal), and  in  Stolpe,  then  professor  in  Halle.  He  first 
attracted  attention  by  the  often  republished  Discourses  on 
Religion  addressed  to  the  Educated  among  t/iose  who  despise 
it,  1 799 (critical  edition  by  Piinjcr,  1879),  which  was  followed 
in  the  succeeding  year  by  the  Monologues,  and  the  anony- 
mous Confidential  Letters  on  Lucinde  [Lucinde  was  the 
work  of  his  friend  Fr.  Schlegel).  Besides  several  collec- 
tions of  sermons,  mention  must  further  be  made  of  his 
Outlines  of  a  Critique  of  Previous  lit  hies,  1803  ;  The  Celebra- 
tion of  Christmas,  I  8c/>  ;  and  his  chief  theological  work-. 
The  Christian  Faith,  1822,  new  edition  1830.  In  the  third 
(the  philosophical)  division  of  his  Collected  Works  (183 
64)  the  second  and  third  volumes  contain  the  essays  on 
the  history  of  philosophy,  on  ethical,  and  on  academic  sub- 
jects J  vols.  vi.  to  i.w,  the  Lectures  on  Psychology,  /Esthet- 


4  7  6  SCHLEIERMA  CHER. 

ics,  the  Theory  of  the  State,  and  Education,  edited  by 
George,  Lommatsch,  Brandis,  and  Platz;  and  the  first  part 
of  vol.  iv.,  the  History  of  Philosophy  (to  Spinoza),  edited  by 
Ritter.  The  Monologues  and  The  Celebration  of  Christmas 
have  appeared  in  Reclavi 's  Bibliothek. 

Schleiermacher's  philosophy  is  a  rendezvous  for  the 
most  diverse  systems.  Side  by  side  with  ideas  from  Kant, 
Fichte,  and  Schelling  we  meet  Platonic,  Spinozistic,  and 
Leibnitzian  elements;  even  Jacobi  and  the  Romanticists 
have  contributed  their  mite.  Schleiermacher  is  an  eclectic, 
but  one  who,  amid  the  fusion  of  the  most  diverse  ideas, 
knows  how  to  make  his  own  individuality  felt.  In  spite  of 
manifold  echoes  of  the  philosophemes  of  earlier  and  of  con- 
temporary thinkers,  his  system  is  not  a  conglomeration  of 
unrelated  lines  of  thought,  but  resembles  a  plant,  which  in  its 
own  way  works  over  and  assimilates  the  nutritive  elements 
taken  up  from  the  soil.  Schleiermacher  is  attractive  rather 
than  impressive;  he  is  less  a  discoverer  than  a  critic  and 
systematizer.  His  fine  critical  sense  works  in  the  service 
of  a  positive  aim,  subserves  a  harmonizing  tendency  ;  he 
takes  no  pleasure  in  breaking  to  pieces,  but  in  adjusting,  lim- 
iting, and  combining.  There  is  no  one  of  the  given  views 
which  entirely  satisfies  him,  none  which  simply  repels  him  ; 
each  contains  elements  which  seem  to  him  worthy  of  trans- 
'  i.  formation  and  adoption.  When  he  finds  himself  confronted 
by  a*sharp  Conflict  of  opinion,  he,  seeks  by  careful  mediation 
to  construct  a  whole  out  of  the  two  "half  truths,"  though 
this,  it  is  true,  does  not  always  give  a  result  more  satisfac- 
tory than  the  partial  views  which  he"» wishes  to  reconcile. 
A  single  example  may  be  given  oPthis  conciliatory  tend- 
ency :  space,  time,  and  the  categories  are  not  only  subjective 
forms  of  knowledge,  but  at  the  same  time  objective  forms 
of  reality.  "Not  only"  is  th-;  watchword  of  his  philos- 
ophy, which  became  the  prototype  of  the  numberless 
"ideal-realisms"  with  which  Germany  was  flooded  after 
Hegel's  death.  If  the  skeptical  and  eclectic  movements, 
which  constantly  make  their  appearance  together,  are  else- 
where divided  among  different  thinkers,  they  here  come 
together  in  one  mind  in  the  form  of  a  mediating  criticism, 
which,  although  it  argues  logically,  is  yet  in  the  end  always 


DIALECTIC.  477 

guided  by  the  invisible  cords  of  a  feeling  of  justice  in  matters 
scientific.  In  its  weaker  portions  Schleiermacher's  phi- 
losophy is  marked  by  lack  of  grasp,  pettiness,  and  sport- 
iveness.  It  lacks  courage  and  force,  and  the  rare  delicacy 
of  the  thought  is  not  entirely  able  to  compensate  for  this 
defect.  In  its  fear  of  one-sidedness  it  takes  refuge  in  the 
arms  of  an  often  faint-hearted  policy  of  reconciliation. 

We  shall  not  discuss  the  specifically  theological  achieve- 
ments of  this  many-sided  man,  nor  his  great  services  in 
behalf  of  the  philological  knowledge  of  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy— through  his  translation  of  Plato,  1804-28,  and  a 
series  of  valuable  essays  on  Greek  thinkers — but  shall  con- 
fine our  attention  to  the  leading  principles  of  his  theory  of 
knowledge,  of  religion,  and  of  ethics. 

The  Dialectic  *  (edited  by  Jonas,  1839),  treats  m  a  tran- 
scendental part  and  a  technical  or  formal  part  of  the  concept 
and  the  forms  of  knowledge.  Knowledge  is  thought.  What 
distinguishes  that  thought  which  we  call  knowledge  from 
that  other  thought  which  does  not  deserve  this  honorable 
title,  from  mere  opinion  ?  Two  criteria  :  its  agreement  with 
the  thought  of  other  thinkers  (its  universality  and  necessity), 
and  its  agreement  with  the  being  which  is  thought  in  it. 
That  thought  alone  is  knowledge  which  is  represented  as 
necessarily  valid  for  all  who  are  capable  of  thought,  and  as 
corresponding  to  a  being  or  reproducing  it.  These  two 
agreements  (among  thinkers,  and  of  thought  witli  the  being 
which  is  thought)  are  the  criteria  of  knowledge — let  us  turn 
now  to  its  factors.  These  are  essentially  the  two  brought 
forward  by  Kant,  sensibility  and  understanding;  Schleier- 
macher  calls  them  the  organic  function  and  the  intellectual 
function.  The  organic  activity  of  the  senses  furnishes  us, 
in  sensations,  the  unordered,  manifold  material  of  knowl- 
edge, which  is  formed  and  unified  by  the  activity  of 
reason.  If  we  except  two  concepts  which  limit  our  knowl- 
edge, chaos  and  God — absolute  formlessness  or  chaos  is  an 
idea  just  as  incapable  of  realization  as  absolute  unity  or 
deity — every  actual  cognition  is  a  product  of  both  factors, 

*  Cf.  Quaebicker,  Ueber  Schleiermachers  erkenntnisstheoretist  he  Grundansit  hi, 
1871,  and  the  Inquiries  by  Bruno  Weiss  in  the  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie ^  vols. 

lxxiii.-lxxv.,  1878-79. 


4  7  8  SCHLEIERMA  CHER. 

of  the  sensuous  organization  and  of  reason.  But  these 
two  do  not  play  equal  parts  in  every  cognitive  act.  When 
the  organic  function  is  predominant  we  have  perception  ; 
when  the  intellectual  function  predominates  we  have 
thought  in  the  strict  sense.  A  perfect  balance  of  the  two 
would  be  intuition,  which,  however,  constitutes  the  goal  of 
knowledge,  never  fully  to  be  realized.  These  two  kinds  of 
knowledge,  therefore,  are  not  specifically,  but  only  rela- 
tively, different :  in  all  perception  reason  is  also  active, 
and  in  all  thought  sensibility,  only  to  a  less  degree 
than  the  opposite  function.  Moreover,  perception  and 
thought,  or  sensibility  and  reason,  are  by  no  means  to 
relate  to  different  objects.  They  have  the  same  object, 
only  that  the  organic  activity  represents  it  as  an  indefinite, 
chaotic  manifold,  while  the  activity  of  reason  (whose  work 
consists  in  discrimination  and  combination),  represents  it 
as  a  well-ordered  multiplicity  and  unity.  It  is  the  same 
being  which  is  represented  by  perception  in  the  form  of  an 
"  image,"  and  by  thought  in  the  form  of  a  "  concept."  In 
the  former  case  we  have  the  world  as  chaos  ;  in  the  latter,  we 
have  it  as  cosmos.  Inasmuch  as  the  two  factors  in  knowl- 
edge represent  the  same  object  in  relatively  different  ways, 
it  may  be  said  of  them  that  they  are  opposed  to  each  other, 
and  yet  identical.  The  same  is  true  of  the  two  modes  of 
being  which  Schleiermacher  posits  as  real  and  ideal  over 
against  the  two  factors  in  thought.  The  real  is  that  which 
corresponds  to  the  organic  function,  the  ideal  that  which 
corresponds  to  the  activity  of  reason.  These  forms  of  being 
also  are  opposed,  and  yet  identical.  Our  self-consciousness 
gives  clear  proof  of  the  fact  that  tliouglit  and  being  can 
be  identical ;  in  it,  as  thinking  being,  we  have  the  identity 
of  the  real  and  the  ideal,  of  being  and  thought  imme- 
diately given.  As  the  ego,  in  which  the  subject  of  thought 
and  the  object  of  thought  are  one,  is  the  undivided  ground 
of  its  several  activities,  so  God  is  the  primal  unity,  which 
lies  at  the  basis  of  the  totality  of  the  world.  As  in  Schell  ing, 
the  absolute  is  described  as  self-identical,  absolute  unity, 
exalted  above  the  antithesis  of  real  and  ideal,  nay,  above 
all  antitheses.  God  is  the  negation  of  opposites,  the 
world  the   totality  of   them.     If    there  were   an  adequate 


DIALECTIC.  479 

knowledge  of  the  absolute  identity  it  would  be  an  absolute 
knowledge.  This  is  denied,  however,  to  us  men,  who  are 
never  able  to  rise  above  the  opposition  of  sensuous  and 
intellectual  cognition.  The  unity  of  thought  and  being  is 
presupposed  in  all  thinking,  but  can  never  actually  be 
thought.  As  an  Idea  this  identity  is  indispensable,  but  to 
think  it  definitely,  either  by  conception  or  judgment,  is 
impossible.  The  concepts  supreme  power  (God  or  creative 
nature)  and  supreme  cause  (fate  or  providence)  do  not  attain 
to  that  which  we  seek  to  think  in  them  :  that  which  has  in 
it  no  opposition  is  an  idea  incapable  of  realization  by  man, 
but,  nevertheless,  a  necessary  ideal,  the  presupposition  of 
all  cognition  (and  volition),  and  the  ground  of  all  certitude. 
All  knowledge  must  be  related  to  the  absolute  unity  and 
be  accompanied  by  it.  Since,  then,  the  absolute  identity 
cannot  be  presented,  but  ever  sought  for  only,  and  absolute 
knowledge  exists  only  as  an  ideal,  dialectic  is  not  so 
much  a  science  as  a  technique  of  thought  and  proof,  an 
introduction  to  philosophic  thinking  or  (since  knowledge  is 
thought  in  common)  to  discussion  in  conformity  with  the 
rules  of  the  art.  With  this  the  name  dialectic  returns 
to  its  original  Platonic  meaning. 

The  popular  ideas  of  God  ill  stand  examination  by  the 
standard  furnished  by  the  principle  of  identity.  The  plu- 
rality of  attributes  which  we  are  accustomed  to  ascribe  to 
God  agree  but  poorly  with  his  unity  free  from  all  contra- 
riety. In  reality  God  does  not  possess  these  manifold 
attributes;  they  first  arise  in  the  religious  consciousness, 
in  which  his  unconditioned  and  undivided  working  is 
variously  reflected  and,  as  it  were,  divided.  They  are 
only  the  various  reflections  of  his  undivided  nature  in 
the  mind  of  the  observer.  In  God  ability  and  perform- 
ance, intelligence  and  will,  his  thought  of  self  and  his 
thought  of  the  world  coincide  in  one.  Even  the  con- 
cept of  personality  must  not  be  ascribed  to  God,  since  it  is 
a  limitation  of  the  infinite  and  belongs  to  mythology;  while 
the  i ( 1  < - . i  of  life,  on  the  contrary,  is  allowable  as  a  protec- 
tion against  atheism  and  fatalism.  When  Schleiermacher, 
further,  equates  the  activity  of  God  and  the  causality 
of    nature    he    ranges    himself  on    the    pantheistic    side  in 


4S0  SCHLE1ERMA  CHER. 

regard  to  the  question  of  the  "  immanence  or  transcendence 
of  God,"  without  being  willing  to  acknowledge  it.  It 
sounds  Spinozistic  enough  when  he  says :  God  never 
was  without  the  world,  he  exists  neither  before  nor  out- 
side it,  we  know  him  only  in  us  and  in  things.  Besides  that 
which  he  actually  brings  forth,  God  could  not  produce  any- 
thing further,  and  just  as  little  does  he  miraculously  inter- 
fere in  the  course  of  the  world  as  regulated  by  natural  law. 
Everything  takes  place  necessarily,  and  man  is  distinguished 
above  other  beings  neither  by  freedom  (if  by  freedom  we 
understand  anything  more  than  inner  necessitation)  nor  by 
eternal  existence.  Like  all  individual  beings,  so  we  are  but 
changing  states  in  the  life  of  the  universe,  which,  as  they 
have  arisen,  will  disappear  again.  The  common  representa- 
tions of  immortality,  with  their  hope  of  future  compensa- 
tion, are  far  from  pious.  The  true  immortality  of  religion 
is  this — amid  finitude  to  become  one  with  the  infinite,  and 
in  one  moment  tobe  eternal. 

Schleiermacher's  optimism  well  harmonizes  with  this  view 
of  the  relation  between  God  and  the  world.  If  the  uni- 
verse is  the  phenomenon  of  the  divine  activity,  then 
considered  as  a  whole  it  is  perfect  ;  whatever  of  imper- 
fection we  find  in  it,  is  merely  the  inevitable  result  of 
finitude.  The  bad  is  merely  the  less  perfect ;  every- 
thing is  as  good  as  it  can  be  ;  the  world  is  the  best  possi- 
ble;  everything  is  in  its  right  place;  even  the  meanest 
thing  is  indispensable  ;  even  the  mistakes  of  men  are  to  be 
treated  with  consideration.  All  is  good  and  divine.  In 
this  way  Schleiermacher  weds  ideas  from  Spinoza  to  Leib- 
nitzian  conceptions.  From  the  former  he  appropriates 
pantheism,  from  the  latter  optimism  and  the  concept  of 
individuality  ;  he  shares  determinism  with  both  :  all  events, 
even  the  decisions  of  the  will,  are  subject  to  the  law  of 
necessity. 

In  the  philosophy  of  religion  Schleiermacher  created  a  new 
epoch  by  his  separation  between  religion  and  related  depart- 
ments with  which  it  had  often  been  identified  before  his  time, 
as  it  has  been  since.  In  its  origin  and  essence  religion  is  not 
a  matter  of  knowing,  further,  not  a  matter  of  willing,  but  a 
matter  of  the  heart.     It  lies  quite  outside  the  sphere  of  spec- 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION.  48 1 

illation  and  of  practice,  coincides  neither  with  metaphysics 
nor  with  ethics,  is  not  knowledge  and  not  volition,  but  an 
intermediate  third  :  it  has  its  own  province  in  the  emotional 
nature,  where  it  reigns  without  limitation ;  its  essence 
is  intuition  and  feeling  in  undivided  unity.  In  feeling  is 
revealed  the  presence  of  the  infinite  ;  in  feeling  we  become 
immediately  aware  of  the  Deity.  The  absolute,  which  in 
cognition  and  volition  we  only  presuppose  and  demand, 
but  never  attain,  is  actually  given  in  feeling  alone  as  the 
relative  identity  and  the  common  ground  of  cognition  and 
volition.  Religion  is  piety,  an  affective,  not  an  objective, 
consciousness.  And  if  certain  religious  ideas  and  actions 
ally  themselves  with  the  pious  state  of  mind,  these  are  not 
essential  constituents  of  religion,  but  derivative  elements, 
which  possess  a  religious  significance  only  in  so  far  as  they 
immediately  develop  from  piety  and  exert  an  influence 
upon  it.  That  which  makes  an  act  religious  is  always  feel- 
ing as  a  point  of  indifference  between  knowing  and  doing, 
between  receptive  and  forthgoing  activity,  as  the  cen- 
ter and  junction  of  all  the  powers  of  the  soul,  as  the  very 
focus  of  personality.  And  as  feeling  in  general  is  the  mid- 
dle point  in  the  life  of  the  soul,  so,  again,  the  religious 
feeling  is  the  root  of  all  genuine  feeling.  What  sort  of 
a  feeling,  then,  is  piety?  Schleiermacher  answers:  A  feel- 
ing of  absolute  dependence.  Dependence  on  what?  On  the 
universe,  on  God.  Religion  grows  out  of  the  longing  after 
the  infinite,  it  is  the  sense  and  taste  for  the  All,  the  direction 
toward  the  eternal,  the  impulse  toward  the  absolute  unit)'-, 
immediate  experience  of  the  world  harmony ;  like  art, 
religion  is  the  immediate  apprehension  of  a  whole.  In  and 
before  God  all  that  is  individual  disappears,  the  religious 
man  sees  one  and  the  same  thing  in  all  that  is  particular. 
To  represent  all  events  in  the  world  as  actions  of  a  God,  to 
see  God  in  all  and  all  in  God,  to  feel  one's  self  one  with  the 
eternal, — this  is  religion.  As  wc  look  on  all  being  within 
us  and  without  as  proceeding  from  the  world-ground,  as 
determined  by  an  ultimate  cause,  we  feel  ourselves  depend- 
ent on  the  divine  causality.  Like  all  that  is  finite,  wc  also 
are  the  effect  of  the  absolute  Power.  While  we  stand  in 
a  relation  of  interaction   with  the   individual   parts  of  the 


48  -  SCHLEIERMA  CHER. 

world,  and  feel  ourselves  partially  free  in  relation  to  them, 
we  can  only  receive  effects  from  God  without  answer- 
ing them  ;  even  our  self-activity  we  have  from  him. 
N  vertheless  the  feeling  of  dependence  is  not  to  be  depress- 
ing, not  humbling  merely,  but  the  joyous  sense  of  an  exalta- 
tion and  broadening  of  life.  In  our  devotion  to  the  universe 
we  participate  in  the  life  of  the  universe;  by  leaning  on  the 
infinite  we  supplement  our  finitude — religion  makes  up  for 
the  needy  condition  of  man  by  bringing  him  into  relation 
with  the  absolute,  and  teaching  him  to  know  and  to  feel 
himself  a  part  of  the  whole. 

From  this  elevating  influence  of  religion,  which  Schleier- 
macher eloquently  depicts,  it  is  at  once  evident  that  his 
definition  of  it  as  a  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  is  only 
half  correct.  It  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  the  feeling 
of  freedom,  which  exalts  us  by  the  consciousness  of  the 
oneness  of  the  human  reason  and  the  divine.  It  is  only  to 
this  side  of  religion,  neglected  by  Schleiermacher,  that  we 
can  ascribe  its  inspiring  influence,  which  he  in  vain 
endeavors  to  derive  from  the  feeling  of  dependence. 
Power  can  never  spring  from  humility  as  such.  This 
defect,  however,  does  not  detract  from  Schleiermacher's 
merit  in  assigning  to  religion  a  special  field  of  spiritual 
activity.  While  Kant  treats  religion  as  an  appendix  to 
ethics,  and  Hegel,  with  a  one-sidedness  which  is  still  worse, 
reduces  it  to  an  undeveloped  form  of  knowledge,  Schleier- 
macher recognizes  that  it  is  not  a  mere  concomitant  phe- 
nomenon— whether  an  incidental  result  or  a  preliminary 
stage — of  morality  or  cognition,  but  something  independ- 
ent, co-ordinate  with  volition  and  cognition,  and  of  equal 
legitimacy.  The  proof  that  religion  has  its  habitation  in 
feeling  is  the  more  deserving  of  thanks  since  it  by  no 
means  induced  Schleiermacher  to  overlook  the  connection 
of  the  God-consciousness  with  self-consciousness  and  the 
consciousness  of  the  world.  Schleiermacher's  theory,  more- 
over, may  be  held  correct  without  ignoring  the  relatively 
legitimate  elements  in  the  views  of  religion  which  he 
attacked.  With  the  view  that  religion  has  its  seat  in  feeling, 
it  is  quite  possible  to  combine  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that 
it  has  its  origin  in  the  will,  and  its  basis  in  morals,  and  that, 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  RELIGION,  4^3 

further,  it  has  the  significance  of  being  (to  use  Schopen- 
hauer's words)  the  "  metaphysics  of  the  people." 

Although  religion  and  piety  be  made  synonymous,  it 
must  still  be  admitted  that  in  a  being  capable  of  knowing 
and  willing  as  well  as  of  feeling,  this  devout  frame  will 
have  results  in  the  spheres  of  cognition  and  action.  In 
regard  to  cultus  Schleiermacher  maintains  that  a  religious 
observance  which  does  not  spring  from  one's  own  feeling 
and  find  an  echo  therein  is  superstitious,  and  demands 
that  religious  feeling,  like  a  sacred  melody,  accompany 
all  human  action,  that  everything  be  done  with  religion, 
nothing  from  religion.  Instead  of  expressing  itself  in 
single  specifically  religious  actions,  the  religious  feeling 
should  uniformly  pervade  the  whole  life.  Let  a  private 
room  be  the  temple  where  the  voice  of  the  priest  is  raised. 
Dogmas,  again,  are  descriptions  of  pious  excitation,  and 
take  their  origin  in  man's  reflection  on  his  religious  feelings, 
in  his  endeavor  to  explain  them,  in  his  expression  of  them  in 
ideas  and  words.  The  concepts  and  principles  of  theology 
are  valid  only  as  descriptions  and  presentations  of  feelings, 
not  as  cognitions  ;  by  their  unavoidable  anthropomorphic 
character  alone  they  are  completely  unfitted  for  science. 
The  dogmatic  system  is  an  envelopment  which  religion 
accepts  with  a  smile.  He  who  treats  religious  doctrines  as 
science  falls  into  empty  mythology.  Principles  of  faith  and 
principles  of  knowledge  are  in  no  way  related  to  one  another, 
neither  by  way  of  opposition  nor  by  way  of  agreement  ; 
they  never  come  into  contact.  A  theology  in  the  sense  of 
an  actual  science  of  G  )d  is  impossible.  Further,  out  of  its 
dogmas  the  Church  constructs  prescriptive  symbols,  a  step 
which  must  be  deplored.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  some  time 
religion  will  no  longer  have  need  of  the  Church.  In  view 
of  the  present  condition  of  affairs  it  must  be  said  that  the 
more  religious  a  man  is  the  more  secular  he  must  become, 
and  that  the  cultured  man  opposes  the  Church  in  order  to 
promote  religion. 

So-called  natural  religion  is  nothing  more  than  an 
abstraction  of  thought;  in  reality  positive  religions  alone 
exist.  Because  of  the  infinity  of  God  and  the  finit  ude  of 
man,  the  one,  universal,  eternal  religion  can  only  manifest 


484  SCHLEIER  MA  t  'HER. 

itself  in  the  form  of  particular  historical  religions,  which 
are  termed  revealed  because  founded  by  religious  heroes, 
creative  personalities,  in  whom  an  especially  lively  reli- 
gious feeling  is  aroused  by  a  new  view  of  the  universe,  and 
determines  (not,  like  artistic  inspiration,  single  moments, 
but)  their  whole  existence.  Three  stages  are  to  be  distin- 
guished in  the  development  of  religion,  according  as  the 
world  is  represented  as  an  unordered  unity  (chaos),  or  as 
an  indeterminate  manifold  of  forces  and  elements  (plurality 
without  unity),  or,  finally,  as  an  organized  plurality  dom- 
inated by  unity  (system) — fetichism  with  fatalism,  poly- 
theism, mono-  (including  pan-)  theism.  Among  the  religions 
of  the  third  stadium  Islam  is  physical  or  aesthetic  in  spirit ; 
Judaism  and  Christianity,  on  the  other  hand,  ethical  or 
teleological.  The  Christian  religion  is  the  most  perfect, 
because  it  gives  the  central  place  to  the  concept  of 
redemption  and  reconciliation  (hence  to  that  which  is 
essential  to  religion)  instead  of  to  the  Jewish  idea  of 
retribution. 

The  concept  of  individuality  became  of  the  highest 
importance  for  Schleiermacher's  ethics,  as  well  as  for  his 
philosophy  of  religion  ;  and  by  his  high  appreciation  of  it  he 
ranges  himself  with  Leibnitz,  Herder,  Goethe,  and  Novalis. 
Now  two  sides  may  be  distinguished  both  in  regard  to  that 
which  the  individual  is  and  to  that  which  he  ought  to 
accomplish.  Like  every  particular  being,  man  is  an  abbrevi- 
ated, concentrated  presentation  of  the  universe;  he  con- 
tains everything  in  himself,  contains  all,  that  is,  in  a  not 
yet  unfolded,  germinal  manner,  awaiting  development  in 
life  in  time,  but  yet  in  a  form  peculiar  to  him,  which  is 
never  repeated  elsewhere.  This  yields  a  twofold  moral 
task.  The  individual  ought  to  rouse  into  actuality  the 
infinite  fullness  of  content  which  he  possesses  as  possibility, 
as  slumbering  germs,  should  harmoniously  develop  his 
capacities  ;  yet  in  this  he  must  not  look  upon  the  unique 
form  which  has  been  bestowed  upon  him  as  worthless.  He 
is  not  to  feel  himself  a  mere  specimen,  an  unimportant  rep- 
etition of  the  type,  but  as  a  particular,  and  in  this  par- 
ticularity a  significant,  expression  of  the  absolute,  whose 
omission  would  cause  a  gap  in  the  world.     It  is  surprising 


ETHICS. 


485 


that  the  majority  of  the  thinkers  who  have  defended  the 
value  of  individuality  lay  far  less  stress  upon  the  micro- 
cosmical  nature  of  the  individual  and  the  development  of 
his  capacities  in  all  directions  than  on  care  for  his  peculiar 
qualities.  So  also  Schleiermacher.  Yet  he  gradually 
returned  from  the  extreme  individualism — the  Monologues 
affect  one  almost  repellently  by  the  impulse  which  they 
give  to  vain  self-reflection — which  he  at  first  defended. 

In  the  Ethics  (edited  by  Kirchmann,  1870;  earlier 
editions  by  Schweizer,  1835,  and  Tvvesten,  1841)  Schleier- 
macher brings  the  well-nigh  forgotten  concept  of  goods 
again  into  honor.  The  three  points  of  view  from  which  ethics 
is  to  be  discussed,  and  each  of  which  presents  the  whole 
ethical  field  in  its  own  peculiar  way — the  good,  virtue, 
duty — are  related  as  resultant,  force,  and  law  of  motion. 
Every  union  of  reason  and  nature  produced  by  the  action 
of  the  former  on  the  latter  is  called  a  good ;  the  sum  of 
these  unities,  the  highest  good.  According  as  reason  uses 
nature  as  an  instrument  in  formation  or  as  a  symbol  in 
cognition  her  action  is  formative  or  indicative  ;  it  is,  further, 
either  common  or  peculiar.  On  the  crossing  of  these 
(fluctuating)  distinctions  of  identical  and  individual  organi- 
zation and  symbolization  is  based  the  division  of  the  theory 
of  goods : 

Goods. 
The  State. 
Class,  House, 
Friendship. 
School  and 

University. 
The  Church 
(Art). 

The  four  ethical  communities,  each  of  which  represents 
the  organic  union  of  opposites — rulers  and  subjects,  host 
and  guests,  teachers  and  pupils  or  scholars  and  the  public, 
the  clergy  and  the  laity — have  for  their  foundation  the 
family  and  the  unity  of  the  nation.  Virtue  (the  personal 
unification  of  reason  and  sensibility)  is  either  disposition 
or  skill,  and  in  each  case  either  cognitive  or  presentative ; 
this  yields  the  cardinal  virtues  wisdom,  love,  discretion,  and 
perseverance.     The  division  of  duties    into  duties  of  right, 


Spheres. 

Relations. 

Ide7it.  Organ.  : 

Intercourse. 

Right. 

Individ.  Organ.  .- 

Property. 

Free  Sociability 

Jdent.  Symbol. : 

Knowledge. 

Faith. 

Individ.  Symbol.  : 

Feeling. 

Revelation. 

486  SCHLEI  1-  KM  A  CHER. 

duties  of  love,  duties  of  vocation,  and  duties  of  conscience 
rests  on  the  distinction  between  community  in  production 
a\\A  appropriation,  each  of  which  may  be  universal  or 
individual.  The  most  general  laws  of  duty  (duty  is  the 
Idea  of  the  good  in  an  imperative  form)  run  :  Act  at  every 
instant  with  all  thy  moral  power,  and  aiming  at  thy  whole 
moral  problem  ;  act  with  all  virtues  and  in  view  of  all 
goods,  further,  Always  do  that  action  which  is  most  advan- 
tageous for  the  whole  sphere  of  morality,  in  which  two  dif- 
ferent factors  are  included  :  Always  do  that  toward  which 
thou  findest  thyself  inwardly  moved,  and  that  to  which 
thou  findest  thyself  required  from  without.  Instead  of 
following  further  the  wearisome  schematism  of  Schleier- 
macher's  ethics,  we  may  notice,  finally,  a  fundamental 
thought  which  our  philosopher  also  discussed  by  itself: 
The  sharp  contraposition  of  natural  and  moral  law,  advo- 
cated by  Kant,  is  unjustifiable  ;  the  moral  law  is  itself  a  law 
of  nature,  viz.,  of  rational  will.  It  is  true  neither  that  the 
moral  law  is  a  mere  "  ought  "  nor  that  the  law  of  nature  is  a 
mere  "  being,"  a  universally  followed  "  must."  For,  on  the 
one  hand,  ethics  has  to  do  with  the  law  which  human  action 
really  follows,  and,  on  the  other,  there  are  violations  of  rule 
in  nature  also.  Immorality,  the  imperfect  mastery  of  the 
sensuous  impulses  by  rational  will,  has  an  analogue  in  the 
abnormalities — deformities  and  diseases — in  nature,  which 
show  that  here  also  the  higher  (organic)  principles  are 
not  completely  successful  in  controlling  the  lower  processes. 
The  higher  law  everywhere  suffers  disturbances,  from  the 
resistance  of  the  lower  forces,  which  cannot  be  entirely  con- 
quered. It  is  Schleiermacher's  determinism  which  leads 
him,  in  view  of  the  parallelism  of  the  two  legislations,  to 
overlook  their  essential  distinction. 

Adherents  of  Schleiermacher  are  Vorländer  (died  1867), 
George  (died  1874),  the  theologian,  Richard  Rothe  (died 
1867;  cf.  Nippold,  1873  seq.),  and  the  historians  of  philos- 
ophy, Brandis  (died  1867)  and  H.  Ritter  (died  1869).* 

*  W.  Dilthey  (born  1834),  the  successor  of  Lotze  in  Berlin,  is  publishing  a 
life  of  Schleiermacher  (vol.  i.  1867-70).  Cf.  also  Dilthey's  briefer  account  in 
the  Allgemeine  deutsehe  Biographie,  and  Haym's  Romantische  Schule,  1870 
Further,  Aus  Schleiermachers  Leben,  in  Briefen,  4  vols.,  1858-63. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

HEGEL. 

Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel  was  born  at 
Stuttgart  on  August  27,  1770.  He  attended  the  gymna- 
sium of  his  native  city,  and,  from  1788,  the  Tübingen  sem- 
inary as  a  student  of  theology;  while  in  1793-1800  he 
resided  as  a  private  tutor  in  Berne  and  Frankfort-on-the- 
Main.  In  the  latter  city  the  plan  of  his  future  system  was 
already  maturing.  A  manuscript  outline  divides  philos- 
ophy, following  the  ancient  division,  logic,  physics,  and 
ethics,  into  three  parts,  the  first  of  which  (the  fundamental 
science,  the  doctrine  of  the  categories  and  of  method,  com- 
bining logic  and  metaphysics)  considers  the  absolute  as 
pure  Idea,  while  the  second  considers  it  as  nature,  and  the 
third  as  real  (ethical)  spirit.  Hegel  habilitated  in  1801  at 
Jena,  with  a  Latin  dissertation  On  the  Orbits  of  the  Planets, 
in  which,  ignorant  of  the  discovery  of  Ceres,  he  maintained 
that  on  rational  grounds — assuming  that  the  number- 
series  given  in  Plato's  Timaeus  is  the  true  order  of  nature 
— no  additional  planet  could  exist  between  Mars  and 
Jupiter.  This  dissertation  gives,  further,  a  deduction  of 
Kepler's  laws.  The  essay  on  the  Difference  betzvecu  tin- 
Systems  of  Fichte  and  Schelling  had  appeared  even  pre- 
vious to  this.  In  company  with  Schelling  he  edited  in 
1802-03  the  Kritisches  Journal  der  Philosophic.  The 
article  on  "  Faith  and  Knowledge"  published  in  this  journal 
characterizes  the  standpoint  of  Kant,  Jacobi,  and  Fichte  as 
that  of  reflection,  for  which  finite  and  infinite,  being  and 
thought  form  an  antithesis,  while  true  speculation  grasps 
these  in  their  identity.  In  the  night  before  the  battle 
of  Jena  Hegel  finished  the  revision  of  his  PhenomenoL 
of  Spirit^  which  was  published  in  1807.  The  extraordinary 
professorship  given  him  in  [805  he  was  forced  to  resign  on 
account    of    financial    considerations;    then    he    was    for  a 

487 


488  HEGEL. 

year  a  newspaper  editor  in  Bamberg,  and  in  1808  went  as  a 
gymnasial  rector  to  Nuremberg,  where  he  instructed  the 
higher  classes  in  philosophy.  His  lectures  there  are 
printed  in  the  eighteenth  volume  of  his  works,  under  the 
title  Propedeutic.  In  the  Nuremberg  period  fell  his  mar- 
riage ami  the  publication  of  the  Logic  (vol.  i.  1812,  vol.  ii. 
[816).  In  1 8 16  he  was  called  as  professor  of  philosophy 
to  Heidelberg  (where  the  Encyclopedia  appeared,  1817), 
and  two  years  later  to  Berlin.  The  Outlines  of  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Right,  1 82 1,  is  the  only  major  work  which  was 
written  in  Berlin.  The  fahrbücher  für  wissenschaftliche 
Kritik,  founded  in  1827  as  an  organ  of  the  school,  con- 
tained a  few  critiques,  but  for  the  rest  he  devoted  his 
whole  strength  to  his  lectures.  He  fell  a  victim  to  the 
cholera  on  November  14,  1831.  The  collected  edition  of 
his  works  in  eighteen  volumes  (1832-45)  contains  in  vols, 
ii.-viii.  the  four  major  works  which  had  been  published  by 
Hegel  himself  (the  Encyclopedia  with  additions  from  the 
Lectures) ;  in  vols,  i.,  xvi.,  and  xvii.  the  minor  treatises  ;  in 
vols,  ix.-xv.  the  Lectures,  edited  by  Gans,  Hotho,  Mar- 
heineke,  and  Michelet.  The  Letters  from  and  to  Hegel 
have  been  added  as  a  nineteenth  volume,  under  the  editor- 
ship of  Karl  Hegel,  1887.* 

We  may  preface  our  exposition  of  the  parts  of  the  sys- 
tem by  some  remarks  on  Hegel's  standpoint  in  general  and 
his  scientific  method. 

*  Hegel's  Life  has  been  written  by  Karl  Rosenkranz  (1844),  who  has  also 
defended  the  master  (Apologie  Hegels,  1858)  against  R,  Haym  (Hegel  und 
seine  Zeit,  1857),  and  extolled  him  as  the  national  philosopher  of  Germany 
(1870  ;  English  by  G.  S.  Hall).  Cf. ,  further,  the  neat  popular  exposition  by  Karl 
Köstlin,  1870,  and  the  essays  by  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Ueber  die  dialektische 
Methode,  1868,  and  Hegels  Panlogisnius  (1870,  incorporated  in  the  Gesammelte 
Studien  und  Aufsätze,  1876).  [The  English  reader  may  consult  E.  Caird's  Hegel 
in  Blackwood's  Philosophical  Classics,  1883  ;  Harris's  Hegel's  Logic,  Morris's 
Hegel '  s  Philosophy  of  the  State  and  of  History,  and  Kedney's  Hegel's  sEstheticsin 
Griggs's  Philosophical  Classics;  and  Wallace's  translation  of  the  "Logic" — 
from  the  Encyclopedia — with  Prolegomena,  1874,  2d.  ed.,  Translation.  1892, 
Prolegomena  to  follow.  Stirling's  Secret  of  Hegel,  2  vols.,  London,  1865,  includes 
a  translation  of  a  part  of  the  Logic,  and  numerous  translations  from  different 
works  of  the  master  are  to  be  found  in  the  Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy. 
The  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  History  have  been  translated  by  J.  Sibree, 
M.  A.,  in  Bohn's  Library,  i860,  and  E.  S.  Haldane  is  issuing  a  translation  of 
those  on  the  History  of  Philosophy,  vol  i.,  1892. — Tr.] 


VIE  W  OF   THE    WORLD.  489 

I.  Hegel's  View  of  the  World  and  his  Method. 

In  Hegel  there  revives  in  full  vigor  the  intellectualism 
which  from  the  first  had  lain  in  the  blood  of  German  phi- 
losophy, and  which  Kant's  moralism  had  only  temporarily 
restrained.  The  primary  of  practical  reason  is  discarded, 
and  theory  is  extolled  as  the  ground,  center,  and  aim  of 
human,  nay,  of  all  existence. 

Leibnitz  and  Hegel  are  the  classical  representatives  of 
the  intellectualistic  view  of  the  world  In  the  former  the 
subjective  psychological  point  of  view  is  dominant,  in 
the  latter,  the  objective  cosmical  posjtion  :  Leibnitz 
argues  from  the  representative  nature  of  the  soul  to  an 
analogous  constitution  of  all  elements  of  the  universe  ; 
from  the  general  mission  of  all  that  is  real,  to  be  a  mani- 
festation of  reason,  Hegel  deduces  that  of  the  individual 
r spirit,  to  realize  a  determinate  series  of  stages  of  thought. 
The  true  reality  is  reason  ;  all  being  is  the  embodiment 
of  a  pregnant  thought,  all  becoming  a  movement  of  the  con- 
cept, the  world  a  development  of  thought.  The  absolute 
or  the  logical  Idea  exists  first  as  a  system  of  antemundane 
concepts,  then  it  descends  into  the  unconscious  sphere  of 
nature,  awakens  to  self-consciousness  in  man,  realizes  its 
content  in  social  institutions,  in  order,  finally,  in  art,  reli- 
gion, and  science  to  return  to  itself  enriched  and  completed, 
i.  e.,  to  attain  a  higher  absoluteness  than  that  of  the  begin- 
ning. Philosophy  is  the  highest  product  and  the  goal  of 
the  world-process.  As  will,  intuition,  representation,  and 
feeling  are  lower  forms  of  thought,  so  ethics,  art,  and  reli- 
gion are  preliminary  stages  in  philosophy  ;  for  it  first  suc- 
ceeds in  that  which  these  vainly  attempt,  in  presenting 
the  concept  adequately,  in  conceptual  form. 

If  we  develop  that  which  is  contained  as  a  constituent 
factor  or  by  implication  in  the  intellectualistic  thesis, 
"  All  being  is  thought  realized,  all  becoming  a  development 
of  thought,"  we  reach  the  following  definitions:  (1)  The 
object  of  philosophy  is  formed  by  the  Ideas  of  things.  Its 
aim  is  to  search  out  the  concept,  the  purpose,  the  signifi- 
cance of  phenomena,  and  to  assign  to  these  their  corre- 
sponding positions  in  the  world  and  in  the  system  of  knowl- 


49°  HEGEL. 

edge.  It  is  chiefly  interested  in  discovering  where  in  the 
scale  of  values  a  thing  belongs  according  to  its  meaning 
and  Its  destination  ;  the  procedure  is  teleological,  valuing, 
aesthetic.  Instead  of  a  causal  explanation  of  phenomena 
we  are  given  an  ideal  interpretation  of  them.  (So  Lotze 
accurately  describes  the  character  of  German  idealism.) 
(2)  If  all  that  is  real  is  a  manifestation  of  reason  and  each 
thing  a  stage,  a  modification  of  thought,  then  thought  and 
being  are  identical.  (3)  If  the  world  is  thought  in  becom- 
ing, and  philosophy  has  to  set  forth  this  process,  philosophy 
is  a  theory  of  development.  If  each  thing  realizes  a  thought, 
then  all  that  is  real  is  rational  ;  and  if  the  world-process 
attains  its  highest  stadium  in  philosophy,  and  this  in  turn 
its  completion  in  the  system  of  absolute  idealism,  then  all 
that  is  rational  is  real.  Reason  or  the  Idea  is  not  merely  a 
demand,  a  longed  for  ideal,  but  a  world-power  which  accom- 
plishes its  own  realization.  "  The  rational  is  real  and  the 
real  is  rational  "  (Preface  to  the  PJiilosopJiy  of  Right).  Or  to 
sum  it  up — Hegel's  philosophy  is  idealism,  a  system  of  iden- 
tity, and  an  optimistic  doctrine  of  development.  What,  then, 
distinguishes  Hegel  from  other  idealists,  philosophers  of 
identity,  and  teachers  of  development  ?  What  in  particular 
distinguishes  him  from  his  predecessor  Schelling? 

In  Schelling  nature  is  the  subject  and  art  the  conclusion 
of  the  development  ;  his  idealism  has  a  physical  and 
aesthetical  character,  as  Fichte's  an  ethical  character.  In 
Hegel,  however,  the  concept  is  the  subject  and  goal  of  the 
cTevelopment,  his  pnilosopTTy  is,  in  the  words  of  Haym,  a 
" Logisieriihg"  of  the  worldja  logical  idealism^/ 

The  theory  of  identity  is  that  system  which  looks  upon 
nature  and  spirit  as  one  in  essence  and  as  phenomenal 
modes  of  an  absolute  which  is  above  them  both.  But 
while  Schelling  treats  the  real  and  the  ideal  as  haying  pr]naJ 
rights,  Hegel  restores  the  Fichtean  subordination  of  nature 
to  spirit,  without,  however,  sharing  Fichte's  contempt  for 
nature.  Nature  is  neither  co-ordinate  with  spirit  nor^ 
mere   instrurrTeiT!    tor"  spintJLbut__a_transition  stage   in  the 


developrflerft  of  the  absolute,  viz.,  the  Idea  in  its  other- 
being  (Anderssein).  It  is  spirit  itself  that  becomes  nature 
in  order  to  become  actual,  conscious  spirit ;  before  the  abso- 


DIALECTIC  METHOD.  49 1 

lute  became  nature  it  was  already  spirit,  not,  indeed,  "  for 
itself"  {für  sich),  yet  "  in  itself"  (an  sich),  it  was  Idea  or 
reason.  The  ideal  is  not  merely  the  morning  which  follows 
the  night  of  reality,  but  also  the  evening  which  precedes  it. 
The  absolute  (the  concept)  develops  from  in-itself  (AnsicJi) 
through  out-of-self  (Ansscrsich)  or  other-being  to  for- 
itself  {Fürsich) ;  it  exists  first  as  reason  (system  of  logical 
concepts),  then  as  nature,  finally  as  living  spirit.  Thus 
Hegel's  philosophy  of  identity  is  distinguished  from 
Schelling's  by  two  factors  :  it  subordinates  nature  to  spirit, 
and  conceives  the  absolute  of  the  beginning  not  as  the 
indifference  of  the  real  and  ideal,  but  as  ideal,  as  a  realm  of 
eternal  thoughts. 

The  assertion  that  Hegel  represents  a  synthesis  of  Fichte 
and  Schelling  is  therefore  justified.  This  is  true,  further,  for 
the  character  of  Hegel's  thought  as  a  whole,  in  so  far  as  it 
follows  a  middle  course  between  the  world-estranged,  rigid 
abstractness  of  Fichte's  thinking  and  Schelling's  artistico- 
fanciful  intuition,  sharing  with  the  former  its  logical 
stringency  as  well  as  its  dominant  interest  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  spirit,  and  with  the  latter  its  wide  outlook  and 
its  sense  for  the  worth  and  the  richness  of  that  which  is 
individual. 

We  have  characterized  Hegel's  system,  thirdly,  as  a  phi- 
losophy of  development.  The  point  of  distinction  here  is 
that  Hegel  carries  out  with  logical  consecutiveness  and  up 
to  the  point  of  obstinacy  the  principle  of  development 
which  Fichte  had  discovered,  and  which  Schelling  also  had 
occasionally  employed, — the  threefold  rhythm  thesis,  antith- 
esis, synthesis.  Here  we  come  to  Hegel's  dialectic  method. 
He  reached  this  as  the  true  method  of  speculation  through 
a  comparison  of  the  two  forms  of  philosophy  which  he 
found  dominant  at  the  beginning  of  his  career— the  Illumi- 
nation culminating  in  Kant,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the 
other,  the  doctrine  of  identity  defended  by  Schelling  and 
his  circle — neither  of  which  entirely  satisfied  him. 

In  regard  to  the  main  question  he    feels  himself  one  with  j) 

Schelling  :   pJlilosophy  is  to  be  metaphysics/the  science  of  cM«Jl 
the  absolntcjmd  its  immanence  in  the  worlcr,  the  doctrine  of 
the  identity  of  opposites,  of  thc/Vr  sc  of  things,  not  merely 


49  -  HEGEL. 

of  their  phenomenon.  But  the  form  which  Schelling  had 
givren  it  seems  to  him  unscientific,  unsystematic,  for  Schell- 
ing had  based  philosophical  knowledge  on  the  intuition  of 
genius — and  science  from  intuition  is  impossible.  The 
philosophy  of  the  Illumination  impresses  him,  on  the  other 
hand,  by  the  formal  strictness  of  its  inquiry ;  he  agrees  with 
it  that  philosophy  must  be  science  from  concepts.  Only 
not  from  abstract  concepts.  Kant  and  the  Illumination 
stand  on  the  platform  of  reflection,  for  which  the  antithesis 
of  thought  and  being,  finite  and  infinite  remains  insoluble, 
and,  consequently,  the  absolute  transcendent,  and  the  true 
essence  of  things  unknowable.  Hegel  wishes  to  combine 
the  advantages  of  both  sides,  the  depth  of  content  of  the 
one,  and  the  scientific  form  of  the  other. 

The  intuition  with  which  Schelling  works  is  immediate 
cognition,  directed  to  the  concrete  and  particular.  The 
concept  of  the  philosophy  of  reflection  is  mediate  cogni- 
tion, moving  in  the  sphere  of  the  abstract  and  universal. 
Is  it  not  feasible  to  do  away  with  the  (unscientific)  immedi- 
ateness  of  the  one,  and  the  (non-intuitive,  content-lacking) 
abstractness  of  the  other,  to  combine  the  concrete  with 
the  mediate  or  conceptual,  and  in  this  way  to  realize  the 
Kantian  ideal  of  an  intuitive  understanding?  A  concrete 
concept  would  be  one  which  sought  the  universal  not 
without  the  particular,  but  in  it ;  which  should  not  find 
the  infinite  beyond  the  finite,  nor  the  absolute  at  an  unat- 
tainable distance  above  the  world,  nor  the  essence  hidden 
behind  the  phenomenon,  but  manifesting  itself  therein.  If 
the  philosophy  of  reflection,  in  the  abstract  lifelessness  of 
its  concepts,  looked  on  opposites  as  incapable  of  subla- 
tion,  and  Schelling  regarded  them  as  immediately  identi- 
cal, if  the  former  denied  the  identity  of  opposites,  and  the 
latter  maintained  it  primordially  given  (in  the  absolute 
indifference  which  is  to  be  grasped  by  intuition),  the  con- 
crete concept  secures  the  identity  of  opposites  throngJi 
self-mediation,  their  passing  over  into  it ;  it  teaches  us  to 
know  the  identity  as  the  result  of  a  process.  First 
immediate  unity,  then  divergence  of  opposites,  and,  finally, 
reconciliation  of  opposites — this  is  the  universal  law  of  all 
development. 


DIALECTIC  METHOD.  493 

The  conflict  between  the  philosophy  of  reflection  and 
the  philosophy  of  intuition,  which  Hegel  endeavors  to 
terminate  by  a  speculation  at  once  conceptual  and  concrete, 
concerns  (i)  the  organ  of  thought,  (2)  the  object  of  thought, 
(3)  the  nature  and  logical  dignity  of  the  contradiction. 

The  organ  of  the  true  philosophy  is  neither  the  abstract 
reflective  understanding,  which  finds  itself  shut  up  within 
the  limits  of  the  phenomenal,  nor  mystical  intuition,  which 
expects  by  a  quick  leap  to  gain  the  summit  of  knowledge 
concerning  the  absolute,  but  reason  as  the  faculty  of 
concrete  concepts.  That  concept  is  concrete  which  does 
not  assume  an  attitude  of  cold  repulsion  toward  its  con- 
trary, but  seeks  self-mediation  with  the  latter,  and  moves 
from  thesis  through  antithesis,  and  with  it,  to  synthesis. 
Reason  neither  fixes  the  opposites  nor  denies  them,  but 
has  them  become  identical.  The  unity  of  opposites  is 
neither  impossible  nor  present  from  the  first,  but  the  result 
of  a  development. 

The  object  of  philosophy  is  not  the  phenomenal  world 
or  the  relative,  but  the  absolute,  and  this  not  as  pas- 
sive substance,  but  as  living  subject,  which  divides  into 
distinctions,  and  returns  from  them  to  identity,  which 
develops  through  the  opposites.  The  absolute  is  a  process, 
and  all  that  is  real  the  manifestation  of  this  process.  If 
science  is  to  correspond  to  reality,  it  also  must  be  a  pro- 
cess. Philosophy  is  thought-movement  (dialectic);  it  is  a 
system  of  concepts,  each  of  which  passes  over  into  its 
successor,  puts  its  successor  forth  from  itself,  just  as  it  has 
been  generated  by  its  predecessor. 

All  reality  is  development,  and  the  motive  force  in  this 
development  (of  the  world  as  well  as  of  science)  is  opposi- 
tion, contradiction.  Without  this  there  would  be  no  move- 
ment and  no  life.  Thus  all  reality  is  full  of  contradiction, 
and  yet  rational.  The  contradiction  is  not  that  which  is  en- 
tirely alogical,  but  it  is  a  spur  to  further  thinking.  It  must 
not  be  annulled,  but  "sublated  "  {aufgehoben)^  i.  e.,  at  once 
negated  and  conserved.  This  is  effected  by  thinking  the 
contradictory  concepts  together  in  a  third  higher,  more 
comprehensive,  and  richer  concept,  whose  moments  they 
then    form.     As    sublated  moments  they    contradict  each 


494  HEGEL. 

other  no  longer;  the  opposition  or  contradiction  is  over- 
come. But  the  synthesis  is  still  not  a  final  one  ;  the  play 
begins  anew  ;  again  an  opposition  makes  its  appearance, 
which  in  turn  seeks  to  be  overcome,  etc.  Each  separate 
concept  is  one-sided,  defective,  represents  only  a  part  of 
the  truth,  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  its  contrary,  and, 
by  its  union  with  this,  its  complement,  yields  a  higher  con- 
cept, which  comes  nearer  to  the  whole  truth,  but  still  does 
not  quite  reach  it.  Even  the  last  and  richest  concept — 
the  absolute  Idea — is  by  itself  alone  not  the  full  truth  ; 
the  result  implies  the  whole  development  through  which 
it  has  been  attained.  It  is  only  at  the  end  of  such  a  dialec- 
tic of  concepts  that  philosophy  reaches  complete  cor- 
respondence with  the  living  reality,  which  it  has  to 
comprehend  ;  and  the  speculative  progress  of  thought  is  no 
capricious  sporting  with  concepts  on  the  part  of  the  think- 
ing subject,  but  the  adequate  expression  of  the  movement 
of  the  matter  itself.  Since  the  world  and  its  ground  is 
development,  it  can  only  be  known  through  a  develop- 
ment of  concepts.  The  law  which  this  follows,  in  little 
as  in  great,  is  the  advance  from  position  to  opposition,  and 
thence  to  combination.  The  most  comprehensive  example 
of  this  triad — Idea,  Nature,  Spirit — gives  the  division  of 
the  system;  the  second — Subjective,  Objective,  Absolute 
Spirit — determines  the  articulation  of  the  third  part. 

2.  The  System. 

Hegel  began  with  a  Phenomenology  by  way  of  intro- 
duction, in  which  (not  to  start,  like  the  school  of 
Schelling,  with  absolute  knowledge  "as  though  shot  from 
a  pistol")  he  describes  the  genesis  of  philosophical 
cognition  with  an  attractive  mingling  of  psychological  and 
philosophico-historical  points  of  view.  He  makes  spirit — 
the  universal  world-spirit  as  well  as  the  individual  conscious- 
ness, which  repeats  in  brief  the  stages  in  the  development 
of  humanity — pass  through  six  stadia,  of  which  the  first 
three  (consciousness,  self-consciousness,  reason)  correspond 
to  the  progress  of  the  intermediate  part  of  the  Doctrine  of 
Subjective  Spirit,  which  is  entitled  Phänomenologie,  and  the 
others   (ethical    spirit,   religion,   and    absolute    knowledge) 


LOGIC. 


495 


give  an  abbreviated  presentation  of  that  which  the  Doc- 
trine of  Objective  and  Absolute  Spirit  develops  in  richer 
articulation. 

(a)  Logic  considers  the  Idea  in  the  abstract  element  of 
thought,  only  as  it  is  thought,  and  not  yet  as  it  is  intuited, 
nor  as  it  thinks  itself;  its  content  is  the  truth  as  it  is  with- 
out a  veil  in  and  for  itself,  or  God  in  his  eternal  essence  before 
the  creation  of  the  world.  Unlike  common  logic,  which  is 
merely  formal,  separating  form  and  content,  speculative 
logic,  which  is  at  the  same  time  ontology  or  metaphysics, 
treats  the  categories  as  real  relations,  the  forms  of  thought 
as  forms  of  reality  :  as  thought  and  thing  are  the  same,  so 
logic  i_s  the  theory  of  thought  and  of  being  in  one.  Its 
three  principal  divisions  are  entitled  Being,  Essence,  the 
Concept.  The  first  of  these  discusses  quality,  quantity,  and 
measure  or  qualitative  quantum.  The  second  considers 
essence  as  such,  appearance,  and  (essence  appearing  or) 
actuality,  and  this  last,  in  turn,  in  the  moments,  sub- 
stantiality, causality,  and  reciprocity.  The  third  part  is 
divided  into  the  sections,  subjectivity  (concept,  judgment, 
syllogism),  objectivity  (mechanism,  chemism,  teleology), 
and  the  Idea  (life,  cognition,  the  absolute  Idea). 

As  a  specimen  of  the  way  in  which  Hegel  makes  the 
concept  pass  over  into  its  opposite  and  unite  with  this  in  a 
synthesis,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  cite  the  famous  beginning 
of  the  Logic.  How  must  the  absolute  first  be  thought,  how 
first  defined  ?  Evidently  as  that  which  is  absolutely  without 
presupposition.  The  most  general  concept  which  remains 
after  abstracting  from  every  determinate  content  of  thought, 
and  from  which  no  further  abstraction  is  possible,  the  most 
indeterminate  and  immediate  concept,  is  pure  being.  As 
without  quality  and  content  it  is  equivalent  to  nothing. 
In  thinking  pure  being  we  have  rather  cogitated  nothing; 
but  this  in  turn  cannot  be  retained  as  final,  but  passes 
back  into  being,  for  in  being  thought  it  exists  as  a  some- 
thing thought.  Pure  being  and  pure  nothing  are  the 
same,  although  we  mean  different  things  by  them;  both 
are  absolute  indcterminatencss.  The  transit  ion  from  being 
to  nothing  and  from  nothing  to  being  is  becoming.  Becom- 
ing is  the  unity,  and  hence  the  truth  of  both.     When   the 


496  HEGEL. 

boy  is  "becoming"  a  youth  he  is,  and  at  the  same  time  is 
not,  a  youth.  Being  and  not-being  are  so  mediated  and 
sublated  in  becoming  that  they  are  no  longer  contradict- 
ory. In  a  similar  way  it  is  further  shown  that  quality  and 
quantity  are  reciprocally  dependent  and  united  in  measure 
(which  may  be  popularly  illustrated  thus:  progressively  dim- 
inishing heat  becomes  cold,  distances  cannot  be  measured 
in  bushels)  ;  that  essence  and  phenomenon  are  mutually 
inseparable,  inasmuch  as  the  latter  is  always  the  appear- 
ance of  an  essence,  and  the  former  is  essence  only  as  it 
manifests  itself  in  the  phenomenon,  etc. 

The  significance  of  the  Hegelian  logic  depends  less  on  its 
ingenious  and  valuable  explanations  of  particulars  than  on 
the  fundamental  idea,  that  the  categories  do  not  form  an 
unordered  heap,  but  a  great  organically  connected  whole, 
in  which  each  member  occupies  its  determinate  position,  and 
is  related  to  every  other  by  gradations  of  kinship  and  sub- 
ordination. This  purpose  to  construct  a  globus  of  the  pure 
concepts  was  itself  a  mighty  feat,  which  is  assured  of  the 
continued'  admiration  of  posterity  notwithstanding  the 
failure  in  execution.  He  who  shall  one  day  take  it  up 
again  will  draw  many  a  lesson  from  Hegel's  unsuccessful 
attempt.  Before  all,  the  connections  between  the  concepts 
are  too  manifold  and  complex  for  the  monotonous  transi- 
tions of  this  dialectic  method  (which  Chalybaeus  wittily 
called  articular  disease)  to  be  capable  of  doing  them  justice. 
Again,  the  productive  force  of  thought  must  not  be 
neglected,  and  to  it,  rather  than  to  the  mobility  of  the 
categories  themselves,  the  matter  of  the  transition  from 
one  to  the  other  must  be  transferred. 

(b)  The  Philosophy  of  Nature  shows  the  Idea  in  its  other- 
being.  Out  of  the  realm  of  logical  shades,  wherein  the  souls 
of  all  reality  dwell,  we  move  into  the  sphere  of  external,  sen- 
suous existence,  in  which  the  concepts  take  on  material  form. 
Why  does  the  Idea  externalize  itself?  In  order  to  become 
actual.  But  the  actuality  of  nature  is  imperfect,  unsuited 
to  the  Idea,  and  only  the  precondition  of  a  better  actuality, 
the  actuality  of  spirit,  which  has  been  the  aim  from  the 
beginning:  reason  becomes  nature  in  order  to  become  spirit; 
the    Idea    goes    forth   from   itself    in  order — enriched — to 


SUBJECTIVE   SPIRIT.  497 

return  to  itself  again.  Only  the  man  who  once  has  been  in 
a  foreign  land  knows  his  home  aright. 

The  relation  of  natural  objects  to  one  another  and  their 
action  upon  one  another  is  an  external  one  :  they  are  gov- 
erned by  mechanical  necessity,  and  the  contingency  of 
influences  from  without  arrests  and  disturbs  their  develop- 
ment, so  that  while  reason  is  everywhere  discernible  in 
nature,  it  is  not  reason  alone  ;  and  much  that  is  illogical, 
contrary  to  purpose,  lawless,  painful,  and  unhealthy,  points 
to  the  fact  that  the  essence  of  nature  consists  in  externality. 
This  inadequacy  in  the  realization  of  the  Idea,  however,  is 
gradually  removed  by  development,  until,  in  "life,"  the  way 
is  prepared  for  the  birth  of  spirit. 

As  Hegel  in  his  philosophy  of  nature — which  falls  into 
three  parts,  mechanics,  physics,  and  organics — follows 
Schelling  pretty  closely,  and,  moreover,  does  not  show  his 
power,  it  does  not  seem  necessary  to  dwell  longer  upon  it. 
In  the  next  section,  also,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  its  models, 
the  constructive  psychologies  of  Fichte  and  Schelling,  have 
already  been  discussed  in  detail,  a  statement  of  the  divi- 
sions and  connections  must  suffice. 

(e)  The  Doctrine  of  Subjective  Spirit  makes  freedom 
(being  with  or  in  self)  the  essence  and  destination  of 
spirit,  and  shows  how  spirit  realizes  this  predisposition  in 
increasing  independence  of  nature.  The  subject  of  anthro- 
pology is  spirit  as  the  (natural,  sensitive,  and  actual)  "  soul  " 
of  a  body;  here  are  discussed  the  distinctions  of  race, 
nation,  sex,  age,  sleeping  and  waking,  disposition  and  tem- 
perament, together  with  talents  and  mental  diseases,  in 
short,  whatever  belongs  to  spirit  in  its  union  with  a  body. 
Phenomenology  is  the  science  of  the  "ego,"  i.e.,  of  spirit, 
in  so  far  as  it  opposes  itself  to  nature  as  the  non-ego, 
and  passes  through  the  stages  of  (mere)  consciousness, 
self-consciousness,  and  (the  synthesis  of  the  two)  reason. 
Psychology  (better  pneumatology)  considers  "spirit  "  in  its 
reconciliation  with  objectivity  under  the  Following  divi- 
sions: Theoretical  Intelligence  as  intuition  (sensation, atten- 
tion, intuition),  as  representation  (passive  memory,  phan- 
tasy, memory),  and  (as  conceiving,  judging,  reasoning) 
thought;   Practical  Intelligence  as  feeling,  impulse  (passion 


49s  HEGEL. 

and  caprice),  and  happiness  ;  finally,  the  unity  of  the  know- 
ing and  willing  spirit,  free  spirit  or  rational  will,  which  in 
turn  realizes  itself  in  right,  ethics,  and  history. 

(d)  The  Doctrine  of  Objective  Spirit,  comprehending  ethics, 
the  philosophy  of  right,  of  the  state,  and  of  history,  is 
Hegel's  most  brilliant  achievement.  It  divides  as  follows: 
(it  Right  (property,  contract,  punishment);  (2)  Morality 
(purpose,  intention  and  welfare,  good  and  evil)  ;  (3)  Social 
Morality:"  {a)  the  family;  (b)  civil  society;  (c)  the  state 
(internal  and  external  polity,  and  the  history  of  the  world). 
In  right  the  will  or  freedom  attains  to  outer  actuality,  in 
morality  it  attains  to  inner  actuality,  in  social  morality  to 
objective  and  subjective  actuality  at  once,  hence  to  com- 
plete actuality. 

Right,  as  it  were  a  second,  higher  nature,  because  a  neces- 
sity posited  and  acknowledged  by  spirit,  is  originally  a  sum 
of  prohibitions;  wherever  it  seems  to  command  the  nega- 
tive has  only  received  a  positive  expression.  Private  right 
contains  two  things — the  warrant  to  be  a  person,  and  the 
injunction  to  respect  other  persons  as  such.  Property  is  the 
external  sphere  which  the  will  gives  to  itself;  without  prop- 
erty no  personality.  Through  punishment  (retaliation)  right 
is  restored  against  un-right  {Unrecht),  and  the  latter  shown 
to  be  a  nullity.  The  criminal  is  treated  according  to  the  same 
maxim  as  that  of  his  action — that  coercion  is  allowable. 

In  the  stadium  of  morality  the  good  exists  in  the  form  of 
a  requirement  which  can  never  be  perfectly  fulfilled,  as  a 
mere  imperative  ;  there  remains  an  irrepressible  opposition 
between  the  moral  law  and  the  individual  will,  between 
intention  and  execution.  Here  the  judge  of  good  and  evil 
is  the  conscience,  which  is  not  secure  against  error.  That 
which  is  objectively  evil  may  seem  good  and  a  duty  to 
subjective  conviction.  (According  to  Fichte  this  was  im- 
possible). 

On  account  of  the  conflict  between  duty  and  will,  which 
is  at  this  stage  irrepressible,  Hegel  is  unable  to  con- 
sider morality,  the  sphere  of  the  subjective  disposition, 
supreme.  He  thinks  he  knows  a  higher  sphere,  wherein 
legality  and  morality  become  one:  "social  moralitv"  {Sitt- 
lichkeit).     This    sphere    takes    its  name    from    Sitte,   that 


THE   STATE  AND  HISTORY.  499 

custom  ruling  in  the  community  which  is  felt  by  the  indi- 
vidual not  as  a  command  from  without,  but  as  his  own  nature. 
Here  the  good  appears  as  the  spirit  of  the  family  and  of  the 
people,  pervading  individuals  as  its  substance.  Marriage 
is  neither  a  merely  legal  nor  a  merely  sentimental  relation, 
but  an  "  ethical  "  {sittliches)  institution.  While  love  rules  in 
the  family,  in  civil  society  each  aims  at  the  satisfaction  of  his 
private  wants,  and  yet,  in  working  for  himself,  subserves 
the  good  of  the  whole.  Class  distinctions  are  based  on 
the  division  of  labor  demanded  by  the  variant  needs  of 
men  (the  agricultural,  industrial,  and  thinking  classes). 
Class  and  party  honor  is,  in  Hegel's  view,  among  the  most 
essential  supports  of  general  morality.  Strange  to  say,  he 
brings  the  administration  of  justice  and  the  police  into  the 
same  sphere. 

The  state,  the  unity  of  the  family  and  civil  society,  is 
the  completed  actualization  of  freedom.  Its  organs  are 
the  political  powers  (which  are  to  be  divided,  but  not 
to  be  made  independent):  the  legislative  power  determines 
the  universal,  the  executive  subsumes  the  particular  there- 
under, the  power  of  the  prince  combines  both  into  personal 
unity.  In  the  will  of  the  prince  the  state  becomes  sub- 
ject. The  perfect  form  of  the  state  is  constitutional  mon- 
archy, its  establishment  the  goal  of  history,  which  Hegel, 
like  Kant,  considers  chiefly  from  the  political  standpoint. 

History  is  the  development  of  the  rational  state;  the 
world-spirit  the  guiding  force  in  this  development  ;  its 
instruments  the  spirits  of  the  nations  and  great  men.  A  par- 
ticular people  is  the  expression  of  but  one  determinate 
moment  of  the  universal  spirit  ;  and  when  it  has  fulfilled 
its  commission  it  loses  its  legal  warrant,  and  yields  up 
its  dominion  to  another,  now  the  only  authorized  one: 
the  history  of  the  world  is  the  judgment  of  the  world,  which 
is  held  over  the  nations.  The  world-historical  characters, 
also,  are  only  the  instruments  of  a  higher  power,  t  he  purposes 
of  which  they  execute  while  imagining  that  they  are  acting 
in  their  own  interests — their  own  deed  is  hidden  from 
them,  and  is  neither  their  purpose  nor  their  object.  This 
should  be  called  the  cunning  of  reason,  that  it  makes  the 
passions  work  in  its  service. 


500  '  UK  GEL. 

History  is  progress  in  the  consciousness  of  freedom.  At 
first  one  only  knows  himself  free,  then  several,  finally  all. 
This  gives  three  chief  periods,  or  rather  four  world-king- 
doms,— Oriental  despotism,  the  Greek  (democratic)  and  the 
Roman  (aristocratic)  republic,  and  the  Germanic  monarchy, 
— in  which  humanity  passes  through  its  several  ages.  Like 
the  sun,  history  moves  from  east  to  west.  China  and  India 
have  not  advanced  beyond  the  preliminary  stages  of  the 
state  ;  the  Chinese  kingdom  is  a  family  state,  India  a  society 
of  classes  stiffened  into  castes.  The  Persian  despotism  is 
the  first  true  state,  and  this  in  the  form  of  a  conquering 
military  state.  In  the  youth  and  manhood  of  humanity 
the  sovereignty  of  the  people  replaces  the  sovereignty  of 
one  ;  but  not  all  have  yet  the  consciousness  of  freedom, 
the  slaves  have  no  share  in  the  government.  The  principle 
of  the  Greek  world,  with  its  fresh  life  and  delight  in  beauty, 
is  individuality  ;  hence  the  plurality  of  small  states,  in  which 
Sparta  is  an  anticipation  of  the  Roman  spirit.  The  Roman 
Republic  is  internally  characterized  by  the  constitutional 
struggle  between  the  patricians  and  the  plebeians,  and 
externally  by  the  policy  of  world  conquest.  Out  of  the 
repellent  relations  between  the  universal  and  the  individual, 
which  oppose  one  another  as  the  abstract  state  and  abstract 
personality,  the  unhappy  imperial  period  develops.  In  the 
Roman  Empire  and  Judaism  the  conditions  were  given  for 
the  appearance  of  Christianity.  This  brings  with  it  the 
idea  of  humanity  :  every  man  is  free  as  man,  as  a  rational 
being.  In  the  beginning  this  emancipation  was  religious  ; 
through  the  Germans  it  became  political  as  well.  The 
remaining  divisions  cannot  here  be  detailed.  Their  cap- 
tions run  :  The  Elements  of  the  Germanic  Spirit  (the 
Migrations  ;  Mohammedanism  ;  the  Frankish  Empire  of 
Charlemagne)  ;  the  Middle  Ages  (the  Feudal  System  and 
the  Hierarchy;  the  Crusades;  the  Transition  from  Feudal 
Rule  to  Monarchy,  or  the  Cities)  ;  Modern  Times  (the 
Reformation  ;  its  Effect  on  Political  Development  ;  Illum- 
ination and   Revolution). 

The  philosophy  of  history*  is  Hegel's  most  brilliant  and 

*  A  well-chosen  collection  of  aphorisms  from  the  philosophy  of  history  is 
given  by  M.  Schasler  under  the  title  Hegel :  Populäre  Gedanken  aus  seinen 
Werken,  2d.  ed.,  1873. 


ABSOLUTE    SPIRIT.  50I 

most  lasting  achievement.  His  view  of  the  state  as  the 
absolute  end,  the  complete  realization  of  the  good,  is 
dominated,  no  doubt,  by  the  antique  ideal,  which  cannot  take 
root  again  in  the  humanity  of  modern  times.  But  his 
splendid  endeavor  to  "  comprehend  "  history,  to  bring  to 
light  the  laws  of  historical  development  and  the  interaction 
between  the  different  spheres  of  national  life,  will  remain 
an  example  for  all  time.  The  leading  ideas  of  his  philoso- 
phy of  history  have  so  rapidly  found  their  way  into  the 
general  scientific  consciousness  that  the  view  of  history 
which  obtained  in  the  period  of  the  Illumination  is  well 
nigh  incomprehensible  to  the  investigator  of  to-day. 

(e)  Absolute  Spirit  is  the  unity  of  subjective  and  object- 
ive spirit.  As  such,  spirit  becomes  perfectly  free  (from  all 
contradictions)  and  reconciled  with  itself.  The  break  be- 
tween subject  and  object,  representation  and  thing,  thought 
and  being,  infinite  and  finite  is  done  away  with,  and  the 
infinite  recognized  as  the  essence  of  the  finite.  The 
knowledge  of  the  reconciliation  of  the  highest  opposites  or 
of  the  infinite  in  the  finite  presents  itself  in  three  forms: 
in  the  form  of  intuition  (art),  of  feeling  and  representa- 
tion (religion),  of  thought  (philosophy). 

(1)  ALsthctics. — The  beautiful  is  the  absolute  (the  infinite 
in  the  finite)  in  sensuous  existence,  the  Idea  in  limited 
manifestation.  According  to  the  relation  of  these  mo- 
ments, according  as  the  outer  form  or  the  inner  content 
predominates,  or  a  balance  of  the  two  occurs,  we  have  the 
symbolic  form  of  art,  in  which  the  phenomenon  predomi- 
nates and  the  Idea  is  merely  suggested  ;  or  the  classical 
form,  in  which  Idea  and  intuition,  or  spiritual  content  and 
sensuous  form,  completely  balance  and  pervade  each 
other,  in  which  the  former  of  them  is  ceaselessly  taken  up 
into  the  latter;  or  the  romantic  form,  in  which  the  phe- 
nomenon retires,  and  the  Idea,  the  inwardness  of  the  spirit 
predominates.  Classical  art,  in  which  form  and  content  are 
perfectly  conformed  to  each  other,  is  the  most  beautiful,  but 
romantic  art  is,  nevertheless,  higher  and  more  significant. 

Oriental,  including  Egyptian  and  Hebrew,  art  was  sym- 
bolic; Greek  art,  classical;  Christian  art  is  romantic, 
bringing  into   art  entirely   new    sentiments  of   a   knightly 


502  HEGEL. 

and  a  religious  sort — love,  loyalty  and  honor,  grief  and 
repentance — and  understanding  how  by  careful  treatment 
to  ennoble  even  the  petty  and  contingent.  The  sublime 
belongs  to  symbolic  art  ;  the  Roman  satire  is  the  dis- 
solution of  the  classical,  and  humor  the  dissolution  of 
the  romantic,  ideal. 

Architecture  is  predominantly  symbolic  ;  sculpture  per- 
mits the  purest  expression  of  the  classical  ideal  ;  painting, 
music,  and  poetry  bear  a  romantic  character.  This  does  not 
exclude  the  recurrence  of  these  three  stages  within  each  art — 
in  architecture,  for  example,  as  monumental  (the  obelisk), 
useful  (house  and  temple),  and  Gothic  (the  cathedral)  archi- 
tecture. As  the  plastic  arts  reached  their  culmination 
among  the  Hellenes,  so  the  romantic  arts  culminate  among 
the  Christian,  nations.  In  poetry,  as  the  most  perfect  and 
universal  (or  the  totality  of)  art,  uniting  in  itself  the  two 
contraries,  the  symbolic  and  the  classical,  the  lyric  is  a 
repetition  of  the  architectonic-musical,  the  epic,  of  the 
plastic-pictorial,  the  drama,  the  union  of  the  lyric  and  the 
epic. 

(2)  Philosophy  of  Religion. — The  withdrawal  from  outer 
sensibility  into  the  inner  spirit,  begun  in  romantic  art, 
especially  in  poetry,  is  completed  in  religion.  In  religion 
the  nations  have  recorded  the  way  in  which  they  represent 
the  substance  of  the  world  ;  in  it  the  unity  of  the  infinite 
and  the  finite  is  felt,  and  represented  through  imagination. 
Religion  is  not  merely  a  feeling  of  piety,  but  a  thought 
of  the  absolute,  only  not  in  the  form  of  thinking.  Religion 
and  philosophy  are  materially  the  same,  both  have  God 
or  the  truth  for  their  object,  they  differ  only  in  form — 
religion  contains  in  an  empirical,  symbolic  form  the  same 
speculative  content  which  philosophy  presents  in  the  ade- 
quate form  of  the  concept.  Religion  is  developing  knowl- 
edge as  it  gradually  conquers  imperfection.  It  appears  first 
as  definite  religion  in  two  stadia,  natural  religion  and  the 
religion  of  spiritual  individuality,  and  finally  attains  the 
complete  realization  of  its  concept  in  the  absolute  religion 
of  Christianity. 

Natural  religion,  in  its  lowest  stage  magic,  develops  in 
three  forms — as  the  religion  of  measure  (Chinese),  of  phan- 


ABSOLUTE   SPIRIT.  5°3 

tasy  (Indian  or  Brahmanical),  and  of  being  in  self  (Buddhis- 
tic). In  the  Persian  (Zoroastrian)  religion  of  light,  the 
Syrian  religion  of  pain,  and  the  Egyptian  religion  of 
enigma,  is  prepared  the  way  for  the  transformation  into  the 
religion  of  freedom.  The  Greek  solves  the  riddle  of  the 
Sphinx  by  apprehending  himself  as  subject,  as  man. 

The  religion  of  spiritual  individuality  or  free  subjectivity 
passes  through  three  stadia :  the  Jewish  religion  of  sub- 
limity (unity),  the  Greek  religion  of  beauty  (necessity),  the 
Roman  religion  of  purposiveness  (of  the  understanding). 
In  contrast  to  the  Jewish  religion  of  slavish  obedience, 
which  by  miracle  makes  known  the  power  of  the  one  God 
and  the  nullity  of  nature,  which  has  been  "created  "  by  his 
will,  and  the  prosaic  severity  of  the  Roman,  which,  in 
Jupiter  and  Fortuna,  worships  only  the  world-dominion  of 
the  Roman  people,  the  more  cheerful  art-religion  of  the 
Hellenes  reverences  in  the  beautiful  forms  of  the  gods,  the 
powers  which  man  is  aware  of  in  himself — wisdom,  bravery, 
and  beauty. 

The  Christian  or  revealed  religion  is  the  religion  of  truth, 
of  freedom,  of  spirit.  Its  content  is  the  unity  of  the  divine 
nature  and  the  human,  God  as  knowing  himself  in  being 
known  of  man  ;  the  knowledge  of  God  is  God's  self-knowl- 
edge. Its  fundamental  truths  are  the  Trinity  (signifying 
that  God  differentiates  and  sublates  the  difference  in  love), 
the  incarnation  (as  a  figure  of  the  essential  unity  of  the 
infinite  and  finite  spirit),  the  fall,  and  Christ's  atoning  death 
(this  signifies  that  the  realization  of  the  unity  between  man 
and  God  presupposes  the  overcoming  of  naturality  and 
selfishness). 

(3)  Philosophy. — Finally  the  task  remains  of  clothing  the 
absolute  content  given  in  religion  in  the  form  adequate  to 
it,  in  the  form  of  the  concept.  In  philosophy  absolute  spirit 
attains  the  highest  stage,  its  perfect  self-knowledge.  It  is 
the  self-thinking  Idea. 

Here  we  must  not  look  for  further  detailed  explanations: 
philosophy  is  just  the  course  which  has  been  traversed. 
Its  systematic  exposition  is  encyclopaedia ;  the  considera- 
tion of  its  own  actualization,  the  history  of  philosophy. 
which,  as  a   "  philosophical  "   discipline,  has    to   show  the 


504  HEGEL. 

conformity  to  law  and  the  rationality  of  this  historical 
development,  to  show  the  more  than  mere  succession,  the 
genetic  succession,  of  systems,  as  well  as  their  connection 
with  the  history  of  culture.  Each  system  is  the  product 
and  expression  of  its  time,  and  as  the  self-reflection  of  each 
successive  stage  in  culture  cannot  appear  before  this  has 
reached  its  maturity  and  is  about  to  be  overcome.  Not 
until  the  approach  of  the  twilight  does  the  owl  of  Minerva 
begin  its  flight. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE    OPPOSITION    TO    CONSTRUCTIVE    IDEALISM: 
FRIES,  HERBART,  SCHOPENHAUER. 

In  Fries,  Herbart,  and  Schopenhauer  a  threefold  oppo- 
sition was  raised  against  the  idealistic  school  represented 
by  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel.  The  opposition  of  Fries 
is  aimed  at  the  method  of  the  constructive  philosophers, 
that  of  Herbart  against  their  ontological  positions,  and 
that  of  Schopenhauer  against  their  estimate  of  the  value 
of  existence.  Fries  and  Beneke  declare  that  a  speculative 
knowledge  of  the  suprasensible  is  impossible,  and  seek  to 
base  philosophy  on  empirical  psychology  ;  to  the  monism 
(panlogism)  of  the  idealists  Herbart  opposes  a  pluralism, 
to  their  philosophy  of  becoming,  a  philosophy  of  being; 
Schopenhauer  rejects  their  optimism,  denying  rationality  to 
the  world  and  the  world-ground.  Among  themselves  the 
thinkers  of  the  opposition  have  little  more  in  common  than 
their  claim  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  Kantian  phi- 
losophy, and  a  development  of  it  more  in  harmony  with 
the  meaning  of  its  author,  than  it  had  experienced  at  the 
hands  of  the  idealists.  Whoever  fails  to  agree  with  them 
in  this,  and  ascribes  to  the  idealists  whom  they  oppose 
better  grounded  claims  to  the  honor  of  being  correct  inter- 
preters and  consistent  developers  of  Kantian  principles, 
will  be  ready  to  adopt  the  name  Scmi-Kantians,  given  by 
Fortlage  to  the  members  of  the  opposition, — a  title  which 
seems  the  more  fitting  since  each  of  them  appropriates 
only  a  definitely  determinable  part  of  Kant's  views,  and 
mingles  a  foreign  element  with  it.  In  Fries  this  non- 
Kantian  element  comes  from  Jacobi's  philosophy  of  faith  ; 
in  Herbart  it  comes  from  the  monadology  of  Leibnitz, 
and  the  ancient  Elcatico-atomistic  doctrine;  in  Schopen- 
hnuer,  from  the  religion  of  India  and  (as  in  Beneke)  from  the 
sensationalism  of  the  English  and  the  French.     We  can  only 

505 


5°6  THE    SEMI-KANTIANS. 

hint  in  passing  at  the  parallelism  which  exists  between  the 
chief  representatives  of  the  idealistic  school  and  the 
leaders  of  the  opposition.  Fries's  theory  of  knowledge 
and  faith  is  the  empirical  counterpart  of  Fichte's  Science  of 
Knowledge.  Schopenhauer,  in  his  doctrine  of  Will  and 
Idea,  in  his  vigorously  intuitive  and  highly  fanciful  view 
of  nature  and  art,  and,  in  general,  in  his  aesthetical  mode  of 
philosophizing,  with  its  glad  escape  from  the  fetters  of 
method,  has  so  much  in  common  with  Schelling  that  many 
unhesitatingly  treat  his  system  as  an  offshoot  of  the  Phi- 
losophy of  Nature.  The  contrast  between  Herbart  and 
Hegel  is  the  more  pronounced  since  they  are  at  one  in  their 
confidence  in  the  power  of  the  concept.  The  most  con- 
spicuous point  of  comparison  between  the  metaphysics  of 
the  two  thinkers  is  the  significance  ascribed  by  them  to 
the  contradiction  as  the  operative  moment  in  the  move- 
ment of  philosophical  thought.  The  attitude  of  hostility 
which  Schleiermacher  assumed  in  relation  to  Hegel's  intel- 
lectualistic  conception  of  religion  induced  Harms  to  give 
to  Schleiermacher  also  a  place  in  the  ranks  of  the  opposi- 
tion. Following  the  chronological  order,  we  begin  with  the 
campaign  opened  by  Fries  under  the  banner  of  anthro- 
pology against  the  main  branch  of  the  Kantian  school. 

I.  The  Psychologists  :  Fries  and  Beneke. 

Jacob  Friedrich  Fries  (1773-1843)  was  born  and  reared  at 
Barby,  studied  at  Jena,  and  habilitated  at  the  same  univer- 
sity in  the  year  1801  ;  he  was  professor  at  Heidelberg  in 
1806-16,  and  at  Jena  from  18 16  until  his  death.  His  chief 
work  was  the  New  Critique  of  Reason,  in  three  volumes, 
1807  (2d  ecU  1828  seq.),  which  had  been  preceded,  in  1805,  by 
the  treatise  Knowledge,  Faith,  and  Presentiment.  Besides 
these  he  composed  a  Handbook  of  Psychical  Anthropology, 
1 82 1  (2d  ed.,  1837  seq.),  text-books  of  Logic,  Metaphysics, 
the  Mathematical  Philosophy  of  Nature,  and  Practical  Phi- 
losophy and  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  and  a  philosoph- 
ical novel,  Jidins  and  Evagoras,  or  the  Beauty  of  the  Soul. 

Fries  adopts  and  popularizes  Kant's  results,  while  he 
rejects   Kant's    method.     With    Reinhold    and    Fichte,  he 


/.  F.  FRIES.  5°7 

thinks  "transcendental  prejudice"  has  forced  its  way  into 
philosophy,  a  phase  of  thought  for  which  Kant  himself 
was  responsible  by  his  anxiety  to  demonstrate  everything. 
That  a  priori  forms  of  knowledge  exist  cannot  be  proved  by 
speculation,  but  only  by  empirical  methods,  and  discovered 
by  inner  observation  ;  they  are  given  facts  of  reason,  of 
which  we  become  conscious  by  reflection  cr  psychological 
analysis.  The  a  priori  element  cannot  be  demonstrated 
nor  deduced,  but  only  shown  actually  present.  The  ques- 
tion at  issue*  between  Fries  and  the  idealistic  school 
therefore  becomes,  Is  the  discovery  of  the  a  priori  element 
itself  a  cognition  a  priori  ox  a  posteriori?  Is  the  criticism 
of  reason  a  metaphysical  or  an  empirical,  that  is,  an  anthro- 
pological inquiry?  Herbart  decides  with  the  idealists: 
"  All  concepts  through  which  we  think  our  faculty  of  knowl- 
edge are  themselves  metaphysical  concepts"  {Lehrbuch 
zur  Einleitung,  p.  231).  Fries  decides:  The  criticism  of 
reason  is  an  empirico-psychological  inquiry,  as  in  general 
empirical  psychology  forms  the  basis  of  all  philosophy. 

With  the  exception  of  this  divergence  in  method  Fries 
accepts  Kant's  results  almost  unchanged,  unless  we  must 
call  the  leveling  down  which  they  suffer  at  his  hands  a  con- 
siderable alteration.  Only  the  doctrine  of  the  Ideas  and 
of  the  knowledge  of  reason  is  transformed  by  the  intro- 
duction and  systematization  of  Jacobi's  principle  of  the 
immediate  evidence  of  faith.  Reason,  the  faculty  of  Ideas, 
i.  e.,  of  the  indemonstrable  yet  indubitable  principles,  is 
fully  the  peer  of  the  sensibility  and  the  understanding. 
The  same  subjective  necessity  which  guarantees  to  us  the 
objective  reality  of  the  intuitions  and  the  categories  accom- 
panies the  Ideas  as  well  ;  the  faith  which  reveals  to  us  the 
per  sc  of  things  is  no  less  certain  than  the  knowledge  of 
phenomena.  The  ideal  view  of  the  world  is  just  as  neces- 
sary as  the  natural  view  ;  through  the  former  we  cognize  the 
same  world  as  through  the  latter,  only  after  a  higher  order  ; 
both  spring  from  reason  or  the  unity  of  transcendental 
apperception,  only  that  in  the  natural  view  we  arc  conscious 
of  the   fact,  from  which  we  abstract   in  the   ideal  view,  that 

*Cf.  Kuno  Fischer's  Pro-Rectoral  Address,  Die  beiden  Kantischen  Schulet» 

in  Jrntt,  1862. 


5°$  J.  F.  FRIES. 

this  is  the  condition  of  experience.  That  which  necessi- 
tates us  to  rise  from  knowledge  to  faith  is  the  circumstance 
that  the  empty  unity-form  of  reason  is  never  completely 
filled  by  sensuous  cognition.  The  Ideas  are  of  two  kinds: 
the  aesthetic  Ideas  are  intuitions,  which  lack  clear  concepts 
corresponding  to  them ;  the  logical  Ideas  are  concepts 
under  which  no  correspondent  definite  intuitions  can  be 
subsumed.  The  former  are  reached  through  combination  ; 
the  latter  by  negation,  by  thinking  away  the  limitations  of 
empirical  cognition,  by  removing  the  limits  from  the  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding.  By  way  of  the  negation  of  all 
limitations  we  reach  as  many  Ideas  as  there  are  categories, 
that  is,  twelve,  among  which  the  Ideas  of  relation  are  the 
most  important.  These  are  the  three  axioms  of  faith — the 
eternity  of  the  soul  (its  elevation  above  space  and  time,  to 
be  carefully  distinguished  from  immortality,  or  its  perma- 
nence in  time),  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and  the  Deity. 
Every  Idea  expresses  something  absolute,  unconditioned, 
perfect,  and  eternal. — The  dualism  of  knowledge  and  faith, 
of  nature  and  freedom,  or  of  phenomenal  reality  and  true, 
higher  reality,  is  bridged  over  by  a  third  and  intermedi- 
ate mode  of  apprehension,  feeling  or  presentiment,  which 
teaches  us  the  reconciliation  of  the  two  realities,  the  union 
of  the  Idea  and  the  phenomenon,  the  interpenetration  of  the 
eternal  and  the  temporal.  The  beautiful  is  the  Idea  as  it 
manifests  itself  in  the  phenomenon,  or  the  phenomenon  as  it 
symbolizes  the  eternal.  The  sesthetico-religious  judgment 
looks  on  the  finite  as  the  revelation  and  symbol  of  the 
infinite.  In  brief,  "Of  phenomena  we  have  knowledge; 
in  the  true  nature  of  things  we  believe  ;  presentiment 
enables  us  to  cognize  the  latter  in  the  former." 

Theoretical  philosophy  is  divided  into  the  philosophy  of 
nature,  which  is  to  use  the  mathematical  method,  hence 
to  give  a  purely  mechanical  explanation  of  all  external 
phenomena,  including  those  of  organic  life,  and  to  leave  the 
consideration  of  the  world  as  a  teleological  realm  to 
religious  presentiment — and  psychology.  The  object  of 
the  former  is  external  nature,  that  of  the  latter  internal 
nature.  I  know  myself  only  as  phenomenon,  my  body 
through    outer,    my    ego    through    inner,    experience.       It 


/.  F.  FRIES.  5°9 

is  only  a  variant  mode  of  appearing  on  the  part  of  one  and 
the  same  reality — so  Fries  remarks  in  opposition  to  the 
inflnxus  physicus  and  the  harmonia  prccstabilata — which 
now  shows  me  my  person  inwardly  as  my  spirit,  and  now 
outwardly  as  the  life-process  of  my  body.  Practical  phi- 
losophy includes  ethics,  the  philosophy  of  religion,  and 
aesthetics.  In  accordance  with  the  threefold  interest  of 
our  animal,  sensuo-rational,  and  purely  rational  impulses, 
there  result  three  ideals  for  the  legislation  of  values. 
These  are  the  ideal  of  happiness,  the  ideal  of  perfection, 
and  the  ideal  of  morality,  or  of  the  agreeable,  the  useful,  and 
the  good,  the  third  of  which  alone  possesses  an  uncondi- 
tioned worth  and  validity  as  a  universal  and  necessary 
law.  The  moral  laws  are  deduced  from  faith  in  the  equal 
personal  dignity  of  men,  and  the  ennobling  of  humanity  set 
up  as  the  highest  mission  of  morality.  The  three  funda- 
mental aesthetical  tempers  are  the  idyllic  and  epic  of 
enthusiasm,  the  dramatic  of  resignation,  the  lyric  of 
devotion. 

Fries's  system  is  thus  a  union  of  Kantian  positions  with 
elements  from  Jacobi,  in  which  the  former  experience 
deterioration,  and  the  latter  improvement,  namely,  more 
exact  formulation.  Among  his  adherents,  and  he  has  them 
still,  the  following  appear  deserving  of  mention  :  the  bot- 
anists Schleiden  and  Hallier;  the  theologian  De  Wette; 
the  philosophers  Calker  (of  Bonn,  died  1870)  and  Apclt 
(1812-59).  The  last  made  himself  favorably  known  by 
his  Epochs  of  the  History  of  Humanity,  1845-46,  Theory 
of  Induction,  1854,  and  Metaphysics,  1857  ;  his  Philosophy  of 
Religion  (i860)  did  not  appear  until  after  his  death.  The 
Catholic  theologian,  Georg  Hermes  of  Bonn  (1775-1831) 
favored  a  Kantianism  akin  to  that  of  Fries. 

The  psychological  view  founded  by  Fries  was  con- 
sistently developed  by  Friedrich  Eduard  Beneke  (1798 
1854).  With  th'-  exception  of  three  years  of  teaching  in 
Göttingen,  1X24-27,  whither  Ik-  had  gone  in  consequence  <>f 
a  prohibition  of  his  lectures  called  forth  by  his  Foundation 
of  the  Physics  of  lithics,  I.S22,  he  was  a  member  of  the  uni- 
versity of  his  native  city,  Berlin,  first  as  Docent,  and,  from 


5io  BEN  EKE. 

1832,  after  the  death  of  Hegel,  who  was  unfavorably  dis- 
posed toward  him,  as  professor  extraordinary.*  Besides 
Kant,  Jacobi,  and  Fries,  Schleiermacher,  Herbart  (with 
whom  he  became  acquainted  in  182 1),  and  the  English 
thinkers  exerted  a  determining  influence  on  the  formation  of 
his  philosophy.  Beneke  denies  the  possibility  of  speculative 
knowledge  even  more  emphatically  than  Fries.  Kant's 
undertaking  was  aimed  at  the  destruction  of  a  non-experi- 
ential science  from  concepts,  and  if  it  has  not  succeeded  in 
preventing  the  neo-Scholasticism  of  the  Fichtean  school, 
with  its  overdrawn  attempts  to  revive  a  deductive  knowl- 
edge of  the  absolute,  this  has  been  chiefly  due  to  the  false, 
non-empirical  method  of  the  great  critic  of  reason.  The  root 
and  basis  of  all  knowledge  is  experience ;  metaphysics  itself  is 
an  empirical  science,  it  is  the  last  in  the  series  of  philosophical 
disciplines.  Whoever  begins  with  metaphysics,  instead  of 
ending  with  it,  begins  the  house  at  the  roof.  The  point  of 
departure  for  all  cognition  is  inner  experience  or  self-obser- 
vation ;  hence  the  fundamental  science  is  psychology,  and 
all  other  branches  of  philosophy  nothing  but  applied  psy- 
chology. By  the  inner  sense  we  perceive  our  ego  as  it  really 
is,  not  merely  as  it  appears  to  us  ;  the  only  object  whose  per 
se  we  immediately  know  is  our  own  soul ;  in  self-conscious- 
ness being  and  representation  are  one.  Thus,  in  opposition 
to  Kant,  Beneke  stands  on  the  side  of  Descartes  :  The  soul  is 
better  known  to  us  than  the  external  world,  to  which  we 
only  transfer  the  existence  immediately  given  in  the  soul 
as  a  result  of  instinctive  analogical  inference,  so  that  in 
the  descent  of  our  knowledge  from  men  organized  like 
ourselves  to  inorganic  matter  the  inadequacy  of  our 
representations  progressively  increases. 

Psychology — we  may  mention  of  Beneke's  works  in  this 
field  the  Psychological  Sketches,  1825-27,  and  the  Text-book 
of  Psychology,  1833,  the  third  and  fourth  (1877)  editions  of 
which,  edited  by  Dressier,  contain  as  an  appendix  a  chrono- 
logical table  of  all  Beneke's  works — must,  as  internal  nat- 
ural science,  follow  the  same  method,  and,  starting  with  the 
immediately    given,  employ  the  same  instruments   in    the 

*  On  Beneke's  character  cf.  the  fourth  of  Fortlage's  Acht  psycfwlogischt 
Vorträge,  which  are  well  worth  reading. 


BEX  EKE.  5  I  r 

treatment  of  experience  as  external  natural  science,  i.  e., 
the  explanation  of  facts  by  laws,  and,  further  still,  by  hy- 
potheses and  theories.  Gratefully  recognizing  the  removal 
of  two  obstacles  to  psychology,  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas 
and  the  traditional  theory  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul  by 
Locke  and  Herbart,  (the  commonly  accepted  faculties — 
memory,  understanding,  feeling,  will — are  in  fact  not  simple 
powers,  but  mere  abstractions,  hypostatized  class  conceptsof 
extremely  complex  phenomena,)  Beneke  seeks  to  discover 
the  simple  elements  from  which  all  mental  life  is  com- 
pounded. He  finds  these  in  the  numerous  elementary 
faculties  of  receiving  and  appropriating  external  stimuli, 
which  the  soul  in  part  possesses,  in  part  acquires  in  the 
course  of  its  life,  and  which  constitute  its  substance  ;  each 
separate  sense  of  itself  includes  many  such  faculties. 
Every  act  or  product  of  the  soul  is  the  result  of  two  mutu- 
ally dependent  factors:  stimulus  and  receptivity.  Their 
coming  together  gives  the  first  of  the  four  fundamental 
processes,  that  of  perception.  The  second  is  the  constant 
addition  of  new  elementary  faculties.  By  the  third,  the 
equilibration  or  reciprocal  transfer  of  the  movable  elements 
in  representations,  Beneke  explains  the  reproduction  of  an 
idea  through  another  associated  with  it,  and  the  widening 
of  the  mental  horizon  by  emotion,  e.  g.,  the  astounding 
eloquence  of  the  angry.  Since  each  representation  which 
passes  out  of  consciousness  continues  to  exist  in  the  soul  as 
an  unconscious  product  (where  we  cannot  tell  ;  the  soul  is 
not  in  space),  it  is  not  retention,  but  obliviscence  which  needs 
explanation.  That  which  persists  of  the  representation 
which  is  passing  into  unconsciousness,  and  which  makes  its 
reappearance  in  consciousness  possible,  is  called  a  "trace  " 
in  reference  to  its  departed  cause,  and  a  "  disposition  " 
{Angelegtheit)  in  reference  to  its  future  results.  Every  such 
trace  or  germ  {Anlage) — that  which  lies  intermediate  be- 
tween perception  and  recollection — is  a  force,  a  striving,  a 
tendency.  The  fourth  of  the  fundamental  proce^i :s  (which 
may  be  traced  downward  into  the  material  world,  since  the 
corporeal  and  the  psychical  differ  only  in  degree  and  pass 
over  into  each  other)  is  the  combination  of  mental  products 
according  to  the  measure  of  their  similarity,  as  these  come 


5  1 1  BEN  EKE. 

to  light  in  the  formation  of  judgments,  comparisons,  witti- 
cisms, of  collective  images,  collective  feelings,  and  collect- 
ive desires.  The  innate  differences  among  men  depend 
on  the  greater  or  lesser  "  povverfulness,  vivacity,  and  recep- 
tivity "  of  their  elementary  faculties  ;  all  further  differences 
arise  gradually  and  are  due  to  the  external  stimuli ;  even  the 
distinction  between  the  human  and  the  animal  soul,  which 
consists  in  the  spiritual  nature  of  the  former,  is  not  original. 

Of  the  five  constructive  forms  of  the  soul,  which  result 
from  the  varying  relation  between  stimulus  and  faculty, 
four  are  emotional  products  or  products  of  moods.  If 
the  stimulus  is  too  small  pain  (dissatisfaction,  longing) 
arises,  while  pleasure  springs  from  a  marked,  but  not  too 
great,  fullness  of  stimulus.  If  the  stimulus  gradually 
increases  to  the  point  of  excess,  blunted  appetite  and  satiety 
come  in  ;  when  the  excess  is  sudden  it  results  in  pain.  A 
clear  representation,  a  sensation  arises  when  the  stimulus 
is  exactly  proportioned  to  the  faculty;  it  is  in  this  case 
only  that  the  soul  assumes  a  theoretical  attitude,  that  it 
merely  perceives  without  any  admixture  of  agreeable  or 
disagreeable  feelings.  Desire  is  pleasure  remembered, 
the  ego  the  complex  of  all  the  representations  which  have 
ever  arisen  in  the  soul,  the  totality  of  the  manifold  given 
within  me.  For  the  immortality  of  the  immaterial  soul 
Beneke  advances  an  original  and  attractive  argument  based 
on  the  principle  that,  in  consequence  of  the  constantly 
increasing  traces,  through  which  the  substance  of  the  soul 
is  continually  growing,  consciousness  turns  more  and  more 
from  the  outer  to  the  inner,  until  finally  perception  dies 
entirely  away.  At  death  the  connection  with  the  outer 
world  ceases,  it  is  true,  but  not  the  inner  being  of  the  soul, 
for  which  that  which  has  hitherto  been  highest  now  becomes 
the  foundation  for  new  and  still  higher  developments. 

Like  Herbart,  on  whom  he  was  in  many  ways  dependent, 
Beneke  discussed  psychology  and  pedagogics  with  greater 
success  than  logic,  metaphysics,  practical  philosophy,  and 
the  philosophy  of  religion.  He  combats  the  apriorism  of 
Kant  in  ethics  as  elsewhere.  The  moral  law  does  not  arise 
until  the  end  of  a  long  development.  First  in  order  are  the 
immediately  felt  values  of  things,  which  we  estimate  accord- 


FORTLAGE.  513 

ing  to  the  degree  of  enhancement  or  depression  in  the  psy- 
chical state  which  they  call  forth.  From  the  feelings  are 
formed  concepts,  from  concepts  judgments  ;  and  the  abstrac- 
tion of  the  categorical  imperative  is  a  highly  derivative 
phenomenon  and  a  very  late  result,  although  the  feeling  of 
oughtness  or  of  moral  obligation,  which  accompanies  the 
correct  estimation  of  values  and  bids  us  prefer  spiritual  to 
sensuous  delights  and  the  general  good  to  our  own  welfare, 
grows  necessarily  out  of  the  inner  nature  of  the  human  soul. 
There  are  two  sources  of  religion  :  one  theoretical,  for  the 
idea  of  God  ;  the  other  practical,  for  the  worship  of  God. 
We  are  impelled  to  the  assumption  of  a  suprasensible,  an 
unconditioned,  a  providence,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  desire 
for  a  unitary  conclusion  for  our  fragmentary  knowledge 
of  the  world  ;  and,  on  the  other,  by  moral  need,  by  our 
unsatisfied  longing  after  the  good.  The  attributes  which 
we  ascribe  to  God  are  taken  from  experience,  the  abstract 
attributes  from  being  in  general,  the  naturalistic  from  the 
world,  the  spiritual  from  man.  As  an  inevitable  outcome 
of  the  transformation  of  religious  feelings  into  representa- 
tions, and  one  which  is  harmless  because  of  the  unmistak- 
ableness  of  their  symbolic  character,  the  anthropomorphic 
predicates,  through  which  we  think  the  Deity  as  personal, 
themselves  establish  the  superiority  of  theism  over  panthe- 
ism. The  object  of  religion,  moreover,  is  accessible  only 
to  the  subjective  certitude  of  feeling  which  is  given  by  faith, 
and  not  to  scientific  knowledge. 

Feuerbach's  anthropological  standpoint  will  be  discussed 
below.  Like  Friedrich  Ueberweg  (1826-71  ;  professor  in 
Königsberg;  System  of  Logic,  1857,  5th  ed.,  edited  by  J.  R. 
Meyer,  1882 — English  translation,  1871),  Karl  Fortlage 
was  strongly  influenced  in  his  psychological  views  by 
Bencke.  Born  in  1806  at  Osnabrück,  and  at  his  death  in 
1 88 1  a  professor  in  Jena,  Fortlage  shared  with  Bcneke  an 
impersonality  of  character,  as  well  as  the  fate  of  meeting 
with  less  esteem  from  his  contemporaries  than  he  merited 
by  the  seriousness  and  originality  of  his  thinking.  To  his 
System  of  Psychology,  1855,  in  two  volumes,  he  added,  as  it 
were,  a  third  volume,  his  Contributions  to  Psychology,  1875, 
besides    psychological     lectures    of    a   more    popular    cast 


514  FORTLAGE. 

{Eight  Lectures,  1869,  2d  ed.,  1872;  Four  Lectures,  1874).* 
Fortlage  characterizes  his  psychological  method — in  the 
criticism  of  which  F.  A.  Lange  fails  to  show  the  justice  for 
which  he  is  elsewhere  to  be  commended — as  observation 
by  the  inner  sense.  In  the  first  place,  consciousness,  as 
the  active  form  of  representation,  must  be  separated  from 
that  of  which  we  are  conscious,  from  the  "  content  of  repres- 
entation," which  is  in  itself  unconscious,  but  capable  of 
coming  into  consciousness.  Next  Fortlage  seeks  to  deter- 
mine the  laws  of  these  two  factors.  In  regard  to  the  content 
of  representation  he  distinguishes  more  sharply  than  Her- 
bart  between  the  fusibility  of  the  homogeneous  and  the 
capacity  for  complex  combination  possessed  by  the  hetero- 
geneous (the  fusion  of  similars  goes  on  even  without  aid 
from  consciousness,  while  the  connection  of  dissimilars  is 
brought  about  only  through  the  help  of  the  latter),  and  adds 
to  these  two  general  properties  of  the  content  of  representa- 
tion two  further  ones,  its  revivability  (its  persistence  in 
unconsciousness),  and  its  dissolubility  in  the  scale  of  size, 
color,  etc.  Consciousness,  on  the  other  hand,  which  for 
Fortlage  coincides  with  the  ego  or  self,  is  treated  as  the 
presupposition  of  all  representations,  not  as  their  result — it 
is  underived  activity.  He  explains  the  nature  of  conscious- 
ness by  the  concept  of  attention,  characterizes  them  both  as 
""questioning  activity"  {Fragcthätigkeif),  and  follows  them 
out  in  their  various  degrees  from  expectation  through 
observation  up  to  reflection.  The  listening  and  watching 
of  the  hunter  when  waiting  for  the  game  is  only  a  pro- 
longation of  the  same  consciousness  which  accompanies  all 
less  exciting  representations.  The  essential  element  in 
conscious  or  questioning  activity  is  the  oscillation  between 
yes  and  no.  As  soon  as  the  disjunction  is  decided  by  a  yes, 
the  desire  which  lies  at  its  basis,  and  which  in  the  condition 
of  consciousness  is  arrested,  passes  over  into  activity.  All 
consciousness  is  based  on  interest,  and  in  its  origin  is 
"arrested  impulse"  {Trieblicmmnng).  "The  direction  of 
impulse  to  an  intuition  to  be   expected  only  in   the  future 

*  Among  Fortlage's  other  works  we  may  mention  his  valuable  History  of 
Poetry,  1830.  ;  the  Genetic  History  of  Philosophy  since  Kant,  1852  ;  and  the 
attractive  Six  Philosophical  Lectures,  1869,   2d  ed.,  1872. 


FORTLAGE.  5X5 

is  called  consciousness."  The  rank  of  a  being  depends 
on  its  capacity  for  reflection  :  the  greater  the  extent  of  its 
attention  and  the  smaller  the  stimuli  which  suffice  to  rouse 
this  to  action,  the  higher  it  stands.  Impulse — this  is  the 
fundamental  idea  of  Fortlage's  psychology,  like  will  with 
Fichte,  and  representation  with  Herbart — consists  of 
an  element  of  representation  and  an  element  of  feeling. 
Pleasure  -f-  effort-image  =  impulse. 

In  his  metaphysical  convictions,  to  which  he  gave 
expression  in  his  Exposition  and  Criticism  of  t lie  Arguments 
for  the  Existence  of  God,  1840,  among  other  works,  Fort- 
lage  belongs  to  the  philosophers  of  identity.  Originally 
sailing  in  Hegel's  wake,  he  soon  recognizes  that  the  roots 
of  the  theory  of  identity  go  back  to  the  Kantio-Fichtean 
philosophy,  with  which  the  system  of  absolute  truth,  as  he 
holds,  hascome  into  being.  He  thus  becomes  an  adherent  of 
the  Science  of  Knowledge,  whose  deductive  results  he  finds 
inductively  confirmed  by  psychological  experience.  Psy- 
chology is  the  empirical  test  for  the  metaphysical  calculus 
of  the  Science  of  Knowledge.  In  regard  to  the  absolute 
Fortlage  is  in  agreement  with  Krause,  the  younger  Fichte, 
Ulrici,  etc.,  and  calls  his  standpoint  transcendent  pantheism. 
According  to  this  all  that  is  good,  exalted,  and  valuable  in 
the  world  is  divine  in  its  nature  ;  the  human  reason  is  of  the 
same  essence  as  the  divine  reason  (there  can  be  nothing 
higher  than  reason) ;  the  Godhead  is  the  absolute  ego  of 
Fichte,  which  employs  the  empirical  egos  as  organs,  which 
thinks  and  wills  in  individuals,  in  so  far  as  they  think  the 
truth  and  will  the  good,  but  at  the  same  time  as  universal 
subject  goes  beyond  them.  If,  after  the  example  of  Hegel, 
we  give  up  transcendent  pantheism  in  favor  of  immanence, 
two  unphilosophical  modes  of  representing  the  absolute 
at  once  result — on  the  one  hand,  materialism  ;  on  the  other, 
popular,  unphilosophical  theism.  If  the  Fichtean  Science 
of  Knowledge  could  be  separated  from  its  difficult  method, 
which  it  is  impossible  ever  to  make  comprehensible  to 
the  unphilosophical  mind,  it  would  be  called  to  take  the 
place  of  religion.* 

*  Amonjj  Fortlage's  posthumous  manuscripts  was  one  on    the    Philosophy  oi 
Religion,  on  which  Eucken  published  an  essay  in  the  Zeitschrift  für  l'/iiloso- 


5i6  HERBART. 

2.  Realism  :     Herbart. 

Johann  Friedrich  Herbart  was  scientifically  the  most 
important  among  the  philosophers  of  the  opposition. 
Herbart  was  born  at  Oldenburg  in  1776,  the  son  of  a  coun- 
cilor of  justice,  and  had  already  become  acquainted  with 
the  systems  of  Wolff  and  Kant  before  he  entered  the  Uni- 
versity of  Jena  in  1794.  In  1796  he  handed  in  to  his 
instructor  Fichte  a  critique  of  two  of  Schelling's  treatises, 
in  which  the  youthful  thinker  already  broke  away  from 
idealism.  While  a  private  tutor  in  Switzerland  he  made 
the  acquaintance  of  Pestalozzi.  In  1802  he  habilitated 
in  Göttingen,  where,  in  1805,  he  was  promoted  to  a  pro- 
fessorship extraordinary;  while  in  1809  he  received  the 
professorship  in  Königsberg  once  held  by  Kant,  and 
later  by  W.  Tr.  Krug  (died  1842).  He  died  in  1841  at  Göt- 
tingen, whither  he  had  been  recalled  in  1833.  His  Col- 
lected Works  were  published  in  twelve  volumes,  1850—52 
(reprinted  1883  seq.),  by  his  pupil  Hartenstein,  who  has 
also  given  an  excellent  exposition  of  his  master's  system  in 
his  Problejne  und  Grundlehren  der  allgemeinen  MetapJtysik, 
1836,  and  his  Grundbegriffe  der  ethischen  Wissenschaften, 
1844;  a  new  edition,  in  chronological  order,  and  under  the 
editorship  of  K.  Kehrbach,  began  to  appear  in  1882,  or  rather 
1887,  and  has  now  advanced  to  the  fourth  volume,  1891. 
Herbart's  chief  works  were  written  during  his  Königsberg 
residence:  the  Text-book  of  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  1813, 
4th  ed.,  1837  (very  valuable  as  an  introduction  to  Herbartian 
modes  of  thought);  General  Metaphysics,  1829  (preceded 
in  1806  and  1808  by   The  Principal  Points  in    Metaphysics, 

phie,  vol.  Ixxxii.  1883,  p.  180  seq.,  after  Lipsius  had  given  a  single  chapter 
from  it — "  The  Ideal  of  Morality  according  to  Christianity  " — in  his  Jahr- 
bücher für  protestantische  Theologie  (vol.  ix.  pp.  1-45).  The  journals  Im  ATeuett 
Reich,  1881,  No.  24,  and  Die  Gegenwart,  1882,  No. 34,  contained  warmly  written 
notices  of  Fortlage  by  J.  Volkelt.  Leopold  Schmid  (in  Giessen,  died  1869)  gives 
a  favorable  and  skillfully  composed  outline  of  Fortlage's  system  in  his  Grundzüge 
der  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie  mit  einer  Beleuchtung  der  von  K.  Ph.  Fischer, 
Sengler,  und  Fortlage  ermöglichten  Philosophie  der  That,  i860,  pp.  226-357. 
Cf.  also  Moritz  Brasch,  K.  Fortlage,  Ein  phiosophisches  Charakterbild,  in  Unsere 
Zeit,  1883,  Heft  II,  pp.  730-756,  incorporated  in  the  same  author's  Philosophie 
der  Gegen  wa  rt,  1888. 


II ERB  A  KT.  517 

with  a  supplement,  The  Principal  Points  in  Logic);  Text- 
book of  Psychology  *  1 8 16,  2d  ed.,  1834  ;  On  the  Possibility  and 
Necessity  of  applying  Mathematics  to  Psychology,  1822; 
Psychology  as  a  Science,  1824-25.  The  two  works  on  ethics, 
which  were  widely  separated  in  time,  were,  on  the  other 
hand,  written  in  Göttingen  :  General  Practical  Philosophy, 
1808;  Analytical  Examination  of  Natural  Right  and  of 
Morals,  1836.  To  these  may  be  added  a  Discourse  on  Evil, 
1 8 17;  Letters  on  the  Doctrine  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Human 
Will,  1836;  and  the  Brief  Encyclopaedia  of  Philosophy,  1831, 
2d  ed.,  1841.  His  works  on  education  and  instruction, 
whose  influence  and  value  perhaps  exceed  those  of  his 
philosophical  achievements  (collected  editions  of  the  peda- 
gogical works  have  been  prepared  by  O.  Willmann,  1873-75, 
2d  ed.,  1880;  and  by  Bartholomaei),  extended  through  his 
whole  life.  Besides  pedagogics,  psychology  was  the  chief 
sphere  of  his  services. 

In  antithesis  to  the  philosophy  of  intuition  with  its  imag- 
ined superiority  to  the  standpoint  of  reflection,  Herbart 
makes  philosophy  begin  with  attention  to  concepts,  defin- 
ing it  as  the  elaboration  of  concepts.  Philosophy,  there- 
fore, is  not  distinguished  from  other  sciences  by  its  object, 
but  by  its  method,  which  again  must  adapt  itself  to  the 
peculiarity  of  the  object,  to  the  starting  point  of  the  inves- 
tigation in  question^ — there  is  no  universal  philosophical 
method.  There  are  as  many  divisions  of  philosophy  as 
there  are  modes  of  elaborating  concepts.  The  first  requisite 
is  the  discrimination  of  concepts,  both  the  discrimination 
of  concepts  from  others  and  of  the  marks  within  each  con- 
cept. This  work  of  making  concepts  clear  and  distinct  is 
the  business  of  logic.  With  this  discipline,  in  which  Her- 
bart essentially  follows  Kant,  are  associated  two  other  forms 
of  the  elaboration  of  concepts,  that  of  physical  and  that  of 
aesthetic  concepts.  Both  of  these  classes  require  more  than  a 
merely  logical  elucidation.  The  physical  concepts,  through 
which  we  apprehend  the  world  and  ourselves,  contain  con- 
tradictions and  must  be  freed  from  them  ;  their  correction 
is  the  business  of  meta-physics.  Metaphysics  is  the  science 
of  the  comprehensibility  of  experience.  The  aesthetic 
•English  translation  by  M.  K.  Smith,  [891. 


518  HER  BART. 

(including  the  ethical)  concepts  are  distinguished  from  the 
nature-concepts  by  a  peculiar  increment  which  they  occasion 
in  our  representation,  and  which  consists  in  a  judgment  of 
approval  or  disapproval.  To  clear  up  these  concepts  and 
to  free  them  from  false  allied  ideas  is  the  task  of  aes- 
thetics in  its  widest  sense.  This  includes  all  concepts  which 
are  accompanied  by  a  judgment  of  praise  or  blame  ;  the 
most  important  among  them  are  the  ethical  concepts. 
Thus,  aside  from  logic,  we  reach  two  principal  divisions  of 
philosophy,  which  are  elsewhere  contrasted  as  theoretical 
and  practical,  but  here  in  Herbart  as  metaphysics  and 
aesthetics.  Herbart  maintains  that  these  are  entirely  inde- 
pendent of  each  other,  so  that  aesthetics,  since  it  presup- 
poses nothing  of  metaphysics,  may  be  discussed  before 
metaphysics,  while  the  philosophy  of  nature  and  psychol- 
ogy depend  throughout  on  ontological  principles.  Together 
with  natural  theology  the  two  latter  sciences  consti- 
tute "applied"  metaphysics.  This  in  turn  presupposes 
"general"  metaphysics,  which  subdivides  into  four  parts: 
Methodology,  Ontology,  Synechology,  i.  e.,  the  theory  of  the 
continuous  (ffvvsx^),  which  treats  of  the  continua,  space, 
time,  and  motion,  and  Eidolology,  i.  r.,  the  theory  of  images 
or  representations.  The  last  forms  the  transition  to  psy- 
chology, while  synechology  forms  the  preparation  for  the 
philosophy  of  nature,  whose  most  general  problems  it 
solves.  Our  exposition  will  not  need  to  observe  these 
divisions  closely. 

Metaphysics  starts  with  the  given,  but  cannot  rest  con- 
tent with  it,  for  it  contains  contradictions.  In  resolving 
these  we  rise  above  the  given.  What  is  given  ?  Kant  has 
not  answered  this  question  with  entire  correctness.  We 
may,  indeed,  term  the  totality  of  the  given  "  phenomena," 
but  this  presupposes  something  which  appears.  If  nothing 
existed  there  would  also  nothing  appear.  As  smoke  points 
to  fire,  so  appearance  to  being.  So  much  seeming,  so 
much  indication  of  being.  Things  in  themselves  may 
be  known  mediately,  though  not  immediately,  by  follow- 
ing out  the  indications  of  being  contained  by  the  given 
appearance.  Further,  not  merely  the  unformed  matter 
of  cognition  is  given  to  us,  but  it  is  rather  true  that  every- 


ME  TA  PH  YSICS.  5  1 9 

thing  comes  under  this  concept  which  experience  so 
presses  on  us  that  we  cannot  resist  it ;  hence  not  merely 
single  sensations,  but  entire  sensation-groups,  not  merely 
the  matter,  but  also  the  forms  of  experience.  If  the  latter 
were  really  subjective  products,  as  Kant  holds,  it  would 
necessarily  be  possible  for  us  at  will  to  think  each  per- 
ceptive-content either  under  the  category  of  substance,  or 
property,  or  cause — possible  for  us,  if  we  chose,  to  see  a 
round  table  quadrilateral.  In  reality  we  are  bound  in  the 
application  of  these  forms  ;  they  are  given  for  each  object 
in  a  definite  way.  The  given  forms — Herbart  calls  them 
experience-concepts — contain  contradictions.  How  can 
these  contradictions  be  removed  ?  We  may  neither  simply 
reject  the  concepts  which  are  burdened  with  contradic- 
tions, for  they  are  given,  nor  leave  them  as  they  are,  for 
the  logical  principium  contradictionis  requires  that  the  con- 
tradiction as  such  be  rooted  out.  The  experience-concepts 
are  valid  (they  find  application  in  experience),  but  they 
are  not  thinkable.  Therefore  we  must  so  transform  and 
supplement  them  that  they  shall  become  free  from  con- 
tradictions and  thinkable.  The  method  which  Herbart 
employs  to  remove  the  contradictions  is  as  follows:  The 
contradiction  always  consists  in  the  fact  that  an  a  should 
be  the  same  as  a  b,  but  is  not  so.  The  desiderated 
likeness  of  the  two  is  impossible  so  long  as  we  think  a  as 
one  thing.  That  which  is  unsuccessful  in  this  case  will 
succeed,  perhaps,  if  in  thought  we  break  up  the  a  into 
several  things — a  ß  y.  Then  we  shall  be  able  to  explain 
through  the  "  together"  (Zusammen)  of  this  plurality  what 
we  were  unable  to  explain  from  the  undecomposed  a,  or 
from  the  single  constituents  of  it.  The  "  together  "  is  a 
"  relation  "  established  by  thought  among  the  elements  of 
the  real.  For  this  reason  Herbart  terms  his  method  of 
finding  out  necessary  supplements  to  the  given  "the 
method  of  relations."  Another  name  for  the  same  thing- 
is  "the  method  of  contingent  aspects."  Mechanics  oper- 
ates with  contingent  aspects  when,  for  the  sake  of  explana- 
tion, it  resolves  a  given  motion  into  several  components. 
Such  fictions  and  substitutions — auxiliary  concepts,  which 
are  not   real,  but  which  serve  only  as   paths    for  thought  — 


52°  HER  BART. 

may  be  successfully  employed  by  metaphysics  also.  The 
abstract  expression  of  this  method  runs:  The  contradiction 
is  to  be  removed  by  thinking  one  of  its  members  as  manifold 
rather  than  as  one.  In  order  to  observe  the  workings  of 
this  Herbartian  machine  we  shall  go  over  the  four  princi- 
pal contradictions  by  which  his  acuteness  is  put  to  the  test 
— the  problems  of  inherence,  of  change,  of  the  continuous, 
of  the  ego. 

We  call  the  given  sensation-complexes  "  things,"  and 
ascribe  "  properties  "  to  them.  How  can  one  and  the  same 
thing  have  different  properties — how  can  the  one  be  at  the 
same  time  many?  To  say  that  the  thing  "  possesses  "  the 
properties  does  not  help  the  matter.  The  possession  of 
the  different  properties  is  itself  just  as  manifold  and  vari- 
ous as  the  properties  which  are  possessed.  Hence  the 
concept  of  the  thing  and  its  properties  must  be  so  trans- 
formed that  the  plurality  which  seems  to  be  in  the  thing 
shall  be  transferred  without  it.  Instead  of  one  thing  let 
us  assume  several,  each  with  a  single  definite  property, 
from  whose  "  together  "  the  appearance  of  many  qualities 
in  one  thing  now  arises.  The  appearance  of  manifold  prop- 
erties in  the  one  thing  has  its  ground  in  the  "  together  " 
of  many  things,  each  of  which  has  one  simple  quality. 
Again,  it  is  just  as  impossible  for  a  thing  to  have  differ- 
ent qualities  in  succession,  or  to  change,  as  it  is  for  it 
to  have  them  at  the  same  time.  The  popular  view  of 
change,  which  holds  that  a  thing  takes  on  different  forms 
(ice,  water,  steam)  and  yet  remains  the  same  substance,  is 
untenable.  How  is  it  possible  to  become  another,  and  yet 
to  remain  the  same?  The  universal  feeling  that  the  con- 
cept needs  correction  betrays  itself  in  the  fact  that  every- 
one involuntarily  adds  a  cause  to  the  change  in  thought, 
and  seeks  a  cause  for  it,  and  thus  of  himself  undertakes  a 
transformation  of  the  concept,  though,  it  is  true,  an  in- 
adequate one.  If  we  think  this  concept  through  we  come 
upon  a  trilemma,  a  threefold  impossibility.  Whether  we 
endeavor  to  deduce  the  change  from  external  or  from  inter- 
nal causes,  or  (with  Hegel)  to  think  it  as  causeless,  in  each 
case  we  involve  ourselves  in  inconceivabilities.  All  three 
ideas — change  as  mechanism,  as  self-determination  or  free- 


ME  TA  PH  YSfCS.  5  2  r 

dorn,  as  absolute  becoming — are  alike  absurd.  We  can 
escape  these  contradictions  only  by  the  bold  decision  to 
conceive  the  quality  of  the  existent  as  unchangeable.  For 
the  truly  existent  there  is  no  change  whatever.  It  remains, 
however,  to  explain  the  appearance  of  change,  in  which 
the  wand  of  decomposition  and  the  "together"  again 
proves  its  magic  power.  Supported  by  the  motley  mani- 
foldness  of  phenomena,  we  posit  real  beings  as  qualitatively 
different,  and  view  this  diversity  as  partial  contraposition  ; 
we  resolve,  e.  g.,  the  simple  quality  a  into  the  elements 
x  +  z,  and  a  second  quality  b  into/  —  z.  So  long  as  the 
individual  things  remain  by  themselves,  the  opposition  of 
the  qualities  will  not  make  itself  evident.  But  as  soon  as 
they  come  together,  something  takes  place — now  the  oppo- 
sites  (+  z  and  —  z)  seek  to  destroy  or  at  least  to  disturb 
each  other.  The  reals  defend  themselves  against  the  dis- 
turbance which  would  follow  if  the  opposites  could  destroy 
each  other,  by  each  conserving  its  simple,  unchangeable 
quality,  i.  e.,  by  simply  remaining  self-identical.  Self-con- 
servation against  threatened  disturbances  from  without  (it 
may  be  compared  to  resistance  against  pressure)  is  the 
only  real  change,  and  apparent  change,  the  empirical 
changes  of  things,  to  be  explained  from  this.  That 
which  changes  is  only  the  relations  between  the  beings,  as 
a  thing  maintains  itself  now  against  this  and  now  against 
that  other  thing;  the  relations,  however,  and  their  change 
are  something  entirely  contingent  and  indifferent  to  the 
existent.  In  itself  the  self-conservation  of  a  real  is  as 
uniform  as  the  quality  which  is  conserved,  but  in  virtue 
of  the  changing  relations  (the  variety  of  the  disturbing 
things)  it  can  express  itself  for  the  observer  in  manifold 
ways  as  force.  The  real  itself  changes  as  little  as  a  paint- 
ing changes,  for  instance,  when,  seen  near  at  hand,  the 
figures  in  it  are  clearly  distinguished,  while  for  the  distant 
observer,  on  the  contrary,  they  run  together  into  an  indis- 
tinguishable chaos.  Change  has  no  meaning  in  the  sphere 
of  the  existent. 

Anyone  who  speaks  thus  has  denied  change,  not  deduced 
it.  Among  the  many  objections  experienced  by  II<t- 
bart's  endeavor  to   explain   the   empirical    fact  <>f  change 


522  HER  BART. 

by  his  theory  of  self-conservation  against  threatened  dis- 
turbances Lotze's  is  the  most  cogent  :  The  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  solve  the  dffiiculties  in  the  concept  of  becoming 
and  action  is  still  instructive,  for  it  shows  that  they  cannot 
be  solved  in  this  way — from  the  concept  of  inflexible  being. 
If  the  "  together,"  the  threatened  disturbance,  and  the 
reaction  against  the  latter  be  taken  as  realities,  then, 
in  the  affection  by  the  disturber,  the  concept  of  change 
remains  uneliminated  and  uncorrected  ;  if  they  be  taken  as 
unreal  concepts  auxiliary  to  thought,  change  is  relegated 
from  the  realm  of  being  to  the  realm  of  seeming.  Herbart 
gives  to  them  a  kind  of  semi-reality,  less  true  than  the 
unmoving  ground  of  things  (their  unchangeable,  permanent 
qualities),  and  more  true  than  their  contradictory  exterior 
(the  empirical  appearance  of  change).  Between  being  and 
seeming  he  thrusts  in,  as  though  between  day  and  night, 
the  twilight  region  of  his  "contingent  aspects,"  with  their 
relations,  which  are  nothing  to  the  real,  their  disturb- 
ances, which  do  not  come  to  pass,  and  their  self-conserva- 
tions, which  are  nothing  but  undisturbed  continuance  in 
existence  on  the  part  of  the  real. 

Besides  the  contradictions  in  the  concepts  of  inherence, 
of  change,  and  action  and  passion,  it  is  the  concept  of  being 
which  prevents  our  philosopher  from  ascribing  a  living 
character  to  reality.  Being,  as  Kant  correctly  perceived, 
contains  nothing  qualitative  ;  it  is  absolute  position.  Who- 
ever affirms  that  an  object  is,  expresses  thereby  that  the 
matter  is  to  rest  with  the  simple  position  ;  in  which  is 
included  that  it  is  nothing  dependent,  relative,  or  negative. 
(Every  negation  is  something  relative,  relates  to  a  precedent 
position,  which  is  to  be  annulled  by  it.)  Besides  being,  the 
existent  contains  something  more — a  quality;  it  consists 
of  this  absolute  position  and  a  what.  If  this  what  is  sep- 
arated from  being  we  reach  an  "image";  united  with 
being  it  yields  an  essence  or  a  real.  This  what  of  things 
is  not  their  sensuous  qualities  ;  the  latter  belong  rather 
to  the  mere  phenomenon.  No  one  of  them  indicates  what 
the  object  is  by  itself,  when  left  alone.  They  depend  on 
contingent  circumstances,  and  apart  from  these  they  would 
not    exist — what    is    color    in    the    dark  ?    what    sound    in 


ME  TA  PH  YSICS.  5  2  3 

airless  space?  what  weight  in  empty  space?  what  fusi- 
bility without  fire  ? — they  are  each  and  all  relative.  Since 
being  excludes  negation  of  every  kind,  the  quality  of  the 
existent  must  be  absolutely  simple  and  unchangeable; 
it  brooks  no  manifoldness,  no  quantity,  no  distinctions  in 
degree,  no  becoming ;  all  this  were  a  corruption  of  the 
purely  affirmative  or  positive  character  of  being.  The 
existent  is  unextended  and  eternal.  The  Eleatics  are  to 
be  praised  because  the  need  of  escaping  from  the  contradic- 
tions in  the  world  of  experience  led  them  to  make  them- 
selves masters  of  the  concept  of  being  without  relation  and 
without  negation,  and  of  the  simple,  homogeneous  quality 
of  the  existent  in  its  full  purity.  But  while  the  Eleatics 
conceived  the  existent  as  one,  the  atomists  made  an 
advance  by  assuming  a  plurality  of  reals.  The  truly  one 
never  becomes  a  plurality  ;  plurality  is  given,  hence  an 
original  plurality  must  be  postulated.  Herbart  character- 
izes his  own  standpoint  as  qualitative  atomism,  since  his 
reals  are  differentiated  by  their  properties,  not  by  quantita- 
tive relations  (size  and  figure).  The  idealists  and  the  pan- 
theists make  a  false  use  of  the  tendency  toward  unity  which, 
no  doubt,  is  present  in  our  reason,  when  they  maintain 
that  true  being  must  be  one.  There  is  absolutely  noth- 
ing in  the  concept  of  being  to  forbid  us  to  think  the 
existent  as  many;  while  the  world  of  phenomena,  with 
its  many  things  and  their  many  properties,  gives  irre- 
fragable grounds  which  compel  us  to  this  conclusion. 
Hence,  according  to  Herbart,  the  true  reality  is  a  (very  large, 
though  not,  it  is  true,  an  infinite*)  plurality  of  supra- 
sensible  (non-spatial  and  non-temporal)  reals,  or,  according 
to  the  Leibnitzian  expression,  monads,  which  all  their  life 
have  nothing  further  to  do  than  to  preserve  intact  against 
disturbances  the  simple  quality  in  which  they  consist  (for 
the  existent  is  not  distinct  from  its  quality  ;  it  does  not  have 
the  quality,  but  is  the  quality).  Each  thing  has  but  one 
response  for  the  most  varied  influences:  it  answers  all 
suggestions   from   without   by   affirming   its  what,   by  con- 

*  Herbart  writes  ( Trxt-book  of  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  156),  quite  in 
the  ancient  manner:  "The  real  cannot  he  infinite.  Infinity  is  a  predicate 
for  thought-entities,  with  whose  construction  we  are  never  done." 


524  HER  BART, 

tinually  repeating,  as  it  were,  the  same  note,  which  gains 
a  varying  meaning  only  in  so  far  as,  in  accordance  with  the 
character  of  the  disturber,  it  appears  now  as  a  third,  now 
as  a  fifth  or  seventh.  This  picture  of  the  world  is  certainly 
not  attractive  ;  in  it  all  change  and  becoming,  all  life  and  all 
activity  is  offered  up  on  the  altar  of  monotonous  being. 
Happily  Herbart  is  inconsistent  enough  to  enliven  this 
comfortless  waste  of  changeless  being  by  the  relatively  real 
or  semi-real  manifoldness  of  the  self-conservations. 

The  infinite  divisibility  of  space  and  of  matter  forms  the 
chief  difficulty  in  the  problem  of  the  continuous.  Herbart 
endeavors  to  solve  it  by  the  assumption  of  an  intelligible 
space  with  "  fixed  "  lines  (lines  formed  by  a  definite  num- 
ber of  points,  hence  finitely  divisible,  and  not  continu- 
ous). Metaphysics  demands  the  fixed  or  discrete  line, 
although  common  thought  is  incapable  of  conceiving  it. 
Space  is  a  mere  form  of  combination  in  representation  or 
for  the  observer,  and  yet  it  is  objective,  i.  e.,  it  is  valid  for  all 
intelligences,  and  not  merely  for  human  intelligence. 
From  his  complex  and  unproductive  endeavors  to  derive 
the  appearance  of  continuity  from  discontinuous  reality  we 
hurry  on  to  the  fourth,  the  psychological  problem,  which 
Herbart  discusses  with  great  acuteness.  He  considers  it 
the  chief  merit  of  Fichte's  Science  of  Knowledge  that  it 
called  attention  to  this  problem. 

The  concept  of  the  ego,  of  whose  reality  we  have  so 
strong  and  immediate  a  conviction  that,  in  the  formula  of 
asseveration,  "  as  true  as  I  exist,"  it  is  made  the  criterion 
of  all  other  certitude,  labors  under  various  contradictions. 
Besides  the  familiar  difficulty,  here  especially  sensible,  of 
one  thing  with  many  marks,  it  contains  other  absurdities 
of  its  own.  In  the  ego  or  self-consciousness  subject  and 
object  are  to  be  identical.  The  identity  of  the  represent- 
ing and  the  represented  ego  is  a  self-contradictory  idea,  for 
the  law  of  contradiction  forbids  the  equation  of  opposites, 
while  a  subject  is  subject  only  through  the  fact  that  it  is 
not  object.  But,  again,  self-consciousness  can  never  be 
realized,  because  it  involves  a  regressus  in  infinitum.  The 
ego  is  defined  as  that  which  represents  itself.  What  is  this 
"  self  "  ?     It  is,  in  turn,  the  self-knower.     This  new  explana- 


METAPHYSICS,    PSYCHOLOGY.  525 

tion  contains  still  a  further  self,  which  once  more  signifies 
theself-knowerand  so  onto  infinity.  The  ego  represents  the 
representation  {Vorstellen)  of  its  representation  {Vorstellen), 
etc.  The  representation  {Vorstellung)  of  the  ego,  there- 
fore, can  never  be  actually  brought  to  completion.  (The 
assumption  of  the  freedom  of  the  will  leads  to  an 
analogous  regressus  in  infinitum,  in  which  the  question, 
"  Willst  thou  thy  volition?  "  "Willst  thou  the  willing  of 
this  volition  "  ?  is  repeated  to  infinity.)  The  only  escape 
from  this  tissue  of  absurdities  is  to  think  the  ego  otherwise 
than  is  done  by  popular  consciousness.  The  knowing  and 
the  known  ego  are  by  no  means  the  same,  but  the  observ- 
ing subject  in  self-consciousness  is  one  group  of  representa- 
tions, the  observed  subject  another.  Thus,  for  example, 
newly  formed  representations  are  apperceived  by  the  exist- 
ing older  ones,  but  the  highest  apperceiver  is  not,  in  turn, 
itself  apperceived.  The  ego  is  not  a  unit  being,  which 
represents  itself  in  the  literal  meaning  of  the  phrase,  but 
that  which  is  represented  is  a  plurality.  The  ego  is  the 
junction  of  numberless  series  of  representations,  and  is  con- 
stantly changing  its  place  ;  it  dwells  now  in  this  representa- 
tion, now  in  that.  But  as  we  distinguish  the  point  of 
meeting  from  the  series  which  meet  there,  and  imagine 
that  it  is  possible  simultaneously  to  abstract  from  all  the 
represented  series  (whereas  in  fact  we  can  only  abstract 
from  each  one  separately),  there  arises  the  appearance  of  a 
permanent  ego  as  the  unit  subject  of  all  our  representa- 
tions. In  reality  the  ego  is  not  the  source  of  our  represen- 
tations, but  the  final  result  of  their  combination.  The 
representation,  not  the  ego,  is  the  fundamental  concept  of 
psychology,  the  ego  constituting  rather  its  most  difficult 
problem.*  It  is  a  "  result  of  other  representations,  which, 
however,  in  order  to  yield  this  result,  must  be  together  in 
a  single  substance,  and  must  interpenetrate  one  another" 
{Text-book  of  Introduction,  p.  243).  In  this  way  Herbart 
defends  the  substantiality  of  the  soul  against  Kant  and 
Fries.     The  soul's    immortality  (as  also    its   pre-existence) 

*  On  the  Herbartian  psychology,  cf.  Ribot,   German  Psychology  of  To-day, 

English  Translation  by  Baldwin,  1886,  pp.  24-67;  and  <•.  F.  Stout,  Mind, 
vols,  xiii.-xiv. — Tk. 


5  26  HERB  ART. 

goes  without  saying,  because  of  the  non-temporal  character 
<.4  the  real. 

The  soul  is  one  of  these  reals  which,  unchangeable  in 
themselves,  enter  into  various  relations  with  others,  and 
conserve  themselves  against  the  latter.  In  its  simple 
what  as  unknowable  as  the  rest,  it  is  yet  familiar  to  us 
in  its  self-conservations.  In  the  absence  of  a  more  fitting 
expression  for  the  totality  of  psychical  phenomena  we  call 
these  representations,  the  phenomenal  manifoldness  of  which 
is  due  to  the  variety  of  the  disturbances  and  exists  for  the 
observer  alone.  In  itself,  without  a  plurality  of  dispositions 
and  impulses,  the  soul  is  originally  not  a  representative 
force,  but  first  becomes  such  under  certain  circumstances, 
viz.,  when  it  is  stimulated  to  self-conservation  by  other 
beings.  The  sum  of  the  reals  which  stand  in  immediate 
relation  to  the  soul  is  called  its  body;  this,  an  aggregate  of 
simple  beings,  furnishes  the  intermediate  link  of  causal  rela- 
tion between  the  soul  and  the  external  world.  The  soul 
has  its  (movable)  seat  in  the  brain.  In  opposition  to  the 
physiological  treatment  of  psychology,  Herbart  remarks 
that  psychology  throws  much  more  light  on  physiology 
than  she  can  ever  receive  from  it. 

The  simplest  representations  are  the  sensations,  which, 
amid  all  their  variety,  still  group  themselves  into  definite 
classes  (odors,  sounds,  colors).  They  serve  us  as  symbols 
of  the  disturbing  reals,  but  they  are  not  images  of  things, 
nor  effects  of  these,  but  products  of  the  soul  itself:  the 
generation  of  sensations  is  the  soul's  peculiar  way  of  guard- 
ing itself  against  threatened  disturbances.  Every  repres- 
entation once  come  into  being  disappears  again  from  con- 
sciousness, it  is  true,  but  not  from  the  soul.  It  persists, 
unites  with  others,  and  stands  with  them  in  a  relation  of 
interaction — in  both  cases  according  to  definite  laws.  These 
original  representations  are  the  only  ones  which  the  soul 
produces  by  its  own  activity;  all  other  psychical  phenomena, 
feeling,  desire,  will,  attention,  memory,  judgment,  the  whole 
wealth  of  innerevents,  result  of  themselves  from  the  interplay 
of  the  primary  representations  under  law.  Representation 
(more  exactly  sensation)  is  alone  original;  space,  time,  the 
categories,  which  Kant  makes  a  priori,  are  all  acquired,  i.e., 


PSYCHOLOGY.  527 

like  all  the  higher  mental  life,  they  are  the  results  of  a  psy- 
chical mechanism,  results  whose  production  needs  no  renewed 
exertion  on  the  part  of  the  soul  itself.  It  has  been  a  very 
harmful  error  in  psychology  hitherto  to  ascribe  each  par- 
ticular mental  activity  to  a  special  faculty  of  the  soul  having 
a  similar  name,  instead  of  deriving  it  from  combinations  of 
simple  representations.  Abstract,  empty  class  ideas  have 
been  treated  as  real  forces,  in  the  belief  that  thus  the 
single  concrete  acts  had  been  "  explained." 

There  is  no  bitterer  foe  of  the  faculty  theory  than  Herbart. 
His  campaign  against  it,  if  not  victorious,  was  yet  salutary, 
and  the  motives  of  his  hostility,  up  to  a  certain  point, 
entirely  justified.  Nothing  is  more  useless  than  the  assur- 
ance that  what  the  soul  actually  does,  that  it  must  also  have 
the  power  to  do.  Who  disputes  this?  A  faculty  explains 
nothing  so  long  as  the  laws  under  which  its  functions  and 
its  relations  to  other  faculties  remain  unexplained.  But 
although  the  faculty  idea  serves  no  positive  end,  it  can- 
not be  entirely  discarded.  It  marks  the  boundary  where 
our  ability  to  reduce  one  class  of  psychical  phenomena  to 
another  ceases.  Herbart's  polemic  has  no  force  against  the 
moderate  and  necessary  use  of  this  idea,  no  matter  how 
much  it  was  in  place  in  view  of  the  impropriety  of  a  super- 
fluous multiplication  of  the  faculties  of  the  soul.  The  real- 
ization of  the  ideal  of  psychology,  the  reduction  of  the  com- 
plex phenomena  of  mental  life  to  the  smallest  possible 
number  of  simple  elements,  is  limited  by  the  heterogeneity 
of  the  original  phenomena,  knowing,  feeling,  willing,  which 
wholly  resists  derivation  from  the  combination  of  sensations. 
That  which  blinded  Herbart  to  these  limitations  was  that 
tendency  toward  unity,  which,  as  a  metaphysician  and  moral 
philosopher,  he  had  all  too  willfully  suppressed,  and  which 
now  took  revenge  for  this  infringement  of  its  rights  by  mis- 
leading the  psychologist  to  an  exaggeration  which  had 
important  consequences.  Nevertheless  his  unsuccessful 
attempt  remains  interesting  and  worthy  of  gratitude. 

The  discovery  of  the  laws  which  govern  tin-  interaction 
of  the  psychical  elements  is  the  task  of  a  statics  and  a 
mechanics  of  representations.  The  former  investigates  the 
equilibrium    or    the    settled     final    state  ;     the     latter,    the 


528  HERBART. 

change,  i.  c,  the  movements  of  representations.  These 
names  of  themselves  betray  Ilerbart's  conviction  that 
mathematics  can  and  must  be  applied  to  psychology.  The 
bright  hopes,  however,  which  Herbart  formed  for  the 
attempt  at  a  mathematical  psychology,  were  fulfilled 
neither  in  his  own  endeavors  nor  in  those  of  his  pupils, 
although,  as  Lotze  remarks,  it  would  be  asserting  too  much 
to  say  that  the  most  general  formulas  which  he  set  up  con- 
tradict experience. — The  unity  of  the  soul  forces  represen- 
tations to  act  on  one  another.  Disparate  representations, 
those,  that  is,  which  belong  to  different  representative  series, 
as  the  visual  image  of  a  rose  and  the  auditory  image  of  the 
word  rose,  or  as  the  sensations  yellow,  hard,  round,  ringing, 
connected  in  the  concept  gold  piece,  enter  into  complica- 
tions [complexes].  Homogeneous  representations  (the 
memory  image  and  the  perceptual  image  of  a  black  poodle) 
fuse  into  a  single  representation.  Opposed  representations 
(red  and  blue)  arrest  one  another  when  they  are  in  con- 
sciousness together.  The  connection  and  graded  fusion  of 
representations  is  the  basis  of  their  retention  and  reproduc- 
tion's well  as  of  the  formation  of  continuous  series  of  re- 
presentations. The  reproduction  is  in  part  immediate,  a  free 
rising  of  the  representation  by  its  own  power  as  soon  as  the 
hindrances  give  way  ;  in  part  mediate,  a  coming  up  through 
the  help  of  others.  On  the  arrest  of  partially  or  totally 
opposed  representations  Herbart  bases  his  psychological  cal- 
culus. Let  there  be  given  simultaneously  in  consciousness 
three  opposed  representations  of  different  intensities,  the 
strongest  to  be  called  a,  the  weakest  c,  the  intermediate  one 
b.  What  happens  ?  They  arrest  one  another,  i.  e.,  a  part  of 
each  is  forced  to  sink  below  the  threshold  of  consciousness.* 
What  is  the  amount  of  the  arrest?  As  much  as  all  the 
weaker  representations  together  come  to — the  sum  of  arrest 
or  the  sum  of  that  which  becomes  unconscious  (as  it  were 

*  By  their  mutual  pressure  representations  are  transformed  into  a  mere  tendency 
to  represent,  which  again  becomes  actual  representation  when  the  arrest  ceases. 
The  parts  of  a  representation  transformed  into  a  tendency,  and  the  residua 
remaining  unobscured,  are  not  pieces  cut  off,  but  the  quantity  denotes  merely  a 
degree  of  obscuration  in  the  whole  representation,  or  rather  in  the  representa- 
tion which  actually  takes  place. 


PSYCHOLOGY.  529 

the  burden  to  be  divided)  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  all  the 
representations  with  the  exception  of  the  strongest  (hence 
=  b  -f-  c),  and  is  divided  among  the  individual  representa- 
tions in  the  inverse  ratio  of  their  strength,  consequently  in 
such  a  way  that  the  strongest  (the  one  which  most  actively 
and  successfully  resists  arrest)  has  the  least,  and  the  weak- 
est the  most,  of  it  to  bear.  It  may  thus  come  to  pass  that 
a  representation  is  entirely  driven  out  of  consciousness  by 
two  stronger  ones,  while  it  is  impossible  for  this  to  happen 
to  it  from  a  single  one,  no  matter  how  superior  it  be.  The 
simplest  case  of  all  is  when  two  equally  strong  representa- 
tions are  present,  in  which  case  each  is  reduced  to  the 
half  of  its  original  intensity.  The  sum  of  that  which 
remains  in  consciousness  is  always  equal  to  the  greatest 
representation. 

As  soon  as  a  representation  reaches  the  zero  point  of 
consciousness,  or  as  soon  as  a  new  representation  (sensation) 
comes  in,  the  others  begin  at  once  to  rise  or  sink.  The 
Mechanics  seeks  to  investigate  the  laws  of  these  movements 
of  representations;  but  we  may  the  more  readily  pass  over 
its  complicated  calculations  since  their  precise  formulas  can 
never  more  than  very  roughly  represent  the  true  state  of 
the  case,  which  simply  rebels  against  precision.  The  rock 
on  which  every  immanent  use  of  mathematics  in  psychology 
must  strike,  is  the  impossibility  of  exactly  measuring  one 
representation  by  another.  We  may,  indeed,  declare  one 
stronger  than  another  on  the  basis  of  the  immediate  impres- 
sion of  feeling,  but  we  cannot  say  how  much  stronger  it  is, 
nor  with  reason  assert  that  it  is  twice  or  half  as  intense. 
Herbart's  mathematical  psychology  was  wrecked  by  this 
insurmountable  difficulty.  The  demand  for  exactness 
which  it  raised,  but  which  it  was  unable  to  satisfy  with  the 
means  at  its  disposal,  has  recently  been  renewed,  and  has 
led  to  assured  results  in  psycho-physics,  which  works  on 
a  different  basis  and  with  ingenious  methods  of  meas- 
urement. 

Herbart  endeavors,  as  we  have  seen,  to  deduce  the  vari- 
ous mental  activities  from  the  play  of  representations. 
Feeling  and  desire  are  not  something  beside  represen- 
tations, arc  not  special  faculties  of    the   soul,  but  results  of 


53°  HERBART. 

the  relations  of  representations,  changing  states  of  repres- 
entations arrested  and  working  upward  against  hindrances. 
A  representation  which  has  been  forced  out  of  conscious- 
ness persists  as  a  tendency  or  effort  to  represent,  and  as  such 
exerts  a  pressure  on  the  conscious  representations.  If  a 
representation  is  suspended  between  counteracting  forces 
a  feeling  results  ;  desire  is  the  rise  of  a  representation  in  the 
face  of  hindrances,  aversion  is  hesitation  in  sinking.  If  the 
effovt  is  accompanied  by  the  idea  that  its  goal  is  attainable, 
it  is  termed  will.  The  character  of  a  man  depends  on  the 
fact  that  definite  masses  of  representations  have  become 
dominant,  and  by  their  strength  and  persistence  hold 
opposing  representations  in  check  or  suppress  them.  The 
longer  the  dominant  mass  of  representations  exercises  its 
power,  the  firmer  becomes  the  habit  of  acting  in  a  certain 
way,  the  more  fixed  the  will.  Herbart's  intellectualistic 
denial  of  self-dependence  to  the  practical  capacities  of  the 
soul  leads  him  logically  to  determinism.  Volition  depends 
on  insight,  is  determined  by  representations  ;  freedom  signi- 
fies nothing  but  the  fact  that  the  will  can  be  determined  by 
motives.  If  the  individual  decisions  of  man  were  undeter- 
mined he  would  have  no  character;  if  the  character  were 
free  in  the  choice  between  two  actions,  then,  along  with  the 
noblest  resolve,  there  would  remain  the  possibility  of  an  op- 
posite decision  ;  freedom  of  choice  would  make  pure  chance 
the  doer  of  our  deeds.  Pedagogics,  above  all,  must  reject 
the  idea  of  an  undetermined  freedom  ;  education,  along  with 
imputation,  correction,  and  punishment,  would  bea  meaning- 
less word,  if  no  determining  influence  on  the  will  of  the  pupil 
were  possible. — This  last  objection  overlooks  the  fact  that 
the  pedagogical  influence  is  always  mediate,  and  can  do  no 
more  than,  by  disciplining  the  impulses  of  the  pupil  and 
by  supplyinghim  with  aids  against  immoral  inclinations,  to 
lighten  his  moral  task.  We  can  work  on  the  motives  only, 
never  directly  on  the  will  itself.  Otherwise  it  would  be 
inexplicable  that  even  the  best  pedagogical  skill  proves 
powerless  in  the  case  of  many  individuals. 

Herbart's  psychology  was  preceded  by  a  philosophy  of 
nature,  which  construes  matter  from  attraction  and  repul- 
sion, and  declares  an  actio  in  distans  impossible.     The  inter- 


religion:  531 

mediate  link  between  physics  and  psychology  is  formed  by 
the  science  of  organic  life  (physiology  or  biology) ;  and  with 
this  natural  theology  is  connected  by  the  following  prin- 
ciples:  The  purposiveness  which  we  notice  \uth  admira- 
tion in  men  and  the  higher  animals  compels  us,  since  it  can 
neither  come  from  chance  nor  be  explained  on  natural 
grounds  alone,  to  assume  as  its  author  a  supreme  artificer, 
an  intelligence  which  works  by  ends.  It  is  true,  indeed, 
that  the  existence  of  the  Deity  is  not  demonstrated  by  the 
teleological  argument ;  this  is  only  an  hypothesis,  but  one 
as  highly  probable  as  the  assumption  that  the  human 
bodies  by  which  we  are  surrounded  are  inhabited  by  human 
souls — a  fact  which  we  can  only  assume,  not  perceive  nor 
prove.  The  assurance  of  faith  is  different  from  that  of 
logic  and  experience,  but  not  inferior  to  it.  Religion  is 
based  on  humility  and  grateful  reverence,  which  is  favored, 
not  injured,  by  the  immeasurable  sublimity  of  its  object, 
the  incompleteness  of  our  idea  of  the  Supreme  Being,  and 
the  knowledge  of  our  ignorance.  If  faith  rests,  on  the  one 
hand,  on  the  teleological  view  of  nature,  it  is,  on  the  other, 
connected  with  moral  need,  and  exercises,  in  addition, 
aesthetic  influences.  By  comforting  the  suffering,  setting 
right  the  erring,  reclaiming  and  pacifying  the  sinner,  warn- 
ing, strengthening,  and  encouraging  the  morally  sound,  reli- 
gion brings  the  spirit  into  a  new  and  better  land,  shows  it  a 
higher  order  of  things,  the  order  of  providence,  which,  amid 
all  the  mistakes  of  men,  still  furthers  the  good.  The 
religious  spirit  always  includes  an  ethical  element,  and  the 
bond  of  the  Church  holds  men  together  even  where  the 
state  is  destroyed.  Indispensable  theoretically  as  a  sup- 
plement to  our  knowledge,  and  practically  because  of  the 
moral  imperfection  of  men,  who  need  it  to  humble,  warn, 
comfort,  and  lift  them  up,  religion  is,  nevertheless,  in  its 
origin  independent  of  knowledge  and  moral  will.  Faith 
is  older  than  science  and  morals:  the  doctrine  of  religion 
did  not  wait  for  astronomy  and  cosmology,  nor  the  erec- 
tion of  temples  for  ethics.  Before  the  development  of  the 
moral  concepts  religion  already  existed  in  the  form  of  won- 
der without  a  special  object,  of  a  gloomy  awe  which  ascribed 
every  sudden    inner  excitement   to  the  impulse  of  an  invisi- 


53  2  II ER  BART. 

ble  power.  Since  a  speculative  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  God  is  impossible,  the  only  task  which  remains  for 
metaphysics  is  the  removal  of  improper  determinations 
from  that  which  tradition  and  phantasy  have  to  say  on  the 
subject.  We  are  to  conceive  God  as  personal,  extramun- 
dane,  and  omnipotent,  as  the  creator,  not  of  the  reals  them- 
selves, but  of  their  purposive  coexistence  {Zusammen}.  In 
order,  however,  to  rise  from  the  idea  of  the  original,  most 
real,  and  most  powerful  being  to  that  of  the  most  excellent 
being  we  need  the  practical  Ideas,  without  which  the  former 
would  remain  an  indifferent  theoretical  concept.  Man 
can  pray  only  to  a  wise,  holy,  perfect,  just,  and  good  God. 

This,  in  essential  outline,  is  the  content  of  the  scattered 
observations  on  the  philosophy  of  religion  given  by  Her- 
bart.  Drobisch  {Ftindamcntal  Doctrines  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Religio)!,  1840),  from  the  standpoint  of  religious  criticism 
and  with  a  renewal  of  the  moral  argument,  and  Taute 
(1840-52)  and  Flügel  {Miracles  and  the  Possibility  of  a 
Knowledge  of  God,  1869)  with  an  apologetic  tendency  and 
one  toward  a  belief  in  miracles,  have,  among  others,  endea- 
vored to  make  up  for  the  lack  of  a  detailed  treatment  of 
this  discipline  by  Herbart — from  which,  moreover,  much  of 
value  could  hardly  have  been  expected  in  view  of  the  jejune- 
ness  of  his  metaphysical  conceptions  and  the  insufficiency 
of  his  appreciation  of  evil. 

It  remains  only  to  glance  at  Herbart's  ^Esthetics.  The 
beautiful  is  distinguished  from  the  agreeable  and  the  desir- 
able, which,  like  it,  are  the  objects  of  preference  and  rejec- 
tion, by  the  facts,  first,  that  it  arouses  an  involuntary  and 
disinterested  judgment  of  approval ;  and  second,  that  it  is 
a  predicate  which  is  ascribed  to  the  object  or  is  objective. 
To  these  is  added,  thirdly,  that  while  desire  seeks  for  that 
which  is  to  come,  taste  possesses  in  the  present  that  which 
it  judges. 

That  which  pleases  or  displeases  is  alway  the  form,  never 
the  matter;  and  further,  is  always  a  relation,  for  that  which 
is  entirely  simple  is  indifferent.  As  in  music  we  have  suc- 
ceeded in  discovering  the  simplest  relations,  which  please 
immediately  and  absolutely — we  know  not  why — so  this 
must   be    attempted   in  all   branches   of  the   theory  of  art. 


THE  PRACTICAL   IDEAS.  533 

The  most  important  among  them,  that  which  treats  of 
moral  beauty,  moral  philosophy,  has  therefore  to  inquire 
concerning  the  simplest  relations  of  will,  which  call  forth 
moral  approval  or  disapproval  (independently  of  the  inter- 
est of  the  spectator),  to  inquire  concerning  the  practical 
Ideas  or  pattern-concepts,  in  accordance  with  which  moral 
taste,  involuntarily  and  with  unconditional  evidence,  judges 
concerning  the  worth  or  unworth  of  (actually  happening  or 
merely  represented)  volitions.  Herbart  enumerates  five 
such  primary  Ideas  or  fundamental  judgments  of  con- 
science. 

(i)  The  Idea  of  inner  freedom  compares  the  will  with 
the  judgment,  the  conviction,  the  conscience  of  the  agent 
himself.  The  agreement  of  his  desire  with  his  own  judg- 
ment, with  the  precept  of  his  taste,  pleases,  lack  of  agree- 
ment displeases.  Since  the  power  to  determine  the  will 
according  to  one's  own  insight  of  itself  establishes  only  an 
empty  consistency  and  loyalty  to  conviction,  and  may  also 
subserve  immoral  craft,  the  first  Idea  waits  for  its  content 
from  the  four  following. 

(2)  The  Idea  of  perfection  has  reference  to  the  quanti- 
tative relations  of  the  manifold  strivings  of  a  subject,  in 
intensity,  extension,  and  concentration.  The  strong  is  pleas- 
ing in  contrast  with  the  weak,  the  greater  (more  extended, 
richer)  in  contrast  with  the  smaller,  the  collected  in  con- 
trast with  the  scattered  ;  in  other  words,  in  the  individual 
desires  it  is  energy  which  pleases,  in  their  sum  variety, 
in  the  system  co-operation.  While  the  first  two  Ideas 
have  compared  the  will  of  the  individual  man  with  itself, 
the  remaining  ones  consider  its  relation  to  the  will  of  other 
rational  beings,  the  third  to  a  merely  represented  will,  and 
the  last  two  to  an  actual  one. 

(3)  According  to  the  Idea  of  benevolence  or  goodness, 
which  gives  the  most  immediate  and  definite  criterion  of 
the  worth  of  the  disposition,  the  will  pleases  if  it  is  in  har- 
mony with  the  (represented)  will  of  another,  i.  <.,  makes 
the  satisfaction  of  the  latter  its  aim. 

(4)  The  Idea  of  right  is  based  <>n  the  fact  that  strife  dis- 
pleases. If  several  wills  come  together  at  one  point  with- 
out  ill-will    (in    claiming    a    thing),    the-    parties    ought    to 


534  II  ER  BART. 

submit  themselves  to  right  as  a  rule  for  the  avoidance  of 
strife. 

(5)  In  retribution  and  equity,  also,  the  original  element  is 
displeasure,  displeasure  in  an  unrequited  act  as  a  disturb- 
ance of  equilibrium.  This  last  Idea  demands  that  no  deed 
of  good  or  evil  remain  unanswered  ;  that  in  reward,  thanks, 
and  punishment,  a  quantum  of  good  and  evil  equal  to  that 
of  which  he  has  been  the  cause  return  upon  the  agent. 
The  one-sided  deed  of  good  or  ill  is  a  disturbance,  the 
removal  of  which  demands  a  corresponding  requital. 

Herbart  warns  us  against  the  attempt  to  derive  the  five 
original  Ideas  (which  scientific  analysis  alone  separates,  for 
in  life  we  always  judge  according  to  all  of  them  together) 
from  a  single  higher  Idea,  maintaining  that  the  demand  for 
a  common  principle  of  morals  is  a  prejudice.  From  the 
union  of  several  beings  into  one  person  proceed  five  other 
pattern-concepts,  the  derived  or  social  Ideas  of  the  ethical 
institutions  in  which  the  primary  Ideas  are  realized.  These 
correspond  to  the  primary  Ideas  in  the  reverse  order:  The 
system  of  rewards,  which  regulates  punishment ;  the  legal 
society,  which  hinders  strife;  the  system  of  administration, 
aimed  at  the  greatest  possible  good  of  all ;  the  system  of 
culture,  aimed  at  the  development  of  the  greatest  possible 
power  and  virtuosity  ;  finally,  as  the  highest,  and  that  which 
unites  the  others  in  itself,  society  as  a  person,  which,  when 
it  is  provided  with  the  necessary  power,  is  termed  the  state. 

If  we  combine  the  totality  of  the  original  Ideas  into  the 
unity  of  the  person  the  concept  of  virtue  arises.  If  we  reflect 
on  the  limitations  which  oppose  the  full  realization  of  the 
ideal  of  virtue,  we  gain  the  concepts  of  law  and  duty.  An 
ethics,  like  that  of  Kant,  which  exclusively  emphasizes  the 
imperative  or  obligatory  character  of  the  good,  is  one-sided  ; 
it  considers  morality  only  in  arrest,  a  mistake  which  goes 
with  its  false  doctrine  of  freedom.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
was  a  great  merit  in  Kant  that  he  first  made  clear  the 
unconditional  validity  of  moral  judgment,  independent  of 
all  eudemonism.  Politics  and  pedagogics  are  branches  of 
the  theory  of  virtue.  The  end  of  education  is  develop- 
ment in  virtue,  and,  as  a  means  to  this,  the  arousing  of 
varied  interests  and  the  production  of  a  stable  character. 


COXCLCSION.  535 

In  conclusion,  we  may  sum  up  the  points  in  which 
Herbart  shows  himself  a  follower  of  Kant — he  calls  himself 
a  "Kantian  of  the  year  1828."  His  practical  philosophy 
takes  from  Kant  its  independence  of  theoretical  philosophy, 
the  disinterested  character  of  aesthetic  judgment,  the  abso- 
luteness of  ethical  values,  the  non-empirical  origin  of  the 
moral  concepts  :  "  The  fundamental  ethical  relations  are  not 
drawn  from  experience."  His  metaphysics  owes  to  Kant 
the  critical  treatment  of  the  experience-concepts  (its  task 
is  to  make  experience  comprehensible),  in  which  the  lead- 
ing idea  in  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  the  antinomies,  the 
inevitableness  of  contradictions,  is  generalized,  extended 
to  all  the  fundamental  concepts  of  experience,  and,  as  it 
were,  transferred  from  the  Dialectic  to  the  Analytic;  it 
owes  to  him,  further,  the  conception  of  being  as  absolute 
position,  and,  finally,  the  dualism  of  phenomena  and  things 
in  themselves.  Herbart  (with  Schopenhauer)  considers  the 
renewal  of  the  Platonic  distinction  between  seeming  and 
being  the  chief  service  of  the  great  critical  philosopher,  and 
finds  his  greatest  mistake  in  the  a  priori  character  ascribed 
to  the  forms  of  cognition.  In  the  doctrine  of  the  pure 
intuitions  and  the  categories,  and  the  Critique  of  Judg- 
ment, he  rejects,  and  with  full  consciousness,  just  those 
parts  of  Kant  on  which  the  Fichtean  school  had  built  fur- 
ther. Finally,  Herbart's  method  of  thought,  his  imperson- 
ality, the  at  times  anxious  caution  of  his  inquiry,  and  the 
neatness  of  his  conceptions,  are  somewhat  akin  to  Kant's, 
only  that  he  lacked  the  gift  of  combination  to  a  much 
greater  degree  than  his  great  predecessor  on  the  Königs- 
berg rostrum.  His  remarkable  acutcness  is  busier  in 
loosening  than  in  binding;  it  is  more  happy  in  the  discov- 
ery of  contradictions  than  in  their  resolution.  Therefore 
he  does  not  belong  to  the  kings  who  have  decided  the  fate 
of  philosophy  for  long  periods  of  time;  he  stands  to  one 
side,  though  it  is  true  he  is  the  most  important  figure 
among  these  who  occupy  such  a  position. 

The  first  to  give  his  adherence  to  Herbart  in  essentia! 
positions,  and  so  to  furnish  occasion  for  tin-  formation  of 
an  Herbartian  school,  was  Drobisch  (horn  1S02).  in  two 
critiques    which    appeared     in      [828     and      [830.        Besides 


536  HERBARTIAN  SCHOOL. 

Drobisch,  from  whom  we  have  valuable  discussions  of 
Logic  (1836,  5th  ed.,  1887)  and  Empirical  Psychology 
(1842),  and  an  interesting  essay  on  Moral  Statistics  and 
the  Freedom  of  the  Will  (1867),  L.  Strümpell  (born  1812; 
The  Principal  Points  in  Herbarfs  Metaphysics  Critically 
Examined,  1840),  is  a  professor  in  Leipsic.  The  organ  of  the 
school,  the  Zeitschrift  für  exakte  Philosophic,  now  edited 
by  Flügel  (the  first  volume,  i860,  contained  a  survey  of  the 
literature  of  the  school),  was  at  first  issued  by  T.  Ziller,  the 
pedagogical  thinker,  and  Allihn.  The  Zeitschrift  für 
Völkerpsychologie  und  Sprachwissenschaft,  from  1859,  edited 
by  M.  Lazarus  (born  1824;  The  Life  of  the  Soul,  3  vols., 
1856  seq.,  3d  ed.,  1883  seq.)  and  H.  Steinthal  (born  1823; 
The  Origin  of  Language,  4th  ed.,  1888;  Sketch  of  the 
Science  of  Language,  parti.  2d  ed.,  1881  ;  General  Ethics, 
1885)  of  Berlin,  also  belongs  to  the  Herbartian  movement. 
Distinguished  service  has  been  done  in  psychology  by 
Nahlowsky  {The  Life  of  Feeling,  1862,  2d.  ed.,  1884), 
Theodor  Waitz  in  Marburg  (1821-84;  Foundation  of 
Psychology,  1846;  Text-book  of  Psychology,  1849),  and  Volk- 
mann in  Prague  (1822-77;  Text-book  of Psychology,^,  ed., 
by  Cornelius,  1884  and  1885);  while  Friedrich  Exner  (died 
1853)  was  formerly  much  spoken  of  as  an  opponent  of  the 
Hegelian  psychology  (1843-44).  Robert  Zimmermann  in 
Vienna  (born  1824)  represents  an  extreme  formalistic  ten- 
dency in  aesthetics  {History  of  ^Esthetics,  1858  ;  General 
^Esthetics  as  Science  of  Form,  1865  ;  further,  a  series  of 
thorough  essays  on  subjects  in  the  history  of  philosophy). 
Among  historians  of  philosophy  Thilo  has  given  a  rather 
one-sided  representation  of  the  Herbartian  standpoint. 
The  school's  philosophers  of  religion  have  been  mentioned 
above  (p.  532).  Beneke,  whom  we  have  joined  with  Fries 
on  account  of  his  anthropological  standpoint,  stands  about 
midway  between  Herbart  and  Schopenhauer.  He  shares 
in  the  former's  interest  in  psychology,  in  the  latter's 
foundation  of  metaphysical  knowledge  on  inner  experience, 
and  in  the  dislike  felt  by  both  for  Hegel ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  differs  from  Herbart  in  his  empirical 
method,  and  from  Schopenhauer  in  the  priority  ascribed  to 
representation  over  effort. 


SCHOPENHA  UER.  537 

3.  Pessimism :    Schopenhauer. 

Schopenhauer  is  in  all  respects  the  antipodes  of  Herbart. 
If  in  Herbart  philosophy  breaks  up  into  a  number  of  dis- 
tinct special  inquiries,  Schopenhauer  has  but  one  funda- 
mental thought  to  communicate,  in  the  carrying  out  of 
which,  as  he  is  convinced,  each  part  implies  the  whole  and 
is  implied  by  the  whole.  The  former  operates  with  sober 
concepts  where  the  latter  follows  the  lead  of  gifted  intui- 
tion. The  one  is  cool,  thorough,  cautious,  methodical  to 
the  point  of  pedantry;  the  other  is  passionate,  ingenious, 
unmethodical  to  the  point  of  capricious  dilettantism.  In 
the  one  case,  philosophy  is  as  far  as  possible  exact  science, 
in  which  the  person  of  the  thinker  entirely  retires  behind 
the  substance  of  the  inquiry  ;  in  the  other,  philosophy  con- 
sists in  a  sum  of  artistic  conceptions,  which  derive  their  con- 
tent and  value  chiefly  from  the  individuality  of  the  author. 
The  history  of  philosophy  has  no  other  system  to  show 
which  to  the  same  degree  expresses  and  reflects  the  person- 
ality of  the  philosopher  as  Schopenhauer's.  This  person- 
ality, notwithstanding  its  limitations  and  its  whims,  was 
important  enough  to  give  interest  to  Schopenhauer's  views, 
even  apart  from  the  relative  truth  which  they  contain. 

Arthur  Schopenhauer  (1788-1860)  was  the  son  of  a  mer- 
chant in  Dantzic  and  his  wife  Johanna,  nee  Trosiener,  who 
subsequently  became  known  as  a  novelist.  His  early  train- 
ing was  gained  from  foreign  travel,  but  after  the  death  of 
his  father  he  exchanged  the  mercantile  career,  which  he 
had  begun  at  his  father's  request,  for  that  of  a  scholar, 
studying  under  G.  E.  Schulze  in  Göttingen,  and  under 
Fichte  at  Berlin.  In  1813  he  gained  his  doctor's  degree  in 
Jena  with  a  dissertation  On  the  Fourfold  Root  of  the  Prin- 
ciple of  Sufficient  Reason.  Then  he  moved  from  Weimar, 
the  residence  of  his  mother,  where  he  had  associated  con- 
siderably with  Goethe  and  had  been  introduced  to  Indian 
philosophy  by  Fr.  Mayer,  to  Dresden  (1814-18).  In  the 
latter  place  he  wrote  the  essay  On  Sight  and  Colors  (1816; 
subsequently  published  by  the  author  in  Latin),  and 
his  chief  work,  '/'he  World  as  Will  and  AAvMiXio,;  new 
edition,  with    a    second    volume,    1844).       After  the  com- 


53s  SCJIO  PEN  HA  UER. 

pletion  of  the  latter  he  began  his  first  Italian  journey, 
while  his  second  tour  fell  in  the  interval  between  his  two 
quite  unsuccessful  attempts  (in  Berlin  1820  and  1825)  to 
propagate  his  philosophy  from  the  professor's  desk.  From 
183 1  until  his  death  he  lived  in  learned  retirement  in 
Frankfort-on-the-Main.  Here  he  composed  the  opuscule 
On  Will  in  Nature,  1836,  the  prize  treatises  On  the  Free- 
dom of  the  Unman  Will  and  On  the  Foundation  of  Ethics  (to- 
gether, The  Two  Fundamental  Problems  of  Ethics,  1841), 
and  the  collection  of  minor  treatises  Parcrga  and  Parali- 
pomena,  2  vols.,  1851  (including  an  essay  "  On  Religion"). 
J.  Frauenstädt  has  published  a  considerable  amount  of 
posthumous  material  (among  other  things  the  translation, 
B.  Gracians  Handorakel  der  Weltklugheit) ;  the  Collected 
Works  (6  vols.,  1873-74,  2d  ed.,  1877,  with  a  biographical 
notice);  Lichtstrahlen  aus  Schopenhauers  Werken,  1861 ,  5th 
ed.„  1885  ;  and  a  Schopenhauer  Lexicon,  2  vols.,  1871.* 

In  regard  to  subjective  idealism  Schopenhauer  confesses 
himself  a  thoroughgoing  Kantian.  That  sensations  are 
merely  states  in  us  has  long  been  known  ;  Kant  opened  the 
eyes  of  the  world  to  the  fact  that  the  forms  of  knowledge 
are  also  the  property  of  the  subject.  I  know  things  only 
as  they  appear  to  me,  as  I  represent  them  in  virtue  of  the 
constitution  of  my  intellect;  the  world  is  my   idea.     The 

*From  the  remaining  Schopenhauer  literature  (F.  Laban  has  published  a 
chronological  survey  of  it,  1880)  we  may  call  attention  to  the  critiques  of  the 
first  edition  of  the  chief  work  by  Herbart  and  Beneke,  and  that  of  the  second 
edition  by  Fortlage  (Jenaisclie  Litteratur  Zeitung,  1845,  Nos.  146-151)  ;  J. 
E.  Erdmann  Herbart  und  Schopenhauer,  eine  Antithese  {Zeitschrift  für 
Philosophie,  185 1)  ;  Wilh.  Gwinner,  Schopenhauers  Leben,  1878  (the  second  edi- 
tion of  Schopenhauer  aus  persönlichem  Umgang  dargestellt,  1862)  ;  Fr.  Nietzsche, 
Schopenhauer  als  Erzieher  (Unzeitgemässe  Betrachtungen,  Stück  iii.,  1874); 
O.  Busch,  A.  Schopenhauer,  2d.  ed.,  1878  ;  K.  Peters,  Schopenhauer  als 
Philosoph  und  Schriftsteller,  1880  ;  R.  Koeber,  Die  Philosophie  A.  Schopen- 
hatters,  i838.  [The  English  reader  may  be  referred  to  Haldane  and  Kemp's 
translation  of  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  3  vols.,  1883-86  ;  the  translation  of 
The  Fourfold  Root  and  the  Will  in  Nature  in  Bohn's  Philosophical  Library, 
1889  ;  Saunders's  translations  from  the  Parerga  and  Paralipomena,  1889  seq.  ; 
Helen  Zimmern's  Arthur  Schopenhauer,  his  Life  and  his  Philosophy,  1876  ; 
W.  Wallace's  Schopenhauer,  Great  Writers  Series,  1890  (with  a  bibliography 
by  Anderson,  including  references  to  numerous  magazine  articles,  etc.)  ;  Sully's 
Pessimism,  2d  ed.,  1882,  chap.  iv. ;  and  Royce's  Spirit  of  Modem  Philosophy, 
chap,  viii.,  1892. — Tr.] 


PRINCIPLE   OF  SUFFICIENT  REASON.  539 

Kantian  theory,  however,  is  capable  of  simplification,  the 
various  forms  of  cognition  may  be  reduced  to  a  single  one, 
to  the  category  of  causality  or  principle  of  sufficient  reason 
— which  was  preferred  by  Kant  himself — as  the  general 
expression  of  the  regular  connection  of  our  representa- 
tions. This  principle,  in  correspondence  with  the  several 
classes  of  objects,  or  rather  of  representations — viz.,  pure 
(merely  formal)  intuitions,  empirical  (complete)  intuitions, 
acts  of  will,  abstract  concepts — has  four  forms:  it  is  the 
principium  rationis  essendi,  rationis  fiendi,  rationis  agc/idi, 
rationis  cognosccndi.  The  ratio  essendi  is  the  law  which 
regulates  the  coexistence  of  the  parts  of  space  and  the 
succession  of  the  divisions  of  time.  The  ratio  ficndi 
demands  for  every  change  of  state  another  from  which  it 
regularly  follows  as  from  its  cause,  and  a  substance  as  its 
unchangeable  substratum — matter.  All  changes  take  place 
necessarily,  all  that  is  real  is  material  ;  the  law  of  causality 
is  valid  for  phenomena  alone,  not  beyond  them,  and  holds 
only  for  the  states  of  substances,  not  for  substances  them- 
selves. In  inorganic  nature  causes  work  mechanically,  in 
organic  nature  as  stimuli  (in  which  the  reaction  is  not 
equal  to  the  action),  and  in  animated  nature  as  motives. 
A  motive  is  a  conscious  (but  not  therefore  a  free)  cause  ; 
the  law  of  motivation  is  the  ratio  agendi.  This  serial  order, 
"mechanical  cause,  stimulus,  and  motive,"  denotes  only  dis- 
tinctions in  the  mode  of  action,  not  in  the  necessity  of 
action.  Man's  actions  follow  as  inevitably  from  his  charac- 
ter and  the  motives  which  influence  him  as  a  clock  strikes 
the  hours;  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  a  chimera.  Finally, 
the  ratio  cognosccndi  determines  that  a  judgment  must  have 
a  sufficient  ground  in  order  to  be  true.  Judgment  or  the 
connection  of  concepts  is  the  chief  activity  of  tin-  reason, 
which,  as  the  faculty  of  .abstract  thought  and  the  organ  of 
science,  constitutes  the  difference  between  man  and  the 
brute,  while  the  possession  of  the  understanding  with  its 
intuition  of  objects  is  common  to  hot  h.  In  opposition  to 
thecustom  ary  overestimation  of  this  gift  of  mediate  repres- 
entations, of  language,  and  of  reflection,  Schopenhauer 
gives  prominence  to  the  fact  thai  the  reason  is  not  a  crea- 
tive  faculty   like    the   understanding,   but    only  a  receptive 


540  SCHOTEN II A  UER. 

power,  that  it  clarifies  and  transforms  the  content  furnished 
by  intuition  without  increasing  it  by  new  representations. 

Objective  cognition  is  confined  within  the  circle  of  our 
representations;  all  that  is  knowable  is  phenomenon. 
Space,  time,  and  causality  spread  out  like  a  triple  veil 
between  us  and  the  per  sc  of  things,  and  prevent  a  vision  of 
the  true  nature  of  the  world.  There  is  one  point,  however, 
at  which  we  know  more  than  mere  phenomena,  where  of 
these  three  disturbing  media  only  one,  time-form,  separates 
us  from  the  thing  in  itself.  This  point  is  the  consciousness 
of  ourselves. 

On  the  one  hand,  I  appear  to  myself  as  body.  My  body 
is  a  temporal,  spatial,  material  object,  an  object  like  all 
others,  and  with  them  subject  to  the  laws  of  objectivity. 
But  besides  this  objective  cognition,  I  have,  further,  an 
immediate  consciousness  of  myself,  through  which  I  appre- 
hend my  true  being — I  know  myself  as  willing.  My  will 
is  more  than  a  mere  representation,  it  is  the  original  element 
in  me,  the  truly  real  which  appears  to  me  as  body.  The 
will  is  related  to  the  intellect  as  the  primary  to  the  second- 
ary, as  substance  to  accident ;  it  is  related  to  the  body  as 
the  inner  to  the  outer,  as  reality  to  phenomenon.  The  act 
of  will  is  followed  at  once  and  inevitably  by  the  move- 
ment of  the  body  willed,  nay,  the  two  are  one  and  the 
same,  only  given  in  different  ways:  will  is  the  body  seen 
from  within,  body  the  will  seen  from  without,  the  will 
become  visible,  objectified.  After  the  analogy  of  ourselves, 
again,  who  appear  to  ourselves  as  material  objects  but  in 
truth  are  will,  all  existence  is  to  be  judged.  The  universe 
is  the  mac-antJiropos  ;  the  knowledge  of  our  own  essence,  the 
key  to  the  knowledge  of  the  essence  of  the  world.  Like 
our  body,  the  whole  world  is  the  visibility  of  will.  The 
human  will  is  the  highest  stage  in  the  development  of  the 
same  principle  which  manifests  its  activity  in  the  various 
forces  of  nature,  and  which  properly  takes  its  name  from 
the  highest  species.  To  penetrate  further  into  the  inner 
nature  of  things  than  this  is  impossible.  What  that  which 
presents  itself  as  will  and  which  still  remains  after  the 
negation  of  the  latter  (see  below)  is  in  itself,  is  for  us  abso- 
lutely unknowable. 


THE    WORLD   AS    WILL  AND   IDEA.  54* 

The  world  is  per  se  will.  None  of  the  predicates  are  to 
be  attributed  to  the  primal  will  which  we  ascribe  to  things 
in  consequence  of  our  subjective  forms  of  thought — neither 
determination  by  causes  or  ends,  nor  plurality  :  it  stands 
outside  the  law  of  causality,  as  also  outside  space  and  time, 
which  form  the  principium  inctividuationis.  The  primal 
will  is  groundless,  blind  stress,  unconscious  impulse  toward 
existence  ;  it  is  one,  the  one  and  all,  ev  uai  -nav.  That 
which  manifests  itself  as  gravity,  as  magnetic  force,  as  the 
impulse  to  growth,  as  the  vis  medicatrix  natura,  is  only 
this  one  world-will,  whose  unity  (not  conscious  character!) 
shows  itself  in  the  purposiveness  of  its  embodiments.  The 
essence  of  each  thing,  its  hidden  quality,  at  which  empiri- 
cal explanation  finds  its  limit,  is  its  will  :  the  essence 
of  the  stone  is  its  will  to  fall;  that  of  the  lungs  is  the 
will  to  breathe  ;  teeth,  throat,  and  bowels  are  hunger  ob- 
jectified. Those  qualities  in  which  the  universal  will  gives 
itself  material  manifestation  form  a  series  with  grades  of 
increasing  perfection,  a  realm  of  unchangeable  specific 
forms  or  eternal  Ideas,  which  (with  a  real  value  difficult  to 
determine)  stand  midway  between  the  one  primal  will  and 
the  numberless  individual  beings.  That  the  organic  indi- 
vidual does  not  perfectly  correspond  to  the  ideal  of  its 
species,  but  only  approximates  this  more  or  less  closely,  is 
grounded  in  the  fact  that  the  stadia  in  the  objectification 
of  the  will,  or  the  Ideas,  contend,  as  it  were,  for  matter  ;  and 
whatever  of  force  is  used  up  in  the  victory  of  the  higher 
Ideas  over  the  lower  is  lost  for  the  development  of  the  exam- 
ples of  the  former.  The  higher  the  level  on  which  a  being 
stands  the  clearer  the  expression  of  its  Individuality.  The 
most  general  forces  of  nature,  which  constitute  the  raw 
mass,  play  the  fundamental  bass  in  the  world-symphony, 
the  higher  stages  of  inorganic  nature,  with  the  vegetable 
and  animal  worlds,  the  harmonious  middle  parts,  and  man 
the  guiding  treble,  the  significant  melody.  With  the  human 
brain  the  world  as  idea  is  given  at  a  stroke;  in  this  organ 
the  will  has  kindled  a  torch  in  order  to  throw  light  upon 
itself  and  to  carry  out  its  designs  with  careful  deliberation  ; 
it  has  brought  forth  the  intellect  as  its  instrument,  which, 
with   the   great    majority   of  men,  remains  in  a  position    of 


54-  SCHOPENHAUER. 

subservience  to  the  will.  Brain  and  thought  are  the  same; 
the  former  is  nothing  other  than  the  will  to  know,  as  the 
stomach  is  will  to  digest.  Those  only  talk  of  an  imma. 
terial  soul  who  import  into  philosophy — -where  such  ideas 
do  not  belong — concepts  taught  them  when  they  were 
confirmed. 

Schopenhauer's  philosophy  is  as  rich  in  inconsistencies  as 
his  personality  was  self-willed  and  unharmonious.  "He 
carries  into  his  system  all  the  contradictions  and  whims  of 
his  capricious  nature,"  says  Zeller.  From  the  most  radical 
idealism  (the  objective  world  a  product  of  representa- 
tion) he  makes  a  sharp  transition  to  the  crassest  material- 
ism (thought  a  function  of  the  brain) ;  first  matter  is  to  be  a 
mere  idea,  now  thought  is  to  be  merely  a  material  phenom- 
enon !  The  third  and  fourth  books  of  The  World  as  Will 
and  Idea,  which  develop  the  aesthetic  and  ethical  standpoint 
of  their  author,  stand  in  as  sharp  a  contradiction  to  the 
first  (noetical)  and  the  second  (metaphysical)  books  as 
these  to  each  other.  While  at  first  it  wras  maintained 
that  all  representation  is  subject  to  the  principle  of  suffi- 
cient reason,  we  are  now  told  that,  besides  causal  cognition, 
there  is  a  higher  knowledge,  one  which  is  free  from  the 
control  of  this  principle,  viz.,  aesthetic  and  philosophical 
intuition.  If,  before,  it  was  said  that  the  intellect  is  the 
creature  and  servant  of  the  will,  we  now  learn  that  in 
favored  individuals  it  gains  the  power  to  throw  off  the 
yoke  of  slavery,  and  not  only  to  raise  itself  to  the  blessed- 
ness of  contemplation  free  from  all  desire,  but  even  to 
enter  on  a  victorious  conflict  with  the  tyrant,  to  slay  the  will. 
The  source  of  this  power— is  not  revealed.  R.  Haym  {A. 
SclwpcnJiaucr,  1864,  reprinted  from  the  Pmtssischc  Jahr- 
bücher) was  not  far  wrong  in  characterizing  Schopenhauer's 
philosophy  as  a  clever  novel,  which  entertains  the  reader  by 
its  rapid  vicissitudes. 

The  contemplation  which  is  free  from  causality  and  will 
is  the  essence  of  aesthetic  life;  the  partial  and  total  subla- 
tion,  the  quieting  and  negation  of  the  will,  that  of  ethical 
life.  It  is  but  seldom,  and  only  in  the  artistic  and  philo- 
sophical genius,  that  the  intellect  succeeds  in  freeing  itself 
from    the    supremacy    of    the    will,    and,    laying  aside  the 


ART  AND  MORALITY.  543 

question  of  the  why  and  wherefore,  the  where  and  when, 
In  sinking  itself  completely  in  the  pure  what  of 
things.  While  with  the  majority  of  mankind,  as  with  ani- 
mals, the  intellect  always  remains  a  prisoner  in  the  service 
of  the  will  to  live,  of  self-preservation,  of  personal  inter- 
ests, in  gifted  men,  in  artists  and  thinkers,  it  strips  off  all 
that  is  individual,  and,  in  disinterested  vision  of  the  Ideas, 
becomes  pure,  timeless  subject,  freed  from  the  will.  Art 
removes  individuality  from  the  subject  as  well  as  from  the 
object ;  its  comforting  and  cheering  influence  depends  on 
the  fact  that  it  elevates  those  enjoying  it  to  the  stand- 
point— raised  above  all  pain  of  desire — of  a  fixed,  calm,  com- 
pletely objective  contemplation  of  the  unchangeable  essence, 
of  the  eternal  types  of  things.  For  aesthetic  intuition  the 
object  is  not  a  thing  under  relation^  of  space,  time,  and  cause, 
but  only  an  expression,  an  exemplification,  a  representative 
of  the  Idea.  Poetry,  which  presents — most  perfectly  in  trag- 
edy— the  Idea  of  humanity,  stands  higher  than  the  plastic 
arts.  The  highest  rank,  however,  belongs  to  music,  since  it 
does  not,  like  the  other  arts,  represent  single  Ideas,  but — 
as  an  unconscious  metaphysic,  nay,  a  second,  ideal  world 
above  the  material  world — the  will  itself.  In  view  of  this 
high  appreciation  of  their  art,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
musicians  have  contributed  a  considerable  contingent  to 
the  band  of  Schopenhauer  worshipers.  A  different  source 
of  attraction  for  the  wider  circle  of  readers  was  supplied  by 
the  piquant  spice  of  pessimism. 

If  the  purposiveness  of  the  phenomena  of  nature  points  to 
the  unity  of  the  primal  will,  the  unspeakable  misery  of  life, 
which  Schopenhauer  sets  forth  with  no  less  of  eloquence, 
proves  the  blindness  and  irrationality  of  the  world-ground. 
To  live  is  to  suffer;  the  world  contains  incomparably  more 
pain  than  pleasure  ;  it  is  the  worst  possible  world.  In  the 
world  of  sub-animal  nature  aimless  striving;  in  the  ani- 
mal world  an  insatiable  impulse  after  enjoyment — while  the 
will,  deceiving  itself  with  fancied  happiness  to  come,  which 
always  remains  denied  it,  and  continually  tossed  to  and  fro 
between  necessity  and  ennui,  never  attains  complete  satis- 
faction. The  pleasure  which  it  pursues  is  nothing  but  the 
removal  of  a  dissatisfaction,  and  vanishes  at  once  when    the 


544  SCHOPENHA  UER 

longing  is  stilled,  to  be  replaced  by  fresh  wants,  that  is,  by 
new  pains.  In  view  of  the  indescribable  misery  in  the 
world,  to  favor  optimism  is  evidence  not  so  much  of  folly 
and  blindness  as  of  a  wanton  disposition.  The  old  saying  is 
true  :  Non-existence  is  better  than  existence.  The  mis- 
ery, however,  is  the  just  punishment  for  the  original  sin  of 
the  individual,  which  gave  itself  its  particular  existence  by 
an  act  of  intelligible  freedom.  Redemption  from  the  sin 
and  misery  of  existence  is  possible  only  through  a  sec- 
ond act  of  transcendental  freedom,  which,  since  it  con- 
sists in  the  complete  transformation  of  our  being,  and  since 
it  is  supernatural  in  its  origin,  the  Church  is  right  in 
describing  as  a  new  birth  and  work  of  grace. 

Morality  presupposes  pessimistic  insight  into  the  bad- 
ness of  the  world  and  the  fruitlessness  of  all  desire,  and 
pantheistic  discernment  of  the  untruth  of  individual  exist- 
ence and  the  identity  in  essence  of  all  individuals  from  a 
metaphysical  standpoint.  Man  is  able  to  free  himself  from 
egoistic  self-affirmation  only  when  he  perceives  the  two 
truths,  that  all  striving  is  vain  and  the  longed-for  pleasure 
unattainable,  and  that  all  individuals  are  at  bottom  one,  viz. 
manifestations  of  the  same  primal  will.  This  is  temporarily 
effected  in  sympathy,  which,  as  the  only  counterpoise  to 
natural  selfishness,  is  the  true  moral  motive  and  the  source 
of  all  love  and  justice.  The  sympathizer  sees  himself  in 
others  and  feels  their  suffering  as  his  own.  The  entire 
negation  of  the  will,  however,  inspiring  examples  of  which 
have  been  furnished  by  the  Christian  ascetics  and  Oriental 
penitents,  stands  higher  than  the  vulgar  virtue  of  sympathy 
with  the  sufferings  of  others.  Here  knowledge,  turned 
away  from  the  individual  and  vain  to  the  whole  and  gen- 
uine, ceases  to  be  a  motive  for  the  will  and  becomes  a 
means  of  stilling  it ;  the  intellect  is  transformed  from  a 
motive  into  a  quietive,  and  brings  him  who  gives  himself 
up  to  the  All  safely  out  from  the  storm  of  the  passions  into 
the  peace  of  deliverance  from  existence.  Absence  of  will, 
resignation,  is  holiness  and  blessedness  in  one.  For  him  who 
has  slain  the  will  in  himself  the  motley  deceptive  dream  of 
phenomena  has  vanished,  he  lives  in  the  ether  of  true 
reality,  which  for  our  knowledge  is  an  empty  nothingness 


MORALITY  AXD  RELIGION.  545 

("  Nirvana "),  yet  (as  the  ultimate,  incomprehensible 
per  se,  which  remains  after  the  annulling  of  the  will)  only  a 
relative  nothingness — relative  to  the  phenomenon. 

Schopenhauer  disposes  of  the  sense  of  responsibility  and 
the  reproofs  of  conscience,  which  are  inconvenient  facts 
for  his  determinism,  by  making  them  both  refer,  not  to 
single  deeds  and  the  empirical  character,  but  to  the  indi- 
visible act  of  the  intelligible  character.  Conscience  does 
not  blame  me  because  I  have  acted  as  I  must  act  with  my 
character  and  the  motives  given,  but  for  being  what  in 
these  actions  I  reveal  myself  to  be.  Operari  sequitur  esse. 
My  action  follows  from  my  being,  my  being  was  my  own 
free  choice,  and  a  new  act  of  freedom  is  alone  capable  of 
transforming  it. 

If  Schopenhauer  is  fond  of  referring  to  the  agreement  of 
his  views  with  the  oldest  and  most  perfect  religions,  the 
idea  lies  in  the  background  that  religion, — which  springs 
from  the  same  metaphysical  needs  as  philosophy,  and,  for 
the  great  multitude,  who  lack  the  leisure  and  the  capacity 
for  philosophical  thought,  takes  the  place  of  the  former, — 
as  the  metaphysics  of  the  people,  clothes  the  same  funda- 
mental truths  which  the  philosopher  offers  in  conceptual 
form  and  supports  by  rational  grounds  in  the  garb  of  myth 
and  allegory,  and  places  them  under  the  protection  of  an 
external  authority.  When  this  character  of  religion  is  over- 
looked, and  that  which  is  intended  to  be  symbolical  is 
taken  for  literal  truth  (it  is  not  the  supernaturalists  alone 
who  start  with  this  unjust  demand,  but  the  rationalists  also, 
with  their  minimizing  interpretations),  it  becomes  the 
worst  enemy  of  true  philosophy.  In  Christianity  the 
doctrines  of  original  sin  and  of  redemption  are  especially 
congenial  to  our  philosopher,  as  well  as  mysticism  and  ascet- 
icism, lie  declares  Mohammedanism  the  worst  religion  on 
account  of  its  optimism  and  abstract  theism,  and  Buddhism 
the  best,  because  it  is  idealistic,  pessimistic,  and — atheistic. 

It  was  not  until  after  the  appearance  of  the  second  edi- 
tion of  his  chief  work  that  Schopenhauer  experienced  in 
increasing  measure  the  satisfaction — which  his  impatient 
ambition  had  expected  much  earlier — of  seeing  his  philos- 
ophy   seriously    considered.     A   zealous   apostle  arose  for 


54Ö  SCHOPENHAUERS  FOLLOWERS. 

him  in  Julius  Frauenstädt  (died  1878;  Letters  on  the  Phi- 
losophy of  Schopenhauer,  1854;  New  Letters  on  the  Phi- 
losophy of  Schopenhauer,  1876),  who,  originally  an  Hegelian, 
endeavored  to  remove  pessimism  from  the  master's  system. 
Like  Eduard  von  Hartmann,  who  will  be  discussed  below, 
Julius  Bahnsen  (died  1882;  The  Contradiction  in  the  Knowl- 
edge and  Being  of  the  World,  the  Principle  and  Particular 
Verification  of  Real-Dialetic,  1880-81  ;  also,  interesting  char- 
acterological  studies)  seeks  to  combine  elements  from 
Schopenhauer  and  Hegel,  while  K.  Peters  {Will-world  and 
World-zi'ill,  1883)  shows  in  another  direction  points  of  con- 
tact with  the  first  named  thinker.  Of  the  younger  mem- 
bers of  the  school  we  may  name  P.  Deussen  in  Kiel 
(The  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  2d  ed.,  1890),  and  Philipp 
Mainländer  (Philosophy  of  Redemption,  2d  ed.,  1879).  As 
we  have  mentioned  above,  Schopenhauer's  doctrines  have 
exercised  an  attractive  force  in  artistic  circles  also. 
Richard  Wagner  (1813-83;  Collected  Writings,  9  vols., 
1871-73,  vol.  x.  1883;  2d  ed.,  1887-88),  whose  earlier  aes- 
thetic writings  ( The  Art-work  of  the  Future,  1850  ;  Opera  and 
Drama,  i85i)had  shown  the  influence  of  Feuerbach,  in 
his  later  works  (Beethoven,  1870;  Religion  and  Art,  in  the 
third  volume  of  the  Bayreuther  Blätter,  1880)  became  an 
adherent  of  Schopenhauer,  after,  in  the  Ring  of  the  Nibel- 
ung,  he  had  given  poetical  expression  to  a  view  of  the 
world  nearly  allied  to  Schopenhauer's,  though  this  was 
previous  to  his  acquaintance  with  the  works  of  the  latter.* 
One  of  the  most  thoughtful  disciples  of  the  Frankfort 
philosopher  and  the  Bayreuth  dramatist  is  Friedrich 
Nietzsche  (born  1844).  His  Unseasonable  Reflections,  1873- 
76,  f  is  a  summons  to  return  from  the  errors  of  modern 
culture,  which,  corrupted  by  the  seekers  for  gain,  by  the 
state,  by  the  polite  writers  and  savants,  especially  by  the 
professors  of  philosophy,  has  made  men  cowardly  and 
false    instead    of   simple    and    honorable,    mere    self-satis- 

*Cf.  on  Warner,  Fr.  v.  Hausegger,  Warner  und  Schopenhauer ,  1878. 
[English  translation  of  Wagner's  Prose  Works  by  Ellis,  vol.  i.,  i8q2. — Tr] 

+  "  D.  Strauss,  the  Confessor  and  the  Author  ";  "  On  the  Advantage  and 
Disadvantage  of  History  for  Life";  "  Schopenhauer  as  an  Educator  "  ;  "  R. 
Wagner  in  Bayreuth." 


SCHOPENHAUERS  FOLLOWERS.  547 

fied  "  philistines  of  culture."  In  his  writings  since  1878* 
Nietzsche  has  exchanged  the  role  of  a  German  Rousseau 
for  that  of  a  follower  of  Voltaire,  to  arrive  finally  at  the 
ideal  of  the  man  above  men.f 

*  Human,  All-too-human,  new  ed.,  1886  ;  The  Dawn,  Thoughts  on  Human 
Prejudices,  18S1  ;  The  Merry  Science,  1882  ;  So  spake  Zarathustra,  1883-84  ; 
Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  1886;  On  the  Genealogy  of  Morals,  1887,  2d  ed.,  1887; 
The  Wagner  Affair,  1888,  2d  ed.,  1892;  Götzendämmerung,  or  How  to  Philos- 
ophize with  the  Hammer,  1889. 

\  Cf.  H.  Kaatz,  Die  Weltanschauung  Fr.  Nietzsches,  I.  Kultur  und  Moral, 
1892. 


CHAPTER    XV. 
PHILOSOPHY   OUT   OF   GERMANY. 

i.  Italy. 

The  Cartesian  philosophy,  which  had  been  widely  ac- 
cepted in  Italy,  and  had  still  been  advocated,  in  the  sense 
of  Malebranche,  by  Sigismond  Gerdil  (1718-1802),  was 
opposed  as  an  unhistorical  view  of  the  world  by  Giam- 
battista  Vico,*  the  bold  and  profound  creator  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  history  (1668-1744;  from  1697  professor  of 
rhetoric  in  the  University  of  Naples).  Vico's  leading 
ideas  are  as  follows:  Man  makes  himself  the  criterion  of 
the  universe,  judges  that  which  is  unknown  and  remote 
by  the  known  and  present.  The  free  will  of  the  individ- 
ual rests  on  the  judgments,  manners,  and  habits  of  the 
people,  which  have  arisen  without  reflection  from  a  uni- 
versal human  instinct.  Uniform  ideas  among  nations 
unacquainted  with  one  another  are  motived  in  a  common 
truth.  History  is  the  development  of  human  nature;  in 
it  neither  chance  nor  fate  rules,  but  the  legislative  power 
of  providence,  in  virtue  of  which  men  through  their  own 
freedom  progressively  realize  the  idea  of  human  nature. 
The  universal  course  of  civilization  is  that  culture  transfers 
its  abode  from  the  forests  and  huts  into  villages,  cities, 
and,  finally,  into  academies  ;  the  nature  of  the  nations  is  at 
first  rude,  then  stern,  gradually  it  becomes  mild,  nay,  effemi- 
nate, and  finally  wanton  ;  at  first  men  feel  only  that  which 
is  necessary,  later  they  regard  the  useful,  the  convenient, 
the  agreeable  and  attractive,  until  the  luxury  sprung  from 
the  sense  for  the  beautiful  degenerates  into  a  foolish  mis- 
use of  things.     Vico  divides  antiquity  into  three  periods: 

*  Vico  :  Principles  of  a  Areu>  Science  of  the  Common  Nature  of  Nations, 
\Ti<5  ;  Works,  in  six  volumes,  edited  by  G.  Ferrari,  1835-37,  new  ed..  1853  seq. 
On  Vico  cf.  K.  Werner,  1877  and  1879.  [Also  Flint's  Vico,  Blackwood's 
Philosophical  Classics,  1884. — Tr.] 

548 


vi  co.  549 

the  divine  (theocracy),  the  heroic  (aristocracy),  and  the 
human  (democracy  and  monarchy).  The  same  course  of 
things  repeats  itself  in  the  nations  of  later  times:  to  the 
patriarchal  dominion  of  the  fanciful,  myth-making  Orient 
correspond  the  spiritual  states  of  the  migrations ;  to  the 
old  Greek  aristocracy,  the  chivalry  and  robber)'  of  the 
period  of  the  Crusades  ;  to  the  republicanism  and  the  mon- 
archy of  later  antiquity,  the  modern  period,  which  gives 
even  the  citizens  and  peasants  a  share  in  the  universal 
equality.  If  European  culture  had  not  been  transplanted 
to  America,  the  same  three-act  drama  of  human  develop- 
ment would  there  be  playing.  Vico  carries  this  threefold 
division  into  his  consideration  of  manners,  laws,  languages, 
character,  etc. 

If  Vico  anticipates  the  Hegelian  view  of  history,  Anto- 
nio Genovesi  (1712-69),  who  also  taught  at  the  University 
of  Naples,  and  while  the  former  was  still  living,  shows  him- 
self animated  by  a  presentiment  of  the  Kantian  criticism.* 
Appreciating  Leibnitz  and  Locke,  and  appropriating  the 
idea  of  the  monads  from  the  one  and  the  unknowableness 
of  substance  from  the  other,  he  reaches  the  conviction — 
according  to  statements  in  his  letters — that  sense-bodies 
are  nothing  but  the  appearances  of  intelligible  unities; 
that  each  being  for  us  is  an  activity,  whose  substratum  and 
ground  remains  unknown  to  us  ;  that  self-consciousness  and 
the  knowledge  of  external  impressions  yield  phenomena 
alone,  through  the  elaboration  of  which  we  produce  the 
intellectual  worlds  of  the  sciences.  For  the  rest,  Genovesi 
thus  advises  his  friends:  Study  the  world,  devote  your- 
selves to  languages  and  to  mathematics,  think  more  about 
men  than  about  the  things  above  us,  and  leave  metaphys- 

*  In  the  following  account  we  have  made  use  of  a  translation  of  the  conclud- 
ing section  of  Francesco  Fiorentino's  Handbook  of  the  History  of  Philosophy, 
1879-81,  which  was  most  kindly  placed  at  our  disposal  by  Dr.  J.  Mainzer. 
Cf.  La  Filosofm  Contemporanea  in  Italia,  1876,  by  the  same  author;  further, 
Bonatelli,  Die  Philosophie  in  Italien  seit,  1815;  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie  und 
philosophische  Kritik,  vol.  liv.  1869,  p.  134  sea,;  and  especially,  K.  Werner, 
Die  Italienische  Philosophie  des  XIX.  Jahrhunderts,  s  vols. ,  1KS4-S0.  [The 
English  reader  may  he  referred  to  tin-  appendix  on  [talian  philosophy  in  vol.  ii. 
of  the  English  translation  of  (Jeberweg,  by  Vincenzo  Botta  ;  and  to  Harzellotti's 
"Philosophy  in  Italy,"  Mind,  vol.  iii.  1878. — Tk.] 


550  ITALY. 

ical  vagaries  to  the  monks  !  His  countrymen  honor  in  him 
the  man  who  first  included  ethics  and  politics  in  philosoph- 
ical instruction,  and  who  used  the  Italian  language  both 
from  the  desk  and  in  his  writings,  holding  that  a  nation 
whose  scientific  works  are  not  composed  in  its  own  tongue 
is  barbarian. 

The  sensationalism  of  Condillac,  starting  from  Parma, 
gained  influence  over  Melchiore  Gioja  (1767-1828  ;  Statis- 
tical Logic,  1803  ;  Ideology,  1822)  and  Giandomenico  Ro- 
magnosi  (1761-1835  ;  What  is  the  Sound  Mind?  1827),  but 
not  without  experiencing  essential  modification  from 
both.  The  importance  of  these  men,  moreover,  lies  more 
in  the  sphere  of  social  philosophy  than  in  the  sphere  of 
noetics. 

Of  the  three  greatest  Italian  philosophers  of  this  century, 
Galluppi,  Rosmini,  and  Gioberti,  the  first  named  is  more  in 
sympathy  with  the  Kantian  position  than  he  himself  will 
confess.  Pasquale  Galluppi*  (1770-1846;  from  1831  pro- 
fessor at  Naples)  adheres  to  the  principle  of  experience, 
but  does  not  conceive  experience  as  that  which  is  sensu- 
ously given,  but  as  the  elaboration  of  this  through  the  syn- 
thetic relations  (rapporti)  of  identity  and  difference,  which 
proceed  from  the  activity  of  the  mind.  Vincenzo  de 
Grazia  {Essay  on  the  Reality  of  Hitman  Knoivlcdge,  1839-42), 
who  holds  all  relations  to  be  objective,  and  Ottavio  Colecchi 
(died  1847;  Philosophical  Investigations,  1843),  who  holds 
them  all  subjective,  oppose  the  view  of  Galluppi  that 
some  are  objective  and  others  subjective.  According  to 
De  Grazia  judgment  is  observation,  not  connection ;  it 
finds  out  the  relations  contained  in  the  data  of  sensation  ; 
it  discovers,  but  does  not  produce  them.  Colecchi  reduces 
the  Kantian  categories  to  two,  substance  and  cause.  Testa, 
Borelli  (1824),  and,  among  the  younger  men,  Cantoni,  are 
Kantians  ;  Labriola  is  an  Herbartian. 

*  Galluppi  :  Philosophical  Essay  on  the  Critique  of  Knowledge,  1819  seq.; 
Lectures  on  Logic  and  Metaphysics,  1832  seq.;  Philosophy  of  the  Will,  1832 
seq.;  On  the  System  of  Fichte,  or  Considerations  on  Transcendental  Idealism  and 
Absolute  Rationalism,  1841.  By  the  Letters  on  the  History  of  Philosophy 
from  Descartes  t"  Kant.  1S27,  in  the  later  editions  to  Cousin,  he  became  the 
founder  of  this  discipline  in  his  native  land. 


ROSMINI,   GIO BERTI.  55 1 

Antonio  Rosmini-Serbati  *  (born  1797  at  Rovereto,  died 
1855  at  Stresa)  regards  knowledge  as  the  common  product 
of  sensibility  and  understanding,  the  former  furnishing  the 
matter,  the  latter  the  form.  The  form  is  one:  the  Idea 
of  being  which  precedes  all  judgment,  which  does  not  come 
from  myself,  which  is  innate,  and  apprehensible  by  imme- 
diate inner  perception  (essere  ideale,  ente  universale).  The 
pure  concepts  (substance,  cause,  unity,  necessity)  arise 
when  the  reflecting  reason  analyzes  this  general  Idea  of 
being ;  the  mixed  Ideas  (space,  time,  motion ;  body, 
spirit),  when  the  understanding  applies  it  to  sensuous 
experience.  The  universal  Idea  of  being  and  the  particular 
existences  are  in  their  being  identical,  but  in  their  mode  of 
existence  different.  In  his  posthumous  TJicosopJiy,  1859 
seq.,  Rosmini  no  longer  makes  the  universal  being  receive 
its  determinations  from  without,  but  produce  them  from  its 
own  inner  nature  by  means  of  an  a  priori  development. 
Vincenzo  Gioberti  *  (born  1801  in  Turin,  died  1852  at 
Paris)  has  been  compared  as  a  patriot  with  Fichte,  and  in 
his  cast  of  thought  with  Spinoza.  In  place  of  Rosmini's 
"  psychologism,"  which  was  advanced  by  Descartes  and 
which  leads  to  skepticism,  he  seeks  to  substitute  "  ontol- 
ogism,"  which  is  alone  held  capable  of  reconciling 
science  and  the  Catholic  religion.  By  immediate  intuition 
(the  content  of  which  Gioberti  comprehends  in  the 
formula  "  Being  creates  the  existences  ")  we  cognize  the 
absolute  as  the  creative  ground  of  two  series,  the  series  of 
thought  and  the  series  of  reality.  The  endeavors  of  Ros- 
mini  and  Gioberti  to  bring  the  reason  into  harmony  with 
the  faith  of  the  Church  were  fiercely  attacked  by  Giussepe 
Ferrari  (1811-76)  and  Ausonio  Franchi  (1853),  while 
Francesco  Bonatelli  {Thought  and  Cognition,  1864)  and 
Terenzio  Mamiani  (1800-85  '■>  Confessions  of  a  Metaphysi- 
cian, 1865),  follow  a  line  of  thought  akin  to  the  1'latonizing 

*  Rosmini  :  New  Essay  on  the  Origin  of  /</r-<is,  1830  (English  translation, 
1883-84);  Principles  of  Moral  Science,  1831  ;  Philosophy  of  Right,  1841. 
Gioberti:  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Philosophy,  [840;  Philosophical  Err  on 
of  A.  Rosmini,  1842  ;  On  the  Beautiful,  [841  ;  On  the  Good,  [842  ;  Protology, 
edited  by  Massari,  1857.  On  both  cf.  K.  Seydel,  Zeitschrift  ///>■  Philosophie, 
1859. 


55-  FRANCE. 

views  of  the  first  named  thinkers.  The  review  Filosofia 
delle  Scuole  Italiane,  called  into  life  by  Mamiani  in  1870, 
has  been  continued  since  1886  under  the  direction  of  L. 
Ferri  as  the  Rivista  It  a  liana  di  Filosofia. 

The  Thomistic  doctrine  has  many  adherents  in  Italy, 
among  whom  the  Jesuit  M.  Liberatore  (1865)  may  be  men- 
tioned. The  Hegelian  philosophy  has  also  found  favor 
there  (especially  in  Naples),  as  well  as  positivism.  The 
former  is  favored  by  Vera,  Mariano,  Ragnisco,  and  Spaventa 
(died  1885);  the  Rivista  di  Filosofia  Scicntifica,  1 88 1  seq., 
founded  by  Morselli,  supports  the  latter,  and  E.  Caporali's 
La  Nuova  Scienza,  1884,  moves  in  a  similar  direction.  Pietro 
Siciliani  (On  the  Revival  of  the  Positive  Philosophy  in  Italy, 
1871)  makes  the  third,  the  critical,  period  of  philosophy 
by  which  scholasticism  is  overthrown  and  the  reason 
made  authoritative,  commence  with  Vico,  and  bases  his 
doctrine  on  Vico's  formula:  The  conversion  (transpo- 
sition) of  the  verum  and  the  factum,  and  vice  versa. 
Subsequently  he  inclined  to  positivism,  which  he  had 
previously  opposed,  and  among  the  representatives  of 
which  we  may  mention,  further,  R.  Ardigo  of  Pavia  (Psy- 
chology as  Positive  Science,  1870  ;  The  Ethics  of  Positivism, 
1885  ;  Philosophical  Works,  1883  seq.),  and  Andrea  Angiulli 
of  Naples  (died  1890;  Philosophy  and  the  Schools,  1889), 
who  explain  matter  and  spirit  as  two  phenomena  of  the 
same  essence  ;  further,  Giuseppe  Sergi,  Giovanni  Cesca, 
and  the  psychiatrist,  C.  Lombroso,  the  head  of  the  posi- 
tivistic  school  of  penal  law. 

2.     France. 

Among  the  French  philosophers  of  this  century  *  none 
can  compare  in  far-reaching  influence,  both  at  home  and 
abroad,  with  Auguste   Comte,-f  the   creator    of    positivism 

*  Accounts  of  French  philosophy  in  the  nineteenth  century  have  been  given 
by  Taine  (1857,  3d  ed.,  1867);  Janet  (La  Philosophie  Francaise  Contemporaine, 
2d  ed.,  1879)  :  A.  Franck  ;  Ferraz  (3  vols.,  1880-89)  ;  Felix  Ravaisson  (2d  ed., 
1884);  the  Swede,  J.  Borelius  (Glances  at  the  Present  Position  of  Philosophy  in 
Germany  and  France,  German  translation  by  Jonas,  1887);  [and  Ribot,  Mind, 
vol.  ii.,  1877]. 

f  On  Comte  cf.  B.  Piinjer,  Jahrbücher  für  protestantische  Theologie,  1878; 
R.  Eucken,  Zur  Würdigung  Comtes  und  des  Positivismus,  in  the  Aufsätze  zum 


COMTE.  553 

(born  at  Montpellier  in  1798,  died  at  Paris  in  1857),  whose 
chief  work,  the  Course  of  Positive  Philosophy,  6  vols.,  ap- 
peared in  1830-42.  [English  version,  "  freely  translated 
and  condensed,"  by  Harriet  Martineau,  1853.] 

The  positive  philosophy  seeks  to  put  an  end  to  the 
hoary  error  that  anything  more  is  open  to  our  knowledge 
than  given  facts — phenomena  and  their  relations.  We  do 
not  know  the  essence  of  phenomena,  and  just  as  little 
their  first  causes  and  ultimate  ends;  we  know — by  means 
of  observation,  experiment,  and  comparison — only  the  con- 
stant relations  between  phenomena,  the  relations  of  suc- 
cession and  of  similarity  among  facts,  the  uniformities  of 
which  we  call  their  laws.  All  knowledge  is,  therefore,  rela- 
tive;  there  is  no  absolute  knowledge,  for  the  inmost  es- 
sence of  facts,  and  likewise  their  origin,  the  way  in  which 
they  are  produced,  is  for  us  impenetrable.  We  know  only, 
and  this  by  experience,  that  the  phenomenon  A  is  invariably 
connected  with  the  phenomenon  B,  that  the  second  always 
follows  on  the  first,  and  call  the  constant  antecedent  of  a 
phenomenon  its  cause.  We  know  such  causes  only  as  are 
themselves  phenomena.  The  fact  that  our  knowledge  is 
limited  to  the  succession  and  coexistence  of  phenomena  is 
not  to  be  lamented  as  a  defect:  the  only  knowledge  which 
is  attainable .  by  us  is  at  the  same  time  the  only  useful 
knowledge,  that  which  lends  us  practical  power  over  phe- 
nomena. When  we  inquire  into  causes  we  desire  to  hasten 
or  hinder  the  effect,  or  to  change  it  as  we  wish,  or  at  least 
to  anticipate  it  in  order  to  make  our  preparations  accord- 
ingly. Such  foresight  and  control  of  events  can  be  attained 
only  through  a  knowledge  of  their  laws,  their  order  of  suc- 
cession, their  phenomenal  causes.  Sa%>oir  pour  privoir. 
But,  although  the  prevision  of  facts  is  the  only  knowledge 
which  we  need,  men  have  always  sought  after  another,  an 
"absolute"  knowledge,  or  have  even  believed  that  they 
were  in  possession  of  it  ;  the  forerunners  of  the  positive 
philosophy  themselves,  Bacon    and    Descartes,  have    been 

Zeller  Jubiläum  y  1887  ;  Maxim.  Brlltt,  Der  Positivismus \  Programme  of  the  Real' 
gymnasium  des  Jokanneums,  Hamburg,  1889;  [also,  besides  Mill,  j>  560,  John 
Morlcy,  Encyclopedia  Britanniea,  vol.  vi.  pp.  229  238,  and.  E.  Caird,  The 
Social  Philosophy  anil  Religion  of  Comte,  1885.— Tr.  J. 


554  FRANCE. 

entangled  in  this  prejudice.  A  long  intellectual  develop« 
ment  was  required  to  reach  the  truth,  that  our  knowledge 
does  not  extend  beyond  the  cognition  of  the  succession 
and  coexistence  of  facts  ;  that  the  same  procedure  must 
be  extended  to  abstract  speculation  which  the  common 
mind  itself  makes  use  of  in  its  single  actions.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  positive  philosophy,  notwithstanding  its 
rejection  of  metaphysics,  is  far  from  giving  its  sanction  to 
empiricism.  Every  isolated,  empirical  observation  is  use- 
less and  uncertain  ;  it  obtains  value  and  usefulness  only 
when  it  is  defined  and  explained  by  a  theory,  and  combined 
with  other  observations  into  a  law — this  makes  the  dif- 
ference between  the  observations  of  the  scholar  and  the 
layman. 

The  positive  stage  of  a  science,  which  begins  when  we 
learn  to  explain  phenomena  by  their  laws,  is  preceded  by 
two  others:  a  theological  stage,  which  ascribes  phenomena 
to  supposed  personal  powers,  and  a  metaphysical  stage, 
which  ascribes  them  to  abstract  natural  forces.  These 
three  periods  denote  the  childhood,  the  youth,  and  the 
manhood  of  science. 

The  earliest  view  of  the  world  is  the  theological  view, 
which  derives  the  events  of  the  world  from  the  voluntary 
acts  of  supernatural  intelligent  beings.  The  crude  view  of 
nature  sees  in  each  individual  thing  a  being  animated  like 
man  ;  later  man  accustoms  himself  to  think  of  a  whole  class 
of  objects  as  governed  by  one  invisible  being,  by  a  divinity  ; 
finally  the  multitude  of  divinities  gives  place  to  a  single 
God,  who  creates,  maintains,  and  rules  the  universe,  and  by 
extraordinary  acts,  by  miracles,  interferes  in  the  course  of 
events.  Thus  fetichism  (in  its  highest  form,  astrolatry), 
polytheism,  and  monotheism  are  the  stages  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  theological  mode  of  thought.  In  the  second, 
the  metaphysical,  period,  the  acts  of  divine  volition  are 
replaced  by  entities,  by  abstract  concepts,  which  are  re- 
garded as  realities,  as  the  true  reality  back  of  phenomena. 
A  force,  a  power,  an  occult  property  or  essence  is  made  to 
dwell  in  things;  the  mysterious  being  which  directs  events 
is  no  longer  called  God,  but  "  Nature,"  and  invested  with 
certain  inclinations,  with  a  horror  of  a  vacuum,  an  aversion 


COMTE.  555 

to  breaks,  a  tendency  toward  the  best,  a  vis  mcdicatrix,  etc. 
Here  belong,  also,  the  vegetative  soul  of  Aristotle,  the  vital 
force  and  the  plastic  impulse  of  modern  investigators. 
Finally  the  positive  stage  is  reached,  when  all  such  abstrac- 
tions, which  are  even  yet  conceived  as  half  personal  and 
acting  voluntarily,  are  abandoned,  and  the  unalterable  and 
universally  valid  laws  of  phenomena  established  by  obser- 
vation and  experiment  alone.  But  to  explain  the  laws  of 
nature  themselves  transcends,  according  to  Comte,  the  fixed 
limits  of  human  knowledge.  The  beginning  of  the  world 
lies  outside  the  region  of  the  knowable,  atheism  is  no  better 
grounded  than  the  theistic  hypothesis,  and  if  Comte  asserts 
that  a  blindly  acting  mechanism  is  less  probable  than  a 
world-plan,  he  is  conscious  that  he  is  expressing  a  mere  con- 
jecture which  can  never  be  raised  to  the  rank  of  a  scientific 
theory.  The  origin  and  the  end  of  things  are  insoluble 
problems,  in  answering  which  no  progress  has  yet  been  made 
in  spite  of  man's  long  thought  about  them.  Only  that 
which  lies  intermediate  between  the  two  inscrutable  ter- 
mini of  the  world  is  an  object  of  knowledge. 

It  is  not  only  the  human  mind  in  general  that  exhibits 
this  advance  from  the  theological,  through  the  metaphys- 
ical, to  the  positive  mode  of  thought,  but  each  separate 
science  goes  through  the  same  three  periods — only  that  the 
various  disciplines  have  developed  with  unequal  rapidity. 
While  some  have  already  culminated  in  the  positive  method 
of  treatment,  others  yet  remain  caught  in  the  theological 
period  of  beginnings,  and  others  still  are  in  the  metaphys- 
ical transition  stage.  Up  to  the  present  all  three  phases 
of  development  exist*  side  by  side,  and  even  among  the 
objects  of  the  most  highly  developed  sciences  there  are 
some  which  we  continue  to  regard  theologically  ;  these  are 
the  ones  which  we  do  not  yet  understand  how  to  calculate, 
as  the  changes  of  the  weather  or  the  spread  of  epidemics. 
Which  science  first  attained  the  positive  state,  and  in  what 
order  have  the  others  followed?  With  this  criterion  Comte 
constructs  his  classification  of the  sciences ;  in  which,  how- 
ever, Ik-  takes  account  only  of  those  sciences  which  lie  calls 
abstract,  that  is,  those  which  treat  of  "events"  in  dis- 
tinction from  "objects.'      The  abstract  sciences  (as  biology) 


55ö  FRANCE. 

investigate  the  most  general  laws  of  nature,  valid  for  all 
phenomena,  from  which  the  particular  phenomena  which 
experience  presents  to  us  cannot  be  deduced,  but  on  the 
basis  of  which  an  entirely  different  world  were  also  possi- 
ble. The  concrete  sciences,  on  the  other  hand  {e.  g.,  botany 
and  zoology),  have  to  do  with  the  actually  given  combina- 
tions of  phenomena.  The  former  follow  out  each  separate 
one  of  the  general  laws  through  all  its  possible  modes  of 
operation,  the  latter  consider  only  the  combination  of  laws 
given  in  an  object.  Thus  oaks  and  squirrels  are  the  result 
of  very  many  laws,  inasmuch  as  organisms  are  dependent 
not  only  on  biological,  but  also  on  physical,  chemical,  and 
mathematical  laws. 

Comte  enumerates  six  of  these  abstract  sciences,  and 
arranges  them  in  such  a  way  that  each  depends  on  the 
truths  of  the  preceding,  and  adds  to  these  its  own  special 
truths,  while  the  first  (the  most  general  and  simplest)  pre- 
supposes no  earlier  laws  whatever,  but  is  presupposed  by 
all  the  later  ones.  According  to  this  principle  of  increas- 
ing particularity  and  complexity  the  following  scale  results: 
(i)  Mathematics,  in  which  the  science  of  number,  as  being 
absolutely  without  presuppositions,  precedes  geometry  and 
mechanics  ;  (2)  Astronomy  ;  (3)  Physics  (with  five  subordi- 
nate divisions,  in  which  the  first  place  belongs  to  the 
theory  of  weight,  and  the  last  to  electrology,  while  the 
theory  of  heat,  acoustics,  and  optics  are  intermediate)  ;  (4) 
Chemistry;  (5)  Biology  or  physiology  ;  (6)  Sociology  or  the 
science  of  society.  This  sequence,  which  is  determined  by 
the  increasing  complexity  and  increasing  dependence  of 
the  objects  of  the  sciences,  is  the  order  in  which  they 
have  historically  developed — before  the  special  laws  of  the 
more  complicated  sciences  can  be  ascertained,  the  general 
laws  of  the  more  simple  ones  must  be  accurately  known. 
It  is  also  advisable  to  follow  this  same  order  of  increasing 
complexity  and  difficult}'-  in  the  study  of  the  sciences,  for 
acquaintance  with  the  methods  of  those  which  are  elemen- 
tary is  the  best  preparation  for  the  pursuit  of  the  higher 
ones.  In  arithmetic  and  geometry  we  study  positivity  at 
its  source;   in   the  sociological  spirit  it  finds  its  completion. 

Mathematics    entered  on    its  positive  stage   at   quite  an 


COMTE.  557 

early  period,  chemistry  and  biology  only  in  recent  times, 
while,  in  the  highest  and  most  complicated  science,  the  meta- 
physical (negative,  liberal,  democratic,  revolutionary)  mode 
of  thought  is  still  battling  with  the  feudalism  of"  the  theo- 
logical mode.  To  make  sociology  positive  is  the  mission 
of  the  second  half  of  Comte's  work,  and  to  this  goal  his 
philosophical  activity  had  been  directed  from  the  beginning. 
Comte  rates  the  efforts  of  political  economy  very  low,  with 
the  exception  of  the  work  of  Adam  Smith,  and  will  not  let 
them  pass  as  a  preparation  for  scientific  sociology,  holding 
that  they  are  based  on  false  abstractions.  Psychology,  which 
is  absent  from  the  above  enumeration,  is  to  form  a  branch  of 
biology,  and  exclusively  to  use  the  objective  method,  espe- 
cially phrenology  (to  the  three  faculties  of  the  soul,  "heart, 
character,  and  intellect,"  correspond  three  regions  of  the 
brain).  Self-observation,  so  Comte,  making  an  impossi- 
bility out  of  a  difficulty,  teaches,  can  at  most  inform  us 
concerning  our  feelings  and  passions,  and  not  at  all  concern- 
ing our  own  thinking,  since  reflection  brings  to  a  stop  the 
process  to  which  it  attends,  and  thus  destroys  its  object. 
The  sole  source  of  knowledge  is  external  sense-perception. 
In  his  Positive  Polity  Comte  subsequently  added  a  seventh 
fundamental  science,  ethics  or  anthropology. 

Sociology,*  the  elevation  of  which  to  the  rank  of  a  positive 
science  is  the  principal  aim  of  our  philosopher,  uses  the 
same  method  as  the  natural  sciences,  namely,  the  interroga- 
tion and  interpretation  of  experience  by  means  of  induction 
and  deduction,  only  that  here  the  usual  relation  of  these 
two  instruments  of  knowledge  is  reversed.  Between  inor- 
ganic and  organic  philosophy,  both  of  which  proceed  from 
the  known  to  the  unknown,  there  is  this  difference,  that  in 
the  former  the  advance  is  from  the  elements,  as  that  which 
alone  is  directly  accessible,  to  the  whole  which  is  composed 
of  them,  while  in  the  latter  the  opposite  is  the  case,  since 
here  the  whole  is  better  known  than  the  individual  parts  of 
which  it  consists.  Hence,  in  inorganic  science  the  laws  of 
the  composite  phenomena  are  obtained  by  deduction  (from 

*  Cf.  Krohn  :  Beiträge  iur  tCenntnist  mn/  Würdigung  <if>  Soziologie,  Jahr- 
bücher für  Nationalökonomie  und  Statistik,  New  Scries,  vols.  i.  and  iii..  1880 
and  1881. 


558  FRANCE. 

the  laws  of  the  simple  facts  inductively  discovered)  and 
confirmed  by  observation  ;  in  sociology,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  laws  are  found  through  (historical)  experience,  and  de- 
ductively verified  (from  the  nature  of  man  as  established  by 
biology)  only  in  the  sequel.  Since  the  phenomena  of 
society  are  determined  not  merely  by  the  general  laws  of 
human  nature,  but,  above  all,  by  the  growing  influence  of 
the  past,  historical  studies  must  form  the  basis  of  socio- 
logical inquiry. 

Of  the  two  parts  of  sociology,  the  Statics,  which  investi- 
gates the  equilibrium  (the  conditions  of  the  existence,  the 
permanence,  and  the  coexistence  of  social  states),  and 
Dynamics,  which  investigates  the  movement  (the  laws  of 
the  progress)  of  social  phenomena,  the  first  was  in  essence 
established  by  Aristotle.  The  fundamental  concept  of  the 
Statics  is  the  consensus,  the  harmony,  solidarity,  or  mutual 
dependence  of  the  members  of  the  social  organism.  All  its 
parts,  science,  art,  religion,  politics,  industry,  must  be  con- 
sidered together;  they  stand  in  such  intimate  harmony  and 
correlation  that,  for  every  important  change  of  condition  in 
one  of  these  parts,  we  may  be  certain  of  finding  corre- 
sponding changes  in  all  the  others,  as  its  causes  and  effects. 
Besides  the  selfish  propensities,  there  dwell  in  man  an 
equally  original,  but  intrinsically  weaker,  impulse  toward 
association,  which  instinctively  leads  him  to  seek  the  society 
of  his  fellows  without  reflection  on  the  advantages  to  be 
expected  therefrom,  and  a  moderate  degree  of  benevolence. 
As  altruism  conflicts  with  egoism,  so  the  reason,  together 
with  the  impulse  to  get  ahead,  which  can  only  be  satisfied 
through  labor,  is  in  continual  conflict  with  the  inborn  dis- 
inclination to  regulated  activity  (especially  to  mental  effort). 
The  character  of  society  depends  on  the  strength  of  the 
nobler  incentives,  that  is,  the  social  inclinations  and 
intellectual  vivacity  in  opposition  to  the  egoistic  impulses 
and  natural  inertness.  The  former  nourish  the  progressive, 
the  latter  the  conservative  spirit.  Women  are  as  much 
superior  to  men  in  the  stronger  development  of  their  sym- 
pathy and  sociability  as  they  are  inferior  in  insight  and 
reason.  Society  is  a  group  of  families,  not  of  individuals, 
and  domestic  life  is  the  foundation,  preparation,  and  pattern 


COMTE.  559 

for  social  life.  Comte  praises  the  family,  the  connecting 
link  between  the  individual  and  the  species,  as  a  school  of 
unselfishness,  and  approves  the  strictness  of  the  Catholic 
Church  in  regard  to  the  indissolubility  of  the  marriage 
relation.  He  remarks  the  evil  consequences  of  the  con- 
stantly increasing  division  of  labor,  which  makes  man  egois- 
tic and  narrow-minded,  since  it  hides  rather  than  reveals 
the  social  significance  of  the  employment  of  the  individual 
and  its  connection  with  the  welfare  of  the  community,  and 
seeks  for  a  means  of  checking  them.  Besides  the  universal 
education  of  youth,  he  demands  the  establishment  of  a 
spiritual  power  to  bring  the  general  interest  continually  to 
the  minds  of  the  members  of  all  classes  and  avocations,  to 
direct  education,  and  to  enjoy  the  same  authority  in  moral 
and  intellectual  matters  as  is  conceded  to  the  astronomer 
in  the  affairs  of  his  department.  The  function  of  this 
power  would  be  to  occupy  the  position  heretofore  held 
by  the  clergy.  Comte  conceives  it  as  composed  of  positive 
philosophers,  entirely  independent  of  the  secular  authori- 
ties, but  in  return  cut  off  from  political  influence  and  from 
wealth.  Secular  authority,  on  the  other  hand,  he  wishes 
put  into  the  hands  of  an  aristocracy  of  capitalists,  with  the 
bankers  at  the  head  of  these  governing  leaders  of  industry. 
The  Dynamics,  the  science  of  the  temporal  succession  of 
social  phenomena,  makes  use  of  the  principle  of  develop- 
ment. The  progress  of  society,  which  is  to  be  regarded 
as  a  great  individual,  consists  in  the  growing  predomi- 
nance of  the  higher,  human  activities  over  the  lower  and 
animal.  The  humanity  in  us,  it  is  true,  will  never  attain  com- 
plete ascendency  over  the  animality,  but  we  can  approach 
nearer  and  nearer  to  the  ideal,  and  it  is  our  duty  to  aid  in 
this  march  of  civilization.  Although  the  law  of  progress 
holds  good  for  all  sides  of  mental  life,  for  art,  politics,  and 
morals,  as  well  as  for  science,  nevertheless  the  most  im- 
portant factor  in  the  evolution  of  the  human  race  is  the 
development  of  the  intellect  as  the  guiding  power  in  us 
(though  not  in  itself  the  strongest).  Awakened  first  l>v  the 
lower  wants,  the  intellect  assumes  in  increasing  measure 
the  guidance  of  human  operations,  and  gives  a  determinate 
direction   to   the    feelings.     The   passions   divide  men,  and, 


56°  FRANCE. 

without  the  guidance  of  the  speculative  faculty,  would  mutu- 
ally cripple  one  another  ;  that  which  alone  unites  them  into 
a  collection  force  is  a  common  belief,  an  idea.  Ideas  are 
related  to  feeling — to  quote  a  comparison  from  John  Stuart 
Mill's  valuable  treatise  Auguste  Comtc  and  Positivism, 
3d  ed.,  1882,  a  work  of  which  we  have  made  considerable 
use — as  the  steersman  who  directs  the  ship  is  to  the  steam 
which  drives  it  forward.  Thus  the  history  of  humanity 
has  been  determined  by  the  history  of  man's  intellectual  con- 
victions, and  this  in  turn  by  the  three  familiar  stages  in  the 
theory  of  the  universe.  With  the  development  from  the 
theological  to  the  positive  mode  of  thought  is  most  inti- 
mately connected,  further,  the  transition  from  the  military 
to  the  industrial  mode  of  life.  As  the  religious  spirit  pre- 
pares the  way  for  the  scientific  spirit,  so  without  the 
dominion  of  the  military  spirit  industry  could  not  have 
been  developed.  It  was  only  in  the  school  of  war  that  the 
earliest  societies  could  learn  order;  slavery  was  beneficial 
in  that  through  it  labor  was  imposed  upon  the  greater 
part  of  mankind  in  spite  of  their  aversion  to  it.  The 
political  preponderance  of  the  legists  corresponds  to  the 
intermediate,  metaphysical  stage.  The  sociological  law 
(discovered  by  Comte  in  the  year  1822)  harmonizes  also 
with  the  customary  division  which  separates  the  ancient 
from  the  modern  world  by  the  Middle  Ages. 

In  his  philosophy  of  history  Comte  gives  the  further 
application  of  these  principles.  Here  he  has  won  commen- 
dation even  from  his  opponents  for  a  sense  of  justice  which 
merits  respect  and  for  his  comprehensive  view.  The  out- 
looks and  proposals  for  the  future  here  interspersed  were 
in  later  writings*  worked  out  into  a  comprehensive  theory 
of  the  regeneration  of  society  ;  the  extravagant  character 
of  which  has  given  occasion  to  his  critics  to  make  a  com- 
plete division  between  the  second,  "subjective  or  senti- 
mental," period  of  his  thinking,  in  which  the  philosopher 
is  said   to  be  transformed   into  the  high   priest   of  a  new 

*■  Positirnst  Catechism,  1852  [English  translation  by  Congreve,  1858,  2d  ed., 
1883]  ;  System  of  Positive  Polity,  4  vols.,  1851-54  [English  translation,  1875— 
77].  Cf.  Pünjer,  A.  Comtes  "  Religion  der  Menschheit"  in  the  Jahrbücher  für 
protestantische  Theologie,  1882. 


COMTE.  561 

religion,  and  the  first,  the  positivistic  period,  although  the 
major  part  of  the  qualities  pointed  out  as  characteristic 
of  the  former  are  only  intensifications  of  some  which  may 
be  shown  to  have  been  present  in  the  latter.  Beneath 
the  surface  of  the  most  sober  inquiry  mystical  and  dic- 
tatorial tendencies  pulsate  in  Comte  from  the  beginning, 
and  science  was  for  him  simply  a  means  to  human  hap- 
piness. But  now  he  no  longer  demands  the  independent 
pursuit  of  science  in  order  to  the  attainment  of  this 
end,  but  only  the  believing  acceptance  of  its  results.  The 
intellect  is  to  be  placed  under  the  dominion  of  the  heart, 
and  only  such  use  made  of  it  as  promises  a  direct  advan- 
tage for  humanity  ;  the  determination  of  what  problems  are 
most  important  at  a  given  time  belongs  to  the  priesthood. 
The  systematic  unity  or  harmony  of  the  mind  demands 
this  dominion  of  the  feelings  over  thought.  The  religion  of 
positivism,  which  has  "  love  for  its  principle,  order  for  its 
basis,  and  progress  for  its  end,"  is  a  religion  without  God, 
and  without  any  other  immortality  than  a  continuance  of 
existence  in  the  grateful  memory  of  posterity.  The  dog- 
mas of  the  positivist  religion  are  scientific  principles.  Its 
public  cultus,  with  nine  sacraments  and  a  large  number 
of  annual  festivals,  is  paid  to  the  Grand  Etre"  Humanity  " 
(which  is  not  omnipotent,  but,  on  account  of  its  compos- 
ite character,  most  dependent,  yet  infinitely  superior  to 
any  of  its  parts);  and,  besides  this,  space,  the  earth,  the 
universe,  and  great  men  of  the  past  are  objects  of  rever- 
ence. Private  devotion  consists  in  the  adoration  of  living 
or  dead  women  as  our  guardian  angels.  The  ethics  of  the 
future  declares  the  good  of  others  to  be  the  sole  moral 
motive  to  action  (altruism).  Comte's  last  work,  the  Philos- 
ophy of  Mathematics,  1856,  indulges  in  a  most  remarkable 
numerical  mysticism.  The  historical  influence  exercised  by 
Comte  through  his  later  writings  is  extremely  small  in  com- 
parison with  that  of  his  chief  work.  Ik-sides  Blignieres 
and  Robinet,  E.  Littre,  the  well-known  author  of  the 
Dictionnaire  de  la  Langue  Francaise  (1863  sea.),  who  was  the 
most  eminent  of  Comte's  disciples  and  the  editor  of  his  Col- 
lected Works  (1867  seq.),  has  written  on  the  life  and  work 
of  the  master.     Comte's  school  divided  into  two  groups — 


562  FRANCE. 

the  apostates,  with  Littre  (1801-81)  at  their  head,  who 
reject  the  subjective  phase  and  hold  fast  to  the  earlier  doc- 
trine, and  the  faithful,  who  until  1877,  when  a  new  division 
between  strict  and  liberal  Comteans  took  place  within  this 
group,  gathered  about  P.  Laffitte  (born  1823).*  The  leader 
of  the  English  positivists  is  Frederic  Harrison  (born  1831). 
Positivistic  societies  exist  also  in  Sweden,  Brazil,  Chili,  and 
elsewhere.  Positivism  has  been  developed  in  an  independ- 
ent spirit  by  J.  S.  Mill  and  Herbert  Spencer. 

The  following  brief  remarks  on  the  course  of  French 
philosophy  may  also  be  added.  Against  the  sensational- 
ism of  Condillac  as  continued  by  Cabanis,  Destutt  de 
Tracy  (see  above,  pp.  259-260),  and  various  physiologists,  a 
twofold  reaction  asserted  itself.  One  manifestation  of  this 
proceeded  from  the  theological  school,  represented  by  the 
"traditionalists"  Victor  de  Bonald  (1818),  Joseph  de 
Maistre  (1753-1821  ;  St.  Petersburg  Soirees,  1821  ),  and 
F.  de  Lamennais  (1782-1854),  who,  however,  after  his 
break  with  the  Church  {Words  of  a  Believer,  1834)  de- 
veloped in  his  Sketch  of  a  Philosophy,  1841  seq.,  an  ontolog- 
ical  system  after  Italian  and  German  models.  The  other 
came  from  the  spiritualistic  school,  at  whose  head  stood 
Maine  de  Biranf  (1766- 1824  ;  On  the  Foundations  of  Psychol- 
ogy ;  his  Works  have  been  edited  by  Cousin,  1841,  Naville, 
1859,  ar>d  Bertrand)  and  Royer  Collard  (1763-1845). 
Their  pupil  Victor  Cousin.  (1 792-1 867;  Works,  1846-50), 
who  admired  Hegel  also,  became  the  head  of  the  eclectic 
school.  Cousin  will  neither  deny  metaphysics  with  the 
Scotch,  nor  construe  metaphysics  a  priori  with  the  Ger- 
mans, but  with  Descartes  bases  it  on  psychology.  For  a 
time  an  idealist  of  the  Hegelian  type  (infinite  and  finite, 
God  and  the  world,  are  mutually  inseparable;  the  Ideas 
reveal  themselves  in  history,  in  the  nations,  in  great  men), 
he  gradually  sank  back  to  the  position  of  common  sense. 
His  adherents,  among  whom  Theodore  Jouffroy  (died 
1842)  was  the  most  eminent,  have  done  special  service  in 
the  history  of  philosophy.     From  Cousin's    school,  which 

*On  this  division  cf.  E.  Caro,  M.  Littre  et  le  Positivisme,  1883,  and  Herrn. 
Gruber  (S.  J.),  Der  Positiv>smus  vom  Tode  Comtes  bis  auf  unsere  7  age,  1891. 
f  Cf-  E.  König  in  the  Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vol.  xxv.  1889,  p.  160 sea. 


COURSE   OF  FRENCH  PHILOSOPHY.  563 

was  opposed  by  P.  Leroux  and  J.  Reynaud,  have  come 
Ravaisson,  Saisset,  Jules  Simon,  P.  Janet  (born  1823),*  and 
E.  Caro  (born  1826;  The  Philosophy  of  Goethe,  1866). 
Kant  has  influenced  Charles  Renouvier  (born  1817;  Essays 
in  General  Criticism,  4  vols.,  1854-64)  and  E.  Vacherot 
(born  1809;  Metaphysics  and  Science,  1858,  2d  ed.,  1863; 
Science  and  Consciousness,  1872). 

Among  other  thinkers  of  reputation  we  may  mention  the 
socialist  Henri  de  Saint-Simon  (1760-1825  ;  Selected  Works, 
1859),  the  physiologist  Claude  Bernard  (1813-78),  the  posi- 
tivist H.  Taine  (1828-93;  The  Philosophy  of  Art,  English 
translation  by  Durand,  2d  ed.,  1873  ;  On  Intelligence,  1872, 
English  translation  by  Haye,  1871),  E.  Renan  (1823-92; 
The  Life  of  Jesus,  1863,  English  translation  by  Wilbour, 
Philosophical  Dialogues  and  Fragments — English,  1883),  the 
writer  on  aesthetics  and  ethics  J.  M.  Guyau  (The  Problems 
of  Contemporary  Aesthetics,  1884  ;  Sketch  of  an  Ethic  with- 
out Obligation  pr  Sanction,  1885  ;  The  Irrcligion  of  the 
Future,  1887),  Alfred  FouiU&e  (The  Future  of  Metaphysics 
founded  on  Experience,  1889;  Morals,  Art,  and  Religion  ac- 
cording to  Guyau,  1889  J  The  Evolutionism  of  the  Idea-Forces, 
1890),  and  the  psychologist  Th.  Ribot,f  editor  of  the  Revue 
Philosophique  (from  1876). 

3.  Great   Britain  and   America. 

Prominent  among  the  British  philosophers  of  the  nine- 
teenth century :}:  are  Hamilton,  Bentham,  J.  S.  Mill,  and 
Spencer.     Hamilton    is   the  leading    representative   of  the 

*  Janet :  History  of  Political  Science  in  its  Relations  to  Morals,  1858.  3d  ed., 
1887;  German  Materialism  of  the  Present  Day,  1864,  English  translation  by 
Masson,  1866:  The  Family,  1855  ;  The  Philosophy  of  Happiness,  1862;  The 
Brain  and  Thought,  1S67  ;  Elements  of  Morals,  1S69  [English  translation  by 
Cordon,  1884];  The  Theory  of  Morals,  1874  [English  translation  by  Mary 
Chapman,  1883]  ;  Final  Causes,  1876  [English  translation  by  Affleck,  with  a 
preface  by  Flint,  new  ed.,  1S83]. 

+  Ribot  :  Heredity,  2d  ed.,  1882  [English  translation,  1875]  ;  The  Diseases  of 
Memory,  1 88  r  [English  translation,  18S2];  The  Diseases  of  the  Will,  18S3 
[English.  1884]  :  The  Diseases  of  Personality,  1885  [English,  18S7]  ;  The 
Psychology  of  Attention,  18R0,  [English,  iS<)n]  ;  German  Psychology  of  To-day, 
2d  ed..  1885  [English  translation  by  Baldwin,  [886]. 

\  Cf.  Harald  [Iöffding,  Einleitung  in  die  englische  Philosophie  unserer  Zeit 
(Danish,  1874),  German  (with   alterations  and   additions   by  the   author)  by   II. 


564  GREAT   BRIT  AI  X  AND   AMERICA. 

Scottish  School  ;  Bentham  is  known  as  the  advocate  of 
utilitarianism  ;  Mill,  an  exponent  of  the  traditional  empiri- 
cism of  English  thinking,  develops  the  theory  of  induction 
and  the  principle  of  utility;  Spencer  combines  an  agnostic 
doctrine  of  the  absolute  and  thoroughgoing  evolution  in 
the  phenomenal  world  into  a  comprehensive  philosophical 
system.*  In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  reaction  against 
empirical  doctrines  on  the  basis  of  neo-Kantian  and  neo- 
Hegelian  principles.  Foremost  among  the  leaders  of  this 
movement  we  may  mention  T.  H.  Green. 

The  Scottish  philosophy  has  been  continued  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  by  James  Mackintosh  {Dissertation  on  the 
Progress  of  EtJiical  Philosophy,  1830,  3d  ed.,  1863),  and 
William  Whewell  {History  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,  3d 
ed.,  1857;  Philosophy  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,  1840,  3d  ed., 
1858-60).  Its  most  important  representative  is  Sir 
William  Hamiltonf  of  Edinburgh  (1788-1856),  who,  like 
Whewell,  is  influenced  by  Kant.  Hamilton  bases  philos- 
ophy on  the  facts  of  consciousness,  but,  in  antithesis  to  the 
associational  psychology,  emphasizes  the  mental  activity  of 
discrimination  and  judgment.  Our  knowledge  is  relative, 
and  relations  its  only  object.  Consciousness  can  never 
transcend  itself,  it  is  bound  to  the  antithesis  of  subject  and 
object,  and  conceives  the  existent  under  relations  of  space 
and  time.  Hence  the  unconditioned  is  inaccessible  to 
knowledge  and  attainable  by  faith  alone.  Among  Hamil- 
ton's followers  belong  Mansel  {Metaphysics,  3d.  ed.,  1875  ; 
Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  5th  ed.,  1870)  and  Veitch.  The 
Scottish  doctrine  was  vigorously  opposed  by  J.  F.  Ferrier 


Kurella,  1889  ;  David  Masson,  Recent  British  Philosophy,  1865,  3d  ed.,  1877; 
Ribot,  La  Psychologie  Anglaise  Contemporaine,  1870,  2d  ed.,  1875  [English, 
1874]  Guyau,  La  Morale  Anglaise  Contemporaine,  1879  [Morris,  British 
Thought  and  Thinkers,  1880  ;  Porter,  "On  English  and  American  Philosophy," 
Ueberweg's  History,  English  translation,  vol.  ii.  pp.  348-460  ;  O.  Pfleiderer, 
Development  of  Theology,  1890,  book  iv. — Tr.]. 

*  Cf.  on  Mill  and  Spencer,  Bernh.  Pünjer,  Jahrbücher  für  protestantische 
Theologie,  1878. 

f  Hamilton  :  Discussions  on  Philosophy  and  Literature,  1852,  3d  ed.,  1866  ; 
Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  2d  ed.,  i860,  and  on  Logic,  2d  ed.,  1866,  edited  by  his 
pupils,  Mansel  and  Veitch  ;  Reitfs  Works,  with  notes  and  dissertations, 
1846,    7th   ed.,    1872.       On    Hamilton  cf.   Veitch,    1882,  1883  [Monck,  1881]. 


B  EXT II AM.  565 

(1808-64;  Institutes  of  MetapJiysics,  2d  ed.,  1856),  who 
himself  developed  an  idealistic  standpoint. 

In  the  United  States  the  Scottish  philosophy  has  exer- 
cised a  wide  influence.  In  recent  times  it  has  been  strenu- 
ously advocated,  chiefly  in  the  spirit  of  Reid,  by  James 
McCosh  (a  native  of  Scotland,  but  since  1868  in  America; 
The  Intuitions  of  the  Mind,  3d  ed.,  1872  ;  The  Laivs  of  Dis- 
cursive Thought,  new  ed.,  1891  ;  First  and  Fundamental 
Truths,  1889);  while  in  Noah  Porter  (died  1892;  The 
Human  Intellect,  new  ed.,  1876;  The  Elements  of  Moral 
Science,  1885)  it  appears  modified  by  elements  from  Ger- 
man thinking. 

Jeremy  Bentham  *  (1748-1832)  is  noteworthy  for  his  at- 
tempt to  revive  Epicureanism  in  modern  form.  Virtue  is 
the  surest  means  to  pleasure,  and  pleasure  the  only  self- 
evident  good.  Every  man  strives  after  happiness,  but  not 
every  one  in  the  right  way.  The  honest  man  calculates 
correctly,  the  criminal  falsely  ;  hence  a  careful  calculation 
of  the  value  of  the  various  pleasures,  and  a  prudent  use  of 
the  means  to  happiness,  is  the  first  condition  of  virtue;  in 
this  the  easily  attainable  minor  joys,  whose  summation 
amounts  to  a  considerable  quantum,  must  not  be  neglected. 
The  value  of  a  pleasure  is  measured  by  its  intensity,  dura- 
tion, certainty,  propinquity,  fecundity  in  the  production  of 
further  pleasure,  purity  or  freedom  from  admixture  of 
consequent  pain,  and  extent  to  the  greatest  possible  number 
of  persons.  Every  virtuous  action  results  in  a  balance  of 
pleasure.  Inflict  no  evil  on  thyself  or  others  from  which  a 
balance  of  good  will  not  result.  The  end  of  morality  is 
the  "  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number,"  in  the  pro- 
duction of  which  each  has  first  to  care  for  his  own  welfare  : 
whoever  injures  himself  more  than  he  serves  others  acts  im- 
morally, for  he  diminishes  the  sum  of  happiness  in  the 
world  ;  the  interest  of  the  individual  coincides  with  the  in- 


*  Bentham  :  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation,  1789; 
new  ed.,  1823,  reprinted  1876  ;  Deontology,  1S34,  edited  by  Bowring,  who  atso 
«dited  the  Works,  1838-43.  Tlie  Principles  of  Civil  iini/  Criminal  I <x- 
islation,  edited  in  French  from  Bentham's  manuscripts  by  his  pupil  Etienne 
Dumont  (1801,  2d  ed.,  1820;  English  by  Hildreth,  5th  ed.,  18S7),  was  translated 
into  German  with  notes  by  F.  E.  Beneke,  1830. 


566  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  AMERICA. 

terest  of  society.  The  two  classes  of  virtues  are  prudence 
and  benevolence.  The  latter  is  a  natural,  though  not  a 
disinterested  affection:  happiness  enjoyed  with  others  is 
greater  than  happiness  enjoyed  alone.  Love  is  a  pleasure- 
giving  extension  of  the  individual ;  we  serve  others  to  be 
served  by  them. 

Associationalism  has  been  reasserted  by  James  Mill  (i 773— 
1836  ;  Analysis  of  the  Phenomena  of  the  Human  Mind,  1829), 
whose  influence  lives  on  in  the  work  of  his  greater  son. 
The  latter,  John  Stuart  Mill,*  was  born  in  London  1806,  and 
was  from  1823  to  1858  a  secretary  in  the  India  House  ;  after 
the  death  of  his  wife  he  lived  (with  the  exception  of  two 
years  of  service  as  a  Member  of  Parliament)  at  Avignon  ; 
his  death  occurred  in  1873.  Mill's  System  of  Logic  ap- 
peared in  1843,  9tn  ed-,  1875  ;  his  Utilitarianism,  1863,  new 
ed.,  1 87 1  ;  An  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  s  Phil- 
osophy, 1865,  5th  ed.,  1878;  his  notes  to  the  new  edition 
of  his  father's  work,  Analysis  of  the  Phenomena  of  the 
Human  Mind,  2d  ed.,  1878,  also  deserve  notice.  With  the 
phenomenalism  of  Hume  and  the  (somewhat  corrected)  asso- 
ciational  psychology  of  his  father  as  a  basis,  Mill  makes  expe- 
rience the  sole  source  of  knowledge,  rejecting  a  priori  and 
intuitive  elements  of  every  sort.  Matter  he  defines  as  a 
"  permanent  possibility  of  sensation  ";  mind  is  resolved  into 
"  a  series  of  feelings  with  a  background  of  possibilities  of 
feeling,"  even  though  the  author  is  not  unaware  of  the  diffi- 
culty involved  in  the  question  how  a  series  of  feelings  can 
be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series.  Mathematical  principles,  like 
all  others,  have  an  experiential  origin — the  peculiar  certitude 
ascribed  to  them  by  the  Kantians  is  a  fiction — and  induction 
is  the  only  fruitful  method  of  scientific  inquiry  (even  in  men- 
tal science).     The  syllogism  is  itself  a  concealed  induction. 

*  Cf.  on  Mill.  Taine.  le  Positivisme  Anglais,  1864  [English,  by  Have]; 
theobiections  of  ~\e\or\s>  (Contemporary  Review,  December,  1877  seq.,  reprinted  in 
Pure  Logic  and  other  Minor  Works,  lSgo  ;  cf.  Mind,  vol.  xvi.  pp.  106-110)  to 
Mill's  doctrine  of  the  inductive  character  of  geometry,  his  treatment  of  the  rela- 
tion of  resemblance,  and  his  exposition  of  the  four  methods  of  experimental  in- 
quiry in  their  relation  to  the  law  of  causation  ;  and  the  finely  conceived  essay  on 
utilitarianism,  by  C.  Hebler,  Philosophische  Aufsätze,  1860,  pp.  35-66.  [Also 
Mill's  own  Autobiography,  1873  :  Bain's  John  Stuart  Mill,  a  Criticism,  1882; 
and  T.  H.  Green,  Lectures  on  the  Logic,   Works,  vol.  ii. — Tr.] 


/.    S.    MILL.  567 

When  I  assert  the  major  premise  the  inference  proper  is 
already  made,  and  in  the  conclusion  the  comprehensive 
formula  for  a  number  of  particular  truths  which  was  given 
in  the  premise  is  merely  explicated,  interpreted.  Because 
universal  judgments  are  for  him  merely  brief  expressions 
for  aggregates  of  particular  truths,  Mill  is  able  to  say  that 
all  knowledge  is  generalization,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
argue  that  all  inference  is  from  particulars  to  particulars. 
Inference  through  a  general  proposition  is  not  necessary, 
yet  useful  as  a  collateral  security,  inasmuch  as  the  syllogistic 
forms  enable  us  more  easily  to  discover  errors  committed, 
The  ground  of  induction,  the  uniformity  of  nature  in 
reference  both  to  the  coexistence  and  the  succession  of 
phenomena,  since  it  wholly  depends  on  induction,  is  not 
unconditionally  certain  ;  but  it  ma)7  be  accepted  as  very 
highly  probable,  until  some  instance  of  lawless  action  (in 
itself  conceivable)  shall  have  been  actually  proved.  Like 
the  law  of  causation,  the  principles  of  logic  are  also  not  a 
priori,  but  only  the  highest  generalizations  from  all  previous 
experience. 

Mill's  most  brilliant  achievement  is  his  theory  of  experi- 
mental inquiry,  for  which  he  advances  four  methods: 
(i)  The  Method  of  Agreement :  "  If  two  or  more  instances 
of  the  phenomenon  under  investigation  have  only  one 
circumstance  in  common,  the  circumstance  in  which  alone 
all  the  instances  agree  is  the  cause  (or  effect)  of  the  given 
phenomenon."  (2)  The  Method  of  Difference:  "If  an 
instance  in  which  the  phenomenon  under  investigation 
occurs,  and  an  instance  in  which  it  does  not  occur,  have 
every  circumstance  in  common  save  one,  that  one  occurring 
only  in  the  former  ;  the  circumstance  in  which  alone  the 
two  instances  differ,  is  the  effect,  or  the  cause,  or  an  indis- 
pensable part  of  the  cause,  of  the  phenomenon."  These 
two  methods  (the  method  of  observation,  and  the  method 
of  artificial  experiment)  may  also  be  employed  in  combina- 
tion, and  the  Canon  of  the  Joint  Method  of  Agreement  and 
Difference  runs:  "If  two  or  more  instances  in  which  the 
phenomenon  occurs  have  only  one  circumstance  in  com- 
mon, while  two  or  more  instances  in  which  it  dors  not 
occur  have  nothing   in  common   save   tin-   absence  of  that 


5b$  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  AMERICA. 

circumstance,  the  circumstance  in  which  alone  the  two  sets 
of  instances  differ  is  the  effect,  or  the  cause,  or  an  indispens- 
able part  of  the  cause,  of  the  phenomenon."  (3)  The  Method 
of  Residues:  "Subduct  from  any  phenomenon  such  part 
as  is  known  by  previous  inductions  to  be  the  effect  of  cer- 
tain antecedents,  and  the  residue  of  the  phenomenon  is  the 
effect  of  the  remaining  antecedents."  (4)  The  Method  of 
Concomitant  Variations  :  "  Whatever  phenomenon  varies 
in  any  manner  whenever  another  phenomenon  varies  in 
some  particular  manner,  is  either  a  cause  or  an  effect  of 
that  phenomenon,  or  is  connected  with  it  through  some 
fact  of  causation."  When  the  phenomena  are  complex  the 
deductive  method  must  be  called  in  to  aid  :  from  the  induct- 
ively ascertained  laws  of  the  action  of  single  causes  this 
deduces  the  laws  of  their  combined  action;  and,  as  a  final 
step,  the  results  of  such  ratiocination  are  verified  by  the 
proof  of  their  agreement  with  empirical  facts.  To  explain 
a  phenomenon  means  to  point  out  its  cause;  the  explana- 
tion of  a  law  is  its  reduction  to  other,  more  general  laws. 
In  all  this,  however,  we  remain  within  the  sphere  of  phe- 
nomena;  the  essence  of  nature  always  eludes  our  knowl- 
edge. 

In  the  chapter  "Of  Liberty  and  Necessity "  (book  vi. 
chap,  ii.)  Mill  emphasizes  the  position  that  the  necessity 
to  which  human  actions  are  subject  must  not  be  conceived, 
as  is  commonly  done,  as  irresistible  compulsion,  for  it 
denotes  nothing  more  than  the  uniform  order  of  our  actions 
and  the  possibility  of  predicting  them.  This  does  not 
destroy  the  element  in  the  idea  of  freedom  which  is 
legitimate  and  practically  valuable:  we  have  the  power  to 
alter  our  character;  it  is  formed  by  us  as  well  as  for  us;  the 
desire  to  mould  it  is  one  of  the  most  influential  circum- 
stances in  its  formation.  The  principle  of  morality  is  the 
promotion  of  the  happiness  of  all  sentient  beings.  Mill 
differs  from  Bentham,  however,  from  whom  he  derives  the 
principle  of  utility,  in  several  important  particulars — by 
his  recognition  of  qualitative  as  well  as  of  quantitative 
differences  in  pleasures,  of  the  value  of  the  ordinary  rules 
of  morality  as  intermediate  principles,  of  the  social  feel- 
ings, and  of  the  disinterested  love  of  virtue.     Opponents 


SPENCER.  569 

of  the  utilitarian  theory  have  not  been  slow  in  availing 
themselves  of  the  opportunities  for  attack  thus  afforded.* 
A  third  distinguished  representative  of  the  same  general 
movement  is  Alexander  Bain,  the  psychologist  (born  1 8 1 8  ; 
The  Senses  and  the  Intellect,  3d  ed.,  1868;  The  Emotions 
and  the  Will,  3d  ed.,  1875  ;  Mental  and  Moral  Science, 
1868,  3d   ed.,  1872,  part  ii.,  1872;    Mind  and  Body,  3d  ed., 

1874). 

The  system  projected  by  Herbert  Spencer  (born  1820), 
the  major  part  of  which  has  already  appeared,  falls  into 
five  parts:  First  Priticiplcs,  1862,  7th  ed.,  1889;  Principles 
of  Biology,  1864-67,  4th  ed.,  1888  ;  Principles  of  Psychology, 
1855,  5th  ed.,  1890;  Principles  of  Sociology  (vol.  i.  1876,  3d 
ed.,  1885  ;  part  iv.  Ceremonial  Institutions,  1879,  3^  e^->  !888, 
part  v.  Political  Institutions,  1882,  2d  ed.,  1885,  part  vi. 
Ecclesiastical  Institutions,  1885,  2d  ed.,  1886,  together  con- 
stituting vol.  ii.)  ;  Principles  of  Ethics  (part  i.  The  Data  of 
Ethics,  1879,  S^1  eQl->  x888  ;  parts  ii.  and  iii.  The  Inductions  of 
Ethics  and  The  Ethics  of  Individual  Life,  constituting  with 
part  i.  the  first  volume,  1892  ;  part  iv.  Justice,  1891).  A  com- 
prehensive exposition  of  the  system  has  been  given,  with  the 
authority  of  the  author,  by  F.  H.  Collins  in  his  Epitome  of 
the  Synthetic  Philosophy,  1889.1  The  treatise  on  Education, 
1 861,  23d  ed.,  1890,  his  sociological  writings,  and  his  various 
essays  have  also  contributed  essentially  to  Mr.  Spencer's 
fame,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  The  First  Principles 
begin  with  the  "Unknowable."  Since  human  opinions,  no 
matter  how  false  they  may  seem,  have  sprung  from  actual 
experiences,  and,  when  they  find  wide  acceptance  and  are 
tenaciously  adhered  to,  must  have  something  in  them 
which  appeals  to  the  minds  of  men,  we   must   assume  that 

*  On  the  relation  of  Bentham  and  Mill  cf.  Höffding,  p.  68  :  Sidgwick's  Outlines, 
chap.  iv.  §  16;  and  John  Grote's  Examination  of  the  Utilitarian  Philosophy, 
1870,  chap.  i. 

fCf.  also  Fiske's  Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  2  vols.,  1874.  Numerous 
critiques  and  discussions  of  Spencer's  views  have  been  given  in  various  journals 
and  reviews  ;  among  more  extended  works  reference  may  be  made  to  Bowne, 
The  Philosophy  of  Herbert  Spencer,  1874;  Malcolm  Guthrie,  On  Mr.  Spencer's 
Formula  of  Evolution,  1879,  and  the  same  author,  On  Mr.  Spencer's  Unified- 
lion  of  k'noiuledge,  1882;  and  T.  II.  Green,  on  Spencer  and  Lewes, //'«Wm-,  vol. 
i.— Tr. 


57°  GREAT  BRITAIN   AND  AMERICA. 

every  error  contains  a  kernel  of  truth,  however  small  it  be. 
No  one  of  opposing  views  is  to  be  accepted  as  wholly  true, 
and  none  rejected  as  entirely  false.  To  discover  the  incon- 
trovertible fact  which  lies  at  their  basis,  we  must  reject  the 
various  concrete  elements  in  which  they  disagree,  and  find 
for  the  remainder  the  abstract  expression  which  holds  true 
throughout  its  divergent  manifestations.  No  antagonism 
is  older,  wider,  more  profound,  and  more  important  than 
that  between  religion  and  science.  Here  too  some  most 
general  truth,  some  ultimate  fact  must  lie  at  the  basis.  The 
ultimate  religious  ideas  are  self-contradictory  and  untenable. 
No  one  of  the  possible  hypotheses  concerning  the  nature 
and  origin  of  things — every  religion  may  be  defined  as  an 
a  priori  theory  of  the  universe,  the  accompanying  ethical 
code  being  a  later  growth — is  logically  defensible  :  whether 
the  world  is  conceived  atheistically  as  self-existent,  or 
pantheistically  as  self-created,  or  theistically  (fetichism, 
polytheism,  or  monotheism),  as  created  by  an  external 
agency,  we  are  everywhere  confronted  by  unthinkable  con- 
clusions. The  idea  of  a  First  Cause  or  of  the  absolute  (as 
Mansel,  following  Hamilton,  has  proved  in  his  Limits  of 
Religions  Thought)  is  full  of  contradictions.  But  however 
widely  the  creeds  diverge,  they  show  entire  unanimity,  from 
the  grossest  superstition  up  to  the  most  developed  theism, 
in  the  belief  that  the  existence  of  the  world  is  a  mystery 
which  ever  presses  for  interpretation,  though  it  can  never 
be  entirely  explained.  And  in  the  progress  of  religion 
from  crude  fetichism  to  the  developed  theology  of  our  time, 
the  truth,  at  first  but  vaguely  perceived,  that  there  is  an 
omnipresent  Inscrutable  which  manifests  itself  in  all  phe- 
nomena, ever  comes  more  clearly  into  view. 

Science  meets  this  ultimate  religious  truth  with  the  con- 
viction, grasped  with  increasing  clearness  as  the  develop- 
ment proceeds  from  Protagoras  to  Kant,  that  the  reality 
hidden  behind  all  phenomena  must  always  remain  unknown, 
that  our  knowledge  can  never  be  absolute.  This  principle 
maybe  established  inductively  from  the  incomprehensibility 
of  the  ultimate  scientific  ideas,  as  well  as  deductively  from 
the  nature  of  intelligence,  through  an  analysis  of  the  product 
and    the    process    of  thought,     (i)  The  ideas  space,  time, 


SPENCER.  57 1 

matter,  motion,  and  force,  as  also  the  first  states  of  con- 
sciousness, and  the  thinking  substance,  the  ego  as  the  unity 
of  subject  and  object,  all  represent  realities  whose  nature 
and  origin  are  entirely  incomprehensible.  (2)  The  subsump- 
tion  of  particular  facts  under  more  general  facts  leads 
ultimately  to  a  most  general,  highest  fact,  which  cannot  be 
reduced  to  a  more  general  one,  and  hence  cannot  be 
explained  or  comprehended.  (3)  All  thought  (as  has  been 
shown  by  Hamilton  in  his  essay  "On  the  Philosophy  of  the 
Unconditioned,"  and  by  his  follower  Mansel)  is  the  estab- 
lishment of  relations,  every  thought  involving  relation, 
difference,  and  (as  Spencer  adds)  likeness.  Hence  the 
absolute,  the  idea  of  which  excludes  every  relation,  is 
entirely  beyond  the  reach  of  an  intelligence  which  is  con- 
cerned with  relations  alone,  and  which  always  consists  in 
discrimination,  limitation,  and  assimilation — it  is  trebly 
unthinkable.  Therefore  :  Religion  and  Science  agree  in 
the  supreme  truth  that  the  human  understanding  is  capable 
of  relative  knowledge  only  or  of  a  knowledge  of  the  rela- 
tive (Relativity).  Nevertheless,  according  to  Spencer,  it  is 
too  much  to  conclude  with  the  thinkers  just  mentioned,  that 
the  idea  of  the  absolute  is  a  mere  expression  for  incon- 
ceivability, and  its  existence  problematical.  The  nature 
of  the  absolute  is  unknowable,  but  not  the  existence  of 
a  basis  for  the  relative  and  phenomenal.  The  considera- 
tions which  speak  in  favor  of  the  relativity  of  knowledge 
and  its  limitation  to  phenomena,  argue  also  the  existence 
of  a  non-relative,  whose  phenomenon  the  relative  is  ;  the 
idea  of  the  relative  and  the  phenomenal  posits  co  ipso  the 
existence  of  the  absolute  as  its  correlative,  which  mani- 
fests itself  in  phenomena.  We  have  at  least  an  indefinite, 
though  not  a  definite,  consciousness  of  the  Unknowable  as 
the  Unknown  Cause,  the  Universal  Power,  and  on  this  is 
founded  our  ineradicable  belief  in  objective  reality. 

All  knowledge  is  limited  to  the  relative,  and  consists  in 
increasing  generalization;  the  apex  of  this  pyramid  is 
formed  by  philosophy.  Common  knowledge  is  un-unificd 
knowledge;  science  is  partially  unified  knowledge;  philos- 
ophy, which  combines  the  highest  generalizations  of  the 
sciences   into  a  supreme   one,  is   completely  unified  knowl- 


57-  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  AMERICA. 

edge.  The  data  of  philosophy  are — besides  an  Unknowable 
Power — the  existence  of  knowable  likenesses  and  differ- 
ences among  its  manifestations,  and  a  resulting  segrega- 
tion of  the  manifestations  into  those  of  subject  and  object. 
Further,  derivative  data  are  space  (relations  of  coexist- 
ence), time  (relations  of  irreversible  sequence),  matter  (co- 
existent positions  that  offer  resistance),  motion  (which 
involves  space,  time,  and  matter),  and  force,  the  ultimate 
of  ultimates,  on  which  all  others  depend,  and  from  our 
primordial  experiences  of  which  all  the  other  modes  of  con- 
sciousness are  derivable.  Similarly  the  ultimate  primary 
truth  is  the  persistence  of force,  from  which,  besides  the  inde- 
structibility of  matter  and  the  continuity  of  (actual  or 
potential)  motion,  still  further  truths  may  be  deduced  :  the 
persistence  of  relations  among  forces  or  the  uniformity  of 
law,  the  transformation  and  equivalence  of  (mental  and 
social  as  well  as  of  physical)  forces,  the  law  of  the  direction 
of  motion  (along  the  line  of  least  resistance,  or  the  line  of 
greatest  traction,  or  their  resultant),  and  the  unceasing 
rhythm  of  motion.  Beyond  these  analytic  truths,  however, 
philosophy  demands  a  law  of  universal  synthesis.  This 
must  be  the  law  of  the  continuous  redistribution  of  matter 
and  motion,  for  each  single  thing,  and  the  whole  universe 
as  well,  is  involved  in  a  (continuously  repeated)  double 
process  of  evolution  and  dissolution,  the  former  consisting 
in  the  integration  of  matter*  and  the  dissipation  of  motion, 
the  latter  in  the  absorption  of  motion  and  the  disintegra- 
tion of  matter.  The  law  of  evolution,  in  its  complete 
development,  then  runs:  "Evolution  is  an  integration  of 
matter  and  concomitant  dissipation  of  motion  ;  during  which 
the  matter  passes  from  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homo- 
geneity to  a  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity  ;  and  during 
which  the  retained  motion  undergoes  a  parallel  transforma- 
tion." This  is  inductively  supported  by  illustrations  from 
every  region  of  nature  and  all  departments  of  mental  and 
social  life;  and,  further,  shown  deducible  from  the  ultimate 
principle  of  the  persistence  of  force,  through  the  mediation 
of  several  corollaries  to  it,  viz.,  the  instability  of  the  homo- 

*  Organic  growth  is  the  concentration   of  elements  before  diffused  ;  cf.  the 
union  of  nomadic  families  into  settled  tribes. 


SPEATCEK.  573 

geneous  under  the  varied  incidence  of  surrounding  forces, 
the  multiplication  of  effects  by  action  and  reaction,  and 
segregation.  Finally  the  principle  of  equilibration  indicates 
the  impassable  limit  at  which  evolution  passes  over  into 
dissolution,  until  the  eternal  round  is  again  begun.  If  it 
may  be  said  of  Hegel  himself,  that  he  vainly  endeavored  to 
master  the  concrete  fullness  of  reality  with  formal  concepts, 
the  criticism  is  applicable  to  Spencer  in  still  greater  meas- 
ure. The  barren  schemata  of  concentration,  passage  into 
heterogeneity,  adaptation,  etc.,  which  are  taken  from  natural 
science,  and  which  are  insufficient  even  in  their  own  field, 
prove  entirely  impotent  for  the  mastery  of  the  complex  and 
peculiar  phenomena  of  spiritual  life. 

Armed  with  these  principles,  however,  Mr.  Spencer 
advances  to  the  discussion  of  the  several  divisions  of 
"  Special  Philosophy."  Passing  over  inorganic  nature,  he 
finds  his  task  in  the  interpretation  of  the  phenomena  of 
life,  mind,  and  society  in  terms  of  matter,  motion,  and 
force  under  the  general  evolution  formula.  This  pro- 
cedure, however,  must  not  be  understood  as  in  any  wise 
materialistic.  Such  an  interpretation  would  be  a  misrep- 
resentation, it  is  urged,  for  the  strict  relativity  of  the 
standpoint  limits  all  conclusions  to  phenomena,  and  permits 
no  inference  concerning  the  nature  of  the  "  Unknowable." 
The  Principles  of  Biology  take  up  the  phenomena  of  life. 
Life  is  defined  as  the  "continuous  adjustment  of  internal 
relations  to  external  relations."  No  attempt  is  made  to 
explain  its  origin,  yet  (in  the  words  of  Mr.  Sully)  it  is  clear 
that  the  lowest  forms  of  life  are  regarded  as  continuous  in 
their  essential  nature  with  sub-vital  processes.  The  evolu- 
tion of  living  organisms,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest, 
with  the  development  of  all  their  parts  and  functions, 
results  from  the  co-operation  of  various  factors,  external  and 
internal,  whose  action  is  ultimately  reducible  to  the  uni- 
versal law. 

The  field  of  psychology  is  intimately  allied  with  biology, 
and  yet  distinguished  from  it.  Mental  life  is  a  subdi- 
vision of  life  in  general,  and  may  be  subsumed  under 
the  general  definition  ;  but  while  biological  truths  con- 
cern   the    connection    between    internal   phenomena,    with' 


574  GREAT   BRITAIN  AND   AMERICA. 

but  tacit  or  occasional  recognition  of  the  environment, 
psychology  has  to  do  neither  with  the  internal  connec- 
tion nor  the  external  connection,  but  "  the  connection 
between  these  two  connections.""  Psychology  in  its  sub- 
jective aspect,  again,  is  a  field  entirely  sui  generis.  The 
substance  of  mind,  conceived  as  the  underlying  substratum 
of  mental  states,  is  unknowable  ;  but  the  character  of 
those  states  of  which  mind,  as  we  know  it,  is  composed,  is 
a  legitimate  subject  of  inquiry.  If  this  be  carefully  investi- 
gated, it  seems  highly  probable  that  the  ultimate  unit  of 
consciousness  is  something  "  of  the  same  order  as  that 
which  we  call  a  nervous  shock."  Mind  is  proximately 
composed  of  feelings  and  the  relations  between  feelings  ; 
from  these,  revived,  associated,  and  integrated,  the  whole 
fabric  of  consciousness  is  built  up.  There  is,  then,  no  sharp 
distinction  between  the  several  phases  of  mind.  If  we 
trace  its  development  objectively,  in  terms  of  the  corre- 
spondence between  inner  and  outer  phenomena,  we  find 
a  gradual  progress  from  the  less  to  the  more  complex,  from 
the  lower  to  the  higher,  without  a  break.  Reflex  action, 
instinct,  memory,  reason,  are  simply  stages  in  the  process. 
All  is  dependent  on  experience.  Even  the  forms  of  knowl- 
edge, which  are  a  priori  to  the  individual,  are  the  product 
of  experience  in  the  race,  integrated  and  transmitted  by 
heredity,  and  become  organic  in  the  nervous  structure.  In 
general  the  correspondence  of  inner  and  outer  in  which 
mental  life  consists  is  mediated  by  the  nervous  organism. 
The  structure  and  functions  of  this  condition  conscious- 
ness and  furnish  the  basis  for  the  interpretation  of  mental 
evolution  in  terms  of  "  evolution  at  large,  regarded  as 
a  process  of  physical  transformation."  Nevertheless 
mental  phenomena  and  bodily  phenomena  are  not  identi- 
cal, consciousness  is  not  motion.  They  are  both  phenom- 
enal modes  of  the  unknowable,  disparate  in  themselves,  and 
giving  no  indication  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  the  abso- 
lute. Subjective  analysis  of  human  consciousness  yields 
further  proof  of  the  unity  of  mental  composition.  All 
mental  action  is  ultimately  reducible  to  "the  continuous 
differentiation  and  integration  of  states  of  consciousness." 
The  criterion  of  truth  is  the  inconceivability  of  the  nega- 


SPENCER.  575 

tion.  Tried  by  this  test,  as  by  all  others,  realism  is 
superior  to  idealism,  though  in  that  "  transfigured  "  form 
which  implies  objective  existence  without  implying  the 
possibility  of  any  further  knowledge  concerning  it,- — hence 
in  a  form  entirely  congruous  with  the  conclusion  reached 
by  many  other  routes. 

Sociology  deals  with  super-organic  evolution,  which 
involves  the  co-ordinated  actions  of  many  individuals. 
To  understand  the  social  unit,  we  must  study  primitive 
man,  especially  the  ideas  which  he  forms  of  himself,  of 
other  beings,  and  of  the  surrounding  world.  The  concep- 
tion of  a  mind  or  other-self  is  gradually  evolved  through 
observation  of  natural  phenomena  which  favor  the  notion 
of  duality,  especially  the  phenomena  of  sleep,  dreams, 
swoons,  and  death.  Belief  in  the  influence  of  these  doubles 
of  the  dead  on  the  fortunes  of  the  living  leads  to  sorcery, 
prayer,  and  praise.  Ancestor-worship  is  the  ultimate 
source  of  all  forms  of  religion  ;  to  it  can  be  traced  even 
such  aberrant  developments  as  fetichism  and  idolatry, 
animal-,  plant-,  and  nature-worship.  Thus  the  primitive 
man  feels  himself  related  not  only  to  his  living  fellows,  but 
to  multitudes  of  supernatural  beings  about  him.  The  fear 
of  the  living  becomes  the  root  of  the  political,  and  the  fear 
of  the  dead  the  root  of  the  religious,  control.  A  society  is 
an  organic  entity.  Though  differing  from  an  individual 
organism  in  many  ways,  it  yet  resembles  it  in  the  perma- 
nent relations  among  its  component  parts.  The  Domestic 
Relations,  by  which  the  maintenance  of  the  species  is 
now  secured,  have  come  from  various  earlier  and  less 
developed  forms  ;  the  militant  type  of  society  is  accom- 
panied by  a  lower,  the  industrial  type  by  a  higher  stage  of 
this  development.  Ceremonial  observance  is  the  most 
primitive  kind  of  government,  and  the  kind  from  which 
the  political  and  religious  governments  have  differentiated. 
Political  organization  is  necessary  in  order  to  co-operation 
for  ends  which  benefit  the  society  directly,  and  the  individ- 
ual only  indirectly.  The  ultimate  political  force  is  the 
feeling  of  the  community,  including  as  ils  largest  part 
ancestral  feeling.  Many  facts  combine  to  obscure  this 
truth,  but  however  much  it  may  be  obscured,  public  feel- 


57<5  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  AMERICA. 

ihg  remains  the  primal  source  of  authority.  The  various 
forms  and  instruments  of  government  have  grown  up 
through  processes  in  harmony  with  the  general  law.  The 
two  antithetical  types  of  society  are  the  militant  and  the 
industrial — the  former  implies  compulsory  co-operation 
under  more  or  less  despotic  rule,  with  governmental 
assumption  of  functions  belonging  to  the  individual  and 
a  minimizing  of  individual  initiative  ;  in  the  latter,  govern- 
ment is  reduced  to  a  minimum  and  best  conducted  by 
representative  agencies,  public  organizations  are  largely 
replaced  by  private  organizations,  the  individual  is  freer 
and  looks  less  to  the  state  for  protection  and  for  aid.  The 
fundamental  conditions  of  the  highest  social  development 
is  the  cessation  of  war.  The  ideas  and  sentiments  at  the 
basis  of  Ecclestiastical  Institutions  have  been  naturally 
derived  from  the  ghost-theory  already  described.  The 
goal  of  religious  development  is  the  final  rejection  of  all 
anthropomorphic  conceptions  of  the  First  Cause,  until  the 
harmony  of  religion  and  science  shall  be  reached  in  the 
veneration  of  the  Unknowable.  The  remaining  parts  of 
Mr.  Spencer's -Sociology  will  treat  of  Professional  Institu- 
tions, Industrial  Institutions,  Linguistic  Progress,  Intel- 
lectual, Moral,  and  ^Esthetic  Progress. 

The  subject  matter  of  ethics  is  the  conduct  termed  good 
or  bad.  Conduct  is  the  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends.  The 
evolution  of  conduct  is  marked  by  increasing  perfection  in 
the  adjustment  of  acts  to  the  furtherance  of  individual  life, 
the  life  of  offspring,  and  social  life.  The  ascription  of 
ethical  character  to  the  highly  evolved  conduct  of  man  in 
relation  to  these  ends  implies  the  fundamental  assumption, 
that  "  life  is  good  or  bad  according  as  it  does,  or  does  not, 
bring  a  surplus  of  agreeable  feeling."  The  ideal  of  moral 
science  is  rational  deduction  :  a  rational  utilitarianism  can 
be  attained  only  by  the  recognition  of  the  necessary  laws — 
physical,  biological,  psychological,  and  sociological — which 
condition  the  results  of  actions;  among  these  the  biological 
laws  have  been  largely  neglected  in  the  past,  though  they  are 
of  the  utmost  importance  as  furnishing  the  link  between  life 
and  happiness.  The  "  psychological  view,"  again,  explains 
the  origin  of  conscience.     In  the  course  of   development 


SPENCER.  577 

man  comes  to  recognize  the  superiority  of  the  higher  and 
more  representative  feelings  as  guides  to  action  ;  this  form 
of  self-restraint,  however,  is  characteristic  of  the  non-moral 
restraints  as  well,  of  the  political,  social,  and  religious  con- 
trols. From  these  the  moral  control  proper  has  emerged — 
differing  from  them  in  that  it  refers  to  intrinsic  instead  of 
extrinsic  effects — and  the  element  of  coerciveness  in  them, 
transferred,  has  generated  the  feeling  of  moral  compulsion 
(which,  however,  "  will  diminish  as  fast  as  moralization 
increases  "). 

Such  a  rational  ethics,  based  on  the  laws  which  condition 
welfare  rather  than  on  a  direct  estimation  of  happiness, 
and  premising  the  relativity  of  all  pains  and  pleasures, 
escapes  fundamental  objections  to  the  earlier  hedonism 
{e.g.,  those  to  the  hedonic  calculus);  and,  combining  the 
valuable  elements  in  the  divergent  ethical  theories,  yields 
satisfactory  principles  for  the  decision  of  ethical  problems. 
Egoism  takes  precedence  of  altruism  ;  yet  it  is  in  turn 
dependent  on  this,  and  the  two,  on  due  consideration,  are 
seen  to  be  co-essential.  Entirely  divorced  from  the  other, 
neither  is  legitimate,  and  a  compromise  is  the  only  pos- 
sibility ;  while  in  the  future  advancing  evolution  will  bring 
the  two  into  complete  harmony.  The  goal  of  the  whole 
process  will  be  the  ideal  man  in  the  ideal  society,  the 
scientific  anticipation  of  which,  absolute  ethics,  promises 
guidance  for  the  relative  and  imperfect  ethics  of  the  tran- 
sition period. 

Examination  of  the  actual,  not  the  professed,  ideas  and 
sentiments  of  men  reveals  wide  variation  in  moral  judg- 
ments. This  is  especially  true  of  the  "pro-ethical"  con- 
sciousnesses of  external  authorities,  coercions,  and  opinions 
— religious,  political,  and  social — by  which  the  mass  (if  man- 
kind are  governed  ;  and  is  broadly  due  to  variation  in  social 
conditions.  Where  the  need  of  external  co-operation  pre- 
dominates the  ethics  of  enmity  develops;  where  internal, 
peaceful  co-operation  is  the  chief  social  need  the  ethics  of 
amity  results  :  and  the  evolution  principle  enables  us  to 
infer  that,  as  among  certain  small  tribes  in  the  past,  so  in 
the  great  cultivated  nations  of  the  future,  the  life  of  amity 
will   unqualifiedly  prevail.     The   Ethics  of  Individual  Life 


S7S  GREAT  BRIT  A IX  AXD  AMERICA. 

shows  the  application  of  moral  judgments  to  all  actions 
which  affect  individual  welfare.  The  very  fact  that  some 
deviations  from  normal  life  are  now  morally  disapproved, 
implies  the  existence  of  both  egoistic  and  altruistic  sanctions 
for  the  moral  approval  of  all  acts  which  conduce  to  normal 
living  and  the  disapproval  of  all  minor  deviations,  though 
for  the  most  part  these  have  hitherto  remained  unconsidered. 
Doubtless,  however,  moral  control  must  here  be  somewhat 
indefinite;  and  even  scientific  observation  and  analysis 
must  leave  the  production  of  a  perfectly  regulated  conduct 
to  "  the  organic  adjustment  of  constitution  to  [social]  con- 
ditions." 

The  Ethics  of  Social  Life  includes  justice  and  beneficence. 
Human  justice  emerges  from  sub-human  or  animal  justice, 
whose  law  (passing  over  gratis  benefits  to  offspring)  is 
"  that  each  individual  shall  receive  the  benefits  and  evils  of 
its  own  nature  and  its  consequent  conduct."  This  is  the 
law  of  human  justice,  also,  but  here  it  is  more  limited  than 
before  by  the  non-interference  which  gregariousness  requires, 
and  by  the  increasing  need  for  the  sacrifice  of  individuals 
for  the  good  of  the  species.  The  egoistic  sentiment  of  jus- 
tice arises  from  resistance  to  interference  with  free  action  ; 
the  altruistic  develops  through  sympathy  under  social  con- 
ditions, these  being  maintained  meanwhile  by  a  "  pro- 
altruistic  "  sentiment,  into  which  dread  of  retaliation,  of 
social  reprobation,  of  legal  punishment,  and  of  divine  venge- 
ance enter  as  component  parts.  The  idea  of  justice 
emerges  gradually  from  the  sentiment  of  justice  :  it  has  two 
elements,  one  brute  or  positive,  with  inequality  as  its  ideal, 
one  human  or  negative,  the  ideal  of  which  is  equality.  In 
early  times  the  former  of  these  was  unduly  appreciated,  as 
in  later  times  the  latter  ;  the  true  conception  includes  both, 
the  idea  of  equality  being  applied  to  the  limits  and  the  idea 
of  inequality  to  the  benefits  of  action.  Thus  the  formula 
of  justice  becomes:  "  Every  man  is  free  to  do  that  which 
he  wills,  provided  he  infringes  not  the  equal  freedom  of  any 
other  man  " — a  law  which  finds  its  authority  in  the  facts, 
that  it  is  an  a  priori  dictum  of  "  consciousness  after  it  has 
been  subject  to  the  discipline  of  prolonged  social  life,"  and 
that   it  is  also   deducible  from  the  conditions   of  the  main- 


SPEXCER.  579 

tenance  of  life  at  large  and  of  social  life.  From  this  law- 
follow  various  particular  corollaries  or  rights,  all  of  which 
coincide  with  ordinary  ethical  concepts  and  have  legal  enact- 
ments corresponding  to  them.  Political  rights  so-called  do 
not  exist ;  government  is  simply  a  system  of  appliances  for 
the  maintenance  of  private  rights.  Both  the  nature  of  the 
state  and  its  constitution  are  variable  :  the  militant  type 
requires  centralization  and  a  coercive  constitution  ;  the 
industrial  type  implies  a  wider  distribution  of  political 
power,  but  requires  a  representation  of  interests  rather  than 
a  representation  of  individuals.  Government  develops  as  a 
result  of  war,  and  its  function  of  protection  against  internal 
aggression  arises  by  differentiation  from  its  primary  function 
of  external  defense.  These  two,  then,  constitute  the 
essential  duties  of  the  state  ;  when  war  ceases  the  first  falls 
away,  and  its  sole  function  becomes  the  maintenance  of  the 
conditions  under  which  each  individual  may  "gain  the 
fullest  life  compatible  with  the  fullest  life  of  fellow-citizens." 
All  beyond  this,  all  interference  with  this  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual, whether  by  way  of  assistance,  restraint,  or  education, 
proves  in  the  end  both  unjust  and  impolitic.  The  remain- 
ing parts  of  the  Ethics  will  treat  of  Negative  and  Positive 
Beneficence 

If  J.  S.  Mill  and  Spencer  (the  latter  of  whom,  more- 
over, had  announced  evolution  as  a  world-law  before  the 
appearance  of  Darwin),  move  in  a  direction  akin  to  posi- 
tivism, the  same  is  true,  further,  of  G.  H.  Lewes  (1817-78; 
History  of  Philosophy,  5th  ed.,  1880;  Problems  of  Life  and 
Mind,  1874  seq.). 

Turning  to  the  discussion  of  particular  disciplines,  we  may 
mention  as  prominent  among  English  logicians,*  besides 
Hamilton,  Whcwell,  and  Mill,  Whately,  Mansel,  Thomson, 
De  Morgan,  Boole  (An  Investigation  of  the  Laws  of  Thought^ 
1854);  W.  S.  Jevons  (The  Principles  of  Science,  2d  ed., 
1877);  Venn  (Symbolic  Logic,  188 1  ;   Empirical  Logic,  1SS9), 

*  Cf.  Nedich,  Die  Lehr,-  ?«»!  der  Quantifikation  des  Prädikats  in  vol.  iii.  of 
Wundt's  Philosophische  Studien;    L.    Liarrl,    /       /<  Xnglais    Content. 

porains,  1878;  AI.  Rieh]  in  vol.  i.  of  t lie  Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  wissenschaft- 
liche Philosophie,  1877  [cf.  also  appendix  A  to  the  English  translation  of 
Ueberwcg's  Logic. — Tk.]. 


5 So  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND   AMERICA. 

Bradley,  and  Bosanquet.  Among  more  recent  investiga- 
tors in  the  field  of  psychology  we  may  name  Carpenter, 
Ferrier,  Maudsley,  Galton,  Ward,  and  Sully  {The  Human 
Mind,  1892),  and  in  the  field  of  comparative  psychology,  Lub- 
bock, Romanes  {Mental Evolution  in  Animals,  1883  ;  Mental 
Evolution  in  Man,  1889),  and  Morgan  {Animal  Life  and  Intel- 
ligence, 1S91).  Among  ethical  writers  the  following,  besides 
Spencer  and  Green,  hold  a  foremost  place  :  H.  Sidgwick 
{The  Methods  of  Ethics,  4th  ed.,  1890),  Leslie  Stephen  {The 
Science  of  Ethics,  1882),  and  James  Martineau  {Types  of 
Ethical  Theory,  3d  ed.,  1891).  The  quarterly  review  Mind 
(vols,  i.-xvi.  1876-91,  edited  by  G.  Croom  Robertson  ;  new 
series  from  1892,  edited  by  G.  F.  Stout)  has  since  its  foun- 
dation played  an  important  part  in  the  development  of 
English   thought. 

German  idealism,  for  which  S.  T.  Coleridge  (died  1834) 
and  Thomas  Carlyle  (died  1881)  endeavored  to  secure  an 
entrance  into  England,  for  a  long  time  gained  ground 
there  but  slowly.  Later  years,  however,  have  brought 
increasing  interest  in  German  speculation,  and  much  of 
recent  thinking  shows  the  influence  of  Kantian  and 
Hegelian  principles.  As  pioneer  of  this  movement  we  may 
name  J.  H.  Stirling  {The  Secret  of  Hegel,  1865)  ;  and  as  its 
most  prominent  representatives  John  Caird  {An  Introduc- 
tion to  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  1880),  Edward  Caird 
(The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Immanuel  Kant,  1889;  The 
Evolution  of  Religion,  1893),  both  in  Glasgow,  and  T.  H. 
Green  (1836-82;  professor  at  Oxford;  Prolegomena  to 
Ethics,  3d  ed.,  1887;  Works,  edited  by  Nettleship,  3  vols., 
1885-88)."  In  opposition  to  the  hereditary  empiricism  of 
English  philosophy — which  appears  in  Spencer  and  Lewes, 
as  it  did  in  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Hume,  though  in  some- 
what altered  form — Green  maintains  that  all  experience  is 
constituted  by  intelligible  relations.  Knowledge,  there- 
fore, is  possible  only  for  a  correlating  self-conscious- 
ness ;  while  nature,  as  a  system  of  relations,  is  likewise 
dependent  on  a  spiritual  principle,  of  which  it  is  the  ex- 
pression. Thus  the  central  conception  of  Green's  philoso- 
phy becomes,  "  that  the  universe  is  a  single  eternal  activity 
*  Cf.  on  Green  the  Memoir  by  Nettleship  in  vol.  iii.  of  the  Works. 


IDEALISM:    T.    II,    GREEN.  58 1 

or  energy,  of  which  it  is  the  essence  to  be  self-conscious, 
that  is,  to  be  itself  and  not  itself  in  one  "  (Nettleship).  To 
this  universal  consciousness  we  are  related  as  manifesta- 
tions or  "  communications  "  under  the  limitations  of  our 
physical  organization.  As  such  we  are  free,  that  is,  self- 
determined,  determined  by  nothing  from  without.  The 
moral  ideal  is  self-realization  or  perfection,  the  progressive 
reproduction  of  the  divine  self-consciousness.  This  is  pos- 
sible only  in  terms  of  a  development  of  persons,  for  as  a 
self-conscious  personality  the  divine  spirit  can  reproduce 
itself  in  persons  alone;  and,  since  "social  life  is  to  person- 
ality what  language  is  to  thought,"  the  realization  of  the 
moral  ideal  implies  life  in  common.  The  nearer  determina- 
tion of  the  ideal  is  to  be  sought  in  the  manifestations  of  the 
eternal  spirit  as  they  have  been  given  in  the  moral  history 
of  individuals  and  nations.  This  shows  what  has  already 
been  implied  in  the  relation  of  morality  to  personality  and 
society,  that  moral  good  must  first  of  all  be  a  common 
good,  one  in  which  the  permanent  well-being  of  self  in- 
cludes the  well-being  of  others  also.  This  is  the  germ  of 
morality,  the  development  of  which  yields,  first,  a  gradual 
extension  of  the  area  of  common  good,  and  second!}',  a 
fuller  and  more  concrete  determination  of  its  content. 
Further  representatives  of  this  movement  are  W.  Wallace, 
Adamson,  Bradley  ;  A.  Seth  is  an  ex-member. 

The  first  and  greatest  of  American  philosophical  thinkers 
was  the  Calvinistic  theologian  Jonathan  Edwards  (1703- 
58;  treatise  on  the  Freedom  of  Will,  1754;  Works,  10 
vols.,  edited  by  Dwight,  1S30).  Edwards's  deterministic 
doctrine  found  numerous  adherents  (among  them  his  son, 
who  bore  his  father's  name,  died  1801)  as  well  as  strenu- 
ous opponents  (Tappan,  Whcdon,  Hazard  among  later 
names),  and  essentially  contributed  to  the  development  of 
philosophical  thought  in  the  United  States.  For  a  con- 
siderable period  this  crystallized  for  the  most  part  around 
elements  derived  from  British  thinkers,  especially  from 
Locke  and  the  Scottish  School.  In  [829  Janus  Mai  h 
called  attention  to  German  speculation*  by  his  American 
edition  of  Coleridge's  Aids  to  Reflection^  with  an  impor- 
ter  Porter,  op.  <//.,  p.  453. 


5s-  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  AMERICA. 

tant  introduction  from  his  own  hand.  Later  W.  E.  Chan- 
ning  (1780-1842),  the  head  of  the  Unitarian  movement, 
attracted  many  young  and  brilliant  minds,  the  most 
noted  of  whom,  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  (1803-82),  became 
a  leader  among  the  New  England  transcendentalists. 
Metaphysical  idealism  has,  perhaps,  met  with  less  resist- 
ance in  America  than  in  England.  Kant  and  Hegel  have 
been  eagerly  studied  (G.  S.  Morris,  died  1889;  C.  C.  Ever- 
ett;  J.  Watson  in  Canada;  Josiah  Royce,  The  Spirit  of 
Modem  PhilosopJiy,  1892;  and  others);  and  The  Journal  of 
Speculative  Philosophy,  edited  by  W.  T.  Harris,  has  since 
1867  furnished  a  rallying  point  for  idealistic  interests.  The 
influence  of  Lotze  has  also  been  considerable  (B.  P.  Bowne 
in  Boston).  Sympathy  with  German  speculation,  however, 
has  not  destroyed  the  naturally  close  connection  with  the 
work  of  writers  who  use  the  English  tongue.  Thus  Spen- 
cer's writings  have  had  a  wide  currency,  and  his  system 
numbers  many  disciples,  though  these  are  less  numerous 
among  students  of  philosophy  by  profession  (John  Fiske, 
Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy,  1874). 

In  the  latest  decades  the  broadening  of  the  national  life, 
the  increasing  acquaintance  with  foreign  thought,  and  the 
rapid  development  of  university  work  have  greatly  enlarged 
and  deepened  the  interest  in  philosophical  pursuits.  This 
is  manifested  most  clearly  in  the  field  of  psychology,  includ- 
ing especially  the  "new"  or  "physiological"  psychology, 
and  the  history  of  philosophy,  though  indications  of  preg- 
nant thought  in  other  departments,  as  ethics  and  the 
philosophy  of  religion,  and  even  of  independent  construc- 
tion, are  not  wanting.  Among  psychologists  of  the  day  we 
may  mention  G.  S.  Hall,  editor  of  The  American  Journal  of 
Psychology  (1887  seq.),  G.  T.  Ladd  {Elements  of  Physio- 
logical Psychology,  1887),  and  William  James  {Principles  of 
Psychology,  1890).  The  International  Journal  of  Ethics 
(Philadelphia,  1890  seq.),  edited  by  S.  Burns  Weston,  is 
"devoted  to  the  advancement  of  ethical  knowledge  and 
practice";  among  the  foreign  members  of  its  editorial  com- 
mittee are  Jodl  and  Von  Gizycki.  The  weekly  journal  of 
popular  philosophy,  The  Open  Court,  published  in  Chicago, 
has  for  its  object  the  reconciliation  of  religion  and  science; 


S  WED  EX.  583 

the  quarterly,  The  Monist  (1890  seq.),  published  by  the  same 
company  under  the  direction  of  Paul  Carus  {The  Soul  of 
Man,  1891),  the  establishment  of  a  monistic  view  of  the 
world.  Several  journals,  among  them  the  Educational 
Review  (1891  seq.,  edited  by  N.  M.  Butler),  point  to  a  grow- 
ing interest  in  pedagogical  inquiry.  The  American  Philo- 
sophical Review  (1892  seq.,  edited  by  J.  G.  Schurman,  The 
Ethical  Import  of  Darwinism,  1887)  is  a  comprehensive 
exponent  of  American  philosophic  thought. 

4.  Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark,  and  Holland. 

In  Sweden  an  empirical  period  represented  by  Leopold 
(died  1829)  and  Th.  Thorild  (died  1808),  and  based  upon 
Locke  and  Rousseau,  was  followed,  after  the  introduction 
of  Kant  by  D.  Boethius,  1794,  by  a  drift  toward  idealism. 
This  was  represented  in  an  extreme  form  by  B.  Höijer 
(died  18 12),  a  contemporary  and  admirer  of  Fichte,  who 
defended  the  right  of  philosophical  construction,  and  more 
moderately  by  Christofer  Jacob  Böstrom  (1 797-1 866),  the 
most  important  systematic  thinker  of  his  country.  As 
predecessors  of  Böstrom  we  may  mention  Biberg  (died 
1827),  E.  G.  Geijer  (died  1846),  and  S.  Grubbe  (died  1853), 
like  him  professors  in  Upsala,  and  of  his  pupils,  S.  Ribbing, 
known  in  Germany  by  his  peculiar  conception  of  the  Pla- 
tonic doctrine  of  ideas  (German  translation,  1863-64), 
the  moralist  Sahlin  (1877),  the  historian  of  Swedish  phi- 
losophy *  (1873  seq.)  A.  Nyblaeus  of  Lund,  and  H.  Edfeldt 
of  Upsala,  the  editor  of  Böstrom's  works  (1883). 

Böstrom's  philosophy  is  a  system  of  self-activity  and  per- 
sonalism  which  recalls  Leibnitz  and  Krause.  The  absolute 
or  being  is  characterized  as  a  concrete,  systematically  artic- 
ulated, self-conscious  unity,  which  dwells  with  its  entire  con- 
tent in  each  of  its  moments,  and  whose  members  both  bear 
the  character  of  the  whole  and  arc  immanent  in  one  another, 
standing  in  relations  of  organic  inter-determination.  The 
antithesis  between  unity  and  plurality  is  only  apparent, 
present  only  for  the  divisive  view  of  finite  consciousness. 
God   is  infinite,  fully  determinate  personality  (f<>r  determi- 

*  Cf .  Ilöffdin^,  Die  Philosophie  in  Schweden  in  the  Philosophische  Monat, 

hefte,  vol.  xv.  1879,  p.  193  seq. 


584  NORWAY  AND   DENMARK. 

nation  is  not  limitation),  a  system  of  self-dependent  living 
beings,  differing  in  degree,  in  which  we,  as  to  our  true  being, 
are  eternally  and  unchangeably  contained.  Every  being  is 
a  definite,  eternal,  and  living  thought  of  God  ;  thinking  be- 
ings with  their  states  and  activities  alone  exist;  all  that  is 
real  is  spiritual,  personal.  Besides  this  true,  suprasensible 
world  of  Ideas,  which  is  elevated  above  space,  time,  motion, 
change,  and  development,  and  which  has  not  arisen  by  crea- 
tion or  a  process  of  production,  there  exists  for  man,  but 
only  for  him — man  is  formally  perfect,  it  is  true,  but  mate- 
rially imperfect  (since  he  represents  the  real  from  a  lim- 
ited standpoint) — a  sensuous  world  of  phenomena  as  the 
sphere  of  his  activity.  To  this  he  himself  belongs,  and  in 
it  he  is  spontaneously  to  develop  the  suprasensible  content 
which  is  eternally  given  him  (/.  c,  his  true  nature),  namely, 
to  raise  it  from  the  merely  potential  condition  of  obscure 
presentiment  to  clear,  conscious  actuality.  Freedom  is  the 
power  to  overcome  our  imperfection  by  means  of  our  true 
nature,  to  realize  our  suprasensible  capacities,  to  become 
for  ourselves  what  we  are  in  ourselves  (in  God).  The 
ethics  of  Böstrom  is  distinguished  from  the  Kantian  ethics, 
to  which  it  is  related,  chiefly  by  the  fact  that  it  seeks  to 
bring  sensibility  into  a  more  than  merely  negative  relation 
to  reason.  Society  is  an  eternal,  and  also  a  personal,  Idea 
in  God.  The  most  perfect  form  of  government  is  constitu- 
tional monarchy ;  the  ideal  goal  of  history,  the  establish- 
ment of  a  system  of  states  embracing  all  mankind. 

J.  Borelius  of  Lund  is  an  Hegelian,  but  differs  from  the 
master  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the  contradiction.  The 
Hegelian  philosophy  has  adherents  in  Norway  also,  as  G. 
V.  Lyng  (died  1884;  System  of  Fundamental  Ideas),  M.  J. 
Monrad  (Tendencies  of  Modern  Thotight,  1874,  German 
translation,  1879),  both  professors  in  Christiania,  and  Mon. 
rad's  pupil  G.  Kent  {Hegel's  Doctrine  of  the  Nature  of  Ex- 
perience,  1 891). 

The  Danish  philosophy  of  the  nineteenth  century  has 
been  described  by  Höffding  in  the  second  volume  of  the 
Archiv  für  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  1888.  He  begins  with 
the  representatives  of  the  speculative  movement  :  Steffens 
(pp.  468-469),  Niels  Treschow  (1751-1S33),  Hans  Christian 


HOLLA  XD.  585 

Oersted  (1777-185 1  ;  Spirit  in  Nature,  German  translation, 
Munich,  1850-51),  and  Frederik  Christian  Sibbern  (1785— 
1872).  A  change  was  brought  about  by  the  philoso- 
phers of  religion  Sören  Kierkegaard  ( 1 8 1 3—5  5)  and 
Rasmus  Nielsen  (1809-84;  Philosophy  of  Religion,  1869), 
who  opposed  speculative  idealism  with  a  strict  dualism  of 
knowledge  and  faith,  and  were  in  turn  opposed  by  Georg 
Brandes  (born  1842)  and  Hans  Bröchner  (1820-75). 
Among  younger  investigators  the  Copenhagen  professors, 
Harald  Höffding*  (born  1843)  and  Kristian  Kroman  f(born 
1846)  stand  in  the  first  rank. 

Land  {Mind,  vol.  iii.  1878)  and  G.  von  Antal  (1888) 
have  written  on  philosophy  in  Holland.  Down  to  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  field  was  occupied  by 
an  idealism  based  upon  the  ancients,  in  particular  upon 
Plato:  Franz  Hemsterhuis  (1721-90;  Works,  new  ed., 
1846-50),  and  the  philologists  Wyttenbach  and  Van  Heusde. 
Then  Cornelius  Wilhelm  Opzoomer  \  (1821-92  ;  professor 
in  Utrecht)  brought  in  a  new  movement.  Opzoomer  favors 
empiricism.  He  starts  from  Mill  and  Comte,  but  goes  be- 
yond them  in  important  points,  and  assigns  faith  a  field  of  its 
own  beside  knowledge.  In  opposition  to  apriorism  he  seeks 
to  show  that  experience  is  capable  of  yielding  universal  and 
necessary  truths  ;  that  space,  time,  and  causality  are  received 
along  with  the  content  of  thought;  that  mathematics  itself 
is  based  upon  experience;  and  that  the  method  of  natural 
science,  especially  deduction,  must  be  applied  to  the  mental 
sciences.  The  philosophy  of  mind  considers  man  as  an  indi- 
vidual being,  in  his  connection  with  others,  in  relation  to  a 
higher  being,  and  in  his  development ;  accordingly  it  divides 
into  psychology  (which  includes  logic,  aesthetics,  and  ethol- 
ogy), sociology,  the  philosophy  of  religion,  and  the 
philosophy  of  history.     Central  to  Opzoomer's  system  is  his 

*  Hoffähig  :    The  Foundations  of  Human  Ethics,  1876,  German  translation, 

1880;  Outlines  of  Psychology,  1882,  English  translation  by  Lowndes,  1S91, 
from  the  German  translation,  1887;  Ethics,  1887,  German  translation  by  Ben- 
dixen,  1888. 

\  Kroman:  Our  Knowledge  of  Nature,  German  translation,  1  ■  18  ;  :  I  Brief 
Logic  and  Psycholo  v,  German  translation  by  Bendixen,  1 

^Opzoomer:  The  Method  of  Science,  a  Handbook  of  Logic,  German  Iransla« 
tion  by  Schwindt,  1852  ;   Religion,  German  translation  by  Mook,  1869. 


586  HOLLAND. 

doctrine  of  the  five  sources  of  knowledge:  Sensation, 
the  feeling  of  pleasure  and  pain,  aesthetic,  moral,  and  relig- 
ious feeling.  If  we  build  on  the  foundation  of  the  first  three 
alone,  we  end  in  materialism  ;  if  we  leave  the  last  unused, 
we  reach  positivism  ;  if  we  make  religious  feeling  the  sole 
judge  of  truth,  mysticism  is  the  outcome.  The  criteria  of 
science  are  utility  and  progress.  These  are  still  wanting  in 
the  mental  sciences,  in  which  the  often  answered  but  never 
decided  questions  continually  recur,  because  we  have 
neither  derived  the  principles  chosen  as  the  basis  of  the 
deduction  from  an  exact  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  nor 
tested  the  results  by  experience.  The  causes  of  this  defec- 
tive condition  can  only  be  removed  by  imitating  the  study 
of  nature  :  we  must  learn  that  no  conclusions  can  be  reached 
except  from  facts,  and  that  we  are  to  strive  after  knowledge 
of  phenomena  and  their  laws  alone.  We  have  no  right  to 
assume  an  "essence  "  of  things  beside  and  in  addition  to 
phenomena,  which  reveals  itself  in  them  or  hides  behind 
them.  Pupils  of  Opzoomer  are  his  successor  in  his  Utrecht 
chair,  Van  der  Wyck,  and  Pierson.  We  may  also  mention 
J.  P.  N.  Land,  who  has  done  good  service  in  editing  the 
works  of  Spinoza  and  of  Geulincx,  and  the  philosopher  of 
religion  Rauwenhoff  (1888). 

On  the  system  of  the  Hungarian  philosopher  Cyrill 
Horväth  (died  1884  at  Pesth)  see  the  essay  by  E.  Nemes 
in  the  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vol.  lxxxviii.  1886.  Since 
1889  a  review,  Problems  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  has 
appeared  at  Moscow  in  Russian,  under  the  direction  of 
Professor  N.  von  Grot. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  SINCE  THE  DEATH  OF 
HEGEL. 

With  Hegel  the  glorious  dynasty  which,  with  a  strong 
hand,  had  guided  the  fate  of  German  philosophy  since  the 
conclusion  of  the  preceding  century  disappears.  From  his 
death  (183 1)  we  may  date  the  second  period  of  post-Kantian 
philosophy,*  which  is  markedly  and  unfavorably  distin- 
guished from  the  first  by  a  decline  in  the  power  of  specu- 
lative creation  and  by  a  division  of  effort.  If  previous  to 
this  the  philosophical  public,  comprising  all  the  cultured, 
had  been  eagerly  occupied  with  problems  in  common,  and 
had  followed  with  unanimous  interest  the  work  of  those  who 
were  laboring  at  them,  during  the  last  fifty  years  the  interest 
of  wider  circles  in  philosophical  questions  has  grown  much 
less  active;  almost  every  thinker  goes  his  own  way,  giving 
heed  only  to  congenial  voices;  the  inner  connection  of  the 
schools  has  been  broken  down  ;  the  touch  with  thinkers  of 
different  views  has  been  lost.  The  latest  decades  have  been 
the  first  to  bring  a  change  for  the  better,  in  so  far  as  new 
rallying  points  of  philosophical  interest  have  been  cre- 
ated by  the  neo-Kantian  movement,  by  the  systems  of 
Lotze  and  Von  Hartmann,  by  the  impulse  toward  the 
philosophy  of  nature  proceeding  from  Darwinism,  by 
energetic  labors  in  the  field  of  practical  philosophy,  and 
by  new  methods  of  investigation  in  psychology. 

*  On  philosophy  since  1831  cf.  vol.  iii.  of  J.  E.  Krdmann's  History; 
Ueberweg,  GrundHss,  part  iii.  §§  37-49  (English  translation,  vol.  ii.  pp. 
292-516);  Lanjje,  History  of  Materialism;  B.  Erdmann,  Die  Philosophie  der 
<i  n  -wart  in  the  Deutsche  Rundschau,  vols,  xix.,  xx.,  1879,  June  and  July  num- 
bers ;  (A.  Krohn,)  StreiJ  tige  durch  die  Philosophie  der  Gegenwart  in  the  Zeit- 
schrift für  Philosophie  und  philosophist  he  Kritik,  vols.  Ixxxvii.,  Ixxxix.,  1885—86  ; 
[Burt,  History  of  Modern  Philosophy,  iH^2),  also  the  third  volume  of  Windel« 
band's  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophie,  when  it  appears. 


5^8  DIVISION   OF    THE  HEGELIAN  SCHOOL. 

i.  From  the  Division  of  the    Hegelian  School  to  the 
Materialistic  Controversy. 

A  decade  after  the  philosophy  of  Ilcgel  had  entered  on 
its  supremacy  a  division  in  the  school  was  called  forth  by 
Strauss's  Life  of  Jesus  (1835).  The  differences  were  brought 
to  light  by  the  discussion  of  religious  problems,  in  regard 
to  which  Hegel  had  not  expressed  himself  with  sufficient 
distinctness.  The  relation  of  knowledge  and  faith,  as  he  had 
defined  it,  admitted  of  variant  interpretations  and  deduc- 
tions, and  this  in  favor  of  Church  doctrine  as  well  as  in 
opposition  to  it.  Philosophy  has  the  same  content  as 
religion,  but  in  a  different  form,  i.  e.,  not  in  the  form  of 
representation,  but  in  the  form  of  the  concept — it  trans- 
forms dogma  into  speculative  truth.  The  conservative 
Hegelians  hold  fast  to  the  identity  of  content  in  the  two 
modes  of  cognition  ;  the  liberals,  to  the  alteration  in  form, 
which,  they  assert,  brings  an  alteration  in  content  with 
it.  According  to  Hegel  the  lower  stage  is  "  sublated  "  in 
the  higher,  i.  e.,  conserved  as  well  as  negated.  The  orthodox 
members  of  the  school  emphasize  the  conservation  of 
religious  doctrines,  their  justification  from  the  side  of 
the  philosopher;  the  progressists,  their  negation,  their 
overcoming  by  the  speculative  concept.  The  general 
question,  whether  the  ecclesiastical  meaning  of  a  dogma  is 
retained  or  to  be  abandoned  in  its  transformation  into  a 
philosopheme,  divides  into  three  special  questions,  the 
anthropological,  the  soteriogical,  and  the  theological. 
These  are:  whether  on  Hegelian  principles  immortality  is 
to  be  conceived  as  a  continuance  of  individual  existence 
on  the  part  of  particular  spirits,  or  only  as  the  eternity  of 
the  universal  reason  ;  whether  by  the  God-man  the  person 
of  Christ  is  to  be  understood,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
human  species,  the  Idea  of  Humanity;  whether  personality 
belongs  to  the  Godhead  before  the  creation  of  the  world, 
or  whether  it  first  attains  to  self-consciousness  in  human 
spirits,  whether  Hegel  was  a  theist  or  a  pantheist,  whether 
he  teaches  the  transcendence  or  the  immanence  of  God. 
The  Old  Hegelians  defend  the  orthodox  interpretation  ;  the 
Young  Hegelians  oppose  it.     The  former,  Göschel,  Gabler, 


HEGELIANS.  589 

Hinrichs,  Schaller  (died  1868  ;  History  of  the  Philosophy  of 
Nature  since  Bacon,  1841  seq.),  J.  E.  Erdmann  in  Halle 
(1805-92  ;  Body  and  Soul,  1837  ;  Psychological  Letters,  1851, 
6th  ed.,  1882;  Earnest  Sport,  1 87 1 ,  4th  ed.,  1890),  form, 
according  to  Strauss's  parliamentary  comparison  carried  out 
by  Michelet,  the  "  right  "  ;  the  latter,  Strauss,  Feuerbach, 
Bruno  Bauer,  and  A.  Ruge,  who,  with  Echtermeyer,  edited 
the  HallescJie,  afterward  Deutsche,  Jahrbücher  für  Wis- 
senschaft und  Kunst,  1838-42,  the  "left."  Between  them, 
and  forming  the  "center,"  stand  Karl  Rosenkranz*  in 
Königsberg  (1805-79),  C.  L.  Michelet  in  Berlin  (p.  16; 
Hegel,  the  Unrcfutcd  World-philosopher,  1870;  System  of 
Philosophy,  1876  seq.),  and  the  theologians  Marheineke  (a 
pupil  of  Daub  at  Heidelberg)  and  W.  Vatke  {Philosophy  of 
Religion,  edited  by  Preiss,  1888).  Contrasted  with  these  is 
the  group  of  semi- or  pseudo-Hegelians  (p.  596),  who  declare 
themselves  in  accord  with  the  theistic  doctrines  of  the  right, 
but  admit  that  the  left  represents  Hegel's  own  opinion,  or 
at  least  the  correct  deductions  from  his  position. 

The  following  should  also  be  mentioned  as  Hegelians: 
the  philosopher  of  history,  Von  Cieszkowski,  the  pedagog- 
ical writer,  Thaulow  (at  Kiel,  died  1883),  the  philosopher  of 
religion  and  of  law,  A.  Lasson  at  Berlin,  the  aesthetic 
writers  Hotho,  Friedrich  Theodor  Vischerf  (1807-87), 
and  Max  Schasler  {Critical  History  of  yEsthetics,  1872  ; 
yEsthetics,  1886),  the  historians  of  philosophy,  Schwegler 
(died  1857;  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  1859,  4tn  C(^->  1 886, 
edited  by  Karl  Köstlin,  whose  yEsthetics  appeared  1869), 
Eduard  Zeller  %  of  Berlin  (born  1814),  and  Kuno  Fischer 
(born  1824;  1856-72  professor  at  Jena,  since  then  at 
Heidelberg;  Logic  and  MctapJiysics,  2d  ed.,  1865).  While 
Weissenborn  (died   1874)  is  influenced  by  Schleiermacher 

*  K.  Rosenkranz:    Psychology,    1837.  3d  ed.,   1863;  Science  of  the  Logical 
Idea,  1858  ;   Studies,  1839  seq.,   New  Studies,  1875  seq.;  yEsthetics  op  the  I ' 
1853  ;  several  works  on  the  history  of  poetry. 

f  Vischer :  /Esthetics,  1846-58  ;  Critical  Excursions,  1844  seq.;  several  Hefte 
"  Altes  and  Neues."  The  diary  in  the  second  part  of  the  novel  Auch  Einer 
develops  an  original  pantheistic  view  of  the  world. 

JZeller :  The  Philosophy  of  the  Greeks  in  its  Historical  Development,  5  vols., 
3d  ed.,  vol.  i.  5th  cd.  [English  translation,  1868  seq.]  ;  three  collections  of  Ad- 
dresses and  Essays,  1865,  1877,  1884. 


59°  THE   HEGELIAN  LEFT. 

also,  and  Zcllcr  and  Fischer  strive  back  toward  Kant, 
Johannes  Volkelt  *  in  Würzburg  (born  1848),  who  started 
from  Hegel  and  advanced  through  Schopenhauer  and  Hart- 
niann,  has  of  late  years  established  an  independent  noetical 
position  and  has  done  good  service  by  his  energetic  oppo- 
sition to  positivism  {Das  Denken  als  Hülfvorstellungs — 
Thätigkeit  und  als  Anpassungsvorgang  in  the  Zeitschrift 
für  Philosophie,  vols,  xevi.,  xcvii.,  1889-90). 

The  leaders  of  the  Hegelian  left  require  more  detailed 
consideration.  In  David  Friedrich  Strauss  f  (1808-74, 
born  and  died  at  Ludwigsburg)  the  philosophy  of  religion 
becomes  a  historical  criticism  of  the  Bible  and  of  dog- 
matics. The  biblical  narratives  are,  in  great  part,  not  his- 
tory (this  has  been  the  common  error  alike  of  the  super- 
naturalistic  and  of  the  rationalistic  interpreters),  but  myths, 
that  is,  suprasensible  facts  presented  in  the  form  of  history 
and  in  symbolic  language.  It  is  evident  from  the  contradic- 
tions in  the  narratives  and  the  impossibility  of  miracles  that 
we  are  not  here  concerned  with  actual  events.  The  myths 
possess  (speculative,  absolute)  truth,  but  no  (historical) 
reality.  They  are  unintentional  creations  of  the  popular 
imagination  ;  the  spirit  of  the  community  speaks  in  the 
authors  of  the  Gospels,  using  the  historical  factor  (the  life- 
history  of  Jesus)  with  mythical  embellishments  as  an  investi- 
ture for  a  supra-historical,  eternal  truth  (the  speculative 
Idea  of  incarnation).  The  God  become  man,  in  which  the 
infinite  and  the  finite,  the  divine  nature  and  the  human,  are 
united,  is  the  human  race.  The  Idea  of  incarnation  mani- 
fests itself  in  a  multitude  of  examples  which  supplement 
one  another,  instead  of  pouring  forth  its  whole  fullness  in  a 
single  one.     The  (real)  Idea  of  the  race  is  to  be  substituted 

*  Volkelt:  The  Phantasy  in  Dreams,  1875  ;  Kants  Theory  of  Knowledge, 
1879  ;  On  the  Possibility  of  Metaphysics,  inaugural  address  at  Basle,  1884  ;  Ex- 
perience and  Thought,  Critical  Foundation  of  the  Theory  of  Knowledge,  1886  ; 
Lectures  Introductory  to  the  Philosophy  of  the  Present  Time  (delivered  in  Frank- 
fort-on-the-Main),  1892. 

f  Strauss  :  The  Life  of  Jesus,  1835-36,  4th  ed.,  1840  [English  translation 
by  George  Eliot,  2d.  ed.,  1893]  ;  the  same  "for  the  German  People,"  1864 
[English  translation,  1865]  ;  Christian  Dogmatics,  1840-41  ;  Voltaire,  1870  ; 
Collected  Writings,  12  vols.,  edited  by  Zeller,  1876-78.  On  Strauss  cf.  Zeller( 
1874  [English,  1874],  and  Hausrath,  1876-78. 


STRAUSS.  591 

for  a  single  individual  as  the  subject  of  the  predicates  (resur- 
rection, ascension,  etc.)  which  the  Church  ascribes  to  Christ. 
The  Son  of  God  is  Humanity. 

In  his  second  principal  work  Strauss  criticises  the  dogmas 
of  Christianity  as  sharply  as  he  had  criticised  the  Gospel 
narrative  in  the  first  one.  The  historical  development  of 
these  has  of  itself  effected  their  destruction  :  the  history  of 
dogma  is  the  objective  criticism  of  dogma.  Christianity  and 
philosophy,  theism  and  pantheism,  dualism  and  immanence, 
are  irreconcilable  opposites.  To  be  able  to  know  we  must 
cease  to  believe.  Dogma  is  the  product  of  the  unphiloso- 
phical,  uncultured  consciousness  ;  belief  in  revelation,  only 
for  those  who  have  not  yet  risen  to  reason.  In  the  trans- 
formation of  religious  representations  into  philosophical 
Ideas  nothing  specifically  representative  is  left ;  the  form  of 
representation  must  be  actually  overcome.  The  Christian 
contraposition  of  the  present  world  and  that  which  is 
beyond  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  sensuo-rational 
spirit  of  man,  so  long  as  it  does  not  philosophically  know 
itself  as  the  unity  of  the  infinite  and  the  finite,  but  only 
feels  itself  as  finite,  sensuo-empirical  consciousness,  projects 
the  infinite,  which  it  has  in  itself,  as  though  this  were  some- 
thing foreign,  looks  on  it  as  something  beyond  the  world. 
This  separation  of  faith  is  entirely  unphilosophical ;  it  is  the 
mission  of  the  philosopher  to  reduce  all  that  is  beyond  the 
world  to  the  present.  Thus  for  him  immortality  is  not  some- 
thing to  come,  but  the  spirit's  own  power  to  rise  above  the 
finite  to  the  Idea.  And  like  future  existence,  so  the  tran- 
scendent God  also  disappears.  The  absolute  is  the  universal 
unity  of  the  world,  which  posits  and  sublates  the  individual 
as  its  modes.  God  is  the  being  in  all  existence,  the  life  in 
all  that  lives,  the  thought  in  all  that  think-:  he  does  not 
stand  as  an  individual  person  beside  and  above  other  per- 
sons, but  is  the  infinite  which  personifies  itself  and  attains 
to  consciousness  in  human  spirits,  and  this  from  eternity  ; 
before  there  was  a  humanity  of  earth  there  were  spirits  on 
other  stars,  in  whom  God  reflected  himself. 

Three  decades  later  Strauss  again  created  a  sensation  by 
his  confession  of  materialism  and  atheism,  The  Old  Faith 
and  the   New,    1X72    (since  the    second  edition,    "With    a 


59*  THE   II  EG  ELI  AX  LEFT. 

Postscript  as  Preface  "),*  in  which  he  continues  the  conflict 
against  religious  dualism.  The  question  "  Are  we  " — the 
cultured  men  of  the  day — "  still  Christians  ?  "  is  answered  in 
the  negative.  Christianity  is  a  cult  of  poverty,  despising 
the  world,  and  antagonistic  to  labor  and  culture  ;  but  we 
have  learned  to  esteem  science  and  art,  riches  and 
acquisition,  as  the  chief  levers  of  culture  and  of  human 
progress.  Christianity  dualistically  tears  apart  body  and 
soul,  time  and  eternity,  the  world  and  God  ;  we  need  no 
Creator,  for  the. life-process  has  neither  beginning  nor  end. 
The  world  is  framed  for  the  highest  reason,  it  is  true,  but  it 
has  not  been  framed  by  a  highest  reason.  Our  highest  Idea 
is  the  All,  which  is  conformed  to  law,  and  instinct  with  life 
and  reason,  and  our  feeling  toward  the  universe — the  con- 
sciousness of  dependence  on  its  laws — exercises  no  less  of 
ethical  influence,  is  no  less  full  of  reverence,  and  no  less 
exposed  to  injury  from  an  irreverent  pessimism,  than  the 
feeling  of  the  devout  of  the  old  type  toward  their  God. 
Hence  the  answer  to  the  second  question  "  Have  we  still  a 
religion?"  maybe  couched  in  the  affirmative.  The  new 
faith  does  not  need  a  cultus  and  a  Church.  Since  the  dry 
services  of  the  free  congregations  offer  nothing  for  the 
fancy  and  the  spirit,  the  edification  of  the  heart  must  be 
accomplished  in  other  ways — by  participation  in  the  in- 
terests of  humanity,  in  the  national  life,  and,  not  last,  by 
aesthetic  enjoyment.  Thus  in  his  last  work,  which  in  two 
appendices  reaches  a  discussion  of  the  great  German  poets 
and  musicians,  the  old  man  returns  to  a  thought  to  which 
he  had  given  earlier  expression,  that  the  religious  cultus 
should  be  replaced  by  the  cultus  of  genius. 

As  Strauss  went  over  from  Hegelianism  to  pantheism, 
so  Ludwig  Feuerbach  f  (1804-72),  a  son  of  the  great  jur- 
ist, Anselm  Feuerbach,  after  he  had  for  a  short  time 
moved  in  the  same  direction,  took  the  opposite,  the  indi- 
vidualistic   course,   only,   like    Strauss,   to    end    at    last    in 

*  English  translation  by  Mathilde  Blind,  1873. 

\  Feuerbach  was  born  at  Landshut,  studied  at  Heidelberg  and  Berlin, 
habilitated,  1828,  at  Erlangen,  and  lived,  1836-60,  in  the  village  of  Bruck- 
berg,  not  far  from  Bayreuth,  and  from  i860  until  his  death  in  Rechenberg,  a 
suburb   of    Nuremberg.      Collected   Works,  in   10  vols.,    1846-66.      The  chief 


FEUERBACH.  593 

materialism.  "  My  first  thought,"  as  he  himself  describes 
the  course  of  his  development,  "was  God;  my  second, 
reason  ;  my  third  and  last,  man."  As  theology  has  been 
overcome  by  Hegel's  philosophy  of  reason,  so  this  in 
turn  must  give  place  to  the  philosophy  of  man.  "  The 
new  philosophy  makes  man,  including  nature  as  his  basis, 
the  highest  and  sole  subject  of  philosophy,  and,  conse- 
quently, anthropology  the  universal  science."  Only  that 
which  is  immediately  self-evident  is  true  and  divine.  But 
only  that  which  is  sensible  is  evident  [sonnenklar)  ;  it  is 
only  where  sensibility  begins  that  all  doubt  and  conflict 
cease.  Sensible  beings  alone  are  true,  real  beings  ;  exist- 
ence in  space  and  time  is  alone  existence  ;  truth,  reality, 
and  sensibility  are  identical.  While  the  old  philosophy 
took  for  its  starting  point  the  principle,  "  I  am  an  ab- 
stract, a  merely  thinking  being ;  the  body  does  not  be- 
long to  my  essence,"  the  new  philosophy,  on  the  other 
hand,  begins  with  the  principle,  "  I  am  a  real,  a  sensible 
being  ;  the  body  in  its  totality  is  my  ego,  my  essence  itself." 
Feuerbach,  however,  uses  the  concept  of  sensibility  in  so 
wide  and  vague  a  sense  that,  supported — or  deceived — by  the 
ambiguity  of  the  word  sensation,  he  includes  under  it  even 
the  most  elevated  and  sacred  feelings.  Even  the  objects 
of  art  are  seen,  heard,  and  felt  ;  even  the  souls  of  other 
men  are  sensed.  In  the  sensations  the  deepest  and  highest 
truths  are  concealed.  Not  only  the  external,  but  the 
internal  also,  not  only  flesh,  but  spirit,  not  only  the  thing, 
but  the  ego,  not  only  the  finite,  the  phenomenal,  but  also 
the  true  divine  essence  is  an  object  of  the  senses.  Sensa- 
tion proves  the  existence  of  objects  outside  our  head — 
there  is  no  other  proof  of  being  than  love,  than  sensation 
in  general.  Everything  is  perceivable  by  the  senses,  if  not 
directly,  yet  indirectly,  if  not  with  the  vulgar,  untrained 
senses,  yet  with  the  "cultivated  senses,"  if  not  with   the 


works  are  entitled  :  P.  Bayle,  1838,  2d  ed.,  1844;  Philosophy  and  Christianity, 
1839;  The  Essence  of  Christianity,  1841,  4th  ed.,  1883  [English  translation 
by  George  Eliot,  1 S  5  4  j  ;  Principles  of  the  Philosophy  <>f  the  Future,  1843  ;  The 
Essence  of  Religion,  1845  ;  Theogony,  1857;  God,  Freedom,  and  Immortality, 
1866.  Karl  Grün,  1874,  C.  N.  Starcke,  1885,  and  \V.  Bolin,  1 89 1,  treat  oi 
Feuerbach. 


594  THE   HEGELIAN  LEFT. 

eye  of  the  anatomist  or  chemist,  yet  with  that  of  the 
philosopher.  All  our  ideas  spring  from  the  senses,  but 
their  production  requires  communication  and  converse 
between  man  and  man.  The  higher  concepts  cannot  be 
derived  from  the  individual  Ego  without  a  sensuously  given 
Thou  ;  the  highest  object  of  sense  is  man  ;  man  does  not 
reach  concepts  and  reason  in  general  by  himself,  but  only 
as  one  of  two.  The  nature  of  man  is  contained  in  com- 
munity alone  ;  only  in  life  with  others  and  for  others  does 
he  attain  his  destiny  and  happiness.  The  conscience  is  the 
ego  putting  itself  in  the  place  of  another  who  has  been 
injured.  Man  with  man,  the  unity  of  I  and  Thou,  is  God, 
and  God  is  love. 

To  the  philosophy  of  religion  Feuerbach  assigns  the  task 
of  giving  a  psychological  explanation  of  the  genesis  of 
religion,  instead  of  showing  reason  in  religion.  In  bidding 
us  believe  in  miracles  dogma  is  a  prohibition  to  think. 
Hence  the  philosopher  is  not  to  justify  it,  but  to  uncover 
the  illusion  to  which  it  owes  its  origin.  Speculative  the- 
ology is  an  intoxicated  philosophy  ;  it  is  time  to  become 
sober,  and  to  recognize  that  philosophy  and  religion  are 
diametrically  opposed  to  each  other,  that  they  are  related 
to  each  other  as  health  to  disease,  as  thought  to  phantasy. 
Religion  arises  from  the  fact  that  man  objectifies  his  own 
true  essence,  and  opposes  it  to  himself  as  a  personal  being, 
without  coming  to  a  consciousness  of  this  divestment  of 
self,  of  the  identity  of  the  divine  and  human  nature.  Hence 
the  Hegelian  principles,  that  the  absolute  is  self-conscious- 
ness, that  in  man  God  knows  himself,  must  be  reversed: 
self-consciousness  is  the  absolute;  in  his  God  man  knows 
himself  only.  The  Godhead  is  our  own  universal  nature, 
freed  from  its  individual  limitations,  intuited  and  wor- 
shiped as  another,  independent  being,  distinct  from  us. 
God  is  self  objectified,  the  inner  nature  of  man  expressed  ; 
man  is  the  beginning,  the  middle,  and  the  end  of  religion. 
All  theology  is  anthropology,  for  all  religion  is  a  self- 
deification  of  man.  In  religion  man  makes  a  division  in  his 
own  nature,  posits  himself  as  double,  first  as  limited  (as  a 
human  individual),  then  as  unlimited,  raised  to  infinity 
(as  God) ;  and  this  deified  self  he  worships  in  order  to  ob- 


BAUER.  595 

tain  from  it  the  satisfaction  of  his  needs,  which  the  course  of 
the  world  leaves  unmet.  Thus  religion  grows  out  of  egoism  : 
its  basis  is  the  difference  between  our  will  and  our  power ;  its 
aim,  to  set  us  free  from  the  dependence  which  we  feel  be- 
fore nature.  (Like  culture,  religion  seeks  to  make  nature 
an  intelligible  and  compliant  being,  only  that  in  this 
it  makes  use  of  the  supernatural  instruments  faith,  prayer, 
and  magic  ;  it  is  only  gradually  that  men  learn  to  attack  the 
evils  by  natural  means.)  That  which  man  himself  is  not, 
but  wishes  to  be,  that  he  represents  to  himself  in  his  gods 
as  existing;  they  are  the  wishes  of  man's  heart  transformed 
into  real  beings,  his  longing  after  happiness  satisfied  by  the 
fancy.  The  same  holds  true  of  all  dogmas  :  as  God  is  the 
affirmation  of  our  wishes,  so  the  world  beyond  is  the  pres- 
ent embellished  and  idealized  by  the  fancy.  Instead  of 
"God  is  merciful,  is  love,  is  omnipotent,  he  performs 
miracles  and  hears  prayers,"  the  statement  must  be  reversed: 
mercy,  love,  omnipotence,  to  perform  miracles,  and  to  hear 
prayers,  is  divine.  In  the  sacraments  of  baptism  and  the 
Lord's  supper  Feuerbach  sees  the  truth  that  water  and  food 
are  indispensable  and  divine.  As  Feuerbach,  following  out 
this  naturalistic  tendency,  reached  the  extreme  of  material- 
ism, the  influence  of  his  philosophy — whose  different  phases 
there  is  no  occasion  to  trace  out  in  detail — had  already 
passed  its  culmination.  From  his  later  writings  little  more 
has  found  its  way  into  public  notice  than  the  pun,  that  man 
is  (ist)  what  he  eats  (isst). 

The  remaining  members  of  the  Hegelian  left  may  be 
treated  more  briefly.  Bruno  Bauer*  (died  in  1882;  his 
principal  work  is  the  Critique  of  the  Synoptics,  in  three  vol- 
umes, 1841-42,  which  had  been  preceded,  in  1840,  by  a 
Critique  of  the  Evangelical  History  of  John)  at  first  belonged 
on  the  right  of  the  school,  but  soon  went  over  to  the  ex- 
treme left.  He  explains  the  Gospel  narratives  as  creations 
with  a  purpose  (Tendenzdichtungen),  as  intentional,  but  not 
deceitful,  inventions,  from  which,  despite  their  unreality, 
history  may  well  be  learned,  inasmuch   as   they    reflect  the 


*  Not  to  be  confused  with    the  head  of   the   Tübingen  School,    Ferdinand 
Christian  Baur  (died  i860). 


596  THE    TH  KI  STIC   SCHOOL. 

spirit  of  the  time  in  which  they  were  constructed.  His  own 
publications  and  those  of  his  brother  Edgar  are  much  more 
radical  after  the  year  1844.  I»  these  the  brothers  advo- 
cate the  standpoint  of  "pure  or  absolute  criticism,"  which 
extends  itself  to  all  things  and  events  for  or  against  which 
sides  are  taken  from  any  quarter,  and  calmly  watches  how 
everything  destroys  itself.  As  soon  as  anything  is  ad- 
mitted, it  is  no  longer  true.  Nothing  is  absolutely  valid, 
all  is  vain  ;  it  is  only  the  criticising,  all-destroying  ego,  free 
from  all  ethical  ties,  that  possesses  truth. 

One  further  step  was  possible  beyond  Feuerbach  and 
Bruno  Bauer,  that  from  the  community  to  the  particular, 
selfish  individual,  from  the  criticising,  therefore  thinking, 
ego,  to  the  ego  of  sensuous  enjoyment.  This  step  was 
taken  in  that  curious  book  The  Individual  and  his  Property, 
which  Kaspar  Schmidt,  who  died  in  1856  at  Berlin,  published 
in  1845  (2d  ed.,  1882),  under  the  pseudonym  of  Max  Stirner. 
The  Individual  of  whom  the  title  speaks  is  the  egoist.  For 
me  nothing  is  higher  than  myself;  I  use  men  and  use  up 
the  world  for  my  own  pleasure.  I  seek  to  be  and  have 
all  that  I  can  be  and  have  ;  I  have  a  right  to  all  that  is 
within  my  power.  Morality  is  a  delusion,  justice,  like  all 
Ideas,  a  phantom.  Those  who  believe  in  ideals,  and 
worship  such  generalities  as  self-consciousness,  man,  society, 
are  still  deep  in  the  mire  of  prejudice  and  superstition,  and 
have  banished  the  old  orthodox  phantom  of  the  Deity  only 
to  replace  it  by  a  new  one.  Nothing  whatever  is  to  be 
respected. 

Among  the  opponents  of  the  Hegelian  philosophy  the 
members  of  the  "  theistic  school,"  who  have  above  (p.  589) 
been  designated  as  semi-Hegelians,  approximate  it  most 
closely.  These  endeavor,  in  part  retaining  the  dialectic 
method,  to  blend  the  immanence  of  the  absolute,  which 
philosophy  cannot  give  up  and  concerning  which  Hegel  had 
erred  only  by  way  of  over-emphasis,  with  the  transcend- 
ence of  God  demanded  by  Christian  consciousness,  to  estab- 
lish a  theism  which  shall  contain  pantheism  asa  moment  in 
itself.  God  is  present  in  all  creatures,  yet  distinct  from 
them  ;  he  is  intramundane  as  well  as  extramundane ;  he  is 


WEISSE,   I.    II.    EICHTE,    ULK  ICE  597 

self-conscious  personality,  free  creative  spirit,  is  this  from  all 
eternity,  and  does  not  first  become  such  through  the  world- 
development.     He  does  not  need  the  world   for  his  perfec- 
tion, but  out  of  his  goodness  creates  it.     Philosophy  must 
begin  with  the  living   Godhead   instead   of  beginning,  like 
Hegel's  Logic,  with  the  empty  concept  of  being.     For  the 
categories — as    Schelling    had     already    objected — express 
necessary  forms  or  general  laws   only,  to  which   all   reality 
must  conform,  but  which  are  never  capable   of  generating 
reality;    the    content   which    appears  in  them   and  which 
obeys  them,  can  only  be  created  by  a  Deity,  and  only  em- 
pirical!}' cognized.     This  is  the  standpoint  of  Christian  Her- 
mann Weisse*  in  Leipsic  (1801-66),  Karl  Philipp  Fischerf 
in  Erlangen  (1807-85),  Immanuel  Hermann  Fichte;};  (1797- 
1879;    1842-65   professor   in  Tübingen),  and    the    follower 
of    Schleiermacher,  Julius  Braniss  in  Breslau  (1792-1873). 
The   following  hold  similar  views,  influenced,  like  Weisse 
and   K.  Ph.  Fischer,  by  Schelling:   Jacob  Sengler  of  Frei- 
burg ( 1 799- 1 878  ;    The   Idea   of  God,   1845   seq.\  Leopold 
Schmid    of    Giessen  (1808-69;    cf.  p.  516,  note),   Johannes 
Huber    (died    1879),    Moritz    Carriere  §    (born    1817),  both 
in    Munich,    K.    Steffensen    of    Basle    (1816-88;    Collected 
Essays,    1890),    and    Karl   Heyder  in    Erlangen    (1812-86 
The  Doctrine  of  Ideas,   vol.  i.  1874).     Chalybaeus    at   Kie 
{died    1862),    and  Friedrich   Harms    at  Berlin    (died   1880 
Metaphysics,  posthumously  edited  by  H.  Wiese,  1885),  who 
like  Fortlage  (p.  515)  and  I.  H.  Fichte,  start  from  the  sys 
tern  of  the  elder  Fichte,  should  also  be  mentioned  as  sympa 
thizing  with  the  opinions  of  those  who  have  been  named 

*  Weisse  :  System  of  /Esthetics,  1830;  The  Ilea  of  the  Godhead,  1833;  Philo 
sophical Dogmatics,  1S55.  His  pupil  Rudolf  Seydel  has  published  several  of 
his  posthumous  works;  IF.  Lotze  also  acknowledges  that  he  owes  much 
to  Weisse.  Rud.  Seydel  in  Leipsic  (born  1835),  Logic,  1866  ;  Ethics,  1874  ; 
cf.p.  17. 

f  K.  Ph.  Fischer:  The  Idea  of  the  Godhead,  1839;  Outlines  of  the  System  of 
Philosophy,  1848.^7.;    The  Untruth  of  Sensationalism  and  Materialism,  1853. 

X  F.  II.  I-ichte  :  System  of  Ethics,  [850-53,  the  firsl  volume  <>f  which  gives 
a  history  of  moral  philosophy  since  1750;  Anthropology,  1856,  3d  ed.,  1876; 
PsychoU  ;r.  [864. 

§1  airier«  :  /  tthetics,  1859,  3d  ed-.  1885  ;  The  Moral  Order  of  the  World, 
1877,  2d  ed.,  1891  ;  Art  in  connection  with  the  Development  of  Culture,  5  vols., 
»863-73. 


59S  THE   MATERIALISTIC   CONTROVERSY. 

The  same  may  be  said,  further,  of  Hermann  Ulrici*  of 
Halle  (1806-84),  for  many  years  the  editor  of  the  Zeit- 
schrift für  Philosophic  und  philosopliiscJic  Kritik,  founded 
in  1837  by  the  younger  Fichte  and  now  edited  by  the  author 
of  this  History,  which,  as  the  organ  of  the  theistic  school, 
opposed,  first,  the  pantheism  of  the  Young  Hegelians,  and 
then  the  revived  materialism  so  loudly  proclaimed  after  the 
middle  of  the  century.  This  Zcitsclirift  of  Fichte  and 
Ulrici,  following  the  altered  circumstances  of  the  time,  has 
experienced  a  change  of  aim,  so  that  it  now  seeks  to  serve 
idealistic  efforts  of  every  shade  ;  while  the  Philosophische 
Monatshefte  (founded  by  Bergmann  in  1868,  edited  subse- 
quently by  Schaarschmidt,  and  now)  edited  by  P.  Natorp  of 
Marburg,  favors  neo-Kantianism,  and  the  Viertclfahrsschrift 
für  ivissenschaft liehe  Philosophie  (begun  in  1877,  and)  edited 
by  R.  Avenarius  of  Zurich,  especially  cultivates  those 
parts  of  philosophy  which  are  open  to  exact  treatment. 

The  appearance  of  materialism  was  the  consequence  of 
the  flagging  of  the  philosophic  spirit,  on  the  one  hand, 
and,  on  the  other,  of  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  representa- 
tives of  natural  science  with  the  constructions  of  the 
Schelling-Hegelian  school.  If  the  German  naturalist  is 
especially  exposed  to  the  danger  of  judging  all  reality  from 
the  section  of  it  with  which  he  is  familiar,  from  the  world 
of  material  substances  and  mechanical  motions,  the  reason 
lies  in  the  fact  that  he  does  not  find  it  easy,  like  the 
Englishman  for  example,  to  let  the  scientific  and  the 
philosophico-religious  views  of  the  world  go  on  side  by  side 
as  two  entirely  heterogeneous  modes  of  looking  at  things. 
The  metaphysical  impulse  to  generalization  and  unification 
spurs  him  on  to  break  down  the  boundary  between  the 
two  spheres,  and,  since  the  physical  view  of  things  has 
become  part  of  his  flesh  and  blood,  psychical  phenomena 
are  for  him  nothing  but  brain-vibrations,  and  the  free- 
dom   of    the    will     and    all     religious    ideas,    nothing    but 

*  Ulrici  :  On  Shaksperes  Dramatic  Art,  1839,  3d  ed.,  1868  [English,  1876]  ; 
Faith  and  Knowledge,  1858  ;  God  and  Nature,  1 861,  2d  ed.,  1866;  God  and 
Man,  in  two  volumes,  Body  and  Soul,  1866,  2d  ed.,  1874,  and  Natural  Law, 
1872  ;  various  treatises  on  Logic — in  which  consciousness  is  based  on  the  dis- 
tinguishing activity,  and  the  categories  conceived  as  functional  modes  of  this — 
on  Spiritualism,  etc. 


NEW  SV  SI' EMS.  599 

illusions.  The  materialistic  controversy  broke  out  most 
actively  at  the  convention  of  naturalists  at  Göttingen  in 
1854,  when  Rudolph  Wagner  in  his  address  "  On  the 
Creation  of  Man  and  the  Substance  of  the  Soul  "  declared, 
in  opposition  to  Karl  Vogt,  that  there  is  no  physiological 
reason  for  denying  the  descent  of  man  from  one  pair  and 
an  immaterial  immortal  soul.  Vogt's  answer  was  entitled 
"Collier  Faith  and  Science."  Among  others  Schaller 
{Body  and  Soul,  1855),  J.  B.  Meyer  in  a  treatise  with  the 
same  title,  1856,  and  the  Jena  physicist,  Karl  Snell,*  took 
part  in  the  controversy  by  way  of  criticism  and  mediation. 
A  much  finer  nature  than  the  famous  leaders  of  materialism 
— Moleschott  {The  Circle  of  Life,  1852,  in  answer  to  Liebig's 
Chemical  Letters),  and  Louis  Büchner,  with  whose  Force  and 
Matter  (1855,  16th  ed.,  1888;  English  translation  by  Col- 
lingwood,  4th  ed.,  1884)  the  gymnasiast  of  to-day  still  satis- 
fies his  freethinking  needs — is  H.  Czolbe  (1819-73  ;  New 
Exposition  of  Sensationalism,  1855  ;  The  Limits  and  Origin 
of  Human  Knowledge,  1865),  who,  on  ethical  grounds, 
demands  the  exclusion  of  everything  suprasensible  and 
contentment  with  the  given  world  of  phenomena,  but  holds 
that,  besides  matter  and  motion,  eternal,  purposive  forms 
and  original  sensations  in  a  world-soul  are  necessary  to 
explain  organic  and  psychical  phenomena. 

2.  New  Systems  :  Trendelenburg,  Fechner,  Lotze,  and 

Hartmann. 

The  speculative  impulse,  especially  in  the  soul  of  the 
German  people,  is  ineradicable.  It  has  neither  allowed 
itself  to  be  discouraged  by  the  collapse  of  the  Hegelian 
edifice,  nor  to  be  led  astray  by  the  clamor  of  the  apostles  of 
empiricism,  nor  to  be  intimidated  by  the  papal  proclamation 
of  the  infallibility  of  Thomas  Aquinas. f     Manifold  at  tempts 

*  Sneil  (1806-86) :  The  Materialistic  Question,  1858  ;  The  Creadon  of  Man, 
1863.  R.  Seydel  has  edited  Lectures  on  the  Descent  of  Man,  1888,  from  Snell's 
posthumous  writings. 

t  In  1879  a  summons  was  sent  forth  from  Rome  for  the  revival  and  dissemi- 
nation of  the   Thomistic  system   as  the  only  true   philosophy  (cf,  R.  Eucken, 
Die  Philosophie  de*    Thomoi  von  Aquino  und  die  Kultur  der  Neuzeit,  1 
This  movement  is  supported  l>y  the  journals,  Jahrbuch  für  Philosophie  und 


6oo  NEW  SYSTEMS. 

have  been  made  at  a  new  conception  of  the  world,  and 
with  varying  success.  Of  the  earlier  theories*  only  two 
have  been  able  to  gather  a  circle  of  adherents — the  dual- 
istic  theism  of  Günther  (1783-1863),  and  the  organic  view 
of  the  world  of  Trendelenburg  (1802-72). 

Anton  Günther  (engaged  in  authorship  from  1827  ; 
Collected  Writings,  1881  ;  Atiti-Savaresc,  edited  with  an 
appendix  by  P.  Knoodt),  who  in  1857  was  compelled  to 
retract  his  views,  invokes  the  spirit  of  Descartes  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  Hegelian  pantheism.  In  agreement  with 
Descartes,  Günther  starts  from  self-consciousness  (in  the 
ego  being  and  thought  are  identical),  and  brings  not  only 
the  Creator  and  the  created  world,  but  also  nature  (to 
which  the  soul  is  to  be  regarded  as  belonging)  and  spirit 
into  a  relation  of  exclusive  opposition,  yet  holds  that  in 
man  nature  (body  and  soul)  and  spirit  are  united,  and  that 
they  interact  without  prejudice  to  their  qualitative  differ- 
ence. J.  H.  Pabst  (died  in  1838  in  Vienna),  Theodor 
Weber  of  Breslau,  Knoodt  of  Bonn  (died  1889),  V.  Knauer 
of  Vienna  and  others  are  Güntherians. 

Adolf  Trendelenburg  f  of  Berlin,  the  acute  critic  of 
Hegel  and   Herbart,  in   his  own  thinking  goes  back  to  the 

spekulative  Theologie,  edited  by  Professor  E.  Commer  of  Münster,  1886  j^., 
and  Philosophisches  Jahrbuch,  edited,  at  the  instance  and  with  the  support  of 
the  Görres  Society,  by  Professor  Const.  Gutberlet  of  Fulda,  1888  sea.  While 
the  text-books  of  Hagemann,  Stoeckl,  Gutberlet,  Pesch,  Commer,  C.  M. 
Schneider,  and  others  also  follow  Scholastic  lines,  B.  Bolzano  (died  1848),  M. 
Deutinger  (died  1864)  and  his  pupil  Neudecker,  Oischinger,  Michelis,  and 
"W.  Rosenkrantz  (1821-74  ;  Science  of  Knowledge,  1866-6S),  who  was  influenced 
by  Schelling,  have  taken  a  freer  course. 

*Trahndorff,  gymnasial  professor  in  Berlin  (1782-1863),  ^Esthetics,  1827 
(cf.  E.  von  Hartmann  in  the  Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vol.  xxii.  1886,  p.  59 
seq.,  and  J.  von  Billewicz,  in  the  same,  vol.  xxi.  1885,  p.  561  seq.) ;  J.  F.  Reiff  in 
Tübingen  :  System  of  the  Determinations  of  the  Will,  1842  ;  K.  Chr.  Planck 
(died  1880)  :  The  Ages  of  the  World,  1850  seq.;  Testament  of  a  Get-man, 
edited  by  Karl  Köstlin,  1881  ;  F.  Rose  (1815-59),  On  the  Method  of  the  Knowl- 
edge of  the  Absolute,  1841  ;  Psychology  as  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of 
Individuality,  1856.  Emanuel  Sharer  follows  Rose.  Friedrich  Rohmer  (died 
1856)  :  Science  of  God,  Science  of  Man,  in  Friedrich  Rohmers  Wissenschaft 
tend  Leben,  edited  by  Bluntschli  and  Rud.  Seyerlen,  6  vols.,  1871-92. 

f  Trendelenburg  :  Logical  Investigations,  1840,  3d  ed.,  1870  ;  Historical  Con- 
tributions to  Philosophy,  3  vols.,  1846,  1855,  1867  ;  Natural  Law  on  the  Basis  of 
Ethics,  1S60,  2d  ed.,  1868.  On  Trendelenburg  cf.  Eucken  in  the  Philos- 
ophische Monatshefte,  1884. 


TREiXDEL  EA  rB  I  'R  (7.  6  o  i 

philosophy  of  the  past,  especially  to  that  of  Aristotle. 
Motion  and  purpose  are  for  him  fundamental  facts,  which 
are  common  to  both  being  and  thinking,  which  mediate  be- 
tween the  two,  and  make  the  agreement  of  knowledge  and 
reality  possible.  The  ethical  is  a  higher  stage  of  the  organic. 
Space,  time,  and  the  categories  are  forms  of  thought  as  well 
as  of  being;  the  logical  form  must  not  be  separated  from 
the  content,  nor  the  concept  from  intuition.  We  must  not 
fail  to  mention  that  Trendelenburg  introduced  a  peculiar 
and  fruitful  method  of  treating  the  history  of  philosophy, 
viz.,  the  historical  investigation  of  particular  concepts,  in 
which  Teichmüller  of  Dorpat  (1832-88  ;  Studies  in  the  His- 
tory of  Concepts,  1874;  New  Studies  in  the  History  of  Con- 
cepts, 1876-79;  The  Immortality  of  the  Sou/,  2d  ed.,  1879; 
The  Nature  of  Love,  1880  ;  Literary  Quarrels  in  the  Fourth 
Century  before  Christ,  1881  and  1884),  and  Eucken  of  Jena 
(cf.  pp.  17  and  623)  have  followed  his  example.  Kym  in 
Zurich  (born  1822;  Metaphysical  Investigations,  1875;  The 
Problem  of  Evil,  1878)  is  a  pupil  of  Trendelenburg. 

Of  more  recent  systematic  attempts  the  following  appear 
worthy  of  mention:  Von  Kirchmann  (1802-84;  from 
1868  editor  of  the  Philosophische  Bibliothek),  The  Philosophy 
of  Knowledge,  1865;  ^Esthetics,  1868;  On  the  Principles  of 
Realism,  1875  ;  Catechism  of  Philosophy,  2d  ed.,  1881  ;  E. 
Diihring  (born  1833),  Natural  Dialectic,  1865;  The  Value  of 
Life,  1865,3d  ed,  1881  ;  Critical  History  of  the  Principles  of 
Mechanics,  1873,  2&  e^->  l%77  >  Course  of  Philosophy,  1875 
(cf.  on  Diihring,  Helene  Druskowitz,  1889);  J.  Baumann  of 
Göttingen  (born  1837),  Philosophy  as  Orientation  concern- 
ing the  World,  1872;  Handbook  of  Ethics,  1879;  Elements  of 
Philosophy,  189 1  ;  L.  Noire,  The  Monistic  Idea,  1875,  and 
many  other  works;  Frohschammer  of  Munich  (born  1S21), 
The  Phantasy  as  the  Fundamental  Principle  of  the  World- 
process,  1877  ;  On  the  Genesis  of  Humanity,  and  its  Spiritual 
Development  in  Religion,  Morality  and  Language,  [883;  On 
the  Organization  and  Culture  of  Human  Society,  1885. 

In  the  first  rank  of  the  thinkers  who  have  made  their 
appearance  since  Hegel  and  Herbart  stand  Fechner  and 
Lotze,  both  masters  in  the  use  of  exact  met  hods,  yet  al  the 
same  time  with  their  whole  souls  devoted   to  the  highest 


Go: 


NEW   SYS  JEMS. 


questions,  and  superior  to  their  contemporaries  in  breadth 
of  view  as  in  the  importance  and  range  of  their  leading  ideas 
—  Fechner  a  dreamer  and  sober  investigator  by  turns,  Lotze 
with  gentle  hand  reconciling  the  antitheses  in  life  and  science. 
Gustav  Theodor  Fechner  *  (1801-87  ;  professor  at  Leip- 
sic)  opposes  the  abstract  separation  of  God  and  the  world, 
which  has  found  a  place  in  natural  inquiry  and  in  the- 
ology alike,  and  brings  the  two  into  the  same  relation 
of  correspondence  and  reciprocal  reference  as  the  soul  and 
the  body.  The  spirit  gives  cohesion  to  the  manifold 
of  material  parts,  and  needs  them  as  a  basis  and  material 
for  its  unifying  activity.  As  our  ego  connects  the  mani- 
fold of  our  activities  and  states  in  the  unity  of  conscious- 
ness, so  the  divine  spirit  is  the  supreme  unity  of  conscious- 
ness for  all  being  and  becoming.  In  the  spirit  of  God 
everything  is  as  in  ours,  only  expanded  and  enhanced. 
Our  sensations  and  feelings,  our  thoughts  and  resolutions 
are  His  also,  only  that  He,  whose  body  all  nature  is,  and  to 
whom  not  only  that  which  takes  place  in  spirits  is  open, 
but  also  that  which  goes  on  between  them,  perceives  more, 
feels  deeper,  thinks  higher,  and  wills  better  things  than 
we.  According  to  the  analogy  of  the  human  organism, 
both  the  heavenly  bodies  and  plants  are  to  be  conceived 
as  beings  endowed  with  souls,  although  they  lack  nerves,  a 
brain,  and  voluntary  motion.  How  could  the  earth  bring 
forth  living  beings,  if  it  were  itself  dead  ?  Shall  not  the 
flower  itself  rejoice  in  the  color  and  fragrance  which  it  pro- 
duces, and  with  which  it  refreshes  us  ?  Though  its  psychical 
life  may  not  exceed  that  of  an  infant,  its  sensations,  at  all 
events,  since  they  do  not  form  the  basis  of  a  higher 
activity,  are  superior  in  force  and  richness  to  those  of  the 
animal.     Thus  the  human  soul  stands  intermediate  in  the 


*  Nanna,  or  on  the  Psychical  Life  of  Plants,  1848  ;  Zend-Avesta,  or  on  the 
Things  of  Heaven  and  the  World  Beyond,  1851  ;  Physical  and  Philosophical 
Atomism,  1855  ;  7Vie  Three  Motives  and  Grounds  of  Belief ,  1863  ;  The  Day 
Vie-u,  1879  ;  Elements  of  ^Esthetics,  1876  ;  Elements  of  Psycho-physics,  i860; 
In  the  Cause  of  Psycho-physics,  1877  ;  Review  of  the  Chief  Points  in  Psycho- 
physics,  1882  ;  Book  of  the  Life  after  Death,  1836,  3d  ed.,  1887  ;  On  the  High- 
est Good,  1846  ;  Eour  Paradoxes,  1846  ;  On  the  Question  of  the  Soul,  l86r  ; 
Minor  Works  by  Dr.  Mises  (Fechner's  pseudonym),  1875.  On  Fechner  cf.  J. 
E.  Kuntze,  Leipsic,  1892. 


FECHNER.  603 

scale  of  psychical  life  :  beneath  and  about  us  are  the  souls 
of  plants  and  animals,  above  us  the  spirits  of  the  earth 
and  stars,  which,  sharing  in  and  encompassing  the  deeds  and 
destinies  of  their  inhabitants,  are  in  their  turn  embraced  by 
the  consciousness  of  the  universal  spirit.  The  omnipres- 
ence of  the  divine  spirit  affords  at  the  same  time  the  means 
of  escaping  from  the  desolate  "  night  view  "  of  modern 
science,  which  looks  upon  the  world  outside  the  perceiving 
individual  as  dark  and  silent.  No,  light  and  sound  are  not 
merely  subjective  phenomena  within  us,  but  extend  around 
us  with  objective  reality — as  sensations  of  the  divine  spirit, 
to  which  everything  that  vibrates  resounds  and  shines. 

The  door  of  the  world  beyond  also  opens  to  the  key  of 
analogy.  Similar  laws  unite  the  here  with  the  hereafter. 
As  intuition  prepares  the  way  for  memory,  and  lives  on  in 
it,  so  the  life  of  earth  merges  in  the  future  life,  and  con- 
tinues active  in  it,  elevated  to  a  higher  plane.  Fechner 
treats  the  problem  of  evil  in  a  way  peculiar  to  himself.  We 
must  not  consider  the  fact  of  evil  apart  from  the  effort  to 
remove  it.  It  is  the  spur  to  all  activity — without  evil,  no 
labor  and  no  progress. 

Fechner's  "psycho-physics,"  a  science  which  was  founded 
by  him  in  continuation  of  the  investigations  of  Bernouilli, 
Euler,  and  especially  of  E.  H.  Weber,  wears  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent aspect  from  that  of  his  metaphysics  (the  "day 
view,"  moreover  does  not  claim  to  be  knowledge,  but  belief 
— though  a  belief  which  is  historically,  practically,  and  theo- 
retically well-grounded).  This  aims  to  be  an  exact  science 
of  the  relations  between  body  and  mind,  and  to  reach  indi- 
rectly what  Herbart  failed  to  reach  by  direct  methods, 
that  is,  a  measurement  of  psychical  magnitudes,  using  in 
this  attempt  the  least  observable  differences  in  sensa- 
tions as  the  unit  of  measure.  Weber's  law  of  the  depend- 
ence of  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  on  the  strength  of 
the  stimulus — the  increase  in  the  intensity  of  the  sensa- 
tion remains  the  same  when  the  relative  increase  of  the 
stimulus  (or  the  relation  of  the  stimuli)  remains  constant  ;  * 

*  Fechner  teaches  :     The  sensation  increases  and  diminishes  in    proportion  to 

the  logarithm  of  the  stimulus  and  of  the  psycho-physical  nervous  activity,  the 
latter   being   directly   proportional    to    the  external    stimulus.      Others,  "ti    the 


604  NEW  SYSTEMS. 

so  that,  e.  g:,  in  the  case  of  light,  an  increase  from  a  stimu- 
lus of  intensity  i  to  one  of  intensity  ioo,  gives  just  the 
same  Increase  in  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  as  an  increase 
from  a  stimulus  of  intensity  2  (or  3)  to  a  stimulus  of  200 
(or  300) — -is  much  more  generally  valid  than  its  discoverer 
supposed  ;  it  holds  good  for  all  the  senses.  In  the  case  of 
the  pressure  sense  of  the  skin,  with  an  original  weight  of 
15  grams  (laid  upon  the  hand  when  at  rest  and  supported), 
in  order  to  produce  a  sensation  perceptibly  greater  we 
must  add  not  I  gram,  but  5,  and  with  an  original  weight  of 
30  grams,  not  5,  but  10.  Equal  additions  to  the  weights 
are  not  enough  to  produce  a  sensation  of  pressure  whose 
intensity  shall  render  it  capable  of  being  distinguished  with 
certainty,  but  the  greater  the  original  weights  the  larger 
the  increments  must  be;  while  the  intensities  of  the  sensa- 
tions form  an  arithmetical,  those  of  the  stimuli  form  a  geo- 
metrical, series  ;  the  change  in  sensation  is  proportional  to 
the  relative  change  of  the  stimulus.  Sensations  of  tone 
show  the  same  proportion  (3  14)  as  those  of  pressure;  the 
sensibility  of  the  muscle  sense  is  finer  (when  weights  are 
raised  the  proportion  is  15  :  16),  as  also  that  of  vision  (the 
relative  brightness  of  two  lights  whose  difference  of  inten- 
sity is  just  perceptible  is  100  :  101).  In  addition  to  the 
investigations  on  the  threshold  of  difference  there  are  others 
on  the  threshold  of  stimulation  (the  point  at  which  a  sen- 
sation becomes  just  perceptible),  on  attention,  on  methods 
of  measurement,  on  errors,  etc.  Moreover,  Fechner  does 
not  fail  to  connect  his  psycho-physics,  the  presupposi- 
tions and  results  of  which  have  recently  been  questioned 
in  several  quarters,*  with  his  metaphysical  conclusions. 
Both  are  pervaded  by  the  fundamental  view  that  body 
and  spirit  belong  together  (consequently  that  everything 
is  endowed   with   a   soul,   and    that    nothing    is  without  a 

contrary,  find  a  direct  dependence  between  nervous  activity  and  sensation, 
and  a  logarithmic  proportion  between  the  external  stimulus  and  the  nervous 
activity. 

*  So  by  Helmholtz  ;  Hering  (Fechner s  psychophysisches  Gesetz,  1875);  P. 
Langer  (Grundlagen  der Psyckophysik,  1876)  ;  G.  E.  Müller  in  Göttingen  (Zur 
Grundlegung  der  Psyckophysik,  1878)  ;  F.  A.  Midler  (Das  Axiom  der  Psycko- 
physik, 1882)  ;  A.  Elsas  (Ueber  die  Psyckophysik,  1886)  ;  O.  Liebmann  (Aphor- 
ismen zur  Psychologie,  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vol.  ci. — Wundt   has   pub- 


LOTZE.  605 

material  basis),  nay,  that  they  are  the  same  essence,  only 
seen  from  different  sides.  Body  is  the  (manifold)  pheno- 
menon for  others,  while  spirit  is  the  (unitary)  self-pheno- 
menon, in  which,  however,  the  inner  aspect  is  the  truer  one. 
That  which  appears  to  us  as  the  external  world  of  matter,  is 
nothing  but  a  universal  consciousness  which  overlaps  and 
influences  our  individual  consciousness.  This  is  Spinozism 
idealistically  interpreted.  In  aesthetics  Fechner  shows 
himself  an  extreme  representative  of  the  principle  of  asso- 
ciation. 

The  most  important  of  the  thinkers  mentioned  in  the 
title  of  this  section  is  Rudolph  Hermann  Lotze  (1817-81  : 
born  at  Bautzen  ;  a  student  of  medicine,  and  of  philosophy 
under  Weisse,  in  Leipsic  ;  1844-81  professor  in  Göttingen  ; 
died  in  Berlin).  Like  Fechner,  gifted  rather  with  a  talent 
for  the  fine  and  the  suggestive  than  for  the  large  and  the 
rigorous,  with  a  greater  reserve  than  the  former  before 
the  mystical  and  peculiar,  as  acute,  cautious,  and  thor- 
ough as  he  was  full  of  taste  and  loftiness  of  spirit,  Lotze 
has  proved  that  the  classic  philosophers  did  not  die  out 
with  Hegel  and  Herbart.  His  Microcosmus  (3  vols.,  1 856— 
64,  4th  ed.,  1884.  seq;  English  translation  by  Hamilton  and 
Jones,  3d  ed.,  1888),  which  is  more  than  an  anthropology,  as 
it  is  modestly  entitled,  and  his  History  of  Aesthetics  in  Ger- 
many, 1868,  which  also  gives  more  than  the  title  betrays, 
enjoy  a  deserved  popularity.  These  works  were  preceded 
by  the  Medical  PsycJiology,  1852,  and  a  polemic  treatise 
against  I.  H.  Fichte,  1857,  as  well  as  by  a  Pathology  and  a 
Physiology,  and  followed  by  the  System  of  Philosophy,  which 
remained  incomplete  (part  i.  Logic,  1874,  2d  ed.,  1881,  En- 
glish translation  edited  by  Bosanquet,  2d  ed.,  1888;  part  ii. 
Metaphysics,  1879,  English  translation  edited  by  Bosanquet, 
2d  ed.,  1887).     Lotzc's  Minor  Treatises  have;  been  published 

lished  a  number  of  papers  from  his  psycho-physical  laboratory  in  his  Phil  - 
phisdit!  Studien,  1881  seq.  Cf.  also  Hugo  Munsterberg,  Neue  Grundlegung 
der  Psychophysik  in  Heft  iii.  of  his  Beiträge  zur  experimentellen  Psychologie, 
1889  seq.  [Further,  Delbceuf,  in  French,  and  a  growing  literature  in  English 
as  A.  Seth,  Encyclopadia  Britannica,  vol.  xxiv.  469-171  ;  Ladd,  Elements  of 
Physiological  Psychology,  part  ii.  chap,  v.;  Janus,  Principles  of  Psychology, 
vol.  i.  p.  533  seq.\  and  numerous  articles  as  Ward,  Mind,  vol.  i. ;  Jastrow, 
American  Journal  of  Psychology,  vols.  i.  and  iii. — Tr.] 


606  NEW  syst/:. ms. 

by  Peipers  in  three  volumes  (1885-91);  and  Rehnisch  has 
edited  eight  sets  of  dictata  from  his  lectures,  1871-84.* 
Since  these  "  Outlines,"  all  of  which  we  now  have  in  new 
editions,  make  a  convenient  introduction  to  the  Lotzean 
system,  and  are,  or  should  be,  in  the  possession  of  all,  a  brief 
survey  may  here  suffice. 

The  subject  of  metaphysics  is  reality.  Things  which  are, 
events  which  happen,  relations  which  exist,  representative 
contents  and  truths  which  are  valid,  are  real.  Events  hap- 
pening and  relations  existing  presuppose  existing  things  as 
the  subjects  in  and  between  which  they  happen  and  exist. 
The  being  of  things  is  neither  their  being  perceived  (for 
when  we  say  that  a  thing  is  we  mean  that  it  continues  to 
be,  even  when  we  do  not  perceive  it),  nor  a  pure,  unrelated 
position,  its  position  in  general,  but  to  be  is  to  stand  in  rela- 
tions. Further,  the  what  or  essence  of  the  things  which 
enter  into  these  relations  cannot  be  conceived  as  passive 
quality,  but  only  abstractly,  as  a  rule  or  a  law  which 
determines  the  connection  and  succession  of  a  series  of 
qualities.  The  nature  of  water,  for  example,  is  the  unintu- 
itable  somewhat  which  contains  the  ground  of  the  change 
of  ice,  first  into  the  liquid  condition,  and  then  into  steam, 
when  the  temperature  increases,  and  conversely,  of  the 
possibility  of  changing  steam  back  into  water  and  ice  under 
opposite  conditions.  And  when  we  speak  of  an  unchange- 
able identity  of  the  thing  with  itself,  as  a  result  of  which  it 
remains  the  same  essence  amid  the  change  of  its  phenomena, 

*  Outlines  of  Psychology,  Practical  Philosophy,  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Phil- 
osophy of  Nature,  Logic  and  the  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  Metaphysics, 
Aesthetics,  and  the  History  of  Philosophy  since  Kant,  all  of  which  may  be  em- 
phatically commended  to  students,  especially  the  one  first  mentioned,  and,  in 
spite  of  its  subjective  position,  the  last.  [English  translations  of  these  Outlines, 
except  the  fourth  and  the  last,  by  Ladd,  1884  sea.]  On  Lotze  cf.  the  obituaries 
by  J.  Baumann  (Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vol.  xvii.),  H.  Sommer  (Im 
Neuen  Reich),  A.  Krohn  (Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vol.  lxxxi.  pp.  56-93),  R. 
Falckenberg  (Augsburg  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  1881,  No.  233),  and  Rehnisch 
(National  Zeitung,  and  the  Revue  Philosophique,  vol.  xii.).  The  last  of  these  was 
reprinted  in  the  appendix  to  the  Grundzüge  der  Aesthetik,  1884,  which  contains, 
further,  a  chronological  table  of  Lotze's  works,  essays,  and  critiques  as  well  as 
of  his  lectures.  Hugo  Sommer  has  zealously  devoted  himself  to  the  populariza- 
tion of  the  Lotzean  system.  Cf.,  further,  Fritz  Koegel,  Lotzes  Aesthetik,  Göt- 
tingen, 1886,  and  the  article  by  Koppelmann  referred  to  above,  p.  330. 


LOTZE.  C07 

we  mean  only  the  consistency  with  which  it  keeps  within 
the  closed  series  of  forms  ax  aa  a3,  without  ever  going  over 
into  the  series  bt  ba.  The  relations,  however,  in  which  things 
stand,  cannot  pass  to  and  fro  between  things  like  threads 
or  little  spirits,  but  are  states  in  things  themselves,  and  the 
change  of  the  former  always  implies  a  change  in  these  inner 
states.  To  stand  in  relations  means  to  exchange  actions.  In 
order  to  experience  such  effects  from  others  and  to  exercise 
them  upon  others,  things  must  neither  be  wholly  incom- 
parable (as  red,  hard,  sweet)  and  mutually  indifferent,  nor 
yet  absolutely  independent  ;  if  the  independence  of  in- 
dividual beings  were  complete  the  process  of  action 
would  be  entirely  inconceivable.  The  difficulty  in  the  con- 
cept of  causality — how  does  being  a  come  to  produce  in 
itself  a  different  state  a  because  another  being  b  enters  into 
the  state  ß  ? — is  removed  only  when  we  look  on  the  things 
as  modes,  states,  parts  of  a  single  comprehensive  being,  of 
an  infinite,  unconditioned  substance,  in  so  far  as  there  is  then 
only  an  action  of  the  absolute  on  itself.  Nevertheless  the 
assumption  that,  in  virtue  of  the  unity  and  consistency 
of  the  absolute  or  of  its  impulse  to  self-preservation,  state 
ß  in  being  b  follows  state  a  in  being  a  as  an  accommoda- 
tion or  compensation  follows  a  disturbance,  is  not  a  full 
explanation  of  the  process  of  action,  does  not  remove 
the  difficulty  as  to  how  one  state  can  give  rise  to  another. 
Metaphysics  is,  in  general,  unable  to  show  how  reality  is 
made,  but  only  to  remove  certain  contradictions  which 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  conceivability  of  these  notions. 
The  so  far  empty  concept  of  an  absolute  looks  to  the  phi- 
losophy of  religion  for  its  content ;  the  conception  of  the 
Godhead  as  infinite  personality  (it  is  a  person  in  a  far  higher 
sense  than  we)  is  first  produced  when  we  add  to  the  onto- 
logical  postulate  of  a  comprehensive  substance  the  ethical 
postulate  of  a  supreme  good  or  a  universal  world-Idea. 

By  "  thing"  we  understand  the  permanent  unit-subject 
of  changing  states.  But  the  fact  of  consciousness  furnishes 
the  only  guaranty  that  the  different  states  a,  ß,  y,  are 
in  reality  states  of  one  being,  and  not  so  many  different 
things  alternating  with  one  another.  Only  a  conscious 
being,    which   itself    effects  the  distinction   between    itself 


60S  NEW  SYSTEMS. 

and  the  states  occurring  in  it,  and  in  memory  and  recol. 
lection  feels  and  knows  itself  as  their  identical  subject, 
is  actually  a  subject  which  has  states.  Hence,  if  things 
are  to  be  real,  we  must  attribute  to  them  a  nature  in  essence 
related  to  that  of  our  soul.  Reality  is  existence  for  self. 
All  beings  are  spiritual,  and  only  spiritual  beings  possess 
true  reality.  Thus  Lotze  combines  the  monadology  of 
Leibnitz  with  the  pantheism  of  Spinoza,  just  as  he  under- 
stands how  to  reconcile  the  mechanical  view  of  natural 
science  (which  is  valid  also  for  the  explanation  of  organic 
life)  with  the  teleology  and  the  ethical  idealism  of  Fichte. 
The  sole  mission  of  the  world  of  forms  is  to  aid  in  the 
realization  of  the  ideal  purposes  of  the  absolute,  of  the 
world  of  values. 

The  ideality  of  space,  which  Kant  had  based  on  insuffi- 
cient grounds,  is  maintained  by  Lotze  also,  only  that  he 
makes  things  stand  in  "intellectual"  relations,  which  the 
knowing  subject  translates  into  spatial  language.  The 
same  character  of  subjectivity  belongs  not  only  to  our 
sensations,  but  also  to  our  ideas  concerning  the  connection 
of  things.  Representations  are  results,  not  copies,  of 
the  external  stimuli  ;  cognition  comes  under  the  general 
concept  of  the  interaction  of  real  elements,  and  depends, 
like  every  effect,  as  much  upon  the  nature  of  the  being  that 
experiences  the  effect  as  upon  the  nature  of  the  one  which 
exerts  it,  or  rather,  more  upon  the  former  than  upon  the 
latter.  If,  nevertheless,  it  claims  objective  reality,  truth 
must  not  be  interpreted  as  the  correspondence  of  thought 
and  its  object  (the  cognitive  image  can  never  be  like  the 
thing  itself),  nor  the  mission  of  cognition,  made  to  consist 
in  copying  a  world  already  finished  and  closed  apart  from 
the  realm  of  spirits,  to  which  mental  representation  is  added 
as  something  accessory.  Light  and  sound  are  not  therefore 
illusions  because  they  are  not  true  copies  of  the  waves  of 
ether  and  of  air  from  which  they  spring,  but  they  are  the 
end  which  nature  has  sought  to  attain  through  these 
motions,  an  end,  however,  which  it  cannot  attain  alone,  but 
only  by  acting  upon  spiritual  subjects;  the  beauty  and 
splendor  of  colors  and  tones  are  that  which  of  right  ought  to 
be  in  the  world  ;  without  the  new  world  of  representations 


LOTZE.  609 

awakened  in  spirits  by  the  action  of  external  stimuli,  the 
world  would  lack  its  essential  culmination.  The  purpose  of 
things  is  to  be  known,  experienced,  and  enjoyed  by  spirits. 
The  truth  of  cognition  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  opens  up 
the  meaning  and  destination  of  the  world.  That  which 
ought  to  be  is  the  ground  of  that  which  is;  that  which  is 
exists  in  order  to  the  realization  of  values  in  it;  the  good  is 
the  only  real.  It  is  true  that  we  are  not  permitted  to  pene- 
trate farther  than  to  the  general  conviction  that  the  Idea  of 
the  good  is  the  ground  and  end  of  the  world  ;  the  question, 
how  the  world  has  arisen  from  this  supreme  Idea  as  from 
the  absolute  and  why  just  this  world  with  its  determinate 
forms  and  laws  has  arisen,  is  unanswerable.  We  under- 
stand the  meaning  of  the  play,  but  we  do  not  see  the 
machinery  by  which  it  is  produced  at  work  behind  the 
stage.  In  ethics  Lotze  emphasizes  with  Fechner  the 
inseparability  of  the  good  and  pleasure  :  it  is  impossible  to 
state  in  what  the  worth  or  goodness  of  a  good  is  to  con- 
sist, if  it  be  conceived  out  of  all  relation  to  a  spirit  capable 
of  finding  enjoyment  in  it. 

If  Lotze's  philosophy  harmoniously  combines  Herbartian 
and  Fichteo-Hegelian  elements,  Eduard  von  Hartmann 
(born  1842  ;  until  1864  a  soldier,  now  a  man  of  letters  in 
Berlin)  aims  at  a  synthesis  of  Schopenhauer  and  Hegel ; 
with  the  pessimism  of  the  former  he  unites  the  evolutionism 
of  the  latter,  and  while  the  one  conceives  the  nature  of  the 
world-ground  as  irrational  will,  and  the  other  as  the  logical 
Idea,  he  follows  the  example  of  Schelling  in  his  later  days 
by  making  will  and  representation  equally  legitimate  at- 
tributes of  his  absolute,  the  Unconscious.  His  principal 
theoretical  work,  The  PhihsopJiy  of  the  Unconscious,  1869 
Ooth  ed.,  1891  ;  English  translation,  by  Coupland,  1884),  was 
followed  in  1879  by  his  chief  ethical  one,  The  Moral  Con- 
sciousness (2d  ed.,  1886,  in  the  Selected  Weeks);  the  two 
works  on  the  philosophy  <>f  religion,  The  Religious  Conscious- 
ness of  Humanity  in  the  Stages  of  its  Development ',  1881,  and 
The  Religion  of  Spirit^  [882,  together  form  the  third  chief 
work  {The  Self-Disintegration  of  Christianity  and  the 
Religion  <>f the  Future,  [874,  and  The  Crisis  of  Christianity  in 
Modern  Theology,  1880,  arc  to  be  regarded  as  forerunners  of 


6io  NEW   SYSTEMS. 

this) ;  the  fourth  is  the  -Esthetics  (part  i.  German  Aesthetics 
since  Kant,  1886;  part  ii.  Philosophy  of  the  Beautiful,  1887). 
The  Collected  Studies  and  Essays,  1876,  were  preceded  by 
two  treatises  on  the  philosophy  of  nature,  Truth  and  Error 
in  Darwinism,  1875,  and  The  Unconscious  from  the  Stand- 
point of  Physiology  and  the  Theory  of  Descent,  published 
anonymously  in  1872,  in  the  latter  of  which,  disguised  as  a 
Darwinian,  he  criticises  his  own  philosophy.  Of  his  more 
recent  publications  we  may  mention  the  Philosophical  Ques- 
tions of  the  Day,  1885;  Modern  Problems,  1886;  and  the 
controversial  treatise  Lotzc  s  Philosophy,  1888.* 

In  polemical  relation,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  naive 
realism  of  life,  and,  on  the  other,  to  the  subjective  idealism 
of  Kant,  or  rather  of  the  neo-Kantians,  the  logical  con- 
clusion of  which  would  be  absolute  illusionism,  Hartmann 
founds  his  "  transcendental  realism,"  which  mediates  be- 
tween these  two  points  of  view  (the  existence  and  true 
nature  of  the  world  outside  our  representations  is  knowable, 
if  only  indirectly;  the  forms  of  knowledge,  in  spite  of  their 
subjective  origin,  have  a  more  than  subjective,  a  transcend- 
ental, significance)  by  pointing  out  that  sense-impressions, 
which  are  accompanied  by  the  feeling  of  compulsion  and  are 
different  from  one  another,  cannot  be  explained  from  the 
ego,  but  only  by  the  action  of  things  in  themselves  external 
to  us,  i.  e.,  independent  of  consciousness,  and  themselves 
distinct  from  one  another.     The  causality  of  things  in  them- 


*On  Hartmann  cf.  Volkelt  in  ATord  und  Süd,  July,  1881  ;  the  same,  Das 
Unbewusste  und  der  Pessimismus,  1873  ;  Vaihinger,  Hartmann,  Diihring  und 
Lange,  1876  ;  R.  Koeber,  Das  philosophische  System  Ed.  v.  Hartmanns,  1884  ; 
O.  Pflei  derer,  critique  of  the  Phänomenologie  des  sittlichen  Bewusstseins  {Im 
neuen  Reich),  1879;  L.  von  Golther,  Der  moderne  Pessiinismus,  1878;  J. 
Huber,  Der  Pessimismus,  1876  ;  Weygoldt,  Kritik  des  philosophischen  Pessi- 
mismus der  neuesten  Zeit,  1875  :  M-  Venetianer,  Der  Allgeist,  1874;  A  Taubert 
(Hartmann's  first  wife).  Der  Pessimismus  und  seine  Gegner,  1873  ;  O.  Plümacher, 
Der  Ka?npf  ums  Unbewusste  (with  a  chronological  table  of  Hartmann  litera- 
ture appended),  188 1  ;  the  same,  Der  Pessimismus  hi  Vergangenheit  und 
Gegetiwart,  1884  ;  Krohn,  Streif züge  (see  above,  p.  587  note) ;  Seydel  (see  above, 
p.  17).  During  the  year  1882  four  publications  appeared  under  the  title  Der 
Pessimismus  und  die  Sittenlehre,  by  Bacmeister.  Christ,  Rehmke,  and  H.  Sommer 
(2d  ed.,  1883).  [English  translation  of  Truth  and  Error  in  Darwinism  in  the 
Journal  of  Speculative  Philosophy,  vols,  xi.-xiii.,  and  of  The  Religion  of  the 
Future,  by  Dare,  1S86  ;  cf.  also  Sully's  Pessimism,  chap.  v. — Tr.] 


HARTMANN.  6ll 

selves  is  the  bridge  which  enables  us  to  cross  the  gulf  be- 
tween the  immanent  world  of  representations  and  the  trans- 
cendent world  of  being.  The  causality  of  things  in  them- 
selves proves  their  reality,  their  difference  at  different 
times,  their  changeability  and  their  temporal  character; 
change,  however,  demands  something  permanent,  existence, 
an  existing,  unchangeable,  supra-temporal,  and  non-spatial 
substance  (whether  a  special  substance  for  each  thing  in 
itself  or  a  common  one  for  all,  is  left  for  the  present  unde- 
termined). My  action  upon  the  thing  in  itself  assures  me 
of  its  causal  conditionality  or  necessity;  the  various  affec- 
tions of  the  same  sense,  that  there  are  many  things  in  them- 
selves; the  peculiar  form  of  change  shown  by  some  bodies, 
that  these,  like  my  body,  are  united  with  a  soul.  Thus  it  is 
evident  that,  besides  the  concept  of  cause,  a  series  of  other 
categories  must  be  applied  to  the  thing  in  itself,  hence 
applied  transcendentally. 

The  "speculative  results"  obtained  by  Hartmann  on  an 
"inductive"  basis  are  as  follows:  The  per  sc  (ÄJisich)  of 
the  empirical  world  is  the  Unconscious.  The  two  attri- 
butes of  this  absolute  are  the  active,  groundless,  alogical, 
infinite  will,  and  the  passive,  finite  representation  (Idea); 
the  former  is  the  ground  of  the  that  of  the  world,  the  latter 
the  ground  of  its  purposive  what  and  how.  Without  the 
will  the  representation,  which  in  itself  is  without  energy, 
could  not  become  real,  and  without  the  representation  (of 
an  end)  the  will,  which  in  itself  is  without  reason,  could  not 
become  a  definite  willing  (relative  or  immanent  dualism  of 
the  attributes,  a  necessary  moment  in  absolute  monism). 
The  empirical  preponderance  of  pain  over  pleasure,  which 
can  be  shown  by  calculation,*  proves  that  the  world  is  evil, 
that  its  non-existence  were  better  than  its  existence ;  the 
purposiveness  everywhere  perceptible  in  nature  and  the 
progress  of  history  toward  a  final  goal  (it  is  true, a  negative 
one)  proves,  nevertheless,  that  it  is  the  best  world  that  was 
possible  (reconciliation  of  eudemonistic  pessimism  with 
evolutionistic  optimism).     The  creation  of  the  world  begins 

*  ('(.  Volkelt,  Ueber die  Lust  ah  höchsten  Werthmassstab  (in  Org  Zeitschrift 
für  Philosophie \  vol.  lxxxviii.),  1886,  and  ().  Pfleiderer,  Philosophy  of  Religion, 
vol.  ii.  p.  240,  teq. 


6i2  NEW  SYSTEMS. 

when  the  blind  will  to  live  groundlessly  and  fortuitously 
passes  over  from  essence  to  phenomenon,  from  potency  to 
act,  from  supra-existence  to  existence,  and,  in  irrational 
striving  after  existence,  draws  to  itself  the  only  content 
which  is  capable  of  realization,  the  logical  Idea.  This 
latter  seeks  to  make  good  the  error  committed  by  the  will 
by  bringing  consciousness  into  the  field  as  a  combatant 
against  the  insatiable,  ever  yearning,  never  satisfied  will, 
which  one  day  will  force  the  will  back  into  latency,  into  the 
(antemundane)  blessed  state  of  not-willing.  The  goal  of 
the  world-development  is  deliverance  from  the  misery  of 
existence,  the  peace  of  non-existence,  the  return  from  the 
will  and  representation,  become  spatial  and  temporal,  to 
the  original,  harmonious  equilibrium  of  the  two  functions, 
which  has  been  disturbed  by  the  origin  of  the  world  or  to 
the  antemundane  identity  of  the  absolute.  The  task  of 
the  logical  element  is  to  teach  consciousness  more  and 
more  to  penetrate  the  illusion  of  the  will — in  its  three 
stages  of  childlike  (Greek)  expectation  of  happiness  to  be 
attained  here,  youthful  (Christian)  expectation  of  happiness 
to  be  attained  hereafter,  and  adult  expectation  of  happiness 
to  be  attained  in  the  future  of  the  world-development — and, 
finally,  to  teach  it  to  know,  in  senile  longing  after  rest,  that 
only  the  doing  away  with  this  miserable  willing,  and,  conse- 
quently, with  earthly  existence  (through  the  resolve  of  the 
majority  of  mankind)  can  give  the  sole  attainable  blessed- 
ness, freedom  from  pain.  The  world-process  is  the  incarna- 
tion, the  suffering,  and  the  redemption  of  the  absolute  ;  the 
moral  task  of  man  is  not  personal  renunciation  and  cowardly 
retirement,  but  to  make  the  purposes  of  the  Unconscious 
his  own,  with  complete  resignation  to  life  and  its  sufferings 
to  labor  energetically  in  the  world-process,  and,  by  the  vigor- 
ous promotion  of  consciousness,  to  hasten  the  fulfillment  of 
the  redemptive  purpose ;  the  condition  of  morality  is  insight 
into  the  fruitlessness  of  all  striving  after  pleasure  and  into 
the  essential  unity  of  all  individual  beings  with  one  another 
and  with  the  universal  spirit,  which  exists  in  the  individuals, 
but  at  the  same  time  subsists  above  them.  "  To  know 
one's  self  as  of  divine  nature,  this  does  away  with  all  diver- 
gence between  selfwill  and  universal  will,  with  all  estrange- 


hartmann;  613 

ment   between    man  and  God,   with  all   undivine,  that  is, 
merely  natural,  conduct." 

Religion,  which,  in  common  with  philosophy,  has  for  its 
basis  the  metaphysical  need  for,  or  the  mystical  feeling  of, 
the  unity  of  the  human  individual  and  the  world-ground, 
needs  transformation,  since  in  its  traditional  forms  it  is  op- 
posed to  modern  culture,  and  the  merging  of  religion  (as  a 
need  of  the  heart)  in  metaphysics  is  impossible.  The 
religion  of  the  future,  for  which  the  way  has  already  been 
prepared  by  the  speculative  Protestantism  of  the  present, 
\s  concrete  monism  (the  divine  unity  is  transcendent  as  well 
as  immanent  in  the  plurality  of  the  beings  of  earth,  every 
moral  man  a  God-man),  which  includes  in  itself  the  abstract 
monism  (pantheism)  of  the  Indian  religions  and  the  Judeo- 
Christian  (mono-)  theism  as  subordinate  moments.  (The 
original  henotheism  and  its  decline  into  polytheism;,  demon- 
ism,  and  fetichism  was  followed  by — Egyptian  and  Persian, 
as  well  as  Greek,  Roman,  and  German — naturalism,  and  then 
by  supernaturalism  in  its  monistic  and  its  theistic  form. 
The  chief  defect  of  the  Christian  religion  is  the  transcen- 
dental-eudemonistic  heteronomy  of  its  ethics.)  The  Re- 
ligion of  Spirit  divides  into  three  parts.  The  psychology 
of  religion  considers  the  religious  function  in  its  subjective 
aspect,  faith  as  a  combined  act  of  representation,  feeling, 
and  will,  in  which  one  of  these  three  elements  may  predomi- 
nate— though  feeling  forms  the  inmost  kernel  of  the  theo- 
retical and  practical  activities  as  well — and,  as  the  objective 
correlate  of  faith,  grace  (revealing,  redeeming,  and  sanctify- 
ing)» which  elevates  man  above  peripheral  and  phenomenal 
dependence  on  the  world,  and  frees  him  from  it,  through  his 
becoming  conscious  of  his  central  and  metaphysical  depend- 
ence upon  God.  The  metaphysics  of  religion  (in  theologi- 
cal, anthropological,  and  cosmological  sections)  proves  by 
induction  from  the  facts  of  religion  the  existence,  omnipo- 
tence, spirituality,  omniscience,  righteousness,  and  holi- 
ness of  the  All-one,  which  coincides  with  the  moral 
order  of  the  world.  Further,  it  proves  the  need  and 
the  capacity  of  man  for  redemption  from  guilt  and 
evil  —  here  three  spheres  <>f  the  individual  will  are 
distinguished,  one   beneath   God,  one  contrary  to  God,  and 


6  i  4  NEt  )-KAN  TIA  XI SM. 

one  conformable  to  God,  or  a  natural,  an  evil,  and  a  moral 
sphere — and,  preserving  alike  the  absoluteness  of  God 
and  the  reality  of  the  world,  shows  that  it  is  not  so  much 
man  as  God  himself,  who,  as  the  bearer  of  all  the  suffering 
of  the  world,  is  the  subject  of  redemption.  The  ethics  of 
religion  discusses  the  subjective  and  objective  processes  of 
redemption,  namely,  repentance  and  amendment  on  the 
part  of  the  individual  and  the  ecclesiastical  cultus  of  the 
future,  which  is  to  despise  symbols  and  art. 

It  is  to  Hartmann's  credit,  though  the  fact  has  not  been 
sufficiently  appreciated  by  professional  thinkers,  that  in  a 
time  averse  to  speculation  he  has  devoted  his  energies  to 
the  highest  problems  of  metaphysics,  and  in  their  elabora- 
tion has  approached  his  task  with  scientific  earnestness  and 
a  comprehensive  and  thorough  consideration  of  previous 
results.  Thus  the  critique  of  ethical  standpoints  in  the  his- 
torical part  of  the  Phenomenology  of  the  Moral  Consciousness, 
especially,  contains  much  that  is  worthy  of  consideration  ; 
and  his  fundamental  metaphysical  idea,  that  the  absolute  is 
to  be  conceived  as  the  unity  of  will  and  reason,  also  deserves 
in  general  a  more  lively  assent  than  has  been  accorded  to 
it,  while  his  rejection  of  an  infinite  consciousness  has  justly 
met  with  contradiction.  It  has  been  impossible  here  to  go 
into  his  discussions  in  the  philosophy  of  nature — they  can- 
not be  described  in  brief — on  matter  (atomic  forces),  on  the 
mechanical  and  teleological  views  of  life  and  its  develop- 
ment, on  instinct,  on  sexual  love,  etc.,  which  he  very 
skillfully  uses  in  support  of  his  metaphysical  principle. 

3.     From  the  Revival  of  the    Kantian    Philosophy  to 
the  Present  Time. 

(a)  Neo-Kantianism,  Positivism,  and  Kindred  Phenomena. — 

The  Kantian  philosophy  has  created  two  epochs:  one 
at  the  time  of  its  appearance,  and  a  second  two  generations 
after  the  death  of  its  author.  The  new  Kantian  movement, 
which  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  characteristics  of  the 
philosophy  of  the  present  time,  took  its  beginning  a  quar- 
ter of  a  century  ago.  It  is  true  that  even  before  1865  indi- 
vidual thinkers  like   Ernst  Reinhold    of    Jena    (died    1855), 


LIEBMANN,    LANGE.  615 

the  admirer  of  Fries,  J.  B.  Meyer  of  Bonn,  K.  A.  von 
Reichlin-Meldegg,  and  others  had  sought  a  point  of  depar- 
ture for  their  views  in  Kant ;  that  K.  Fischer's  work  on  Kant 
(i860)  had  given  a  lively  impulse  to  the  renewed  study 
of  the  critical  philosophy  ;  nay,  that  the  cry  "  Back  to  Kant " 
had  been  expressly  raised  by  Fortlage  (as  early  as  1832  in 
his  treatise  The  Gaps  in  the  Hegelian  System),  and  by  Zeller 
(p.  589).  But  the  movement  first  became  general  after  F.  A. 
Lange  in  his  History  of  Materialism  had  energetically  ad- 
vocated the  Kantian  doctrine  according  to  his  special  con- 
ception of  it,  after  Helmholtz*  (born  1821)  had  called  atten- 
tion to  the  agreement  of  the  results  of  physiology  with  those 
of  the  Critique  of  Reason,  and  at  the  same  time  Liebmann's 
youthful  work,  Kant  and  the  Epigones,  in  which  ever)'  chap- 
ter ended  with  the  inexorable  refrain,  "  therefore  we  must 
go  back  to  Kant,"  had  given  the  strongest  expression  to 
the  longing  of  the  time. 

Otto  Liebmann  (cf.  also  the  chapter  on  "  The  Metamor- 
phoses of  the  A  Priori  "  in  his  Analysis  of  Reality)  sees  the 
fundamental  truth  of  criticism  in  the  irrefutable  proof  that 
space,  time,  and  the  categories  are  functions  of  the  intellect, 
and  that  subject  and  object  are  necessary  correlates,  in- 
separable factors  of  the  empirical  world,  and  finds  Kant's 
fundamental  error,  which  the  Epigones  have  not  corrected, 
but  made  still  worse,  in  the  non-concept  of  the  thing  in  itself, 
which  must  be  expelled  from  the  Kantian  philosophy  as  a 
remnant  of  dogmatism,  as  a  drop  of  alien  blood,  and  as  an 
illegitimate  invader  which  has  debased  it. 

According  to  Friedrich  Albert  Langef  (1828-75  ;  during 
the  last  years  of  his  life  professor  at  Marburg),  mate- 
rialism, which  is  unfruitful  and  untenable  as  a  principle,  a 
system,  and  a  view  of  the  world,  but  useful  and  indispen- 
sable as  a  method  and  a  maxim  of  investigation,  must  be 
supplemented  by  formal  idealism,  which,  rejecting  all  science 
from  mere  reason  limits  knowledge  to  the  sensuous,  to  that 

*  Helmholtz:  On  Human  Vision,  1S55  ;  Physiological  Optics,  1 S67  ;  Sensa- 
tions of  T/fne,  1863,  4th  ed.,  1^77  [English  translation  by  Ellis,  2d  ed.,  1885]. 

f  F.  A.  Lan^e :  Logical  Studies,  1877.  Cf.  M.  Heinze  in  the  Vierteljahrs* 
schrift  für  wissenschaftliche   Philosophie,  1877,  and  Vaihingei   in  the    work 

cited  above,  p.  610  note. 


6 1 6  NEO-k'A  NTIA  -VS. 

which  can  be  experienced,  yet  at  the  same  time  con- 
ceives the  formal  clement  in  the  sense  world  as  the  product 
of  the  organization  of  man,  and  hence  makes  objects  con- 
form to  our  representations.  Above  the  sensuous  world  of 
experience  and  of  mechanical  becoming,  however,  the  specu- 
lative impulse  to  construction,  rounding  off  the  fragmentary 
truth  of  the  sciences  into  a  unified  picture  of  the  whole  truth, 
rears  the  ideal  world  of  that  which  ought  to  be.  Notwith- 
standing their  indefeasible  certitude,  the  Ideas  possess  no 
scientific  truth,  though  they  have  a  moral  value  which  makes 
them  more  than  mere  fabrics  of  the  brain  :  man  is  framed 
not  merely  for  the  knowledge  of  truth,  but  also  for  the  real- 
ization of  values.  But  since  the  signifiance  of  the  Ideas  is 
only  practical,  and  since  determinations  of  value  are  not 
grounds  of  explanation,  science  and  metaphysics  or 
"  concept  poetry  "  {Begriffsdichtung)  must  be  kept  strictly 
separate. 

Friedrich  Paulsen  of  Berlin  (born  in  1846;  cf.  pp.  330, 
332,  note)  sees  in  the  Kantian  philosophy  the  foundation 
for  the  philosophy  of  the  future.  A  profounder  Wolff 
(the  self-dominion  of  the  reason),  a  Prussian  Hume  (the 
categories  of  the  understanding  are  not  world-categories  ; 
rejection  of  anthropomorphic  metaphysics),  and  a  Ger- 
man Rousseau  (the  primacy  of  the  will,  consideration  of 
the  demands  of  the  heart;  the  good  will  alone,  not  deeds 
nor  culture,  constitutes  the  worth  of  man  ;  freedom,  the 
rights  of  man)  in  one  person,  Kant  has  withdrawn  from 
scientific  discussion  the  question  concerning  the  depend- 
ence of  reality  on  values  or  the  good,  which  is  theoretically 
insoluble  but  practically  to  be  answered 'in  the  affirmative, 
and  given  it  over  to  faith.  Kant  is  in  so  far  a  positivist  that 
he  limits  the  mission  of  knowledge  to  the  reduction  of  the 
temporo-spatial  relations  of  phenomena  to  rules,  and  declares 
the  teleological  power  of  values  to  be  undemonstrable. 
But  science  is  able  to  prove  this  much,  that  the  belief  in  a 
suprasensible  world,  in  the  indestructibility  of  that  which 
alone  has  worth,  and  in  the  freedom  of  the  intelligible  char- 
acter, which  the  will  demands,  is  not  scientifically  impossi- 
ble. Since,  according  to  formal  rationalism,  the  whole 
order  of  nature   is   a  creation   of   the   understanding,   and 


PAULSEX.  617 

hence  atomism  and  mechanism  are  only  forms  of  represen- 
tation, valid,  no  doubt,  for  our  peripheral  point  of  view,  but 
not  absolutely  valid,  since,  further,  the  empirical  view  of  the 
world  apart  from  the  Idea  of  the  divine  unity  of  the  world 
(which,  it  is  true,  is  incapable  of  theoretical  realization) 
would  lack  completion,  the  immediate  conviction  of  the 
heart  in  regard  to  the  power  of  the  good  is  in  no  danger  of 
attack  from  the  side  of  science,  although  this  can  do  no  fur- 
ther service  for  faith  than  to  remove  the  obstacles  which 
oppose  it.  The  will,  not  the  intellect,  determines  the  view 
of  the  world;  but  this  is  only  a  belief,  and  in  the  world  of 
representation,  the  intelligible  world,  with  which  the  will 
brings  us  into  relation,  can  come  before  us  only  in  the  form 
of  symbols. — While  Albrecht  Krause  {The  Laws  of  the  Hu- 
man Heart,  a  Formal  Logic  of  Pure  Feeling,  1876)  and  A. 
Classen  {Physiology  of  the  Sense  of  Sight,  1877)  are  strict 
followers  of  Kant,  J.  Volkelt  {Analysis  of  the  Fundamental 
Pri?iciples  of  Kant 's  Theory  of  Knowledge,  1879)  nas  traced 
the  often  deplored  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  in 
Kant  down  to  their  roots,  and  has  shown  that  in  Kant's 
thinking,  which  has  hitherto  been  conceived  as  too  simple 
and  transparent,  but  which,  in  fact,  is  extremely  complicated 
and  struggling  in  the  dark,  a  number  of  entirely  hetero- 
geneous principles  of  thought  (skeptical,  subjectivistic,  met- 
aphysico-rationalistic,  a  priori,  and  practical  motives)  are  at 
work,  which,  conflicting  with  and  crippling  one  another, 
make  the  attainment  of  harmonious  results  impossible. 
Benno  Erdmann  (p.  330)  and  Hans  Vaihinger  (pp.  323  note, 
331)  have  given  Kant's  principal  works  careful  philological 
interpretation. 

Among  the  various  differences  of  opinion  which  exist 
within  the  neo-Kantian  ranks,  the  most  important  relates 
to  the  question,  whether  the  individual  ego  or  a  transcen- 
dental consciousness  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  the  executor 
of  the  a  priori  functions.  In  agreement  with  Schopen- 
hauer and  with  Lotze,  who  makes  the  subjectivity  of  spare, 
time,  and  the  pure  concepts  parallel  with  th.it  of  the  sense 
qualities,  Lange  teaches  that  the  human  individual  is  so 
organized  that  he  must  apprehend  thai  which  is  sensuously 
given  under  these  forms.     Others,  on  the  contrary,  urge  that 


6iS  GERMAN  POSITIVISM. 

the  individual  soul  with  its  organization  is  itself  a  pheno- 
menon, and  consequently  cannot  be  the  bearer  of  that  which 
precedes  phenomena — space,  time,  and  the  catagories  as 
"  conditions  "  of  experience  are  functions  of  a  pure  conscious- 
ness to  be  presupposed.  The  antithesis  of  subject  and  ob- 
ject, the  soul  and  the  world,  first  arises  in  the  sphere  of 
phenomena.  The  empirical  subject,  like  the  world  of  ob- 
jects, is  itself  a  product  of  the  a  priori  forms,  hence  not  that 
which  produces  them.  To  the  transcendental  group  belong 
Hermann  Cohen  *  in  Marburg,  A.  Stadler,f  Natorp,  Lass- 
witz  (p.  17),  E.  König  (p.  17),  Koppelmann  (p.  330),  Staud- 
inger  (p.  331).  Fritz  Schultze  of  Dresden  is  also  to  be 
counted  among  the  neo-Kantians  {Philosophy  of  Natural 
Science,  1882;  Kant  and  Darwin,  1875;  The  Fundamental 
Thoughts  of  Materialism,  1 881  ;  The  Fundamental  Thoughts 
of  Spiritualism,  1883;   Comparative  Psychology,  i.  I,  1892). 

The  German  positivists ;{; — E.  Laas  of  Strasburg  (1837- 
85),  A.  Riehl  of  Freiburg  in  Baden  (born  1844),  and  R. 
Avenarius  of  Zurich  (born  1843) — develop  their  sensation- 
alistic  theory  of  knowledge  in  critical  connection  with  Kant. 
Ernst  Laas  defines  positivism  (founded  by  Protagoras,  advo- 
cated in  modern  times  by  Hume  and  J.  S.  Mill,  and  hostile 
to  Platonic  idealism)  as  that  philosophy  which  recognizes 
no  other  foundations  than  positive  facts  (i.  e.,  perceptions), 
and  requires  every  opinion  to  exhibit  the  experiences  on 
which  it  rests.  Its  basis  is  constituted  by  three  articles  of 
belief:  (1)  The  correlative  facts,  subject  and  object,  exist 
and  arise  only  in  connection  (objects  are  directly  known 
only  as  the  contents  of  a  consciousness,  cut  objecta  sunt, 
subjects  only  as  centers  of  relation,  as  the  scene  or  founda- 
tion of  a  representative  content,  cui  subjecta  sunt :  outside 

*  Cohen  :  Kant's  Theory  of  Experience,  1871,  2d  ed.,  1886;  Kaut's  Founda- 
tion of  Ethics,  1877  ;  Kant's  Foundation  of  Aesthetics,  1889. 

f  Stadler  :  Kant's  Teleology,  1874;  The  Principles  of  the  Pure  Theory  of 
Knowledge  in  the  Kantian  Philosophy,  1876  ;  Kant's  Theory  of  Matter,  1883. 

%  Laas  :  Idealism  and  Positivism,  1879-84.  Riehl:  Philosophical  Criticism, 
1876-87  ;  Address  On  Scientific  and  Unscientific  Philosophy,  1883.  Avenarius 
(p.  598):  Philosophy  as  Thought  concerning  the  World  according  to  the  principle 
of  Least  Work,  1876;  Critique  of  Pure  Experience,  vol.  i.  1888,  vol.  ii. 
1890;  Man's  Concept  of  the  World,  1891.  C.  Goring  (died  1879  ;  System  of 
Critical  Philosophy,  1875)  may  also  be  placed  here. 


MO XI SM  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.  619 

my  thoughts  body  does  not  exist  as  body,  nor  I  myself 
as  suul).  (2)  The  variability  of  the  objects  of  perception. 
(3)  Sensationalism — all  specific  differences  in  consciousness 
must  be  conceived  as  differences  in  degree,  all  higher  mental 
processes  and  states,  including  thought,  as  the  perceptions 
and  experiences,  transformed  according  to  law,  of  beings 
which  feel,  have  wants,  possess  memory,  and  are  capable  of 
spontaneous  motion.  The  subject  coincides  with  its  feel- 
ing of  pleasure  and  pain,  from  which  sensation  is  distin- 
guished by  its  objective  content.  The  illusions  of  meta- 
physics are  scientifically  untenable  and  practically  unneces- 
sary. Various  yearnings,  wants,  presentiments,  hopes,  and 
fancies,  it  is  true,  lead  beyond  the  sphere  of  that  which  can 
be  checked  by  sense  and  experience,  but  for  none  of  their 
positions  can  any  sufficient  proof  be  adduced.  As  physics 
has  discarded  transcendent  causes  and  learned  how  to 
get  along  with  immanent  causes,  so  ethics  also  must  en- 
deavor to  establish  the  worth  of  moral  good  without  excur- 
sions into  the  suprasensible.  The  ethical  obligations  arise 
naturally  from  human  relations,  from  earthly  needs.  The 
third  volume  of  Laas's  work  differs  from  the  earlier  ones 
by  conceding  the  rank  of  facts  to  the  principles  of  logic  as 
well  as  to  perception.  Aloys  Riehl  opposes  the  theory  of 
knowledge  (which  starts  from  the  fundamental  fact  of  sen- 
sation) as  scientific  philosophy  to  metaphysics  as  unscien- 
tific, and  banishes  the  doctrine  of  the  practical  ideals  from 
the  realm  of  science  into  the  region  of  religion  and  art. 
Richard  Avenarius  defends  the  principle  of  "pure  experi- 
ence." Sensation,  which  is  all  that  is  left  as  objectively 
given  after  the  removal  of  the  subjective  additions,  con- 
stitutes the  content,  and  motion  the  form  of  being. 

With  the  neo-Kantians  and  the  positivists  there  is 
associated,  thirdly,  a  coherent  group  of  noetical  thinkers, 
who,  rejecting  extramental  elements  of  every  kind,  look 
on  all  conceivable  being  as  merely  a  conscious  emit  nit. 
This  monism  of  consciousness  is  advocated  by  W.  Schuppe 
of  Greifswald  (born  \^:/>\  Noetical  Logic,  [878),  J.  Rehmke, 
also  of  Greifswald  {The  World  as  Percept  and  Concept,  [880; 
"The  Question  of  the  Soul"  in  vol.  ii.  of  the  Zeitschrift 
für  Psychologie^  1891),  A.  von  Leclair   {Contributions  to  d 


620  SCIENCE  AND  rillLOSOPHY. 

Monistic  Theory  of  Knowledge^  1882),  and  R.  von  Schubert« 
Soldern  {Foundations  of  a  Theory  of  Knowledge,  1884;  On 

the  Transcendence  of  Object  and  Subject,  1882;  Foundations 
for  an  lit  hies,  1887).  J.  Bergmann*  in  Marburg  (born  1840) 
occupies  a  kindred  position. 

It  is  the  same  scientific  spirit  of  the  time,  which  in  the 
fifties  led  many  who  were  weary  of  the  idealistic  specula- 
tions over  to  materialism,  that  now  secures  such  wide  dis- 
semination and  so  widespread  favor  for  the  endeavors  of  the 
neo-Kantians  and  the  positivists  or  neo-Baconians,  who 
desire  to  see  metaphysics  stricken  from  the  list  of  the 
sciences  and  replaced  by  noetics,  and  the  theory  of  the 
world  relegated  to  faith.  The  philosophy  of  the  present, 
like  the  pre-Socratic  philosophy  and  the  philosophy  of  the 
early  modern  period,  wears  the  badge  of  physics.  The 
world  is  conceived  from  the  standpoint  of  nature,  psychical 
phenomena  are  in  part  neglected,  in  part  see  their  incon- 
venient claims  reduced  to  a  minimum,  while  it  is  but  rarely 
that  we  find  an  appreciation  of  their  independence  and 
co-ordinate  value,  not  to  speak  of  their  superior  position. 
The  power  which  natural  science  has  gained  over  philosophy 
dates  essentially  from  a  series  of  famous  discoveries  and 
theories,  by  which  science  has  opened  up  entirely  new  and 
wide  outlooks,  and  whose  title  to  be  considered  in  the 
formation  of  a  general  view  of  reality  is  incontestable.  To 
mention  only  the  most  prominent,  the  following  have  all 
posited  important  and  far-reaching  problems  for  phil- 
osophy as  well  as  for  science:  Johannes  Midler's  (Müller 
died  1858)  theory  of  the  specific  energies  of  the  senses, 
which  Helmholtz  made  use  of  as  an  empirical  con- 
firmation of  the  Kantian  apriorism ;  the  law  of  the  conser- 
vation of  energy  discovered  by  Robert  Mayer  (1842,  1850; 
Helmholtz,  1847,  1862),  and,  in  particular,  the  law  of  the 
transformation  of  heat  into  motion,  which  invited  an 
examination  of  all  the  forces  active  in  the  world  to  test 
their  mutual   convertibility;  the  extension   of  mechanism 

*  Bergmann:  Outlines  of  a  Theory  of  Consciousness,  1870;  Pure  Logic,  1879  ; 
Being  and  Knowing,  1880;  The  Fundamental  Problems  of  Logic,  1882  ;  On  the 
Right,  1883  ;  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  1886  ;  On  the  Beautiful,  1887  ■  His- 
tory of  Philosophy,  vol.  i.,  Pre-Kantian  Philosophy,  1892. 


SCIENCE  AXD  PHILOSOPHY.  621 

to  the  vital  processes,  favored  even  by  Lotze  ;  the  renewed 
conflict  between  atomism  and  dynamism  ;  further,  the  Dar- 
winian theory*  (1859),  which  makes  organic  species  develop 
from  one  another  by  natural  selection  in  the  struggle  for 
existence  (through  inheritance  and  adaptation);  finally,  the 
meta-geometrical  speculations f  of  Gauss  (1828),  Riemann 
{On  the  Hypotheses  which  lie  at  the  Basis  of  Geometry,  1854, 
published  in  1867),  Helmholtz  (1868),  B.  Erdmann  {The 
Axioms  of  Geometry,  1877),  G.  Cantor,  and  others,  which 
look  on  our  Euclidean  space  of  three  dimensions  as  a  special 
case  of  the  unintuitable  yet  thinkable  analytic  concept  of 
a  space  of  n  dimensions.  The  circumstance  that  these 
theories  are  still  largely  hypothetical  in  their  own  field 
appears  to  have  stirred  up  rather  than  moderated  the  zeal 
for  carrying  them  over  into  other  departments  and  for 
applying  them  to  the  world  as  a  whole.  Thus,  especially, 
the  Darwinians  J  have  undauntedly  attempted  to  utilize  the 
biological  hypothesis  of  the  master  as  a  philosophical  prin- 
ciple of  the  world,  and  to  bring  the  mental  sciences 
under  the  point  of  view  of  the  mechanical  theory  of 
development,  though  thus  far  with  more  daring  and  noise 

*  A  critical  exposition  of  the  modern  doctrine  of  development  and  of  the 
causes  used  to  explain  it  is  given  by  Otto  Hamann,  Entwickelungslehre  und  Dar- 
winismus,  Jena,  1892.  Cf.  also,  O.  Liebmann,  Analysis  iter  Wirklichkeit j 
and  Ed.  von  Hartmann  (above,  p.  610).  [Among  the  numerous  works  in  English 
the  reader  may  be  referred  to  the  article  "  Evolution,"  by  Huxley  and  Sully, 
Encyclopedia  Britannica,  9th  ed.,  vol.  viii.  ;  Wallace's  Darwinism,  1889; 
Romanes,  Darwin  and  after  Darwin,  i.  The  Darwinian  Theory,  1892  ;  and 
Conn's  Evolution  of  To-day,  1 886. — Tk.] 

f  Cf.  Eiebmann,  Analysis  der  Wirklichkeit,  2d  ed.,  pp.  53-59.  G.  Erege 
{Begriffsschrift,  1879;  The  Foundations  of  Arithmetic,  1SS4  ;  Function  and  Con- 
cept, 1891  ;  "On  Sense  and  Meaning"  in  the  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vol.  c. 
1892)  lias  also  chosen  the  region  intermediate  between  mathematics  and  philos- 
ophy for  his  field  of  work.  We  note,  further,  E.  G.  Husserl,  Philosophy  of  Arith- 
metic, vol.  i. ,  1  -'i  1 . 

\  Ernst  Haeckel  of  Jena  (born  1834;  General  Morphology,  1866;  Natural 
History  of  Creation.  1868  ('English,  1875];  Anthropogeny,  1874  J  Aims  and 
Methods  of  the  Development  History  oj  To-day,  1*75;  Popular  Lectures,  1878 
seq. — English,  1883),  G.  Jäger,  A.  Schleicher  (  The  Darwinian  Theory  and  the 
Science  of  Language,  1865),  Ernst  Krause  (Carus  Sterne,  the  editor  of  Kosmos) 
O.  Caspari,  Carncri  [Morals  and  Darwinism,  1S71),  O.  Schmidt,  Du  I'rcl, 
Paul  Ree  (  The  Origin  of  the  Moral  Feelings,  1 S77  ;  The  Genesis  of  Con 
1885;   The  Illusion  of  Free  Will,  i8H5);  r,.  n.  Schneider  {The  Animal  Will, 

1880;    The  Human   Wilt,   [882;    The  Hood  and  111  of  the  1 1  union  Race,   1SS3), 


62  2  THE  IDEALISTIC  REACTION. 

than  success.  The  finely  conceived  ethics  of  Höffding 
(p.  5S5)  is  an  exception  to  the  rule  which  'is  the  object  of 
this  remark. 

Besides  the  theory  of  knowledge,  in  the  elaboration  of 
which  the  most  eminent  naturalists  *  participate  with  acute- 
ness  and  success,  psychology  and  the  practical  disciplines 
also  betray  the  influence  of  the  scientific  spirit.  While 
sociology  and  ethics,  following  the  Euglish  model,  seek  an 
empirical  basis  and  begin  to  make  philosophical  use  of  statis- 
tical results  (E.  F.  Schaffte,  Frame  and  Life  of  the  Social 
Body,  new  ed.,  1885  ;  A.  von  Oettingen,  A/oral  Statistic  in 
its  Significance  for  a  Social  Ethics,  3d  ed.,  1882),  psychology 
endeavors  to  attain  exact  results  in  regard  to  psychical  life 
and  its  relation  to  its  physical  basis — besides  Fechner  and 
the  Herbartians,  W.  Wundt  and  A.  Horwicz  should  be 
mentioned  here.  Wundt  and,  of  late,  Haeckel  go  back  to 
the  Spinozistic  parallelism  of  material  and  psychical  exist- 
ence, only  that  the  latter  emphasizes  merely  the  insepar- 
ability (Nic/itohneeinander)  of  the  two  sides  (the  cell- 
body  and  the  cell-soul)  with  a  real  difference  between 
them  and  a  metaphysical  preponderance  of  the  material 
side,  while  the  former  emphasizes  the  essential  unity  of 
body  and  soul,  and  the  higher  reality  of  the  spiritual  side. 

(b)  Idealistic  Reaction  against  the  Scientific  Spirit. — In 
opposition  to  the  preponderance  of  natural  science  and  the 
empirico-skeptical  tendency  of  the  philosophy  of  the  day 
conditioned  by  it,  an  idealistic  counter-movement  is  mak- 
ing itself  increasingly  felt  as  the  years  go  on.  Wilhelm 
Diltheyf  abandons   metaphysics  as  a  basis,  it  is   true,  but 

*  Helmholtz,  Virchow  (born  1821),  Zöllner  (1834-82  ;  On  the  Nature  of 
Comets,  1872),  and  Du  Bois-Reymond  (born  1818) ,  who,  in  his  lectures  On  the 
Limits  of  the  Knowledge  of  Nature,  1872,  and  The  Seven  World-riddles,  1880 
(both  together  in  1882,  and  reprinted  in  the  first  series  of  his  Addresses,  1886), 
looks  on  the  origin  of  life,  the  purposive  order  of  nature,  and  thought  as  prob- 
lems soluble  in  the  future,  but  declares,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  nature  of 
matter  (atoms)  and  force  (actio  in  distans),  the  origin  of  motion,  the  genesis  of 
consciousness  (of  sensation,  together  with  pleasure  and  pain)  from  the  knowable 
conditions  of  psychical  life,  and  the  freedom  of  the  will,  are  absolute  limits  to 
our  knowledge  of  nature. 

f  Dilthey  :  Introduction  to  the  Mental  Sciences,  part  i.,  1883  ;  Poetic  Creation 
in  the  Zeller  Aufsätze,  1887  ;  "  Contributions  to  the  Solution  of  the  Question  of 
the  Origin  of  our  Belief  in  the  Reality  of  the  External  World,  and  its  Validity," 


THE  IDEALISTIC  REACTION.  623 

(with  the  assent  of  Gierke,  Pr russische  Jahrbücher,  vol.  liii. 
1884)  declares  against  the  transfer  of  the  method  of  natural 
science  to  the  mental  sciences,  which  require  a  special 
foundation.  In  spite  of  his  critical  rejection  of  meta- 
physics, Wilhelm  Windelband  in  Strasburg  (born  1848; 
Preludes,  1884)  is,  like  Dilthey,  to  be  counted  among  the 
idealists.  In  opposition  to  the  individualism  of  the  pos- 
itivists,  the  folk-psychologists — at  their  head  Steinthal  and 
Lazarus  (p.  536);  Gustav  Glogau  *  in  Kiel  (born  1844)  is  an 
adherent  of  the  same  movement — defend  the  power  of 
the  universal  over  individual  spirits.  The  spirit  of  the 
people  is  not  a  phrase,  an  empty  name,  but  a  real  force,  not 
the  sum  of  the  individuals  belonging  to  the  people,  but  an 
encompassing  and  controlling  power,  which  brings  forth  in 
the  whole  body  processes  (e.  g.,  language)  which  could  not 
occur  in  individuals  as  such.  It  is  only  as  a  member  of 
society  that  anyone  becomes  truly  man  ;  the  community  is 
the  subject  of  the  higher  life  of  spirit. 

If  folk-psychology,  whose  title  but  imperfectly  expresses 
the  comprehensive  endeavor  to  construct  a  psychology  of 
society  or  of  the  universal  spirit,  is,  as  it  were,  an  empir- 
ical confirmation  of  Hegel's  theory  of  Objective  Spirit, 
Rudolf  Eucken  +  (born  1846),  pressing  on  in  the  Fichtean 
manner  from  the  secondary  facts  of  consciousness  to  an 
original  real-life,  endeavors  to  solve  the  question  of  a  uni- 
versal becoming,  of  an  all-pervasive  force,  of  a  supporting 
unity  ("  totality  ")  in  the  life  of  spirit  (neither  in  a  purely 
noetical  nor  a  purely  metaphysical,  but)  in  a  noological 
way,  and  demands  that  the  fundamental  science  or  doctrine 
of  principles  direct  its  attention  not  to  cognition  by  itself, 
but  to  the  activity  of  psychical  life  as  a  whole. 

Sitzungsberichte  of  the  Berlin  Academy  of  Sciences,  1890;  "Conception  and 
Analysis  of  Man  in  the  Fifteenth  and  Sixteenth  Centuries"  in  the  Archiv  für 
Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  vols,  iv.,  v.,  1891-92. 

*  Glogau  :  Sketch  of  the  Fundamental  Philosophien!  Sciences  (part  i.,  The 
Form  and  the  Latus  of  Motion  of  the  Spirit,  1880;  part  ii..  The  Nature  and 
the  Fundamental  /■'or »is  of  Conscious  Spirit,  [888) ;  Outlines  of  Psychology, 
I8K4. 

\  Eucken  :  The  Unity  of  Spiritual  Life  in  the  Consciousness  und  Heeds  of 
Humanity,  [888  j  Prol  romena  to  this,  [885.  A  detailed  analysis  of  the  latter 
by  Falckenberg  is  given  in  the  Zeitschrift  für  Philosophie,  vol.  xc.  [887  ;  cf. 
above,  pp.  17  and  6lO. 


6^4  THE  IDEALISTIC  REACTION. 

We  have  elsewhere  discussed  the  more  recent  attempts 
to  establish  a  metaphysic  which  shall  be  empirically  well 
grounded  and  shall  cautiously  rise  from  facts.*  In  regard 
to  the  possibility  of  metaphysics  three  parties  are  to  be 
distinguished  :  On  the  left,  the  positivists,  the  neo-Kan- 
tians,  and  the  monists  of  consciousness,  who  deny  it  out 
of  hand.  On  the  right,  a  series  of  philosophers — e.  g., 
adherents  of  Hegel,  Herbart,  and  Schopenhauer — who, 
without  making  any  concessions  to  the  modern  theory  of 
knowledge,  hold  fast  to  the  possibility  of  a  speculative 
metaphysics  of  the  old  type.  In  the  center,  a  group  of 
thinkers  who  are  willing  to  renounce  neither  a  solid 
noetical  foundation  nor  the  attainment  of  metaphysical 
conclusions — so  Eduard  von  Hartmann,  Wundt,f  Eucken, 
Volkelt  (pp.  590,617).  Otto  Liebmann  (born  1840;  On  the 
Analysis  of  Reality,  1876,  2d  ed.,  1 880;  Thoughts  and  Facts, 
Heft  i.  1882)  demands  a  sharp  separation  between  the  cer- 
tain and  the  uncertain  and  an  exact  estimation  of  the 
degree  of  probability  which  theories  possess  ;  puts  the  prin- 
ciples of  metaphysics  under  the  rubric  of  logical  hypoth- 
esis; and,  in  his  Climax  of  the  Theories,  1884,  calls  attention 
to  the  fact  that  experiential  science,  in  addition  to  axioms 
necessarily  or  apodictically  certain  and  empeiremes  possess- 
ing actual  or  assertory  certainty,  needs,  further,  a  number 
of  "  interpolation  maxims,"  which  form  an  attribute  of  our 
type  of  intellectual  organization  (/.  e.,  principles,  according  to 
the  standard  of  which  we  supplement  the  fragmentary  and 
discrete  series  of  single  perceptions  and  isolated  observa- 
tions by  the  interpolation  of  the  needed  intermediate 
links,  so  that  they  form  a  connected  experience).  The 
most  important  of  these  maxims  are  the  principles  of  real 
identity,  of  the  continuity  of  existence,  of  causality,  and  of 
the  continuity  of  becoming.  Experience  is  a  gift  of  the 
understanding;    the  premises,  as  a  rule,  latent  in  ordinary 

*  R.  Falckenberg,  Ueber  die  gegenwärtige  Lage  der  deutschen  Philosophie, 
inaugural  address  at  Erlangen,  Leipsic,  1890. 

f  Wundt  :  Essays,  1885,  including  "Philosophy  and  Science";  System  of 
Philosophy,  1889.  On  the  latter  cf.  Volkelt's  paper  in  the  Philosophische 
Monatshefte,  vol.  xxvii.  1891  ;  and  on  the  Essays  a  notice  by  the  same  author 
in  the  same  review,  vol.  xxiii.  1887. 


THE  SPECIAL  PHILOSOPHICAL   SCIENCES.  625 

consciousness,  on  whose  anticipator}'  application  our  ex- 
perience is  based  throughout,  assert  something  absolutely 
incapable  of  being  experienced.  If,  in  order  to  the  pro- 
duction of  a  "pure  experience,"  we  eliminate  all  subjective 
additions  of  the  understanding  contained  in  experiential 
thought  (all  that  cannot  be  present  at  the  moment  or  locally 
at  hand,  in  short,  all  that  cannot  be  the  direct  object 
and  content  of  actual  observation),  this  breaks  up  into  an 
unordered,  unconnected  aggregate  of  discontinuous  per- 
ceptual fragments;  in  order  that  a  complete  and  articulated 
condition  of  experience  may  result,  these  fragments  (the 
purely  factual  content  of  observation,  the  incoherent 
matter  of  perception)  must  be  supplemented  and  connected 
by  very  much  that  is  not  observed. 

Further,  a  reaction  against  crude  naturalism  is  observable 
in  the  practical  field,  though  political  economists  (Roscher) 
and  jurists  take  a  more  active  part  in  it  than  the  philoso- 
phers. Personally  R.  von  Jhering  (1818-92  ;  Purpose  in 
Lazu,  2  vols.,  1877-83,  2d  ed.,  1884-86)  stands  on  idealistic 
ground,  although,  rejecting  the  nativistic  and  formalistic 
theory,  he  is  in  principle  an  adherent  of  "  realism,"  of  the 
principle  of  interest  and  social  utility  (the  moral  is  that 
which  is  permanently  useful  to  society). 

Finally,  similar  motives  underlie  the  growing  interest 
in  the  history  of  philosophy.  The  idealistic  impulse  seeks 
the  nourishment  which  the  un-metaphysical  present  denies 
to  it  from  the  great  works  of  the  past,  and  hopes,  by  keep- 
ing alive  the  classical  achievements  of  previous  times,  to 
enhance  the  consciousness  of  the  urgency  and  irrcpressible- 
ness  of  the  highest  questions,  and  to  awaken  courage  for 
renewed  attempts  at  their  solution.  Thus  the  study  of  his- 
tory enters  the  service  of  systematic  philosophy. 

(O  The  Special  Philosophical  Sciences. — The  more  the 
courage  to  attack  the  central  problems  of  philosophy  has  been 
paralyzed  by  the  neo-Kantian  theory  of  knowledge  and  the 
coming-in  of  the  positivistic  spirit,  the  more  lively  has  been 
the  work  of  the  last  decades  in  the  special  departments: 
the  transfer  of  the  center  of  gravity  from  metaphysics  to 
the  particular  sciences  is  the  most  prominent  characteristic 
of  the  philosophy  of  the  time.      Logic  sees  century-old  eon- 


CzG  THE    SPECIAL   PHILOSOPHICAL   SCIEArCES. 

victions  shattered  and  new  foundations  arising.  Psychology 
has  entered  into  competition  with  physiology  in  regard  to 
the  discovery  of  the  laws  of  the  psychical  functions  which 
depend  on  bodily  processes,  while  metaphysical  questions 
are  forced  into  the  background  and  there  is  a  growing  dis- 
trust of  the  reliability  of  inner  observation.  The  philoso- 
phy of  religion  is  favored  with  undiminished  interest  and 
aesthetics,  after  long  neglect,  with  a  renewal  of  attention; 
the  philosophy  of  history  is  about  to  reconquer  its  former 
rights.  There  is,  moreover,  an  especially  lively  interest  in 
ethics  ;  and  the  investigation  of  the  history  of  philosophy  is 
more  widely  extended  than  ever  before.  We  will  close  our 
sketch  with  a  short  survey  of  the  particular  disciplines. 

In  the  department  of  logic  the  following  should  be  men- 
tioned as  classical  achievements:  the  works  of  Christoph 
Sigwart  of  Tübingen  (vol.  i.  1873,  2d  ed.,  1889;  vo^  '*• 
1878),  of  Lotze(p.  605),  and  of  Wundt  (vol.  i.  Erkenntniss- 
Iclire,  1880;  vol.  ii.  Methodenlehre,  1883).  Besides  these, 
Bergmann  (p.  620),  Schuppe  (p.  619),  and  Benno  Erdmann 
{Logik,  vol.  i.  1892)  deserve  notice. 

In  psychology  the  following  writers  have  made  themselves 
prominent  :  Wilhelm  Wundt  at  Leipsic  (born  1832),  Grund- 
züge der  physiologischen  Psychologie,  1874,  3d  ed.,  1887;  A. 
Horwicz,  Psychologische  Analysen  aiif  physiologischer  Grund 
läge,  1872  seq.;  Franz  Brentano  in  Vienna  (born  1838), 
Psychologie  vom  empirischen  Standpunkte,  vol.  i.  1874; 
Carl  Stumpf  of  Munich  (born  1848),  Ueber  den  psychol- 
ogischen Ursprung  der  Raumvorstellung,  1873,  Tonpsychol- 
ogie, vol.  i.  1883,  vol.  ii.  1890;  Theodor  Lipps  of  Breslau 
(born  185 1),  Grundthatsachcn  des  Seelenlebens,  1883.  The 
following  may  be  mentioned  in  the  same  connection:  J. 
H.  Witte,  Das  Wesen  der  Seele,  1888;  H.  Münsterberg,  Die 
Willenshandlung,  1888,  Beiträge  zur  experimejitellen  Psychol- 
ogie, 1889  seq.;  Goswin  K.  Uphues  at  Halle,  Wahrnehmung 
tind  Empfindung,  1888,  Ueber  die  Erinnerung,  1889;  H. 
Schmidkunz,  Psychologie  der  Suggestion,  1892  ;  H.  Ebbing- 
haus,  the  co-editor  of  the  Zeitschrift  für  Psychologie  una 
Physiologie  der  Sinnesorgane,  1890  seq.;  H.  Spitta;  Max 
Dessoir,  Der  Hautsinn,  in  the  Archiv  für  Anatomie  una 
Physiologie,  1892.     The  following  works   are   psychological 


THE   SPECIAL  PHILOSOPHICAL   SCIENCES.  627 

contributions  to  the  theory  of  knowledge  :  E.  L.  Fischer, 
Theorie  der  Gesichtswahrnehmung,  1891  ;  Hermann  Schwarz, 
Das  Wahrnehmungsproblem,  1892.  Finally  we  may  add 
A.  Dorner  in  Königsberg,  Das  menschliche  Erkennen,  1887  ; 
and  E.  L.  Fischer,  Die  Grundfragen  der  Erkenntnisstheorie, 
1887. 

The  literature  of  moral  philosophy  has  been  substantially 
enriched  by  Wundt,  Ethik,  1886,  2d  ed.,  1892;  and  Fried- 
rich  Paulsen,  System  der  Ethik,  1889,  2d  ed.,  1891.  We 
may  mention,  further,  Baumann  (p.  601)  ;  Schuppe,  Grund- 
züge der  Ethik  and  Rechtsphilosophie,  1882;  Witte,  Freiheit 
des  Willens,  1882;  G.  Class  in  Erlangen,  Ideale  und  Güter, 
1886;  Richard  Wallaschek,  Ideen  zur  praktischen  Philos- 
ophie, 1886;  F.  Tönnies  in  Kiel,  Gemeinschaft  und  Gesell- 
schaft, 1887 ;  A.  Döring,  Philosophische  Güterlchre,  1888; 
Th.  Ziegler,  Sittliches  Sein  und  Werden,  2d  ed.,  1890;  G. 
Simmel,  Einleitung  in  die  Moralwissenschaft,  vol.  i.  1892. 

Of  the  newer  works  in  the  field  of  aesthetics,  in  addition 
to  A.  Zeising's  Aesthetische  Forschungen,  1855,  C.  Her- 
mann's Acsthetik,  1875,  and  Hartmann's  Philosophie  des 
Schönen,  1887,  we  may  mention  the  Einleitung  in  die 
Aesthetik  of  Karl  Groos,  1892,  and  the  following  by  Lipps: 
Der  Streit  über  die  Tragödie,  1890  ;  Aesthetische  Faktoren  der 
Raumanschauung,  1891  ;  the  essay  Psychologie  der  Komik 
{Philosophische  Monatshefte,  vols,  xxiv.-xxv.  1888-89),  and 
Aesthetische  Littcraturberichte  (in  the  same  review,  vol. 
xxvi.  1890  seq.). 

Among  the  writers  and  works  on  the  philosophy  of  history 
we  may  note  Conrad  Hermann  in  Leipsic  (born  1819), 
Philosophie  der  Geschichte,  1870;  Bern  hei  m,  Geschichtsfor- 
schung und  Geschichtsphilosophie,  1880;  Karl  Fischer,  Ist 
eine  Philosophie  der  Geschichte  wissenschaftlich  erforderlich 
bezw.  möglich?  Dillcnburg  Programme,  1889;  Hinneberg, 
Die  philosophischen  Grundlagen  der  Geschichtswissenschaft 
in  Sybel's  Historische  Zeitschrift,  vol.  Ixiii.  [889;  A.  Dippe, 
Das  Geschichtsstudium  mit  seinen  Zielen  und  Fragen,  [891  ; 
Georg  Simmel,  Die  Probleme  der  Geschieht sphilosophie,  [892. 

In  the  philosophy  of  religion,  which  is  discussed  especially 
by  the  theologians,  a  neo-Kantian  and  a  neo-Hegelian  ten- 
dency confront  each  other.     The  former,  dividing  in  its  turn, 


62S  THE    SPECIAL  PHILOSOPHICAL    SCIENCES. 

is  represented,  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  Ritschlian  school — 
W.  Herrmann  in  Marburg  {Die  Metaphysik  in  der  Theologie, 
1876,  Die  Religion  im  Verhältniss  zum  Welterkennen  und  zur 
Sittlichkeit,  1889),  J.  Kaftan  in  Berlin  {Das  Wesen  der 
christlichen  Religion,  1881) — and,  on  the  other,  by  R.  A. 
Lipsius  in  Jena  (born  1830;  Dogmatil-,  1876,  2d  ed.,  1879; 
Philosophie  und  Religion,  1885).  The  latter  is  represented  by 
A.  E.  Biedermann  of  Zurich  (1819-85  ;  Christliehe  Dogmatik, 
1868;  2d  ed.,  1884-85),  a  pupil  of  W.  Vatke,  and  by  Otto 
Pfleiderer  of  Berlin  (born  1839;  Religionsphilosophie,  1879; 
2d  ed.,  1883^4).  The  neo-Kantians  base  religion  exclu- 
sively on  the  practical  side  of  human  nature,  especially  on 
the  moral  law,  derive  it  from  the  contrast  between  external 
dependence  on  nature  and  the  inner  freedom  or  super- 
natural destination  of  the  spirit,  and  wish  it  preserved  from 
all  intermixture  with  metaphysics.  According  to  the  neo- 
Hegelians,  on  the  contrary,  the  theoretical  element  in 
religion  is  no  less  essential ;  and  is  capable  of  being  purified, 
of  being  elevated  from  the  form  of  representation,  which 
is  full  of  contradictions,  into  the  adequate  form  of  pure 
thought,  capable,  therefore,  of  reconciliation  with  philos- 
ophy. Hugo  Delff  {Ueber  den  Weg  zum  Wissen  und  zur 
Gewissheit  zu  gelangen,  1882;  Die  Hauptprobleme  der  Phil- 
osophie und  Religion,  1886)  follows  Jacobi's  course. 

Among  the  numerous  works  on  the  history  of  philosophy, 
besides  the  masterpieces  of  Zeller,  J.  E.  Erdmann,  and 
Kuno  Fischer,  the  following  are  especially  worthy  of 
attention : 

CI.  Bäumker  in  Breslau,  Das  Problem  der  Materie  in  der  griechischen 
Philosophie,  1890;  H.  Bonitz,  Platonische  Studien,  3d  ed.,  1886, 
Aristotelische  Studien,  1862  seq.,  Index  Aristotelicus,  1870,  Kleine 
Schriften;  P.  Deussen  (born  1845),  Das  System  der  Vedanta,  1883, 
H.  Diels  in  Berlin,  Doxographi  Gr&ci,  1879;  Eucken  in  Jena  (p.  17), 
Die  Methode  der  aristotelischen  Forschung,  1872,  Address   Ueber  den 

Werth  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  1874;  J.  Freudenthal  in  Breslau 
(born  1839;  pp.  63,  118),  Hellenistische  Studien,  3  Hefte,  1879,  Ueber  die 

Theologie  des  Xenophaues,  1886;  M.  Heinze  in  Leipsic,  Die  Lehre  vom 
Logos  in  der  griechischen  Philosophie,  1872  ;  G.  Freiherr  von  Hertling 
in  Munich  (born  1843),  Materie  und  Form  und  die  Definitio7i  der  Seele 
bei  Aristoteles,  1871,  Albertus  Magnus,  1880;  H.  Heussler  in  Basle  (p.  65 
note),  Der  Rationalismus  des  XVII.  Jahrhunderts  in  seinen    Bezie* 


RETRO  SrECT.  629 

hungert  zur  Entwickelungslehre,  1885;  Fr.  Jodl  in  Prague  (born  1849; 
pp.  16,  221  note);  A.  Krohn  (1840-89),  So/crates  und  Xenophon,  1874, 
Der  platonische  Staat,  1876,  Die  platonische  Frage,  1878 — on  Krohn, an 
obituary  by  Falckenberg  in  the  Biographisches  Jahrbuch  für  Alterthums- 
kunde,  Jahrg.  12,  1889  ;  P.  Natorp  (pp.  88  note,  598),  Forschungen  zur 
Geschichte  des  Erkenntnissproblems  im  Alterthum,  1884;  Edmund 
Pfleiderer  in  Tübingen  (born  1842;  p.  113  note*),  Empirismus  und  Skepsis 
im  D.  Humes  Philosophie,  1874,  Die  Philosophie  des  Heraklit  im  Lichte 
der  Mysterienidee,  1886;  K.  von  Prantl  (1820-88),  Geschichte  der  Logik 
im  Abendlande,  4  vols.,  1855-70;  Carl  Schaarschmidt  (pp.  88  note,  117- 
118)  Johannes  Sarisberiensis,  1862,  Die  Sammlung  der  platonischen 
Schriften,  1866  ;  L.  Schmidt  in  Marburg  (born  1824),  Die  Ethik  der  alten 
Griechen,  1881  ;  Gustav  Schneider,  ZVf  platonische  Metaphysik,  1884; 
H.  Siebeck  in  Giessen,  Untersuchungen  zur  Philosophie  der  Griechen, 
1873,  2d  ed.,  1888,  Geschichte  der  Psychologie,  part  i.  1880-84;  Chr.  von 
Sigwart  (born  1830;  pp.  17,118);  Heinrich  von  Stein  in  Rostock  (born 
1833),  Sieben  Bücher  zur  Geschichte  des  Piatonismus,  1862-75  ;  Ludwig 
Stein  in  Berne,  editor  of  the  Archiv  Jür  Geschichte  der  Philosophie, 
founded  in  1877, Die  Psychologie  der  Stoa,  I.  Metaphysisch-Anthro- 
pologischer Theil,  1886,  II.  Erkenntnisstheorie,  1888,  Leibniz  und 
Spinoza,  1890;  L.  Strümpell,  Geschichte  der  griechischen  Philosophie, 
1854,  1861  ;  Susemihl  in  Greifswald,  Die  Politik  des  Aristoteles,  Greek 
and  German  with  notes,  1879,  further,  a  series  of  essays  on  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle; Teichmüller  (p.  601) ;  Trendelenburg  (pp.  600-601),  Ar istotelis  de 
Anima,  2d  ed.,  by  Beiger,  1887;  Th.  Waitz,  Ar  istotelis  Organon,  1844- 
46;  J.  Walter  in  Königsberg,  Die  Lehre  von  der  praktischen  Ver- 
nunft in  der  griechischen  Philosophie,  1874,  Geschichte  der  Aesthetik 
im  Alterthum,  1892  ;  Tob.  Wildauer  in  Innsbruck,  Die  Psychologie  des 
Willens  bei  Sokrales,  Piaton,  und  Aristoteles,  1877,  1879;  W.  Windel- 
bund in  Strasburg  (pp.  1 5-16),  Geschichte  der  alten  Philosophie,  1888; 
Theob.  Ziegler  in  Strasburg,  Geschichte  der  christlichen  Ethik,  1886,  2d 
ed.,  with  index,  1892;  Rob. Zimmermann  (pp.  19  note,  331,  536),  Studien 
und  Kritiken,  1870. 


4.    Retrospect. 

In  order  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  arbitrary  construc- 
tion we  have  been  sparing  with  references  of  a  philosophico- 
historical  character.  In  conclusion,  looking  back  at  the 
period  passed  over,  we  may  give  expression  to  some  con- 
victions concerning  the  guiding  threads  In  the  development 
of  modern  philosophy,  though  these  here  claim  only  the 
rights  of  subjective  opinion. 

A  mirror  of  modern  culture,  and  conscious  <>f  its  sharp 
antithesis  to  Scholasticism,  modern  philosophy  in  its  pre- 


630  RETROSPECT. 

Kantian  period  is  pre-eminently  characterized  by  natural- 
ism. Nature,  as  a  system  of  masses  moved  according  to 
law,  forms  not  only  the  favorite  object  of  investigation,  but 
also  the  standard  by  which  psychical  reality  is  judged  and 
explained.  The  two  directions  in  which  this  naturalism 
expresses  itself,  the  mechanical  view  of  the  world,  which 
endeavors  to  understand  the  universe  from  the  standpoint 
of  nature  and  all  becoming  from  the  standpoint  of  motion,* 
and  the  intellectualistic  view,  which  seeks  to  understand 
the  mind  from  the  standpoint  of  knowledge,  are  most  inti- 
mately connected.  Where  the  general  view  of  the  All 
takes  form  and  color  from  nature,  a  content  and  a  mission 
can  come  to  the  mind  from  no  other  source  than  the  ex- 
ternal world  ;  whether  we  (empirically)  make  it  take  up  the 
material  of  representation  from  without  or  (rationalistic- 
ally)  make  it  create  an  ideal  reproduction  of  the  content 
of  external  reality  from  within,  it  is  always  the  function  of 
knowledge,  conceived  as  the  reproduction  of  a  completed 
reality,  which,  since  it  brings  us  into  contact  with  nature, 
advances  into  the  foreground  and  determines  the  nature 
of  psychical  activity.  As  is  conceivable,  along  with 
dogmatic  faith  in  the  power  of  the  reason  to  possess  itself 
of  the  reality  before  it  and  to  reconstrue  it  in  the  system 
of  science,  and  with  triumphant  references  to  the  mathe- 
matical method  as  a  guaranty  for  the  absolute  certainty 
of  philosophical  knowledge,  the  noetical  question  emerges 
as  to  the  means  by  which,  and  the  limits  within  which, 
human  knowledge  is  able  to  do  justice  to  this  great 
problem.  Descartes  gave  out  the  programme  for  all  these 
various  tendencies — the  mechanical  explanation  of  nature, 
the  absolute  separation  of  body  and  soul  (despirituali- 
zation  of  matter),  thought  the  essence  of  the  mind,  the 
demand  for  certain  knowledge,  armed  against  every  doubt, 
and  the  question  as  to  the  origin  of  ideas.  Its  execution 
by  his  successors  shows  not  only  a  lateral  extension  in  the 
most  various  directions  (the  dualistic  view  of  the  world 
held  by  the  occasionalists,  the  monistic  or  pantheistic  view 
of  Spinoza,  the  pluralistic  or  individualistic  view  of  Leib- 

*  Even  for  Leibnitz  the  mind  is  a  machine  {automaton  spirituale),  and  psy- 
chical action  a  movement  of  ideas. 


RETROSPECT.  631 

nitz ;  similarly  the  antithesis  between  the  sensational- 
ism of  Locke  and  Condillac  and  the  rationalism  of  Spinoza 
and  Leibnitz),  but  also  a  progressive  deepening  of  prob- 
lems, mediated  by  party  strife  which  puts  every  energy 
to  the  strain.  What  a  tremendous  step  from  the  empiricism 
of  Bacon  to  the  skepticism  of  Hume,  from  the  innate  ideas 
of  Descartes  to  the  potential  a  priori  of  Leibnitz  !  From 
the  moment  when  the  negative  and  positive  culminations 
of  the  pre-Kantian  movement  in  thought — Hume  and  Leib- 
nitz— came  together  in  one  mind,  the  conditions  of  the 
Kantian  reform  were  given,  just  as  the  preparation  for  the 
Socratic  reform  had  been  given  in  the  skepticism  of  the 
Sophists  and  the  vovl  principle  of  Anaxagoras. 

Kant,  who  dominates  the  second  period  of  modern  philoso- 
phy down  to  the  present  time,  is  related  to  his  predecessors 
in  a  twofold  way.  In  his  criticism  he  completes  the  noetical 
tendency,  and  at  the  same  time  overcomes  naturalism,  by 
limiting  the  mechanical  explanation  (and  with  it  certain 
knowledge,  it  is  true)  to  phenomena  and  opposing  moral- 
ism  to  intellectualism.  Nature  must  be  conceived  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  spirit  (as  its  product,  for  all  conformity  to 
law  takes  its  origin  in  the  spirit),  the  spirit  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  will.  Metaphysics,  as  the  theory  of  the  a  priori 
conditions  of  experience,  is  raised  to  the  rank  of  a  science, 
while  the  suprasensible  is  removed  from  the  region  of  proof 
and  refutation  and  based  upon  the  rock  of  moral  will.  In  the 
positive  side  of  the  Kantian  philosophy — the  spirit  the  law- 
giver of  nature,  the  will  the  essence  of  spirit  and  the  key  to 
true  reality' — we  find  its  kernel,  that  in  it  which  is  forever 
valid.  The  conclusions  on  the  absolute  worth  of  the  moral 
disposition,  on  the  ultimate  moral  aim  of  the  world,  on  the 
intelligible  character,  and  on  radical  evil,  reveal  the  energy 
with  which  Kant  took  up  the  mission  of  furnishing  the  life- 
forces  opened  up  by  Christianity — which  the  Middle  Ages 
had  hidden  rather  than  conserved  under  the  crust  of 
Aristotelian  conceptions  entirely  alien  to  them,  and  the 
pre-Kantian  period  of  modern  times  had  almost  wholly 
ignored — an  entrance  into  philosophy,  and  of  transform- 
ing and  enriching  the  modern  view  of  the  world  from 
this  standpoint.      Kant's  position  is  as  opposite  and  superior 


u$2  RETROSPECT. 

to  the  specifically  modern,  to  the  naturalistic  temper 
of  the  new  period,  as  Plato  stands  out,  a  stranger  and 
a  prophet  of  the  future,  above  the  level  of  Greek  modes 
of  thought.  More  fortunate,  however,  than  Plato,  he  found 
disciples  who  followed  further  in  the  direction  pointed  out 
by  that  face  of  the  Janus-head  of  his  philosophy  which  looked 
toward  the  future:  the  ethelism  of  Fichte  and  the  histori- 
cism  of  Hegel  have  their  roots  in  Kant's  doctrine  of  the 
practical  reason.  These  are  acquisitions  which  must 
never  be  given  up,  which  must  ever  be  reconquered  in  face 
of  attack  from  forces  hostile  to  spirit  and  to  morals.  In 
life,  as  in  science,  we  must  ever  anew  "  win  "  ethical 
idealism  "  in  order  to  possess  it."  As  yet  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  the  historical  and  the  scientific,  the  Christian  and 
the  modern  spirit  is  not  effected.  For  the  inbred  natural- 
ism of  the  modern  period  has  not  only  asserted  itself, 
amalgamated  with  Kantian  elements,  in  the  realistic  meta- 
physics and  mechanical  pyschology  of  Herbart  and  in  the 
system  of  Schopenhauer,  as  a  lateral  current  by  the  side  of 
Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel,  but,  under  the  influence  of 
the  new  and  powerful  development  of  the  natural  sciences, 
has  once  more  confidently  risen  against  the  traditions  of 
the  idealistic  school,  although  now  it  is  tempered  by 
criticism  and  concedes  to  the  practical  ideals  at  least  a 
refuge  in  faith.  The  conviction  that  the  rule  of  neo-Kant- 
lanism  is  provisional  does  not  rest  merely  on  the  mutability 
of  human  affairs.  The  widespread  active  study  of  the 
philosophy  of  the  great  Königsberger  gives  ground  for  the 
hope  that  also  those  elements  in  it  from  which  the  systems 
of  the  idealists  have  proceeded  as  necessary  consequences 
will  again  find  attention  and  appreciation.  The  perception 
of  the  fact  that  the  naturalistico-mechanical  view  represents 
only  a  part,  a  subordinate  part,  of  the  truth  will  lead  to  the 
further  truth,  that  the  lower  can  only  be  explained  by 
the  higher.  We  shall  also  learn  more  and  more  to  distin- 
guish between  the  permanent  import  of  the  position  of 
fundamental  idealism  and  the  particular  form  which  the 
constructive  thinkers  have  given  it;  the  latter  may  fall  be- 
fore legitimate  assaults,  but  the  former  will  not  be  affected 
by  them.      The  revival  of  the  Ficliteo-Hcgelian  idealism  by 


RETROSPECT.  633 

means  of  a  method  which  shall  do  justice  to  the  demands  of 
the  time  by  a  closer  adherence  to  experience,  by  making  gen- 
eral use  of  do  til  the  natural  and  the  mental  seienees,  and  by  an 
exact  and  cautious  mode  of  argument — this  seems  to  us  to  be  the 
task  of  the  future.  The  most  important  of  the  post-Hegel- 
ian systems,  the  system  of  Lotze,  shows  that  the  scientific 
spirit  does  not  resist  reconciliation  with  idealistic  convic- 
tions in  regard  to  the  highest  questions,  and  the  considera- 
tion which  it  on  all  sides  enjoys,  that  there  exists  a 
strong  yearning  in  this  direction.  But  when  a  deeply 
founded  need  of  the  time  becomes  active,  it  also  rouses 
forces  which  dedicate  themselves  to  its  service  and  which 
are  equal  to  the  work. 


THE  END. 


INDEX. 


Abbt,  302 

Absolute,  the,  Fichte  on,  441  seq. ; 
Schelling  on,  448,  456  seq.,  461  seq., 
466  ;  F.  Krause  on,  471-472; 
Schleierma  »her  on,  478  seq. ; 
Hegel  on,  489  seq.,  495-496;  Fort- 
lage on,  515;  Spencer  on,  569^^.; 
Bö'strom  on,  583;  Strauss  on,  591- 
592;  Feuerbach  on,  594-595;  the 
theistic  school  on,  596-597;  Lotze 
on,  607,  60S;  Hartmann  on,  611, 
613-614.  See  also  God,  the  Un- 
conditioned 

Achillini,  30 

Adamson,  R.,  65  note*,  331,  424 
note,  581 

Esthetics,  of  Home  (Lord  Karnes) 
239-240;  of  Burke,  239-240,  401; 
of  Baumgarten,  299,  401;  of  Her- 
der, 312;  of  Kant,  401  seq. ;  of 
Schiller,  417-41S;  of  Schelling, 
456;  of  Hegel,  501-502;  of  J.  F. 
Fries,  508,  509;  of  Herbart,  518, 
532  seq.;  of  Schopenhauer,  542- 
543 

Agnosticism,  of  Spencer,  564,  569 
seq. 

Agricola,  R.,  29 

Agrippa  of  Nettesheim,  27 

Ahrens,  H.,  471,  472 

Alexandrists,  29-30 

Allihn,  536 

Ahhusius,  39  note,  40,  43-44 

Anderson,  538  note 

An^iulli,  A.,  552 

Annet,  P.,  190  note 


Antal,  G.  von,   585 

Antinomies,  the,  of  Kant,  373,  375— 
37S;  his  antinomy  of  aesthetic 
judgment,  406-407;  and  of  tele- 
ological  judgment,  411-412 

Apelt,  E.  F.,  69  note  *,  509 

A  priori,  the,  in  Kant,  318,  333  seq., 
338  j*/.,  341  seq.,  347,  357  seq.,  3S4, 
388-3S9,  401  seq.;  in  Kant  and 
the  post-Kantians,  340;  nature,  in 
Schelling,  340,  450;  in  J.  F.  Fries, 
340,  506-507;  Beneke  on,  510, 
512-513  ;  Herbart  on,  526-527, 
535;  J.  S.  Mill  on,  566-567;  Spen- 
cer's doctrine  of  the  racial  origin 
of,  574;  Opzoomer  on,  585.  Cf. 
Ideas 

Aquinas,  Thomas,  9  note,  11,  26,  37, 
45  note*    599 

Ardigö,  R.,  552 

Aristotelians,  the,  29-30;  opponents 
of,  30  seq. 

Arnauld,  87,  143 

Arnoldt,   E.,  330 

Associationalism,  of  Hartley  and 
Priestley,  183-184;  of  Hume,  223 
seq.;  of  the  Mills,  566  seq.;  of 
Bain,  569 

Ast,  G.  A.  F.,  468 

Atomism,  in  modern  physics,  57;  in 
Gassendi  and  Descartes,  61  ;  in 
Boyle,  61-62;  Leibnitz  on  270-271 

Attributes,  in  Descartes,  95;  Spino- 
za's doctrine  of,  [26  sea. 

Auerbach,  1 18 

Augustine,  37 

635 


636 


INDEX. 


Avenarius,  R.,  nS,  59S,  61S  nctej, 

619 
Averroists,   .M-30 

Baader,  F.  (von),  53  note  f,  56;  and 
Schelling,    447,    462,    46S;    system 

of,  472-475 

Bach,  J.,  51  note 

Bacmeister,  610  note 

Bacon,  Francis,  6,  9,  15,  48,  63,  80, 
182,  1S4,  iq3,  241,  266,  293,  553, 
631;  a  beginner  of  modern  phi- 
losophy, 14,  81;  doctrine  of,  64-71; 
in  relation  to  Locke,  155,  175 

Bacon,  Roger,  56 

Bahnsen,  J.,  546 

Bain,  Alexander,  566  note,  569 

Baku,  62  note 

Barclay,  44 

Bardili,  416 

Bartholomaei,  517 

Barzellotli,  G.,  549  note 

Basedow,  303 

Bauer,  Bruno,  589,  595-596 

Bauer,  Edgar,  596 

Baumann,  J.,  16,  17,  473  note,  601, 
606  note,  627 

Baumeister,  299 

Baumgarten,  Alex.,  299,  401 

Baumgarten,  Siegmund,  300 

Bäumker,   Cl.,  628 

Baur,  F.  C,  595  note 

Bayle,  P. ,  242,  253  ;  doctrine  of,  149- 
152;  and  Leibnitz,  289 

Beattie,  J.,  239 

Beck,   Sigismund,  416,  417,  425,  429 

Beckers,  H.,  446  note  * 

Bekker,  Balthasar,  in 

Beiger,  629 

Bellarmin,  47 

Beneke,  F.  E.,  505,  509-513.  53°. 
538  note 

Benoit,  G.  von,  154  note 

Bentham.J.,  213,   563,  564,565,   568 

Bentley,  Richard,  189 

Berger,  J.  E.   von,  468,470 

Bergmann,  J.,  598,  620,  626 

Berkeley,   George,  position  in   mod- 


ern philosophy,  81  ;  view  of  mind 
and  matter,  109  ;  relation  to  Locke 
on  perception,  15S,  on  knowledge, 
181  ;  his  system,  214-220  ;  rela- 
tion to  Hume,  221-222  ;  relation 
to  Scottish  School,  236,  238;  rela- 
tion to  Condillac,  245-246;  his 
idealism  criticised  by  Kant,  338, 
339  note  *,  346;    referred   to,   5S0 

Bernard,  Claude,  563 

Bernheim,  627 

Bessarion,  26-27 

Bezold,  F.  von,  39  note  % 

Biberg,  5S3 

Biedermann,  A.  E.,  39S,  628 

Biedermann,  Fr.  K.,  16 

Bilfinger,  297 

Billewicz,  J.  von,  600  note  * 

Biran,  Maine  de,  562 

Blignieres,  561 

Bluntschli,  16 

Bodin(us),  40,  42-43,  44,  243 

Body  and  Mind,  see  Mind  and  Body 

Boethius,  D.,  583 

Böhme,  Jacob,  system  of,  53-56;  and 
Schelling,  447,  44S,  462 

Böhmer,  117,  11S 

Böhringer,  A.,  330 

Bolin,  W.,  593  note 

Bolingbroke,  193,  196,  203-204,  241 

Bolzano,  B.,  600  note 

Bonald,  Victor  de,  562 

Bonatelli,  F..  549  note,  551-552 

Bonitz,  H.,  628 

Bonnet,  242,  249-250,  303,  312 

Bontekoe,    112 

Boole,  G.,  579 

Borelius,  J.,  552  note*,  584 

Borelli,  550 

Borgeaud,  262  note 

Bosanquet,  B.,  17,  580 

Böstrom,  C.  J.,  583-584 

Botta,  V.,  15,  549  note 

Bouillier,  88  note,  145 

Bourdin,  88 

Bourignon,  Antoinette,  149 

Bovven,  F.,  16 

Bowne,  B.  P.,  569  note  f ,  582 


INDEX. 


637 


Boyle,  R.,  61-62,  1S2 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  580,  58t 

Brahe,  Tycho,  61 

Brandes,  G.,  585 

Brandis,  C.  A.,  4S6 

Braniss,  J.,  597 

Brasch,  M.,  516  note  . 

Brentano,  F.,  626 

Bröchner,  H.,  5S5 

Brockerhoff,  260  note 

Brown,  Thomas,  239 

Browne,  Peter,  246 

Browne,  Sir  Thomas,  So 

Brucker,  301  note 

Bruder,  117 

Brunnhofer,  35  note 

Bruno.Giordano,  14,  24,  26,  33  note*; 
system  of,  34-36;  and  Spinoza, 
119;  and  Schelling,  447,  458 

Brütt,  M.,  553  note 

Buchanan,  George,  63 

Büchner,  L.,  599 

Buckle,  62  note  * 

Budde, 301 

Buffon,  254 

Burckhardt,  17 

Burdach,  K.  F.,  468 

Burgersdijck,  118 

Burke,  Edmund,  239-240,  401 

Burt,  B.  C.,  587  note 

Busch,  O.,  53S  note 

Butler,  Joseph,  194,  204,  206 

Butler,  N.  M.,  583 

Cabanis,  259,  562 

Cffisalpin,  30 

Caird,    Edward,    89    note,    331,    488 

note,  553  note,  580 
Caird,  John,  117  note  f,  580 
Cairns,  184  note  f 
Calkcr,  F.  v.,  509 
Camerer,  1 17  note  f 
Campanella,    Thomas,    29    note,   33 

note,  34;  system  of,  36-38 
Campe,  303 
Cantoni,  331,  550 
Cantor,  G.,  621 
Caporali,  E.,  552 


Cardanus,  Hieronymus,  33,  35 

Carlyle,   Thomas,  580 

Carneri,  621  note  % 

Caro,  E.,  562  note*,  563 

Carpenter,  W.  B.,  580 

Carriere,  M.,  17,  597 

Cartesians,  the,  Locke's  relation 
to,  159,  173,  175  ;  Leibnitz's  rela- 
tion to,  270,  274 

Carus,  F.  A.,  469  note  % 

Carus,  K.  G.,  468,  469-470 

Carus,  P.,  5S3 

Caspari,  O.,  621  note  % 

Categories,  the,  Kant  on,  365  seq.  ; 
Hegel's  doctrine  of,  495,  496 

Caterus,  87 

Causation,  Spinoza's  view  of,  126, 
129  ;  Locke  on,  164  ;  Hume's 
skeptical  analysis  of,  223-225  ; 
Kant  on,  357,  363-364,  375,  377, 
391-392,  410-41 1  ;  Schopenhauer 
on,  539 ;  Lotze  on,  607  ;  Hart- 
mann on,  610-611.  See  also  Suffi- 
cient Reason,  Teleology 

Cesca,  Giovanni,  552 

Chalybaeus,  16,  496,  597 

Chandler,  Samuel,  193 

Channing,  W.  E.,  582 

Character,  the  Intelligible,  in  Kant, 
377.  39!-392,  394-395  \  'n  Schell- 
ing, 462  ;    in  Schopenhauer,   544, 

545 
Charron,  Pierre,  49-50 
Christ,  P.,  610  note 
Chubb,  Thomas,  187,  191-192 
Cieszkowski,  A.  von,  589 
Clarke,  Samuel,  62  note  f,  190,  [95, 

268  ;  ethics  of,  197-198 
Class,  G.,  2S0  note,  627 
Classen,  A.,    617 
Clauberg,  11 1  note 
Cogito  ergo   sum,  the   Cartesian,    89 

seq. 
Cohen,  II.,  329,  618 
Colecchi,  A.,  550 
Coleridge,  S.  T.,  580,  581 
Collard,  Royer,  562 
Collier,  Arthur,  218  note 


638 


INDEX. 


Collins,  Anthony,  187,  189,  190  note 

Collins,  F.  H.,  569 

Collins,  W.  L.,  206  note  * 

Combachius,  1  iS 

Comenius,  29  note 

Commer,  E.,  600  note 

Common    Sense,    Scottish    doctrine 

of,  237  seq 
Comte,  Auguste,  552-562 
Condillac,    83,    158,    250,    258,    550, 

562,    631 ;  doctrine  of,    242,   245- 

249 
Condorcet,  258-259 
Conn,  H.  W.,  621  note  * 
Conybeare,  J.,  194 
Copernicus,  N.,  35,  58,  61,  100 
Cordemoy,  111  note 
Cosmological     Argument,     the,    in 

Locke,  168-169;  'n  Rousseau,  263; 

in     Leibnitz,    288-289  ;    in    Kant, 

379-380 
Cotes,  Roger,  182 
Cousin,  Victor,  144,  331,  446,  562 
Cremonini,  30 
Crescas,  Chasdai,  118,  119 
Creuz,  K.  von,  300 
Critique  of  Reason,  the,  meaning  of, 

321-323  ;    the     neo-Kantians    on, 

615-618  ;  its    central     position    in 

modern  thought,  631-632 
Crousaz,  301 

Crusius,  C.  A.,  300-301,  325 
Cudworth,    Ralph,    154,    156    note  ; 

ethics  of,  195,  196-197 
Cumberland,  Richard,  195,  196 
Czolbe,  H.,  599 

D'Alembert,  242,  251,  253-254 

Damiron,  243  note* 

Danzel,  300  notef 

Darjes,  301 

Darwin,    Charles,  17,  453,  579,   587, 

610,  621 
Darwin,  Erasmus,  184 
Daub,  K.,  589 
Da  Vinci,  Leonardo,  56 
Deism,    naturalism    of,  45-47,    185  ; 

in     Herbert,    79-80 ;    in    English 


thinkers  of  XVIII.  century,  184- 
195;  in  Hume,  228;  in  Rousseau, 
262;  of  Reimarus,  303  seq.  ;  in 
Lessing,  306  seq.  ;  Kant's  relation 
to,  309.  See  also  Faith,  Faith  and 
Reason,  Religion,  Theology 

Delbcouf,  605  note 

Delff,  H.,  62S 

De  Morgan,  A.,  579 

Denifle,  51  note 

Des  Bosses,  281 

Descartes,  Rene,  6,  7,  57,  50,  60,  62, 
72,  143,  144,  1S2,  184,  193,  195, 
214,  293,  553,  600,  630;  system  of, 
S6-107;  and  occasionalism,  108 
seq.  ;  and  Spinoza,  119  seq.,  135, 
137;  and  Locke,  153,  155,  156  note, 
15S-159;  and  Leibnitz,  271,  279, 
283  seq.,  288.      See  also  Spinoza 

Desdouits,  331 

Dessoir,  M.,  626 

Deter,  17 

Determinism,  in  Hobbes,  75;  in  Spi- 
noza, 122,  124,  131,  133;  of  the 
early  associationalists,  184  ;  of 
Hume,  232  ;  in  Leibnitz,  285,  2S6; 
of  Schleiermacher,  480,  486  ;  of 
Herbart,  525,  530;  of  Schopen- 
hauer, 539,  545;  of  J.  S.  Mill,  568; 
of  Jonathan  Edwards,  581.  See  also 
Character,  the  Intelligible  ;  Free- 
dom of  the  Will 

Deussen,  P.,  546,  628 

Deutinger,  M.,  600  note 

De  Wette,  509 

Dewey,  J.,  269  note  * 

Diderot,  Denis,  243  note  *,  251,  253- 

254 
Diels,   H.,  628 
Dieterich,  K.,  330 
Digby,  Everard,  63 
Dillman,  269  note  * 
Dilthey,   W.,   10    note,  328    note*, 

330,    417,    486  note;   doctrine    of, 

622-623 
Dippe,  A.,  627 
Döring,  A.,  627 
Dorner,  A.,  627 


INDEX. 


(>39 


Doubt,  the  Cartesian,  88  seq.  ;  in 
Bayle,  150-152;  Rousseau's  rever- 
ential, 265 

Drobisch,  M.  W.,  330,  532,  535-536 

Droz,  144  note 

Druskowitz,  Helene,  601 

Du  Bois-Reymond,  E.,  252  note, 
622  note  * 

Dühring,  E.,  16,  59,  601,  610  note 

Dumont,  E.,  565  note 

Duncan,  G.  M.,  269  note  * 

Durdik,  181  note 

Ebbinghaus,  H.,  626 

Eberhard,  J.  A.,  303,  414 

Echtermeyer,  589 

Eckhart,  51,  53,  473 

Eclecticism,  of  the  German  Illumi- 
nation, 294,  295,  300,  302,  307;  of 
Schleiermacher,  476  seq.;  of  Cou- 
sin and  his  School,  562 

Edfeldt,  H.,  583 

Education,  Locke  on,  180;  Rous- 
seau on,  262 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  581 

Ego,  the,  certain  knowledge  of,  in 
Campanella,  and  Descartes,  37, 
89-90;  the  individual,  and  the 
transcendental  consciousness  in 
Kant,  345,  350;  Fichte's  doctrine 
of,  429  seq.,  441  seq. ;  a  complex  of 
representations  in  Beneke,  512; 
Fortlage  on,  514;  Herbart's  doc- 
trine of,  524  seq. ;  the  neo-Kan- 
tians  on  the  individual,  and  the 
transcendental  consciousness, 61 7- 
618.      See  also  Soul 

Ellis,  65 

Emerson,  R.  W.,  582 

Empiricism,  founded  by  Bacon,  64 
seq. ;  in  Hobbes,  72;  and  rational- 
ism, So  seq.,  315  seq. ;  of  Locke, 
155  seq.,  173-175;  of  J.  S.  Mill, 
564,  566  seq.;  of  Opzoomer,  585— 
586;  Liebmann  on,  624-625.  See 
also  Experience,  Sensationalism 

Encyclopedists,  the,  242,243  note*, 
251  seq. 


Engel,  J.  J.,  216  note,  302-303 

Ennemoser,  469 

Erasmus,  Desiderius,  30 

Erdmann,  Benno,  works  by,  156 
note,  175  note,  300  note*,  329,330, 
332  note,  587  note,  621,  626 

Erdmann,  J.  E.,  10,  94,  127,  46S; 
works  by,  15,  269,  538  note,  628; 
philosophy  of,  589 

Erhardt,  F.,  330 

Eschenmayer,  K.  A.,  447,  462 

Ethelism,  in  Crusius,  301;  of  Fichte, 
419,  42S  seq.,  434  seq. ;  of  Schopen- 
hauer, 540  seq.;  in  Hartmann, 
609,  611  seq.      See  also  Panthelism. 

Ethics,  Bacon  on,  70-71;  Hobbes's 
political  theory  of,  75-79;  Des- 
cartes on,  106;  Geulincx  on,  1 15— 
116;  Spinoza  on,  136^.;  Pascal 
on,  143-144;  Malebrancheon,  147- 
148;  Locke  on,  170-171,  176-179; 
English,  of  XVIII.  century,  195- 
214;  Hume's  empirical  and  me- 
chanical, 231  seq.;  of  French  sen- 
sationalists 248-251;  of  French 
materialists,  252-253,  257-259;  of 
Rousseau,  263-264;  of  Leibnitz, 
285-287;  of  Herder,  314;  of  Kant, 
383  seq. ;  of  Fichte,  434  seq. ;  of 
Schleiermacher,  485-486;  of  Hegel, 
498-499;  of  J.  F.  Fries,  509;  of 
Beneke,  512-513;  of  Herbart,  518, 
533-534.  535!  °i  Schopenhauer, 
543-545;  of  Comte,  561;  of  Ben- 
tham,  564,  565-566;  of  J.  S.  Mill, 
564,  568-569;  of  Spencer,  576-579; 
of  T.  H.  Green,  581 ;  of  Lotze,  609; 
of  Hartmann,  612  seq.;  recent  Ger- 
man interest  in,  626 
Eucken,  R.,  works  by,  9  note,  17, 
19  note,  112  note  *,  113  note  f,  [49 
note, 471  note,  515  note, 552  note  f, 
600  note  f ,  601,628;  philosophy  of, 
623,  624 
Everett,  C.  C,  424  note,  582 
Evil,  Weigel  on  the  origin  of,  53; 
Böhme  on  the  origin  of,  53-55; 
Spinoza's    doctrine    of,    139    seq.; 


640 


INDEX. 


Leibnitz's  doctrine  of,  289-292; 
Schelling's  theory  of,  461  seq.; 
Baader's  theory  of,  475;  Fechner's 
view  of,  603.  See  also  Optimism, 
Pessimism 

Evolution,  in  the  sense  of  explica- 
tion in  Nicolas  of  Cusa,  25-26;  and 
involution  in  Leibnitz,  2S1-282; 
cosmical,  of  Spencer,  564,  572  j*y.; 
biological,  of  Darwin,  579,  621- 
622.  Cf.  also  the  systems  of 
Schelling,  Hegel,  Hartmann 

Exner,  F.,  536 

Experience,  the  basis  of  science  in 
Bacon,  66,  67;  Kant  on,  339  seq., 
344  seq.,  354.^.,  369;  Green  on, 
580;  Liebmann's  view  of,  624-625. 
See  also  Empiricism,  Sensational- 
ism 

External  World,  the,  reality  of,  in 
Descartes,  93,  97-98;  knowledge 
and  reality  of,  in  Locke,  159-160, 
167-168;  Berkeley  on,  214-215, 
217-218,  219;  Kant  on  the  reality 
°f.  338-3393  346 sei/.;  the  "  material 
of  duty  in  the  form  of  sense"  in 
Fichte,  434-435 

Faber  Stapulensis  (Lefevre  of  Eta- 
ples),  30 

Faith,  the  reformers'  view  of,  51,  52; 
Deistic  view  of,  185  seq.;  Kant  on, 
395;  Kant  on  moral  or  practical, 
377.  3Si,  392,  393-394,  412;  Paul- 
sen on  practical,  616-617.  See 
also  Deism 

Faith  and  Reason,  the  relation  of,  in 
modern  philosophy,  io-li;  Bayle 
on,  149-152;  Locke  on,  175-176; 
Deistic  view  of,  185  seq. ;  in  Rous- 
seau, 262-265;  Leibnitz  on,  288- 
289;  Lessing  on,  306-30S;  Baader 
on,  473  seq. ;  Schleiermacher  on, 
4S3.      See  also  Deism 

Faith  Philosophy,  the,  of  Hamann, 
310;  of  Herder,  310-312;  of  Jacobi, 
312-314;  elements  of,  in  J.  F. 
Fries,  507  seq. 


Falckenberg,  R.,  works  by,  19  note, 
337  note,  598,  606  note,  623  notef, 
624  note  *,  629 

Farrer,  J.  A.,  206  note 

Fechner,  G.  T.,  17,  292,  609,  622-' 
system  of,  601-605 

Fechner,  H.  A.,  53  notef 

Feder,  J.  G.  H.,  303,  414 

Feeling,  the  basis  of  knowledge  in 
Pascal,  143-144;  the  central  doc- 
trine of  Rousseau,  260,  262-265; 
central  to  religion  in  Schleierma- 
cher, 4S0  seq.  See  also  The  Faith 
Philosophy 

Ferguson,  Adam,  213,  303 

Ferrari,  Giuseppe,  551 

Ferraz,  552  note  * 

Ferri,  L.,  552 

Ferrier,  D.,  580 

Ferrier,  J.  F.  564-565 

Fester,  R.,  17 

Feuerbach,  L.,  7,  149  note,  546; 
philosophy  of,  5S9,  592-595 

Fichte,  I.  H.,  16,  423,  442,  515,  597, 
598,  605 

Fichte,  J.  G.,  6,  7,  9,  46,  84,  96,  220. 
246,  265,  476,  505,  506,  537,  583, 
597,  598,  623,  632;  and  Kant,  340, 
356  note,  413  seq.,  455  note  ;  sys- 
tem of,  419-444  ;  and  Schelling, 
446  seq.,  461  ;  and  Hegel,  487, 
491  ;  and  Herbart,  516,  535  ;  and 
Lotze,  60S,  609.  See  also  Idealism, 
Jacobi,  Kant 

Ficinus,  26,  27 

Filmer,  179 

Final  Causes,  see  Teleology 

Fiorentino,  F.,  33  note,  549  note 

Fischer,  E.  L.,  627 

Fischer,  K,  Ph.,  516  note,  597 

Fischer,  Karl,  627 

Fischer,  Kuno,  works  by,  13,  306 
note,  417  note  f,  507  note,  628  ;  on 
Spinoza,  118-119,  121  note,  127, 
128,  131;  on  Kant,  327  note  f,  328 
notef;  his  philosophy,  589;  and 
neo-Kantianism,  615 

Fiske,  John,  569  note  f ,  5S2 


INDEX. 


641 


Flint,  R.,  17,  54S  note,  563  note  * 

Fludd,  R.,  29 

Flügel,  532.  536 

Forberg,  421,  423 

Forge,  L.  de  la,  111  note,  113 

Fortlage,  Karl,  389  note  f,  399,  442, 
597,  615  ;  works  by,  16,  53S  note  ; 
system  of,  513-515 

Fouillee,  A.,  563 

Fowler,  Thos.,  69  note,  155  note, 
199  note 

Fox  Bourne,  154  note,  156  note 

Franchi,  A.,  551 

Franck,  A.,  39  note  *,  552  note  * 

Franck,  Sebastian,  52 

Francke,  296 

Frantz,  K.,  466  note 

Fräser,  A.  C,  155  note,  214 

Frauenstädt,  J.,  446  note  f,  53S, 
546 

Frederichs,  F.,  330 

Frederick  the  Great,  251,  296 

Freedom  of  the  Will,  Hobbes's  denial 
of,  75;  Descartes's  unlimited  af- 
firmation of,  106-107;  denied  by 
Spinoza,  131,  133;  Locke  on,  176- 
177;  affirmed  by  Berkeley,  219; 
denied  by  Hume,  232;  in  Rous- 
seau, 263;  Leibnitz  on,  285-286; 
Herder  on,  313-314;  Kant  on, 
375,  377,  39!-392;  Fichte  011,420, 
427,  436-437;  Schelling  on,  461 
seq.,  Heibart  on,  525,  530;  Scho- 
penhauer on,  539,  544,  545;  J.  S. 
Mill  on,  56S.  See  also  Character, 
the  Intelligible;  Determinism 

Frege,  G.,  621  note  f 

Freudenthal,  J.,  10  note,  63,  118 

Fries,  A.  de,  155  note 

Fries,  J.  F.,  and  Kant,  340;  an  op- 
ponent of  constructive  idealism, 
505;  his  system,  506-509;  and 
llerbart,  525 

Froschammer,  601 

Fuller  ton,  G.  S.,  117  note  f 

Gabler,  588 

( rale,  1 56  note- 


Galileo  (Galileo  Galilei),  32,  57,  72, 
80,  175,  182;  his  work  as  a  founda- 
tion for  modern  physics,  56;  his 
system,  58-60 

Galluppi,  P.,  550 

Galton,  Francis,  580 

Garve,  C.,  303,  331 

Gassendi,  P.,  29,  57,  60-61,  72,  S7 

Gauss,  621 

Gay,  1  S3 

Geijer,  E.  G.,  5S3 

Geil,  156  note 

Genovesi,  A.,  549 

Gentilis,  Albericus,  42,  43 

George,  L.,  4S6 

George  of  Trebizond,  27 

Georgius  Scholarius  (Gennadius),  27 
note 

Gerdil,  S.,  54S 

Gerhardt,  269 

Gerson,  39 

Gersonides,  118 

Geulincx,  Arnold,  no,  111-116,  143, 
218 

Gichtel,    53 

Gierke,  O.,  25  note  f,  39  note  *,  623 

Gilbert,  William,  64 

Gioberti,  V.,  550,  551 

Gioja,  M.,  550 

Gizycki,  G.  von,  199  note,  231  note, 
5S2 

Glanvil,  224  note 

Glisson,  Francis,  270  note 

Glogau,  G.,  88  note,  623 

God,  doctrine  of,  in  Nicolas  of  Cusa, 
20-24  ;  >n  Taurellus,  31-32  ;  in 
Hruno,  35,  36;  Campanella's  argu- 
ment for  the  existence  of,  37;  Wei- 
gel's  doctrine  of,  52-53;  Böhme  s 
doctrine  of,  53,  54,  55;  Descai; 
arguments  for  the  existence  of,  92- 
94  ;  Spinoza's  doctrine  of,  123 
seq. ;  Malebram  he's  view  of,  1  \i> 
•■<</.;  Locke's  doctrine  of,  150,  163, 
168-169;  Berkeley  ascribes  ideas 
of  sense-world  to,  217  seq. ;  Hume's 
dot  ti  ine  of,  229  231  ;  Voltaire's 
doctrine  of,  245  ;    Hoi  bach's  dis- 


642 


INDEX. 


cussion  of,  255  sit/.;  Leibnitz's 
doctrine  of,  273,  276-277,  287  seq.; 
Reimarus's  doctrine  of,  304  ;  Les- 
sing's  doctrine  of,  305-306  ;  Her- 
der's doctrine  of,  311  ;  Jacobi's 
doctrine  of,  313-314  ;  Kant  on  the 
arguments  for  the  existence  of, 
325,  37S  seq.,  393-394,  412  ; 
Fichte's  doctrine  of,  419,  421-422, 
441  sc-./. ;  Schelling's  doctrine  of, 
462  set/  ,  466-467;  F.  Krause's  doc- 
trine of,  471-472  ;  Baader's  doc- 
trine of,  473-475;  Schleiermacher's 
doctrine  of,  478  seq.;  Beneke's 
doctrine  of,  513  ;  Herbart's  doc- 
trine of,  531-532  ;  Böstrom's  doc- 
trine of,  5S3-584;  the  doctrine  of, 
in  Hegel's  School,  5S8  seq. ; 
Strauss's  doctrine  of,  590-592  ; 
Feuerbach's  doctrine  of,  594-595  ; 
the  doctrine  of,  in  the  Theistic 
School,  596-597  ;  Fechner  on  the 
relation  of  God  and  the  world,  602- 
603  ;  Lotze's  doctrine  of,  607,  608; 
Hartmann's  doctrine  of,  613-614. 
See  also  Cosmological  Argument, 
Deism,  Ontological  Argument, 
Religion,  Teleological  Argument, 
Theology 

Göhring,  C,  61S  note  % 

Golther,  L.  von,  610  note 

Göschel,  588 

Goethe,  28,  265,  413,  414,  537 

Gottsched,  300 

Gracian,  B.,  301,  53S 

Grazia,  V.  de,  550 

Green,  T.  H.,  works  by,  155  note, 
332,  566  note,  569  note  f  ;  doctrine 
of,  564,  5S0-5S1 

Grimm,  E.,  17,  88  note,  114 

Grimm,  F.  M.,  Baron  von,  255 

Groos,  K.,  466  note,  627 

Grot,  N.  von,  5S6 

Grote,  John,  569  note* 

Grotius,  Hugo,  40,  42,  44-45,  46,  47 
note  f,  1S4 

Grubbe,  S.,  5S3 

Gruber,  H.,  562  note  * 


Grün,  K.,  593  note 
Guhrauer,  269  note 
Günther,  A.,  600 
Gutberiet,  C.,  600  note 
Guthrie,  M.,  569  note  \ 
Güttier,  C,  469  note  * 
Guyau,  J.  M.,  563,  564  note 
Gwinner,  W.,  53S  note 

Haeckel,  E.,  621  note  \,  622 

Haeghen,  V.  van  der,  112  note  f 

Hagemann,    600  note 

Hall,  G.  S.,  5S2 

Hallier,  509 

Hamann,  J.  G.,  310 

Hamann,  O.,  621  note  * 

Hamberger,  53  note  f ,  473  note 

Hamilton,  Sir  William,  563,  564, 
570,  571,  579 

Harless,  A.  von,  53  note  f 

Harmony ,  Leibnitz's  pre-established, 
274-276  ;  Wolff's  development  of 
Leibnitz's,  pre-established,  297 

Harms,  F.,  16,  424  note,  442,  597 

Harris,  W.  T.,  4S8  note,  582 

Harrison,  Frederic,  562 

Hartenstein,   G.,  283  note,   329,  516 

Hartley,  David,  181,  183-184 

Hartmann,  E.  von,  17,  587,  624  ; 
works  by,  17,  330,  466  note,  488 
note,  600  note  *,  627  ;  system  of, 
609-614 

Harvey,  101 

Hase,  K.  A.,  421  note 

Hassbach,  207  note 

Hausegger,  F.  von,  546 

Hausrath,  590  note  f 

Havet,  144  note 

Haym,  R.,  310  note,  431  note,  488 
note,  542 

Hazard,  R.  G.,  5S1 

Heath,   65 

Hebler,  C,  330,  566  note 

Heereboord,  118 

Hegel,  G.  W.  F.,  3,  5,  7,  84,  127,  284, 
291,  305,  356  note,  39S,  433,  455 
note,  482;  and  Schelling,  445, 
446,  457,  468  ;  system  of,  4S7-504  ; 


INDEX. 


643 


opponents  of,  505  seq.,  536,  600, 
615  ;  influence  and  followers  of, 
515,  546,  562,  564,  580,  5S2,  587 
seq.,  609,  623,  624,  632-633.  See 
also  J.  G.  Fichte,  Kant,  Schelling 

Hegelians,  the  Old,  5S8,  589;  the 
Young,  588,  5S9.  See  also  Semi- 
Hegelians 

Hegler,  A.,  330 

Heiland,  K.,  33  note 

Heinze,  M.,  15,  SS  note,  303,  615 
note  f,  628 

Helmholtz,  IL,  604  note*,  615,  621, 
622  note  * 

Helmont,  F.  M.  van,  29,  269  note  f 

Helmont,  J.  B.    van,  29,  33  note 

Helvetius,  C.  A.,   242,  250-251,  254, 

255 

Hemming,  47 

Hemsterhuis,  F.,  5S5 

Herbart,  J.  F.,  7,  510,  511,  512,  538 
note,  624,  632  ;  system  of,  505, 
506,  507,  516-535.  See  also  J.  G. 
Fichte 

Herbert,  Lord,  of  Cherbury,  45,  79- 
80,  156  note,  187 

Herder,  J.  G.,  47,  260,  309,  314,  328, 
484;  system  of,  310-312  ;  Schell- 
ing and,  447,449.  450.  46i 

Hering,  604  note  * 

Hermann,  C,  627 

Hermann,  W.,  62S 

Hermes,  G.,  509 

Herz,  M.,  327 

Heusde,  P.  W.  van,  585 

Heussler,  II.,  65  note  *,  121  note, 
628 

Heyder,   Karl,   424  note,  446    note, 

597 

Hinneberg,  627 

Hinrichs,  589 

Hirnhaym,    293 

History,  Machiavelli  on,  42  ;  Her- 
der's philosophy  of,  311  ;  Kant's 
view  of,  399;  Fichte 's  view  of,  440- 
441  ;  Schilling's  view  of,  456,  (62, 
464,  466-467  ;  F.  Krause's  philo 
phy    of,   472  ;   Hegel's   philosopl  y 


of,  499-501  ;  Vico's  philosophy  of, 

54S-549 

History  of  Philosophy,  the,  impor- 
tance of,  1-4  ;  method  in,  4-6  ; 
Hegel's  view  of,  503-504  ;  recent 
development  of,  582,  625,  626 

Hobbes,  Thomas,  14,  39,  40,  57,  62, 
SS,  1S2,  184,  195,  204,  241  ;  his 
system,  71-79  ;  and  Descartes,  80, 
Si,  87  ;  and  Spinoza,  134,  141  ; 
and  Locke,  175  ;  and  Hume,  235  ; 
and   Pufendorf,   293 

Höffding,  H.,  563  note  \,  583  note, 
5S4,  5S5,  622 

Hoffmann,  Franz,  424  note,  4-3 

Höijer,  B.,  583 

Holbach,  Baron  von,  1S4,  242,  254- 
258 

Holder,  A.,  330 

Hölderlin,  445 

Home,  Henry,  (Lord  Karnes,)  239- 
240 

Horväih,  C.,  586 

Horwicz,  A.,  622,  626 

Hotho,  589 

Huber,  J.,  597,  610  note 

Huber,  U.,  40  note  * 

Huei(ius),  P.  D.,  51,  149 

Hufeland,  414 

Hume,  David,  Si,  94,  181,  194,  207, 
241,  312,  5S0,  618,  629,  631;  sys- 
tem of,  220-236;  and  Scottish 
School,  237  seq. ;  and  Kant,  323, 
332  note,  357,  416.  Seealso  Berke- 
ley, Locke 

Hunt,  J.,  184  note  f 

Husserl,  E.  G.,  621  note  f 

Hutcheson,  Francis,  204-206,  237 

Huxley,  T.  IL,  221  notef,  621 
note  * 

Ibbot,  189 

Idealism,  phenomenal  or  indiviilu.il 
of  Berkeley,  214-220;  in  Leibnitz, 
270,  2S1;  critical  or  transcen- 
dental, of  Kant,  33S  seq.,  31?.  368i 
419,  424  seq.;  post-Kantian,  <>f 
Beck,    417;    subjective,  of    Fichte, 


('44 


INDEX. 


419,  42  '  seq. ;  objective,  of  Schill- 
ing, 44S  seq.;  absolute  or  logical, 
of  Hegel,  4S9  seq. ;  the  opposition 
tc  constructive,  505  seq. ;  in  Scho- 
penhauer, 538  seq. ;  German,  in 
Great  Britain,  5S0-5S1;  of  Green, 
580-551;  in  America,  5S1-5S2; 
ethical  or  teleological,  of  Lotze, 
606  seq.\  idealistic  reaction  in  Ger- 
many against  the  scientific  spirit, 
622  seq. ;  Falckenberg  on  (ethical) 
idealism  and  the  future,  632-633 

Ideas,  innate,  in  Descartes,  Locke, 
Leibnitz,  the  rationalists  and  the 
empiricists,  92,  155-157»  2S3-285, 
315;  origin  of,  in  Descartes,  Locke, 
Berkeley,  Hume,  the  rationalists 
and  empiricists,  and  Herbart,  92, 
157  seq  ,  217-219,  222,  315  seq., 
526  seq.;  impressions  and, in  Hume, 
222;  unconscious  ideas  or  repre- 
sentations in  Leibnitz,  271  seq., 
283  seq.,  285;  Ideas  of  reason  in 
Kant,  371  seq.,  381-383,  391  seq. ; 
the  logical  Idea  the  subject  of  the 
world-process  in  Hegel,  489  seq. 

Identity,  Locke  on,  164,  169;  Spino- 
zism  a  system  of,  127  seq. ;  Spell- 
ing's philosophy  or  system  of ,  447, 
456  seq.;  the  philosophy  of,  among 
Schelling's  followers,  470-472; 
Hegel's  doctrine  a  system  of,  490 
seq.;  Fortlage's  system  of,  515; 
philosophy  of,  in  Schopenhauer, 
540 

Immortality,  Hume  on,  227;  Vol- 
taire on,  245;  Rousseau  on,  263; 
Leibnitz  on,  271,  282;  Kant  on, 
374,  393;  Schleiermacher  on,  480; 
Beneke  on,  512;  Herbart  on,  525; 
Hegel's  followers  on,  5S8;  Strauss 
on,  591;  Fechner  on,  603 

Imperative,  the  Categorical,  in  Kant, 
384^.;  in  Fichte,  426,  42S,  436; 
in  Beneke,  513 

Induction,  Kepler  on,  57;  Galileo  on, 
59;  used  before  Bacon,  64;  Bacon's 
theory  of,  66-70;  in    Hobbes,    73; 


J.  S.    Mill's   theory   of,    564,    566- 
56S 
I r wing,  Von,  303 

Jacobi,  F.  H.,  117,  237,  302  note  f , 
305,  416,  446,  4S7,  62S;  system  of, 
226  note,  310,  312-314;  and  Fichte, 
425,429,437  note;  and  the  anti- 
idealists,  505,  507,  510 

Jacobson,  J.,  330 

Jäger,  G.,  621  note  \ 

James,  William,  582,  605  note 

Janet,  Paul,  552  note  *,  563 

Jansenists,  143 

Jastrow,  J.,  605  note 

Jesuits,  47 

Jevons,  W.  S. ,  566  note,  579 

Jhering,  R.  von,  625 

Jodl,  F.,  16,  221  note,  446  note  4% 
582 

Joel,  M.,  118 

Jouffroy,  T.,  562 

Judgment,  Descartes  on,  106-107; 
rationalists  and  empiricists  both 
mistake  nature  of,  319-320;  Kant 
on  synthetic  judgments  a  priori, 
333  seq.,  339;  the  categories  and, 
in  Kant,  355  seq.;  judgments  of 
perception  and  of  experience  in 
Kant,  359;  Kant  on  aesthetic  and 
teleological,  400  seq. 

Jungius,  293 

Kaatz,  H.,  547  note  f 

Kaftan,  J.,  62S 

Kaltenborn,  C.  von,  47  note  \ 

Kant,  I.,  84,  S5,  94,  114,  116,  235, 
265,  2S5,  303,  482;  position  in 
modern  philosophy,  6,  7,  632-633; 
and  Locke,  160,  174;  and  the  Illu- 
mination, 309-310;  system  of,  315— 
414;  the  development  to  Fichte,  414 
-418;  and  Fichte,  419-444  passim; 
and  Schelling,  446-455  passim;  and 
Hegel,  487,  492;  and  Schopen- 
hauer, 538-539;  his  influence,  fol- 
lowers, and  opponents,  312,  313, 
476>  505-535 passim,  563,564,  580, 


INDEX. 


645 


5S2,  60S,  610,  614  seq.  See  also 
Berkeley,  Critique  of  Reason,  J. 
G.  Fichte,  Hume,  Leibnitz,  Locke, 
Schopenhauer,  Wolff 

Kayserling,  302  note  % 

Kedney,  J.  S.,  4SS  note 

Kent,  G.,  5S4 

Kepler,  J.,  32,  35,  56,  72,  1S2,  293, 
4S7;    philosophy  of,  57-58 

Kielmeyer,  447,  451 

Kierkegaard,  S.,  585 

Kieser,  40S 

King,  Lord,  154  note 

Kirchmann,  J.  H.  von,  601 

Kirchner,  17 

Klein,  G.  M.,  46S 

Knauer,   V.,  16,  600 

Knight,  \V.,  221   note  f 

Knoodt,  P.,  600 

Knowledge,  theory  of,  in  modern 
thought,  10-11,  630  seq. ;  doctrine 
of,  in  Nicolas  of  Cusa,  20-22;  de- 
clared deceptive  by  Montaigne, 
48-49;  mathematical  basis  of,  in 
Kepler  and  Galileo,  5S,  60  ;  in 
Bacon,  66-68;  in  Hobbes,  73-75; 
in  Herbart,  79;  the  two  views  of, 
80  seq.,  315  seq. ;  Geulincx  on, 
1 14-1 15;  Descartes  on,  128  seq. ; 
Spinoza  on,  131  seq. ;  Malebranche 
on  ("we  see  all  things  in  God"), 
145  seq. ;  Locke's  doctrine  of,  155 - 
176;  Berkeley  on,  214  seq.;  Hume's 
skeptical  doctrine  of,  221  seq.; 
Scottish  doctrine  of,  237-239;  sen- 
sationalistic  doctrine  of,  in  France, 
245-251;  Leibnitz's  theory  of,  282- 
285;  Kant  on,  321  seq.,  333  seq., 
341-3S3;  Fichte's  Science  of,  424 
seq.;  Schelli  ng's  philosophy  of, 
448,  454  seq.,  459-460;  Baader  on, 
473-474 ;  Schleiermacher's  doctrine 
of,  477. wv/.;  Hegel  on  philosoph- 
ical, 492  ./. ;  J.  F.  Fries's  doctrine 
of,  507^7/.;  Benckeon  speculative, 
510;  Schopenhauer's  doctrine  of, 
538  seq.;  Comte's  doctrine  of,  553 
seq. ;  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton's. doctrine 


of,  564;  J.  S.  Mill's  doctrine  of, 
566  seq. ;  Spencer's  doctrine  of, 
569  seq. ;  T.  H.  Green's  doctrine 
of,  5S0;  Feuerbach's  doctrine  of, 
593-594;  Lotze's  doctrine  of,  60S- 
609;  Hartmann's  doctrine  of,  610 
seq.;  the  neo-Kantians  on,  615- 
61S;  the  German  positivists  on, 
61 S  seq.;  influence  of  recent  science 
on  the  theory  of,  615,  620,  622; 
Liebmann's  doctrine  of,  615,  624- 
625.  See  also  Agnosticism,  Cri- 
itque  of  Reason,  Empiricism,  Faith, 
Faith  and  Reason,  Nominalism, 
Positivism,  Rationalism  and  Em- 
piricism, Relativity,  Sensational- 
ism, Skepticism 

Knutzen,  M.,  300 

Koch,  A.,  103  note 

Koeber,  R.  von,  17,  53S  note,  610 
note 

Koegel,  F.,  606  note 

König,  E.,  17,  562  note  f,  61S 

Koppelmann,  330,  618 

Köstlin,    Karl    424    note,    4S8   note, 

5S9 
Krause,  A.,  329,  331,  617 
Krause,  E.,  621  note  \ 
Krause,  F.,  46S,  471-472,  515,  583 
Krauth,  C.  P.,  214  note 
Krohn,  A.,    557   note,   5S7   note,   606 

note,  629 
Kroman,  K.,  585 
Krug,  W.  T.,  516 
Kuhn,  17 

Kuntze,  J.  E.,  602  note 
Kvacsala,  29  note 
Kym,  A.  L.,  424  note,  601 

I  .i.i  ,  E.,  330,  618-619 

Laban,  F.,  53S  note 

Labriola,  550 

La  Bruyere,  250  note 

Ladd,  G.  T.,  582,  605  note 

Laffitte,  P.,  562 

Lagrange,  254 

Lambert,  J.  II.,  300,  333  note  f 

Lamennais,  F,  '!<■,  562 


646 


INDEX. 


La  Mettr  i,  J.  O.  de,  242,   250  note, 

251-253,  254 
La  Mothe  lc  Vayer,  51,  149 

Land,  J.  P.  N.,  112  note  f,  117,  5S5, 
5S6 

Lange,  F.  A.,  17,  150,  514,  615-616 

Lange,  J.  J.,  296 

La  Rochefoucauld,  250  note 

Lasson,  A.  51  note,  424  note,  589 

Lasswitz,  K.,  27  note  f,  331.  61S 

Last,  E.,  331 

Lavater,  420 

Law  (or  Right),  early  philosophy  of, 
39-4S;  Montesquieu  on,  243-244; 
Pufendorf  on,  293-294;  C.  Tho- 
masius  on,  294;  Kant's  theory  of 
legal  right,  39S;  Fichte's  theory 
of  right,  437  seq. ;  Schelling's  view 
of,  455;  F.  Krause's  philosophy 
of  right,  472;  Hegel's  philosophy 
of  right,  49S 

Lazarus,  M.,  536,  623 

Lechler,  1S4  note  % 

Leclair,  A.  von,  619-620 

Leibnitz,  Friedrich  (the  father),  267 

Leibnitz,  G.  W.,  7,  19  note,  24,  32, 
35,  47,  96,  120,  181  note,  220,  246, 
254,  447,  476,  505,  549.  5S3,  60S; 
position  in  modern  thought,  6,  Si, 
85,  630  note,  631;  and  occasion- 
alism, 109,  113,  274-275;  system 
of,  266-292;  and  the  Illumination 
(Wolff,  Lessing),  295-305  passim; 
and  Kant,  316,  323,  324,  332  note, 
333  notef,  369.  See  also  Descartes, 
Locke,  Spinoza 

Leonhardi,  II.  K.  von,  472 

Leopold,  5S3 

Lessing,  G.  E.,  47,  288,  304  note, 
396,  45S,  461;  system  of,  305-310 

Lewes,  G.  H.,  16,  569  note  f,  579, 
580 

Liard,  L.,  579  note 

Liberatore,  M.,  552 

Lichtenberg,  303 

Liebig,  599 

Liebmann,  O.,  370  note  *,  428  note, 
615,  624-625 


Linde,  A.  van  der,  117  note  % 

Lindemann,  472 

Lipps,  T.,  626 

Lipsius,  Justus,  29 

Lipsius,  R.  A.,  39S,  516  note,  628 

Littre,  E.,  561,  562 

Locke,  J.,  14S  note,  189,  193,  199, 
204,  236,  301,  511,  549,  580,  581. 
583;  position  in  modern  philoso- 
phy, 6,  14,  Si,  83,  85,  631;  system 
of,  153-180;  and  Berkeley,  214 
seq. ;  and  Hume,  221-222,  236; 
and  the  French  Illumination  (and 
Rousseau),  241-262  passim;  and 
Leibnitz,  266,  268,  282  seq.;  and 
Kant,  332  note,  369.  See  also 
Bacon,  Berkeley,  Descartes,  Em- 
piricism, Kant 

Lohmeyer,  35  note  * 

Lombroso,  C.,  552 

Lossius,  303 

Lott,  F.  C.,  424  note 

Lotze,  R.  H.,  17,  330,  490,  522,  528, 
597  note  *,  621,  626,  633;  system 
of,    5S7,  601-602,  605-609 

Löwe.  J.  H.,  SS  note,  424  note 

Lubbock,  J.,  580 

Liilmann,  C.,  13S,  note  * 

Luther,  17,  47,  51-52 

Lutterbeck,  473  note 

Lyng,  G.  V.,  5S4 

Macaulay,  T.  B.,  64 

Machiavelli,  N.,  3S,  40-42,  47 

Mackie,  269  note  * 

Mackintosh,  J.,  564 

Mahaffy,  J.  P.,  S9  note 

Maimon,  S.,  416-417 

Maimonides,  11S 

Mainländer,  P.,  546 

Mainzer,  J.,  330 

Maistre,  J.  de,  562 

Malebranchc,    Nicolas,  84,  110,  174, 

218,  54S;  system  of    144-14S 
Mamiani,  T.,  551-552 
Mandeville,    Bernard  de,    196,   202- 

203 
Mansel,  H.  L.,  564,  570,  571,  579 


INDEX. 


647 


Marcus,  445  note 

Marheineke,   5S9 

Mariana,  Juan,  47-4S 

Mariano,  552 

Marion,  H.,  270  note 

Marsh,  James,  581 

Marsilius  of  Padua,  39 

Martin,  B. ,  471  note 

Martineau,  Harriet,  553 

Martineau,  James,  117  note  f,  580 

Martini,  Jacob,  11S 

Masson,  David.  564  note 

Materialism,  in  Hcbbes,  72,  73; 
Spinoza's  tendency  toward,  130;  in 
the  early  associationalists,  183- 
1S4  ;  in  France  in  XVIII.  cen- 
tury, 251-260;  Kant  on,  374-375; 
in  Schopenhauer,  541-542;  and 
Spencer's  philosophy,  573-574;  in 
Strauss,  592-593 ;  of  Feuerbach, 
592-595;  the  controversy  over,  in 
Germany,  598-599  ;  Lange  on, 
615,  616 

Mathematics,  the  philosophical  use 
of,  advocated  by  Nicolas  of  Cusa, 
22,  by  Kepler,  57-58;  scientific 
use  of,  ignored  by  Bacon,  70; 
Hobbes's  recognition  of,  72,  74; 
method  of,  adopted  by  Spinoza, 
121-122;  Kant  on  philosophy  and, 
325  seq.,  334  seq,  343  seq. ;  Kant  on 
science  and,  366-367;  applied  to 
psychology  by  Herbart,  528  seq., 
and  by  Fechner,  603-604;  recent, 
and  philosophy,  621 

Maudsley,  Henry,  580 

Maupertuis,   242,  251 

Mayer,  F.,  537 

Mayer,  R.,  620 

McCosh,  J.,  237  note,  565 

Mechanism,  in  modern  thought,  8, 
630  seq. ;  in  modern  physical 
science,  56-57,  181-182;  the  cen- 
tral doctrine  of  Hobbes,  72;  fun- 
damental in  Spinoza,  122  seq.;  ap- 
plied to  mind  by  the  asso<  iational- 
ists,  183-184;  of  J.  F.  Fries,  508; 
<>f  ideas  in  Herbart,  527,  529  seq.; 


in  Lotze,  60S;  in  recent  physical 
science,  620-621.  See  also  Natu- 
ralism, Physical  Science,  Tele- 
ology 

Meier,  G.  F.,  299 

Meiners,  303,  414 

Melancthon,  47 

Mellin,  332 

Melville,  Andrew,  63 

Mendelssohn,  302,  303 

Mersenne,  61,  72,  S7 

Merz,  J.  T.,  269  note  * 

Metaphysics,  Bacon  on,  6S  note;  of 
Descartes,  88  seq. ;  of  Spinoza, 
119  seq.\  of  Leibnitz,  269  seq.;  the 
Wolffian  division  of,  29S;  Kant 
on,  325  seq.,  333  seq.,  340  seq. ; 
Hegel  on,  491  seq.,  495  seq.;  of 
Fortlage,  515;  of  Herbart,  517,  51S 
seq.,  535;  Comte  on,  553  seq.;  of 
Fechner,  602-603;  of  Lotze,  606 
seq. ;  of  Hartmann,  610  seq.;  re- 
cent German  views  on,  624 

Meyer,  J.  B.,  330,  424  note,  599,  615 

Meyer,  Ludwig,  1 17 

Michelet,  C.  L.,  16,  589 

Michelis,  600  note 

Mill,  James,  184,  566 

Mill,  J.  S.,  69  note  *,  560,  562,  563, 
564  note  *,  566-569,  579,  618 

Milton,  John,  179 

Mind  and  Body,  Descartes  on,  95— 
96,  101  seq.,  108  seq.;  occasional- 
istic  view  of,  in  Geulincx,  10S  seq, ; 
Spinoza  on,  122-123,  12S  seq.; 
Hartley  and  Priestley  on,  1S3-1S4; 
Leibnitz  on,  275,  2S0  seq. ;  J.  F. 
Fries  on,  508-509 

Modern  Philosophy,  value  of  history 
of,  6—7;  characteristics  of,  7-12; 
relation  to  the  church,  11,  12;  re- 
lation  to  nationality,  13;  begin 
nings  of,  14;  bibliography  of,  15- 
17;  two  main  schools  of,  So-85, 
266,  31  5  seq. ;  future  ol 

(Oi     Sill!-!. ui(  <■  i,    in    I  )cs<  ai 

95;  in  Spinoza,  [28  req.;  in  Locke, 
102,  [65-166 


64S 


INDEX. 


Moleschott,  599 

Monads,  Giordano  Bruno's  doctrine 
°f>  35.  3°:  Leibnitz's  doctrine  of, 
269  seq. ;  Wolff's  development  of 
Leibnitz's  doctrine  of,  297 

Monchamp,  G.,  10S  note 

Monck,  W.  H.  S.,  564  note  f 

Monrad,  M.  J.,  5S4 

Montaigne,  M.  de,  14,  48-49,  143 

Montesquieu,  180,241,242,  243-244, 
262 

More,  H.,  156  note 

More,  Thomas,  42 

Moreau,  260  note 

Morel lv,  242 

Morgan,  C.  L.,  5S0 

Morgan,  Thomas,  192-193 

Moriz,  303 

Morley,  J.,  243  note  *,  553  note 

Morris,  G.  S.,  332,  4SS  note,  564 
note,  582 

Morselli,  552 

Mueller,  W.,  29  note 

Müller,  F.  A.,  604  note* 

Müller,  G.  E.,  604  note* 

Müller,  H.,  in  note 

Müller,  Johannes,  620 

Müller,  Max,  329 

Münsterberg,  H.,  626 

Münz,  W.,  331 

Nahlowsky,  536 

Naigeon,  254 

Natge,  69  note 

Natorp,   P.,  57  note  *,    59   note,    60 

note  f,  598,  618,  629 
Naturalism,  characteristic  of  modern 

philosophy,     12,    45-47,    630    seq. 

See     also      Mechanism,      Physical 

Science,  Teleology 
Nature,  Philosophy  of,  early  Italian, 

33  Scq.\  Schelling's,  447,  448  seq.; 

among  Schelling's  followers,  46S- 

470;     Hegel's,      496-497;     J.     F. 

Fries's,    50S;    Herbart's,    530-531. 

See  also  Physical  Science 
Nedich,  579  note 
Nees  von  Esenbeck,  468 


Nemes,  E.,  586 

Neo-Kantians,     587,     610,     614-C18, 

632 
Nettleship,  R.  L.,  580 
Neudecker,  600  note 
Newton,     Isaac,    32,     175,     181-183, 

268,  324,  326,  332  note,   452 
Nichol,  65  note  f 
Nicolai,  F.,  303,  414-415 
Nicolas  of  Cusa,  15,    18,    19-26,   36, 

39 

Nicole,  143 

Nielsen,  R.,  585 

Niethammer,  421 

Nietzsche,  F.,  546-547 

Niphus,  30 

Nippold,  486 

Nizolius,  Marius,  29 

Noack,  L.,  17 

Noire,  L.,  601 

Nolen,  331 

Nominalism,  in  Hobbes,  72-75;  in 
Locke,  161;  of  Berkeley,  215-217; 
of  Hume,  221 

Noumena,  36S-371.  See  also  Phe- 
nomena, Things  in  themselves 

Novalis,  4S4 

Nyblaeus,  A.,  5S3 

Occam,  39 

Occasionalists,  10S-116,  120,  122, 
14S,    153,   630 

Oischinger,  16,  600  note 

Oken,  L.,  459,  468,  469 

Oldendorp,  47 

Ontological  argument,  the,  in  Des- 
cartes, 93;  in  Spinoza,  125;  in 
Leibnitz,  288;  in  Kant,  379,  3S0 

Opel,  J.  O.,  53  note  * 

Opposites,  the  unity  of,  in  Nicolas 
of  Cusa,  20  seq. ;  in  Schelling,  456 
seq.;  the  reconciliation  and  iden- 
tity of,  in  Hegel,  491  seq. 

Optimism,  in  Voltaire,  245;  of  Leib- 
nitz, 275-277,  289  seq. ;  of  Schlei- 
ermacher, 480 

Opzoomer,  C.  W. ,  5S5-586 

Oratorians,  144,  145 


INDEX. 


649 


Oersted,  H.  C,  584-585 
Oswald,  James,  239 
Oettingen,  A.  von,  622 

Pabst,  J.  H.,  600 

Paley,  W.,  213 

Pantheism,  of  Nicolas  of  Cusa,  23- 
24;  of  Spinoza,  119,  123  seq.; 
Malebranche's  "Christian,"  14S; 
in  Toland,  1SS-189;  Berkeley's 
tendency  to,  21S-219;  of  Holbach, 
256-257;  in  Fichte,  441  seq. ;  in 
Schelling,  456  seq.,  461  seq.  ;  in 
Schleiermacher,  479-480;  Fort- 
lage'stranscendent,5i5;  of  Strauss, 
591-592;  the  theistic  school  on, 
596,  597.  See  also  Hegel,  Pan- 
thelism 

Panthelism,  of  Fichte,  419,  428  seq., 
434  seq.;  in  Schelling,  449,  455, 
463;  of  Schopenhauer,  540  seq. 
See  also  Ethelism 

Pappenheim,  29  note 

Paracelsus,  27-29,  33  note,  52,  473 

Parker,  156  note 

Pascal,  Blaise,  84,  143-144 

Patritius,  Franciscus,  34 

Paulsen,  F.,  330,  332,  616-617,  D27 

Paulus,  446  note  f 

Pertz,  269 

Pessimism,  of  Schopenhauer,  543 
seq.;  of  Hartmann,  609,  611  seq. 

Pesch,  600  note 

Pestalozzi,  J.  H.,  303,  420,  516 

Peters,  K.,  538,  note,  546 

Pfleiderer,  E.,  113,  389  note  f,  629 

Pfleiderer,  O.,  16,  398,  564  note, 
610  note,  628 

Phenomena,  and  things  in  them- 
selves in  Kant,  335,  345-354.  36S- 
371,  375-377,  382-3s3l  and  repre- 
sentation in  Kant,  345-354,  364; 
and  things  in  themselves  in  Hcr- 
bart,  352,  51S  seq.,  535;  in  Scho- 
penhauer, 538  seq. ;  in  Lotze,  352, 
607,  608.  See  also  Noumena, 
Things  in  themselves 

Physical  Science,  concepts  of  mod- 


ern, 56-57;  Newton's  develop- 
ment of,  181-182;  its  influence  on 
philosophy  in  XIX  century,  620— 
622 

Pico,  Francis,  of  Mirandola,  27 

Pico,  John,  of  Mirandola 

Pierson,  586 

Pietsch,  T.,  1S0  note 

Planck,  A.,  466  note 

Planck,  K.  C,  600  note  * 

Platner,  303 

Platonists,  26-29 

Pletho,  G.  G.,  26,  27 

Plitt,  446  note  % 

Ploucquet,  300 

PlUmacher,  O.,  610  note 

Poiret,  P.,  14S-149,  1S2  note 

Pollock,  F.,  117  note  f 

Pomponatius,  Petrus,  30 

Porter,  N.,  332,  564  note,  565,  5S1 
note 

Positivism,  in  Italy,  552;  of  Comte, 
552-561;  of  Comte's  followers, 
561-562;  in  England,  562,  579;  in 
Sweden,  Brazil,  and  Chili,  562;  in 
Germany,  618  seq. 

Prantl,  629 

Prel,  K.  du,  621  note  X 

Price,  Richard,  183  note  f 

Priestley,  J.,  183,  1S4 

Prowe,  L.,  35  note  * 

Psychology,  the  associational,  183- 
184,  566,  569;  the  sensationalistic, 
245-249;  of  Leibnitz,  2S2  seq.;  of 
Wolff,  298;  of  Tetens,  303;  Kant 
on  rational,  373-375;  constructive, 
433-43-4»  454  St'</-,  497;  the  basis  of 
philosophy  in  J.  F.  Fries,  507,  and 
Beneke,  509^.;  of  Beneke,  510- 
512;  of  Fortlage,  513-515;  of 
Herbart,  525  seq. ;  of  Comte,  557; 
physiological,  526,  5S2,  603-604, 
622,  626;  folk-psychology,  536, 
623;  of  Spencer,  573-575-  See  also 
Ego,  Mind  and  Body,  Soul 

Pufendorf,  Samuel,  40,  293 

Pttnjer,  B.,  works  by,  16,  330,  552 
nolo  f,  560  note,  564  note  * 


650 


INDEX. 


Quaebicker,  R.,  330 

Qualities,  Primary  and  Secondary, 
so  termed  by  Boyle,  62;  Locke's 
doctrine  of,  159;  Kant's  relation 
to,  160;  Berkeley's  co-ordination 
of,  214 

Ouesnay,  242 

Rabus,  L.,  17,  470  note  * 

Ragnisoo,  552 

Ramus  (Pierre  de  la  Ramee),  30 

Rationalism  and  Empiricism,  %oseq., 
315  seq.;  in  Locke,  173-175;  in 
Leibnitz,  266,  282-285;  in  Tschirn- 
hausen,  295;  in  others  of  the  Ger- 
man Illuminati,  300,  301;  in  rela- 
tion to  Kant,  315  seq.,  401-402 

Rauwenhoff,  586 

Ravaisson,  F.,  552  note  *,  563 

Realism,  of  Herbart,  517  seq.,  the 
"transfigured,"  of  Spencer,  571, 
575;  the  "  transcendental  realism  " 
of  Hartmann,  610  seq. 

Ree,  P.,  621  note  \ 

Regius,  87,  in 

Regulative  and  constitutive  prin- 
ciples, in  Kant,  372-373,  411 

Rehmke,  J.,  330,  610  note,  619 

Rehnisch,  606  note 

Reichlin-Meldegg,  K.  A.  von,  424 
note,  615 

Reicke,  R.,  328,  330 

Reid,  Thomas,  237-239 

Reiff,  J.  F.,  600  note  * 

Reimarus,  303-305 

Reinhold,  E.,  614 

Reinhold,  K.  L.,  414,  415-416,  421, 
422,  426,  428,  506 

Relativity  of  Knowledge,  in  Comte, 
553  se1-\  °f  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton, 
564,  570,  571;  of  Mansel,  570,  571; 
of  Spencer,  569  seq. 

Religion,  Bacon's  view  of,  71  ; 
Hobbes  on,  77-7S;  Lord  Herbert's 
doctrine  of  natural,  45-47,  79_So  ; 
Pascal  on,  143-144;  deistic  view 
of,  185  seq. ;  Hume  on,  228-231; 
Voltaire  on,  244-245;  Holbach  on, 


255  •*<:/•  I  Rousseau's  view  of,  262- 
265;  Leibnitz  on,  287  seq.;  Rei- 
marus on,  304;  Lessing's  develop- 
mental theory  of,  305  seq. ;  Kant 
on,  394  seq. ;  Fichte  on,  441  seq. ; 
Schelling  on,  460,  466-467  ; 
Schleiermacher's  philosophy  of, 
4S0-484;  Hegel's  philosophy  of, 
502-503;  Beneke  on,  513;  Her- 
bart's  doctrine  of,  531-532  ; 
Schopenhauer's  doctrine  of,  545  ; 
Comte 's  religion  of  humanity,  561; 
Spencer's  view  of,  570  seq.,  575, 
576;  Hegel's  followers  on,  5S8  seq. ; 
Strauss  on,  590  seq.;  Feuerbach's 
doctrine  of,  594-595;  Hartmann's 
philosophy  of,  613-614.  See  also 
Deism,  Faith,  Faith  and  Reason, 
God,  Theology 

Remusat,  C.  de,  63 

Renan,  E.,  563 

Renery,  in 

Renouvier,  C,  563 

Reuchlin,  H.,  144  note 

Reuchlin,  J.,  27 

Reuter,  H.,  10  note 

Reynaud,  J.,  563 

Ribbing,  S.,  583 

Ribot,  Th.,  525  note,  552  note,  563 
564  note 

Riedel,  O.,  330 

Riehl,  A.,  579  note,  61S,  619 

Riemann,  621  * 

Riezler,  S.,  39  note 

Right,  see  Law 

Rio,  J.  S.  del,  471 

Ritschl,  A.,  628 

Ritter,  H.,  15,  486 

Rixner,  33  note,  468 

Robertson,  G.  C,  73  note  f,  580 

Robinet,  561 

Robinet,  J.  B.,  254 

Rocholl,  17 

Roeder,  472 

Rohmer,  F.,  600  note  * 

Romagnosi,  G.,  550 

Romanes,  G.  J.,  580,  621  note  * 

Romanticists,  the,  431  note 


INDEX. 


651 


Romundt,  H.,  331 

Röscher,  625 

Reise,  F.,  600  note  * 

Rosenkrantz,  VW,  600  note 

Rosenkranz,  K.,  253  note,  32g,  446 
note  %,  4S3  note,  5S9 

Rosmini,  A.,  530,  551 

Rothe.  R..  4S6 

Rousseau,  J.  J.,  39,  40,  47,  84,  242, 
243.  332  note;  39S,  43g,  5S3;  Sys- 
tem of,  260-265 

Royce,  J.,  16,  53S  note,  5S2 

Rüdiger,  300-301 

Rüge,  A.,  5S9 

Rüge,  S.,  25  note  * 

Ruysbroek,  51 

Sahlin,  5S3 

St.  Martin,  L.  C,  473 

Saint  Simon,  H.  de,  563 

Saisset,  E.,  SS  note,  563 

Sanchez,  Francis,  50 

Schaarschmidt,  C,  SS  note,  117,  118, 
59S,  629 

Schaffte,  E.  F.,  622 

Schaller,  58g,  59g 

Schärer,  E.,  6co  note  * 

Schasler,  M.,  17,  500  note,  589 

Scheffter,  293 

Scheibler,  11S 

Schelling,  F.  W.  J.  (von),  7,  9,  17, 
84,  340,  433,  505,  506,  516,  600 
note,  608;  system  of,  445-467; 
immediate  followers  of,  465-486 
passim;  and  Hegel,  4S7-504  pas- 
sim, 597.  See  also  J.  G.  Fichte, 
Hegel,  Kant,  Spinoza 

Schelver,  463 

Schematism,  Kant's,  35g  seq. 

Schiller,  40S,  413,  415.  417-41S,  455 
note 

Schindler,  C,  142  note 

S(  hlegel,  F.,  422,  431  note,  475 

Schleicher,  A.,  62 1  note  | 

Schieiden,  50g 

Schleiermacher,  F.  D.  E.,  17,  398, 
422,  460,  506,  510,  589,  597;  system 
of,  475-486 


Schmid,  E.,  332 

Schmid,  Leopold,  516  note,  597 

Schmidkunz,   H.,  626 

Schmid-Schwarzenberg,  30  note 

Schmidt,  K.,  596 

Schmidt,  L.,  629 

Schmidt,  O.,  621  note  \ 

Schneider,  C.  M.,  60c  note 

Schneider,  G.,  629 

Schneider,  G.  II.,  621  note  \ 

Schneider,  O.,  330  ■ 

Schoenlank,  1S3  note  f 

Schopenhauer,    A.,   9,  505,  506,  632; 
and     Kant,    327    note  f,    332,    455 
note;  system  of,  537-545;    follow- 
ers of,  545-547,  609,  624 
Schoppe  (Scioppius),  29 
Schubert,  F.  W.,  329 
Schubert,  G.  IL,  468,  469 
Schubert-Soldern,  R.  von,  620 
Schuller,  H.,  117 
Schultze,  Fritz,  17,  27  note*,  618 
Schulz,  J.,  414 
Schulze, G.  E.  (yEnesidemus-Schulze), 

416,  429,  537 
Schuppe,  W.,  619,  626,  627 
Schurman,  J.  G.,  583 
Schütz,  414 
Schwarz,  H.,  627 
Schwarz,  G.  E.,  305  note  f 
Schwegler,  A.,  17,  589 
Schwenckfeld,  52 
Scottish   School,    the,  236-240,    562, 

564-565,  58 1 
Selby-Bigge,  221  note  f 
Semi-Hegelians,  the,  5S9,  596  seq. 
Scmi-Kantians,  the,  505 
Semler,  305 

Sengler,  J.,  516  note,  597 
Sennert,  D.,  57 

Sensation,  a  source  of  knowledge  in 
Locke,     157    seq. ;     and    in     II  nine. 

222;  the  sole  source  ol  knowledge 
in  Condillai  .  245  seq. ;  Leibnitz's 
view  of,  282-285.  See  a/so  Ration- 
alism and  Empiricism,  Sensation- 
alism 

itionalism,    in    Hobbes,   72-75; 


652 


IXDEX. 


in  modern  thought  in  general,  80 
sti].,  631;  of  Locke,  155  seq. ;  of 
Condillac, 245-249;  of  Bonnet,  249- 
250;  of  Helvetius,  250-251;  of  La 
Mettrie,  252-253;  of  Holbach,  257; 
in  Italy,  550;  of  Feuerbach,  592 
seq. ;  of  the  German  positivists, 
61S  seq.  See  also  Empiricism,  Ex- 
perience, Sensation 

Sergi,  G.,  552 

Seth,  A.,  5S1,  605  note 

Seydel,  R.,  17,  551  note,  597  note* 

Seyfarth,  11 1  note 

Shaftesbury,  1S1,  190,  195,  199-202, 
204,  235,  237,  253,  332  note 

Sherlock,  T.,  190  note 

Sibbern,  F.  C,  585 

Siber,  33  note 

Siciliani,  P.,  552 

Sidgwick,  H.,  16,  580 

Sidney,  Algernon,  179 

Siebeck,  51  note,  629 

Sigwart,  Chr.  von,  17,  65  note,  69 
note  *,  11S,  626,  629 

Sigwart,  Chr.  W.,  16 

Silesius,  293 

Sime,  J.,  306  note 

Simmel,  G.,  627 

Simon,  J.,  563 

Skepticism,  in  Montaigne,  48-49  ; 
in  Charron,  49-50  ;  in  F.  Sanchez, 
50;  in  Bayle,  149  seq.  ;  of  Hume, 
221  seq.,  227-228,  236  ;  of  Diderot, 
251  ;  of  D'Alembert,  253;  the  anti- 
Critical,  of  Schulze,  416  ;  the 
Critical,  of  Maimon,  416-417 

Smith,  Adam,  206-213,  557 

Snell,  K.,  181  note,  599 

Social  Contract,  the  theory  of,  in 
Hobbes,  75-77  ;  Hume  on,  235  ; 
in  Rousseau,  261  ;  Kanton,  339 

Solger,  K.  F.,  468,  470 

Sommer,  H.,  606  note,  610  note 

Sommer,  R.,  156  note 

Soul,  the,  thought  the  essence  of,  in 
Descartes,  95-96  ;  a  congeries  of 
ideas  in  Spinoza,  130  ;  thought 
the  essence    of,   in    Malebranche, 


145  ;  thought  merely  an  activity 
of,  in  Locke,  159  ;  a  sum  of  inner 
states  in  Hume,  227  ;  Leibnitz's 
monadological  view  of,  2S0  seq.  ; 
Kant  on,  35S,  360  note,  372,  373, 
37-1—375  ;  Herbart  on,  525-526. 
See  also  Ego,  Immortality,  Mind 
and  Body 

Space  (and  Time),  Hobbes  on,  73  ; 
in  Leibnitz,  2S1  ;  in  Kant,  341  seq.; 
in  Herbart,  524  ;  in  Schopenhauer, 
540,  541;  in  Spencer,  570,  571-5/2; 
in  Lotze,  608 

Spaventa,  552 

Spedding,  65 

Spencer,  H.,  236,  562,  580,  582;  sys- 
tem of,  563,  564,  569-579 

Spicker,  G.,  305  note  f 

Spinoza,  B.  de,  7,  35,  116,  148,  148 
note,  151  note,  175,  1S8,  254,  305, 
311,  312,  316,  476,  551,  608  ;  posi- 
tion in  modern  philosophy,  81, 
631  ;  and  Descartes,  8S  note,  96, 
105,  109  ;  system  of,  1 16-142  ; 
and  Leibnitz,  266,  269,  269  note  *  ; 
and  Schelling,  447,  457,  460-461. 
See  also  Descartes 

Spirit,  Schelling's  philosophy  of, 
447,  -44S,  454-456  ;  Hegel's  phe- 
nomenology of,  494,  his  doctrine 
of  subjective,  497.^.,  of  objective, 
498  seq.,  of  absolute,  501  seq. ; 
recent  German  philosophy  of, 
623 

Spitta,  H.,  626 

Stadler,  A.,  618 

Stahl,  F.  J.,  468 

Starcke,  C.  N.,  593  note 

State,  the,  early  theories  of,  39-4S  ; 
Hobbes  on,  76-79  ;  Spinoza  on, 
141  ;  Locke  on,  179-180;  Montes- 
quieu on,  243-244  ;  Rousseau's 
theory  of,  261-262  ;  Kant's  view 
of,  397-398  ;  Fichte  on,  438-439  ; 
Schelling  on,  455  ;  Hegel  on,  499, 
501;  Spencer  on,  575,  576,  579. 
See  also  Social  Contract 

Staudinger,  F.,  331,  618 


IXBEX. 


653 


Steckelmacher,  M.,331 

Steffens,  H.(  447,  453,  459,  468-460, 

534 

Steffensen,   K.,  597 

Steinbart,  303 

Stein,  H.  von,  17,  62g 

Stein,  L.,  in  note,  117  note  *,  269 
note  *,  629 

Steinthal,  H.,  536,  623 

Stephen,  Leslie,  1S4  note  f,  5S0 

Stern,  A.,  331 

Stewart,  Dugald,  213,  239 

Stirling,  J.  H.,  331,  4SS  note,  580 

Stirner,  Max  (pseudonym,  cf.  K. 
Schmidt),  596 

Staeckl,  A.,  16,  600  note 

Stühr,  A.,  331 

Stout,  G.  F.,  525  note,  580 

Strauss,  D.  F.,  304  note,  546  note  \, 
588,  589,  590-592 

Strümpell,  L.,  536,  629 

Stumpf,  C,  331,  626 

Stumpf,  T.,  39  note  f 

Sturm,  Christoph,  293 

Stutzmann,  468 

Suabedissen,  468,  471 

Suarez,   Francis,  11S 

Substance,  Descartes  on,  94-95,  10S 
seq.;  Spinoza  on,  123^.;  Locke 
on,  1Ö3  seq. ;  Berkeley  on  (mate- 
rial), 215,  217  ;  Hume's  skeptical 
analysis  of,  226-227  \  Leibnitz's 
doctrine  of,  269  seq. ;  Kant  on, 
357.  364-365  ;  Schopenhauer  on, 
539  ;  Hartmann  on,  611 

Sufficient  Reason,  the  Principle  of, 
in  Leibnitz,  277  seq.;  in  Schopen- 
hauer, 539 

Sully,  James,  538  note,  573,  580,610 
note,  621  note  * 

Sulzer,  303 

Susemihl,  629 

Suso,  51 

Taine,  H.,  563,  566  note 
Tappan,  H.  P.,  581 
Taubert,  A.,  610  note 
Tauler,  51 


Taurellus,    30-32 

Taute,  532 

Teichmüller,  601,  629 

Teleological  Argument,  the,  in 
Boyle,  62  ;  Hume  on,  230  ;  Rei- 
marus  on,  304;  Leibnitz  on,  2S9; 
Kant  on,  379  ;  Herbart  on,  531 

Teleology,  minimized  by  modern 
thought,  8  ;  rejected  by  modern 
physics,  56-57  ;  in  Boyle,  62  ; 
Bacon  on,  68;  Hobbes's  denial  of, 
73  ;  Descartes  on,  100  ;  Spinoza's 
denial  of,  124,  132  ;  Newton  on, 
1S2  ;  Leibnitz  on,  27S  ,  Kant  on, 
382,  409  seq.;  in  Fichte,  434; 
Schelling  on,  451-454,  in  Hegel, 
4S9-490  ;  in  Trendelenburg,  601  ; 
in  Hartmann,  611.  See  also 
Mechanism,  Naturalism,  Sufficient 
Reason,  Teleological  Argument 

Telesius,  33-34,  35,  36 

Temple,  Sir  William,  63 

Testa,  550 

Tetens.J.  N.,  249,  303,  336 

Thaulow,  589 

Theology,  relation  of,  to  philosophy 
in  TaurcIlus,3i-32,  in  Campanella, 
37;  and  science  in  Bacon,  71;  in 
Leibnitz,  2S7  seq. ;  Lessing's  specu- 
lative, 305  seq. ;  Kant's  view  of, 
378  seq.,  393  seq. ;  Schelling  on, 
460  ;  Schleiermacher's  view  of, 
483  ;  Comte  on  the  theological 
stage  of  thought,  553  seq.  \  Strauss 
on,  591-592 ;  Feuerbach  on,  594- 
595.  See  also  Deism,  Faith,  Faith 
and  Reason,  God,  Religion 

Thiele,    G.,  331 

Things  in  themselves,  in  Kant's 
critics  and  immediate  successors, 
415-417;  in  Fichte,  424  seq.;  Lieb- 
mann on,  615.  See  also  Phenom- 
ena, Noumena 

Thomasä  Kempis,  51 

Thilo,  16,    536 

Thomasius,  Christian,  294,    296,  3112 

Thomasius,  Jacob  (Father  ol  Chris- 
tian), 267 


Oj4 


INDEX. 


Thomson,  W.,  579 

Thorild,  T.,  5S3 

Thümmig,  300 

Tieck,  422 

Tiedemann,  303 

Tillotson,  J.,  189 

Time,  Kant  on  objective  determina- 
tions of,  362  seq.  See  also  Space 
and  Time 

Tindal,  Matthew,  187,  190-191 

Toland,  John,  181,  187-1S9 

Tönnies,  F.,  73  note  f,  627 

Torrey,  H.  A.  P.,  89  note 

Toscanelli,  25  note  * 

Tracy,  Destutt  de,  259-260,  562 

Trahndorff,  600  note  * 

Transcendental  and  Transcendent, 
meaning  of,  in  Kant,  339-340 

Trendelenburg,  A.,  17,  331,  ^24 
note,  600-601,  629 

Treschow,  N.,  584 

Tschirnhausen,  295-296 

Turgot,  242,  25S 

Twardowski,  K.,  88  note 

Ueberhorst,  331 

Ueberweg,  F.,  15,  214  note,  513, 
564  note,  579  note,  587  note 

Uebinger,  J.,  19  note 

Ulrici,  H.,  515,  598 

Unconditioned,  the,  in  Kant,  371 
seq.,  408;  in  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton, 
564,  570,  571;  in  Mansel,  570,  571; 
in  Spencer,  569  seq.  See  also  the 
Absolute 

Unconscious,  the,  Hartmann's  phi- 
losophy of,  611  seq. 

Uphues,  G.  K.,  626 

Vacherot,  E.,  583 

Vaihinger,    H.,   323   note,   330,   331, 

332  note,  610  note 
Valla,  L.,  29,  291 
Vanini,  34 
Vatke,  W.,  5S9,  62S 
Veitch,  J.,  89  note,  564  and  note  f 
Venetianer,  M.,  610  note 
Venn,  J.,  579 


Vera,  552 

Vico,  54S-549.  552 

Villers,  331 

Virchow,  R.,  622  note 

Vischer,  F.  T. ,  589 

Vives,  29 

Vloten,  J.  van,  117 

Voeiius,  87 

Vogel,  17 

Vogt,  Karl,  599 

Volkelt,  J.,  works  by,  120,  516  note, 

590,    610    note,  611  note;  position 

of,  590,  617,  624 
Volkmann  von  Volkmar,  536 
Volney  (Chassebceuf),  258-259 
Voltaire,  241,   242,  243  note*,  244- 

245.  253 
Vorländer,  F.,  16,  486 

Waddington,  30  note* 

Wagner,  J.  J.,  46S,  470 

Wagner,  Richard,  546 

Wagner,  Rudolph,  599 

Waitz,  Theodor,  536,  629 

Wallace,  A.  R.,  621  note* 

Wallace,  William,  332,  4S8  note,  538 

note,  5S1 
Wallaschck,  R.,  627 
Walter,  J.,  331,  629 
Warburton,  W.,  193 
Ward,  J.,  5S0,  605  note 
Watson,  John,  332,  466  note  %,  582 
Weber,  E.    H.,  603 
Weber,  Theodor,  331,  600 
Weigel,  E.,  267 
Weigel,  Valentin,  52-53 
Weiss,  Bruno,  477  note 
Weisse,  C.  H.,  17,  332,  597,  605 
Weissenborn,  5S9 
Werner,    K.,    11S   note  f,   548    note, 

549  note 
Weston,  S.  Burns,  582 
Weygoldt,  610  note 
Whately,  Richard,  579 
Whedon,  D.  D.,  5S1 
Whewell,  W. ,  564,  579 
Whiston,  W.,  190  note 
Wildauer,  T.,  629 


INDEX. 


^55 


Willmann,  O.,  517 

Windelband,  W.,  15-16,  331,  332, 
587,  623,  629 

Winkler,  B.,  47 

Witte,  J.  H.,  306  note,  331,  416,  627 

Wohlrabe,  331 

Wolff,  Christian,  3i,  293  note  *,  301, 
304,  516;  system  of,  296-299;  and 
Kant,  323,  332  note,  336,  374,  401 

Wollaston,  William,  195,  198-199 

Woplston,  T.,  190  note 

Wundt,  W.,  622,  624,  626 

Wyck,  Van  der,  586 

Wyttenbach,  D.,  585 


Zabarella,  30 

Zart,  G.,  302  note  * 

Zeising,  A.,  627 

Zeiler,  E.,  150,  389  note  f,  542; 
works  of,  16,  17,  113  note  f,  251 
note  *,     331  ;     position     of,     589, 

615 
Ziegler,  T.,  627,  629 
Ziller,  T.,  536 
Zimmer,  F.,  424  note 
Zimmermann,  R.,  17,    19  note,    331, 

536,  629 
Zimmern,  Helen,  53S  note 
Zöllner,  622  note  * 


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